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IN THIS ISSUE

Chauncy D. Harris, author of the article on "Suburbs," is assistant professor of geography at the University of Chicago. He has recently been connected with the University of Nebraska and the Department of State. He has published a number of articles on urban and industrial problems of Europe and North America in various geographical journals.

The late Ralph Danhof, author of "The Accommodation and Integration of Conflicting Cultures in a Newly Established Community," wrote a study of the social organization of newly established planned communities as a doctoral dissertation. He was a collaborator in the Division of Program Planning of the Agricultural Adjustment Administration and later a social science analyst for the Bureau of Agricultural Economics. He died February 24, 1942, following an illness of almost a year.

Three years of participant observation in an Italian slum community have provided material for many articles by William F. Whyte, of which "A Slum Sex Code," appearing in this issue, is only one. "Corner Boys: A Study of Clique Behavior" appeared in the *American Journal of Sociology* in March, 1941. "Social Organization in the Slums" appeared in the *American Sociological Review* in February of this year. *Street Corner Society* will appear as a Sociology Book Club book this fall.

"The Paranoid Pseudo-community" describes some of the sociological and psychological implications of paranoia. The author, Dr. Norman Cameron, is chairman of the department of psychology at the University of Wisconsin. He has written on schizophrenic thinking, problem-solving, and language. He will have a section on "The Functional Psy-

To be published this fall

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University of California

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ARNA BONTEMPS, in a review in the *New York Herald Tribune*, says: "*Negroes in Brazil* is the result of long study and a complete familiarity with the country and the people . . . he selected the seaport city of Bahia. Here in microcosm, he examined the whole scope of race contact in a city about the size of Seattle or Indianapolis, located in a state that has been called the 'Virginia' of Brazil."

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
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choses" in *Personality and the Behavior Disorders*, edited by J. McV. Hunt of Brown University.

Jerome S. Bruner, who uses the interview method for information on "How Much Post-war Migration?" is associate director of Princeton University's Office of Public Opinion Research and managing editor of the *Public Opinion Quarterly*. During 1941 and 1942 Dr. Bruner was connected with the Foreign Broadcast Intelligence Service and the Office of War Information in Washington, working on propaganda analysis and the measurement of public opinion. He received his doctorate in psychology from Harvard in 1941.

Frank Knight and Robert MacIver participate in an exchange of views on causation in social science occasioned by the publication of Professor MacIver's book, *Social Causation*. Professor MacIver is head of the department of sociology at Columbia University. Frank Knight is professor of social science at the University of Chicago.

E. L. Thorndike and Ella Woodyard's "The Relation between the Aesthetic Status of a Community and Its Status in Other Respects" is another in the series of statistical studies of the quality and the appraisal of life in 310 American cities of which *Your City* (1939) was the summary. Professor Thorndike is one of America's leading psychologists. Articles by Professor Thorndike which have appeared in the *American Journal of Sociology* are "The Relation between Intellect and Morality in Rulers," in November, 1936, and "The Influence of Disparity of Incomes on Welfare," in July, 1938. "Individual Differences in American Cities: Their Nature and Causation," by Professor Thorndike and Miss Woodyard, appeared in the September, 1937, issue.



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SUBURBS

CHAUNCY D. HARRIS

ABSTRACT

The suburbs of the 140 metropolitan districts defined by the Sixteenth Census are analyzed in this paper. These suburbs have a population of 22,369,432, or 35.5 per cent of the population of the districts and 17.0 per cent of the population of the entire country. In 10 metropolitan districts more than 60 per cent of the people live in suburbs. The extent of development of suburbs varies according to functional type and size of city, location with respect to a climax area, and location with respect to rivers and associated state boundaries. Of the 552 individual suburbs of more than 10,000 population classified in this paper, 174 are residential and 149 industrial. Generalized suburb types including the whole suburban area of each district have also been evolved. These suburb types, indicated by letters are: A, industrial fringe; B, industrial; C, complex; D, dormitory; and E, mining and industry. Although suburban development has been closely associated with industry, industrial suburbs stagnated during the last decade, whereas residential suburbs showed rapid growth.

The strong suburban trend in American cities calls for a study of suburban types and trends.¹ In view of the need for studies of cities with their suburbs, the Bureau of the Census has recognized some sort of metropolitan district since 1910.² The Sixteenth Census provides

data on 140 metropolitan districts. Each contains at least one city of more than 50,000 population and includes contiguous minor civil divisions with a density of population of 150 or more per square

Suburbs, pp. 62-71. In this census 29 metropolitan districts are recognized; each contained a city of more than 200,000.

¹ See Louis Wirth, "Urban Communities," *American Journal of Sociology*, XLVII (May, 1942), 829-40, especially pp. 833-35; and Anonymous, "The Growth of City Suburbs," *Federal Home Loan Bank Review*, VII (August, 1941), 373-75, 387.

² U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Thirteenth Census of the United States, 1910*, Vol. I: *Population, 1910, General Report and Analysis* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1911), "Cities and Their Suburbs," pp. 73-77. In this census 25 metropolitan districts were recognized; each contained a city of more than 200,000 population.

Idem, *Fourteenth Census of the United States, 1920*, Vol. I: *Population, 1920, Number and Distribution of Inhabitants* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1921), "Cities and Their

Idem, *Fifteenth Census of the United States, 1930, Metropolitan Districts, Population and Area* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1932). This census defined 96 metropolitan districts, each of which had a population of more than 100,000. Significant studies based largely on this census include R. D. McKenzie, *The Metropolitan Community* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1933), especially pp. 39-49, and U.S. National Resources Committee, *Our Cities, Their Role in the National Economy* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1937).

Population figures for metropolitan districts and their suburbs for 1940 as used in this paper have been taken from U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Sixteenth Census of the United States, 1940*, Press Re-

mile. Mere density is only a moderately good indicator of the limits of cities, but the figures on metropolitan districts have the great virtue of uniformity. The following study includes only those areas which lie within metropolitan districts but outside the chief cities.

POPULATION IN SUBURBS

The suburbs of the 140 metropolitan districts have a population of 22,369,432, which is 35.5 per cent of the population of these urban units and 17.0 per cent of the population of the entire country.³ Of the 1,077 urban units in the United States

leases, Ser. PH-1, Nos. 1-140, and Summary (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Bureau of the Census, various dates between February 13, 1941, and June 11, 1941). The same figures are found in *ibid.*, *Population, First Series, Number of Inhabitants, United States Summary* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1941), pp. 71-75. Detailed figures on each district are contained in the bulletins issued for each state. It is planned also to have a Vol. VIII, *Metropolitan Districts*.

³ Large cities which are clearly subordinate to the main city either in terms of size or trade relationships are grouped with suburbs in this study, even though they are considered part of the "central cities" by the census. Without these changes the suburbs would have a population of 20,169,603, or 32.0 per cent of the population of the metropolitan districts.

Fifteen of the 23 metropolitan districts with more than one central city have been altered. The following "central cities" are grouped with suburbs: Elizabeth, Jersey City, Newark, and Paterson (New York); Oakland (San Francisco); Niagara Falls (Buffalo); Kansas City, Kan. (Kansas City, Mo.); New Britain (Hartford); Schenectady and Troy (Albany); Holyoke (Springfield, Mass.); Haverhill (Lowell-Lawrence); Bethlehem and Easton (Allentown); Portsmouth and Newport News (Norfolk); Council Bluffs, Iowa (Omaha, Neb.); Rome (Utica); Rock Island and Moline, Ill. (Davenport, Iowa); Ashland, Ky. (Huntington, W.Va.); and Superior, Wis. (Duluth, Minn.).

The 9 metropolitan districts in which two central cities are recognized as either co-ordinate or relatively independent are: Beaumont-Port Arthur, Fall River-New Bedford, Hamilton-Middletown, Lowell-Lawrence, Minneapolis-St. Paul, Racine-Kenosha, Saginaw-Bay City, Scranton-Wilkes-Barre, and Tampa-St. Petersburg. (Lowell-Lawrence falls in both groups.)

with more than 10,000 population in 1940, slightly more than one-third (383) were suburbs in metropolitan districts.⁴ In 10 metropolitan districts more than 60 per cent of the total population live outside the political boundaries of the chief city. Of this group, Boston and Pittsburgh are particularly striking in having more than a million people in suburbs. Other cities are Providence, Springfield (Massachusetts), Hartford, Albany, Scranton, Allentown, Wheeling, and Davenport. On the other hand, there are 9 cities with less than 10 per cent of their population in suburbs, but most of these have fewer than 100,000 inhabitants; the only large city of this group is New Orleans.

The extent of development of suburbs in metropolitan districts varies according to location with respect to a climax area; according to location with respect to rivers, bays, and associated state boundaries, to functional type of cities, and to size of cities.

The principal factor in amount of suburbanization appears to be location with respect to a small area, hereafter called simply the "climax area," which covers only the eastern part of the Manufacturing Belt and includes southern New England, the middle Atlantic states, and the industrial area near the Appalachian coal fields (Fig. 1). Within the climax area are 9 of the 10 metropolitan districts with more than 60 per cent of

⁴ Of this number, 317 were incorporated and 66 were unincorporated but defined as urban under a special rule of the United States Census. The 352 suburbs classified in the Appendix include the suburbs with more than 10,000 population in 1930. Together with 5 unincorporated suburbs not classified for lack of sufficient data and 153 in central cities (130 single central cities, 18 centers in 9 double districts, and the 5 boroughs of New York City) they make up the 510 urban units within metropolitan districts for which employment data were available in the 1935 censuses of trade and manufactures.

their population in suburbs and 15 of 18 with more than 50 per cent. The 31 metropolitan districts in this area average 49.2 per cent of their population in suburbs, compared to 23.9 per cent for

this area 48 per cent of the metropolitan districts have more than half of their population in suburbs, compared to but 3 per cent of the districts in the rest of the country. Tables 1 and 2 show that in




FIG. 1.—Percentage of population in each metropolitan district living in suburbs. The line incloses the climax area.

the other 109 districts in the United States (Table 1). Stated another way, in

TABLE 1

PERCENTAGE OF PCPULATION OUTSIDE CENTRAL CITY IN METROPOLITAN DISTRICTS BY SIZE GROUPS IN CLIMAX AREA AND IN REST OF COUNTRY*

Size Group	Climax Area	Rest of United States
1,000,000 or more.....	50.8	34.7
500,000-1,000,000.....	65.1	26.6
300,000- 500,000.....	55.2	24.1
200,000- 300,000.....	33.2	21.6
150,000- 200,000.....	51.0	28.4
100,000- 150,000.....	42.2	24.4
50,000- 100,000.....	38.8	19.4
All sizes.....	49.2	23.9

* Each metropolitan district is given equal weight.

this area all functional types and all sizes of cities are well above the national average in percentage of population in suburbs.

The sharp localization of the climax area appears to be related to two factors. (1) In the East, extensive urbanization and a high density of population associated with manufacturing have been superimposed on an older pattern of small towns and townships. Although engulfed by the spread of population from the larger centers, these small units have maintained their political independence. Urban growth has not been conspicuous in the part of the East that lies outside the climax area. (2) In the western part of the climax area the high de-

gree of suburbanization appears related rather to the nature of the steel and coal-mining industries, which have fostered the development of suburbs in western Pennsylvania, eastern Ohio, and West Virginia. Except locally, other types of industry have not given rise to marked

political division thus results from the dual function of rivers as political boundaries and as once-important highways of commerce along which large cities became aligned. State boundaries associated with the Mississippi River and its tributaries form the basis for the political separation of suburbs in the midwestern cities of Wheeling, Huntington, Cincinnati, Louisville, Davenport, Omaha, Kansas City, and St. Louis. (See the Appendix for the names of the larger suburbs.) Other examples are New York, Philadelphia, and Columbus, Georgia. Bays and associated rivers (but without state boundaries) have been important in Boston, Norfolk, and San Francisco.

Among the various functional types of cities recorded in Figure 2, manufacturing cities show the greatest development of suburbs, averaging 34.4 per cent of their population in suburbs.⁵ This type of city shows above-average suburban development in all regions except the climax area and in all size groups except the largest (Tables 2 and 3). In the climax area, however, 24 of the 31 cities have been classified as manufacturing, and the suburban development in the others is due almost exclusively to industry. Manufacturing centers include most of the metropolitan districts already mentioned as having more than 60 per cent of their population in suburbs. Other industrial centers with important suburbs in the climax area are Lowell-Lawrence, New Haven, Binghamton, Youngstown, Canton, and Huntington. Examples from the less-suburbanized Midwest are Peoria, South Bend, Cincinnati, and Louisville. The mining dis-

⁵ For a list of cities in each category and a discussion of the criteria of classification see Chauncy D. Harris, "A Functional Classification of Cities in the United States," *Geographical Review*, XXXIII (January, 1943), 86-99.

TABLE 2
PERCENTAGE OF POPULATION OUTSIDE CENTRAL CITY IN METROPOLITAN DISTRICTS BY REGION AND FUNCTIONAL TYPE*

FUNCTIONAL TYPE	REGION				TOTAL†
	Climax Area	Midwest†	South	West	
Manufacturing (M)	48.1	25.7	26.6	31.0	34.4
Diversified (D)	51.7	20.7	22.9	28.9	24.9
Political (P)	57.2	15.3	25.2	33.4	27.2
Transportation (T)	29.7	35.8	26.2	27.8
Wholesaling (W)	14.2	16.6	29.2	20.8
Retailing (R)	9.7	14.8	23.4	19.3
Resort (X)	32.0	33.5	33.4
Mining (S)	64.0	64.0
Av.	49.2	22.4	23.5	30.1	29.5

* Each metropolitan district is given equal weight, regardless of size.

† Excluding 7 cities in the climax area.

‡ Including cities in the East not in the climax area.

suburbanization in other parts of the Manufacturing Belt in the Midwest.

Location with respect to rivers, bays, and state boundaries is important in the suburban development of a number of cities. San Francisco, Davenport, and Norfolk, the only three cities outside the climax area having more than 50 per cent of their population in suburbs, fall into this group.

Six metropolitan districts include parts of three states; all lie on rivers which form state boundaries. Twenty-two metropolitan districts include portions of two states; all except 6 of these districts lie on rivers forming state boundaries. Suburbanization due to

trict of Scranton-Wilkes-Barre includes scores of suburban mining boroughs.

Resort cities show above-average suburban development. In the South and West, where such cities are most numerous, they have a higher proportion of

population in suburbs than any other type.

Diversified, political, and transportation cities as groups show moderate suburban development. Some political centers, such as Albany, Harrisburg, and




FIG. 2.—Functional types of cities (*M*, industrial; *D*, diversified; *P*, political; *T*, transportation; *W*, wholesaling; *R*, retail; *X*, resort; and *S*, mining).

TABLE 3
PERCENTAGE OF POPULATION OUTSIDE CENTRAL CITY IN METROPOLITAN DISTRICTS
BY FUNCTIONAL TYPE AND SIZE GROUP*

SIZE GROUP	FUNCTIONAL TYPE								ALL TYPES
	M	D	P	T	W	R	X	S	
1,000,000 or more.....	39.2	35.7	55.3	40.6
500,000-1,000,000.....	46.4	25.4	27.0	8.4	64.0	37.1
300,000-500,000.....	41.2	26.5	43.0	55.4	17.7	38.0
200,000-300,000.....	28.2	16.9	20.1	18.8	26.0	24.5
150,000-200,000.....	40.5	32.7	23.6	24.6	36.7
100,000-150,000.....	29.1	14.3	31.6	32.4	12.9	41.2	27.5
50,000-100,000.....	21.8	16.8	18.0	21.9	13.8	22.8	32.8	20.0
All sizes.....	34.4	24.9	27.2	27.8	20.8	19.3	33.4	64.0	29.5

* Each metropolitan district is given equal weight.

Charleston, have strong suburban development associated with industry. Similarly, the diversified cities of New York, Boston, and Chicago have many industrial suburbs.

Wholesale and retail centers show the weakest suburban development of any functional types. Trading centers as a group have few suburbs.

In general, the larger cities exhibit stronger suburban development than the smaller cities, but the relationship is rather irregular (Tables 1 and 3).

FUNCTIONAL TYPES OF INDIVIDUAL SUBURBS

Suburbs are highly differentiated segments showing much greater specialization in function than characterizes the urban unit as a whole. The commonest types of individual suburbs are housing or dormitory suburbs (H) and manufacturing or industrial suburbs (M).⁶ Of the 352 suburbs which have been classified in the Appendix, 174 are dominantly residential, 149 dominantly industrial, and only 29 fall into other categories (3 assembly wholesaling, 4 retailing, 10 di-

versified, 1 government, and 11 mining). Retailing and distribution wholesaling are seldom of more than local importance in suburbs; such functions cling tenaciously to the central city. Several diversified suburbs, although subordinate to the central city, serve as trade centers for lesser suburbs in addition to having moderate industrial development: Hammond (Chicago), Oakland (San Francisco), and East St. Louis (St. Louis).

Some residential suburbs contain remarkable concentrations of professional or clerical workers who commute to the central city. This concentration can be measured by occupation figures which record occupations by place of residence rather than by place of work. Of the 19 cities in the United States which had the highest percentage of their gainfully occupied workers in professional occupations, 16 were suburbs in metropolitan districts.⁷ Similarly, of the 21 cities with the highest percentage of the gainfully occupied in clerical occupations, 18 were suburbs.⁸ Transportation workers show

⁶ The types of individual suburbs designated by the letters H and M discussed in this section and again referred to in Table 4 and in the Appendix are not represented on the maps. The symbol M on Fig. 2 should therefore not be confused with suburb type M. For the study of residential areas a valuable source with suggestive techniques, useful maps, and extensive references is Federal Housing Administration, *The Structure and Growth of Residential Neighborhoods in American Cities* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1939). An excellent study of a suburban area is Robert C. Klove, *The Park Ridge-Barrington Area, a Study of Residential Land Patterns and Problems in Suburban Chicago* (Chicago: Private edition, distributed by the University of Chicago Libraries, 1940). Examples of planned suburbs of various types are given in Arthur S. Comey and Max S. Wehrly, "Planned Communities," Part I in *Land Planning and Land Policies*, Vol. II of *Supplementary Report of the Urbanism Committee to the National Resources Committee* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1939), especially pp. 51-55, 67, 83-92, and 101-9.

⁷ In Berkeley (San Francisco), Glendale, Pasadena, and Santa Monica (Los Angeles), Evanston and Oak Park (Chicago), Cleveland Heights, East Cleveland, and Lakewood (Cleveland), Wilkinsburg (Pittsburgh), Lower Merion Township (Philadelphia), East Orange, Montclair, and White Plains (New York), and Brookline town and Newton (Boston) more than 14 per cent of the gainfully occupied were in professional occupations in 1930. (Calculated from U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Fifteenth Census of the United States, 1930, Population*, Vol. IV: *Occupations by States*, Tables 3 and 5. Figures were available for cities of more than 25,000 population only. Detailed occupation figures for 1940 are available for metropolitan districts as units and for all cities of more than 10,000 population in *Sixteenth Census of the United States, 1940, Population, Second Series, Characteristics of the Population* [Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1942] [bulletin for each state], Tables 33, 42, and 51.)

⁸ In Alameda (San Francisco), Oak Park, Berwyn, Cicero, and Maywood (Chicago), Norwood (Cincinnati), East Cleveland and Lakewood (Cleveland), Wilkinsburg (Pittsburgh), Upper Darby Township (Philadelphia), Jersey City, East Orange, Kearny, Bloomfield, and Irvington (New York),

a high degree of concentration in 3 suburbs.⁹

There are three good measures of intensity of industrialization in industrial suburbs. The Appendix lists the principal suburbs indicated by each index. One measure is the percentage of the total gainful workers who are engaged in manufacturing and mechanical occupations. Of the 16 cities in the United States with the highest percentages, 13 are suburbs and 3 are co-ordinate members of central cities. Particularly notable are Hamtramck (Detroit), with 74 per cent; Garfield (New York) and Aliquippa (Pittsburgh), with 72 per cent; and Central Falls (Providence), with 71 per cent. Occupation figures are by place of residence and do not necessarily indicate a large industrial employment within the suburb.

A second and closely related measure of industrialization is the percentage which industrial employment forms of the total employment in industry and trade.¹⁰ A high percentage indicates that a suburb leans heavily on other suburbs for trade, since a relatively insignificant number of people work in stores within the suburb. (Employment figures are recorded by place of work.) Unusually high percentages in industry are found in Dearborn (Detroit), Campbell (Youngstown), and Munhall (Pittsburgh), with

98 per cent, and Ecorse (Detroit) and Lodi and Harrison Township (New York), with 96 per cent.

A third measure of industrialization is the ratio of employment within a suburb to the population of the suburb. A high ratio indicates a strong daily movement of people who work here but who live in other suburbs or in the central city. The outstanding example of such a suburb is Dearborn (Detroit), in which 70,635 people were employed in 1935, although the entire population of the city was only 63,584 in 1940. Other suburban units with unusually high ratios are Hamtramck and Highland Park (Detroit) and Johnson City and Endicott (Binghamton). Also worthy of mention are East Chicago (Chicago), Lawrence (Lowell-Lawrence), and Passaic (New York). Such suburbs are similar to city cores such as the Loop in Chicago or Manhattan in New York City in being the focal points of commuting; they differ, however, in the relative dominance of industrial employment.

GENERALIZED SUBURB TYPES

The study and classification of individual suburbs is a fascinating business; but, in order to facilitate generalizations, all suburbs in each metropolitan district have been grouped and treated as a unit. On this basis the suburbs have been classified into six types.¹¹ The clas-

and Somerville, Arlington town, and Medford (Boston) more than 18 per cent of the gainfully occupied were in clerical occupations in 1930. The three cities not suburbs are Washington, D.C., Hartford, and Topeka.

⁹ Council Bluffs (Omaha), Covington (Cincinnati), and Superior (Duluth).

¹⁰ Figures are calculated from figures of the 1935 *Biennial Census of Manufactures* and the 1935 *Census of Trade* as assembled in U.S. Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce, *Consumer Market Data Handbook*, 1939 edition, "Domestic Commerce Series," No. 102 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1939), lines 18, 20, and 22 for each city.

¹¹ The various types have been recognized and separated by a rather complex set of statistical criteria. With a few exceptions the principal types may be recognized, however, by rather simple indices. A-type suburbs are found only in metropolitan districts in which the central city is relatively dominant, having over 75 per cent of the population. The ratio of people employed in industry and trade in the suburbs to the population in the suburbs is at least .12 and exceeds the ratio for the central city by at least .02. In B-type suburbs the central city is relatively less dominant, and the ratio of people employed in the suburbs is sometimes higher and sometimes lower than in the central city, but the ratio employed in industry alone is considerably

sification includes only 104 metropolitan districts with more than 100,000 population. Statistics are not definitive for 4 districts of this size or for the 32 smaller metropolitan districts with populations between 50,000 and 100,000. Figure 3 shows the distribution of these suburb types.

strictions; others, to find large blocks of cheap land; and yet others, to be away from the city because of their own fire hazards, odors, or other nuisances. Sometimes the city line has even been redrawn to exclude large industrial properties from the city tax base. A-type suburbs are most numerous among smaller metro-




FIG. 3.—Suburb types (A, industrial fringe; B, industrial; C-1, complex with industrial more important; C-2, complex with residential more important; D, dormitory; E, mining and industrial).

Industrial fringe suburbs, designated by the letter "A," are those in which there are many factories but relatively few people. Commuting is not from suburbs to city but from city to suburbs to work in factories located outside the political limits of the city. Some factories are so located to avoid taxes or legal re-

higher. In C-type suburbs the ratio employed in industry and trade in the suburbs is considerably less than in the central city, but the ratio employed in industry alone may be either more or less. In C-1 suburbs the ratio in industry in the suburbs is at least .08, and in C-2 suburbs .04-.08. In D-type suburbs the figure is usually considerably below .04. In E-type suburbs the employment in both mining and industry is high.

politan districts in the South, where several cities have large oil refineries or other factories just outside city limits. Wichita, Tulsa, and Oklahoma City are examples. New Orleans is the largest city of this group. Fort Wayne is the best example within the Manufacturing Belt.

B-type suburbs are industrial suburbs containing not only factories but also a large porportion of the people who work in them.⁶ These suburbs lean heavily on the central city for wholesale and retail trade and professional services. B-type suburbs are found in the Manufacturing Belt, particularly in the climax area, which alone accounts for 11 of the 17

cities with this type of suburbs. Reading, Allentown, Binghamton, Utica, Albany, Springfield (Massachusetts), and Providence are outstanding examples in the climax area. Davenport is the leading example outside this area.

D-type suburbs are dormitory or residential suburbs. Industries in them are relatively insignificant, and such retail trade as is carried on is merely to serve the people who live there. D-type suburbs are well distributed except in the climax area, where they are overwhelmed by industrial suburbs. In resort and political centers this is the most common type. Although dormitory suburbs characterize the large cities of Los Angeles, Washington, and Cleveland, such suburbs are more common among smaller cities, such as the political centers of Austin, Lansing, and Des Moines; among resorts, such as Phoenix, San Diego, and Miami; among industrial centers, such as Winston-Salem, Evansville, and Flint; and among other types, such as Portland (Maine), Jacksonville, Omaha, and San Antonio. It is probable that most of the metropolitan districts with populations between 50,000 and 100,000—not here classified for lack of data—would fall into this group.

Many cities have a complex group of suburbs among which both industrial and residential suburbs are important. Suburbs in such cities have been classified as C-type. "C-1" is used to designate urban areas in which industrial suburbs appear to be the more important, and "C-2" those in which dormitory suburbs predominate. C-1-type suburbs are most common among manufacturing cities on the southern and western edges of the Manufacturing Belt. It is the suburb type of the great centers of Boston, New York, Philadelphia, and Chicago, 4 of the five largest cities of the nation. C-2-

type suburbs, the most numerous type, are well distributed both regionally and among different functional types of cities. Cincinnati, St. Louis, San Francisco, and Columbus are examples from industrial diversified, wholesaling, and political centers. Both complex types are proportionately more common among large than among small centers.

A mixture of coal-mining and manufacturing suburbs has been designated by the letter "E." E-type suburbs are best represented in the anthracite region of eastern Pennsylvania (Scranton-Wilkes-Barre) but are also found in the Appalachian bituminous field (Johnstown, Pittsburgh, Wheeling, and Charleston) and in its southern extension (Birmingham).

The percentage of the population in suburbs shows close correlation with suburb types. The percentage ranges from 56.6 per cent for E suburbs (mining and industry) through 50.3 per cent for industrial suburbs (B), 35.5 per cent for C-1 suburbs, 28.5 per cent for C-2 suburbs to 25.1 per cent for D suburbs; thus, with decreasing relative importance of the industrial function there is a decreasing percentage of total population in suburbs. The relationship holds reasonably well for all regions and for all functional types of cities. The most significant single group is the B-type suburbs in the East, which average 57.5 per cent of the population of their metropolitan districts.

THE SUBURBAN TREND

The decade 1930-40 was one of marked suburbanization. If each metropolitan district is given equal weight regardless of size, the average increase of population in suburbs was 29.7 per cent, compared to only 6.5 per cent for the central cities. It is notable that, whereas the total population of the United States increased 7.2

per cent, the total urban population 7.9 per cent, and the population in 133 metropolitan districts 8.2 per cent, the total population in central cities increased by only 5.0 per cent but that in suburbs by 15.8 per cent.¹² Rapid increases in population in suburbs characterized all sections of the country, all functional types

larger cities.¹³ The percentage increase in population in suburbs varied directly with the general rate of increase of the district and inversely with the percentage of population of the district living in suburbs.

Although suburban development has been closely associated with industry, the

TABLE 4
AVERAGE PERCENTAGE INCREASE IN POPULATION, 1930-40, FOR SELECTED
METROPOLITAN DISTRICTS AND THEIR SUBURBS

METROPOLITAN DISTRICT	WHOLE DISTRICT	CENTRAL CITY	OUTSIDE CENTRAL CITY	SUBURBS OVER 10,000 POPULATION*		
				All	Industrial (M)	Residential (H)
New York.....	7.2	7.6	6.7	7.4	- 0.6	11.6
Chicago.....	3.1	0.6	11.5	5.1	- 0.2	7.7
Los Angeles.....	25.3	21.5	29.6	25.0	28.9
Philadelphia.....	1.8	- 1.0	7.9	7.2	0.4	11.8
Boston.....	1.8	- 1.3	3.5	4.5	- 0.6	7.5
Detroit.....	9.1	3.5	25.4	7.0	4.2	9.8
Pittsburgh.....	2.1	0.3	3.0	1.7	3.3	- 2.0
San Francisco.....	10.7	0.0	20.8	20.6	17.7	21.1
St. Louis.....	5.8	- 0.7	17.0	5.1	- 0.5	13.8
Milwaukee.....	6.3	1.6	22.8	10.6	5.0	21.8
Providence.....	3.0	0.2	4.6	4.8	0.3	12.0
United States†.....	10.8	6.5	29.7	6.6	1.7	11.7
United States-†.....	8.2	5.0	15.8

* Each suburb is given equal weight. For list of suburbs included under each classification in each district see Appendix.

† Each metropolitan district is given equal weight (percentage increases for each district are added and this total is divided by the number of districts).

‡ Cities weighted by size (total numerical increase is divided by the total 1930 population of identical units).

of cities, and all sizes of cities, although in cities of less than 100,000 the suburban trend was relatively weaker than in the

¹² The figures of 9.3 per cent increase in metropolitan districts, 6.1 per cent for the central cities, and 16.9 per cent for areas outside central cities given in the census include in the increases the total 1940 population of the 7 metropolitan districts for which 1930 figures are not available (622,021 total population—445,174 in central cities and 176,847 outside). The only metropolitan districts in which central cities grew more rapidly than suburbs were New York, Scranton-Wilkes-Barre, Allentown, Oklahoma City, Jacksonville, Savannah, Altoona, Lincoln, Cedar Rapids, and Corpus Christi.

chief growth during the last decade was in residential suburbs. Among individual suburbs of more than 10,000 population (which incidentally grew less rapidly than the smaller suburbs and unincorporated areas), those classified as residential averaged 11.7 per cent increase in

¹³ Analysis of rate of increase of population in suburbs failed to reveal significant differences related to size of city (above 100,000), function of city, or regional location, except differences due to correlation of the above with rate of increase of population for whole metropolitan districts or with percentage of the population living in suburbs.

population, compared to 1.7 per cent for those classified as industrial.¹⁴ Table 4 shows that in nearly all large metropolitan districts industrial suburbs either lost population or gained only slightly, whereas residential suburbs showed rapid growth. In the New York metropolitan district the City of New York increased

¹⁴ The metropolitan districts classified as industrial also grew slowly during 1930-40. Their average rate of growth was 6.1 per cent, compared to 10.8 per cent for all metropolitan districts and 34.4 per cent for resorts, 28.2 per cent for retail centers, 16.0 per cent for political centers, 13.2 per cent for transportation centers, 12.1 per cent for wholesaling centers, and 11.8 per cent for diversified cities. See Chauncy D. Harris, "Growth of the Larger Cities in the United States, 1930-1940," *Journal of Geography*, XLI (November, 1942), 313-18.

The slower rate of growth of industrial centers extended back into the 1920 decade. Daniel O. Price ("Factor Analysis in the Study of Metropolitan Centers," *Social Forces*, XX [May, 1942], 450, Table I) found a negative correlation of .2758 between percentage of increase in population 1920-30 and the percentage of the gainfully occupied in nonservice industry in the 93 cities of more than 100,000 population in 1930.

more rapidly than did the suburbs, for, although the new residential suburbs of Long Island grew rapidly, the more numerous and populous industrial suburbs of New Jersey stagnated.

Three factors contributed to the rapid growth of suburbs: (1) increasing use of the automobile, which facilitated commuting to distant but pleasant residential suburbs, many of which had cheaper land and lower tax rates; (2) decreasing size of the family and the consequent increase in number of housing units needed for a given population; and (3) a tendency for changes in some city lines to lag behind the expansion in the built-up areas.¹⁵

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¹⁵ For fuller analyses see Charles C. Colby, "Centrifugal and Centripetal Forces in Urban Geography," *Annals of the Association of American Geographers*, XXIII (1933), 1-20, and Homer Hoyt, "Forces of Urban Centralization and Decentralization," *American Journal of Sociology*, XLVI (May, 1941), 843-52.

APPENDIX

FUNCTIONAL TYPES OF SUBURBS

This list includes the 352 suburbs of more than 10,000 population for which figures were available. Of these, 310 are incorporated, and 42, mostly in Massachusetts, Rhode Island, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania, are unincorporated.

Letter symbols for functional types of suburbs are as follows: M for manufacturing or industrial suburbs; H for housing or dormitory suburbs; D for diversified suburbs having both important trade and manufacturing; R for suburbs in which retail trade appears to be the chief function; W for suburbs in which wholesaling is important.

A letter in parentheses indicates a secondary function. Danvers town (Boston), principally a dormitory suburb but with

large industrial employment also is listed: "H: Danvers (M)."

Since figures refer to political boundaries, a suburb is classified as H if its industrial workers are employed in a factory just across the line in another suburb or in an unincorporated area.

Akron, Ohio.—M: Barberton; H: Cuyahoga Falls

Albany, N.Y.—M: Cohoes, Rensselaer, Schenectady, Troy; H: Watervliet

Allentown, Pa.—M: Bethlehem, Pa., Phillipsburg, N.J.; D: Easton, Pa.

Atlanta, Ga.—H: Decatur

Atlantic City, N.J.—H: Pleasantville

¹ One of 32 industrial suburbs which lean heavily on other suburbs or on the central city for retail trade, as evidenced by the very high percentage which industrial employment forms of the total

Baltimore, Md.—Government: Annapolis
Binghamton, N.Y.—M: Endicott,^{1, 2} Johnson City^{1, 2}

Birmingham, Ala.—M (and mining): Bessemer; H: Fairfield

Boston, Mass.—In Essex Co., M: Beverly, Gloucester, Lynn, Peabody,^{1, 2} Salem; H: Danvers town (M), Saugus town, Swampscott town

In Middlesex Co., M: Cambridge (also university), Everett, Framingham town, Waltham, Watertown town; H: Arlington town, Belmont town, Malden, Medford, Melrose, Matick town, Newton, Somerville, Stoneham town, Wakefield town, Winchester town, Woburn (M)

In Norfolk Co., M: Norwood town, Quincy; H: Braintree town, Brookline town, Dedham town, Milton town, Needham town, Wellesley town, Weymouth town

In Plymouth Co., M: Brockton

In Suffolk Co., M: Chelsea; H: Revere, Wintrop town

Bridgeport, Conn.—M: Shelton¹

Buffalo, N.Y.—M: Lackawanna,¹ Niagara Falls, North Tonawanda, Tonawanda; H: Kenmore

Canton, Ohio.—M: Alliance, Massillon

Chicago, Ill.—M: Chicago Heights, Cicero, Harvey, Melrose Park, Waukegan, Ill., East Chicago,^{1, 2, 3} Gary, Whiting,^{1, 2} Ind.; H: Ber-

wyn, Blue Island (M), Brookfield, Calumet City, Elmhurst, Elmwood Park, Evanston (also university), Forest Park, Highland Park, La Grange, Maywood, Oak Park, Park Ridge, Wilmette, Winnetka, Ill.; D: Hammond, Ind.

Cincinnati, Ohio.—M: Norwood, Ohio; H: Covington, Fort Thomas, Newport, Ky.

Cleveland, Ohio.—M: Euclid; H: Cleveland Heights, East Cleveland, Garfield Heights, Lakewood, Parma, Shaker Heights

Columbus, Ga.—H: Phenix City, Ala.

Davenport, Iowa.—M: East Moline,^{1, 2} Moline, Rock Island, Ill.

Detroit, Mich.—M: Dearborn^{1, 2, 3} Ecorse,¹ Hamtramck,^{1, 2, 3} Highland Park,² Pontiac, Wyandotte;³ H: Ferndale, Grosse Pointe Park (?), Lincoln Park (?), Mount Clemens, River Rouge, Royal Oak

Duluth, Minn.—H: Superior, Wis. (also transportation)

Evansville, Ind.—W: Henderson, Ky.

Fall River³—New Bedford,³ Mass.—H: Fairhaven town

Harrisburg, Pa.—M: Steelton¹

Hartford, Conn.—M: Bristol,^{1, 2, 3} Meriden, Middletown, New Britain

Huntington, W.Va.—M: Ashland, Ky., Ironton, Ohio

Kansas City, Mo.—M: Kansas City, Kan. (H); H: Independence, Mo.

Lancaster, Pa.—M: Columbia

Little Rock, Ark.—H: North Little Rock

Los Angeles, Calif.—H: Alhambra, Belvedere Township, Beverly Hills, Burbank, Compton, Gardena Township, Glendale, Huntington Park, Inglewood, Long Beach, Monrovia, Pasadena, Pomona, Santa Ana, Santa Monica, South Gate, South Pasadena, Whittier; D: Ontario; W: Anaheim, Fullerton

Louisville, Ky.—H: Jeffersonville, New Albany (M), Ind.

Lowell—Lawrence,^{2, 3} Mass.—M: Amesbury town Haverhill, Newburyport; H: Methuen town (M)

Milwaukee, Wis.—M: Cudahy,¹ South Milwaukee, Waukesha, West Allis; H: Shorewood Wauwatosa

Minneapolis—St. Paul, Minn.—M: South St. Paul

New Haven, Conn.—M: Ansonia, Wallingford; H: Derby (M)

employment in industry and trade—more than 90 per cent, compared to the national average of 59 per cent and about 80 per cent for several of the highest metropolitan districts.

² One of 19 suburbs to which there is a large daily movement of working population from other areas in the metropolitan district, as evidenced by the fact that the ratio of people employed to the total population is .300 or more, compared to an average of .138 for all metropolitan districts, .243 for Flint, the highest metropolitan district, and .348 for Manhattan, the commuting heart of New York City. The employment figures are from the 1935 *Census of Trade* and the 1935 *Biennial Census of Manufactures*, as conveniently assembled in U.S. Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce, *Consumer Market Data Handbook*, 1939 edition, lines 18, 20, and 22.

³ One of 16 suburbs of more than 25,000 population in which an unusually high percentage of the residents are engaged in manufacturing and mechanical occupations—more than 60 per cent of the gainfully occupied, compared to the national average of 28.9 per cent and 58.3 per cent for Flint, the highest single central city in a metropolitan district. Three members of central-city clusters are also marked. Employment is not necessarily in the same

suburb. (U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Fifteenth Census of the United States, 1930, Population*, Vol. IV: *Occupations by States*, Tables III and V).

New York, N.Y.—In Nassau Co., N.Y., H: Freeport, Floral Park, Glen Cove, Hempstead, Lynbrook, Rockville Centre, Valley Stream

In Westchester Co., N.Y., H: Mamoroneck, Mount Vernon, New Rochelle, Ossining, Peekskill, Port Chester (M), White Plains, Yonkers (M)

In Fairfield Co., Conn., M: Norwalk, Stamford

In Bergen Co., N.J., M: Garfield,^{1, 3} Lodi^{1, 2}; H: Cliffside, Park, Englewood, Hackensack (R), Lyndhurst Township, Ridgely Park, Ridgewood, Rutherford, Teaneck Township

In Essex Co., N.J., M: Bloomfield, Newark; H: Belleville, East Orange, Irvington (M), Maplewood Township, Montclair, Nutley, Orange (D), South Orange, West Orange (M)

In Hudson Co., N.J., M: Bayonne, Harrison,¹ Hoboken, Kearny,¹ Union City, West New York; H: Jersey City (M), North Bergen Township, Weehawken Township

In Middlesex Co., N.J., M: Carteret,^{1, 2} New Brunswick, Perth Amboy, South River;¹ H: Woodbridge Township

In Monmouth Co., N.J., H: Long Branch, Neptune Township; D: Red Bank; R: Asbury Park

In Morris Co., N.J., R: Morristown

In Passaic Co., N.J., M: Clifton, Hawthorne, Passaic,² Paterson

In Union Co., N.J., M: Elizabeth, Linden, Rahway; H: Cranford Township, Hillside Township, Roselle, Summit, Union Township, Westfield; D: Plainfield

Norfolk, Va.—M: Newport News; H: Portsmouth

Omaha, Neb.—H: Council Bluffs, Iowa (also transportation)

Peoria, Ill.—M: Pekin

Philadelphia, Pa.—M: Bristol, Chester, Conshohocken Township, Phoenixville, Pa., Burlington, Camden, N.J.; H: Abington Township, Cheltenham Township, Haverford Township, Lower Merion Township, Norristown, Upper Darby Township, Pa., Collingswood, Gloucester (M), Pensauken Township, N.J.

Pittsburgh, Pa.—In Allegheny Co., M: Clairton,¹ Coraopolis, Duquesne,¹ McKeesport,

McKees Rocks,¹ Munhall;¹ H: Bellevue, Braddock, Carnegie (M), Dormont, Homestead, North Braddock, Swissvale (M), Turtle Creek, Wilkinsburg

In Beaver Co., M: Aliquippa,³ Ambridge

In Fayette Co., R: Uniontown

In Washington Co., M: Canonsburg, Charleroi, Donora; D: Washington

In Westmoreland Co., M: Jeannette, Latrobe, Monessen,^{1, 2} New Kensington; H: Arnold,¹ R: Greensburg

Portland, Me.—H: South Portland, Westbrook

Portland, Ore.—M: Vancouver, Wash.

Providence, R.I.—M: Bristol,¹ Central Falls,³ Cumberland town, Pawtucket,³ West Warwick town, Woonsocket,³ R.I., Attleboro, North Attleboro town, Mass.; H: Cranston (M), East Providence (W), Newport, North Providence (M), Warwick, R.I.

St. Louis.—M: St. Charles, Mo., Alton, Belleville, Granite City,^{1, 3} Ill.; H: Maplewood, University City (also university), Webster Groves, Mo.; D: East St. Louis, Ill.

San Francisco, Calif.—M: Richmond; H: Alameda, Berkeley (also university), Burlingame, Palo Alto (also university), San Leandro, San Mateo, Vallejo; D: Oakland

Scranton-Wilkes-Barre, Pa.—M: Kingston; mining: Carbondale, Dickson City, Dunmore, Hannover Township, Nanticoke, Old Forge, Olyphant, Pittston, Plains Township, Plymouth, Taylor

South Bend, Ind.—M: Mishawaka³

Springfield, Mass.—M: Chicopee,³ Easthampton town, Holyoke, Northampton, Westfield, West Springfield town

Tulsa, Okla.—H: Sapulpa

Utica, N.Y.—M: Rome; D: Herkimer

Washington, D.C.—H: Arlington Co., Va.; D: Alexandria, Va.

Waterbury, Conn.—M: Naugatuck^{1, 2}

Wheeling, W.Va.—M: Moundsville, W.Va., Bellaire (H), Martins Ferry, Ohio

Worcester, Mass.—M: Clinton town, Marlborough

Youngstown, Ohio.—M: Campbell,^{1, 2} Niles, Warren, Ohio; Farrell, ^{1, 2} Sharon, Pa.; H: Struthers (M), Ohio

THE ACCOMMODATION AND INTEGRATION OF CONFLICTING CULTURES IN A NEWLY ESTABLISHED COMMUNITY¹

RALPH H. DANHOF

ABSTRACT

At least five groups, each possessing distinct cultural patterns, settled in Boulder City, Nevada, in consequence of employment upon the Boulder Dam project. The cultural patterns represented were in constant conflict with one another—a conflict which is examined in its effects upon the standards of each group in respect to housing, sexual relationships, and participation in group activities. Two hypotheses are suggested in conclusion: (1) the conflict of cultures in a community results in some integration but also in the emergence of common conflict patterns and (2) such common conflict patterns need not represent a transitional stage of development to a common culture but may in themselves form a part of a stabilized form of culture.

The object of this discussion is to examine the nature of the integration and accommodation of conflicting cultures meeting for the first time in a newly established community. In order to make such a study, the community selected had to be characterized by the following: (1) two or more inimical "ways of living" had to be carried into the community at the same time by its settlers; (2) the bearers of these conflicting cultures had to be numerous enough to maintain their respective modes of life and not be forced to adopt the "way of living" of another group in order to find satisfying forms of social life; and (3) the cultures carried into the community had not to possess, as far as the individuals within the new center were concerned, the means for accommodating to the existence of anti-thetic cultural traits within the same social organization.²

¹ This article summarizes a phase of a field study made possible by a Social Science Research Council predoctoral fellowship grant. Throughout this article the term "culture" is not used in the traditional anthropological sense to mean a well-knit comprehensive culture based upon a distinct language and a relatively isolated economy. It is used rather to refer to any important cluster of related differences in the "way of living" of individuals. This use of the term "culture" is justified because, as such, it can serve as a methodological tool for the study of societies participating in what is commonly called the "Western world."²

Boulder City, Nevada, erected in 1931 by the United States Bureau of Reclamation in order to facilitate the construction of Boulder Dam, offered an excellent setting for such a study. Within a year after the federal government began the task of constructing the physical plant of the community, five thousand individuals had moved into the city and had begun the task of evolving a community organization. For the purpose of our analysis this population can be divided into five major classes: (a) the "construction stiffs," (b) the Mormons, (c) migratory governmental workers and the highly trained employees of private construction companies, (d) temporary construction workers, and (e) permanent settlers.

The members of these various culture groups occupied markedly distinct positions in society before entering Boulder City. In time, however, these individuals became accustomed to their niches and developed patterns of individual and group activities based on their functional

² In the case of Boulder City, as a matter of fact, some of the minority cultures had become adjusted to one or two of the other ways of living carried into the community. None of the cultures, however, had accommodated previously to all the cultures found in the new center. Mormonism, for example, had adjusted previously to the culture of the permanent settlers but not to the way of living of the "construction stiff."

roles which gradually became in themselves ends or reasons for living. In so far as these patterns of activity came to be regarded as natural and inevitable and in so far as they were unique to this one group, they constituted a separate way of living or, in other words, a culture. When individuals possessing such well-crystallized ways of living drift into a new social or economic role either in an old or in a new community, their ways of living tend to persist, and they constitute the basis for adapting to a new world. This investigation seeks to analyze the character of the process of change that takes place in each contrasting way of living when individuals possessing inimical cultures move out of old communities and settle in a new one.

The "construction stiffs," a name applied throughout the West to migratory construction workers, were the only individuals entering Boulder City who possessed a cultural basis for participation in community life based upon conditions of extreme mobility.³ These veteran construction workers and their families had moved for many years from one town to another throughout the West, seeking work wherever a large "job" was under way. Little value, therefore, was attached to immovable material culture objects (such as the house or household furniture), and there was no tendency to accept or develop forms of group life that depended upon long-time obligations involving relatively permanent residence in one community. The pattern of social life of the construction stiff, of which the automobile, the most highly prized material culture trait, is a fitting symbol, was devised to give the individual immediate and direct satisfaction. The job,

the poolroom, the gambling hall, the roadside inn, and the "crib of the prostitute" are the focal points of the lives of these men. Through hard work, reckless gambling and spending, sustained and masterful drinking, nonsentimentalized sex experiences, and frequent tavern brawls, these construction workers struggle to be recognized as "real men" and as "good Joe's" and avoid being branded as "pikers" or "quitters."

The culture of the permanent settlers of Boulder City was in sharp contrast to that of the migratory construction workers. The members of this group were interested in establishing permanent homes which measured up to the exacting requirements of older communities; in obtaining secure positions that offered possibilities for a higher standard of living; and in maintaining intimate and permanent relations with mate, offspring, kin, and friend within the usual range of informal and formally organized groups typical of the average American community. Neither the behavioral situation nor the cultural training of these individuals permitted them to define life in Boulder City in any other way than they would have done if they were settling in an older, more stable American town.

The highly trained, old-time construction experts employed by the government or by private companies, on the other hand, had developed a culture before entering Boulder City that represented a blending-together of the ways of living of the construction stiff and the permanent settler. In contrast to the construction stiff, whose life developed within camps or towns that grew up alongside a big job, construction supervisors and engineers lived in a larger society. The members of this group participated in the activities of the construction stiff while on the job, either directly or vi-

³ No census was ever taken of the population of Boulder City either by the government or by some private concern. Hence it is impossible to attempt to calculate the size of these various groups.

cariously as circumstances warranted, but at the same time maintained a position of general acceptability in the respectable phase of community life. Membership was generally sought in the community's well-recognized organizations and clubs, though only a minimum amount of support was given to conventional traditions and beliefs. In short, members of this group entered Boulder City equipped to participate in the activities of the two most antagonistic elements of the population to the degree that was necessary to satisfy individual desires and social demands.

Temporary construction workers who migrated to Boulder City in search of depression-time employment carried the same culture into Boulder City as the permanent settlers. Since the role of the temporary workers in the community was radically different from that of the permanent settlers and since their receptivity to cultural change was much greater in many instances, it seems wise to treat them separately.⁴

The Mormons (Latter-Day Saints), although maintaining a way of living much more similar to the culture of the perma-

nent settlers than that of the construction stiffs, attempted to isolate themselves from all the other groups in the community. Intramarriage was encouraged and participation in community activities other than those of an economic character was frowned upon. The church, with its varied and extensive program providing for every phase of life of its members, represented a complete, well-organized, and autonomous social order.

Within a year after the establishment of Boulder City the various cultures described above had been carried into the community, and throughout the next six years they existed side by side as component parts of one social organization. The analysis of the incorporation of these conflicting cultures into the same community organization will be carried on in terms of three hypotheses: First, that the assimilation of conflicting cultures into one social organization is not accomplished solely through the development of a minimum common way of living, to be referred to hereafter as "integration," but also through that gradual modification of each culture that takes place whenever its bearers come in contact with the members of another culture.⁵ The latter process, to be labeled "accommodation," results not in a common way of living but in the definition and institutionalization of cultural differences. Second, whenever conflicting cultures become adjusted to one another, they become dependent upon one another, and the disintegration of one minority culture will disrupt to some extent all the other cultures that have become geared

⁴ Temporary workers were of three types: (1) Those who regarded Boulder City merely as a temporary place of work, and who were uninterested in participating in the life of the community any more than was necessary. Such individuals were interested primarily in laying aside savings or sending their wages to their families back home, and all community activities, including commercial recreation, were avoided. Pioneer residents claimed that there were a large number of highly trained professional men and college graduates in this group. (2) Those who looked upon their stay in Boulder City as an opportunity to release themselves from many of the irritating cultural restraints they had to accept in their home communities. The members of this group, therefore, sought to participate in the life of the construction stiffs. (3) Those who attempted to maintain previously acquired ways of living, or one approximately similar, by participating in the organizations and activities of the permanent residents.

⁵ Accommodation should not be regarded as synonymous with either cultural blending or disintegration. In the case of accommodation a minority culture remains intact, while cultural blending or disintegration leads to a new and possible common way of living. Accommodation is rarely recognized or sponsored.

to it.⁶ Third, that conflict between such cultures incorporated into one community organization is not necessarily lessened because it has been patterned and that such conflict may make each minority culture more meaningful to its possessors.⁷

It was obviously impossible to attempt to trace all the changes taking place in the various cultures carried into Boulder City. Certain areas of activity, therefore, for which each culture had sharply conflicting patterns of adjustment, were selected as indices of larger processes of development. The indices to be discussed at this time are (1) securing housing facilities, (2) sexual relations, and (3) participating in a common set of organized community activities.

Securing housing facilities.—Each culture carried into Boulder City defined the housing requirements of the individ-

⁶ In a multicultural community individuals become accustomed to defining their values and social roles in terms of opponents. The construction stiff feels that he is more manly than the permanent settler, while the permanent settler regards himself as more refined. Cultural transmission likewise becomes as much a matter of educating the young as to "what not to be" as it is a matter of teaching them "what to be." If one minority culture is destroyed or is carried out of the community, the remaining cultures must develop new means for defining its members' roles in the community. This adjustment may take place very gradually. In many communities, for example, both Catholics and Protestants define their position, in part, in terms of the rival church as it existed a century or more ago.

⁷ In a community characterized by conflicting cultures no single way of living can become completely sacred. An individual cannot avoid recognizing that his culture is not the natural, only, and inevitable way of living, since he constantly observes alternative patterns of life. If, after contact with another culture, an individual comes to regard his way of living as more adequate, however, it comes to have increased meaning. This is true, because he is conscious of the superiority of his culture as compared with that possessed by his neighbor. The fact that conflicting cultures thus become based upon values that are consciously accepted gives to his way of living a stability that is highly significant.

ual and the housing standards of the various economic classes in a strikingly different manner. Any temporary, home-made shack, house-tent, or trailer was considered adequate by the construction stiff, and in a good many instances the automobile of the Boulder Dam worker was worth twice as much as his house. The majority of migratory construction engineers and supervisors attempted to secure as inexpensive housing facilities as their social situations would permit. This was not true of the white-collar office worker in this group, however, who, in spite of years of life in construction camps, upon arrival in Boulder City attempted to secure housing facilities that measured up to standards enforced in more permanent communities.⁸ Permanent settlers and temporary construction workers, on the other hand, carried expectations as to their dwellings and those of others that were current in the areas from which they migrated.

Owing to peculiar circumstances, however, practically every group that entered Boulder City secured housing facilities that contrasted sharply with original expectations. The government and private contractors provided housing facilities for the construction stiffs and migratory construction experts that were superior to those generally occupied, while these quarters were inferior to those to which temporary construction workers and permanent settlers had been accustomed. Housing facilities provided by the government or its contractor were inadequate, and no quarters whatever were constructed for individuals who were not employed by the United States Bureau of Reclamation or by one of its

⁸ The chief clerk of the Boulder City office of the Bureau of Reclamation claimed that, apart from permanent settlers, the only real demand for government houses renting for more than forty dollars per month came from the members of the office staff.

contractors. A large number of every group in the community, therefore, had to erect or purchase their own dwellings. Under such circumstances, therefore, it is possible to seek answers to two questions: "Did the provision of housing facilities that were not the fulfilment of the original expectations of the individuals lead to a modification of the cultural

tion of the pattern of housing of the other cultures in the community. At this time only the direction of cultural change will be considered.

In the judgment of members of the community and kin and friends in other communities, housing conditions and life in general in Boulder City produced a noticeable change in the pattern of hous-

TABLE 1
EXTENT AND DIRECTION OF CHANGE IN THE PATTERNS OF HOUSING
CARRIED INTO BOULDER CITY

CULTURE GROUP	PRESENT BOULDER CITY DWELLERS*					FORMER BOULDER CITY DWELLERS†					KIN OR FRIENDS OF BOULDER CITY INHABITANTS‡				
	Total Sample	+	-	o	Percentage +	Total Sample	+	-	o	Percentage +	Total Sample	+	-	o	Percentage +
Construction stiffs	50	26	2	23	52.0	50	14	3	33	28.0	45	39	1	5	86.6
Temporary workers.....	30	8	8	14	26.6	45	13	4	28	28.8	25	14	2	9	56.0
Construction experts.....	50	13	0	37	26.0	25	11	0	14	44.0	25	16	1	8	64.0
Permanent settlers	50	18	4	28	36.0	50	41	7	2	82.0
Mormons.....	15	7	1	7	46.6	15	5	1	9	33.0	30	18	1	11	60.0
Total.....	195	72	15	109	36.9	135	42	8	85	33.6	175	128	12	35	73.1

* Only those individuals were selected who had lived in the community at least two years and had entered the community during the boom period.

† Two years' residence in Boulder City was required for inclusion in the sample.

‡ Individuals who were acquainted with Boulder City before and after residence in the community.

§ The plus sign (+) designates movement away from the cultural pattern carried into the community; the minus sign (-) indicates an intensification or elaboration of the pattern carried into Boulder City; the zero (o) designates no change. The "Percentage of +" represents the number of individuals in the sample who experienced a change away from the cultural pattern which they carried into the community. (Cf. Tables 2 and 3.)

|| Individuals were included in this sample only if they had entered the construction industry before 1929.

pattern involved?" and "Did the individuals who erected or purchased their own homes experience a similar modification of their cultural pattern of housing?"

In an effort to secure an answer to the first of these two questions, individuals were asked to describe the nature of the changes that had taken place in their cultural pattern of housing as a result of living in Boulder City and to indicate whether those changes were in the direc-

ing of all but one of the minority cultures carried into the center. Table 1 indicates, furthermore, that a higher percentage of kin and friends recognized changes in the cultural pattern of housing than did the members of the community. This is especially true of construction stiffs and permanent settlers.

This discrepancy between the extent of the cultural change perceived by the individual as compared with that recognized by kin and friends may be account-

ed for by the presence of considerable accommodative alteration. The failure of an individual to recognize shifts identified by outsiders indicates that, although his way of living has been modified to some extent, he still believes that he is maintaining his original culture. Some of this discrepancy is due to the inability of the individual to recognize subtle modifications in his culture, but, in a little over two-thirds of the cases where kin and friends noted alterations not suggested by Boulder City residents themselves, informants stated that the changes had not been experienced consciously by the individuals involved.

In an attempt to answer the second question, an analysis made of the development of the cultural pattern of housing of individuals who erected or rented quarters in Boulder City yielded conflicting results. Inasmuch as private construction or purchase of houses in Boulder City was undertaken only by construction stiffs or permanent settlers, it will be necessary to restrict our analysis to these two groups.⁹

In a sample group of 60 individuals who had purchased homes in Boulder City, of the 30 construction stiffs included, all testified that they had experienced a change in their pattern of housing. Twenty-two of 30 permanent settlers claimed that they had undergone similar change. The construction stiffs, however, claimed that their pattern of housing had become more like that of the permanent settlers, while the latter held that they had "lowered" their standards. A study of 30 citizens of Boulder City who had erected their own houses revealed that 5

of 15 construction stiffs claimed their pattern of housing had changed, while 10 felt that they were conforming to their original standards. Twelve of the 15 permanent settlers who erected their own quarters felt that they had experienced a relaxation of their standards of housing, while 3 felt that no change had taken place. Of the 195 individuals living in Boulder City, included in the study on which this paper is based (see Table 1), 97 per cent held that there had been a development of common patterns of housing in cases of homeownership. Of the 50 Boulder City construction stiffs interviewed, moreover, 46 claimed that members of their group who owned homes tended to develop the pattern of housing of permanent settlers.

This evidence, though admittedly inadequate, suggests the reasonableness of the hypothesis that common behavioral situations (i.e., the necessity for building and maintaining a house under a common set of circumstances) lead to the development of a common pattern of housing (integration). Life within the same material culture setting and community organization, however, not necessarily calling for individual acceptance of a common situation, brings about a gradual modification of a cultural pattern which is not recognized by the individual because it does not destroy completely the distinctiveness of this own way of living (accommodation).

Acknowledging the possibility that the common material culture setting of Boulder City might operate to bring about a fairly uniform extension of those aspects of nonmaterial culture closely related to it, it seemed wise to examine the development of a sample of cultural patterns that were concerned primarily with the relationship of man to man.

Sexual relations.—No aspect of life in

⁹ Included in this carefully selected sample are an equal number of houses from each of the five important rent levels in force in the community. The houses in the lowest rent level are made up almost entirely of the well-known, hastily erected "shanty" houses of the construction stiffs.

Boulder City was more bitterly fought over than that of sexual relations between adult members of the community. Construction stiffs, accustomed to a degree of freedom in sexual matters entirely foreign to a settled community, regarded virtually every adult woman as accessible for sexual purposes. A group of temporary construction workers and migratory construction engineers and su-

thern of sexual relations that resulted from living in Boulder City. Again, only the direction of cultural change will be considered here.

A striking result of the tabulation of the information summarized in Table 2 is the extent to which the rate of recognition of change in the pattern of sexual relationships by the individual himself has decreased while the rate of recognition by

TABLE 2
EXTENT AND DIRECTION OF CHANGE IN PATTERNS OF SEXUAL RELATIONSHIPS

CULTURE GROUP	PRESENT BOULDER CITY DWELLERS					FORMER BOULDER CITY DWELLERS					KIN OR FRIENDS OF BOULDER CITY INHABITANTS				
	Total Sample	+	-	o	Percentage +	Total Sample	+	-	o	Percentage +	Total Sample	+	-	o	Percentage +
Construction stiffs.	50	11	4	35	22.0	50	12	2	36	24.0	45	37	1	7	82.2
Temporary workers	30	7	2	21	23.3	45	18	2	25	40.0	25	22	1	2	88.0
Construction experts.....	50	16	1	33	32.0	25	8	0	17	32.0	25	16	1	8	64.0
Permanent settlers	50	19	3	28	38.0	50	43	3	4	86.0
Mormons.....	15	4	0	11	26.6	15	5	1	9	33.3	30	11	2	17	36.6
Total.....	195	57	10	128	29.2	135	43	5	87	34.0	175	129	8	38	73.7

pervisors, although maintaining externally the conventional pattern of more permanent communities, were prepared to join in the exploits of the construction stiffs whenever it was socially convenient. The permanent settlers, the Mormons, and many temporary construction workers, on the other hand, came into the community predisposed to maintain the conventional pattern of sexual relations enforced in their home communities. In order to determine, therefore, the extent and direction of the modification of these directly opposite patterns of behavior that took place when they came in contact with one another, individuals were asked to indicate the nature of the change they had experienced in their pat-

kin or friends has increased in comparison with rates of the recognition of change derived from the analysis of the development of the pattern of housing.

This harmonizes with the insight into the life of Boulder City gained from six months' residence there. In spite of some tendency toward cultural integration on this score, it was clearly evident that throughout the history of the community conflicting patterns of sexual relationship had operated as functional parts of the same community organization without the loss of distinctiveness on the part of any one of them. This is true in spite of the fact that the entire community came to possess a common body of myths and stories regarding the exploits of the

construction stiffs and that every group soon became equipped with knowledge regarding the way of living of other groups.

Important differences remained, however, between the way of living of each individual group and those of others, and these differences remained the best available means for patterning association. It must not be concluded, however, that the members of the community no longer desired cultural homogeneity. Construction stiffs strove to get their more conservative neighbors to "unbend," and permanent settlers attempted to get their less respectable fellow-workers to become more respectable. Such a struggle for homogeneity, however, merely seems to indicate the viability of the various minority cultures.¹⁰ In fact, in a multicultural community each minority culture seems to come to serve the function of giving its rival way of living added meaning and hence added stability. The permanent settler becomes more firmly committed to his pattern of sexual relationships, because, by maintaining his way of living, his culture permits him to regard himself as superior to the construction stiff. Similarly, the construction stiff, by indulging in his exploits, finds that he can regard himself as more manly than his timid neighbor whom he may considered frustrated. In time, individuals come to derive satisfaction out of their own way of living by contrasting it with alternative cultures

present in their community. Of 175 kin and friends of Boulder City inhabitants, 132, or 75 per cent, noted a definite tendency on the part of the members of the community to think about and transmit their own culture in terms of other ways of living with which they previously had had no direct contact. In brief, it would appear reasonable to accept for further testing the hypothesis that, when conflicting cultures come in contact with one another on an equal footing, they are gradually modified until they can function adequately as contrasts for one another.

If it is true that minority cultures remain intact in spite of accommodative change, it would prove interesting to determine whether the struggle on the part of the permanent settlers to secure the participation of all the citizens of Boulder City in a common set of organized groups succeeded in breaking down cultural barriers to such association. If the analysis of the development of the pattern of sexual relationships is sound, it would follow that neither Boulder City dwellers nor their kin or friends would discern any marked tendency toward greater willingness to participate in a common set of organized groups.

Participating in a common set of organized community activities.—The construction stiff shunned all organized forms of group activity. Conditions of extreme mobility had brought about the development of a social life organized around the roadside inn and the poolroom. Some migratory construction engineers and supervisors, likewise, had developed predispositions toward highly flexible forms of group life. Other migratory construction experts, however, as well as all permanent settlers, entered the community prepared to establish and secure members for churches, lodges, and the various

¹⁰ The members of one minority culture group soon became adjusted to the routinized conversion activities of the members of an opposing group. The construction stiffs, for example, felt no resentment toward one of the local ministers (popularly known as "Parson Tom") who actively sought to interest them in the church. The majority of the permanent settlers, on the other hand, accepted good-naturedly the frequent exhortations of the construction stiff to see something of life before getting too old. Only the occasional demands of a few that the entire way of living of a minority group should be destroyed stirred up resentment and antagonism.

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clubs and organizations found in home communities. The Mormons, though also accustomed to formally organized group activities, possessed their own pattern of institutions which they had been trained to perpetuate. Temporary construction workers, generally trained in a community life characterized by formal group activities, were equipped at least to join in the activities of the permanent

willingness to participate in the forms of group activity of the construction stiff as was true the other way around. It must be recognized, however, that the rates of change obtained in this case may be relatively high, because this study deals only with the period of the establishment of the community. After these conflicting cultures become functional parts of a common community organization, it is

TABLE 3
THE EXTENT AND DIRECTION OF CHANGE IN PATTERNS OF
PARTICIPATION IN GROUP ACTIVITIES

CULTURE GROUP	PRESENT BOULDER CITY DWELLERS					FORMER BOULDER CITY DWELLERS					KIN OR FRIENDS OF BOULDER CITY INHABITANTS				
	Total Sample	+	-	o	Percentage +	Total Sample	+	-	o	Percentage +	Total Sample	+	-	o	Percentage +
Construction stiffs.	50	18	0	32	36	50	3	9	38	6	45	16	2	27	35.5
Temporary workers	30	9	4	17	30	45	14	8	23	31	25	11	2	12	44.0
Construction experts.....	50	4	0	46	8	25	2	1	22	8	25	8	0	17	32.0
Permanent settlers	50	12	9	29	24	50	18	6	26	36.0
Mormons.....	15	0	0	15	0	15	0	0	15	0	30	6	2	22	20.0
Total.....	195	43	13	139	22	135	19	18	98	14	175	59	12	104	35.5

settlers. In an effort to determine the effect of such contrasting patterns of group activity upon one another, individuals of all groups were asked to indicate the nature and direction of change in their pattern of participation in group activities.

A study of Table 3 reveals that there was no marked tendency for the inhabitants of Boulder City to develop a single community pattern of organized activities in which everyone would participate. The meeting of conflicting patterns of organized group activity seemed to result primarily in an exchange of personnel between the various culture groups. Practically as many permanent settlers claimed that they had developed greater

likely that there will be less actual or potential mobility between groups. It is interesting to note, furthermore, that kin and friends supported the claims of Boulder City dwellers that their groups had remained largely intact.

This exploratory study suggests two tentative conclusions of importance. First, the data presented demonstrate that conflicting cultures are made functional parts of a single community organization not only through the development of common values and common patterns of behavior (integration) but also through the emergence of common conflict patterns which permit each culture to function and transmit itself by

opposing other cultures. It is true that a minimum number of common values and behavior patterns must develop if conflicting culture groups are to participate in the same social organization. Obviously, the members of a multicultural community must agree to disagree. It is important to note, however, that, in addition to the development of a common core of culture, the distinct and unique features of each way of living become adjusted to, and based upon, the other conflicting cultures present. Second, the

analysis of the situation in Boulder City casts doubt upon the assumption that a permanent, stable society must possess a common culture, covering the majority of the important areas of behavior, and that a social order characterized by conflicting cultures is in a transitional stage of development. Conflicts between individuals over their "ways of living," large-scale proselyting activities, and demands for cultural homogeneity may, as a matter of fact, be the routine functions of the modern society.

A SLUM SEX CODE

WILLIAM FOOTE WHYTE

ABSTRACT

Men in the slums behave in terms of an elaborate and binding sex code. Women are classified into "good girls" (virgins) and three categories of nonvirgins. For each category there is an appropriate form of behavior supported by social sanctions. Social and familial ties within the community also determine sex behavior. The limitations the code places upon social activity within the slum tend to push young men and women toward outside contacts and thus promote assimilation and social mobility.

Respectable middle-class people have very definite standards of sex behavior. They are inclined to assume that behavior which does not conform to these standards is unorganized and subject to no set of ethics. It is my purpose to point out that, in one particular area commonly thought to be characterized by laxness of sex behavior, there is an elaborate and highly developed sex code. A study of the social and sex life of the slum will also yield certain clues as to the nature of the process of assimilation of an alien people into American society.

My information is based upon a three-and-a-half-year study of the Italian slum district of "Cornerville" in "Eastern City."¹ By discussions with a number of men in corner gangs, in which I was a participant observer, I was able to learn the sex code of the slum, as it appears to the corner boys.

The story must be told against a background of local social life. In peasant Italy, as in other peasant societies, the family group undertook to regulate the social and sexual relations of the children. Marriages were arranged by the parents of the couple, and no young man was allowed to visit a girl's home unless he had been accepted as her suitor. The influence of this system is still to be ob-

served in Cornerville. Parents try to keep a strict watch upon their daughters. In most cases they are unable to arrange the marriages for their children, but they retain control over the home. The corner boy knows that if he once visits a girl in her home it will be assumed by her parents (and by everyone else) that he intends to marry her. Consequently, until he is completely sure of his own intentions, the corner boy remains outside of the house. He even hesitates to make a date with a girl, for if he does take her out alone it is assumed that he is her "steady."

Dances given by local clubs mark the high point of the social activities. Except for those who are "going steady," groups of men and groups of girls go separately to the dances. The man chooses his girl for each dance and, at the conclusion of the number, leaves her with her friends. There is no cutting in. When the dance is over, the men and women go home separately. Parties in a girl's home, picnics, evenings at the bowling alleys, and other social activities all tend to take this group form.

When a man centers his attention upon one girl, he arranges to meet her on the street corner. Good girls are not expected to "hang" on the corner, but the men consider it perfectly respectable for them to keep appointments on the corner. Most parents object to this practice

¹ A detailed report of this research will be found in "Street Corner Society," to be published by the University of Chicago Press in the fall of 1943.

more or less strongly and try to insist that the man shall come to the home. The insistence of the parents and the reluctance of the corner boy place the girl in a difficult position. Of course, she herself may not wish to give the relationship the permanent form which a visit to the home would involve. If they work outside of the home, most girls are able to insist upon some right to govern their own social relations; but this always involves friction with the parents, its seriousness depending upon the strength of parental control and the strenuousness of the daughter's efforts to gain independence.

The sex life of the corner boy begins when he is very young. One of them writes:

In Cornerville children ten years of age know most all the swear words and they have a good idea of what the word "lay" means. Swearing and describing of sex relations by older people and by the boys that hang on the corner are overheard by little children and their actions are noticed and remembered. Many of the children when they are playing in the streets, doorways and cellars actually go through the motions which pertain to the word "lay." I have seen them going through these motions, even children under ten years of age.

Most all the boys that I know and all my friends carry safes [condoms]. Most boys start carrying safes when they are of high school age.

Safes are purchased from necktie salesmen as cheap as a dozen for fifty cents. Some boys buy them and then make a profit by selling them to the boys at school. You can get them in some of the stores around here.

The sex play of young boys is relatively unregulated. The code of sex behavior crystallizes only as the corner boys reach maturity.

Relations between corner boys and women cannot be described in uniform terms, since there are tremendous variations in behavior, depending upon the category in which the woman is placed and the man's qualifications for access to

women of various categories. The local classification of women which is explicit or implicit in corner-boy attitudes and behavior may be represented in the three categories shown in the accompanying tabulation. The most highly valued type of woman is placed at the top of each category.

Sex Experience	Physical Attractiveness	Social- and Ethnic-Group Position
1. "Good girls"	Beautiful	1. Superior groups
2. "Lays"		2. Italian nonslum
a) One-man girls	to	3. Italian slum
b) Promiscuous		
c) Prostitutes	ugly	

One evening the corner boys were discussing a beautiful girl in the neighborhood. Danny said that he would take three months in any jail in the country, even Alcatraz, for the privilege of being in bed with her for eight hours. Doc said that Danny felt this way because the girl was a virgin. Danny agreed but added: "I would take one week in any jail even if she was a lay; that's how good I think she is." The difference between three months and one week strikingly illustrates the different valuations placed upon "good girls" and "lays." Doc explained the desirability of a virgin in this way: "No one has been there before. You are showing her the way. It's a new discovery. . . . We all say we would like to lay a virgin, but we really wouldn't."

The corner-boy code strongly prohibits intercourse with a virgin. Thus the most desirable of women is also the most inaccessible. A good girl may submit to a limited amount of kisses and caresses without compromising her reputation. She must not be a "teaser" (one who attempts to excite the man as much as possible without granting him sexual access). The virginity of a "teaser" is thought to be only a technicality, and if she is raped it serves her right. Otherwise a girl's virginity must be protected.

"Good girls" are the kind that one marries. A man who takes her virginity from a "good girl," seriously affecting her marriageability, will marry her because he is responsible. The man who seeks to evade his responsibility, especially if he has made the girl pregnant, may be forced into marriage by the priest and the girl's parents. The alternative is going to jail and being held liable for the support of the child to the age of twenty-one.

While strong legal and institutional sanctions uphold virginity, corner boys do not abide by the code simply from fear of the consequences of violation. They have strong sentiments supporting the sanctity of virginity. It is felt that only the lowest type of man would have intercourse with a virgin.

If the ban on intercourse with virgins were never violated, the only nonvirgins would be girls who had had sex relations with men outside of the district. This is obviously not the case. Several stories indicate that some early-adolescent boys and girls introduce each other to sex activity. The young boy who has never had intercourse himself does not feel so strongly the protective attitude toward virgins that he will assume later. There are a few local men who break the rule, but the danger of entanglements within the district is so great that most such activity must be confined to outsiders. In any case a corner boy cannot admit having "laid" a virgin without incurring the scorn of his fellows.

The corner boys believe that a man's health requires sexual intercourse at certain intervals. "Good girls" are not available for this purpose, and even casual social relations with them are likely to lead to commitments and responsibilities that the man is not prepared to assume. The corner boy has much more freedom, and much less responsibility in dealing

with "lays"; freedom increases and responsibility decreases as he establishes relations lower down in this class.

From the standpoint of prestige and social advantage, the ideal girl in the "lay" class is the one who will have sexual relations with only one man in one period, but there are great risks involved in such a relationship. As one corner boy said:

If you go with a girl too long, even if she lays, you're bound to get to like her. That's human nature. I was going out with a girl, and I was banging her every date. After about four months, I saw I was really getting fond of the girl, so I dropped her just like that.

While a man should marry only a good girl, he may become attached to the one-man girl and allow his emotions to override his judgment. Furthermore, if it is not widely known that the girl is a "lay" and she consequently enjoys a good reputation, her family will be able to exert a good deal of pressure to force a marriage. If he makes her pregnant, marriage is hardly to be avoided.

The promiscuous girl is less desirable socially, but there is also less risk in having relations with her. Only pregnancy can impose a responsibility; and, since the identity of the father is difficult to prove, such entanglements may frequently be avoided.

In practice it is hard to distinguish between these two types of "lays," because the promiscuous girl usually tries to pass herself off as a one-man "lay" and one-man girls are constantly slipping into the lower category. Nevertheless, there is a real distinction in the mind of the corner boy, and he acts differently according to his conception of the girl's sexual status. He talks freely about the promiscuous girl and is glad to share her with his friends. He keeps the higher type of "lay" to himself, says little about his relations

with her, and treats her with more respect. The reputation of the one-man "lay" is not, however, permanently protected. If she breaks off with the corner boy and takes up with another man, the corner boy is likely to boast openly that he had her first.

The professional prostitute or "hustler" is the least desirable of women. I have heard some men advocate having relations with prostitutes on the ground that no social risk is involved; but generally the corner boys feel that to go to a house of prostitution would be to admit that they could not "pick up" any girls. One corner boy expressed his opinion in this way:

I never go to a whore house. What do you get out of that? It's too easy. You just pay and go in and get it. Do you think the girl gets any fun out of that? . . . I like to take a girl out and bull her into it [persuade her]. Then when you lay her, you know she's enjoying it too. . . . And after you're through, you feel that you have accomplished something.

Another had this to say:

You might pay a hustler a dollar and that's all there is to it, it's a business proposition. If you pick up a girl, you may spend three to five dollars on food and drinks, but I'd rather do that any time. . . . You figure, the other way, it's just a business proposition. When you go out with a girl that ain't a hustler, you figure, she must like you a little anyway or she wouldn't go out with you. A hustler will take any man she can get, but this girl is just for you tonight anyway. You take her out, have something to eat and drink, you go for a ride, you begin muggin' her up, then you get in there. . . . That's the way I like to do it. You're staking out new territory. You get the feeling you really done something when you get in there.

The corner boys make a distinction between a house of prostitution and a "line-up." In a line-up one of the men brings a prostitute to some room in the district and allows his friends to have intercourse with her, each man paying the girl for the

privilege. While this is a commercial arrangement, nevertheless, it is handled by the boys themselves, and some who would not think of going to a house of prostitution are willing to participate with their friends in a line-up.

The code not only differentiates different types of women in corner-boy attitudes; it also involves strikingly different behavior with women of the different categories, as the following stories indicate.

Danny had picked up a "hustler" and taken her to his gambling joint on the understanding that she would receive a dollar a man. When she was finished, he handed her an envelope containing the bills. She had counted the bills when he pretended to be alarmed and snatched the envelope away from her, replacing it in his pocket. She protested. Danny handed her another envelope of the same size which contained only slips of paper. She was satisfied and went away without looking into the envelope. Danny felt that he had played a clever trick upon the girl.

Doc told me another story about Danny:

There are some noble things down here, Bill. . . . You take Danny's wife, as we call her. She goes to church all the time—what a good kid she is, and she's nice looking too. She goes for Danny. She wants to marry him. Now she goes for him so much that he could probably belt her if he wanted to. But he doesn't want to marry her. He hasn't a job to support a wife. So he stays away from her. . . . Then take Al Mantia. He was a hound. He was after women all the time. One time he and Danny went out with a girl—she said she was a virgin. She had one drink, and she was a little high. They were up in a room, and they had her stripped—stripped! She still said she was a virgin, but she wanted them to give her a belt. But they wouldn't do it. . . . Can you imagine that, Bill? There she was stripped, and they wouldn't do anything to her. . . . The next day she came around and thanked both of them. They can't be such bad fellows if they do that.

The Danny who spared the virgin is the same Danny who cheated the "hus-tler." In one case the code imposed a strong responsibility; in the other case no responsibility was involved.

The physical-attractiveness criterion needs little comment, for here the corner boys are simply evaluating women in much the same terms as those used by men everywhere in their society. The only significant local variation is found in the strong preference for blondes in sexual relationships. Most of the local Italian girls tend to have black hair and olive complexions. While a good example of this type may appear strikingly attractive to the outsider, the corner boys are more impressed by blonde hair and a fair skin.

In the social- and ethnic-group category, the most desirable woman for non-marital sex relations is the girl of old American-stock background, preferably blonde, who has a higher status than the corner boy. Once I was walking through the aristocratic section of Eastern City with a corner boy when we passed a tall and stately blonde, fashionably dressed, and very attractive. My companion breathed deeply as he said: "The old Puritan stock! . . . The real McCoy! Wouldn't I like to give her a belt."

The attraction of the native stock is not confined to the lower-class Italian. Mario Martini was born in Cornerville, but as he became successful in business he moved out to a fashionable suburb. He married an Italian girl and raised a family, sending his children to private school. He had many business relations and some social relations with upper-class Yankees. He made a practice of hiring only girls of native background for his secretarial work, and on some of his business trips he would take one of these girls along—for sexual as well as secre-

tarial purposes. One of Martini's former secretaries, who told me this story, was a girl of rather plain features, which emphasizes the prestige of the native background even for a man who was as successful as Mario Martini.

If an old-stock American girl is not accessible, then a socially superior member of an ethnic group living outside of Cornerville is the next best thing. There is little prestige involved in having relations with a Cornerville "lay," unless she is especially attractive on a physical basis.

The three categories so far discussed give us a rating scale in terms of feminine desirability. There is one important factor which limits access to certain women, however desirable they may be in terms of these categories. We must consider the social ties between the man and the woman. The incest taboo operates in Cornerville, as elsewhere, to prohibit access to females of certain specified familial ties. While marriages may be contracted beyond these incest limits, the corner-boy code also prohibits nonmarital access to relatives who are not blood relations (for example, the brother-in-law's cousin) and to relatives of friends. A corner boy described such a case to me. He was careful to explain that his friend, the girl's cousin, knew that she was a "lay" and would have been glad to have him enjoy himself. Furthermore, the girl was chasing after him so that she was practically forcing the sex relationship upon him. When he was about to have intercourse, he thought of his friend, and, as he says, "I couldn't do a thing." It is only with an outsider, with someone who is not related to him or to a friend, that the corner boy feels free to have sexual relations.

The three categories of "Sex Experience," "Physical Attractiveness," and

"Social- or Ethnic-Group Position" are not, of course, the product of any individual's evaluation. They represent, implicitly, the standards of the group—the corner gang. The standards are being continually defined in action and in group discussion. The corner boys are continually talking over the girls that they know and others that they have observed in terms of all these categories. Consequently, a high degree of consensus tends to arise in placing the individual girl in her position in each category. The men then know how they are supposed to act in each case; and the observer, equipped with this conceptual scheme, is able to predict how, as a general rule, the men will attempt to act.

One feature of this classificatory scheme should be noted. The standards for marriage and for nonmarital sex relations are quite different. For nonmarital sex relations the ideal girl is a one-man "lay," blonde and fair skinned, belonging to a socially superior old-stock group, and having no familial connection with the corner boy or any of his friends. For marriage, preference is for the virgin of Italian extraction and having some family connection with friends or relatives of ego. (The girl fitting this description would usually, but not always, be a dark brunette.)


Different sorts of evaluation are involved in the two cases. The corner boy thinks of casual sex relations in terms of personal prestige as well as physical satisfaction. If he were able to persuade an attractive blonde to drive down to his corner and pick him up in an expensive-looking car, he could make a great impression upon his fellows. Wives are thought of in terms of long-run compatibility and utility. Corner boys express their preference for a wife of Italian extraction because "she would understand

my ways," "she would know how to cook for me," and "I could trust her more than the others"; "the Italian women make faithful wives; it's their upbringing."

The corner boy's relations with the opposite sex are not determined simply by his evaluation of feminine desirability. He must possess certain qualifications in order to gain access to the most desirable women. Talk is important. The man who can talk entertainingly and "bull the girl to her ears" gains in prestige with his fellows, as well as in his social opportunities. However, talk is not enough. Social position, money, and possession of a car weigh heavily in the balance. It is a common complaint of the corner boys that the most desirable women are most difficult of access because they demand more in position, money, and a car than most corner boys can provide. I once asked a corner boy if it was necessary to have a car in order to pick up a girl for sexual purposes. He answered:

No, you can take her up to a room. . . . But no nice girl will go up to a man's room. If you take her out in the car, that's all right. If she goes up to your room with you, she's really a bum.

Under the influence of a car, a ride in the country, drinks, and heavy petting, a girl can allow a man to have sexual intercourse with her without any premeditation on her part. But if he suggests to her that they go to a room she can no longer pretend that she does not know what he is about. By consenting, she stamps herself as the kind of girl who goes to rooms with men. Even the most promiscuous like to maintain the pretense that they do it seldom and never in such a premeditated fashion. Thus the man with a car is generally able to have intercourse with a more desirable class of women than are available to the man who must rely upon rented rooms.



If the observer can classify the corner boy in terms of these criteria and classify the women within his social orbit in terms of the categories described above, then the individual's social and sexual behavior becomes still more subject to close prediction. No invariable rules can be set up, for the corner boy's code, like all other codes, is sometimes violated; but the discussion so far should clearly indicate that the relations between the sexes in the slums are subject to definite rules of behavior. The corner boys, while deviating from respectable middle-class standards, lead an organized sex life.

Our discussion has been confined to pre-marital sex and social relations. Little change is required in order to apply our conclusions to the post-marital behavior of the corner boy. The wife is expected to be completely faithful, and even the slightest flirtations are seriously regarded. The husband is expected to be a good provider and to have an affection for his wife and children. Nevertheless, the field of sexual adventure is not barred to him, and he endeavors to keep this quite separate from his married life. While the wives object, the men see nothing wrong in extra-marital sex relations, as long as they are not carried to the extremes of an open scandal or serious neglect of the family. Within these limits, the married man looks upon the feminine world just as he did before marriage.

While the slum sex code has now been described in outline form, it remains for us to consider the effect of this code and of the behavior it involves upon some of the broader social processes.

It is not easy for the Cornerville girl to maintain a good reputation if she has social relations with Cornerville men. Once I went to a dance outside of the district with two corner boys and three girls. It was late when we drove back to

Cornerville. The driver stopped the car just outside of the district, and all the girls and one of the men got out to walk home. Later I asked why the girls had not been driven home. The driver answered:

Well, you know, Bill, the people of Cornerville are very suspicious people. They can make up a story about nothing at all. . . . If the girls came home alone, people would talk. If we all drove up in a car at one o'clock in the morning, they would wonder what we had been doing. . . . If the three of them walk home with Nutsy, then people will say, "Well, they have been in good company."

It is not only the older generation which gossips about the girls. The corner gang is continually defining and redefining reputations. Not even the "good girl" is safe from suspicion, and her local field of action is sharply circumscribed if she does not want to commit herself to marriage at an early age. As we have seen, the one-man "lay" cannot afford to have her "boy friend" in Cornerville because, if the relationship broke down, her reputation could be destroyed.

While social life outside of Cornerville has a great appeal to most girls, those who center their activities beyond the local boundaries seem to fit largely into two categories that represent the top and the bottom of Cornerville feminine society. There are a number of "good girls" who work outside of the district and use contacts made in this way in order to move into superior social circles. Then there are the "lays," who find greater freedom elsewhere. Most of the "good girls," being limited by their backgrounds, are unable to build up a social life outside of Cornerville. They have a romantic picture of a non-Cornerville, non-Italian of superior educational and economic status who will some day come along and marry them. While the social restrictions of Cornerville weigh particu-

larly heavily upon the girls and influence many of them to wish for an escape through marriage outside the district, most marriages are contracted within Cornerville or between Cornerville and adjoining districts of similar social background. Nevertheless, the character of Cornerville social life operates to withdraw a significant number of local women from the orbit of the corner boys.

This situation is recognized by the corner boys. One of them commented:

There are lots of lays in Cornerville. You take Market Street from Norton Street down; nine out of ten of those girls will lay. But they won't lay for a Cornerville fellow. You know why? Because they figure if they lay for me, I'll tell my friends the girls lay, and they'll want to lay her, and it'll get around. . . . Can you beat it, Bill, they're all around us yet we can't get them.

My informant was disgruntled over his failure to "get" Cornerville girls, and his 90 per cent figure is not to be taken seriously. If these girls actually did go outside of the district, he was in no position to know their sexual status, and any estimate can be no more than a guess. Probably the percentage of "lays" among local girls is very small. In any case, the

fact remains that Cornerville men find most local girls barred to them except for marriage. In this situation they also must look outside of Cornerville for social and sexual satisfactions. The men, with their highly organized and localized corner gangs, tend to be even more restricted than the women in their social movements, and only a minority are able to operate at all effectively outside of Cornerville. However, even that minority contributes toward changing the social structure of Cornerville and Eastern City.

The restrictions of the peasant Italian family mores, plus the close watch kept upon their behavior, tend to push some of the young Italian girls out of Cornerville. Finding local fields restricted, some of the young men follow the girls in reaching for outside social contacts. This operates to stimulate intermarriage, illegitimate births out of interethnic sex relations, and social mobility. The study of the assimilation of the Italian population would be incomplete if we did not analyze the social and sex life of the slums in these terms.

WARM SPRINGS, GA.

THE PARANOID PSEUDO-COMMUNITY

NORMAN CAMERON

ABSTRACT

Social communication depends upon the conformity of symbolic behavior with prevailing linguistic patterns. Adults differ markedly in the degree to which they have developed and maintained the social skills underlying communication. Those with inadequate social learning in this direction are likely to prove incompetent under conditions of unusual stress. Paranoid developments represent one outcome. Out of the fragments of the social behavior of others the paranoid individual organizes a pseudo-community whose functions then seem to be focused upon him. His own reactions to this supposed community of response bring him into open conflict with the actual community and lead to his temporary or permanent isolation from its affairs.

As far as its formal organization and *modus operandi* are concerned, the symbolic behavior of adults is to a very large extent socially derived. It is biological activity which in each child originates in a social field as a part of conjoint activity and tends strongly to operate thereafter in line with existing traditional patterns. Whether normal or not, adult symbolic behavior can be graded roughly according to its relative efficacy as interpersonal communication. At one end of such a scale would lie the highly communicative organization in genuine discussions of public matters in conversation or in print and, for more restricted communities, those in technical journals, monographs, and symposiums. Near the other end would be found symbolic behavior that is relatively ineffectual as interpersonal communication, such as that associated with highly individual preferences, with judgments in aesthetic matters by untrained persons, with most emotional subjects having deep personal values, and with many other unshared or rarely shared attitudes and fantasies. Among these last belong the basic biological functions of human organisms (such as the sexual) that have important social consequences but seldom get well organized within a genuinely shared social field.

In the repertory of all normal persons there is this range from private, inner symbolic conduct, in which the organization is such as to be relatively or completely inadequate as communication, to publicly shared social behavior, where, in order to be able to function as communication at all, the organization has to be maintained at a level sufficiently high to operate as a part of mutual activity. In thinking or private discourse the restrictions, distortions, and compromises are determined mainly by the abilities and limitations, the needs and conflicts, of the one person involved. While this may permit much greater latitude to the private thinker, it also requires of him much less completeness, clarity, and definition, for the simple reason that there is no social "other" participating who needs and demands amplification or explanation. The man communing with himself can and does take great liberties with the linguistic tool given him by his social background.

The clearer and more complete organization in publicly shared communication is purchased at the cost of increased rigidity and conformity to the prevailing cultural pattern. Originally, for each person, this sacrifice is imposed by the necessity for sharing effectively some conjoint activity. Once this form of compromise

develops, it is maintained by the success with which it functions. If it falls below the level of intelligible communication (as it does practically every day of everyone's life), the demands of the other person or persons bring it up to that minimal level again by requiring the speaker to restate differently, to amplify, to give examples or demonstrations in verbal or manual terms. Under certain circumstances individuals with socially inadequate development fail progressively to maintain such a level, with the result that they become "socially disarticulated" and very often have to be set aside from the rest of their community to live under artificially simplified conditions.¹ Such are many of the chronically disorganized schizophrenics.

Within a given social group the usual development of language behavior results in a high degree of conformity in speech habits and other modes of communication. On the biological side this occurs because the organs involved are closely similar; and on the cultural side it occurs because language arises in the child under conditions of mutual action with persons who are already linguistically organized, and it operates from then on for the most part in situations calling for the social sharing of activity, of preparation for action, or of the results of action.² In other words, communication is the outgrowth of repeated social acts and is itself an organization of well-defined social habits, which are maintained adequately as any other social habits are, through continued operation under conditions of shared activity.

¹ Norman Cameron, *Reasoning, Regression and Communication in Schizophrenics* ("Psychological Monographs," Vol. I, No. 221 [1938]), pp. 1-34.

² Cameron, "Individual and Social Factors in the Development of Graphic Symbolization," *Journal of Psychology*, V (1938), 165-84.

It is not quite so obvious at first glance that the preservation of social organization in thinking may be similarly dependent upon the setting-up and maintenance of such social habits as are involved in its more formal aspects, its sequences, its frames of reference, and its correspondence with nonlanguage behavior. Of course, as long as communication with others is not involved, a much lower level of conformity with community patterns suffices for the intrapersonal needs which it must meet. Nevertheless, the practice of frequently talking with another about things one has been thinking in private performs an important function. It helps to maintain a fairly high degree of correspondence between these symbolic systems—the individual and the shared—as to critiques accepted, methods employed, and conclusions reached. Since most significant action ultimately involves social operations, this correspondence makes it more likely that the action will be socially appropriate and will fall within the limits of what others deem possible. The differences existing in the degree to which different activities have been thus shared help to account for the markedly different degrees of social maturity achieved by a given person in different areas. That this is not merely the result of inhibitory influences but also an outcome of simple neglect in exercising a given function publicly is indicated by the fact that neglected forms of symbolic behavior with no special emotional involvement remain, even in superior adults, at a childish level of performance.³

The more personal and private the thing with which one is preoccupied, the less likely is the pondering over it to fol-

³ Cameron, "Functional Immaturity in the Symbolization of Scientifically Trained Adults," *ibid.*, VI (1938), 161-75.

low the more strictly formal patterns which shared activity fosters. It should not be concluded, however, that in imperfectly socialized private matters there are no firmly established habits of thinking at all. On the contrary, individual patterns may be very rigid and difficult to change. It is possible to demonstrate this even in asocial, disorganized schizophrenic patients.⁴ Their thinking and their talking give evidence of habit organization which is consistent and idiomatic and which recurs in recognizable patterns; but through a process of progressive desocialization these patterns have become so highly individualized that, to share in their conversation even partially, one must often master their asocial idiom (*metonymy*) and their formally incomplete logic (*asyndesis*).⁵ Personal language habits in these persons have gradually replaced the more social language habits.

As one might expect from the multiplicity of factors involved in developing language habits, operating either as communication with others or in personal thought, there are wide individual variations in the normal product even within a given cultural group. Just as they do in any other habit system, persons differ in the dexterity, flexibility, variety, and aptness of their language habits. The broad fundamental attitudes developing in infancy, childhood, and adolescence are especially important in determining not only vocabulary, syntax, and style but also such basic, generalized social learning as that which leads to ready interchange of opinion and role with other

persons; ease and degree of genuine social communication; habitual ability to modify or even reverse one's stand on occasion; tendencies to enter freely into co-operative activities, to accept the judgments of others as to one's own conduct and achievements, and to be able to behave toward one's own behavior as one can toward the behavior of another.

It is hardly going too far to attribute to the development of these habitual social attitudes, these readiesses-to-react in social relationships, most of the responsibility for success or failure in forming appropriate and valid conclusions regarding one's social environment in late adolescence and in adulthood. Among young children of school age there are already clear differences in these results of social learning. With maturity the differences become more pronounced. Most individuals grow less flexible and less suggestible. They learn to conceal and evade more, and their private life of asocial thought with its satisfactions may get quite isolated. Flexibility, the ability to change one's course, the degrees of concealment practiced, and the extent to which one habitually turns to asocial preoccupations for refuge or pleasure—these definitely help decide what the fundamental social relationships between any given individual and his fellows will be. They may easily determine what perspective he is able to gain and how he regards himself; how adequately he grasps the attitudes, plans, and intentions of others with regard to him; and, therefore, how he will react to what goes on around him.

The high susceptibility of some individuals to slights—intentional, unintentional, or imagined—grows out of an unworkable attitude they have toward themselves as social objects; either they have no stable and dependable attitude,

⁴ Cameron, "Schizophrenic Thinking in a Problem-solving Situation," *Journal of Mental Science*, LXXXV (1939), 1012-35

⁵ Cameron, "A Study of Thinking in Senile Deterioration and Schizophrenic Disorganization," *American Journal of Psychology*, LI (1938), 650-65.

or it is deprecatory or condemnatory and hostile. This makes them especially vulnerable to delusional development, the rudiments of which can easily be seen even among "sensitive" persons who are never deemed neurotic or psychotic by their associates. There are two other factors that may aggravate such a reaction beyond normal bounds. One is the operation of seriously conflicting reactions which can be neither successfully resolved nor allowed for and ignored, particularly if antisocial trends are involved. Another is the tendency to hang on to a conclusion once formed and to build secretly upon it.

Whether one of these factors or another is predominant, the crucial thing with certain individuals is their habitual inability to share their social attitudes with others, to give their growing suspicions an airing, to set them out before another and so make them objective. It is not enough that they are suspicious; they keep their suspicions to themselves, with only halfhearted, abortive attempts to share them, until they have become so involved with their own hidden conflicts and have accumulated and organized so much supporting anecdotal and incidental evidence that they can at best be understood only by an expert after long and careful analytic study. Even then, the same inflexibility and the onward push of their tensions usually prevent any fundamental change in the system of developed attitudes.

Systematized paranoid or paranoic delusions of discrimination and persecution, develop out of the person's attempts to account for situations and happenings that usually are themselves products of his own asocial behavior, his attitudes, and his fantasies. His socially inadequate interchange of attitudes and interpretations with others not only throws him

upon his own limited resources for explanations and hypotheses but allows these also to be elaborated without the checks and modifications that the contrary opinions of others, if entertained seriously, would inevitably induce. Such preoccupation, with its collection and noting of incidents, becomes more and more engrossing; it narrows down the interests and activities of the person and further isolates him from the affairs of others.

As the delusional interpretations grow in extent and intensity, the person may be driven finally to try to share his suspicions with others; but by this time his own beliefs have become so firmly established as a habitual way of thinking that any sweeping, basic modifications are impossible without changing the whole system and abandoning interpretations that were originally developed under conditions of great emotional stress, which is still present. In addition, his suspicions may have become so systematized and intricate that another person cannot enter into the situation easily. The average layman, even if given the opportunity, is unlikely to go to all the trouble it takes to follow step by step the growth of such a delusional system. He either argues against it, thus compelling the paranoiac in defense to evolve new contrary arguments and consolidate further his position; or he dismisses what he does grasp as being absurd or ridiculous and so may get himself classed as another enemy.

As more and more data accumulate, the individual decides that the whole business must be much more than bad luck or isolated casual slights. He concludes, sometimes very suddenly, that a widespread plot is afoot in which a number of persons is implicated, some recognized and some not. This is a crucial stage in paranoic development. There

has been a tendency in the past to look upon it as simply a part of some obscure process, localized by some in a diseased brain and by others in a diseased psyche. Both are static interpretations that ignore what the paranoid person is trying to do and in what way his response organization is defective. The central nervous system of the paranoiac, as far as anyone can determine, is structurally well within normal limits; and a restatement of paranoic conclusions in terms of psychic theories that are themselves fixed, intricate, and inflexible seems to be only an exchange of one problem for another, similar one.

The paranoid person, because of poorly developed role-taking ability, which may have been derived from defective social learning in earlier life, faces his real or fancied slights and discriminations without adequate give-and-take in his communication with others and without competence in the social interpretation of motives and intentions. When he feels himself under scrutiny, he proceeds as anyone else might by checking up and by putting together events that seem to belong together. It is clear that by such a process any person, whether normal or not, will tend automatically to organize his environment; and, the more he organizes his environment through his responses to events, the more in turn his responses get organized in terms of this environment. This whole process in itself is neither abnormal nor even unusual. All persons do it, and all at some time or other make the mistake of organizing events in ways that fail to correspond with the consensus; but the vast majority of persons will then backtrack and revise their interpretive reactions to agree more or less with those of others. The person whose social habits are inadequately developed may try the same

thing; but his means for establishing socially valid criteria and for sharing in the consensus are insufficient when conditions of severe personal stress arise. He lacks the necessary social skills involved, first, in being able to suspend judgment until the attitudes of others can be ascertained and, then, in being able to assume these attitudes of others adequately toward himself when the situation demands it.

Obviously, this relative incompetence is not going to be uniform throughout his behavior repertory. His manners, his courtesy toward others, his deference and flexibility in the give-and-take of impersonal conversation, and even his co-operation in competitive group games or community enterprises may sometimes be very adequate. These are public matters which seldom of themselves threaten the integrity and security of the individual. When they become involved it is usually after the delusional developments have expanded. These in most instances begin with personal matters, things that belong nearer the incommunicable even for normal persons. It is easy to understand the almost universality of sexual involvement in paranoid delusions. It is in this sphere that failure to develop genuine social maturity is most frequently encountered in our culture. Sexual attitudes enter relatively seldom into social communication. The ratio of sexual attitudes functioning in private to those freely and genuinely shared with the community is disproportionately high when compared with most other commonly held attitudes. From this standpoint, the greater prevalence of heterosexual preoccupations among women developing paranoid delusions and of homosexual ones among men⁶ probably reflects basic differences

⁶ A. Noyes, *Modern Clinical Psychiatry* (Philadelphia, 1939), pp. 492-98.

in social attitudes rather than biological differences.

The delusion formation itself may begin with preoccupations stimulated and encouraged by conversations, arguments, or reading; it may be started off by some unfortunate incident which lights up doubts and leads to ruminations. The sensitized person, at first preoccupied with his own conflicting responses and then with the possibility that others share his doubts or the facts about himself, inevitably looks around for evidence. Because of his own attitudes or fears regarding himself and because of his relative incompetence in taking the role of others and thus really sharing their attitudes toward him, he is especially vulnerable. Like a child in a dark forest or an adult who has actually been maligned in public, he is primed for certain kinds of happenings rather than others. He is more ready to react to unfavorable or danger signs. His responses tend, first, to select reactions from his surroundings that fit into such an interpretation and, then, to reshape in retrospect things that seemed innocent enough when they occurred, in such a way that they support the trend of his suspicions. In other words, he has become prejudiced with regard to his social environment.

Unlike the normal child or adult, he is not able to get lasting reassurances from others to counteract his developing fear and distrust. As he begins attributing to others the attitudes which he has toward himself, he unintentionally organizes these others into a functional community, a group unified in their supposed reactions, attitudes, and plans with respect to him. He in this way organizes individuals, some of whom are actual persons and some only inferred or imagined, into a whole which satisfies for the time being his immediate need for explanation but

which brings no reassurance with it and usually serves to increase his tensions. The community he forms not only fails to correspond to any organization shared by others but actually contradicts the consensus. More than this, the actions and attitudes ascribed by him to its personnel are not actually performed or maintained by them; they are united in no common undertaking against him. What he takes to be a functional community is only a pseudo-community created by his own unskilled attempts at interpretation, anticipation, and validation of social behavior.

This pseudo-community of attitude and intent which he succeeds in thus setting up organizes his own responses still further in the direction they have been going; and these responses in turn lead to greater and greater systematization of his surroundings. The pseudo-community grows until it seems to constitute so grave a threat to the individual's integrity or to his life that, often after clumsy attempts to get at the root of things directly, he bursts into defensive or vengeful activity. This brings out into the open a whole system of organized responses to a supposed functional community of detractors or persecutors which he has been rehearsing in private. The real community, which cannot share in his attitudes and reactions, counters with forcible restraint or retaliation, depending upon whether it recognizes his outburst as illness or as wickedness.

It is an important fact that, for the paranoid person, this reaction of the real community becomes further evidence that he has been completely justified in his suspicions and interpretations right along. He has come out into the open with overt action against his supposed enemies and so managed to bring down real social retaliation upon himself. This

new phase has the unfortunate effect of making the paranoid pseudo-community become more objective and real to him; for the reactions of the real community in now uniting against him are precisely those which he has been anticipating on the basis of his delusional beliefs. He is more than likely to include all those who frustrate his attempts at obtaining redress or revenge among his persecutors and their accomplices.

By this time his system of interpretations has become firmly organized. He has developed such marked tensions in response to so many ordinary happenings and has built up such an elaborate structure of defensive attitudes that it is virtually impossible for him to alter his conclusions fundamentally. His chief hope for social rehabilitation lies, on the negative side, in his being protected from too much outside interference on the part of inexperienced persons or persons unacquainted with his illness and in his being prevented from taking finalistic overt action in terms of supposed plots or discriminations. For, while the latter action might relieve his tensions temporarily, it eventually only intensifies them and necessitates further overt action. On the positive side, it is sometimes possible through a slow process of retraining to introduce habits of doubt, of entertaining alternative hypotheses in personal matters, and of suspending judgment and overt action.⁷ Something may be achieved in objectifying personal mate-

rial at the basis of the pathological sensitivity through therapeutic discussion and "free association"; but the usually mature paranoid case comes for treatment rather too late in most instances for any sweeping reorganizations. For the therapist the task of picking a way through these explosive areas of sensitivity is like that of getting through a hostile mine field.

The almost lifelong difficulty these persons have had in sharing with others, in exchanging and modifying attitudes of a personal character, in entertaining alternative interpretations through the method of role-taking; their pride and the inflexibility of their systems of defense—these make therapy tedious, painfully difficult, and of very uncertain outcome. Usually the most that can be hoped for is the development of a relationship such that a paranoid person becomes convinced of the therapist's genuine impartiality and complete trustworthiness. He may then be willing to come for help whenever the old pseudo-community shows signs of reappearing or a new one seems to be organizing.⁸ This gives him at least one chance for social sharing with another and for the objectivity this engenders. A paranoiac who can develop even a lasting doubt concerning his false interpretations in areas of special sensitivity is already to that degree partially socialized in those areas. It is understandable that in practice a majority of these persons never succeed in achieving so much.

⁷ A. Meyer, "The Treatment of Paranoic and Paranoid States," in W. White and S. E. Jelliffe (eds.), *Modern Treatment of Nervous and Mental Diseases* (Philadelphia, 1913).

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⁸ O. Diethelm, *Treatment in Psychiatry* (New York, 1936), pp. 234-57.

HOW MUCH POST-WAR MIGRATION?

JEROME S. BRUNER

ABSTRACT

The present study is an attempt to assess the amount of post-war migration away from crowded industrial defense areas. Using the polling technique, it approaches the problem of migration by inquiring about people's expectations in the event that they lose their jobs after the war. Interviewing was conducted on a representative cross-section of the war labor force in eight major defense areas over the country. It was found that 36 per cent of the workers in these areas expect to move away if they should lose their jobs after the armistice. Central among the factors contributing to readiness for migration is the feeling that one's job will not continue after the war. In industries or in cities where this feeling is widespread—the shipbuilding city of Portland, Maine, for example—workers in large numbers are expecting to move out when the war ends.

Population shifts during periods of wartime production prosperity cast their shadows ahead into the peace that follows. It is a truism that the geographical distribution of heavy industry for war production is not adequate for the more balanced industrial pattern of peacetime. Reconversion to "normal" production will require extensive "re-migration." Some ghost towns will result—if not immediately after the war, then two or three years later.

Although economists are not yet ready to tell us, even in terms of probability, how many people will have to move after the war and to what places, there are, nevertheless, several important variables in the migration problem that can be investigated now. Although, traditionally, migration has been studied after the fact—the major datum being the shift of John Smith from Place A to Place B—it is relatively simple to investigate one aspect of migration before the actual act has occurred. This aspect we shall call "readiness for migration"—under what conditions *will* John Smith move from Place A to Place B.

Techniques have been developed for predicting the number of people who will attend a movie with such-and-such a plot and such-and-such principals. Elections

have been forecast. Market research does a fairly good job of predicting sales of a particular bauble before it has gone into production. Why not prediction of migration before the fact? This article is a first and tentative attempt to apply the techniques of market research, election forecasting, and public opinion polling to the problem of migration.

The problem in brief is this. Would warworkers move away from their present places of employment in search of jobs if they found themselves unemployed after the war? What sorts of people would move—skilled workers, recent migrants, aircraft workers, old men? How far away would they move?

The method used is the conventional polling interview. In order to approximate roughly the characteristics of the war labor force, interviewing was conducted in eight widely scattered war production centers: Detroit, Wichita, Buffalo, Pittsburgh, Portland (Maine), Mobile, Los Angeles, and Atlanta. Somewhat more than half of the respondents had been living in these cities longer than two years; the remainder were more recent arrivals. Semiskilled workers comprised half the sample, with the remainder equally divided between white-collar and skilled workers. The order of repre-

sentation by industry was as follows: aircraft and aircraft parts, shipbuilding and marine equipment, steel and smelting, automotive and machinery, munitions, and miscellaneous. A third of the workers were under thirty, almost six in ten were between thirty and forty-nine, and the remainder were in their fifties and sixties. In this first study only men were canvassed. A total of four hundred were interviewed, fifty in each city.

Interviewing was conducted in parking lots, at bus stations, in lunchrooms, around pinball machines. The time was early February, 1943.

Questions were designed to get the following information and opinions: how long the person had been in the city; where he had come from if he had migrated; whether he expected to keep his job or lose it after the war; whether he would move away if he did lose his job and where to; what sort of work he did; and what plant he worked in. The major questions on employment prospects and migration plans will be discussed in turn.

POST-WAR JOB EXPECTATIONS

Compared to the total labor force of the United States, warworkers are pessimistic about their chances of holding onto jobs after the war. Asked, "After the war is over, do you expect to keep your present job or do you think you will have to look for a new job?" 50 per cent thought they would be able to keep their present jobs, 35 per cent expected to look for new jobs, and the remaining 15 per cent were uncertain. A nationwide survey conducted by the Office of Public Opinion Research at the same time, using the identical question, indicated that 71 per cent of the total labor force expected to keep their jobs, 9 per cent thought they would lose them, while

the remainder were either uncertain or planned to stop working after the war.¹

If one takes the number twenty million as the size of the labor force engaged in war industry, our figure of 35 per cent expecting to lose their jobs amounts to some seven million warworkers. Whether this figure tallies with the estimates of economists on unemployment or reconversion lay-off is difficult to say because of wide variability of such estimates. Expert opinion of business and labor leaders indicates that the percentage expecting unemployment is not too high. A poll of one hundred and fifty national, regional, and state leaders of the Congress of Industrial Organization, conducted by the Office of Public Opinion Research, asked: "As you see things developing now, do you think the country will experience extensive unemployment, moderate unemployment, or little or no unemployment in the period immediately following the war during which industry will be converting to peacetime production?" Sixty-six per cent predicted extensive unemployment, which may be taken to mean between five and ten million unemployed. It goes without saying that any estimate may be thrown completely off by the extent of effective post-war planning.

READINESS FOR MIGRATION

Whether they expected to lose their jobs or not, all warworkers were asked: "If you did lose your present job after the war, would you be likely to move away from here to try to find work?"

¹ The Office of Public Opinion Research of Princeton University, of which the writer is associate director, is a project of the Rockefeller Foundation. In its interviewing work it uses its own field staff and, occasionally, the field staff of the American Institute of Public Opinion (Gallup Poll). The national survey referred to here was conducted by Gallup interviewers. The migration study utilized interviewers from both organizations.

Thirty-six per cent would move away, 58 per cent would stay on, and 6 per cent were undecided. In short, seven million two hundred thousand are ready to migrate in the event of widespread unemployment.

The reader should at once be cautioned about the social interpretation of these figures. At this writing there is no way of telling whether 36 per cent readiness for migration in the war labor force

exploratory study did not touch directly on these factors, casual comments from interviewers and respondents justify mentioning them in passing.

Who are the people most likely to migrate? Where did they come from? Where will they go?

Migration by occupational groups.—A surprising finding is that the three broad occupational groups treated in this sur-

TABLE 2

READINESS FOR MIGRATION IN THREE
OCCUPATIONAL GROUPS

In Case of Unemployment	White- Collar (Per Cent)	Skilled (Per Cent)	Semi- skilled (Per Cent)
Will move away after war.....	34	38	36
Will stay here after war.....	63	53	57
Uncertain.....	3	9	7
Total.....	100 n=100	100 n=119	100 n=190

TABLE 1

THE EFFECT OF POST-WAR JOB EXPECTATION
ON READINESS FOR MIGRATION

In Case of Unemployment	Expect To Keep Job (Per Cent)	Expect To Lose Job (Per Cent)
Will move away after war...	26	50
Will stay here after war...	66	46
Uncertain.....	8	4
Total.....	100 n=202	100 n=146

is "appallingly large" or "surprisingly small." *Any interpretation will depend entirely on the plans (or the lack of plans) for post-war production.* Only a complete lack of planning could convert this figure into cause for alarm.

MIGRATION AND JOB EXPECTATION

As one might expect, readiness for migration is far more common among those who expect to lose their jobs than among those who expect to continue in the same jobs after the war (Table 1).

Pessimism about post-war job prospects is, of course, only one psychological determinant of readiness for migration. Satisfaction with housing facilities, with school facilities, with the "atmosphere" of the town; status in the home town; failure to make friends in the new place—these, too, are factors which contribute to readiness for migration. Although this

vey—white-collar, skilled, and semiskilled—are equally ready to migrate should they lose their present jobs (Table 2).

This finding raises some thorny problems. Table 3 indicates that, although the three groups are equally ready to move after the war, the number of people in each group who lived in the community before February, 1940, is quite different.

As we shall see shortly, readiness for migration correlates negatively with length of residence. This negative correlation holds for warworkers in general and within any particular occupational group. Since this is the case and since as a group white-collar workers (the group which has been longest in the eight cities) are as ready to move as any other occupational group, there must be some other factor which operates to raise the over-

all readiness of this long-resident group to move away in the event of unemployment. It is difficult to isolate this factor. The most likely guess is that readiness for migration in these three groups reflects their expectations as to post-war employment. But Table 4 shows that this is not the case.

TABLE 3

RATE OF MIGRATION INTO WAR-WORK CENTERS OF THREE OCCUPATIONAL GROUPS

Length of Residence in War-Work Center	White- Collar (Per Cent)	Skilled (Per Cent)	Semi- skilled (Per Cent)
Less than a year.	8	16	26
One year to less than two.	18	17	17
Two to three years.	10	13	7
Over three years.	64	54	50
Total.	100 <i>n</i> = 100	100 <i>n</i> = 119	100 <i>n</i> = 190

TABLE 4

POST-WAR EMPLOYMENT EXPECTATIONS OF
THREE OCCUPATIONAL GROUPS

Employment Expectancy	White- Collar (Per Cent)	Skilled (Per Cent)	Semi- skilled (Per Cent)
Expect to keep job.	52	60	41
Expect to lose job.	38	24	42
Uncertain.	10	16	17
Total.	100 <i>n</i> = 100	100 <i>n</i> = 119	100 <i>n</i> = 190

Two other factors might be operative. The white-collar and skilled groups, it seems safe to assume, enjoy greater economic security than the unskilled. Within limits these two groups would be able to afford moving to some other place to look for work if their means of livelihood were cut off in their home communities. This much, of course, is speculation. A second

hypothesis is that the white-collar and skilled groups have a broader view of their possibilities for work, a broader view of the labor market. If such a broad view were related to educational level, the figures in Table 5, showing the educational level of the three groups would bear out this point.

No discussion of migration among different occupational levels should come to an end without making the obvious

TABLE 5

THE EDUCATIONAL LEVELS OF THREE
OCCUPATIONAL GROUPS

Educational Level	White- Collar (Per Cent)	Skilled (Per Cent)	Semi- skilled (Per Cent)
Grammar school or less.	5	15	39
High school.	30	65	54
College.	65	20	7
Total.	100 <i>n</i> = 100	100 <i>n</i> = 119	100 <i>n</i> = 190

point that, whether or not upper occupational levels are ready for migration in the event of unemployment, they are less likely to lose their jobs for long periods of time and are better able to support themselves in the event of temporary lay-off than are workers in the lower occupational brackets. These two factors point up the difference between readiness for migration and the act of migration itself.

Migration by age groups.—It is no surprise to find that readiness for migration in all age groups up to fifty is equally great and that those over fifty are the least likely to move. Table 6 presents the migration readiness of different age groups.

Migration by industrial groups.—Readiness for migration of workers in different industries is not so much a function of the

extent to which particular industries have expanded; rather, it seems to be influenced by the chances of a particular industry for continuing at present rates of production in the post-war economy. That much emerges from comments made by respondents. Whether they

TABLE 6
MIGRATION READINESS BY AGE GROUPS

In Case of Unemployment	Under Thirty (Per Cent)	Thirty to Forty-nine (Per Cent)	Over Fifty (Per Cent)
Will move away after war.....	36	38	20
Will stay here after war.....	60	55	70
Uncertain.....	4	7	10
Total.....	100 n=107	100 n=198	100 n=39

TABLE 7
READINESS FOR MIGRATION AMONG
WORKERS IN FOUR INDUSTRIES

In Case of Unemployment	Aircraft and Parts (Per Cent)	Shipbuilding (Per Cent)	Steel and Smelting (Per Cent)	Automotive and Machine (Per Cent)
Will move away after war.....	36	51	37	19
Will stay here after war.....	55	44	61	80
Uncertain.....	9	5	2	1
Total.....	100 n=172	100 n=100	100 n=60	100 n=54

guess correctly or not is a matter for individual judgment. Table 7 shows how many workers in each of four industries are ready to migrate in the event of unemployment.

Migration from the eight cities.—Readiness for migration of workers in the eight cities reflects the same tendency noted in

the discussion of the mobility of workers in various industries. Thus, shipbuilding cities lead the list, aircraft towns follow, and the rear is brought up by steel and automotive centers. The figures are shown in Table 8. Other figures in this table indicate that extent of in-migration² to these cities is also an important factor. To a consideration of the relationship of in-migration and readiness for migration after the war we turn next.

Migration by in-migrants and residents.
—That length of residence in a commu-

TABLE 8
READINESS FOR MIGRATION OF WORKERS
IN EIGHT CITIES

City	IN CASE OF UNEMPLOYMENT		
	Move Away (Per Cent)	Stay Here (Per Cent)	Uncertain (Per Cent)
Portland (60%)*.....	57	43
Mobile (75%)*.....	49	45	6
Los Angeles (46%)*.....	39	55	6
Wichita (40%)*.....	38	58	4
Atlanta (20%)*.....	37	61	2
Pittsburgh (36%)*.....	33	63	4
Buffalo (54%)*.....	23	54	23
Detroit (24%)*.....	13	80	7

* Figures in parenthesis represent the percentage of those interviewed in each city classified as "in-migrant."

nity has an influence on one's readiness to move from that community in the event of unemployment is obvious. Within limits, the longer one lives in a war center, the greater is the desire to stay on—even if one's job folds up (Table 9). During the first year of residence, to be sure, people are ready to leave in droves if their livelihood is cut off. During the second and third years the impulse to stay grows stronger. Perhaps, if the war goes on long enough, the desire to stay will grow apace with length of residence. It

² An "in-migrant" is defined as one who has moved to the city since February, 1940.

is certain, however, that the three years of industrial boom in big war centers have gone only a small way toward making in-migrants as eager to stay put where they are as are the permanent residents of the same areas. Only time will tell whether a long spell in wartime Wichita will make one wish for a still longer one in peacetime Wichita.

TABLE 9

READINESS FOR MIGRATION OF PEOPLE WHO HAVE LIVED IN WAR-WORK AREAS FOR DIFFERENT LENGTHS OF TIME

LENGTH OF RESIDENCE	IN CASE OF UNEMPLOYMENT			NUMBER OF CASES
	Move Away (Per Cent)	Stay Here (Per Cent)	Uncertain (Per Cent)	
Less than a year.....	72	21	7	76
One year to less than two.....	55	30	15	70
Two to three years....	57	37	6	40
Over three years.....	14	82	4	225

As one might expect, readiness for migration among those who have been living in a community for varying lengths of time is influenced by the fact that residents of long standing feel, on the basis of seniority or less tenuous factors, more secure about their jobs. We see this strikingly in Table 10.

Migration by people who moved from other states and those from the same state.—Is America so homogeneous that people who move from one state to another get no more homesick than people who have moved within the same state? The figures indicate that this is not the case. Out-of-state migrants are clearly readier for migration than are those from within the boundaries of the state where they now live. The figures appear in Table 11.

That this difference does not result

from difference in length of residence in war-work centers of the two groups can be seen in Table 12.

Where will people move?—The 36 per cent of the respondents indicating a readiness to migrate after the war in the

TABLE 10

POST-WAR EMPLOYMENT EXPECTATION OF PEOPLE WHO HAVE BEEN LIVING IN THE EIGHT CITIES FOR VARYING LENGTHS OF TIME

Length of Residence	Less than Year (Per Cent)	1-2 Years (Per Cent)	2-3 Years (Per Cent)	Over 3 Years (Per Cent)
Expect to keep job.....	32	34	47	62
Expect to lose job.....	49	46	37	27
Uncertain.....	19	20	16	11
Total.....	100 n = 76	100 n = 70	100 n = 40	100 n = 225

TABLE 11

READINESS FOR MIGRATION OF MIGRANTS FROM IN THE STATE AND FROM OUT OF THE STATE

In Case of Unemployment	In-state Migrants (Per Cent)	Out-of-state Migrants (Per Cent)
Will move away after the war.....	56	67
Will stay here after the war.....	35	23
Uncertain.....	9	10
Total.....	100 n = 86	100 n = 100

event of job loss were asked: "Where do you think you might move to?" Sixteen per cent thought they would move within the state, 19 per cent thought they would move out of the state, and 1 per cent were not sure where they would move.

What about the many people (44 per cent) who moved into these war-work areas within the last three years? What

will happen to them? Their potential movements can be summarized as follows:

Somewhat less than half of both migrant groups plan to make the same kind of move that brought them to their present place of work. It seems safe to

should be considered in post-war municipal planning.

Looking at the problem from a slightly different viewpoint, the places from which people migrated before the war industrial boom can count on only a 45-55 per cent population return after the war. This figure, taken in conjunction with Selective Service figures indicating that approximately 50 per cent of the armed personnel of the United States Army are ready to move to new centers after the war, points clearly to great population shifts after the war.

TABLE 12

LENGTH OF RESIDENCE OF IN-STATE AND
OUT-OF-STATE MIGRANTS

Length of Residence	In-state Migrants (Per Cent)	Out-of-state Migrants (Per Cent)
Less than a year.....	40	43
One year to less than two..	40	36
Two to three years.....	20	21
Total.....	100 n=86	100 n=100

TABLE 13

POTENTIAL POST-WAR MOVEMENTS

In Case of Unemployment	In-state Migrants (Per Cent)	Out-of-state Migrants (Per Cent)
Will stay where they are..	35	23
Are not sure whether to move or stay.....	9	10
Will move within the state..	45	17
Will move out of the state..	8	48
Will move, but don't know where.....	3	2
Total.....	100	100

conclude, therefore, that whatever conditions exist after the war—full employment or mass unemployment—this war will have effected some permanent changes in our distribution of population. Such redistribution creates pressing problems in community reorganization, which

CONCLUSIONS

1. Migration can be studied before the fact—indeed, should be studied before the fact as an aid to post-war planning. Plans for the relocation of industry cannot be fully realistic until they figure into their economic equation the potential mobility of various sections of the public.

2. Specific estimates of the movement of particular population groups in the event of unemployment are possible. The potential mobility, for example, of various occupational groups, age groups, industrial groups, migrants, and workers in particular cities is described.

3. The present survey, admittedly tentative in nature, merely scratches the surface. Readiness for migration can be studied more precisely, with a large battery of questions dealing with related problems, and in such a way as to serve as a guide to makers of post-war policy. The government has, at the time of writing, the facilities for such work in various agencies.

SOCIAL CAUSATION¹

FRANK H. KNIGHT

Professor MacIver's book is more a philosophical discussion of the meaning of causation, with reference to social phenomena, than an essay on scientific method, or even "methodology," in social science. What can be done in reviewing such a work, in a compass about one-twentieth that of the book itself, must be limited to indicating its general character and briefly discussing the author's position on a few major issues. To be useful, one must necessarily be somewhat negative; and to be brief, one must be somewhat dogmatic. The difficulties are rather especially great in the present case because of the unusual extent to which the reviewer finds himself in general agreement with the author's position and yet dissatisfied with its development and exposition, while recognizing the high intellectual and literary quality of the book. It is likely that the major differences of viewpoint between the reviewer and the author are connected with the reviewer's approaching the general problem more from the standpoint of a social science other than sociology—namely, economic theory, which in its methodology resembles natural science of the theoretical and quantitative type, represented by mechanics. The problem set by the title is, of course, to bring out what social causation has in common with causation in other fields of inquiry, and the important differences. Thus, the author's task calls for a survey of the whole field of knowledge and for an effort to distinguish its main divisions, from the standpoint of the types of explanatory thinking involved.

In the reviewer's thinking, the philosophical issue in the interpretation of causality centers in the ambiguous and varying relation between knower and known, or, in phil-

osophical jargon, between "subject" and "object." That is, the difficulty in the analysis of knowledge lies in the varying kinds and degrees of opposition or assimilation between these two entities. At one extreme we have the direct self-knowledge of the individual subject. Here the primary fact is assimilation or identity; and, while separation and interrelationship are evidently involved in the knowing relation, they present a peculiar difficulty for discursive thought and linguistic expression. At the other extreme we have the matter-of-fact knowledge, through sense-perception, of the external physical world of inert objects. Here the primary fact of common sense—especially in the modern, scientifically sophisticated variety—is opposition between knower and known. Yet philosophical analysis is forced to recognize that man is also a part of nature; and the superficial opposition also breaks down from the other side, for physical objects have an ultimate kinship with mind.

Between and around these two poles of thinking lie many complications and perplexities. Of these, the most important center in the intermediate and ambiguous position, for the individual knower, of other knowers, who have to be recognized as both objects and subjects, in a relationship which is fully as puzzling for the individual, though in a different way, as the relation between himself as knower and as known in his own self-consciousness. The crux of the difficulty here is that the individual must immediately recognize, as soon as he begins to think seriously about it, that all knowledge is itself "social"; it is based on intercommunication between individuals, each of whom is both subject and object, both to himself and to all others in the thinking community in which knowledge has its being. Apart from society, we can perhaps conceive of

¹ Boston: Ginn & Co., 1942. Pp. x+414.

mental life, but only in the sense of unordered, chaotic "fantasy" or the equally unorganized perception of the "buzzing, booming confusion" which William James attributed to the newborn infant. Certainly, neither would be "knowledge," to say nothing of understanding.

It seems to the reviewer that the first, and perhaps the major, hiatus in Professor MacIver's treatment is his complete failure to confront this fact of the social character of knowledge. From this point of view, human society is fundamentally intellectual activity. But modern thought cannot envisage man in any aspect without being driven back to a genetic and evolutionary view; and, from this standpoint, overt action is unquestionably prior to thinking, both in social life and in that of the individual. Our author fails completely (at least in this book) to give any explicit consideration to conduct, either individual or social, in its relation to thinking and knowledge. He does not mention the fact that in the animal kingdom, particularly in the "social" insects, we have empirical knowledge of society without thinking, as far as we know and must assume, while human association also is conscious only in part. In short, he ignores the functional significance of knowledge and thinking. Moreover, he has written a philosophical treatise without any explicit reference to the great historical schools of thought in the field of his subject—pragmatism, positivism, and idealism, to mention only the major divisions and contrasting positions. The result is, to this reader, confusing and difficult to interpret.

To come to grips with causation as the principle of order in the object-matter of knowledge, we begin by confronting the relations between subjectivity and objectivity, in the form of activity and passivity. This opposition enters into all interpretation of persistence and change. The final impression of the book upon the reviewer is that of a kind of vain twisting and turning, almost a squirming, through four hundred pages, in an effort to "have it both ways,"

in the conception of reality. There is equal insistence that causality is an *active* principle, and, on the other hand, upon concrete methods of problem-solving which are "scientific" in the sense of natural science as purely empirical, phenomenalist, and positivistic. The main criticism of the book is that the author sees both horns of this intellectual dilemma but fails to recognize it and to see that it has no real solution. The issue arises in connection with every type of subject matter, from physical science through psychology and sociology to the study of "values" in logic or epistemology, aesthetics, and morals. The author wrestles with it over a large part of the field, but he never makes clear either the issue itself or his own position toward it. Rather, he seems to take first one side and then the other, in bewildering confusion. In the mind of the reviewer the only tenable position is to recognize that causality always has both aspects; it is at once an empirical and a dynamic concept. Yet the two principles are logically opposed, even antithetical, in meaning. The nearest we can come to a solution is through a kind of pragmatism. For "practical" purposes—and this includes the purposes of knowing as well as of acting—we must adopt the empirical, descriptive view; causality is a matter of discoverable and describable order in phenomena. But it is also true that this empirical or positive knowledge is never satisfying and that, further, we never really stop with generalized phenomenal description; in the discussion of any subject matter we always use interpretive principles of a nonempirical, metaphysical, more or less dynamic, character.

This is conspicuously true in physical science, where the metaphysical principles in question take the form of "forces." (In modern physics these are replaced by "field theory," running in terms of some conception of "hyperspace," which is even further from empirical knowledge than is the concept of force.) "Force" has bothered students and thinkers from the beginning of modern science, and they have struggled to get rid of it (on the principle of "Occam's Razor")

and to use only equations of motion. But this simply cannot be done. Prerelativity physicists, notably Poincaré, made it clear that a purely empirical mechanics is impossible. The conception of some kind of "real interaction" between physical bodies is indispensable to thought. The simplest mechanical phenomenon—that of impact—cannot otherwise be pictured or thought of as real. Professor MacIver himself really argues for this position, throughout chapter ii, and effectively criticizes such phenomenologists as Pearson, Russell, Cohen, Ogden, and Richards, and the sociologist Lundberg, as well as Hume, who "reduce" causation to uniformity or regularity of sequence (p. 63). But he himself remains ambiguous as well as halfhearted. He really comes out with the positivist position that causality is simply "the ways of things" (an expression quoted from Montague), though the last section of the chapter insists upon the reality of the principle of causation as something more than empirical sequence (or accompaniment).

MacIver's position is weak in his refusal frankly to recognize that the positivists are right in insisting that causality in this "real" sense is "anthropomorphic" or animistic, epithets which to the scientific mind are even more damning than "metaphysical." Men cannot think about anything in wholly unanthropomorphic terms. This is hardly a mystery. Long before the advent of Ward and Whitehead, Huxley pointed out in connection with Hume's example of the billiard balls that we cannot finally picture physical objects as real—as persistently and actively real—without reading into them some rudiment of mind, some kinship with ourselves. Pure existence cannot be thought of entirely without activity, and the only intelligible meaning of activity is that of will. If one is determined to have a "monistic" theory of reality (which to this reviewer is absurd as well as dogmatic), it must certainly be formulated in idealistic terms. The difficulty with this position is that if it is carried to its logical conclusion it results in solipsism, or perhaps in the sheer dogma of an "absolute"

cosmic mind into which the reality neither of individual minds nor of "objects," as known to experience, can be fitted intelligibly.

The ambiguity and untenability of Professor MacIver's position—or his lack of a position—come out in his repudiation of indeterminacy with reference to the Heisenberg principle (p. 32), and most clearly in a long chapter on "Cause as Responsible Agent," where he comes nearest to confronting the fact of will (Part III, chap. viii). Here, while formally insisting on the nature of human beings as "dynamic participants" (p. 236) in the causal order and on the reality of the act of choice (p. 240), the substance of the argument reduces to the conventional positivistic "explanation" of freedom of choice as an illusion. The contradiction, or equivocation, is apparent throughout Parts III and IV, which present, respectively, the author's "Analytic Approach" and his "Interpretation." He argues nobly, effectively, and correctly for the reality of motives and for the necessity of taking them into account for the understanding of human behavior and social phenomena. But the nearest he ever comes to interrelating the two factors, empirical uniformity and "real" cause, is in the presentation of a sharp antithesis between the physical and the social realms. "The chain of physical causation does not need mind except for its discovery. The chain of social causation needs mind for its existence" (p. 263).

The antithesis is false in both its parts. Physical causation also ultimately needs mind, of a sort, to be "real"; and social causation does not need it and cannot use it for the purposes of "science," properly interpreted. The author presently adds:

There is no point in seeking to apply to social systems the causal formula of classical mechanics, to the effect that if you know the state of a system at any instant you can calculate mathematically, in terms of a system of coordinates, the state of that system at another time. We simply cannot use such a formula. It fits into another frame of reference.

But social "science," in so far as it goes beyond mere taxonomy and attempts to explain events and at the same time sticks to scientific concepts and methods, does use precisely this formula and no other. If it also recognizes conscious states or attitudes as a factor in its subject matter, these are treated as "epiphenomena," as simply "parallel" to the empirical order, without adding anything to the latter, and as superfluous for scientific discussion. Motives in human behavior play the same role in discussion as forces in mechanics; they are essential for ultimate intelligible interpretation, and in this case we know them as directly and as certainly as we know physical objects; but they are supernumerary, for science itself is descriptive and analytical. As far as science is concerned, free will, which is the only real dynamism, is either an illusion or simply a methodological limitation. Social science should recognize this limitation and admit that it has nothing to say about it beyond recognizing its existence as a limitation upon regularity and its place in our interpretive thinking. In so far as the activities of will are to be made intelligible, it is the task of philosophy and, perhaps, of literature and art.

However, the limitation due to freedom is relatively unimportant in a quantitative sense and with reference to any phase of social phenomena which anyone would think of discussing in scientific terms, in sober, nonfigurative language. Free choice, based on genuine mental activity and not finally explicable in terms of antecedent conditions, is of very limited scope even in the individual life, even though infinitely important. Its significance as a limitation of scientific treatment is greater the narrower the area within which one may be interested in "predicting," i.e., describing, in terms of reliable and stable patterns of uniformity of coexistence and sequence. But, even in the narrowest range, factors which we must call "caprice" and "accident" are indubitably more important than will or free choice in setting limits to scientific generalization, though the two categories cannot be clearly

distinguished. The great bulk of individual conduct, bodily and mental, must be conformable to established patterns as a condition of the individual's own effective functioning, specifically as a "free" individual; and this is more pronouncedly true of that part of his conduct which is properly called "social." For the most part, social phenomena come under the "laws" of physics and chemistry; of biology and psychology, including logic; and of anthropology, as the general science of culture.

If we examine social phenomena and our knowledge about them, with a view to discovering the differences between social and natural science, as science, the major difference will undoubtedly be found in the enormously greater role played by "history" in contrast with nonhistorical science. That is, the "independent variables" and the forms of their interrelations are to a vastly greater degree "functions of time"—of chronological as well as clock time—in comparison with the constant or recurrent features. Professor MacIver refers to history several times, particularly in section ii of chapter ix (from which we have quoted just above), which is entitled "The Special Case of the Social Sciences." He mentions "the unreturning stream of history" (p. 256) and here and elsewhere stresses the "uniqueness of historical configurations." But what he is interested in is the limitations of the experimental method, and he nowhere discusses the relation between history and science, in the narrower meaning in which it contrasts with history, or the relation between social science (in this narrower meaning) and human history.

There are, of course, historical sciences dealing with nature, inanimate as well as animate; such are historical astronomy or cosmology, geology (in contrast with physical geography), and evolutionary biology. But, when we speak of "science" without qualification or explanation, we naturally think of laboratory science or of statistical induction. The propositions of such sciences are hypothetical for the most part;

they describe associative relations among phenomena or events, not phenomena or events as actual, at a particular point in space-time. They run in the form of "if this, then that"—or, correctly speaking, if "this" is present in a certain magnitude or degree, "that" is to be expected to accompany or follow in some corresponding magnitude or degree. Professor MacIver's weakness with respect to the quantitative aspect of science will call for notice presently, in another connection. Our point at the moment is simply that the historical character of social data presents a difference from natural science only in degree, and no difference in the ultimate meaning of scientific method. The propositions of history, natural or human, are also essentially "timeless," in the metaphysical sense, in so far as history itself is scientific. This quality of science, even when it describes irreversible changes and nonrecurrent sequences, is surely familiar to anyone who has made any serious study of the philosophy of science. It is often expressed by saying that, for science, time is essentially a spatial dimension. The philosophy of Bergson in particular centered around the contrast between such time—mere duration—and "real time." The latter, as Bergson also emphasized, is intelligible only in terms of will—really active or creative change.

We have mentioned, as an important limitation of Professor MacIver's treatment, that he has so little to say about quantity and quantitative relations. This comes out particularly in his discussion of the notion of equilibrium and most specifically in his references to economics, which he uses as the main illustration of "error" in the use of the equilibrium concept (see especially chap. vi, sec. i, "Equilibrium and Precipitant"). The entire chapter, entitled "Cause as Precipitant," shows a predilection for the "romantic" view of causality, as centering in catastrophic events or discontinuities, and a repugnance for the conception of it as orderly process, and particularly for stable quantitative relations. The meaning of the very concept of an "event" is interpreted in this

way, which, of course, is in harmony with everyday usage, reflecting the interests of the man in the street. Numerous examples are cited, such as the spark which starts a forest fire, the assassination which precipitates a world war, etc.

It is true that there are such phenomena and that they present a certain difficulty for the quantitative conception of causality favored by scientific thinkers. That the difficulty is not insuperable for scientific method in general is proved by the simple fact that men are able to predict the consequences of such events, and even the events themselves and their magnitude, accurately enough to make such knowledge useful for action. The root of the apparent anomaly—the failure of quantitative correspondence between cause and effect—is well brought out by the case of a spark and the resulting conflagration or explosion. The phenomenon centers in the release of stored "potential energy"; this is admittedly a nonempirical, metaphysical conception and is somewhat repugnant to the scientific mind, but it has to be recognized and used in scientific thought. All the higher phenomena of life, everything beyond photosynthesis (which is the opposite phenomenon), consist essentially of the release of potential energy. All animal life is a species of combustion, including all that goes on in our own bodies. And practically all our control over natural phenomena, all our ability to use nature for human purposes, centers in the mysterious capacity of thought and will to direct the mode of release of potential energy in living and nonliving nature, beginning with our own nerves and muscles. To a limited extent we are also able to direct its accumulation, especially in agriculture. But the growing plant is finally no exception to the downhill flow of energy. Like a hydraulic dam, the fixation of a certain amount of carbon merely catches and temporarily imprisons a minute quantity of energy radiated from the sun.

Physical science recognizes unstable as well as stable equilibrium, but it is no exaggeration to say that in fact the latter is infinitely more important. And it is also vast-

ly more important in biological phenomena, and even in those of psychology, where apparent discontinuity and the absence of discoverable quantitative equivalence are most striking. Modern electronic physics is, indeed, based on the notions of ultimately unstable equilibrium and ultimate discontinuity. Here quantitative theory runs in terms of statistical probability. But for all "gross" phenomena, for all change subject to any kind of direct observation (with possible reservations for thought itself), an event, in the everyday meaning, is simply a case of exceptionally rapid change, and quantitative relations still hold between what happens and its "conditions."

What Professor MacIver says about economics tends to confirm the reviewer's impression that it is futile for an economic theorist to discuss the problems of this discipline with a sociologist. One or the other seems to lack those primary perceptions of fact and principle in this field which make relevant communication possible—and the question of which one it is can hardly be fruitfully discussed by the parties themselves. To begin with, the writer does not know of any expression by economists which has the implications criticized in the section referred to—e.g., that "change advance[s] by a series of jumps and halts as disturbances successively interrupt states of equilibrium" (p. 164), or that "change itself [is] the incidental and temporary interruption of a persistent order" (p. 169). We do not believe there is any implication in the writings of any recognized economist that the concept of equilibrium implies either stationariness or that change is "slow," whatever that may mean. And the word "normal," as used in the writings of reputable economists, has (as far as known) no other meaning than the reference to equilibrium under conditions defined with respect to the problem under discussion—and entirely different according to the problem. Consequently, such theory does not "minimize change in favor of the *status quo*" (p. 169) except as all scientific explanation of change runs in terms

of the unchanging. If one were to look for the "cause" of the sociologist's attitude toward economics (which is virtually that of the man in the street), it is not far to seek; it roots in the abhorrence of the romanticist for anything that can be interpreted as defending anything that exists, and the natural suspicion that this is what others are doing. However, it is true and important, if unfortunate, that scientific explanation of what is demonstrated that it is inevitable under the given conditions, which is easily interpreted as a defense.

The meaning of equilibrium in economic theory is best shown by a mechanical analogy. The explanation of a price (or, in fact, any other economic variable) is closely parallel to the explanation of the level of water in a tank or reservoir where water flows in by one pipe and out by another. Given the head of the inflow and the relevant characteristics of the outflow (and the density of the fluid), it is fairly easy to calculate the head in the tank itself which will equalize the two. But it goes without saying that this head will actually prevail only "at equilibrium," when the two rates of flow are in fact equal and the head is stationary *in relation to the given conditions*. There is, to repeat, absolutely no implication that these conditions will be constant over time. The intellectual confusion in denying the relevance of these equilibrium concepts centers in ignoring the practical significance of the role of time. If a change is introduced in any of the conditions taken as given, the actual level of the water in the tank at any moment could be predicted from all the given conditions; but it would be a complicated function of time, in relation to the "conditions" themselves as functions of time. The equilibrium method is practically indispensable in the interpretation of reality because the given conditions are changing, *not* because they are stationary. It is necessary because changes in the value magnitude to be predicted *lag* behind changes in the given conditions which ultimately determine it.

It is not usually possible to predict the

actual magnitude of a dependent variable at any moment, as a function of time, because the necessary data are not available. The use of the method is chiefly to predict the direction of change and to give some idea of the magnitude and speed of the change to be expected; this is possible to the extent that the changes of the independent variable themselves are predictable. These changes, in turn, can often and to a useful extent be predicted through the use of the same method, by bringing them into relation, as dependent variables, with others which are treated as independent, or causal, in relation to them. Thus, the method of economic theory on the whole proceeds by steps or stages from the variables of primary interest back to others which those who apply the theory—businessmen or statesmen—must know, as constants or as functions of time, deriving their information from factual data of the situation in which they act. Of course, it is a part of economic science as a whole to give instruction as to these data or the sources from which they may be obtained; but it is *not* a part of the task of general theory.

A vitally important fact which is almost systematically ignored by the critics of economic theory—including most specialists in other social sciences and many who are called economists, as well as the man in the street—is that the subject as expounded in modern times has been developed with definite reference to the practical needs of free society. This means that “society,” represented by the statesman, is not interested in the concrete content of the economic conduct of individuals. The practical relevance of economic theory is chiefly to the problems of social action. But in free society the objective of social control is not usually to make individuals behave in one particular way rather than in another; it is simply to create the conditions under which individuals will be able to realize their individual objectives to the maximum degree, i.e., to act harmoniously, with a minimum of conflict and mutual frustration.

Economic theory is the science which

deals with general principles, first, of individual conduct, from the point of view of quantitative means and ends. This is the meaning of “economic behavior,” which is one meaning of rational behavior. It takes individual ends as given and is concerned with the rational use of means in realizing ends, i.e., in realizing them to the maximum extent possible with the available means, including knowledge of the ways of using means (technology) as well as concrete resources, material and human. There seems to be some innate repugnance in human nature against this whole point of view, against rationally facing the problem of choice as a comparison of possible alternatives. Human nature seems to be fundamentally romantic in this regard; men in general hate any reference to “costs,” which means simply the deliberate comparison of alternatives.

This attitude (prejudice?) is reflected in such statements as that made by Professor MacIver to the effect that the works of an artist or a prophet are primary values because some people get direct satisfaction from them, while “a similar statement does not hold for the trader or the manufacturer or the banker or the engineer or the armament maker” because “the utilities they provide remain also means for those who provide them” (p. 278). To this writer such a statement is a sheer absurdity, a distinction without a difference. Books and pictures, and manufactured products, mercantile services, and anything that is salable are patently alike in being sources of direct satisfaction to their “consumers,” who pay money for them and so give up other satisfactions because they prefer these. What Professor MacIver presumably means is that “the direct satisfactions” in the one case are in some sense “higher,” on a scale of absolute values, than they are in the other. • We need not enter into a discussion of the question raised, beyond suggesting that the author might have said what he meant and observing that it does not fall in the field either of economics or of any other social science, unless this field is made to include all philosophy as the theory of utili-

mate values. And the answer to the question would not in any way affect the validity or significance of economics as a special science.

Only in a provisional and preliminary sense, however, is economics a science of individual behavior. In its main content it is a social science. It deals with interindividual relations, with co-operation or organization between individuals for increasing efficiency in the use of means to realize their ends. Modern economics treats chiefly of a particular form or mode of co-operative organization—that which is worked out through the exchange of goods and services in markets (more accurately, their purchase and sale against money as an intermediary in exchange). When economists approve or condemn the system, they are speaking as social or moral philosophers, or as ordinary human beings, and not as scientists. Whether they “ought” to do this or not is another problem of values. (But we may note again that any scientific explanation presents a superficial appearance of justifying the results which it explains, since it treats them as necessary consequences of causes.)

It is worth noting also that all “free” co-operation takes the general form of exchange. Moreover, it is difficult to discuss social relations in purely hypothetical or factual terms, entirely free of value judgments, especially if motives are taken into account. In particular, it is difficult to discuss social relations in the context of our own culture without assuming or implying that individual freedom is a good as well as a fact; hence, that the individual has a right to be the judge as to his own wants. It might be better if even these normative judgments were kept more clearly separate from scientific analysis than is usually done in economics textbooks; or it might not; that, again, is a question of values. But sociologists would hardly claim to be in a position to throw stones at economists on this point—and the statement applies to the work under review. As a sociological datum we may throw in the observation that the traditions of literature

and learning as well as religion manifest a romantic-aristocratic prejudice against “the market”; practically anything that has a connection with money is regarded as “sordid.” But the market is simply a mechanism for organizing relations of mutual advantage, which is assumed to be a good; and, incidentally, the free-market organization leaves any persons who do not like the terms of co-operation established in the market, by the meeting of minds of all interested parties, free to adopt any other terms on which they can agree as better.

These more detailed criticisms bring us back, by way of conclusion, to the larger issues raised by Professor MacIver’s treatment as a whole. This discussion must be reduced to the briefest compass and most summary form. The main issue centers in the relation between science and interpretation and the corresponding implications of the concept of causation. As already noted, Part IV, which comprises the last third of the work, bears the title, “Interpretation.” It starts out in the same general way as the book as a whole. The first section (of chapter x, “The Realm of Conscious Being”) deals with “The Dynamic Realms” and presents a classification more or less parallel with the “Modes of the Question Why,” distinguished in chapter i, section ii. As in the rest of the book, the author constantly insists on “real” causation, here under the name of “The Dynamic Assessment” (meaning essentially the rational evaluation of objectives); but, at the same time, whenever he gets down to the brass tacks of concrete problems, he insists on sociology’s being a “positive” science of descriptive analysis and generalization. This dualistic view is, in the mind of the reviewer, philosophically correct. The procedure is open to criticism, first, in the detail (but surely a very important detail) that the treatment of scientific method seems to strive to ignore the quantitative aspects of cause and effect and the logical method of “concomitant variations,” which has become nearly the whole procedure of modern inductive science. The au-

thor's theory of method ignores the conception of "function and variable"; and, even when he is explicitly discussing statistical procedure, he seems to strive to avoid quantitative correspondence as far as possible. In fact, of course, the "all-or-none" relationship is extremely rare in nature, if it occurs at all; and it is logically a special case of the broader principle. But our author prefers to think in terms of the methods of agreement and difference, with the main emphasis on difference (see especially p. 65 n.).

The more general criticism has to do with the failure to distinguish between science and interpretation and to bring out the relation between the two. In the abstract, or logically speaking, the method of science is the same, regardless of the nature of the subject matter. It consists in the discovery of uniformities of coexistence and sequence, regularities or stable patterns in the time and space relations of observed data, which are not apparent in the data themselves. The main differences in the meaning of causation in natural and social science center in two facts. The first is the meaning of observation. Strangely enough, our author does not mention this difference in either of his discussions of the major divisions of the field of knowledge. If the fact that social data are derived through intercommunication rather than through direct sense observation may be regarded as not belonging to the nature of causation, this certainly cannot be said of communication as an essential feature of the social process—unless one adopts the position of physical behaviorism, which the author is throughout particularly concerned to combat—and it is one of the most useful features of his book. Moreover, if intercommunicative activity is relegated to the realm of interpretation rather than to that of observation and induction—a kind of quasi-behaviorism—it nonetheless calls for explicit discussion in a book of this sort. But communication seems to be mentioned but once, and rather cursorily (in the concluding paragraph of the last chapter of Part III, p. 264), as incidental to the notion of "imaginative reconstruction."

With respect to the division of the field of knowledge, from the standpoint of principles of interpretation, the schemes given in chapters i and x are difficult to reconcile, and both seem vulnerable at many points. Attempts of this sort are, of course, familiar, especially from the hands of sociologists, back to the famous hierarchy of Auguste Comte. The results differ widely from one author to another, and the problem raised, however important, cannot be discussed here. But the writer would offer two or three criticisms of MacIver's second scheme (pp. 272-73), with only brief reference to the more elaborate (and more confused?) layout given in chapter i.

The first step is a division of all "Being" into three realms: the physical, the organic, and the conscious. These must be interrelated in some way with the scheme of four "nexi" (p. 271): the physicochemical, the biological, the psychological, and the social; presumably they correspond to the first three. The third is said to have three varieties, or aspects, "exhibiting, respectively, objective, motivation, and design"—all modes of "teleological activity." The author continues:

In this form of activity we introduce for the first time the relation of means and ends, the emergence into the realm of consciousness of the relation of organs and functions. As this form of activity becomes socially articulate, two interdependent systems or orders gradually become distinct, the system of apparatus or means, and the system of values or ends. These we designate respectively the technological order and the cultural order. The social order itself is the scheme of relationships between social beings. . . . In the social order the . . . social nexus for the first time appears [p. 271].

Then we are told explicitly that the three orders—cultural, technological, and social—lie "within . . . the realm of conscious Being" (p. 272).

After close study the reviewer finds much of this scheme unintelligible. We can understand the ideas of physical being, with and without life, and of life with and without

consciousness. -But the relation between conscious being and society is quite obscure. For symmetry, the meaning would be that conscious being may be either social or non-social; but in that case "social being" should be introduced as a fourth level. The intent of the discussion, in this chapter and in the book as a whole, seems to be rather to identify the social and the conscious. But the facts surely call for recognition both of conscious being, which is not social, and of social being, which is not conscious. Specifically with reference to human society and to its scientific discussion, in sociology and anthropology, conscious activity plays a highly various, problematic, and, on the whole, rather limited role. The distinctive interpretive conception would rather be habit, formed in the individual and transmitted in the group by unconscious imitation. And a place must certainly be made for social forms and changes which result unintentionally and unconsciously from acts which are individually conscious, in the sense of purpose or (conscious) teleology. If teleology is not restricted to conscious purpose, then the biological nexus of function all comes under this head. It would seem that the bulk of social process and change consists of activities which fall within the realm of behavior which lies somewhere in this region of the "functional" (in a broad, loose interpretation) but unintentional, whether conscious or unconscious.

The author's scheme not only leaves the order of categories confused and obscure but finds no place for conduct which is at once consciously social and consciously purposive, i.e., for all deliberate group activity.

That is, it excludes the phenomena of democratic political action and the similar activities of the infinite variety of voluntary, private associations—unless, again, these are to be dealt with in physical-behavioristic terms, in accord with the canons of positive science in the strictest and narrowest interpretation. If they are to be dealt with "realistically," in the higher meaning of the term and in accord with the position our author so ably espouses in the central section of his book, it is clearly necessary to recognize the category of "social mind," of group feeling and knowledge, and of group deliberation and choice.

Finally, the identification of values with ends conceals or denies one of the most important distinctions which has to be made in any realistic discussion of conscious teleology. This is the distinction between thinking or deliberating about the procedure for realizing given ends (the appropriate use of means) and deliberation about what ends to pursue, in terms of more general purposes or ideals. (Confusion on this point has been noticed in connection with the author's misconception of the meaning of the economic as a behavior category.) Partly, no doubt, because popular usage and thinking eschew anything resembling careful analysis, there is no established terminology for clearly referring to this distinction; but the minimum departure from general usage would seem to call for the use of the words "end" and "value" for the purpose—though value has other meanings, including both economic value (relative magnitude of different given ends) and even pure mathematical magnitude as such.

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

SOCIAL CAUSATION: A REJOINDER

ROBERT M. MACIVER

Being well aware that my treatment of the big and bristling problem of social causation is lacking at many points, I approached with great expectation the lengthy review written by Professor Knight. I did not look for comfort from it, but I did expect enlightenment. I was right only on the first count. An author is subject to the prejudices of paternity, but I submit to the judgment of the reader the unhappy conclusion that Professor Knight's abundant criticism has not contributed clarity.

My reviewer labels my book "a philosophical discussion of the meaning of causation." This I consider a misconception. I take cause to be an elementary and primary notion. In the two introductory chapters of my book I defend the experiential *reality* of causation against the Humian skeptics and their modern followers. I explain, however, that the argument of the work does not depend on these two chapters. My subject throughout is the problem of the discovery and attribution of causes in the field of the social sciences. It is to my treatment of this subject that the critical acumen of my reviewer should have been addressed. Instead, he goes off on a philosophical disquisition of his own, while charging me with not undertaking certain philosophically magnificent tasks that lay outside both my reach and my intention. Since the reader cannot gather the nature of my argument from the review, I may be permitted, in order to join issue with my critic, to state it succinctly, as follows:

The investigation of causes by students of the social sciences, whether their objective is practical or theoretical, is in a highly unsatisfactory condition. Frequently we are presented with a multiplicity of heterogeneous "factors," to which different weights are somehow assigned. Not infrequently the whole issue is evaded, the favorite expedi-

ents being the substitution of pattern for cause, the resort to a key cause, explanation in terms of putative origins, and the treatment of social change as merely the disturbance of a relatively permanent equilibrium. These conditions accentuate the necessity for the development of a methodology for the investigation of social change. To this task the work is largely devoted.

The inquiry into causes is stimulated by the challenge of a difference—between present and past, between a situation here and a situation there, between the actual and the expected, and so forth. It is this apprehension of difference that prompts every specific "why?" Following this lead, we arrive at a universal formula of causal investigation, which consists in the setting-up of two comparable situations, say S and S_1 , where S manifests the challenging phenomenon (x) while it is absent from S_1 . Thence, through comparative analysis and inference, through observation and experimentation, we seek to discover the particular nexus containing our x , as far as possible reducing our finally comparable situations to one (S_n) that contains the x -nexus and another (S_{n+1}) that differs only by the absence of the x -nexus.

Why, for example, does goiter prevail in some areas and not in others? Our initial areas may be, respectively, mountain and plain. Investigation soon shows that altitude is not directly relevant; and by successive elimination of nonrelevant differences we conclude that the goiter sequence—our x -nexus—is distinguished by the absence of iodine salts from one of the two areas. This discovery is not the whole story, for, in spite of it, we may very occasionally find cases of goiter not associated with iodine scarcity, and this new difference opens the way to a further investigation. But in every instance we segregate out of a larger conjuncture a nearer conjuncture that is the immediate an-

swer to our problem. The investigation of causes is always the pursuit of the specific linkage of a differentiating phenomenon.

Our example is not taken from the field of the social sciences, because the clearest instances occur, for reasons dwelt on in the text, in the fields of the physical and the biological sciences. We proceed to show that the same formula of investigation holds for the social sciences but that its application is complicated by certain differences of subject matter. These differences are briefly as follows: (1) The phenomenon under investigation is seldom a clean-cut distinction between situations but for the most part a matter of more or less—more crime, more unemployment, fewer births, and so forth. (2) Crucial experiment is less available and perhaps never fully available. (3) In the causal conjuncture there is present a subjective or psychological element—to which we apply names like “purpose,” “objective,” “motive,” “desire,” “drive”—that is not manifested in physical phenomena but nevertheless plays a dynamic role in social phenomena.

These conditions set the problem for the social scientist. He is embarrassed in the attempt to proceed from his first roughly comparable situations to a final pair. Another consequence is that the discovery of statistical ratios and quantitative relations generally is never the end of his causal quest but only a stage on the road. Another consequence is that the “factors” of the social conjuncture present a great apparent diversity, as though they belonged to different orders of reality: physical, biological, and psychological; the problem is to organize them *within a single frame of reference*. This frame of reference is found in the ends-means-conditions scheme, the unifying role being fulfilled by the “dynamic assessment.” To the application of this scheme the latter portion of the work is directed. The various types of causal investigation are classified on this basis, and examples of each type are analyzed to show how we can approach nearer to our goal of causal discovery.

I vainly hoped that Professor Knight

would supply an explicit appraisal of this treatment. Instead, he blows at me from every point of the philosophical compass before settling down to his own true north of scientific positivism. Science proper, he suggests, has no truck with interpretation. If we employ interpretative concepts, they are *ipso facto* nonempirical, “metaphysical.” When, for example, the physicist resorts to the concept of potential energy, he is introducing a “metaphysical conception, somewhat repugnant to the scientific mind.” In the next breath he tells us that “all the higher phenomena of life . . . consist essentially of the release of potential energy.” He ought to have put a decent interval between these two assertions! Seriously, it is time that social scientists cease to appoint themselves the guardians of the gates of science. “Abandon concepts, all ye who enter here.” Do they realize what it is they are demanding? If the concept of relativity is infected with metaphysics, if that of potential energy is so infected, every concept of science is so in its degree, including Professor Knight’s own favorite concept of equilibrium. Do they realize that every advance in *science*, from Ptolemy to Copernicus, from Newton to Einstein, is registered in the discovery, development, and application of newer concepts that more adequately explain or synthesize the phenomena of observation and experiment?

Starting from this barren dichotomy of science and interpretation, my reviewer sets up various dilemmas that exist only for those who espouse his own wavering positivism. Throughout, his attack is on the categories I use and not on the use I make of them, and sometimes he detaches these categories of mine so completely from their context as to convey a misleading notion of the main construction to which they belong. Many of his perplexities I am unable to share. Thus we are told that causality is at once “an empirical and a dynamic concept,” though the two principles are “logically opposed, even antithetical in meaning.” Since the “logical opposition” stems solely from Professor Knight’s postulates, my withers

are unwrung. I must leave it at that, for it would take too much space to examine the numerous issues of this kind that are raised in the review. I shall turn instead to a charge of a quite different kind.

Obviously, the problem of social causation is not peculiar to sociology but is common to all the sciences of society. I have therefore drawn my illustrations as freely from economics, jurisprudence, history, and political science as from sociology. Actually, for the discussion of this theme, there can be no demarcation between these various disciplines. If we limit ourselves within any one of them, the causal investigation of almost any social phenomenon remains abortive. The causes of a legal phenomenon are not themselves purely legal, or of an economic phenomenon purely economic. If there is a sphere of social science as distinct from that of sociology or economics or political science, the study of social causation assuredly belongs to it.

In dealing with what I call "equilibrium and precipitant," as one of the particular ways in which, for the sake of convenience, we circumscribe the investigation of social change, I pointed out that classical economic theory characteristically prefers to think in terms of "equilibrium and disturbance" and claimed that this approach, while it may be quite useful for other purposes, does not enable us to get to grips with socioeconomic *change*, since it minimizes the significance of change as against the significance of the status quo. This position has been upheld by a number of well-known economists, and in the text I quoted two of them. Along comes Professor Knight, exclaiming: "It is futile for an economic theorist to discuss the problems of this discipline with a sociologist." The sociologist's view of economics is "virtually that of the man in the street. . . . It roots in the abhorrence of the romanticist for anything that can be interpreted as defending anything that exists."

Something should be said about these generalities, but let us look at the particular

instance. First, I was concerned in the text solely with the efficacy of the equilibrium-disturbance concept as an approach to the interpretation of social change, and my conclusions in this regard are corroborated by the explicit statements of most reputable economists. My own citations (from Wesley Mitchell and Barbara Wootton) could have been greatly extended. Second, my acquaintance with economic theory somewhat exceeds that of the "man in the street," since I taught that subject for twelve years before "crossing over" to sociology. Third, the two passages quoted from the text by Professor Knight as examples of the kind of criticism falsely leveled at equilibrium economists are, I claim, fully justified in their setting. One of these, in which I speak of the view that change advances "by a series of jumps and halts as disturbances successively interrupt states of equilibrium," is applied in the text to certain legal theories without any reference whatever to equilibrium economics. The other, in which I speak of the view that change itself is "the incidental and temporary interruption of a persistent order," occurs in a general criticism of the validity of the equilibrium-disturbance concept, when employed *instead of the equilibrium-precipitant concept*, to the phenomena of social change. It implies no attack on the concept of equilibrium itself, no suggestion that it is not of great service in economic theory. It does imply, with especial reference to economists of the Marshall school, that the treatment of change as merely disturbance of a relatively permanent equilibrium fails to measure or to comprehend the far-reaching processes of social change. And for this position I have the authority of many modern economists.

Professor Knight has no justification whatever for speaking in this way of "the sociologist" or of "the economist." He is here in the prison of his stereotypes, and I wish something could be done about it. He is too good a thinker to be so confined. I would gently plead with him to abandon these academic images.

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

THE RELATION BETWEEN THE AESTHETIC STATUS OF A COMMUNITY AND ITS STATUS IN OTHER RESPECTS

E. L. THORNDIKE AND ELLA WOODYARD

For seven cities of Pennsylvania and western New York we have measurements of the aesthetic merit of an adequate sampling of (1) houses, (2) front yards, (3) schools and churches, and (4) goods displayed in shop-windows. The correlation of the combined score for one half of a city with that of the other half is .95; for the houses and yards with the score for schools, churches, and shopwindows, .60. The combined score is thus an accurate measure of the combination of the four features specified and apparently a rough index of general aesthetic quality. It is so computed as to give weights of $\frac{1}{8}$, 1, 1, and 1 to its four components.¹

We have also, for each of the seven cities, scores for the general goodness of life for good people (*G* score); for per capita income (*I* score); and for a composite of intelligence, morality, devotion to the family, and other desirable personal qualities of the population (*P* score).² Cities I, II, and III were chosen as especially high in *G* and Cities V, VI, and VII as especially low among northern cities. We also have a measurement of the intelligence-test score (Int. score) of a large sample of each city's children.³

Table 1 gives the resulting scores as deviation measures, "+" meaning superiority. There is clearly a substantial correspondence

¹ For a detailed description of the aesthetic measurements see the *Journal of Aesthetics*, No. 7 (1943), pp. 51-58.

² For detailed descriptions of these *G*, *I*, and *P* scores, see E. L. Thorndike, 144 *Smaller Cities*, pp. 97-101. The *G* score was a composite of 24 items such as the infant death rate (reversed), the per capita public expenditures for schools, and the infrequency of child labor. *I* was a composite of income tax, wage, and sales data. *P* was a composite of the percentage of illiteracy (reversed), the per capita number of homes owned, the per capita number of telephones, the per capita number of deaths from syphilis (reversed), and the per capita number of deaths from homicide (reversed).

³ *Journal of Educational Psychology*, XXXIII, 641-56.

between the score for the aesthetic quality of houses, yards, churches, schools, and shopwindow displays and all the other scores. The coefficients of correlation are, in fact, .77 with *G*, .82 with *I*, .97 with *P*, and .80 with Intelligence. In view of the fact that there were only seven cities and that cities high or low in *G* among cities

TABLE 1
DEVIATION MEASURES OF EACH OF
SEVEN CITIES*

	<i>E</i> (Houses, Yards, Shop- windows, etc.)	<i>G</i> (Welfare)	<i>I</i> (Income)	<i>P</i> (Personal Qualities)	Int. (Intelligence of Children)
City I.	+ 6	+6	+19	+6	+ 3
City II.	+ 1	+3	+ 5	+3	+ 4
City III.	+ 2	+3	+ 9	+3	+ 6
City IV.	0	+1	+ 2	-1	+ 3
City V.	+ 2	-3	- 4	+1	- 3
City VI.	- 8	-4	-12	-9	-11
City VII.	- 3	-5	0	-2	- 4

* For *E* and Intelligence, deviations are from the average of the 7 cities. For *G*, *I*, and *P*, deviations are from the median of 144 cities of 20,000-30,000 residents.

of twenty to thirty thousand were somewhat favored in the selection of the seven, these correlations may be given a wide margin of possible error. But until further evidence is obtained from other cities they make it highly probable that the aesthetic status of a city is determined in large measure by the same factors that make it score high in welfare, income, and desirable personal qualities in its population, including the intelligence of its children. The differences among communities in good taste seem to be positively associated with differences in the intelligence, morality, and competence of their residents.

TEACHERS COLLEGE
COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

IN MEMORIAM
NICHOLAS JOHN SPYKMAN, 1893-1943

FREDERICK J. TEGGART

In the summer of 1920 I had the pleasure of a call from a young man in his later twenties who had just arrived in California from Batavia, Java, and who expressed the ambition to prepare himself for a career in which he would be able to contribute to a better understanding of world affairs. Mr. Spykman made the instant impression of an attractive personality, of one accustomed to social intercourse and at his ease with strangers, and of a man of more than ordinary intelligence. His interest in world politics had been fostered by his early life in Holland (where he had attended Delft University); by his observation of the events of 1914; and by his experiences from 1916 to 1920 in the Near East, where he was attached to the Dutch Diplomatic Agency at Cairo, and in the Dutch East Indies.

At the University of California Spykman devoted himself eagerly to the study of political science, economics, and social institutions; he took his Ph.D. degree in 1923, with a thesis on *The Social Theory of Georg Simmel*, published by the University of Chi-

cago Press in 1925. In 1925 he received an invitation to Yale University and was there promoted to the position of professor of international relations in 1928. From 1935 to 1940 he was chairman of the department of international relations and director of the Institute of International Studies.

Spykman's most important contribution was his *America's Strategy in World Politics*, published in 1942, a book which exhibits his deep appreciation of the difficulties which will inevitably confront this country in the peace settlement after the war. Despite the fact that this book has been well received and widely read, I feel that it does less than justice to the wide knowledge and understanding of world problems which the author exhibited in personal conversation and public discussion. He had broken ground on a subject of the greatest difficulty, and one of national importance, and time was not allowed him to embody his knowledge and judgment in mature expression.

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA

NEWS AND NOTES

Alfred University.—Roland L. Warren, head of the department of philosophy and sociology at Alfred University, has been on leave of absence since May 1, 1943, with the United States Naval Reserve. He is training at the Naval Training School, Harvard University, for duty as a communications officer.

American Red Cross.—Seventy-five scholarships in medical and psychiatric social work will be made available to eligible candidates between July 1, 1943, and July 30, 1944, by the American Red Cross, it has been announced. These are a continuation of the program initiated last December, under which approximately sixty scholarships have been granted.

Upon successful completion of the scholarship training, students will be assigned to positions on Red Cross staffs in military hospitals where the need for well-qualified personnel has rapidly expanded because of the war.

Candidates may designate the school of their choice from a list of social work schools offering an approved course in medical and psychiatric social work. Educational requirements include successful completion of one year of graduate work in an accredited school of social work, and it will be necessary for each applicant to apply directly to the school of his choice to obtain approval for admission. Awards of full tuition and sixty-five dollars a month for maintenance will be made according to the individual qualifications of the applicant in order of receipt of the applications by the assistant director of Red Cross Military and Naval Welfare Service, Hospital Service, in the four following Red Cross area headquarters: North Atlantic Area, 300 Fourth Avenue, New York City; Eastern Area, 615 North St. Asaph Street, Alexandria, Virginia; Mid-

western Area, 1709 Washington Avenue, St. Louis, Missouri; Pacific Area, Civic Auditorium, San Francisco, California.

Application forms may be obtained from any of the above addresses or the Personnel Training Unit, Services to the Armed Forces, American Red Cross, Washington, D.C.

Seventy-five Red Cross scholarships will be available July 1 to selected persons eligible for training in approved schools of social work, Red Cross Home Service announced today. These are being made available to provide the organization with a larger number of home-service workers.

Candidates for scholarships must be between the ages of twenty-two and forty years. They must be graduates of an accredited college and acceptable for admission to schools of social work accredited by the American Association of Schools of Social Work.

Scholarships provide full tuition and an allowance of sixty-five dollars a month toward maintenance for a period of one academic year.

The scholarship plan is under the immediate supervision of the home-service directors in each of the four Red Cross area offices: Eastern Area, 615 North St. Asaph Street, Alexandria, Virginia; North Atlantic Area, 300 Fourth Avenue, New York City; Midwestern Area, 1709 Washington Avenue, St. Louis, Missouri; Pacific Area, Civic Auditorium, Larkin and Grove Streets, San Francisco, California.

Division of Statistical Standards, Bureau of the Budget.—On June 24 the President transmitted to Congress a "Report of the Bureau of the Budget on Measures Relating to Vital Records and Vital Statistics." The President some months ago instructed the bureau to study the problems which have re-

sulted from an unprecedented volume of demands for documentation of the status of individuals in wartime. In attempting to keep pace with these demands, state and local registration offices have been forced into serious neglect of their normal statistical work. On the ground that before American vital statistics can be made as good as they should be there must be fundamental improvements in the process of registering and recording vital facts, the Budget Bureau's report recommends creation of a national vital-records office as a separate unit in the United States Public Health Service. Choice of the location of the proposed office was dictated by the fact that in every state but one the registration of vital records is a function of the state department of public health; and it is felt that co-ordination and encouragement of state activities in this field can best be carried on by the federal agency with which state health authorities have the closest general relationships.

Before the Budget Bureau's report was completed, a bill (*S. 1096*) providing for the creation of a bureau of vital records in the public health service and for the transfer to it of the functions of the present Division of Vital Statistics of the Bureau of the Census was introduced in the Senate by Senator Josiah W. Bailey at the request of the Association of State and Territorial Health Officers. The bill has been referred to the Senate Committee on Commerce, which Senator Bailey heads.

University of Denver.—The School of Social Work offers a series of short, intensive conference courses for social workers and others interested in social welfare problems growing out of the war. These courses and the dates of each are as follows:

July 28–August 10—"American and British Plans for Social Security": The nature and scope of the Beveridge plan and the proposals of the National Resources Planning Board will be presented and the various aspects of these recommendations discussed critically, based upon a presentation of the existing measures.

August 16–20—"Community Services in Housing of War Workers": A survey and analysis of housing problems resulting from war needs will be presented with emphasis upon the social implications revealed in the tenant selection and community service practices of the War Housing Developments.

The Social Science Foundation of the University of Denver sponsored the second conference on "Humanities during and following the War" in Denver on May 1 and 2. Dr. Waldo Leland, director of the American Council of Learned Societies, spoke at the morning session on "International Cultural Relations: Historical Considerations and Present Problems."

The first-term program at the University of Denver School of Social Work will include an inter-American workshop. The Federal Office of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs and the Social Science Foundation of the University are co-operating in this activity. The theme of the workshop is "The Spanish-American Minority in the Southwest and Inter-American Relations." Emphasis will be put upon the economic, social, cultural, and other influences at work among the Spanish-American peoples of the Southwest as major factors contributing to the satisfactory inter-American relations. Students will have an opportunity for individual conferences with consultants and for group discussion. Morning periods will be open for consultation, meetings of special-interest groups, class visitation, library research, and other informal activities, including instruction for those studying languages. Afternoon meetings of a formal and informal nature will be scheduled. These will center around a number of special phases of the total workshop progress. Each week will feature one or more of these units, which will bring to workshop students specialized information to be integrated into the area of study being pursued by them.

Students of languages may study Spanish and Portuguese as a part of the workshop program. Other phases of the workshop activity can be utilized to point up the use of the language in its relation to other

cultural and practical phases of the total experience. Persons with knowledge of the languages may apply it in the study of reference materials in developing facility in its use.

Free China.—(1) Teaching of sociology in the universities: Teaching of sociology in Free China is now concentrated in three centers—Chungking, Kunming, and Chengtu. In Chungking and its suburbs there are two universities with sociology departments, namely, the Central University and Fu-tan University. Dr. Pen-Wen Sun, dean of Chinese sociologists, has been the moving spirit of sociological activities in Central University. His *Principles of Sociology*, which is comparable to many books of its kind published in the United States, has been the leading textbook used in all Chinese universities. During the war he has published four volumes on Chinese social problems, works which have been well received by the Chinese public. In Kunming the Southwest Associated University, which is a combination of the former Peking National University, Tsing Hua University, and Nankai University, has one of the biggest sociology departments in Free China. Its faculty members, consisting of Ta Chen, Quentin Pan, Charles C. L. Wu, C. H. Li, and S. C. Li, are widely versed in this field. Courses are given in both theoretical and applied sociology. There is a research institute conducted by Dr. Ta Chen for the study of population problems and for the experimentation in methods of taking the census in China. The National Yunnan University, which is also situated in Kunming, has a small, but vigorous, sociology department. Under the leadership of Dr. Shao-Tung Fei a number of young sociologists have gathered together and carried on an ambitious program of research on rural communities in Yunnan. Several monographs have been published which have thrown a great deal of light on changes in rural life during the war. In Chengtu three refugee universities—the University of Nanking, Yenching University, and Ginling College—still retain

their sociology departments. Both Nanking and Yenching universities are interested in the study of primitive tribes around the border of China.

(2) Sociology and the government: Many former professors of sociology have been asked to serve in the government during the war. Dr. W. S. Wu is now a counselor of the supreme Defense Council; Dr. Kato Yang is head of a division of the Foreign Trade Commission; and Dr. H. C. Chang is head of the research department of the newly created Ministry of Social Welfare—all were formerly professors of Yenching. Dr. C. C. Wu, formerly of Tsing Hua, has been with the Ministry of Economic Affairs since its establishment in 1938. There are two governmental organizations which have drafted many sociologists to serve in their committees. One is the Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs Commission. This commission has been keenly interested in the social life of tribes in those areas and has asked many sociologists to work out plans of research and actually direct the work. Another governmental organization which has close contact with the sociology departments in the universities is the Ministry of Social Welfare. It has established a committee on social policy, on which nearly all sociology professors in leading universities have been asked to serve as members. Once in every three months the committee is called into session; and social policies with regard to population, child welfare, social relief, and social insurance are thoroughly discussed in the meetings. The committee is intrusted to work out practical means of carrying out some of the most important functions of the ministry.

(3) The Chinese Sociological Society: The Chinese Sociological Society was formed in 1928 to further the interest of teaching and research of sociology in China. Before the war its activities consisted mainly of the publication of a quarterly and the holding of an annual meeting to discuss problems of social interest and to read papers on findings of research. Since the war, owing to lack of funds and the difficulty of publication, the

activities of this society have been greatly curtailed. Recently, the Ministry of Social Welfare became interested in the work of the society and persuaded its officers to revive its annual meeting. Accordingly, an annual meeting was held simultaneously at Chungking, Kunming, and Chengtu last February. Its main theme was "Social Reconstruction after the War," and about twenty papers were read at each place. The same ministry is also interested in reviving the publication of the society, and with the ministry's pecuniary help a plan is under way to publish a monthly for the discussion of social problems and social research. This magazine, if published, will be under the auspices of both the ministry and the society.

Michigan State College.—Beginning July 15 some three hundred men in the Army Specialized Training Program were assigned to the college for thirty-six weeks of intensive area and language instruction. Together with the air corps trainees and engineers, this makes a total of over three thousand. The department of sociology is assisting in area study and is furnishing instruction for four of six classes. Professor Clayton Watts, who has been absent on leave since the close of the winter term as a social economist with the War Board in Detroit, was released to teach two of the classes in the program. Dr. Paul Honigshiem is responsible for the other two classes, and Dr. Banzet is teaching history to the army engineers. These three men are now devoting full time to the army instruction program.

In addition, the department is offering work in both the traditional six-weeks summer school and the new full summer session. To meet the demands of the war situation and various needs in the field of sociology, it is expected that the undergraduate social work course will be offered next July, while the one in the graduate school will be abandoned for the duration.

Highlands University (N.M.).—An inter-American workshop, sponsored by the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs, and un-

der the directorship of Professor Quincy Guy Burris, was conducted on the campus between June 7 and July 16 for twenty carefully chosen Spanish-speaking students from rural communities. Its purpose was to elevate the general standards of the Spanish-speaking minority in New Mexico and thus enable it to serve as the bridge between the two Americas, on the theory that this state is the shortest route to Mexican good will and that it is necessary to work in close harmony with Mexico and to heal the open sore created in the Pan-American body by the distressing situation of Spanish-American citizens and Spanish descendants in the midst of our vaunted democracy. Among the outstanding specialists were: Dr. Charles P. Loomis, senior social scientist of the Bureau of Agricultural Economics, Dr. Michel Pijoan of the Indian Nutrition Laboratory, and Dr. Joseph S. Roucek, of Hofstra College, who lectured on the sociological aspects of minorities problems. The results of the work of the workshop will be dramatized this fall in thirty radio broadcasts in Spanish over station KFUN; the scripts are to be prepared by Ramon Sender, a well-known Spanish novelist, for the students of the course, who are to form listening and discussion groups in their communities.

New York Medical Society for Psychodrama and Group Therapy.—The New York Medical Society for Psychodrama and Group Therapy has elected the following officers: J. L. Moreno, M.D., president; Frederic Feichtinger, M.D., secretary.

Oklahoma Agricultural and Mechanical College.—Robert Turner McMillan (B.S., M.S., Oklahoma A & M College), associate professor of sociology and rural life, received the Ph.D. degree from Louisiana State University in June, 1943. The title of his thesis, which was completed last summer, is "The Interrelation of Migration and Socioeconomic Status of Open Country Families in Oklahoma."

William Lester Kolb (A.B., Miami; M.A., Wisconsin); assistant professor of sociology,

received the Ph.D. degree from the University of Wisconsin at the end of May, 1943. The title of his thesis, which was completed in April, is "The Peasant in Revolution: A Study in Constructive Typology."

John C. Belcher (B.S., Oklahoma A & M College, 1943) has been appointed graduate assistant in rural sociology at Louisiana State University, effective July 1, 1943.

Pacific Sociological Society.—The Northern Division of the Pacific Sociological Society held an abbreviated session in Salem, Oregon, April 16. Dr. John C. Evans, superintendent, Oregon State Mental Hospital, was the host for the luncheon. More than forty people, including Governor Earl Snell, administrators of state institutions, and other state officials, attended this luncheon.

The central theme for the luncheon meeting was "American Correctional Institutions in Wartime." Mr. David Lockwood, director of the Washington State Department of Finance, Budget, and Business, acted as chairman. Mr. Richard A. McGee, supervisor of institutions in Mr. Lockwood's department and president of the American Prison Association, spoke on "Washington State Correctional Institutions in Wartime." Dr. Coral W. Topping, sociologist, University of British Columbia, and author of *Canadian Penal Institutions*, presented a paper on "Recent Trends in Canadian Penal Institutions." (This paper will be published soon in *Prison World*, edited by Mr. McGee.)

President G. Herbert Smith, of Willamette University, was the host of the Society for the afternoon meeting, which was held on the Willamette University campus. Special attention was given to "The Sociology of War." Dr. Norman S. Hayner, of the University of Washington, vice-president of the Pacific Sociological Society in charge of the Northern Division, acted as chairman. Dr. Elon H. Moore, of the University of Oregon, presented a paper on "The Social Functions of War," which was discussed by Dr. William C. Smith of Linfield College. The second paper, "Morale in

the Shipbuilding Industry," was written by Dr. Joseph Cohen, of the University of Washington. Dr. Cohen's paper was criticized by Dr. Glenn A. Bakkum of Oregon State College. Both these papers will be published in the 1942 *Proceedings of the Pacific Sociological Society*.

University of Washington.—Dr. Jesse F. Steiner has been appointed a public member of the Pacific Northwest Regional War Labor Board.

Leaves of absence have been granted to Dr. Joseph Cohen and Dr. Elton Guthrie. Dr. Cohen is on the staff of the regional office of the United States Housing Authority, and Dr. Guthrie is with the regional office of the Office of War Information.

Mrs. Laile Eubank Bartlett, associate in sociology, has been chosen director of the Seattle Students-in-Industry Project, sponsored by the National Student Council of the Young Women's Christian Association. Seattle represents one of the twelve centers chosen for these projects, the purpose of which is to combine an academic program with full-time work in a local industry or in agriculture during the summer months.

Mr. Robert W. O'Brien, instructor in sociology, and assistant to the dean, has returned to the university after six months' leave with the War Relocation Authority.

Wayne University.—Norman D. Humphrey, instructor in anthropology at Wayne, received his Ph.D. in sociology in June from the University of Michigan. His dissertation deals with Mexican immigrants in various American urban centers and with their background in Mexico. Dr. Humphrey also received his M.A. and his M.S.W. from the University of Michigan.

Thelma James, H. Warren Dunham, Norman D. Humphrey, and Alfred McClung Lee have launched a project to prepare an "ethnic map" of the city of Detroit and pertinent environs. In their work they have the co-operation of the Detroit Bureau of Government Research, through Rose Mohaupt, and of the Metropolitan Detroit

Council of Social Agencies, through Florence Cassidy.

The 1943 summer faculty at Wayne University includes H. Warren Dunham, Maude Fiero, Donald C. Marsh, Frank E. Hartung, Norman F. Kinzie, Norman D. Humphrey, and Alex Linn Trout.

Fritz Redl, associate professor of social work, will teach and conduct research in the workshop on later childhood and early adolescence at a fresh-air camp sponsored jointly by the University of Michigan, Wayne University, and other interested organizations.

Alfred McClung Lee, chairman of the Wayne department of sociology, is conducting research for the United States Department of Justice in its case against the Associated Press as a monopoly in restraint of trade and in violation of press freedom.

Wheaton College (Mass.).—Dr. Margaret I. Conway has just been appointed as assistant professor of sociology. Miss Conway is a Ph.D. from the University of Minnesota (in 1939) and since then has been teaching at Whitman College, Walla Walla, Washington.

HIGHER DEGREES IN SOCIOLOGY CONFERRED IN 1942

According to reports received by the *Journal* from institutions offering graduate instruction, 56 doctoral degrees and 121 Masters' degrees in sociology were conferred in the calendar year 1942 by 37 institutions in the United States and Canada. This list includes only those institutions which require dissertations or theses. Because of lack of space, degrees, dissertations, and theses in the field of social work are not included.

DOCTORS' DEGREES

- Janina Gdulewicz Adamczyk, B.S., M.A. Northwestern, 1929, 1930. "The Relation of Problem-solving Behavior to the Structuralization of Social Groups." *Northwestern*.
- Chester Stephen Alexander, Ph.B., M.A. Chicago, 1929, 1932. "Antipathy and Prejudice: A Study of the Distinctions between These Two Phenomena." *Chicago*.
- Sidney Axelrad, B.S. City College of New York, 1933; M.A. New York University, 1937. "The German Front Reports in the Russian Campaign: A Study in Propaganda Analysis." *New School for Social Research*.
- Edward Jackson Baur, B.A., M.A. 1935, 1938. "Voluntary Control in the Advertising Industry." *Chicago*.
- Gilbert W. Beebe, B.A. Dartmouth, 1933; M.A. Columbia, 1938. "Contraception and Fertility in the Southern Appalachians." *Columbia*.
- Egon Ernest Bergel, Dr. Jur. Vienna, 1918; M.A. Harvard, 1941. "The Class Phenomenon." *Harvard*.
- Julia Saparoff Brown, B.A. Radcliffe, 1936; M.A. Wisconsin, 1938. "Factors Affecting Union Strength." *Yale*.
- Carl F. Butts, B.S. Northwestern, 1935. "The Shakers: A Case Study in Social Variation." *Yale*.
- Clifford M. Carey, B.A. Lake Forest College, 1930; M.A. Northwestern, 1933. "Current Practices in Group Work." *Southern California*.
- Stanley Hastings Chapman, B.A., M.A. Yale, 1933, 1942. "New Haven Churches: A Study of Their Structure and Function in the Community." *Yale*.
- Charles Wesley Churchill, B.A. Dana College, 1934; M.A. New York, 1940. "The Italians of Newark: A Community Study." *New York University*.
- Pearl E. Clark, B.A., M.A. Montana, 1916, 1917. "The Social Unadjustment Problems of a Selected Group of Junior College Girls." *Southern California*.
- Marion Vera Cuthbert, B.S. Boston, 1920; M.A. Columbia, 1931. "Education and Marginality: A Study of the Negro Woman College Graduate." *Teachers College, Columbia*.
- Alice W. Davis, B.A. Radcliffe, 1915; B.S. Richmond Division, William and Mary, 1939. "The Growth of the Technicways: A Study in Societal Change." *North Carolina*.
- Ethelyn Davis, B.A., M.A. Southern Methodist, 1935, 1936. "The American Colony: A North American Adjustment to Life in Mexico." *Missouri*.
- Nicholas J. Demerath, B.A. DePauw, 1934; M.A. Harvard, 1938. "Adolescent Status and the Individual, with Special Reference to Schizophrenia." *Harvard*.
- Stephen E. Epler, B.A. Cotner, 1932; M.A. Nebraska, 1933. "Honorary Degrees in the United States of America." *Teachers College, Columbia*.
- Ephraim Fischhoff, B.A. City College of New York, 1924; M. Hebrew Litt. Jewish Institute of Religion, 1928. "Max Weber and the Sociology of Religion, with Special Reference to Judaism." *New School for Social Research*.
- David Martin Fulcomer, B.A. Macalester College, 1932; M.A. Minnesota, 1937. "The Adjustive Behavior of Some Recently Bereaved Spouses: A Psycho-sociological Study." *Northwestern*.
- Herbert Goldhamer, B.A., M.A. Toronto, 1929, 1931. "Some Factors Affecting Participation in Voluntary Associations." *Chicago*.
- S. Earl Grigsby, B.S., M.A. Louisiana State, 1935, 1937. "A Socio-economic Study of Families Living on Marginal Land." *Cornell*.
- Gordon Grosvenor, B.A. Bryn Mawr, 1939.

- "Government Control of Internal Rural Migration in the United States." *Yale*.
- Louis Guttman, B.A., M.A. Minnesota, 1936, 1939. "The Prediction of Quantitative Social Variates by Factor Analysis." *Minnesota*.
- Harry C. Harmsworth, B.A., M.A. Colorado State College of Education, 1928, 1932. "Social Phases of the Co-operative Insurance Movement in the United States." *Southern California*.
- Robert Harper, B.A., M.A. Ohio State, 1938, 1939. "An Exploratory Questionnaire Study of Conforming and Nonconforming Behavior." *Ohio State*.
- William Cecil Headrick, B.A. Southwestern College, 1926. "A Study of Social Stratification with Reference to Social Class Barriers and Social Class Rigidity." *New York University*.
- Oscar Frederick Hoffman, B.A. Mississippi House College, 1924; M.A. Wisconsin, 1929. "Culture of the Centerville-Mosel Germans in Manitowoc and Sheboygan Counties, Wisconsin." *North Carolina*.
- Roy E. Hyde, B.A. Louisiana State Normal College, 1927; M.A. Louisiana State University, 1932. "Social Stratification of Cotton Farmers in the Hills and Delta of Louisiana." *Louisiana State*.
- Charles E. Ironside, M.A. Aberdeen, 1920. "The Family in Colonial New York: A Sociological Study." *Columbia*.
- R. W. James, B.A., M.A. Chicago, 1936, 1938. "The Collective Action Involved in the Removal and Relocation of Shawneetown, Illinois." *Illinois*.
- Elizabeth Dewey Johns, B.A. Chicago, 1934. "Chicago's Newspapers and the News: A Study of Public Communication in a Metropolis." *Chicago*.
- Harold F. Kaufman, B.A., M.A. Missouri, 1938, 1939. "Significant Social Groups in a New York Rural Community." *Cornell*.
- Fenton Keyes, B.A. Yale, 1937. "The Correlation of Social Phenomena with Community Size." *Yale*.
- Herbert Lohrman. "The Role of Field Experience and Agency Participation in Teacher Education." *Ohio State*.
- Edward C. McDonagh, B.A., M.A. Southern California, 1937, 1938. "Social Phases of the Group Health Association Movement in the United States." *Southern California*.
- Stephen W. Mamchur, B.A. Saskatchewan, 1931; M.A. McGill, 1934. "Nationalism, Religion, and the Problem of Assimilation among Ukrainians in the United States." *Yale*.
- Ersel Le Masters, M.A. Western Reserve, 1937. "An Evaluation of the Family Education Program of Toledo, Ohio." *Ohio State*.
- Selz Cabot Mayo, B.A. Atlanta Christian College, 1935; M.S. North Carolina State, 1937. "Rural Poverty and Relief in the Southeast, 1933-35." *North Carolina*.
- C. Wright Mills, B.A., M.A. Texas, 1938, 1939. "A Sociological Account of Some Aspects of Pragmatism." *Wisconsin*.
- Floyd Allen Pollock, B.A. Baker University, 1927; M.S. Colorado State, 1932. "Navajo-Federal Relations as a Social-Cultural Problem." *Southern California*.
- Harry W. Roberts, B.A. Wilberforce, 1929; B.D. Yale, 1932; M.A. University of London, 1934. "Life and Labor of Rural Virginia Negroes." *Yale*.
- Leopoldo Teodosio Ruiz, B.A. University of California, 1920; M.A. Columbia, 1924. "Development and Solution of Certain Socio-economic Problems of the Philippines with Reference to the Present Co-operative Movement." *Southern California*.
- Rockwell Smith, B.A. DePauw, 1928; S.T.B. Boston, 1931. "Church Affiliation as Social Differentiator in Rural Wisconsin." *Wisconsin*.
- William Martin Smith, Jr., B.S. Ohio State, 1934; M.S. Cornell, 1937. "Participation of Rural Young Married Couples in Group Activities." *Cornell*.
- Theodore Wentworth Sprague, B.A. Cambridge, 1933. "Some Problems in the Integration of Social Groups, with Special Reference to Jehovah's Witnesses." *Harvard*.
- Herbert Hewitt Stroup, B.A. Muskingum College, 1937; B.D. Union Theological Seminary, 1940. "The Jehovah's Witnesses." *New School for Social Research*.
- Seng Tancharoensukh, LL.B. University of Moral and Political Sciences, Thailand, 1935; M.A. Chicago, 1939. "A Study of the Co-operative Movement in Thailand." *Harvard*.
- Iva Telberg, M.A. Western Reserve, 1932. "The Soviet Drama as an Organ of Propaganda." *Ohio State*.
- Dorothy Hope Tisdale, B.A. Barnard, 1925; M.A. New York University, 1935. "Urbanization: A Study of the Process of Population

- Concentration in the United States and Its Relation to Social Change." *North Carolina*.
- Viola Van Zee, B.A. Pasadena College; M.A. Southern California. "The Role of Recreation in Chicago from 1803 to 1848 as Revealed in Literature Available in the Metropolitan Area." *Northwestern*.
- Paul Wallin, B.A. Manitoba, 1930; M.A. Toronto, 1933. "The Characteristics of Participants in a Social-Psychological Study." *Chicago*.
- Samuel Kirson Weinberg, B.A., M.A. Chicago, 1934, 1935. "Incest Behavior and Family Organization." *Chicago*.
- Lloyd Wilcox, B.A., M.A. Ohio State, 1924, 1931. "Group Structures and Personality Types among the Sioux Indians of North Dakota." *Wisconsin*.
- Robert Francis Winch, B.A. Western Reserve, 1935; M.A. Chicago, 1939. "Social and Personality Characteristics of Courtship Revealed in Men." *Chicago*.
- Martin C. Yang, B.A. Cheeloo, 1929; M.S. Cornell, 1941. "The Role of Market-Town in Rural Community Organization in China." *Cornell*.
- J. Milton Yinger, B.A. DePauw, 1937; M.A. Louisiana State, 1939. "A Sociological Analysis of Religious Group Behavior." *Wisconsin*.

MASTERS' DEGREES

- Eleanor Electa Amend, B.A. Northwest State Teachers College, Oklahoma, 1940. "A Comparative Study of Selected Attitudes and Personality Characteristics of Rural and Urban College Women." *Oklahoma A. & M.*
- Florence Angell, B.A. Vassar, 1919. "A Comparative Study of Nonrecidivists and Recidivists at the Indiana Boy's School." *Butler*.
- Bernard Barber, B.A. Harvard, 1939. No thesis required. *Harvard*.
- Laura Colby Barrett, B.A. Wisconsin, 1928. "Some Sociological Aspects of the Professional Career of Social Work." *Columbia*.
- William Kenneth Barrs, B.A., B.D. Duke, 1937, 1940. "A Critical Survey of the Social Philosophy of Walter Rauschenbusch." *Duke*.
- Emma Rachel Bassinor, B.S. Simmons, 1938. "Social Structure of the Public Library." *Columbia*.
- Alice Beebe, B.S. Kansas, 1933. "An Analysis of the Racial Reactions of a Selected Group of Mexican School Children." *Southern California*.
- Christine Berry, B.S. Mississippi State, 1918. "Child Labor in Mississippi." *Duke*.
- Audrey Bower. "Classification in Penal Institutions with Special Reference to the State Reformatory for Women, Dwight, Illinois." *Illinois*.
- Earle Wesley Bruce, B.A. Chicago, 1935. "Comparison of Traits of the Homosexual from Tests and Life History Materials." *Chicago*.
- Jessie Agnes Brumitt, B.A. Mississippi State College for Women, 1929. "A Survey of an Isolated Community: Casey County, Kentucky." *Chicago*.
- George C. Bubolz, B.A. Capital University, 1926. "Lutheran Church and Community Planning." *Michigan State*.
- Armata L. Butcher, B.A. Virginia State, 1933. "The Negro Church in Big Stone Gap Differs from the White Church." *Michigan*.
- Ollie Mae Butler, B.A. Dillard, 1939. "A Study of Class Differences and Personality Development of Youth at Bethlehem Center, Nashville, Tennessee." *Fisk*.
- John Paul Campisi, B.A. Arizona, 1938. "The Adjustment of Italian-Americans to the War Crisis." *Chicago*.
- Gwendolyn J. Carpenter, B.A. New Jersey College for Women, 1931. "Social Ideals in the Comic Strips." *New School for Social Research*.
- Sadie Edwina Carry, B.A. Pennsylvania, 1936. "The Origin and Family Pattern of Thirty-six Negro Common-Law Families of Nashville, Tennessee." *Fisk*.
- Toribio B. Castillo, B.A. Chapman College, 1933. "The Changing Social Status of the Filipino Women during American Administration." *Southern California*.
- Betsy Pryor Castleberry, Associate of Arts, Christian College, 1928; B.S. Missouri, 1932. "A Socio-economic Analysis of the White School Children in Richland Parish, Louisiana, 1941." *Louisiana State*.
- Edwin Christ, B.A. Missouri, 1941. "Physical Handicaps and Social Participation." *Michigan State*.
- Eugene F. Christgau, B.A. Chicago, 1940.

- "Unincorporated Communities in Cook County." *Chicago*.
- Albert Kircidel Cohen, B.A. Harvard, 1939. "Differential Implementation of the Criminal Law." *Indiana*.
- Lillian Cohen, B.A. Temple, 1940. "A Study of the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom and Its Adjustment to a War Crisis." *Chicago*.
- Frances Tull Cooke, B.A. North Carolina, 1941. "A Survey of Public Recreation in the United States." *North Carolina*.
- Tilman Christopher Cothran, B.A. Agricultural, Mechanical & Normal College, 1939. "The Attitude of Negro Students toward Indiana University." *Indiana*.
- Archie Roy Crouch, B.A. Jamestown, 1930; B.Th. Princeton Theological Seminary, 1933. "Youth and Submarginal Land Families." *Cornell*.
- Bernard Desenberg, B.A. Stanford, 1937. "A Study of the Organization in Pasadena, California, for the Development of Mutual Acquaintances between Young Men and Women." *Southern California*.
- Corrado DeSylvester, B.A., B.S. Lewis Institute, 1933. "A Comparison of a Delinquent and a Nondelinquent Community." *Chicago*.
- Hymen Doben, B.A. Washington University. "Social Participation of Unmarried Governmental Employees at Jefferson City, Missouri." *Washington University*.
- Earl Douglas, Th.B. Gordon College, 1935. "The Case-Work Method as Applied to Pastoral Counseling." *New Hampshire*.
- Otis Dudley Duncan, B.A. Louisiana State, 1941. "A Comparison of Age of White Parents at Birth of First Child for Urban, Village, and Open-Country Populations: An Analysis of Oklahoma Birth Registration Data." *Minnesota*.
- Robert Eisner, B.S.S. City College New York, 1940. "The Gallup Poll of Opinion on Conscription." *Columbia*.
- Anne Margaret Eldridge, B.A. Rollins College, 1931. "Trends in the Case-Work Services of a Family Welfare Agency in a Small City, from 1935 through 1941." *Northwestern*.
- Philip E. Emerson, B.S. Springfield, 1941. "Trends in Savings Bank Life Insurance." *Clark*.
- J. Earl Endacott, B.A. Kansas, 1923. "An Analysis of Friendship Selections and Other Social Relations and Activities of 103 Seniors in a Kansas High School." *Kansas*.
- Max Feder, B.S. Minnesota, 1922. "An Evaluation of the Contemporary Jewish Immigration to the United States (1880-1942)." *New York University*.
- Merle Fish, Jr., B.A. Chapman College, 1940. "A Study of the Christian Youth Fellowship of the Wilshire Christian Church of Los Angeles." *Southern California*.
- Robert Louis Fisher, B.A. Oklahoma A. & M., 1941. "An Analysis of the Influence of Rural and Urban Communities on Selected Personality Traits." *Oklahoma A. & M.*
- Donald L. Foley, B.A. Colgate, 1938. "An Index of the Physical Quality of Dwellings in Chicago Residential Areas." *Chicago*.
- James Fontana, B.S. Monmouth, 1937. "A Study of a Community Center in Relation to Its Neighborhood." *Chicago*.
- Joseph B. Ford, B.A. University of California, Los Angeles, 1937. "The Technics and Techniques of War and Anti-war Propaganda with Reference to the United States since 1914." *Southern California*.
- Gladys Engel-Frisch, B.A. Michigan, 1940. "A Frame of Reference for the Further Study of Some Temporal Aspects of Human Ecology." *Washington*.
- Harold Garfinkel, B.A. Newark, 1939. "Inter-racial and Intra-racial Homicide in Ten Counties in North Carolina, 1930-40." *North Carolina*.
- J. Benton Gillingham, B.A. State College of Washington, 1939; M.A. Wisconsin, 1942. No thesis required. *Wisconsin*.
- Julius A. Graber, B.A. City College of New York, 1935. "Study in the Motivation of Families on Relief in New York City in Refusing To Consider Return to Their Places of Legal Settlement." *Columbia*.
- Bess Frazier Graham, B.A. Wellesley, 1941. "The Y.W.C.A. and the Problem of the Unmarried Working Woman in Hartford, Conn." *Columbia*.
- Rev. Roger E. Griesse, B.A. Mount St. Gregory, 1938. "The Philosophical Approach to Sociology." *Catholic University*.
- Neal C. Gross, B.A. Marquette, 1941. "Diffusion of a Culture Trait in Two Iowa Townships." *Iowa State*.
- Fayga J. Halpern, B.A. Washington University, 1940. "Social Participation of 100 Adult Persons in a Selected Middle Class Area of St. Louis." *Washington University*.

- Roxlyn Handler, B.A. New York University, 1940. "Conscription Marriage." *Columbia*.
- Stella E. Hartman, B.S.S.W. Carnegie Institute of Technology, 1927. "A Study of Leisure-Time Habits of Young Men and Women in Los Angeles." *Southern California*.
- Arthur L. Henze, B.J. Missouri, 1941. "A Study of a Suburban Neighborhood." *Missouri*.
- Ray Hutchins, B.A. Wilmington, 1935. "Kentucky Migrants in Hamilton, Ohio." *Miami*.
- Julius A. Jahn, B.A. Minnesota, 1938. "A Control Group Experiment on the Effect of W.P.A. Work Relief as Compared to Direct Relief upon the Personal-Social Morale and Adjustment of Clients in St. Paul, 1939." *Minnesota*.
- Luther Theodore Jansen, B.A. Washington, 1941. "The Relationship of Federal Civil Service Employees to the Socio-economic Classes." *Washington*.
- Deborah M. Jensen. "Professional Nursing as a Social Institution in the United States." *Washington University*.
- Harry Morton Johnson, B.A. Harvard, 1939. No thesis required. *Harvard*.
- Alice Marie Jones, B.A. Prairie View, 1940. "The Negro Folk Sermon: A Study in the Sociology of Folk Culture." *Fisk*.
- Edmund Kenneth Karcher, B.A. St. Lawrence, 1941. "The Measurement of Social Adjustment by Comparison of Self-ratings and Group Ratings of the Same Individuals." *North Carolina*.
- Benjamin Katz, Ph.G. City College of New York, 1924; B.S. New York University, 1931. "The Arts and Crafts as Factors in Social Adjustment with Special Reference to Juvenile Delinquency." *New York University*.
- Louise Lillian Kemp, B.A. Louisiana State, 1940. "Selected Demographic and Socio-economic Characteristics of Negro Inhabitants of Ward I, St. Helena Parish, Louisiana." *Louisiana State*.
- Vernon Benjamin Kiser, B.A. Wofford, 1932. "Occupational Change among Negroes in Durham." *Duke*.
- Lucille Kohler, B.A., B.J. Missouri, 1923, 1930. "Neosho, Mo., under the Impact of Army Camp Construction." *Missouri*.
- Earl Lomon Koos, B.S. Ohio State, 1931. "Keps Bay—Yorkville, 1940." *Columbia*.
- Mary Ellen Krum, B.A. Illinois Wesleyan, 1931. "Attitudes of Thirty-eight Women Prisoners Incarcerated at Dwight, Illinois." *Illinois*.
- Alexander Kuman, Th.B. Princeton Theological Seminary, 1930. "Churches as Sources of Unity and Disunity among Ukrainian-Americans." *Columbia*.
- Israel Kurz, B.A. Yeshiva, 1941. "Friendship as a Social Relationship." *Columbia*.
- Helen Levisohn, B.S. New York University, 1929. "A Study of Adjustment in Old Age." *Chicago*.
- Thomas Wilson Longmore, B.S. Colorado State, 1933. "A Demographic Analysis of the Mexican Population of the United States, 1930." *Louisiana State*.
- William D. McBride, B.A. Heidelberg College, 1934. "A Comparative Study of Home-ownership of Married Teachers and Married City Employees in Three Trumbull County (Ohio) Municipalities." *Kent State*.
- Muriel Emery McCrory, B.A. Southern California, 1921. "A Sociological Evaluation of Recreational Programs of the Churches of the Wilshire District, Los Angeles." *Southern California*.
- Gilman McDonald, S.B. Bates, 1939. No thesis required. *Harvard*.
- Alice Maloney, B.A. Hunter, 1940. "Evaluations of Federal Resettlement Projects Found in Current Periodicals." *Columbia*.
- Dorothy Powis Marcuse, B.A. "Factors in the Adjustment of Jewish-Gentile Marriages." *Cornell*.
- Clarence F. Marshall, B.A. Whittier, 1935. "The Interests of Young Men in the Values Derived from Program Activities of the Los Angeles Y.M.C.A." *Southern California*.
- Thomas R. Marshall, B.A. Pomona, 1929. "The Recreation Problems of 737 Junior and Senior Pupils in Torrance, California." *Southern California*.
- Olive S. Melinkoff, B.A. McGill, 1939. "Occupational Attitudes of Medical Interns." *Southern California*.
- Robert Jenness Milliken, B.A. Occidental College, 1940. "Rural Social Subregions of North Carolina: An Application of Factor Analysis to the Problem of Subregional Delineation." *North Carolina*.
- Evelyn Montague, B.A. Cornell College, 1939. "Some Social Background Factors in the Personality Development of Children in the Michigan School for the Deaf." *Michigan State*.
- Carl Henry Napier, B.A. Concordia Seminary, 1921. "A Sociological Study of the Childless Divorcee." *Southern Methodist University*.
- Lois J. Neiser, B.A. Milligan College, 1937;

- B.S. Peabody College, 1938. "Factors Involved in Undergraduate Use of the Library." *Vanderbilt*.
- Kathryn Louise Nelson, B.A. Iowa, 1940. "Factors in the Recidivism of Juvenile Delinquents." *Alabama*.
- Toni Oelsner, University of Frankfurt a/M., 1931-34. "Three Jewish Families in Modern Germany: A Study in the Process of Emancipation." *New School for Social Research*.
- Lloyd Edgar Ohlin, B.A. Brown, 1940. "A Study of the Variations in the Rate of Growth of Population with Zonal Distance from the City Center." *Indiana*.
- Frank Everett Orenstein, B.A. Dartmouth, 1940. "Industrial Decentralization in Metropolitan Areas of the Great Lakes and Ohio Valley Region." *Chicago*.
- Julius John Ozog, B.S. New Hampshire, 1940. "A Study of Polish Homeownership in Chicago." *Chicago*.
- Harald A. Pedersen, B.A. New Mexico College, 1939. "A Study of Social Participation in Two Covington County, Mississippi, Open-Country Communities." *Louisiana State*.
- Clara Lewis Pergament, B.A. New York University, 1941. "Culture Conflict in the Ukia Valley in Relation to the Rearing of Children." *Columbia*.
- Paul Irving Phillips, Ph.B. Marquette, 1937. "A Sociological Study of Boys' Clubs in a Community Center." *Fisk*.
- Betty Doreen Pickering, B.A. Wayne, 1941. "Predicting the Length of Hospitalization of a Selected Group of Mental Patients." *Wayne*.
- Walter J. Pierron, B.A. Louisiana Normal, 1927. "A Sociological Study of the French-speaking People in Chauvin, a Line Village in Terrebonne Parish." *Louisiana State*.
- Mildred C. Povalski, B.A. Brooklyn, 1937. "Selective Mechanisms in Radio Newscasting." *Columbia*.
- Alberta Ellen Price, B.A. Fisk, 1934. "The Economic and Socio-cultural Factors Associated with Negro Infant Mortality in Nashville, Tennessee." *Fisk*.
- Daniel O'Haver Price, B.S. Florida Southern, 1939. "Analysis of Occupational Characteristics and Their Social and Economic Correlates for the 93 Metropolitan Centers, 1930." *North Carolina*.
- Cecil P. Randall, B.S. Western State Teachers College, 1934. "Relation of Social Factors to Maladjustment of Eighth-Grade Students in the Junior High." *Michigan State*.
- James Daniel Ray, B.A. Kent State, 1938. "Dating Behavior as Related to Organizational Prestige." *Indiana*.
- Robert Balentine Reed, B.A. Johns Hopkins, 1938. "The Use of Factor Grouping in Reducing the Number of Personality Variables Used in Predicting Male Adjustment in Engagement." *Chicago*.
- Bertha S. Rockwell, B.S. Akron, 1935. "A Comparative Study of Leisure-Time Differences between N.Y.A. Wage-earning High-School Girls and Nonwage-earning High-School Girls." *Kent State*.
- Erich Rosenthal. "Adjustment to Old Age in an Old Age Home." *Chicago*.
- Betty Jane Salk, B.A. Chicago, 1941. "Social and Personality Characteristics of Courtship Revealed in College Women." *Chicago*.
- Jyotirmoyee Sarma, B.A. Chicago, 1941. "The Hindu System of Caste in the Province of Bengal in India." *Chicago*.
- Philip Selznick, B.S.S. City College of New York, 1938. "A Theory of Bureaucratic Behavior." *Columbia*.
- George Lee Simpson, B.A. North Carolina, 1941. "Some Aspects of Man and Nature Patterns in North Carolina." *North Carolina*.
- Erwin O. Smigel, B.A. North Carolina, 1939. "The Effect of War on Sex Conventions." *New York University*.
- Ernest Allyn Smith, B.S. New York University, 1940. "Co-operative Communities as Social Units." *New York University*.
- William Spencer, B.A. Southern California, 1939. "Problems of Assimilation of the Holland-Dutch People in a Selected Area in Southern California." *Southern California*.
- Anselm Leonard Strauss, B.S. Virginia, 1939. "A Critical Analysis of the Concept of Attitude." *Chicago*.
- Fred Strodtbeck, B.A. Miami, 1940. "Migration from Kentucky: A Study of Intervening Opportunities." *Indiana*.
- Lucille G. Terrell, B.A. Bennett College, 1940. "The Economic Factor in the Migration of 200 Negro Migrants to Winston-Salem, North Carolina." *Northwestern*.
- William J. Thacker, B.A. Morningside College, 1929. "Some Social Effects of the Radio." *Southern California*.

- Louis Truncellito, B.S. Fordham, 1931. "Juvenile Delinquency in West New York, N.J." *New York University*.
- Albie Ngok Tse, S.B. Northeastern, 1940. No thesis required. *Harvard*.
- William Edward Watson, B.S. Ohio State, 1932. "The Differential Association of Selected Social Factors with Prognosis and Outcome for 2,521 White Cases of Schizophrenia." *Chicago*.
- Dorothy Westby-Gibson, B.A. Bucknell, 1940. "An Investigation of the Function of the Y.M.C.A. in the Community." *New School for Social Research*.
- Margaret Williamson, Certificate, Cambridge, 1910. "A Study in Social Adjustment: Some Problems in Adjustment of Y.W.C.A. Club Members to Membership on Boards in Committees." *Columbia*.
- Everett Keith Wilson, B.A. Antioch, 1938. "Criteria of Urbanism Applied to Religion in Chicago." *Chicago*.
- Margaret Scoon Wilson, B.A. "Measuring Social Classes in a New York Village." *Cornell*.
- Mary Isabelle Wolf, B.A. North Carolina, 1941. "A Compilation and Analysis of Statistics Relating to American Marriage in 1930." *North Carolina*.
- Donald Emery Wray, B.A. Chicago, 1940. "Caste as Social Structure and Rank in the Central Provinces of India." *Chicago*.
- Maude E. Young, B.A. Bryn Mawr, 1915. "The Works Projects Administration as Seen by the Workers Themselves." *Missouri*.

STUDENTS' DISSERTATIONS IN SOCIOLOGY

The following list of doctoral dissertations and Masters' theses in preparation in universities and colleges in the United States and Canada is a compilation of the returns from letters sent by the editors of the *Journal* to departments of sociology. The name of the college or university in italics designates the institution where the research is in progress. The list does not include names which have formerly been printed in the *Journal*, except where the research problem has been changed. The number now working for doctoral degrees is 100, and the number working for Master's degrees is 95.

DOCTORAL DISSERTATIONS

- Dorothy M. Abts, B.A. College of St. Teresa, 1929; M.A. Catholic University, 1931. "Study of Religious, Moral, and Ethical Problems Encountered by Catholic Social Workers." *Catholic University*.
- Milton Barron, B.A., M.A. Yale, 1939, 1942. "Intermarriage in a New England Industrial Community." *Yale*.
- Dorothy Fahs Beck, B.A. North Carolina; M.A. Chicago. "The Costs of Dental Care: A Study of Clinical Patients in New York City." *Columbia*.
- Libby B. Berger, B.S. Indiana State Teachers College, 1937. "A Study of Membership Models in Religious Group Structure." *Wisconsin*.
- Nathan Bodin, B.A., M.A. California, 1933, 1935. "Differential Major Crime Rates in the Economic and Housing Areas of Chicago." *Chicago*.
- John Bovingdon, B.S. Harvard, 1915. "Ideological Tendencies in Congressional Thinking Capable of Affecting American Participation in a World-wide Collective Security Program." *Teachers College, Columbia*.
- Barbara Klose Bowdery, B.A. North Central, 1939; M.A. Illinois, 1940. "The Associations of Minority Groups." *Illinois*.
- Wilbur B. Brookover, B.A. Manchester, 1933; M.A. Wisconsin, 1939. "The Relation of Social Factors to Teaching Ability." *Wisconsin*.
- Louis Bultena, B.A. Dubuque, 1929; B.D., M.A. San Francisco Seminary, 1932, 1935; Ph.M. Wisconsin, 1941. "A Study of Factors of Integration of Religious and Church Groups." *Wisconsin*.
- Rev. H. C. Callaghan, B.A., M.A. Boston College, 1931, 1932; M.A. Catholic University, 1940. "A Study of Maternal and Infancy Welfare Provisions in the Legislation of Selected European Countries and the United States." *Catholic University*.
- Sophie Cambria, B.A. Barnard, 1937; M.A. Bryn Mawr, 1938. "A Study of Vocational Adjustment of Youth: A Study of Young Workers Placed by the Junior Employment Service in Philadelphia, Pa." *Bryn Mawr*.
- David Bailey Carpenter, B.A., M.A. Washington University, 1937, 1938. "Migration into Cut-over Areas of Western Washington." *Washington*.
- Chang Hsi-Ku, B.S., M.S. Iowa State College, 1930, 1931. "Adult Education in Rural Areas." *Wisconsin*.
- Walter Richard Chivers, B.A. Morehouse College, 1919; M.A. New York University, 1929. "Co-operation between White and Negro People in the United States: A Sociological Interpretation." *New York University*.
- Maybelle Coleman, B.A. Langer, 1909; M.A. Columbia, 1926. "Poverty and Poor Relief in the Plantation Society of South Carolina." *Duke*.
- Faye C. Cossairt, B.A., M.A. Illinois, 1930, 1932. "The Comparative Study of Two Religious Groups as Territorial Communities." *Illinois*.
- John P. Dean, B.A. Dartmouth, 1936; M.A. Columbia, 1938. "Homeownership: As Tradition and the Factual Situation Today." *Columbia*.
- Richard S. Dewey, B.A. Wooster, 1936; M.A. Oberlin, 1939. "Sociological Processes Operating between Major and Minority Groups in the United States." *Wisconsin*.
- Donald Hughes Dietrich, B.A., M.A. Southern California, 1931, 1932. "Youth, Social

- Change, and the Gallup Poll." *Teachers College, Columbia*.
- David H. Dingilian, B.A. Chapman, 1934; M.A. Southern California, 1936. "The Social Ideas of the Armenian Press in America." *Teachers College, Columbia*.
- Joseph Eaton, B.S. Cornell. "Co-operative Group Farming in the U.S.A." *Columbia*.
- George Norman Eddy, Th.B. Gordon, 1929; M.A. New Hampshire, 1930. "The Face and Facial Expression in Race Relations." *Duke*.
- Allan W. Eister, B.A. DePauw, 1936; M.A. American University, 1937. "The Oxford Group Movement: A Typological Study." *Wisconsin*.
- Hugo Engelmann, B.A. Wisconsin, 1941. "A Study in Sociology of Knowledge." *Wisconsin*.
- Rev. Michael English, S.J. "Sources of Present-Day Catholic Sociology." *Northwestern*.
- Sara Feder, Ph.B. Chicago, 1929; M.A. Missouri, 1931. "Workmen's Compensation in Missouri: Its Social Aspects." *Missouri*.
- William H. Form, B.A., M.A. Rochester, 1938, 1940. "A Sociological Study of a White-Colar Suburb (Greenbelt, Md.)." *Maryland*.
- Edith J. Freeman, B.S. Washington, 1932; M.S. Cornell, 1939. "Social Class Differences in Parent-Child Relationships." *Cornell*.
- Clara Alberta Hardin, B.A., M.A. Colorado, 1928, 1930. "A Study of Negroes in Philadelphia." *Bryn Mawr*.
- Huntington Harris, B.S. School of Public Affairs, 1939. "The Theory of Personal Names." *Columbia*.
- Paul K. Hatt, B.A. Linfield College, 1937; M.A. Washington, 1939. "Methodological Analysis of the Concept 'Natural Area.'" *Washington*.
- Ruth M. Hill, B.A. Miami, 1936. "A Study of Certain Culture Patterns among the Indians of South Dakota." *Wisconsin*.
- Otto Giede Hoiberg, B.A. Drake, 1931; M.A. Nebraska, 1933. "The Sociological Effects of the Mead-Wahoe Defense Area Development upon Family Life." *Nebraska*.
- Rex Devern Hopper, B.A. Butler, 1922; M.A. College of Missions, 1924. "The Struggle for Independence in Latin America: A Sociological Interpretation." *Texas*.
- Richard A. Hornseth, B.A. Carroll, 1937; M.A. Wisconsin, 1941. "A Statistical Index of Social Disorganization with Reference to Factor Control and Probability Theory." *Wisconsin*.
- Paul Horton, B.A. Kent State, 1939. "An Attempted Delimitation of the Field of Educational Sociology." *Ohio State*.
- G. T. Hudson, B.S. Illinois, 1936; M.S. Wisconsin, 1941. "Study of Farm Families Living on Marginal Land in Three Selected Areas in New York State." *Cornell*.
- John E. Ivey, Jr., B.S. Alabama Polytechnic Institute. "A Method for Measuring the Range and Scope of Social and Economic Planning for the Subregional Laboratory." *North Carolina*.
- Melville Corbett Ivey, B.A. North Carolina, 1940. "A Study of the Planter Aristocracy as a Folk Level of Life in the Old South." *North Carolina*.
- Sister Mary Eloise Johannes, C.S.J., B.A. Marymount, 1940; M.A. Catholic University, 1941. "Sociohistorical Study of the German-Russian Settlements in Ellis County, Kansas." *Catholic University*.
- Patricke A. Johns, B.A. Illinois, 1940; M.A. Northwestern, 1941. "Nineteenth-Century Anarchism: The Social Psychology of the Anarchist Movement." *Wisconsin*.
- Forrest Kellogg, B.A. Simpson College, 1932. "The Role of the Protestant Minister." *Missouri*.
- C. Wendell King, B.A., M.A. Yale, 1940, 1942. "Branford Borough: A Study in Social Cleavage." *Yale*.
- Genevieve Knupfer, B.A. Wellesley; M.A. Columbia, 1938. "The Measurement of Social Economic Status." *Columbia*.
- William L. Kolb, B.A. Miami, 1938; M.A. Wisconsin, 1939. "Revolutionary Roles of German and Russian Peasants." *Wisconsin*.
- Alexander Kuman, Th.B. Princeton Theological Seminary, 1930; M.A. Columbia, 1942. "The Social Role of the Ukrainian Church in the United States." *Columbia*.
- Charles R. Lawrence, Jr., B.A. Morehouse, 1936; M.A. Atlanta, 1938. "Negro Policy as Reflected in Present Leadership and Programs of Negro Organizations in Harlem." *Columbia*.
- Anita Libman Lebeson. "The Woman's Page: A Study in Cultural Lag." *Northwestern*.
- Virgil E. Long, B.A. Kentucky Wesleyan, 1928; M.A. Emory, 1933. "A Sociological Study of the Board of Control in Wisconsin." *Wisconsin*.
- Sophia Fagin McDowell, B.A., M.A. Chicago, 1936, 1939. "The Radical Press in the United States, 1910-22." *Chicago*.

- Cecilia T. McGovern, B.A. Regis, 1936; M.S. Boston College, 1938; M.A. Yale, 1942. "Illegitimacy: A Comparative Study of the Social Reaction to and the Treatment of the Consequences of Deviant Sex Behavior." *Yale*.
- Robert T. McMillan, B.S., M.S. Oklahoma A. & M., 1931, 1932. "The Interrelation of Migration and Socioeconomic Status of Open-Country Families in Oklahoma." *Louisiana State*.
- Grace Barr Maas, B.A. Northland College, 1935. "The Origin and Development of Social Case Work." *Wisconsin*.
- Douglas S. Marshall, B.S. Colorado State College, 1940; M.S. Montana State College, 1941. "Greendale: A Study of a Resettlement Community." *Wisconsin*.
- Helen Elizabeth Martz, B.A. Pennsylvania; M.S.W. Pennsylvania School of Social Work, 1939. "A Study of Policies and Functioning of County Boards of Assistance in Pennsylvania, 1938-41." *Bryn Mawr*.
- William McKinley Menchan, B.A. Howard, 1924; M.A. Pennsylvania, 1928. "Child-bearing and Early Child-rearing among Negroes in a Typical Southern Urban Negro Population Center." *Teachers College, Columbia*.
- Vera Miller, B.A. Chicago, 1938. "Tax Delinquency in Chicago and Its Relation to Certain Housing and Social Characteristics." *Chicago*.
- James E. Montgomery, B.A. Maryville College, 1940; M.A. Vanderbilt, 1941. "Utilization of Natural Resources in Relation to Overpopulation in Two Selected Communities of the Cumberland Plateau." *Vanderbilt*.
- Evlon J. Niederfrank, B.S., M.S. Oregon State, 1932, 1935. "Rural Families in Maine Who Migrated to Urban War Industries: Types, Adjustments, Probable Redistribution." *Wisconsin*.
- C. J. Nuesse, B.E. Stevens Point Normal, 1934; M.A. Northwestern, 1937. "The Social Thought of Early Catholics in the United States (1634-1829)." *Catholic University*.
- Joseph E. Nuquist, B.A., M.A. Nebraska, 1935, 1936. "The Country Bank: An Analysis of the Sociology of Finance." *Wisconsin*.
- Rev. Albert R. O'Hara, M.A. Gonzaga University, 1933. "The Position of Chinese Women as Indicated in Lieh Nü Chuan by Liu Hsiang and Others." *Catholic University*.
- Mary Bess Owen, B.A., M.A. Indiana, 1937, 1938. "The Relationship of Insight to Sociability in Psychotic Patients." *Indiana*.
- Charles Hodges Patrick, B.A. Wake Forest College, 1931; B.D. Andover-Newton Theological Seminary, 1934. "The Use of Alcoholic Beverages: A Cultural Study." *Duke*.
- Ethel Shanas Perlman, B.A., M.A. Chicago, 1935, 1937. "The Nature and Control of Collective Excitement." *Chicago*.
- Samuel Perlman, B.S.S. City College of New York, 1926; Rabbi and M.H.L. Jewish Institute of Religion, 1930. "The Effect of N.Y.A. Residence Centers on Unemployed Young People." *Columbia*.
- Orville Quackenbush, B.A., B.S., M.A. Minnesota, 1933, 1935, 1938. "A Theoretical and Empirical Consideration of the Concept 'Stereotype.'" *Minnesota*.
- Donald Rasmussen, B.A., M.A. Illinois, 1937, 1938. "A Sociological Study of Ormsby Village." *Illinois*.
- William Woodland Reeder, B.S., M.S. Utah State, 1935, 1938. "Informal Social Participation of Farm Families in Otsego County, New York." *Cornell*.
- William Resnick. "Metropolitan Society." *Northwestern*.
- Earle L. Reynolds, B.A. Chicago, 1939. "Racial Differences in Human Growth." *Wisconsin*.
- Duane Robinson, B.A., M.A. University of Washington, 1935, 1939. "The Relation between Social and Economic Stratification in a Western City." *Columbia*.
- Thomas P. Robinson, B.A. Williams College, 1928; M.A. Columbia, 1932. "Radio Networks and the Government." *Columbia*.
- George Rosen, B.S. City College of New York, 1930; M.D. University of Berlin, 1935. "Medical Specialization." *Columbia*.
- Murl B. Salsbury. "Leaders among High-School Students." *Illinois*.
- Aife Sayin, B.A. American College for Girls, Istanbul, 1936; M.A. Brown, 1939. "A Study of Industrial Homework in Pennsylvania: A Comparison of Licensing and Prohibition under State and Federal Law." *Bryn Mawr*.
- Louis Schneider, B.A. City College of New York, 1933; M.A. Columbia, 1938. "Freudism and Veblenism: A Study in Social Theory." *Columbia*.
- Anne Shyne, B.A. Vassar, 1935; M.A. Bryn Mawr, 1937. "Child Welfare Services in Montgomery County, Pennsylvania." *Bryn Mawr*.

- Anna Green Smith, B.A. Cumberland University; M.A. Peabody College. "Regional Differences in Education." *North Carolina*.
- Edward Crawford Solomon, B.S. Georgia School of Technology, 1933; M.A. Peabody College, 1940. "Factors in Rural to Urban Migration of Teachers." *Vanderbilt*.
- Christopher Sower, M.A. Ohio State, 1938. "An Analysis of Youth Action Programs." *Ohio State*.
- Henry G. Stetler, B.S. Franklin and Marshall, Lancaster, 1928; M.A. Columbia, 1930. "The Socialist Movement in Reading, Pa., 1896-1940: A Study in Class Conflict and Social Change." *Columbia*.
- A. Philip Sundal, B.A. Augustana College, 1938; M.A. Wisconsin College, 1940. "Factors in Population Theory." *Wisconsin*.
- Robert Harris Talbert, B.A., B.S. Southeast Missouri Teachers College, 1931, 1932; M.A. Missouri, 1936. "The Emergence of Rural-town: The Sociology of a Missouri Community." *Duke*.
- John W. Teter, B.A., M.A. Wisconsin, 1932, 1935. "An Ecological Study of Madison, Wisconsin." *Wisconsin*.
- William J. Tudor, M.S. Ohio State, 1936. "Institutional Factors Affecting the Functioning of Professional and Volunteer Leadership." *Iowa State*.
- Preston Valien, B.A. Prairie View, 1935; M.A. Atlanta, 1936. "A Study of Negro Urban Migrations in the United States." *Wisconsin*.
- Theo Vaughan, B.S. Clemson College, 1924; M.A. Y.M.C.A. Graduate School, Nashville, 1934. "Comparative Backgrounds of Farming and Nonfarming Young Men from Selected Townships in Six South Carolina Counties, 1936-42." *Teachers College, Columbia*.
- Edmund H. Volkart, B.A. St. John's, 1939; M.A. Yale, 1942. "Censorship in the United States." *Yale*.
- Clayton R. Watts, B.A. Western Reserve, 1932; M.A. Drew University, 1932. "Sociological Study of Mennonites in Perth and Waterloo Counties, Canada." *Washington University*.
- Donald E. Webster, B.A. Oberlin, 1923; M.A. Wisconsin, 1935. "Leadership and Social Structure in the New Turkey." *Wisconsin*.
- William F. Whyte, B.A. Swarthmore, 1936. "Street Corner Society: The Social Structure of an Italian Slum." *Chicago*.
- Robin Murphy Williams, M.A. Harvard, 1939. "Sociological Aspects of Farmers' Responses to A.A.A. Programs: Selected Kentucky Areas, 1938-40." *Harvard*.
- Marion F. Williamson, B.A. Buffalo, 1937; M.A. Nebraska, 1938. "Prediction Tables for Probation and Institutional Treatment of Juvenile Delinquents." *Minnesota*.
- Rosamonde Ramsay Wimberly, B.A., M.A. South Carolina, 1933, 1934. "Blindness and the Blind in South Carolina: The Sequence Pattern of a Social Problem." *Duke*.
- Rev. Brendan J. Wolfe, B.A. St. Joseph College, 1932; M.A. Catholic University, 1940. "The Field of Sociology According to Catholic Sociologists." *Catholic University*.
- Abd-el-Hamid Zaki, B.S. New York University, 1940; M.A. Columbia, 1941. "The Rural Child: His Needs and His Welfare (in Orange County, N.Y.)." *Teachers College, Columbia*.
- Anna Zaloha. "Trends in Community Organization during War with Particular Reference to Chicago." *Northwestern*.
- Jose Zapata, B.A. Puerto Rico, 1928; M.A. Columbia, 1933. "Socio-economic Aspects of the Puerto Rican Sugar Industry and Educational Implications." *Teachers College, Columbia*.
- Carolyn Zeleny, B.A. Vassar, 1930; M.A. Yale, 1939. "Conflict and Accommodation in a Dual-Ethnic Community in New Mexico." *Yale*.

MASTERS' THESES

- Reuben Abel, B.A. Columbia, 1929; J.D. New York, 1934. "The Role of the Great Man in History." *New School for Social Research*.
- Viola Anderson, B.S. New York University, 1940. "Rehabilitation of Female Criminals." *New York University*.
- Harry Apovian, B.S. New York University, 1940. "American Food Distribution to Europe during the First World War." *New York University*.
- Stuyvesant Barry, B.A. Harvard, 1931. "A Study of Cases of Group Nonviolence." *Pennsylvania*.
- Rev. Gilles O. Belanger, B.A. St. Anne, 1934. "Objectives in a Christian Solution of Labor Problems." *Catholic University*.
- Annabelle Bender, B.S. Wisconsin, 1941. "A Sociological Analysis of Civilian Defense Block Organization." *Chicago*.
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BOOK REVIEWS

A Primitive Mexican Economy. By GEORGE M. FOSTER. ("Monographs of the American Ethnological Society," Vol. V, ed. A. IRVING HALLOWELL.) New York: J. J. Augustin, 1942. Pp. 115.

This is an attempt to describe the economy of a simple, nonliterate society in the terms economists use in describing our modern society. Frank Knight (*Jour. Pol. Econ.*, XLIX, 260) declared that economists should know the facts of economies other than our own. He also wrote that the chief requisite for better understanding between anthropologists and economists is that the former have some grasp of the difference between economics as an exposition of principles and economics as a descriptive exposition of facts. Whether the author of this short monograph had sufficient grasp of economics to enable him to report this simple economy so the report may be understood and the results made comparable with facts from our own economy is probably critical in evaluating the book. One not an economist can assert only that the analysis seems to him successful and that it suggested to this reviewer lines of comparison between societies which he had not perceived before.

The society described—a cluster of small villages of Popoluca Indians in the state of Vera Cruz—is not wholly primitive. It is primitive in that the technology is simple and only human power is employed. Production is by individual enterprisers only; there is little division of labor within the community; and all consumption, "except about two or three per cent," is final consumption. On the other hand, its members are familiar with money, produce commodities for a wide market, and consume the products of distant modern factories. A brisk trade with the use of money and the long-established export of money-crops distinguish this society from such moneyless societies as have been described, with respect to their economies, by Raymond Firth. No one has yet published any considerable account of a Mexican Indian economy comparable with this. Charles Wagley's paper deals chiefly with technology.

"The Popoluca are particularly interesting," writes the author, "because to us their solution is rationalistic to a degree not always found in

primitive groups." The account departs from the headings used in describing a modern economy chiefly in the inclusion of sections on death rites, marriage, and magic under "Consumption" because of "the importance of [these areas of activity] to the people concerned." The reader might then ask if inclusion of similar sections in accounts of our economy might make those accounts even better than they are.

Several points are of interest because of the failure of the Indian to act with economic rationality (narrowly understood). Collective labor in housebuilding is uneconomic; additional workers are added, although their production is worth less than their remuneration; diminishing productivity fails to have the effect that might be expected. Interest is recognized in capital goods, such as horses; but, although money is accepted for the use of a horse, the Indian lends his money without taking interest. Land—the chief tangible good in Popoluca society—is without any money value; it is never bought or sold. Despite evident opportunity to profit, the Indian leaves to outsiders the hauling of corn to market and fails to speculate in corn, although the record of marked fluctuation in the money value of corn is well known. In spite of the generally pecuniary economy, certain transactions are always by barter. A producer of lime is sure that he may at any time exchange 1 *arroba* of lime for 1 *arroba* of beans and regularly does convert much of his lime directly into beans, although beans vary in money value from 1 to 2½ pesos, while lime is always worth 1¼ pesos. Cash means uncertainty as to where the beans will come from and at how much.

This is a book of modest pretensions and one to be commended. The absence of an index is regrettable.

ROBERT REDFIELD

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Charles Horton Cooley: His Life and His Social Theory. By E. C. JANDY. New York: Dryden Press, 1942. Pp. 319. \$3.00.

The author of this work concerning a pioneer American sociologist had the advantage of the use of Cooley's personal journals and corre-

spondence and was thus enabled to trace the development of his distinctive attitudes and ideas and to verify the general background of his thought. The continuing influence of Goethe, Emerson, Thoreau, Bryce, and Darwin upon Cooley's way of thinking is substantiated in detail; and yet the originality of the man in his chosen field is not thereby diminished. One sees ever more clearly how he brooded upon and felt the complex matrix of social relations and how he quickly moved beyond biological analogies to the empirical realities of social psychology. Jandy brings out clearly the fact that it was this man's artistic sensitiveness which made him aware of facts which more obtuse people could hardly glimpse. It is sometimes forgotten that the artist is an acute observer of compositions and values whose existence can surely not be denied, since they constitute the very nature of a work of art, but which are not readily apprehended by unprepared and unattuned minds. But there need be no jealous rivalry in sociological matters, once it is realized how complex human society is and how many interacting levels constitute its being.

The book is divided into two main parts dealing, respectively, with the biography and the theories of Cooley. The "Life" is, again, subdivided into two chapters, which are devoted in a consecutive way to "Youth and Early Manhood" and "Mature Years." Jandy is seeking clues for the correct appreciation of his subject's personality in the family antecedents and even in his precarious health. As is fairly well known, Cooley's father was Judge Cooley, the distinguished constitutional lawyer.

Cooley's well-kept diary is a mine of information on the early years. It took him long to find himself and his life-work. He was not pressed by his father to make up his mind, and so he tried one thing after another until the right subject appeared. It is clear that he had unusual opportunities, in many ways like those of William James, to travel and make social contacts. But, to use his own later terminology, his was an endogenous personality, extremely sensitive and introspective and yet withal perspicaciously interested in the social scene. This introspective quality he counterbalanced in some measure by his training as an engineer and as a statistician.

Jandy, I think, does a good job in this part and gives a really illuminating picture of Cooley's development and personality. It is soon evident that high admiration is tempered

by scientific zeal. The query is never far absent as to why this man tended to ignore the quantitative side of his subject, despite the fact that he was professionally trained to handle it and had early made ecological investigations on transportation and communication. In any case it became clear that Cooley increasingly concentrated on the mental side of society, upon ideas and attitudes. And here I quote from Waller's Introduction: "No one can be Cooley but Cooley himself. That bothers people. There is no royal road to Cooley's kind of wisdom." It is quite evident that Jandy is aware of this finality, though he cannot, as a good modern sociologist spurred by the dominant scientific tradition, help asking himself constantly these questions: "Isn't this social philosophy as much as it is sociology? Isn't there too much of the Emersonian moralist about Cooley? How is the *ought* to connect up with the *is*?"

But I must leave this biographical portion of the book with the warm recommendation that it deserves reading. I am myself, perhaps, prejudiced, since I was an undergraduate member of the class in sociology which first had the pleasure of using the new text, *Human Nature and the Social Order*. That is already a long time ago.

The part devoted to theory is at once expository and controversial. Here Jandy moves with competence, as both his handling of such topics as the growth of the self, and the self-idea, primary groups and social classes, and his excellent Bibliography show. Always, the journal is used to throw additional light. A good instance of this use is to be found in his discussion of the term "primary group." I found illuminating his treatment of the genesis of the self-idea, beginning with James and Baldwin and proceeding through Cooley to Mead.

Now, since the author has seen fit to bring in my name in connection with several points, I feel justified in making comments. In the first place, as a realist of an emergent or evolutionary type, I do think that in all this literature there is not sufficiently present the distinction between the growth of the self and the growth of the idea of the self. It is indubitable that these two factors are interconnected, and yet they are distinguishable. The *self*, as I see it, stands more for capacities and abilities, many of which are realized only in social relations but which have a biological base. The *idea* of the self is an epistemic affair, which arises to awareness *in the individual* as this process of the growth of the self within social relations proceeds.

My impression is that Cooley reflected the philosophical climate of the time and of his favorite sources of suggestion but that he was not an overt idealist in any technical sense, let alone a solipsist. It must be remembered that the organic, or objective, idealism of the time was not strong in epistemology. There was much of the so-called objective mind about it and little clarity as to how one passed back and forth between objective mind and private mind. And it is probable that Cooley long felt that the social mind could be known by individuals only as they creatively reproduced this social mind in terms of the ideas of other selves. Do we not know *through* ideas? For a very long time Cooley rather avoided epistemological distinctions and the methodological problems tied up with them. But, as I read Jandy and as I think back over my conversations with him about the time I published *Evolutionary Naturalism*, I would hazard the statement that he began to see that such questions were ultimately unavoidable. Was he mistaken in this? Sociologists must search their own consciences in such a matter, as must psychologists.

Jandy is aware that Cooley was moving in a direction incompatible with extreme behaviorism and with the Meadian and Deweyian type of experiential social realism. He is quite frankly puzzled by the situation. Now I think that I can tell what Cooley was driving at. He realized that man is unique in that he combines knowledge based upon external observation with a supplementary reflective self-awareness. There is integration and interplay, but the two supplementary avenues are distinguishable. "Imaginative intuition" is Cooley's term for the technique by which ideas of the self and of others are attained. But I am sure he would have held that such ideas must be verified and justified in their agreement with sensory observation of social behavior. That is what I have called our "double knowledge" of minded organisms. But this double knowledge, while distinguishable, is mutually supplementary. That is why we finally conceive ourselves as minded organisms.

Mead and his followers refuse to make these distinctions which involve the acceptance of existentially private minds and consciousnesses. Theirs is a kind of experiential realism in which things are wrapped up in social interpretations of them. In my opinion this is more nearly akin to the tradition of idealism than is Cooley's view. I can never see how it can escape being a subtle

form of anthropomorphism. Even to speak, as some do, of the "relational properties" of things or the "funded properties" is to forget that the real focus in human life is the way in which things affect the interests of human beings and how they are used and interpreted. I am inclined to think that the increasing emphasis upon linguistics and semantics will lead to an awareness of the bases and implications of communication. Cooley knew that you had to have something in you to communicate, that you had to have ideas.

In conclusion, I would say that Professor Jandy's study seems to me well worth reading. It is careful and sincere, and he is aware of the important problems. The passages from the journal seem to me judiciously selected and used with effect.

ROY WOOD SELLARS

University of Michigan

Geopolitics: The Struggle for Space and Power.

By ROBERT STRAUSS-HUPÉ. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1942. Pp. xii + 274. \$2.75.

World wars encourage, if they do not compel, global thinking. We are learning, under the impact of the present war, to look at the world geopolitically. The existing world order, generally speaking, is based on sea transportation and upon sea power. The world order which is coming into existence will almost certainly be based on air transportation and land power. This seems inevitable, not merely because of the changes the airplane is bringing about, but because air power is most effective when planes are land-based. On the other hand, air power diminishes in effectiveness inversely as the circumference of the area in which an airplane operates widens. The coming of the airplane has transformed political geography quite as completely as the building of the Suez Canal and later the Panama Canal once did. It is because of the airplane that we are beginning to look at the world from the point of view of the North Pole, where the continental masses seem to converge, rather than from the point of view of the Equator region, where the great seaways, encircling the planet, constitute, at present, the Main Street of the world. In short, the airplane has become the decisive factor not only in the present war but in the coming peace.

If the first World War was a conflict between a power based on land and a power based on sea, the second is a struggle between a world order

based on ships and a new emergent based on airplanes. That is, perhaps, what Mrs. Lindbergh meant by her cryptic and disturbing reference to "the wave of the future." That is, perhaps, what Billy Mitchell, the prophet and champion of aerial warfare, meant when he said that Alaska, where the continents converge, was strategically the most important spot in the world today.

Germany, as the author of this volume points out, did not invent geopolitics. Germans merely took the concept seriously and applied it. Geopolitics is based on the realization that, in a world of unstable political forces, geography is the most important stabilizing factor. Most of our so-called historical policies—historical because they have remained unchanged under all the vicissitudes of changing political regimes—are based on geography. Russia's persistent effort to get to the sea, Germany's desperate struggle for "living room," and the United States' Monroe Doctrine are individual examples.

Geopolitics is politics in a field where the units of discourse are no longer states or nationalities but continents and races. Incidentally and as a consequence of that fact, it is politics in a world in which all minor political units are pawns and only the great states are pieces. It is, besides a free world, where no customary moral and institutional order exists capable of imposing restraints or limits upon the brute forces with which men fight.

All this and much more that is suggestive and interesting about the policies and strategy of present-day world politics are set forth in this concise, breezy, historical, and analytical account of this new emphasis in political science—geopolitics. Strausz-Hupé's volume is not, however, a treatise. It is just news. It is, nevertheless, unquestionably the most authoritative and informing introduction to the subject, in all its wide-ranging implications, that has appeared to date.

ROBERT E. PARK

Fisk University

Generals and Geographers: The Twilight of Geopolitics. By HANS W. WEIGERT. New York: Oxford University Press, 1942. Pp. x+273. \$3.00.

This book deals with a specific general and specific geographer, Haushofer, the head of the Munich geopolitical school. The author con-

fesses in his Preface that his book exaggerates and simplifies. He did not want to add another "scientific study" to a mounting pile but to write a "political book." By this he means obviously not merely a book about politics but a book to a political purpose. This political purpose is twofold. He assumes (p. 243) that the heir of Hitler will be not one of his disciples but an army man—which means a follower of Haushoferism¹ in the author's mind—and he warns against peace with this army power. On the other hand, he warns against the ideological maxims of American geopolitics voiced "more dangerously" by university professors than by the armed forces¹ in the interest of a "century of the common man in a free world." The author is at his best where he describes and analyzes the post-war atmosphere of fatalism, romanticism, and defeat as background of Haushofer. He gives a consistent picture of the twilight of Haushoferism, but he does not give more.

The political purpose prompts the author to exaggerate the importance of Haushofer. This general and geographer was only a moderately gifted man, his "school" had a lot of publicity, but only limited influence—even on the army. The general staff may have been interested in the material facts, collected and published by the geopoliticians, but certainly not in their hazy ideology. We should not underestimate the modern German general. He is neither hazy nor speculative but an expert, a very realistic one on a narrow field, which is war, devoted to efficiency and nothing else. The pro-Russian tendencies in the German army have nothing to do with Haushofer and MacInders' "heartland" theory adopted by Haushofer. They are remnants of a Prussian tradition of a hundred years ago, in existence since the fall of czarism and revived only occasionally for reasons of expediency suggested by a particular situation. The author has a great deal of praise for Friedrich Ratzel, Haushofer's teacher. *The Politische Geographie* of Ratzel is a great book indeed and a classic of political science. Haushofer, popularizing, simplifying, and distorting Ratzel, did not, as the author assumes, introduce "dynamics" into a "static" political geography. Ratzel is by no means static. What Haushofer introduced is a normative element into a factual science. As he permits this normative element to spoil the interpretation of the facts, his geopolitics is not only a bad ideology but a dubious

¹ He thinks such warning to be necessary.

science of facts. Geopolitics as a normative science deserves no interest.

Geopolitics, however, as a factual science dealing with the geographical conditions of the behavior, interests, actions, and ideas of states and nations in history or political geography, deserves the greatest interest of everybody who still thinks about the ways of putting a political ideal into practice. The author seems to recognize it but does not contribute much to such knowledge. He denounces an ideology in the name of another and better ideology. But present conditions and the task of the future demand more. Political geography does not demand that we submit to a magic of space. We need not submit to MacInde's "heartland" theory. If this globe should have a heart, this heart need not necessarily be the Russian and Siberian plains. At the present moment it is not yet there, though it may be there in the future. Where the "mostest" people agree in putting the "mostest" heart into the "mostest" soil, there will be the heart of the globe. The magic of space is the dynamic of man.

We can learn nothing from Haushofer, something from MacInde—provided that we guard ourselves against his kind of magic—and a great deal from Ratzel, whose *Politische Geographie* unfortunately is not translated.

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Man and Society in Calamity. By PITIRIM A. SOROKIN. New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., 1942. Pp. 352. \$3.00.

The study of the larger aspects of social life, by means of "comparative history" and the interpretation of historical records, has had a fluctuating career. Such endeavors were relatively popular, at least in Europe, during the middle of the nineteenth century; but, when sociology blossomed as "the American science" at the turn of the century, American sociologists manifested a disposition to avoid inquiries into the nature and functioning of "societies" in the largest sense and to concentrate on smaller social units—local communities and other groups of much less than "national" magnitude. More recently, however, beginning with Spengler's *Decline of the West*, there have appeared once more a number of works devoted to the description

and interpretation of some of the largest-scale manifestations of social and collective behavior. Of these, Arnold J. Toynbee's *A Study of History*, Quincy Wright's *A Study of War*, and Professor Sorokin's *Social and Cultural Dynamics* are outstanding examples. *Man and Society in Calamity*, like *The Crisis of Our Age* (1941), represents Sorokin's attempt to popularize and in other respects to supplement some of the findings of his four-volume *Social and Cultural Dynamics*.

Man and Society in Calamity bears the secondary title, *The Effects of War, Revolution, Famine, Pestilence upon Human Mind, Behavior, Social Organization, and Cultural Life*, which describes quite fairly the contents of the book. Drawing heavily upon the materials collected for his *Social and Cultural Dynamics* but supplementing them by other material, notably his own experience and observations in Russia during the early period of the Bolshevik revolution (1918–22), Sorokin has undertaken to examine systematically the effects of these four types of calamities, as they have occurred in history both singly and in combination with one another. In some contrast with the method of presentation used in *Social and Cultural Dynamics*, he has almost completely omitted statistical treatment of his data in the present work and has contented himself with reporting and generalizing, without pretense of quantitative precision, the facts about great national and international calamities which have been recorded by historians and others. The result is a moderately readable book, not at all difficult to understand and one which is obviously concerned with matters of the greatest human importance. In places, what Sorokin has found it possible to say about the effects of calamities savors of the elaboration of the obvious; and there is in the course of the volume no little repetition. There is also, no doubt, room for endless and inconclusive argument over the validity of his generalizations from the somewhat inadequate and unsatisfactory records that we have for most of the past history of mankind. Surely, however, the difficulties of "comparative history" do not constitute a sufficient reason for neglecting this type of inquiry. In a field of investigation where generalizations of unchallenged validity are so difficult to establish, one may be pardoned for elaborating and reiterating the obvious. It affords, at least, a basis for further study.

FLOYD N. HOUSE

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Permanent Revolution. By SIGMUND NEUMANN.
New York and London: Harper & Bros.,
1942. Pp. 388. \$3.00.

Neumann distinguishes between the contributions of participants, observers, and scholars to the study of history in process. Participants and observers provide the raw materials; the scholar attempts "to fit the facts into the frame of reference." Neumann has successfully achieved this purpose. His book is thoughtfully composed, carefully written, and based on extensive and systematic research. Sixty pages of annotated Bibliography add to its usefulness and make it an indispensable manual to the student of government and social order in totalitarian states.

The title indicates only one of the characteristics of totalitarianism: the fact that revolution was institutionalized. Neumann's analysis is not centered on this point. It deals with leaders, lieutenants, and the one-party system; with the institutional and propagandistic control of the masses; with the impact of war on totalitarian organization; and with the reaction of the democracies to totalitarian strategy in international politics. In each of these sections Neumann discusses the representative theories, and—careful in acceptance, moderate in criticism—he presents a balanced view of the problem. He has overcome the danger of simplification inherent in all similar approaches; he does not minimize the difference between the social systems in Russia, Italy, and Germany and refers repeatedly, though possibly not always with enough insistence, to their historical interdependence.

The catholicity of Neumann's learning leads occasionally into a danger zone, for example, when from the economic, social, and political scene he expands to that of psychology. Modern psychology, which inspired Italian and German propaganda chiefs, is not limited to the researches of Watson and Pavlov, to whom Neumann refers. The writings of Gustave le Bon and of his followers in social psychology deserve to be mentioned. Le Bon was studied by Hitler and Mussolini. The spurious masses Le Bon describes do not exist in a free society; they had to be created by violence and organization in order to make his managerial prescriptions applicable. Le Bon's manual also provides the background of the "strategy of terror," to which Neumann refers in these terms:

Out of fear of their own survival Fascist leaders systematized their own terroristic tactics. The re-

sult was the creation of an atmosphere which the Fascist *Epoca* described as one of "morale hygiene" and which the then anti-Fascist *Tribuna* characterized as "thick with violence and rancors." Similar reactions can be seen clearly in all the dictatorships. In fact, the purges in Nazi Germany and the mass trial in Soviet Russia in the late 30's were no less the result of a consuming fear on the part of the ruling elite.

This approach seems to me open to misunderstanding, since similar views were proposed by advocates of the appeasement policy of the 1930's in Britain and France. Freud's decisive discovery on the relation of fear and aggression was applied to the analysis of German politics. William Brown, a noted London psychiatrist, used to write letters to the *London Times* in which he explained Hitler's aggressiveness by his basic anxiety. Similar vulgarizations of psychoanalysis were current in France and had some considerable influence on public opinion in both countries. In England, a scientist of Lord Horder's integrity and caliber found it necessary to expose their danger. Neumann has, I suspect, inadvertently adopted a similar sequence of thought, though only as a subsidiary explanation of the strategy of terror. While his argument may fit the Italian situation after Matteotti's murder, it does not, I feel, apply either to Germany or to Russia. In Germany, at least, the strategy of terror was systematized by the National Socialist party before its accession to power, and the German experts on psychological management commented upon its effects. Hadamowsky, one of the officials of the Ministry of Propaganda, is reliably reported to have discussed the purge of 1934 in his seminar on propaganda at the Deutsche Hochschule für Politik. He contradicted those who claimed that the purge might have undermined confidence. Its effect, he said, was reassuring, since it proved to the people that all Germans, irrespective of rank and position, were equally subject to the Führer's will.

In conclusion, I should like to suggest a correction for a second edition, which, I feel sure, will soon be necessary: Stanley Baldwin should not be mentioned as a representative democratic leader; nor should he, whose personal responsibility Neumann stresses, and Neville Chamberlain be called typical representatives of the Victorian age. Some of us may consider this an insult to the Victorians.

ERNST KRIS

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Our Age of Unreason. By FRANZ ALEXANDER.
Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Co., 1942.
Pp. 371. \$3.00.

This book combines the historical, psycho-analytic, and sociological interests of the author as a first step in the task of placing the study of personality and social relations on a sound scientific basis. This can be done only by recognizing that the primary problem of social science is to achieve an understanding of the role of emotional forces in social life. An alternative statement by the author is that the main theme of the volume is to explain the origin of the individual insecurity resulting from the transition from a pioneer to an industrial civilization and to announce the remedy for the existing conditions. The first part of the volume purports to present a psychological analysis of the historical factors which in combination produced the present era. In concrete content it is given over in large part to summaries of well-known political theories and criticisms of them in terms of psychoanalytic criteria. The second part is a review of "dynamic psychology," which seems to differ from other summary statements chiefly in details and placement of emphasis. The final part of the volume is described as "an analysis of the emotional structure of democratic and totalitarian systems and especially America."

It is difficult to state the content and evaluate the contribution of a volume which purports to cover "the history of political thought, the theory of emotional disturbance, and the psychological analysis of social systems and events." The author does not integrate the diverse data into a systematic body of thought; there is rather scanty evidence to indicate that he made any genuine effort to do so. In consequence, the book might well be allowed to stand as a concrete exemplification of the author's assertion that man is mentally confused in the presence of modern forms of social organization. The author's neglect carefully to define the terms he uses in a specialized way adds to the difficulty of interpretation.

The author's basic assumptions run to the effect that essential human nature is a given body of biological or deeply rooted instinctive forces that is modified in some measure by infantile experiences. Its underlying pattern—the unconscious asocial nucleus—is emotional in character and remains relatively unchanged throughout the life of the organism. Social and cultural experiences are of secondary and minor

importance; they are, at the most superimpositions upon the enduring and more or less uniform biological and emotional substratum. They introduce nothing into the organism that is not already there; they can reflect only what is biologically performed. Social influences, therefore, cannot make human nature capable of living within a rational order; improvements in human relations must come from progressive changes within the organic personality. The intellect, a servant of the desires, plays a role subordinate to the blind, irrational forces. The psychological or organic complexes, the hidden emotional forces, are the dynamic factors of social life, the human motivations.

There is a basic polarity in the irrational and asocial emotional forces of the unconscious. Human nature is divided, in conflict with itself; it is social and asocial at the same time. The individual is impelled to act in contradictory ways—in accord with emotional drives and in accord with socially defined codes. Conflict is thus made the basic concept in the study of human behavior. In the unconscious it is a struggle between growth and fixation, a struggle between the trend toward maturity and independence resulting from biological growth and maturation and the regressive desires and resistance of the ego to maturity and independence. The social self develops from the asocial nucleus; like the asocial, the social impulses are dynamic, irrational, and emotional. They exist as a "cover" over the unchanging basic nature. The "underworld" of human nature—envy, hostility, revenge, and the lust for power—latent in everyone is released by frustration, discontent, and hopelessness. The untamed impulses of man thus come to the surface in conflict with conscience and the social self.

These and other psychiatric ideas in regard to essential human nature are applied somewhat mechanically, though not systematically, to the somewhat mechanical conception popularized under the term "social lag." Social changes in the modern world are asserted to follow a conflict pattern analogous to the developmental and regressive tendencies in the unconscious. Alterations resulting from man's creative activities necessitate adjustments to the new conditions. But this brings disharmony of attitudes and existing conditions, conflict between established habits and customary modes of thought and action, and imperative demands of the new order. Man is prone to adhere to the old and familiar, but these no longer satisfy his needs; in conse-

quence, he is frustrated and forced to make new adjustments.

The author seems profoundly convinced as to the adequacy of his positions, but the presentations he makes prove to be singularly unconvincing. The organic conception of human nature and personality may be a useful and valid tool in physiological areas of research, but for social analysis and interpretation it appears to be a sterile and unprofitable concept. If it is kept within its proper biological orbit, it excludes everything that is significant in the study of social reality; if it is carried over and used in the social and personal area, we have the familiar pseudo-scientific procedure of explaining one order of reality by the data or concepts of another. The position that the cultural acquisitions of human beings are simply a veneer that imperfectly conceals, without modifying or adding anything to, the original equipment is flatly contradictory of everything we know about the nature of man. But, aside from all questions as to the validity of the author's brand of "dynamic psychology," the present attempt to show its usefulness as a principle of social analysis is not notably successful. It seems obvious that it could not be. There appear to be neither logical grounds nor a body of empirical data to justify an assumption of identity or genuine similarity in the processes. Explanations of social reality derived by the extension of specialized interpretations or patterns of individual conflict appear to be little more than excursions into the realm of irresponsible speculation. The common analogies between the mental and the cultural processes of conflict and disorganization arise more from verbal confusion than from observation.

E. B. REUTER

University of Iowa

Myth and Society in Attic Drama. By ALAN M. G. LITTLE. New York: Columbia University Press, 1942. Pp. 95. \$1.50.

Here is another work in that fruitful tradition of Greek scholarship of which George Thomson's *Aeschylus and Athens* is perhaps the most impressive example to date. Little attempts to explain the development of Greek tragedy and, to a lesser extent, of Greek comedy with reference to the changing forces in Attic society. In the plays of Aeschylus, he maintains, we find "a dynamic use of myth in the interests of the new Athenian state." Aeschylus "so contrives that behind each of his trilogies

lies a new social principle in opposition to an older." He emphasizes particularly the significance of Aeschylus in illustrating the transition from an attitude founded on a matrilineal society to the more realistic attitude related to the new economic organization of Athenian society. The plays of Sophocles, Little maintains, reflect in their balance and nobility the "period of reaction and fusion" between the Persian Wars and the Peloponnesian War—a period in which we find "a democracy fairly balanced by a Eupatrid rule which, though shorn of its older power, was still definitely aristocratic, pro-Spartan, and controlled by Cimon." The view of the individual and of society implicit in Sophocles "is an aristocratic conception which presupposes a democratic background as a foil for its elevated code." Paradoxically, the balance of Sophocles' plays represents the reflection of a transitional society: it is an equilibrium, but an unstable one. Sophocles is the conservative in an age of social change; but the "disruptive forces" catch up with him in the end. By the time Euripides comes on the scene, these disruptive forces are in full swing: Euripides is more individualist, more realistic, more disorganized as a result. His plays are in part "the product of a rampant and excessive individualism which accompanies democratic rule, but they are evidence of a split in the coherence of society, revealing, as they do, a focused and articulate realism alternating with a blurred and inarticulate *Weltschmerz*." After the fourth century the rise of bourgeois society encourages the development of the New Comedy, which springs not from myth and ritual, as did fifth-century tragedy, but from the tradition of the mime.

This summary does not do justice, of course, to Little's argument. These points are raised in a wider context than can be made clear by a synopsis—for example, he inquires carefully into the place of myth in the development of social thought. Nevertheless, it is not unfair to charge Little with too facile generalization, inadequate documentation, and a certain naïveté of thought.

C. S. Lewis, that most cautious and sophisticated of literary historians, takes time off, in his book on the courtly love literature of the Middle Ages, to utter this caveat:

Before we proceed . . . I must put the reader on his guard against a necessary abstraction in my treatment of the subject. I have spoken hitherto as if men first became conscious of a new emotion and

then invented a new kind of poetry to express it: as if Troubadour poetry were necessarily "sincere" in the crudely biographical sense of the word: as if convention played no part in literary history.

In other words, Lewis was aware of the dangerous generalizations and simplifications which even the most careful literary historian cannot avoid. Little's fault is that he does not seem to be aware of these dangers.

In the first place, to produce even an elementary discussion of the relation of Attic drama to Attic society in under eighty pages is pretty nearly impossible without inadequacies and naïve generalizations. The whole thing is too easy. The *Eumenides*, we are told, "was designed to set the seal of mythological sanction on the new conscious principle of democratic Athenian law as opposed to the old semiconscious obligations of the unwritten tribal code." The question-begging term here is "designed." To what extent were these plays conscious attempts to present these problems or unconscious reflections of them? In a study of this kind it is impossible to ignore this question without blurring almost every issue; yet Little almost entirely ignores it. The "unexpected lack of artistry" at the end of the *Trachiniae* is related to "the disruptive forces already at work in the balance of Attic society"; but such a naïve correlation between aesthetic techniques and social forces would soon be shown up as—to say the least—wholly inadequate in any extensive application of it to literary history. How on earth would we explain the formal perfection of *Paradise Lost*? In the plays of Sophocles, says Little, tragedy becomes "a makeweight presentation of the dignified codes of a powerful minority." But a parallel social situation existed in Restoration England, and Restoration drama is anything but Sophoclean! The trouble is that the *differentiating* qualities of the situation are not seen or presented with sufficient precision or clarity. The relation between psychological and sociological factors, the relation between tradition and individual intention, the relation between the dramatist and his public—these points need much more careful discussion than Little has given them before any of the questions he raises can be satisfactorily answered.

"There is," says Little of *Iphigeneia in Tauris* and other of the later plays of Euripides, "no mistaking the realistic message of the myth. Not here the conflict of tribal society and city-state, nor of aristocratic code and democratic

interest. This was the conflict of the human soul in the shattered ruins of a society." Of course, there is an element of truth in this; but to reduce the whole problem to this simple level is both inadequate literary history and defective sociology. Little is rarely wrong, but he is rarely adequate.

We should also expect evidence of a wider range of reading in both primary and secondary sources than is apparent in this book. There are some suggestive and some illuminating ideas here, but the whole context of the discussion is too limited. Little has read, for this book, all the Greek plays discussed, the *Poetics* of Aristotle, and some forty secondary sources from Plutarch to George Thomson; in addition he has made some study of Greek archeological remains. He would have enriched his argument considerably by taking some notice of the non-dramatic literature of the period and endeavoring to construct a fuller and more complete picture of the civilization and culture of fifth-century Athens than he here gives us. What we have here is a sketch for an interesting book; and with patient reading and reflection the sketch could be developed into something really worth while. In its present form it is altogether too sketchy and premature.

DAVID DAICHES

University of Chicago

The Institutional Theory of Economics. By RADHAKAMAL MUKERJEE. London: Macmillan & Co., Ltd., 1941. Pp. xv+376. 10s. 6d.

Practically the only thing in common among those who advocate an "institutional" approach to economics is antagonism to the "orthodox" treatment in terms of price theory and demand and supply. The content which they propose instead is of several kinds, including economic history (with a theoretical slant—Sombart, Veblen), statistical induction and analysis (W. C. Mitchell), legal economics (J. R. Commons), and economic sociology or, perhaps, cultural anthropology. The work before us represents the last of these conceptions—the one with the best claim to the term "institutionalism"—as would be expected from the author's previous work.

The book is an excellent statement of, and plea for, the point of view indicated. Its theme is a call for the study of "life, mind, and society as an integral whole" (cf. section heading on p. 34; also pp. 164, 344 ff., and *passim*). The

position is an attractive one, as long as it is stated in very general terms—and until certain crucial questions are raised. The most important such question may be suggested by certain statements from the book itself. Classical economics in general and the marginal-utility theory in particular are criticized (p. 164) because they "abstract[s] economic values from their vital and organic connections with the universe of meaning and values." Again, classical economics is said (pp. 350–51) to have "followed the procedure of an abstracting, analysing dissection," and to have used "neglective fictions which all the sciences have employed provisionally in the discovery of laws" (reviewer's italics).

One must ask, first, whether any science can ever get beyond this "provisional" function and point of view, and then, more particularly, about the incidence and scope of the task of "integrating" the knowledge of society which is revealed by the admittedly, but deliberately, specialized and limited individual sciences and about the relation between this function and that of the sciences themselves. Surely an integral and complete account of "life, mind, and society" is the traditional task of philosophy; and surely it must use data and results not merely from all the recognized social sciences but also from the natural sciences, physical and biological. The claim of sociology to replace philosophy as the synthetic culmination of all branches of specialized knowledge is as old as Comte but is not yet established—or even universally put forward by sociologists themselves.

Another angle which opponents of price-theory economics seem to a somewhat more old-fashioned economist to overlook is that a large sector of the vital problems which confront modern society—i.e., any society which has evolved to the point of undertaking conscious self-direction—are "economic" problems in the sense that the type of analysis which is presented by classical economic theory is the essential requisite for their solution. Knowledge from many other fields is certainly involved in intelligent social action, even with respect to the problems which are to be classed as economic. But it would be difficult to maintain that the "wholistic" approach could ever conceivably replace the special sciences. The need for applying various sciences to social problems does not imply that there should be only one, or even that a super-science is necessary or can be achieved.

FRANK H. KNIGHT

University of Chicago

And Keep Your Powder Dry. By MARGARET MEAD. New York: William Morrow & Co., 1942. Pp. 274. \$2.50.

And Keep Your Powder Dry by Margaret Mead is a thought-provoking book by one of America's foremost anthropologists. Miss Mead begins by stating that "we are our culture" (p. 21) and then goes on to develop her theme in an analysis of what composes the unique elements of the American character. Miss Mead is limited by spatial considerations (her book is less than three hundred pages in length); but in a series of brilliant insights she points out that while Americans are rootless they can trace their culture heritage to the Puritans, and while Americans are boastful they are also amazingly humble. American society, she says, is organized about a "success system." American character develops in a culture where the child is supposed to outdistance the parent. The child should be "brighter, stronger, more aggressive, more successful" (p. 155).

Following her rather hasty discussion of the American character, Miss Mead goes on to suggest what the role of the United States must be in rebuilding the post-war world.

And Keep Your Powder Dry is a valuable book. One may not always agree with the author's analyses, but her insights are certainly shrewd and her treatment provocative. The book would probably have been better if Miss Mead had not tried so often to remind the reader that she is an anthropologist and that she has, therefore, an anthropological point of view. To the lay reader it does not matter that *And Keep Your Powder Dry* is written by an anthropologist; and the professional social scientist will be aware of Miss Mead's antecedents. In actuality, of course, what Miss Mead has done is to view the United States, as one of its more observing citizens, and say: "Look—this is us as I see us, and these are the implications I draw from what I see." Other social scientists, and the general public, could profitably devote some time to similar analyses.

ETHEL SHANAS

Chicago

The Standard of Living in 1860: American Consumption Habits on the Eve of the Civil War. By EDGAR W. MARTIN. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1942. Pp. x+451. \$4.50.

Mr. Martin presents his study as a contribution to American economic history. Following Professor C. W. Wright, he argues that the level of living of the people measures the national achievement in the struggle to produce and distribute economic goods. In this position he is following also Sir Frederic Morton Eden, who wrote in his great work, *The State of the Poor*, in 1797:

The historian who wishes to record the progress of society will not confine himself to a recital of public transactions; he will explore the recesses of domestic life and minutely detail the employments, the manners and the comforts of the different ranks in society; for it is only by such details that he can properly exemplify the excellence or defects of political institutions.

Mr. Martin is the first to carry through in comprehensive fashion this most difficult type of historical research. By choosing 1860 he gives us a picture at a midway point in our national history. It is to be hoped that some other student will be encouraged to try his hand at a reconstruction of the levels of living in the nation-to-be on the eve of the Revolution, and another, using the vastly more adequate materials, the situation at the outbreak of the second World War.

Mr. Martin has attempted, as was said, to make his picture complete, to show how both farm and city people lived—those with high and with low income; those living in the North, in the South, and in the West. He sought to discover what they ate and wore, what kind of houses they lived in, with what furnishings they were equipped, what were their methods of transportation and communication, their medical care, their reading, their educational facilities, the public services provided them, their church activities, their uses of leisure. There may be sources of information he overlooked, but, if so, they are few and minor. The weaknesses of the study come not from failure to find the relevant data but from the defects of the data themselves for the purpose they are to serve. The only statistical data available were data on production, not on consumption; and on production for the market at a time when household production was extensive. • Production data, even if complete, do not reveal the relative consumption of the various classes and communities. Data of a nonstatistical character gleaned from travelers' accounts, letters, diaries, newspapers, and other contemporary records have a similar deficiency. They may

fail to indicate or may even falsify the frequency or universality of use of the articles mentioned or described. The possibilities of error may be appreciated if one thinks of a description of present-day levels of living drawn from similar sources without the corrective of consumption studies by income, occupation, race, and region. In fact, part of the preparation for making a study of the levels of living in 1860 might well be a careful study of the levels in 1940. From a knowledge of the family in the median, upper, and lower quartile position in 1940 one should be able to "sight" more accurately those of similar economic status at the earlier date.

Mr. Martin is well aware of these difficulties. He calls them to the attention of his readers, differentiates between speculation as to probabilities and statements supported by clear-cut evidence. His discussion is lightened and its value enhanced by the fact that he not always is informing the reader but also raises questions, turns over the evidence, and ventures some personal opinions.

Studies of this sort are not only contributions to economic history. The recounting of the consumption habits of the past gives perspective and possibly a greater objectivity to our view of current concepts of the necessary and desirable. A few of those interested in the "why's" and "wherefore's" of our consumption habits have suggested that international comparisons and comparisons over a period of time would be of value, since, in Knight's words, "wants are culture products, reflect culture traits and are to be judged by culture canons." The study of consumption, however, concentrates more and more on the collection and analysis of statistical data, largely on quantities in dollars of things acquired. It is greatly to be desired that those responsible for these collections think of them in part as sources of information for future historians wanting to know what people of various conditions and circumstances really ate, wore, and otherwise used.

HAZEL KYRK

University of Chicago

How Collective Bargaining Works. By HARRY A. MILLIS (Research Director) and CONTRIBUTING AUTHORS. New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1942. Pp. xxviii+986. \$4.00.

This work comes at a particularly timely period in the labor history of the United States. The New Deal espousal of the cause of labor is

now being assayed in the light of the last ten years of experience and also in the light of the whole history of the American labor movement. This volume is not a history of the labor movement as such, nor is it a theoretical analysis of labor economics; it is a series of full-length sketches of the actual working of so-called "collective bargaining" in nearly a score of major United States trades and industries, together with very brief summaries from thirteen other fields. These sketches and summaries are practically contemporaneous; for, although most of the field work was done three or four years ago, the materials have been brought up to date. The general plan in each of the larger essays is to give a history of industrial relations from the beginning in each case, in certain instances going back more than a century; then to add the various agreements, citations of cases, quotations from statutes, and other documents.

A straightforward chapter on "Organized Labor and the New Deal" prefaces the factual case studies. From this preliminary statement certain trends may be deduced: first, that the industrial or semi-industrial union now provides the dominant organizational and bargaining patterns; second, in recent years a tendency has been shown for agreements to cover a wider geographical area; third, the reduction of inequalities in labor standards promises to continue as a very important trade-union objective; fourth, it is quite clear that the New Deal as such has forwarded the unions and aided their organizational gains until now over a quarter of the workers in America are organized in some pattern. As for the results, the authors of this volume are somewhat conservative. They do note an increase in wage rates and the reduction in the differences between wage rates for similar jobs; also a tendency to reduce the difference between skilled and unskilled wages by establishing high minimum rates and granting larger relative increases in the lower brackets. They by no means claim that all problems have been solved; for example, in the case of the daily newspapers it is clear that one very tough unsolved problem is the relation of union legislation to collective bargaining—that is, how far unions may go in passing laws which affect the scope of collective bargaining and contractual relations. Apparently the crying unsolved problem which union leaders have been wont to ignore is the economic principle of diminishing returns as revealed by the growing number of suspensions of daily newspapers and their relation

to wage scales and labor costs. The writers' question as to the newspaper industry might well apply to many others, namely: "How long an industry can continue to support a steadily mounting structure of wage rates, and how union sentiment for rising wages and living standards can be reconciled with the stubborn fact that the industry is no longer expanding nor as profitable as in former years." Of course, this disadvantage is attributable in part to craft autonomy and to inadequate knowledge of the economics of the industry, upon which labor leaders should base their decisions. Jurisdictional disputes and failures of unions to adjust such disagreements peacefully are set down as major causes of unstable industrial relations in the building trades, but such difficulties have not been unknown in other industries.

It is manifestly impossible, within a few lines, to do justice to an encyclopedic case book of this sort, but the Twentieth Century Fund, its labor committee, and the co-operating authors of these case studies are to be congratulated on presenting this excellent factual summary of labor-management relations.

ARTHUR J. TODD

Northwestern University

Social Aspects of Industry: A Survey of Labor Problems and Causes of Industrial Unrest. By L. HOWARD PATTERSON. 3d ed. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc., 1943. Pp. xvii+536. \$3.00.

In the orthodox tradition of the writings of present-day economists the author presents a treatise upon physical conditions of work, national distribution of wealth and income, legal and economic aspects of collective bargaining, history of labor organizations, "scientific management," and "comprehensive programs of economic reconstruction" (the co-operative movement, socialism, communism, etc.). Dr. Patterson has probably done about as good a job as his competitors in this textbook field.

However, from the standpoint of the sociologist, the title is completely misleading. For example, it leads one to expect to learn something about the causes of strikes and other forms of industrial conflict. It all boils down to this statement:

Frequent causes of strikes are to be found in labor's demands for an increase in wages, for a decrease in hours of work, and for a recognition of the union. The chief cause of over half of the strikes

from 1881 to 1905 was a demand for higher wages or a protest against lower wages. Although still the chief cause of industrial disputes, the wage question seems to be declining in relative importance as compared with purely union causes of strikes, such as a demand for recognition, status, or jurisdiction.

Following out this emphasis upon wages, we should expect to find that industries paying low wages have more frequent strikes than those paying high wages and that, within the same company, the men in the low-pay brackets would be more active in organizing strikes than those in higher brackets. Of course, no such correlations can be shown. The author has made the elementary mistake of accepting people's explanations for their behavior as representing the actual motivating factors in the situation. If he had paid any attention to the findings of the Western Electric studies, as interpreted by Mayo, Roethlisberger, and Dickson, he might have avoided this pitfall and discovered other aspects of labor unrest.

The book raises the important issue of what we mean by "social aspects of industry." If we follow the assumption of Patterson that general economic conditions motivate human behavior, then we can never get down to cases and explain events which we observe. Against such a background of thinking the author's efforts to get down to cases are absurdly inadequate. Witness this statement: "Among the personal causes of excessive labor turnover are such factors as illness, a migratory tendency, or an uncongenial disposition."

The only way to reach conclusions of practical significance in this field is to define the social aspects of industry as the systems of human relations to be observed there. If this approach were accepted, it would be impossible for a scholar, as in the case of Dr. Patterson, to write a textbook on the social aspects with no attention to the nature of human relations in the industrial hierarchy; with hardly a mention of problems of adjustment between workers and foreman, foreman and plant superintendent, and so on up the line; and with no consideration of the staff and line functions of technically trained personnel.

I am not criticizing Dr. Patterson simply because he is not a sociologist. The significant point is that business executives, labor-union leaders, or college students could read the book through without running across a single observation that would help them to understand the functioning of business organizations and labor

organizations in relation to one another. For classroom use the book would serve simply to indoctrinate the student in some of the social theories of our age, clutter up his mind with ideas having no demonstrable relationship to observable behavior, and make it more difficult for him to act effectively in these key structures of our society.

WILLIAM FOOTE WHYTE

University of Oklahoma

The Pullman Strike. By ALMONT LINDSEY. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1942. Pp. xii+385. \$3.75.

This book is a history. It makes no pretense to be anything else. However, it contains material useful to the sociologist. One aim of sociology is to collect case histories and reduce their uniformities to mathematical form. The present volume will prove useful as an exceptionally well-documented case history of a social upheaval of secondary, but still real, importance. The economic and social background of the historic labor struggle is set forth in a very competent manner. The consequences are not, perhaps, so adequately treated. The most useful chapter for professional sociologists is the one on "Public Opinion and the Press." It could be more elaborate, but it is excellent as far as it goes. Our science needs more and more such carefully made studies as this if it is ever to produce an adequate theory of social unrest. In many cases sociologists fail to carry far enough their investigation of the interaction of functional systems and institutional complexes. To correct this failing, historical studies such as the present one are highly useful.

LYFORD P. EDWARDS

Columbia University

Race—Reason and Rubbish: A Primer of Race Biology. By GUNNAR DAHLBERG. Translated from the Swedish by LANCELOT HOG-BEN. New York: Columbia University Press, 1942. Pp. 240. \$2.25.

Two currently popular bodies of racial doctrine—bastard offspring of a liaison between philosophy and practical politics—cite biology in support of their claims to respectability. Eugenics, as a system of antidemocratic thought, consists in the main of Darwinian biology and experimental genetics applied, prematurely and chiefly by analogy, to human popula-

tions; as a practical reform program it rests on a misconception of the effect of lethal selection on the internal structure of social aggregates. The doctrines of racial superiority—pseudo-scientific types of biological philosophy—rationalize the racial attitudes developed by Western peoples during the era of exploration and colonial development. The findings of the biological sciences, whether genuine or spurious, are drawn upon to provide a basis for the body of rationalizations; and they are cited to excuse or to justify the abuse, exclusion, and exploitation of the militaristically impotent peoples. As inferiors, the retarded peoples are outsiders; in dealing with outsiders civilized ethical standards need not be observed.

It would be manifestly unfair to hold the biologists exclusively responsible for the flourishing state of these racial doctrines; almost any body of scientific data can be misunderstood and misused. Moreover, various biologists have been careful to guard against popular misunderstanding and are critical of unwarranted extensions of their research. But it is nevertheless true that in some considerable measure the growth of racial doctrines receives direct support from the biological students. Some otherwise reputable biologists have expounded racial theories and have aligned themselves with the racialists. Others, by unwarranted extensions into social reality of limited biological research findings, have given support to racial doctrines or, by neglect so to qualify or clarify statements as to prevent improper inferences, have left their findings open to easy misinterpretation. Because of the aid, whether intentional or unwitting, that some biologists have given to spurious racial philosophies, this popular volume by an outstanding biological scholar—ranked by Professor Hogben as one of the five genuinely competent geneticists in the world today—is particularly timely.

The early chapters deal with the simple and more general aspects of heredity. A chapter on the fundamental mechanisms of inheritance—hereditary determinants, Mendelian ratios, dominants, recessives, chromosomes, etc.—is followed by others discussing the independent assortment and linkage of genes, dihybrid inheritance and mutation, and sex determination and sex linkage. The following chapters bear more directly on the nature of human inheritance. The section on environment and gene exhibition touches upon likenesses and differences in uniovular twins, emphasizing the compara-

tively great temperamental differences frequently observed between them and the fact that, owing to lack of precise methods of measuring them, no results of scientific value have been reached in regard to likenesses and differences in mental and some other characteristics. The discussion of the principle of random mating is following by more detailed material on selection and its limited efficacy as a means of working changes in the character of the population. The discussion of inbreeding and cousin-marriage closes with the warning that "the inclination to apply the results of race biology in practical policy is too strong rather than too weak." The discussion of assortive mating leads to a consideration of isolate effect. Serious recessive defects are more common in small isolates, not because of inbreeding or because of inferiority of the stock in rural and village areas, as is so often asserted, but because the presence of a defective gene in a small population is more frequently exhibited. As far as rare defects are concerned, the shortsighted policy of sterilization, like other methods of hindering reproduction, is ineffective. In the meanwhile, a real diminution in the number of defectives has been brought about by the increased human mobility resulting from improved means of transportation. Defects decrease with the size of the isolate and are rarer today than they were fifty years go; also, though the scientific proof is not adequate to a demonstration, the general intellectual level of the population has probably been raised.

The author's brief discussion of race is essentially in harmony with the sociological position. A race is a group within a species, and it is "meaningless to talk about race types within a community." In a biological usage race is merely a descriptive label; in the political usage it is a pseudo-historical idea. Most of the biological discussion of race resorts to the use of a pre-Mendelian type of biology. Racial differences do exist, but the racialists are unable to agree as to their nature. It is no more reasonable to assert that the brain of the Negro does not work in the same way as the brain of the white man than it would be to assert that the kidneys of the Negro do not function in the same way as those of the white man. The genuinely social and sociological problems of race are not discussed.

In the final chapter the Jewish problem is shown to have been originally a religious quarrel between Christians and Jews. In the nineteenth century the Jews came to be defined as a race, though, "so far as inherited traits are concerned,

there is absolutely no reason for maintaining that Jews represent a special type." While there are, perhaps, some general racial differences that distinguish Jews from other peoples, the Jews do not conform to any biological conception of a pure race; they show the same wide range of individual variations as do other peoples. There is no scientific ground for thinking of them as inferior and no justification for believing them to be inordinately intelligent. But they do have a religion and a body of tradition of their own. Hatred of the Jews is explained on the basis of spontaneous antagonisms toward a divergent minority in successful competition with a dominant group.

In the five processes that bring about changes in the inherited characteristics of a people, only two—mutation, which is so rare as to have no significance in brief historic times, and selection—lead to essential alterations of population quality. On the two fundamental questions of human genetics—the significance of selection resulting from differential fertility of social groups and the dissolution of isolates because of migration—there is no basis for decided views and no ground for suggesting practical applications; "sterilization of defectives can never bring about results of great value" and may bring unnecessary suffering. "There is no sufficient reason for paying much attention to the political consequences of race biology from a constructive point of view." Also, in the presence of widespread, irrational racial prejudices and class dogmas, "we have grounds for being glad that it is not possible to do more about deciding the hereditary make-up of posterity."

E. B. REUTER

University of Iowa

Patterns of Negro Segregation. By CHARLES S. JOHNSON. New York: Harper & Bros., 1943. Pp. 332. \$3.50.

From field and case studies made within the last two years, this second monograph of the Carnegie-Myrdal study, "The Negro in America," presents a firsthand account of the full range and extent of racial segregation in the United States. It gains its unique value in comparison with other studies in this field not merely through its recency and an unimpeachable objectivity but also by correlating in illuminating fashion all the various phases of discrimination and segregation—legal, political, economic, educational, recreational, social, and civil. With-

out overgeneralization and with due regard for local and regional variations, it becomes possible, in Professor Johnson's vitalized presentation, to diagnose these undemocratic social phenomena as general symptoms and thus to focus the analysis upon the underlying practical question of the general need for democratic consistency and constructive reform.

The distribution of racial discrimination far beyond the boundaries of the traditional South and its stubborn persistence in the industrial and military activities of a democracy at war—both carefully documented in this volume—show how serious these issues are, for majority and minority well-being alike. Indeed, as presented, the case is even more of a challenge to the health and prospects of general democracy than a mere indictment of special plea in behalf of the Negro minority.

The view is expressed that chronic racial discrimination is good soil for fascism and that, therefore, in the light of the present democratic crisis drastic improvement in these matters is imperative. Dr. Johnson concludes that "the effects of the unrestrained operation of the principle of racialism are conceivably as dangerous to American society as the unrestricted play of free competition in the economic sphere," and since "to preserve the democratic principle it is now necessary for the government to impose rigid controls and regulations to determine the conditions under which the competitive principle may operate, to provide safeguards for small industries, to preserve the economic security of labor, and to protect women, children, and the handicapped," . . . "logically it would be appropriate for government to impose controls and regulations, as mandatory as those imposed on economic life, to ensure to all racial minorities not only free but equal participation in the economic and political life of the country. In fact, before the present war is ended, such action may become a political necessity."

ALAIN LOCKE

Howard University

The Jewish Community: Its History and Structure to the American Revolution. By SALO WITTMAYER BARON. Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society of America, 1942. 3 vols.

I know of very little writing about the Jews which has not been tendentious. Owing to the role assigned this people in the Christian scheme of salvation, the very word "Jew" is a tenden-

tious word, and it has not been easy for either Jews or Gentiles to write of the Jews in the spirit and according to the methods of science—always a difficult thing in the social sciences, whatever the theme. On the Jewish theme the intent of the most objective is unconsciously diverted, by Christian theological animus or by its correlative Jewish insecurity, toward either attack or apologetic. But this book, by the Jewish professor of Jewish history, literature, and institutions in Columbia University, is the result of a conscientious and, I believe, a very largely successful effort to overcome the unconscious distorting disposition. As an over-all sociological and historical view of the structure and functions of the Jewish community, its rulers and functionaries, its institutions, its folkways and mores, its inner conflicts and outer adjustments, it impresses one with a gratifying scientific objectivity. Dr. Baron not only has read and digested the bulk of the available literature in his field (the 335 pages of notes and bibliography making up more than half of Vol. III [the rest is the Index] testify to it); he has been able to measure with the body of life the learned books he has consulted and synthesized. Because of his own direct observation of the Jewish scene here and abroad and his personal participation in community tasks, his historical knowledge and mastery of documents have an empirical frame of reference in present perception of living forms and trends. As far as I know, this study of his is a pioneer work, the first of its kind with respect to both method and matter; comprehensive, sober, unpretentious, aiming neither to defend nor to attack but to understand.

The upshot is a sort of space-time anatomy of the Jewish community as it struggles for survival, as the forms of its institutions and the behaviors of its functionaries are modified by the impact of the different cultural economies which they undergo, from Greco-Roman times to the beginning of "emancipation." Starting with the well-defined pattern of the Jewish community in Hellenistic antiquity, we see its changes through absorption from, as well as through reaction to, the diverse Christian, the Mohammedan, the feudal; and the early capitalist European cultures amid which it strives and works. We see its structures not only in their characteristic identity but as responsive conformations to the various religious, socioeconomic, and political organizations which environ it. Hence, we see—in Poland, in Germany, in Russia, in France, in

England, in the United States—sharply distinct variations of the basic species, each a reshaping of the original Jewish community pattern toward harmony with the dominant institutional setup. Of course, this is not exactly a new idea or a startling discovery. Like so much in social science, it is largely a confirmation of the obvious. But the way in which the confirmation is established and the spirit in which it is undertaken are definitely something new and hopeful in the sociological study of the Jewish component in Western civilization.

H. M. KALLEN

*New School for Social Research
New York City*

The Hopi Child. By WAYNE DENNIS. New York: D. Appleton-Century Co. (for the Institute for Research in the Social Sciences, University of Virginia), 1940. Pp. xi+204. \$2.50.

Students of culture and personality will be interested in this study of the Hopi child, carried out by a psychologist who has taken the trouble to acquaint himself with the field of anthropology. After a year's preparation, the Dennises spent two summers in New Oraibi gathering data both on child care and on child behavior. The data on child care come from Hotevilla, a conservative village, and from New Oraibi, a progressive village. The systematic observation of child behavior was carried out primarily in New Oraibi.

Of particular interest are the Dennises' observations on the general course of infant development, the effects of the cradleboard, and the conclusions drawn from Hopi play activities. There is apparently no essential difference in the basic responses of Hopi infants as compared with those of white infants, at least in the types of responses noted. Comparison between the children of conservative families which employed cradleboards and progressive families which did not indicated no essential difference in the age at onset of walking. Incidentally, the restraint of the cradleboard soon after birth appears to cause no infant reaction. The observations on child behavior are suggestive rather than definitive—as Professor Dennis himself points out. In general, he finds a strong resemblance between the behavior of Hopi and that of American children at all ages.

The student of Hopi culture will find some

new items of ethnography overlooked by previous investigators, as well as several errors of fact due, in part, to the short time available for field work and the difficulty of working with informants in conservative villages. It seems to the reviewer that Old Oraibi, despite its partial disintegration, would have offered an illuminating contrast with reference to child play—a contrast which it was not possible to observe at Hotevilla because of the lack of co-operation on the part of the villagers.

This study reveals also that the psychologists in general have not yet realized the opportunities afforded by diverse cultures to test hypotheses derived from the study of our own behavior. When we are able to probe deeper into Hopi psychology and to study, in particular, the stresses and conflicts within the extended kinship structure and their effects upon the developing personality, we shall find answers to why the Hopi adult differs considerably in his behavior from adults in our society. Professor Dennis has been too much concerned with the similarities which he finds in behavior and development and has perhaps underestimated the differences which may be noted between Hopi and white behavior in most villages.

FRED EGGAN

University of Chicago

The Changing Indian. Edited by OLIVER LA FARGE. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1942. Pp. 184. \$2.00.

This volume comprises the discussions presented at a meeting in March, 1941, under the sponsorship of the Institute on the Future of the American Indian. As is inevitable in any symposium, the several contributions are of unequal value, though the authors maintain a rather high standard. They contribute much information not generally available. The reviewer's selection of articles for comment implies no reflection on those omitted but merely attempts to direct attention to sociologically interesting material. H. L. Shapiro, for example, demonstrates that there is a large percentage of mixed-bloods among those officially registered as Indians (pp. 19-27). J. G. Townsend judiciously sets forth some of the basic facts concerning Indian health (pp. 28-41), such as the astounding mortality during the infant's first year (24 per cent of deaths as compared with 8 per cent for the entire United States). In opposition to a widespread

view, he does not consider the race as innately predisposed to tuberculosis, crediting any group similarly placed economically with a corresponding endemic index. He suggests interesting researches—e.g., tests of the alleged immunity of the Navaho to scarlet fever. John H. Provinse (pp. 55-71) convincingly illustrates the importance of the pre-existing cultural patterns, to which effective plans for the utilization of land must adjust. Ward Shepard (pp. 72-83) points out the disproportionate immobility of the Indian as compared with the Negro and white populations and the catastrophic effects of the General Allotment Act. The latter are enlarged upon by Allan G. Harper (pp. 84-102), with special attention to the Lower Brule Sioux of South Dakota, where within a generation over half the original allotted area has passed into white ownership as a result of ill-considered assignment of grazing land for farming. Educational problems are outlined by Gordon MacGregor (pp. 116-27) and Willard W. Beatty (pp. 128-43), who show that typically the Indians educated in boarding-schools return to their reservations and fail to utilize their industrial training. The problem, evidently, is to educate them for making a living among their own people. The editor epitomizes the several contributions (pp. 166-74), the subsequent pages being devoted to a brief bibliography and an index.

ROBERT H. LOWIE

University of California

Look to the Mountain. By LEGRAND CANNON. New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1942. \$2.75.

Where land is good and free, the folk society grows. A man and his woman, a gun, a canoe, an ax, and the canny, careful training of the New England child can be the nucleus of a new family unit on new land. This fine novel shows this process of growth in dramatic form. It is recommended to teachers of sociology who do not disdain the novel as a supplementary means of instruction.

The story is that of a Connecticut youth of the eighteenth century who takes his wife to unsettled country in New Hampshire. Barely literate, he is a skilled woodsman and farmer. He finds the conditions of life in his native settlement hard and unpromising. They create in him a powerful push to get away. He has this push, plus something else—i.e., the nerve to get

away and an appetite for higher status and security.

With his meager but invaluable tools and his indispensable wife, he sets himself against the forces of nature—against the river which can move you where you want to go or make you break your back paddling; against the forest which can feed and shelter you or wear you down with dread fatigue; against disease, where a man has only his own strong physique and his often impotent charms to help. Whit Livingston, the hero, is pitted against all these forces. He fights the cold, slaving to build a cabin and chimney against the ringed snows of winter; as time goes on he forces an ever better living from the brutish soil, glorying in the strength and patience of his oxen.

The pioneer is lonely, and his wife is lonelier still. Men are not trained to suffer detachment from settled life. One good friend can change the world. New neighbors are a solid joy, for then the singing begins, the dancing, and the endless roundabout chat.

Men are ever collecting together, assorting themselves, building a community, a road, a bridge, a mill. In friendship they share the tasks too much for the strength of one. Behind the simple imagery of this novel these slow-moving and powerful processes are seen having their way, creating a new community. Whit Livingston is mastered by the American dream of having "something better." He has the strength and faith to buck the current alone. What education is today to the seeker after power and security, free land was to our forebears of the eighteenth century. Whit, who had the dream and was able to master himself, was able to master his land.

JOHN DOLLARD

Yale University

Culture of a Contemporary Rural Community: El Cerrito, New Mexico. By OLEN LEONARD and C. F. LOOMIS. ("Rural Life Studies," No. 1.) Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Agriculture, Bureau of Agricultural Economics, November, 1941. Pp. 72.

In 1931 the Department of Agriculture initiated a study of six American communities, chosen not so much to explore geographical localities as to sample cultural differences, these differences lying in the range of cultural stability to be found in the communities. El Cerrito, thirty miles from Las Vegas, belongs among the

stable cultures. It is an example of isolated, integrated village life in which the people are bound by ties of blood and of early intimacies as well as by shared mores and traditions; a life to which the inhabitants cling with extreme tenacity in spite of the fact that within recent years it has become almost overpoweringly difficult from an economic standpoint. The moving-to-town by the older people, in order to work on relief projects, and, even more powerfully, the drawing-off of many of the young people to C.C.C. and N.Y.A. camps have been influential factors in introducing changes and some breakdowns in older attitudes. Yet the values of family, church, and village still remain strong, and one gets the impression that, given half a chance, they will endure for a long time yet.

One of the most interesting aspects of this report lies in what it discloses of the expanding interests of the Department of Agriculture. Once confined almost exclusively to land usage, these interests now extend to the community as a whole. The authors of this report did not make a hasty high-powered survey but spent months in becoming intimate with the inhabitants. And the most detailed reporting in the study is on patterns of community association.

There is included a supplementary volume of photographs to give a more intimate contact with the nature and realities of village life.

MARGARET PARK REDFIELD

Glenview, Illinois

The Chilean Popular Front. By JOHN REESE STEVENSON. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1942. \$1.50.

This is not merely a satisfactory study of the ephemeral Chilean Popular Front; it is also a good survey of more than a century of Chilean national politics, to which subject five of the ten brief chapters are devoted. The Popular Front survived for less than five years (1936-41) and was actually in control of the government for only a little more than two years before its disintegration. It was never a harmonious and unified organization, and it was subjected to almost constant assaults from both the extreme Left and the extreme Right. Its resurrection within a year after its demise might have occurred but for the death of Pedro Aguirre Cerda, one of its most astute and moderate leaders.

Chile's most successful reform movement was not the Popular Front but the coalition led

by Arturi Alexandri, who was the dominant political figure in the country in 1920-25 and 1932-38. With few exceptions the Popular Front merely continued the early program which he had inaugurated but had more or less abandoned during his later and more conservative years when he was centering most of his attention on the preservation of constitutional procedures against men who preferred the sword to the ballot, which had largely been nullified by the purchasing of votes.

Early in 1942, Juan Antonio Ríos, a rather conservative member of the Radical party, became president. In Chile, as in most countries of the world, the transcendent political problem is that of settling sociopolitical issues without resort to military force. Stevenson thinks the prospects are fairly bright since the problem is no longer complicated by other issues, such as the religious and the racial. The main problems are the expansion of production and a more equitable distribution of national income in order that mass living standards may be raised. The majority of Chileans are suffering from hunger, alcoholism, disease, and ignorance. Moreover, because of mountains, deserts, and defective distribution of rainfall, the natural resources of the country are none too abundant. While Chile possesses iron and potential water power, coking coal is scarce and timber for charcoal is not plentiful except in the rainy and cold region of the south.

J. FRED RIPPY

University of Chicago

Grass Roots Politics: National Voting Behavior of Typical States. By HAROLD F. GOSNELL. Washington: American Council on Public Affairs, 1942.

At a time when American life is undergoing great transformations, an analysis of the shifting forces behind the American party system throws some light on the road which America is traveling. Although he does not go so far as to say that America faces the danger of a return to the isolationism and reactionary Republicanism of the 1920's, Gosnell does warn that the democratic party system faces severe tests in the future. He finds that the middle class, the traditional backbone of American democracy, is losing faith in the democratic way of life; that the insecurities of the post-war world may bring fascism to America unless there is planning to meet the situation; and that the future of the

American party system depends upon the faith of all of us

in the efficacy of the democratic process to solve the difficult problems of the war and post-war periods, upon our willingness to make sacrifices to attain national unity, upon our ability to achieve discipline without going fascist, and upon our tolerance of changes in our economic and political institutions urgently called for by the times.

Among the trends that the author emphasizes are: (1) the two major parties are tending to divide more on economic and class lines than in the past; (2) there is a decline in the old type of patronage system brought about by the growth of the civil service system; and (3) there is a tendency for formerly nonpartisan civic groups to become partisan and fight in the political arena for their ends.

Gosnell's method of approach is a study of the election returns of six states—Pennsylvania, Wisconsin, Iowa, California, Illinois, and Louisiana—selected because each represents a bloc of states that vote in a similar pattern. There are some valuable insights into the political developments of these states, as well as an overwhelming array of statistics; but this book would have been more valuable had the author been able to interview politicians and newspaper editors for information as to the "deals" between the two parties which sometimes render election statistics meaningless.

WALTER JOHNSON

University of Chicago

The Flight of the Chiefs: Epic Poetry of Fiji. By BUELL H. QUAIN. New York: J. J. Augustin, 1942. Pp. 248.

In the isolated villages of Fiji the bard still flourishes. The young introduce innovations, but the old men cherish the ancient traditions in song and story. Here are to be found classic examples of primitive literature—"true songs" or epics, the composition of which is said to be directly inspired by the ancestors and which hand on historic traditions of the tribe; "serenades," which serve in entertaining guests as well as in courting; dance songs, full of archaic words and closely bound up with ancient rituals; tales or "true conversation," which embody ancient lore and may influence conduct; stories told merely for diversion; animal stories told to the young, sometimes pointing a moral; and, finally, "conversation," an art form in itself.

(Texts of all these save the last class make up the volume.) The places and people, the very words used, are all intimately connected with the local life and can hardly be appreciated by an outsider. But Mr. Quain, by providing annotations, a short introduction, and a glossary, has made this literature intelligible without destroying its expressive character.

MARGARET PARK REDFIELD

Glenview, Illinois

Juvenile Delinquency and Urban Areas: A Study of Rates of Delinquents in Relation to Differential Characteristics of Local Communities in American Cities. By CLIFFORD R. SHAW and HENRY D. MCKAY, with chapters by NORMAN S. HAYNER, PAUL G. CRESSEY, CLARENCE W. SCHROEDER, T. EARL SULLENGER, EARL R. MOSES, and CALVIN F. SCHMID. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1942. Pp. xxxii+451. \$4.50.

This is a compilation of most of the ecological studies of delinquency that have been made in the United States and an extension of the studies to new areas. It includes more than one hundred thousand cases in twenty-one cities. It demonstrates in a practically incontrovertible manner that delinquency rates vary regularly and consistently in American cities by concentric zones and that the variations in delinquency rates are closely correlated with variations in relief, unemployment, rentals, homeownership, bad housing, infant mortality, tuberculosis, mental disorders, decrease in the population, and the proportion of the population which is foreign-born or Negro. This close-packed analysis of factual data makes it clear that delinquency rates are a function of, and dynamically related to, community life. The factual analysis is supplemented by a valuable introductory chapter on the history of ecological studies of delinquency rates.

In two chapters the authors depart somewhat from the factual analysis and present an interpretation of the data. This portion of the book, although restricted, is likely to receive the greatest attention of students. In chapter vii the delinquency rates are interpreted as due to the traditions of an area and to the breakdown of the family and of the local community as agencies of control. This interpretation is essentially the theory of differential association and is an explanation of the genesis of delinquent behavior of a particular person. In chapter xx

the principal question is: Why does the tradition of delinquency develop in areas of certain types and not in areas of other types? The answer which is suggested is poverty. This answer is qualified in various ways, although the qualifications are not explicitly organized. The qualifications seem to the reviewer to be as follows: First, this generalization is stated with reference to the American city, with its freedom and anonymity. Poverty in a rural area need not and often does not result in a tradition of delinquency. Second, the conventional American culture is assumed to be dominant in all areas of the American city. Therefore, delinquents have the same generalized objectives as nondelinquents. Certain immigrant groups which have not assimilated the conventional values of American culture do not immediately develop traditions of delinquency, even though they are in poverty. Third, poverty does not produce a tradition of delinquency because of the sheer lack of money (as it may produce a high rate of infant mortality) but because of its impediments to the realization of generalized objectives, such as status or prestige.

The interpretation of the genesis of traditions of delinquency in certain areas is an approximation to a satisfactory generalization. The inadequacies in the interpretation are probably due to the small space allotted to it. The inadequacies or unanswered questions are as follows: First, the interpretation could be more readily grasped and would be more intelligible if the qualifications and explanations were merged with the original answer to form a single clear-cut proposition. It would be difficult to test its validity by specific research studies, as it now stands. Second, the postulate regarding conventional values is not clear. Does it mean that the wants are of the same kinds or of the same intensity in all parts of a city? Does it refer to specific things, such as Cadillac cars, or to generalized objectives, such as status? Do generalized objectives mean anything except to sociologists? Third, although the generalization is stated with reference to juvenile delinquency, it should be consistent with the data regarding other kinds of criminal behavior. It does not seem to be consistent with the data regarding white-collar criminality, for traditions of criminal behavior develop in the business and professional world where facilities for satisfying needs by legal methods are not limited in the sense in which they are limited in the deteriorated areas of the city. Fourth, the interpretation

does not seem to be consistent with the recommendations of local community organization, in the form of area projects, as the method of reducing juvenile delinquency. The area projects cannot make appreciable modifications in the system of distribution of wealth and therefore cannot break down the traditions of delinquency if those traditions are due to poverty. Since the area projects are having some effect on the traditions of delinquency, it is probable that the interpretation of their genesis is inadequate.

EDWIN H. SUTHERLAND

Indiana University

The Etiology of Delinquent and Criminal Behavior: A Planning Report for Research. By WALTER C. RECKLESS. New York: Social Science Research Council, 1943. Pp. xii+169.

The purpose of this monograph is to provide suggestions and better planning for future research in the etiology of delinquent and criminal behavior, particularly with a view to a more integrated research effort. As Professor E. W. Burgess points out in the Foreword, it is an attempt to co-ordinate the work of the representatives of various disciplines—such as anthropology, psychiatry, psychology, and sociology—who are engaged in the study of the causes of criminal behavior but who often remain unaware of what has been or is being done by others in the field. In order to achieve this purpose, the author gives a brief review of the research in criminal etiology done to date. Leaving unsurveyed what he calls “the classical era of criminology” with its “particularistic theories” (the writings of Lombroso, Tarde, Ferri *et al.*), Reckless sketches the more significant researches of the last twenty or thirty years, to which he refers as “the period of segmented studies.” The studies of twins, of the feeble-minded, and of endocrine glands, of delinquent areas and of business cycles, etc., are brought in brief review before the reader. Finally, several hypotheses concerning crime causation, in which Reckless sees the dawn of a new period in criminological thinking, namely, that of reformulation and systematization, are brought to the fore. The largely Continental school of criminal biology, Sutherland’s hypothesis about differential association as a cause of crime, and Sellin’s analysis of conduct norm observance are presented. In addition to these, Reckless mentions four research trends

which are, according to him, not strictly etiological but closely related, namely: the studies of criminal careers, categoric criminal risks, trait differences between criminals and noncriminals, and response to treatment.

The suggestions for future research by the author himself are to be found in three places in the book: (1) in the scattered remarks accompanying the specific researches presented, indicating what issues remain open and on what specific points more research is needed; (2) in a special chapter on promising research leads, where several research projects are suggested; (3) in Appendix D, where various suggestions for the organization of research are made, such as, e.g., establishment of an academy for research in delinquent and criminal behavior, clearance of larger research projects through a conference of representatives of the disciplines concerned, etc. As to the general orientation of future research, the basic theme of Reckless’ suggestions is his emphasis on the study of both situational and personality differentials of conforming behavior and conformist versus nonconforming behavior and nonconformists, visualizing at the same time criminal and delinquent behavior as a special case of more general nonconformity with the conduct norms.

In the volume are included also some three appendixes written by various authors and consisting of short descriptions of collections of data available for research and of plans for some research projects, which the respective criminologists consider as especially vital for extending our knowledge about etiology of crime at the present juncture.

This monograph itself is thus far the most conspicuous symptom of what Reckless chooses to call a new period of reformulation and systematization in criminal etiology. Being an attempt at rethinking and co-ordinating scattered data and hypotheses, the book should be heartily welcomed. As somebody aptly put it, the researchers often speak “the language of criminology with an accent of their mother-field,” and it is always good to translate these dialects so that a common body of organized knowledge may be formed which at the same time should yield basis for further research.

An always pertinent question is: For whose benefit, exactly, is the book written? Did Reckless have in mind the beginner seeking to acquaint himself with the research in etiology of criminal behavior or the graduate student on the lookout for a topic for a Master’s or Doctor’s

thesis? Or was he writing for a full-grown criminologist interested and possibly directing research? The needs of the first two are well taken care of, but the whole setting of the monograph implies that it is the last group to whom the writing is primarily addressed. And yet the monograph has surveyed too many specific topics in too small a space to reach the level of discussion on which the author would have the full opportunity to help the advance of vanguard criminological thought. As it stands now, the book is a collection of brief suggestions for the future and an encyclopedic survey of the researches done to date—well systematized, to be sure, but on the whole somewhat repetitious of the respective chapters of any good text on criminology, e.g., Reckless' own *Criminal Behavior*.

PETER P. LEJINS

University of Maryland

Recreation and Delinquency. By ETHEL SHANAS, with the collaboration of CATHERINE E. DUNNING. Prepared for the Chicago Recreation Commission. Chicago: Chicago Recreation Commission, 1942. Pp. xxxi+284.

Three broad purposes underlie the investigation that is reported in this volume: (1) to ascertain the recreational interests and activities of Chicago boys and girls; (2) to study comparatively the recreational activities of delinquents and nondelinquents; and (3) to ascertain what relationships, if any, exist between participation in organized recreation and delinquent behavior.

In conducting the study, recreation-participation records were secured for 15,000 boys and 8,000 girls, ten to seventeen years old, in four communities of high delinquency and one community of low delinquency. Delinquency was interpreted to include both "official" delinquents (those with police records) and "unofficial" delinquents (those judged to be delinquent by the personnel of the agencies co-operating in the study).

The findings of the investigation are of importance to sociologists, recreation administrators, and community planners alike. Some of the findings bring additional factual support to the results yielded by previous studies; others represent new knowledge. The study showed that there was more provision for the supervised recreation of boys than there was for girls; that boys over fourteen were much less at-

tracted by current programs of supervised recreation than were younger boys; that delinquent boys preferred loosely supervised activities, such as those in the gameroom, and competitive sports; that delinquents attended movies more frequently than did nondelinquents; that all the boys and girls spent twice as much time at the movies as in organized recreation; and that relatively few boys or girls participated in the programs of more than one agency.

Although the investigation appears in the main to have been soundly conceived and conducted, social scientists are likely to consider it vulnerable at two points. First, the procedure for determining "unofficial" delinquents is rather precarious. It would be very easy, if not an actual temptation, for the personnel of the agencies to consider as "malicious mischief" the behavior of a boy or girl who had caused trouble in the agency—perhaps especially if he or she were no longer an agency participant.

Second, the conclusion that "participation in supervised recreation reduces juvenile delinquency" (p. x) is wide open to question in the light of the evidence presented. Some of the data indicate that delinquents spend more time in recreation than do nondelinquents (p. 240), although a smaller percentage of delinquents than of nondelinquents participate in organized recreation (p. 242).

Considerable importance is given to the data showing that, of delinquents who did not attend recreation agencies, 5.5 per hundred more became recidivists than was true of the delinquents who did participate in recreation programs. The figures for recidivism were 10.5 and 15.5 per hundred for recreation participants and nonparticipants, respectively. Even granting that the difference of 5.0 per hundred is large enough to be statistically significant, the interpretation of this finding may well be a case of "putting the cart before the horse," the effect before the cause, in assuming that the boys were less delinquent because more "recreational." In dealing with behavior that possesses so complex a set of causal and contributing conditions as does delinquency, it is probably more cautious to assume that the kind of individuals who are, or who become, delinquent are the kind who are less likely to participate in organized recreation (and in many other constructive activities) than to assume that individuals are less likely to be delinquent because they participate an hour or two a week in supervised recreation. In other similar studies the investigators assumed that a

complex set of physiological, emotional, and social factors is basic in delinquent behavior, and the degree of participation in recreation agencies is interpreted to be more the result of a selective process at work.¹

The recommendations growing out of the study, ten in number, are basically sound in principle and could be adopted fruitfully, on a wide scale, in the community planning of recreation for children and youth.

HADLEY S. DIMOCK

George Williams College

✓ *Criminology*. By DONALD R. TAFT. New York: Macmillan Co., 1942. Pp. xii+708.

In criminology more than in other specialized fields of our discipline a fortunate tradition requires that the textbook not only provide for educational purposes but make an original contribution to theory and systematic integration of research. The new text by Taft adds to the current discussion by exhausting in an extremely stimulating manner the possibilities of viewing crime as the product of culture—and, in particular, of viewing modern crime as the outcome of our general American culture.

The author does not restrict himself to the well-known references about the competitive rather than co-operative structure of our society. He focuses attention upon various exploitative relationships in our culture, likely to be reflected in illegal as well as legal activities. He analyzes the crimogenetic effect of our dynamic institutions, the lack of homogeneity in our population, and the overlapping of cultural traditions. The predominance of a materialistic outlook, the close relationship of speculative attitudes, labor exploitation, and monopolistic advantages to success and prestige in the business world are given consideration. An attempt is made to trace similar attitudes in the pattern of criminal behavior in the American scene.

Undoubtedly, the approach chosen enables the author to throw light upon the most striking

features of American crime: the racketeering enterprises, the organization of the crime community, and the planned career of the professional criminal. These latter phenomena find exhaustive treatment in an excellent chapter which interprets their function in terms of social demand relating criminal activities to the needs of various sections of our society: labor, business, and the general consumer.

The discussion of crime as a product of culture is suggestive, but the conclusions remain tentative because of the lack of comparative material. Generalizations on the basis of a single case are of doubtful validity. Has the author arrived at significant differentials? What are the relevant differences between European and American culture and how do they affect the composition and organization of crime? Perhaps competition and exploitation are characteristic of our Western civilization. What, then, is the specific background of American crime? There is little recognition of European conditions in our criminological literature. Taft's leading hypothesis, however, makes the study of crime in other cultures a *sine qua non*. Anthropological and historical material may have to compensate for the lack of information about crime in contemporary cultures. It is to be regretted that the author overlooked Rusche and Kirchheimer's *Punishment and Social Structure*, a publication which in a challenging manner carries the assumption of "crime as a product" into the historical background of Western civilization.

The process of crime causation as it affects the individual is seen in close relationship to the cultural background. Taft arrives at a "tripartite explanation of crime" as follows:

(1) The crimogenic processes must originate first in universal human needs or desires, just as non-criminal behavior originates. These we assume. Since not all men are similarly criminal, the crimogenic processes must also take cognizance of individual differences. . . . (2) A complete theory of crime must then be stated in terms of all types of differential experiences as they affect immediate situations and as they have conditioned the personality in the past. . . . (3) Finally, the crimogenic process is basically conditioned by the nature of the general culture [p. 288].

With the emphasis upon psychogenic and sociogenic factors as well as the cultural background, Taft uses an eclectic approach to the problem of crime causation. Thus the limitations of Sutherland's otherwise closely related

¹ See Henry P. Fairchild, *The Conduct Habits of Boy Scouts* (New York: Boy Scouts of America, 1931), p. 81; and Frederic M. Thrasher, "The Boys' Club and Juvenile Delinquency," *American Journal of Sociology*, July, 1936, pp. 66-80. For discussion of the complex causal factors in delinquency see Sheldon Glueck, "Of Crime, Probation and Cognate Matters," *Federal Probation*, July-September, 1942, pp. 53-60.

theory of differential association are avoided. But they are avoided at the cost of clarity in the definition of the problem. Our attention is called to the importance not only of factors but of combinations of factors in the process of crime causation; but the process of interaction within these "clusters" as well as the causative role of the cultural background remains somewhat in the dark. The author abandons the hope of a "single theory of crime." "Strictly speaking," he writes, "every criminal's history is unique." True enough; but recent discussions of case history and statistical methods permit a more concise description of the methods and purpose of research than the statement that "we may distinguish approximately similar combinations of experience which account for much crime" (p. 290).

As a textbook, Taft's *Criminology* should prove to be an extremely useful instrument. The "Selected References" make ample use of recent articles in our leading periodicals, introducing the student to the latest progress in criminological research. The penological discussion, or rather the discussion of "The Treatment of the Criminal," is marked by an unusually clear and systematic representation of our institutions of law enforcement. Taft's "Principles of a New Penology" (p. 308) are applied as a measuring-rod for critical evaluation. Thus, the student is never lost in the confusing detail of contemporary institutions but is guided toward a constructive attitude in the field of applied criminology.

SVEND RIEMER

Cornell University

Disorganization: Personal and Social. By ERNEST R. MOWRER. New York: J. B. Lippincott Co., 1942. Pp. 665.

Social Pathology. By LAWRENCE GUY BROWN. New York: F. S. Crofts & Co., 1942. Pp. 584.

These are important books, if for no other reason than that each presents in its own way a systematic theory of social and personal disorganization. Sociology has sorely needed textbook-writers with the patience and courage to re-work the valuable Thomas and Znaniecki disorganization theory into an intelligible frame of reference for the consideration of contemporary social problems. The two books under review should encourage sociologists and advanced stu-

dents to sharpen their thinking in a much-neglected area of theoretical analysis.

Mowrer, although purporting to regard social and personal disorganization simply as different aspects of the same organic process (as did Cooley, and Thomas and Znaniecki), focuses almost exclusively on the individual. "Thus, social change, social disorganization, and personal disorganization all have their genesis in the variant behavior of individuals" (p. 26). When these individual innovations meet with social disapproval (in varying degrees of intensity), the individual responds to the critical attitudes of others by manifesting some type of personal disorganization. Thus, a person may actively rebel against the social order, defining his goal in terms of the larger social welfare and seeking to align himself with sympathetic cults or sects, as in the revolt of youth, the reformer, the radical, and the revolutionist. Or the rebellion of the individual may be directed toward hedonistically defined goals, where he finds certain fellow-sympathizers likewise socially disapproved, as in the case of the delinquent, the adult criminal, the prostitute and other sexual variants, the partner in marital discord. Still others, as characterized by the alcoholic, the drug addict, and the neurotic, develop escape mechanisms of one kind or another, subjective compensations for their failure to gain social approval. Finally, some retreat into a subjective world of their own construction, withdrawing from participation in the social order; the consequence of this in the extreme forms is the psychotic and the suicide.

Social disorganization, according to Mowrer, is merely the collective aspect of personal disorganization, witnessed by individual deviants in the mass—e.g., delinquents, alcoholics, divorcees, etc. The variant responses of individuals disturb "the equilibrium inherent in the social order," and there is "a breakdown in the patterns of social control."

Brown finds his unifying theme in the assumption that "abnormal" social behavior is as naturalistic in causation as "normal" behavior and that the same set of sociological and social-psychological principles explain each type. He believes that we must have a frame of reference "in which both normal and abnormal persons [can] be studied and explained as unities" (p. 8). Brown's suggested frame of reference for the understanding of all personal disorganization is the interactive relationship between the organic heritage, the social heritage, the human nature of

the person, and his unique experience. These factors are always in interaction with each other, so that behavior can never be explained in terms of only one [p. 8].

In the light of the interaction of these factors, he then considers different types of personal disorganization, such as speech disorders, sex pathologies, pathological drinking, pathological eating, mental ill-health, suicide, delinquents, and criminals.

Brown sees social disorganization as likewise a product of "interactive living," and he considers it the result of the same sociological and social-psychological processes as govern social organization. In fact, social disorganization is simply "social organization that is not culturally approved" (p. 365). The explanation of social disorganization lies in our understanding the whole social process, which is "the interactive relationship between human nature and social organization" (p. 358). This theory is woven into an analysis of such cross-sections of social life as the family, education, religion, science, economic factors, political factors, legal factors, the press, social-psychological epidemics, and war.

Both these theoretical contributions are scientific in approach; each eschews a moralistic or social welfare theme. This in itself is a promising departure from much of the extant literature in the field. Brown succeeds better than Mowrer in keeping his theoretical scheme constantly in sight as he discusses each separate problem. Mowrer is obscure and difficult to follow at various points in his discussion. However, he has made effective use of pertinent research materials. Both books are excellently documented.

Neither frame of reference is adequate within itself. Mowrer's is too particularistic; Brown's is too general. Mowrer's quasi-psychiatric approach is so preoccupied with the individual as the source of both personal and social disorganization that he overlooks the important role of social institutions and group values as sources of deviant individual behavior. Any concept of social disorganization which is a sort of summation of personally disorganized individuals certainly misses the forest because of the trees.

Brown has a more comprehensive theory, and he grasps the significance of culture and institutions; but it is a theory which is amorphous and elusive. It is important to emphasize the interaction of all factors and to avoid particularism, but it is also necessary to be incisive in the handling of analytical concepts. It is meaningless to talk about interaction unless each factor in-

cluded is carefully defined and its particular role in relation to the other factors specifically delineated. Such nebulous concepts as "human nature" and "social heritage" do not lend themselves to the precise analysis of problem phenomena.

Indeed, the reviewer is skeptical whether any theory of personal-social disorganization can be made sufficiently precise for the analysis of social problems in a multinorm society such as ours. Awareness of social problems is relative to the multiplicity of diverse social values. When a society is loosely integrated, with no solid core of common values, a deviation from one norm is always in the direction of conformity with some other norm. For this reason any given deviation may be regarded with abhorrence, indifference, or positive approval by the different people who make up that society. Thus, the existence of social problems is relative to those groups who are problem-conscious with respect to certain deviations from norms they think desirable. This is why race prejudice is defined as a social problem by some people but not by others. The same can be said of the labor movement, housing conditions, and trends in the birth rate. Pathological eating is not a social problem to most intemperate eaters, although it may be one to physicians. Furthermore, even among those people who are agreed that a given deviation is a problem, solutions are usually frustrated because of value-conflicts over appropriate policy.

Social problems are practical problems of social control, and all the available scientific information will not solve a social problem until the attitudes of those whose ways of living constitute the problem are changed. Any serviceable theory of social problems, therefore, must be one which can identify and delineate the multiple conflicts of values which give rise to the behavior or conditions we wish to control.

R. C. FULLER

University of Michigan

Personality and Mental Illness: An Essay in Psychiatric Diagnosis. By JOHN BOWLBY. New York: Emerson Books, Inc., 1942. Pp. viii+280. \$2.75.

This piece of research, while painstakingly done, does not advance our knowledge of the possible relationship between personality type and the form of mental illness much beyond

Kretschmer's brilliant analysis—a point of which the author seems to be quite cognizant, as there are numerous approvals given to Kretschmer's formulations.

The general methodological framework within which this research has been conducted includes the following five well-known viewpoints: (1) the differences between the normal, healthy mental state, the psychoneuroses, and the psychoses are not of kind but of degree; (2) there is a fundamental difference between schizoid and syntonics individuals even though mixed types are observed; (3) the tendency to mental illness is inherited; (4) the major functional psychoses breed true; and (5) early environmental surroundings are of significance in determining the manner in which genetic stability or instability will materialize in the growing personality.

Within this intellectual mold his procedure is to construct a schedule containing 105 personality traits. This list is found to contain 33 specific schizoid traits and 72 nonspecific traits of which some are depressive and others are hyperthymic. Three series of cases—23 affective psychotics, 13 schizophrenics, and 29 psychoneurotics—in which the diagnoses are supposedly accurate, are selected, and a tabulation is made of the personality traits found in each case. To accomplish this, the author relies on the "hearsay" technique—namely, the clinical case history and interviews with patients' relatives. He regards this technique of learning about a person as "simpler and more reliable than any test yet devised." From this analysis

of the personality traits found in these three diagnostic groups two general conclusions are indicated: (1) "whereas any sytonic trait may appear in schizoids, the reverse does not happen"; (2) in general, the symptomatology of psychoneurotics may appear in either sytonic or schizoid personalities. In addition to these general conclusions the attempt is made to develop a diagnostic procedure which will be more useful for prognosis than any of the current schemes.

What of this? There are a number of dubious points affecting the author's conclusions. How were the schizoid and nonspecific traits determined or classified? If they were labeled as such after the empirical work was done (which appears to be the case [p. 57]), then one gets statements like the following: Schizoid traits are traits of schizophrenics. Schizophrenics have also many nonspecific (sytonic) traits. Sytonic personalities do not have schizoid traits but have nonspecific (sytonic) traits. The reviewer can find no justification or value for this classification of traits. What is a personality trait? This concept is nowhere defined.

This work contains an adequate review of the available literature, written in English, in this research area. It is hoped that studies of this general character will continue, utilizing more rigorous and objective techniques of analysis and also, possibly, including a study of other types of mental reactions in addition to the two major diagnostic groups.

H. WARREN DUNHAM

Wayne University

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BY EVERETT C. HUGHES

In 1911 a township we shall call Cantonville was a country trading town with a population of 2,605. By 1937 a booming industry of 19,424 persons had settled about this small community. *French Canada in Transition* presents the problems—human, social, economic, and civic—involved in making this change from a rural to a fast-growing industrial town.

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IN THIS ISSUE

Professor E. W. Burgess, of the University of Chicago, and Paul Wallin, now a member of the Psychological Research Unit of the Army Air Forces, have made a statistical study of the social characteristics of engaged couples, set forth in their article "Homogamy in Social Characteristics." This is part of their larger study of engaged couples.

"Woman's Social Status and the Forms of Marriage," by Marvin K. Opler, criticizes the McLennan classification of the forms of marriage and discusses, in the light of their re-examination, the relation between material conditions and woman's social status. A critical comment by Professor Burgess follows the article. Dr. Opler is social science analyst with the War Relocation Authority.

"The Spatial Aspect of the Differential Birth Rate," by Henry Allen Bullock, studies the spatial variation of birth rates and also their association with several socioeconomic variables. Mr. Bullock is professor of sociology and director of research at Prairie View State College.

Robert Nisbet's article on "The French Revolution and the Rise of Sociology in France" accounts for certain nuclear concepts of sociology, which have persisted down to the present, in terms of the consequences of the French Revolution. Professor Nisbet teaches in the University of California's department of social institutions.

Dr. C. Wright Mills, associate professor of sociology at the University of Maryland, has contributed theoretical articles on the sociology of knowledge to this journal and to the *American Sociological Review*. "The Professional Ideology of Social Pathologists" uses this mode of analysis in an account of an important phase of American sociology.

The article on the disappearance of foot-binding in the province of Tingsien was written by Sidney Gamble during his connection with the Mass Education Movement of China. He has published several studies of Chinese economic and social life. At present he is trustee of Yenching University and of Mount Holyoke College and president of the Princeton-Yenching Foundation.

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
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HOMOGAMY IN SOCIAL CHARACTERISTICS

ERNEST W. BURGESS AND PAUL WALLIN

ABSTRACT

Previous studies of homogamy show that married couples tend more to resemble than to differ from each other in physical and psychological traits. Data secured from one thousand engaged couples living in the Chicago metropolitan area make it possible to present the evidence on homogamy for social characteristics. In all but six of the fifty-one social characteristics studied, the excess of the actual over the expected percentage of resemblance between members of the couple is statistically significant. The tendency for homogamy, however, varies by different social characteristics, as may be indicated by the mean value of *C* for groups of items as follows: religious affiliation and behavior, .54; family backgrounds, .38; courtship behavior, .33; conceptions of marriage, .31; social participation, .24; and family relationships, .12.

"Homogamy" is a Greek word meaning "like marries like." It is used here as a term to denote the theory that persons tend to marry those with characteristics similar to their own.¹ This is also known as "assortative mating." The rival theory—that opposites attract each other—may be denominated "heterogamy."

Both theories, in fact, may be correct. First, certain couples may be attracted to each other by similarities and others by dissimilarities. Second, in some unions couples may be drawn together both by like and by unlike characteristics. Third, in every union there are similari-

ties and dissimilarities between marriage partners, though one or the other may be in the majority. The question for research is, therefore, not if like or unlike attract each other but which tendency prevails in marriage.

The growing literature in the field² indicates the preponderance of homogamy or assortative mating over heterogamy.³ On no trait except sex is there reliable evidence of predominance in marriage of dissimilarity.

No detailed review of the literature on homogamy will be attempted in this paper, since three excellent summaries have appeared. A few comments on these, however, are pertinent to place

¹ When mate selection outside a given race, caste, nativity, or religious group is prohibited, homogamy is a consequence of group control rather than of the attraction of like to like which is here hypothecated. But, to the extent that freedom of choice of mate is given individuals in an endogamous group, homogamy as a consequence of attraction may prevail in regard to attributes other than those defining the endogamy of the group.

² In an unpublished paper Anselm Strauss lists eighty contributions to this subject.

³ See C. Arnold Anderson, "Our Present Knowledge of Assortative Mating," *Rural Sociology*, III (1938), 296-302, for a summary statement of the evidence supporting the hypothesis of homogamy.

the present study in the perspective of past research.

The first review of the literature was by J. A. Harris in 1912.⁴ His article reviewed the significant research upon homogamy in physical characteristics such as age, stature, cephalic index, hair and eye color, health, longevity, and deafness. He also included fragmentary data upon psychological and social characteristics.

The second summary article, by Harold E. Jones in 1929,⁵ criticizing the early studies on resemblances of husband and wife in intelligence and other mental and social characteristics because these studies were based upon unreliable ratings, presented and analyzed the findings of later studies on similarity of husbands and wives in intelligence (see Burks,⁶ Freeman *et al.*,⁷ Jones,⁸ and Willoughby⁹). These studies, using standardized tests, gave an unweighted average husband-wife correlation of approximately .55.

⁴ "Assortative Mating in Man," *Popular Science Monthly*, LXXX (1912), 476-92.

⁵ "Homogamy in Intellectual Abilities," *American Journal of Sociology*, XXXV (1929), 369-82. See this article, too, for a statement of the significance of research in homogamy.

⁶ Barbara Burks, "A Comparative Study of Foster Parent-Foster Child Resemblance and True Parent-True Child Resemblance," *Twenty-seventh Yearbook of the National Society for the Study of Education*, I (1928), 219-316.

⁷ F. N. Freeman, Karl J. Holzinger, and B. Mitchell, "The Influence of the Environment on the Intelligence, School Achievement, and Conduct of Foster Children," *Twenty-seventh Yearbook of the National Society for the Study of Education*, I (1928), 103-217.

⁸ H. E. Jones, "A First Study of Parent-Child Resemblance," *Twenty-seventh Yearbook of the National Society for the Study of Education*, I (1928), 61-72.

⁹ R. Willoughby, "Family Similarities in Mental Test Abilities," *Twenty-seventh Yearbook of the National Society for the Study of Education*, I (1928), 55-59.

The third summary paper, by Helen M. Richardson, published in 1939,¹⁰ covered the studies made in 1928-39 of the resemblances of husband and wife. In addition to a few new studies of intelligence, Richardson reported research indicating similarity of husband and wife in information, word associations, temperamental characteristics, opinions on current topics, attitudes, values, and interest constellations. It is evident that this decade marked the transition in research on homogamy from emphasis on the investigation of resemblances in intelligence to the study of similarities in personality traits.

Five brief comments may be made upon the present state of research in assortative mating as revealed in these summaries and in an examination of the literature:

First, there has been a trend in homogamy research from physical characteristics to intellectual abilities and finally to personality traits.

Second, there has been no systematic comprehensive attempt to deal with social factors, which so far, as represented in the literature, appear under such individual categories as residential and occupational propinquity,¹¹ racial intermarriage, nationality, nativity, and socioeconomic status.¹²

¹⁰ "Studies of Mental Resemblance between Husbands and Wives and between Friends," *Psychological Bulletin*, XXXVI (1939), 104-20.

¹¹ Strictly speaking, residential and occupational propinquity of potential marriage partners are not traits or characteristics of individuals which, as such, can be subsumed under the hypothesis of homogamy. Rather they are conditions which facilitate homogamy in so far as residential propinquity implies relative similarity of cultural background and occupational propinquity, homogamy of vocational interests and economic status.

¹² See, for example, J. H. S. Bossard, *Marriage and the Child* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1940), chap. iv, "Residential Propin-

Third, with but one exception the studies reported upon have been of married couples.¹³ If traits are measured after marriage, the influence of interaction in marriage is not excluded. Certain characteristics, of course, such as age and stature, are not affected by marital experience. Some may or may not be, such as body weight, intelligence, and temperament. Others undoubtedly are, as, for example, opinions, attitudes, and values. It is, therefore, important that studies be made of physical, intellectual, personality, and social characteristics of couples before marriage and, if possible, before the meeting of the couples.

Fourth, studies already made present evidence of homogamy but offer little or no description and analysis of the process of assortative mating. It is important not only to establish the fact that "like mates with like" but also to find an explanation for assortative mating.

Fifth, some findings in a few studies¹⁴ show a positive relation of homogamy to fertility and to marital happiness. But it is fair to say that no study has dealt with this subject in a comprehensive and systematic way.

quity as a Factor in Marriage," pp. 79-92; Donald M. Marvin, "Occupational Propinquity as a Factor in Marriage Selection (unpublished doctoral diss.; University of Pennsylvania, 1918); R. E. Baber, "A Study of 325 Mixed Marriages," *American Sociological Review*, II (1937), 705-16; R. J. Reeves Kennedy, "Premarital Residential Propinquity and Ethnic Endogamy," *American Journal of Sociology*, XLVIII (1943), 580-84.

¹³ See E. L. Kelly, "Psychological Factors in Assortative Mating," *Psychological Bulletin*, XXXVII (1940), 493, and "Personality Factors in Assortative Mating," *ibid.*, p. 576, for abstracts of findings on a study of engaged couples.

¹⁴ See R. Willoughby, "Homogamy in Fertility," *Eugenics Review*, XXIII (1931), 223-29; and L. M. Terman and P. Butterweiser, "Personality Factors in Marital Compatibility. II," *Journal of Social Psychology*, VI (1935), 367-89.

The present paper¹⁵ presents findings upon assortative mating by a number of social characteristics most of which have not previously been represented in the literature.¹⁶ These data were obtained from engaged couples, thereby eliminating the influence of marital interaction and common experiences after marriage.

The 1,000 engaged couples who are the subjects of the present study¹⁷ resided in the Chicago metropolitan region at the time of filling out the schedules. They are all of the white race and children of parents somewhat more than half of whom are both native-born; one-tenth, one parent native-born; and three-tenths, both foreign-born. Their parents are mainly of the middle and upper middle class, over one-third having a college education; their fathers are engaged predominantly in business and in the professions, with incomes largely in the range between \$2,000 and \$10,000.

The young people at the time of their participation in the study were almost entirely in the age range from twenty to thirty. Three-fourths of the young men and not quite two-thirds of their fiancées are of college level of education. The remainder had high-school training, nearly all being graduates. To an even greater extent than their fathers, the young men were engaged in or preparing for business and the professions.

¹⁵ The analysis of the process of assortative mating and the significance of homogamy for fertility and for engagement and marital happiness will be considered in other papers.

¹⁶ In a subsequent paper findings will be presented for assortative mating by personality characteristics.

¹⁷ E. W. Burgess and Paul Wallin, "One Thousand Engaged Couples" (study in progress). The chief purposes of this study are (1) investigation of the engagement process, (2) prediction during the engagement period of probability of success in marriage, and (3) the test of prediction by actual outcome of the marriage.

The findings upon assortative mating for these 1,000 engaged couples will be presented under the following headings: (1) family backgrounds, (2) religious affiliation and behavior, (3) family relationships, (4) social participation, (5) courtship behavior, and (6) conceptions of marriage.

The procedure followed in testing all items for evidence of homogamy can be illustrated by reference to the first item in Table 1, "Place lived in childhood." Both members of 983 of our 1,000 couples reported on this item. If there had been a random mating of persons with regard to place lived in childhood, the total percentage reporting the same—i.e., both members of couples brought up in a city of 100,000 or over, both in a city of 10,000-99,000, both in a suburb, or both in places under 10,000—would have been 37.1 (see col. 3). The actual percentage the same (col. 4) is 55.2. The ratio of the actual to the expected percentage of couples (col. 5) reporting similarly on place lived in childhood is 1.49, and C , the coefficient of mean square contingency, is .43 (col. 6). The difference between the expected and the actual percentage the same is also given for the subcategories of the item. The statistical significance of this and all other items was evaluated by the chi-square test. Except where otherwise indicated, the probabilities that the differences between the actual and the expected percentages of identical responses could have occurred by chance are less than one out of a hundred.

FAMILY BACKGROUNDS

Do young people marry into the same or different cultural backgrounds? Our data provide answers to six questions which may be taken as indices of cultural background. These are: place lived in

childhood, with whom living now, education, nativity of parents, present income of parents, and social status of parents. In all these factors there is a tendency for like to marry like, as shown in Table 1.

An examination of this table indicates that there is a marked degree of homogamy with respect to nativity of parents, place lived in childhood, and education. The children of native-born unite with the children of native-born parents; the offspring of foreign parents with each other; and those of mixed parentage with others of mixed unions. This finding is in accordance with the findings of other studies.¹⁸

The marked degree to which engaged couples are made up of persons who in childhood lived in communities of the same size is probably another indication, although a less specific one, of the tendency to homogamy in regard to cultural background. Differences in the size of community in which persons spent their childhood reflect broad cultural differences. Two persons reared in the country, town, suburb, small city, or large city are likely to have much in common in background, experiences, ideas, and ideals and may for this reason be more disposed to mate with each other. In many cases the members of the couples in this study have lived in the same community from childhood on.

Education, like the place lived in childhood, acts as a selective factor in marriage. There is a markedly greater-than-chance probability that persons with graduate or professional training will select marriage partners of the same educational level. The same is true of

¹⁸ Bossard, *op. cit.*, chap. v, "Nationality and Nativity as Factors in Marriage," pp. 93-119; Julius Drachler, *Intermarriage in New York City* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1921).

TABLE 1
SIMILARITY OF MEMBERS OF ENGAGED COUPLES IN FAMILY BACKGROUNDS

KIND OF FAMILY BACKGROUND	No. OF CASES		PERCENTAGE THE SAME		RATIO OF ACTUAL TO EXPECTED	C*
	Men	Women	Expected	Actual		
Place lived in childhood:						
City 100,000 and over.....	533	539	29.7	38.6
City 10,000-99,999.....	122	108	1.3	2.8
Suburb.....	98	139	1.4	3.8
All places under 10,000.....	230	197	4.7	10.0
Total.....	983†	983	37.1	55.2	1.49	.43
Living at present with:						
Parents.....	628	711	45.6	52.2
Relatives, friends, private family.....	131	107	1.4	2.3
All other†.....	231	172	4.0	9.4
Total.....	990	990	51.0	63.9	1.25	.35
Education:						
Graduate and professional.....	246	86	2.1	5.9
College.....	530	549	29.1	33.2
High school or less.....	224	305	8.2	14.7
Total.....	1,000	1,000	39.4	53.8	1.37	.40
Nativity of parents:						
Both native.....	559	571	34.3	45.0
One native-, one foreign-born.....	113	119	1.5	2.0
Both foreign-born.....	292	274	8.6	18.5
Total.....	964	964	44.4	65.5	1.48	.46
Present income of parents:						
Under \$2,000.....	243	226	13.1	17.3
\$2,000-\$4,999.....	263	280	17.6	19.6
\$5,000 and over.....	142	142	4.8	10.6
Total.....	648	648	35.5	47.5	1.34	.34
Social status of parents:						
Leading family.....	111	401	1.1	2.2
Upper and upper middle class.....	448	530	24.4	28.2
Middle class.....	371	324	12.4	17.3
Lower middle and lower class.....	56	31	0.2	0.9
Total.....	986	986	38.1	48.6	1.28	.32

* The coefficient of mean square contingency is a measure of the extent of association between the responses of the men and women of the couples. The higher the value of *C*, the greater is the degree of homogamy. The maximum value of *C* is .816 for a 3 × 3 table and .866 for a 4 × 4 table (see G. U. Yule and M. G. Kendall, *An Introduction to the Theory of Statistics* [London, 1937], p. 69).

† The total number of cases of men and women may be less than 1,000 on certain items because some questions were left unanswered by a number of the subjects.

‡ Rooming-house, hotel, apartment, dormitory, etc.

persons who have had college experience and of those with high-school education or less. This tendency for like to mate with like is probably the resultant of two influences. First, the halls of learning constitute a fertile meeting place for the sexes, offering opportunity for continued association which is a favorable condition for the development of the attachments which lead to engagement and marriage. And in the school, of course, meetings are more likely between persons at approximately the same educational level. Second, persons having relatively similar education are more likely to have a similar cultural outlook, the same universe of discourse, common interests, etc., and, accordingly, to have the basis for initiating and maintaining an enduring relationship.

Three background characteristics of the engaged couples show a marked degree of homogamy, but of somewhat smaller magnitude than those already discussed. These are: with whom each is living at the time of the engagement, the social status of the parents in their community, and the present parental income.

Persons living with parents tend to marry persons similarly situated, as do those living with relatives, friends, or in private families, or those residing in rooming-houses, hotels, dormitories, fraternities, and sororities. The high degree of homogamy within these groupings is doubtless due to the fact that they reflect two influences—that of propinquity and that of cultural homogeneity.

The influence of propinquity is perhaps most apparent in the case of those living in rooming-houses, hotels, dormitories, fraternities, and sororities. Such persons are likely to have the majority of their social contacts with persons residing in comparable establishments.

Correspondingly, there is a greater probability that persons dwelling with their parents or at the home of relatives will more frequently meet members of the opposite sex who, like themselves, live at home or with relatives.

Cultural homogeneity is reflected in this factor in that persons living at home remain subject to parental control and supervision, whereas young people living away from their families are likely to have achieved some degree of emancipation and independence. Behavior patterns, interests, and values doubtless vary with extent of emancipation; and similarity in these respects, added to the influence of propinquity, probably accounts for the finding of homogamy for the factor "with whom living at present."

Whether consideration is given to the ratings by the couple of the social status of their parents in the community in which they live or to their reports of the present income of their fathers, it is clear that there is a considerable excess over chance for young people to fall in love and become engaged to those in the same social and economic class. Here, too, the influences reflected are propinquity and cultural homogeneity.

RELIGIOUS AFFILIATION AND BEHAVIOR

The extent to which engaged couples are alike in religious affiliations and behavior is shown in Table 2.

The most striking finding of this table is the degree to which marriages occur within the chief religious faiths. Marriage takes place to a greater degree within one's religious faith than inside one's nativity group. This is most pronounced for Jews and Catholics. The great disproportion between the number of actual and expected combinations of persons of the same religious affiliation is an indica-

tion of the great pressure, both internal and external, exerted upon persons to marry within their own religious groups. That the pressure is in regard to religious affiliation rather than to religiosity is evidenced by the far greater extent of

homogamy than was found for cultural background and religion. This is clearly shown by the consistently lower values of *C* for the items in Table 3.

The first five items deal with the happiness of the marriage of the parents and

TABLE 2
SIMILARITY OF MEMBERS OF ENGAGED COUPLES IN
RELIGIOUS AFFILIATION AND BEHAVIOR

RELIGIOUS BEHAVIOR	No. OF CASES		PERCENTAGE THE SAME		RATIO OF ACTUAL TO EXPECTED	<i>C</i>
	Men	Women	Expected	Actual		
Religious affiliation:						
Catholic.....	140	131	2.0	10.0
Protestant.....	493	541	30.1	47.8
Jewish.....	177	185	3.7	16.8
None.....	131	84	1.3	4.8
Total.....	941	941	37.1	79.4	2.14	.75
Sunday-school attendance:						
Stopped before age 11*.....	189	175	3.5	7.5
Stopped at 11-18.....	561	568	33.9	40.1
Stopped at 19 or over.....	220	227	5.3	13.2
Total.....	970	970	42.7	60.8	1.42	.45
Church membership:						
Yes.....	520	591	33.5	43.4
No.....	302	281	9.3	14.7
No preference.....	136	86	1.2	4.6
Total.....	958	958	44.0	62.7	1.43	.44
Church attendance:						
Never attend.....	202	189	4.0	10.0
Less than once a month.....	329	283	9.9	16.5
One to four times a month.....	440	499	23.3	36.4
Total.....	971	971	37.2	62.9	1.69	.51

* Or never attended.

homogamy found in religious affiliation than for the three items indicative of religious activity. All four items on religious behavior of couples, however, show a high degree of like marrying like.

FAMILY RELATIONSHIPS

The answers to the questions indicative of the psychological aspects of family interaction reveal a far lesser degree of

with parent-child relationships as reported by the engaged couples.

There is a small, but statistically non-significant, excess over chance of engagements where the marriage of the parents of both members of the couple is very happy, happy, average, or unhappy. A small but greater degree of homogamy is shown with respect to childhood and present attitudes of hostility and attach-

TABLE 3
SIMILARITY OF MEMBERS OF ENGAGED COUPLES IN FAMILY RELATIONSHIPS

TYPES OF FAMILY RELATIONSHIPS	No. OF CASES		PERCENTAGE THE SAME		RATIO OF ACTUAL TO EX- PECTED	C
	Men	Women	Expected	Actual		
Happiness of parents' marriage:						
Very happy.....	343	360	12.8	14.0
Happy.....	307	265	8.5	9.2
Average.....	234	234	5.7	7.1
Unhappy and very unhappy.....	98	123	1.2	1.8
Total.....	982	982	28.2	32.1	1.14	.13
Attitude toward father when a child:						
Hostility.....	65	48	0.3	0.7
Mild attachment.....	252	196	5.5	7.0
Considerable and strong attachment.....	638	711	49.7	52.7
Total.....	955	955	55.5	60.4	1.09	.15
Attitude toward father at present:						
Hostility.....	46	68	0.5	1.1
Mild attachment.....	105	152	4.0	6.3
Considerable and strong attachment.....	586	577	53.2	56.7
Total.....	797	797	57.7	64.1	1.11	.19
Attitude toward mother when a child:						
Hostility.....	18	28	0.1	0.0
Mild attachment.....	77	85	0.7	1.4
Considerable and strong attachment.....	872	854	79.7	80.3
Total.....	967	967	80.5	81.5	1.02*	.10
Attitude toward mother at present:						
Hostility.....	20	26	0.1	0.1
Mild attachment.....	99	76	0.9	1.5
Considerable and strong attachment.....	792	809	77.2	78.0
Total.....	911	911	78.2	79.6	1.02*	.08
Attachment to siblings:						
No sibling, only child.....	112	118	1.7	2.6
No attachment.....	231	209	6.0	8.7
Attachment to one or more.....	554	570	39.2	42.6
Total.....	897	897	46.9	53.9	1.15	.18
Number of siblings:						
Four or more.....	370	310	11.7	12.7
Two or three.....	498	553	2.3	28.4
One.....	119	124	1.5	2.4
Total.....	988	988	41.5	43.5	1.05*	.10
Sex of siblings:						
No siblings, only child.....	118	123	1.5	2.5
Siblings, female.....	203	238	5.2	5.4
Siblings, male.....	214	234	5.4	5.9
Siblings, male and female.....	429	369	17.0	18.5
Total.....	964	964	29.1	32.3	1.11	.13

* The probability that these ratios could have occurred by chance is more than 1 out of 100 by the chi-square test; they are, therefore, not regarded as significant.

TABLE 3—Continued

TYPES OF FAMILY RELATIONSHIPS	NO. OF CASES		PERCENTAGE THE SAME		RATIO OF ACTUAL TO EXPECTED	C
	Men	Women	Expected	Actual		
Rank order of birth:						
Oldest.....	333	343	11.6	12.3
Middle.....	291	263	7.8	9.2
Youngest.....	249	262	6.6	7.3
Only.....	119	124	1.5	2.4
Total.....	992	992	27.5	31.2	1.14*	.14

ment to the father than is indicated for the mother.

The data on sibling relations—their number, sex, and rank order of birth—like those on attitudes to parents, also suggest only a slight tendency for like to mate like in terms of the characteristics involved in these relationships. The findings on number of siblings and order of birth are consistent with those of an earlier study.¹⁹

SOCIAL PARTICIPATION

Under social participation are presented data upon the extent and type of social activities participated in by the engaged couples. These data on (a) their friendships with persons of the same and opposite sex, (b) their participation in organizations, (c) their leisure-time activities, and (d) their drinking and smoking habits were analyzed for evidences of assortative mating. The findings are shown in Table 4.

The findings indicate that to a degree somewhat greater than chance the "lone wolf" mates with the solitary person; the gregarious with his kind; that those who have had no, few, or many friends of the opposite sex select a life-partner with similar experience; and that those who

are and who are not considered indifferent to the opposite sex tend to gravitate toward others like themselves.

Participation in social organizations shows a small degree of like attracting like. The highest association here is by number of organizations which both regularly attend, followed by number of offices held in organizations to which they belonged in the past.

In leisure-time preferences both the "stay-at-homes" and those wanting to be "on the go" are disposed to become engaged with their own kind. On the average, those who like to see plays keep company with other theatergoers, while dance enthusiasts seek each other's company.

There is a marked tendency for persons to select marriage partners with drinking and smoking habits similar to their own, with the extent of homogamy being considerably greater for the former. Since drinking and smoking habits are, at least in part, associated with religious training, the finding of homogamy here may be a reflection of assortative mating by religious affiliation and behavior. In part, too, the finding may be an indication of the influence of propinquity. Persons who neither drink nor smoke are likely to mingle socially with groups where such abstention is common,

¹⁹ B. Schiller, "A Quantitative Analysis of Marriage Selection in a Small Group," *Journal of Social Psychology*, III (1932), 297-318.

TABLE 4
SIMILARITY OF MEMBERS OF ENGAGED COUPLES IN EXTENT AND
TYPE OF SOCIAL PARTICIPATION

EXTENT AND TYPE OF SOCIAL PARTICIPATION	No. of CASES		PERCENTAGE THE SAME		RATIO OF ACTUAL TO EX- PECTED	C
	Men	Women	Expected	Actual		
Friends of same sex:						
None.....	3	4	0.0*	0.0*
One to seven.....	215	200	4.3	6.6
Eight or more.....	774	788	62.0	64.2
Total.....	992	992	66.3	70.8	1.07	.15
Friends of opposite sex:						
None.....	33	11	0.0*	0.3
One to seven.....	458	393	18.4	20.2
Eight or more.....	500	587	29.8	32.4
Total.....	991	991	48.2	52.9	1.10	.17
Considered indifferent to opposite sex:						
Yes.....	193	135	2.6	4.4
No.....	769	812	63.6	65.4
Don't know.....	29	44	0.1	0.3
Total.....	991	991	66.3	70.1	1.06	.14
Organizations regularly attended:						
None.....	268	189	6.9	9.7
One or two.....	442	507	30.6	32.6
Three or more.....	146	160	3.1	5.0
Total.....	856	856	40.6	47.3	1.17	.18
Offices in organizations belong to now:						
None.....	307	274	12.9	13.8
One.....	238	293	10.8	9.9
Two or more.....	262	248	9.6	12.6
Total.....	807	807	33.3	36.3	1.09	.15
Offices in organizations belonged to in past:						
None.....	202	157	5.3	6.9
One or two.....	292	328	16.3	15.7
Three or more.....	274	283	13.2	15.0
Total.....	768	768	34.8	37.6	1.08	.13
Leisure-time preferences:						
Stay at home.....	416	384	16.2	23.0
Be on go most of time.....	506	573	29.6	35.4
Be on go all the time.....	69	34	0.2	0.8
Total.....	991	991	46.0	59.2	1.29	.29
Prefer play or dance:						
Play.....	590	537	32.4	39.6
Dance.....	337	367	12.6	18.8
Don't know.....	62	85	0.5	1.4
Total.....	989	989	45.5	59.8	1.31	.31

* Less than 0.05.

TABLE 4—Continued

EXTENT AND TYPE OF SOCIAL PARTICIPATION	No. OF CASES		PERCENTAGE THE SAME		RATIO OF ACTUAL TO EX- PECTED	C
	Men	Women	Expected	Actual		
Drinking habits:						
Never.....	238	323	7.9	19.0
Rarely.....	305	307	9.6	14.7
Occasionally or often.....	446	359	16.4	27.8
Total.....	989	989	33.9	61.5	1.81	.55
Smoking habits:						
Does not smoke.....	421	490	21.7	29.9
Smokes, will stop if betrothed objects.....	216	208	6.2	7.9
Smokes, will not stop if betrothed objects.....	315	154	6.7	10.0
Total.....	852	852	34.6	47.8	1.38	.33
Object if betrothed smokes:						
No.....	628	878	55.1	58.7
Yes.....	353	87	3.1	6.4
No answer.....	19	35	0.1	0.1
Total.....	1,000	1,000	58.3	65.2	1.12	.24

and the members of the opposite sex with whom they associate are therefore likely to have habits similar to their own. The same would be true of persons who did drink and smoke.

COURTSHIP BEHAVIOR

The data on courtship behavior presented in Table 5 offer further support for the hypothesis of homogamy. By far the highest correlation here is the correspondence in age at which members of the couples started keeping company with each other. This finding, of course, reflects similarity in age of engaged persons.²⁰

Among the items on courtship behavior the next highest association is the mating of those with like experiences in having gone steady with none, one or

two, or three or more other persons previous to keeping company with the person to whom they are now engaged. But also, interestingly, the engagement of those who have or have not been previously engaged conforms to the principle of homogamy. There is also a tendency for persons who report having discussed their engagement with others to mate with one another. This tendency is indicated, too, for those who have not discussed their engagement. This association may, however, be due in part to the fact that there is a problem in the engagement which leads both members of the couple to seek advice. This patterning of association by frequency of "going steady," of previous engagements, and of discussing the engagement with others may perhaps be an index of the presence or absence of sophistication. If such an interpretation is valid, the findings on courtship behavior would indicate that persons who are more sophisticated and experienced in their

²⁰ A high correlation in ages of husbands and wives has been found in many studies. See, for example, F. Lutz, "Assortative Mating in Man," *Science*, XVI (1918), 249-50; and K. Pearson and O. Heron, "On Theories of Association," *Biometrika*, IX (1913), 224.

relations with the opposite sex tend to select as partners persons resembling themselves in this respect, and similarly with the less sophisticated.

CONCEPTIONS OF MARRIAGE

Young people before and during engagement are imbued with certain atti-

about various aspects of marriage. Widely divergent as are their notions, in every case there is a tendency greater than chance for engagements to take place among persons with the same conceptions. This is true both of attitudes toward loveless or romantic marriages and of opinions about the justifiability of di-

TABLE 5
SIMILARITY OF MEMBERS OF ENGAGED COUPLES IN COURTSHIP BEHAVIOR

COURTSHIP BEHAVIOR	No. of Cases		PERCENTAGE THE SAME		RATIO OF ACTUAL TO EXPECTED	C
	Men	Women	Expected	Actual		
Age started keeping company with betrothed:						
Man, under 19, woman, under 18.....	205	271	5.6	15.3
Man, 19 to 25, woman, 18 to 22.....	641	554	36.3	44.8
Man, 26 or over, woman, 23 or more.....	144	165	2.4	8.6
Total.....	990	990	44.3	68.7	1.55	.57
Persons gone with steadily:*						
None.....	293	310	9.4	15.1
One or two.....	452	440	20.5	22.0
Three or more.....	239	234	5.8	8.3
Total.....	984	984	35.7	45.4	1.27	.29
Previously engaged:						
Never.....	772	642	56.3	60.0
Once.....	150	215	3.6	5.6
Twice or more.....	16	81	0.1	0.2
Total.....	938	938	60.0	65.8	1.10	.21
Discussed engagement:						
With no one.....	494	411	21.7	26.9
With one or two persons.....	342	442	16.1	19.0
With three or more persons.....	130	113	1.6	3.3
Total.....	966	966	39.4	49.2	1.25	.24

* Before going steadily with betrothed.

tudes, ideas, and ideals about marriage. It is interesting to know to what extent the members of engaged couples cherish the same or different conceptions about marriage, about children, about divorce, and about the role of the wife in modern marriage.

In Table 6 are presented the answers to seventeen questions indicative of the conceptions of modern young people

and separation. Interestingly, there is a higher tendency to form unions according to negative than according to positive²¹ conceptions of marriage, although the association is in either case low.

There is a rather marked tendency for engaged young people to entertain the same ideas about the advisability of

²¹ See footnote to Table 6 for a description of these items.

TABLE 6

SIMILARITY OF MEMBERS OF ENGAGED COUPLES IN CONCEPTIONS OF MARRIAGE

ATTITUDE	NO. OF CASES		PERCENTAGE THE SAME		RATIO OF ACTUAL TO EX- PECTED	C
	Men	Women	Expected	Actual		
Ever marry if not in love:						
Yes.....	123	154	1.9	3.9
Uncertain.....	58	51	0.3	0.9
No.....	817	793	65.0	68.6
Total.....	998	998	67.2	73.4	1.09	.24
Romantic marriages more successful:						
Yes.....	630	625	39.8	44.1
Uncertain.....	113	94	1.1	2.0
No.....	251	275	7.0	11.0
Total.....	994	994	47.9	57.1	1.19	.23
Divorce justifiable:						
Yes.....	872	910	80.7	83.5
Uncertain.....	25	21	0.1	0.1
No.....	95	61	0.6	2.7
Total.....	992	992	81.4	86.3	1.06	.31
Divorce justifiable if no unfaithfulness:						
Yes.....	728	786	58.6	63.7
Uncertain.....	47	46	0.2	0.5
No.....	213	156	3.4	7.3
Total.....	988	988	62.2	71.5	1.15	.29
Positive factors in conceptions of marriage:*						
One or less.....	240	233	6.9	8.8
Two or three.....	487	485	29.1	29.1
Three or more.....	174	183	3.9	4.8
Total.....	901	901	39.9	42.7	1.07	.13
Negative factors in conceptions of marriage:*						
None.....	473	461	27.6	30.4
One.....	215	246	6.6	8.2
Two or more.....	202	183	4.7	7.2
Total.....	890	890	38.9	45.8	1.18	.18
Separate when cease to be in love:						
Divorce.....	530	509	38.0	45.3
Separate.....	148	198	4.1	6.9
Continue together.....	164	135	3.1	5.6
Total.....	842	842	45.2	57.8	1.28	.31
Object to betrothed's going out with opposite sex after marriage:						
Yes.....	869	894	77.7	79.9
No.....	93	70	0.7	1.7
Other or no reply.....	38	36	0.1	0.7
Total.....	1,000	1,000	78.5	82.3	1.05	.23

* Subjects were asked to indicate (by a plus or a minus sign) which of the following factors had appreciably influenced (positively or negatively) their conceptions of marriage: marriage of parents, marriage of siblings, marriage of relatives, movies and theater, books, etc.

TABLE 6—Continued

ATTITUDE	No. OF CASES		PERCENTAGE THE SAME		RATIO OF ACTUAL TO EX- PECTED	C
	Men	Women	Expected	Actual		
Object to betrothed's having dates with opposite sex during engagement period:						
Yes.....	680	726	55.0	62.8
No.....	252	191	5.4	12.8
No issue.....	15	30	0.0†	0.4
Total.....	947	947	60.4	76.0	1.26	.41
Head of family:						
Husband.....	632	633	43.2	50.2
Mutual.....	123	130	1.8	3.5
Neither.....	207	199	4.5	8.2
Total.....	962	962	49.5	61.9	1.25	.31
Wife keep own name after marriage:						
Yes.....	231	238	5.5	11.1
No.....	718	718	51.6	56.7
Other or no reply.....	51	44	0.2	0.5
Total.....	1,000	1,000	57.3	68.3	1.19	.30
Should woman work after marriage:						
No.....	593	443	30.0	41.7
Yes: desirable.....	147	211	3.5	10.3
Yes: if necessary.....	196	282	6.3	13.1
Total.....	936	936	39.8	65.1	1.64	.52
Prefer apartment or house:						
Apartment.....	207	221	4.6	10.0
House.....	739	718	54.0	59.8
Undecided.....	46	53	0.2	0.3
Total.....	992	992	58.8	70.1	1.19	.31
First sex information:						
Wholesome.....	600	726	50.7	53.1
Unwholesome.....	316	193	7.1	9.3
Partly unwholesome.....	11	8	0.0†	0.2
Total.....	927	927	57.8	62.6	1.08	.23
Present knowledge of sex:						
Adequate for marriage.....	778	713	60.4	65.2
Doubtful.....	111	98	1.8	4.3
Inadequate for marriage.....	69	147	0.7	2.6
Total.....	958	958	62.9	72.1	1.15	.32
Attitude toward having children:						
Very much desire.....	657	671	44.9	53.9
Mildly desire.....	272	263	7.3	12.8
Object.....	61	56	0.4	2.4
Total.....	990	990	52.6	69.1	1.31	.46
Number of children desired:						
Three or more.....	360	407	16.2	26.3
One or two.....	568	523	32.8	42.6
None.....	24	21	0.1	1.0
Total.....	951	951	49.1	69.9	1.42	.51

† Less than 0.05.

dating with others during engagement. There is much more accord on this than on the question of the husband's or the wife's going out with the opposite sex after marriage. In both instances, however, these attitudes may be influenced more by association in engagement and accordingly be consequences of the engagement rather than evidence of homogamy.

Four questions deal directly or indirectly with conceptions of the role of woman in marriage, and all show a more or less marked association of the like-minded. Couples tend to agree on the pros and cons of the husband's being the head of the family, of the wife's keeping her maiden name, of the wife's working, and of living in a house or an apartment. The most marked association is on the question of a woman's working after marriage, where the responses were grouped under three categories: (1) no; (2) yes, desirable for economic independence of wife, wife better companion when occupied with a career or occupation, and woman desires career or occupation; and (3) yes, if necessary (husband's income not sufficient for purposes of establishing home on firm economic basis and to aid husband to complete schooling).

The two questions in this series on wholesomeness of first sex information and adequacy of present knowledge of sex showed the same tendency to selective grouping, although somewhat greater for the latter than for the former.

Outstanding as a selective factor is similarity of attitude toward having children and agreement on number desired. Correspondence of desire for a given number of children appears to be slightly more discriminating an item than strength of desire for children. There is, of course, no doubt that the extent of homogamy indicated by these

findings is spuriously high in so far as discussion between couples has influenced their attitude both as to desire for children and as to the number they should have.

It is evident that in all the questions upon conceptions of marriage, with the exception of the wholesomeness of first sex information, the association of the couple may be, and undoubtedly is, in part, a contributing factor in the extent of resemblance. It is also reasonable to assume that, in part, those with similar conceptions tend to meet and fall in love with each other. From the existing data there is no way of separating the effect of these two factors. Therefore, similarity of conceptions of marriage secured from engaged couples cannot be considered unqualified evidence of homogamy.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

1. The data presented in this report demonstrate that assortative mating takes place by social factors such as religious affiliation and behavior, family background, courtship behavior, conceptions of marriage, social participation, and family relationships.

2. The influence of homogamy upon engagement is indicated by the fact that all the characteristics considered in this study show a higher actual than expected proportion of assortative unions. In all but 6 of the 51 items studied the differences between the actual and the expected association of responses of the members of the couples are statistically significant.

3. The degree of like mating with like varies by our groups of items, being highest for religious affiliation and behavior, next for family cultural background, and lowest for family relationships.

The mean value of C for the questions

under each of the main headings is given in Table 7.

4. By taking responses of engaged rather than of married couples as the basis for a study of homogamy the effect of marital association and of common experience is eliminated. Correlations found in previous studies on attitudes

TABLE 7
VARIATIONS IN DEGREE OF HOMOGAMY FOR
GROUPS OF ITEMS AS MEASURED BY
MEAN VALUE OF C

Groups of Items	Number of Items	Mean (C)
Religious affiliation and behavior.....	4	.54
Family background.....	6	.38
Courtship behavior.....	4	.33
Conceptions of marriage.....	17	.31
Social participation.....	11	.24
Family relationships.....	9	.12

and values may be spuriously high due to influences effective after marriages.

5. The point should be made that the engagement, although much shorter than the marriage period, may operate to make for similarity in the behavior and attitudes of engaged couples because of the mutual responsiveness during the courtship relationship. A careful scrutiny indicates that this may be true for several items: number of persons with whom discussed engagement as indicative of the presence of a problem as well

as of a tendency to seek advice (Table 5); church attendance and possibly church membership as in part affected by engagement (Table 2); attitude toward having children and number of children desired (Table 6); perhaps, to a limited extent, drinking and smoking habits (Table 4); all the questions under conceptions of marriage except wholesomeness of first sex information (Table 6).

6. Any group of engaged couples will contain a considerable proportion who do not marry. If broken engagements occur more frequently among couples who are unlike than like, then the findings based upon engaged couples may minimize somewhat the actual influence of assortative mating.

7. Finally, the reader should be cautioned against assuming that the findings reported here can be generalized beyond the universe sampled in this study. They are, however, consistent with the findings of other studies of assortative mating and therefore strengthen the case for the theory of homogamy. Further research is necessary to determine differences in degree of homogamy in various social characteristics for the country as a whole and for its component regions, urban and rural areas, communities and social classes.

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WOMAN'S SOCIAL STATUS AND THE FORMS OF MARRIAGE

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ABSTRACT

The study of relationships between woman's social status and the forms of marriage brings into sharp contrast the position of sociologists commenting on the present and certain classical evolutionary anthropologists theorizing on the early history of marital institutions. Concerning the forms of marriage, much of our present-day terminology goes back to a pseudo-evolutionist, J. F. McLennan, and to an anti-evolutionist, Edward Westermarck. The limitations and bias of both are discussed below. More recent field work throws new light on the ancient controversies and suggests that a revision is in order both in terminology and in thinking if objectivity and realism are to be preserved. The data suggest that woman's social status and the sexual role accorded her in society are related facts which find expression in the rules and attitudes governing marital and extra-marital relations.

In their *The Science of Society* Sumner and Keller state:

Sex-status is a matter of adjustment, over ages of variation and selection in the mores, to the major life conditions of maintenance-needs and bi-sexuality. . . . The key to the whole situation as respects woman's evolving status lies, in the end, in maintenance considerations. . . . Every wide fluctuation or convulsion in the mores has important consequences in the effects upon the relation of the sexes, the status of woman.¹

A recent statistical study by Dr. L. W. Simmons of seventy-one specific cultures geographically staggered to eliminate historic connection tests these generalizations and in summary concludes:

Suffice it to say, that the status of woman appears decidedly influenced by maintenance mores and the family organization. In maintenance activities their position appears highest among collectors, hunters, and fishers, intermediate in agricultural societies, and lowest among herders.²

This research is admittedly incomplete, but the data place their author in "substantial agreement" with the leaders of the Yale sociological school.

¹ W. G. Sumner and A. G. Keller, *The Science of Society* (New York, 1932), pp. 1793, 1825, 1532.

² "Statistical Correlations in the Science of Society," in *Studies in the Science of Society*, ed. George P. Murdock (New Haven, 1937), pp. 515 ff. ("Summary").

The study of possible relationships between woman's social status, on the one hand, and the familial and marital institutions, on the other, is unequally developed in the general science of society. The theme of Sumner and Keller is that changes in economic structure and social organization have transformed the status of woman. Simmons continues:

The institution of slavery is not an unmixed blessing to their status; warfare may work to their detriment, and the extension of codified laws is correlative with divorce restrictions, subjection, and property rights in their person. Matrilineal institutions consistently favor a high status for woman . . . in contrast to patrilineal.³

Apart from the Simmons study, there is little anthropological data in support of the Sumner and Keller thesis which can be called recent, although current sociological thought accepts as the most commonplace truism the idea that woman's increasing economic independence has modified her status markedly and thereby deeply affected the character of family life.

Turning first to the sociological material, concrete data, notably supplied by Ogburn in *Recent Social Trends*, leave no doubt concerning the transformation of

³ *Ibid.*

the American family.⁴ Indeed, at whatever point one tests the recent literature on the change in woman's status, one finds historically minded students of society locating the framework of this change in the manifold effects of the industrial revolution upon family life.⁵ The family seems to have shifted in size, location, mobility, and functions from a relatively stable, moderate-sized unit, self-sufficient and self-contained, to one in which the basic economic activities have been transferred largely to outside agencies, necessitating readjustments all along the line. There is the more complete dependence on factory-made goods and on extra-familial agencies providing services and recreation. There are the tenements and apartment houses. There is the resultant growth of cities and congestion. And, within the same frame of history, there are the consequences of all this for early family structure. Today, no serious student of modern marriage and the family will comment on this development without first referring to the whole complex of changes in the economic sphere which presumably account for the growing importance of women both within and without the family association. The alterations in family life and intersexual attitudes, they note, are more than stylistic, temporary fads.

Following the same theme, Professor Lowie writes of nonliterate peoples:

Accordingly, it is not surprising that the sexual division of labor should color the family

⁴ W. F. Ogburn (ed.), *Recent Social Trends* (New York, 1933).

⁵ See J. S. Mill, *The Subjection of Women* (1869); E. Abbott, *Women in Industry* (1909); W. Goodsell, *History of Marriage and the Family* (1934); B. J. Stern, *The Family Past and Present* (1938), chap. v; E. R. Groves, *The American Woman* (1937); G. Abbott, "The Changing Position of Women," in *A Century of Progress*, ed. C. A. Beard (1932); S. P. Breckinridge, *Women in the Twentieth Century* (1933), Part I.

life of simpler cultures. This division is very largely conventional, i.e., in no way connected with the physiological characteristics of the sexes as may often be proved by contrasting the regulations of different and even neighboring tribes.⁶

Professor Murdock, in a more recent investigation, goes still further in illuminating the position of women in nonliterate society. In an essay supplemental to that of Simmons, he marshals data on 230 cultures selected "to represent as adequately as possible the whole range of known civilizations."⁷ By employing careful statistical method, he draws the following conclusions:

1. "That, by and large, simpler cultures tend to be matrilineal, more advanced ones patrilineal."
2. "The patrilineate and matrilineate represent adjustments to specific elaborations respectively in the male and female realms of economic activity." Or, quoting Professor Linton's *The Study of Man* (p. 169): "There does seem to be a very rough and general correlation between the line of descent selected by a particular group and the sex which is of preponderant economic importance. Male-supported societies tend to be patrilineal, female-supported ones matrilineal."
3. "Social organization under primitive conditions tends to be matrilineal only partially and in an incipient sense, and is elaborated into a full-fledged and consistent matrilineal system, with the extension of the principle to authority and succession, only after cultural advances favorable to the extension and expansion of the principle, e.g., the adoption of agriculture. Typical mother-right, or the full matrilineal complex, would then be, not primitive, but a special adjustment to a somewhat exceptional set of social and economic circumstances on a relatively advanced level of cultural development."
4. While patrilineal institutions are associated with the presence of traits "indicative of higher civilization," this by no means im-

⁶ R. H. Lowie, *Primitive Society* (1920), p. 74.

⁷ George P. Murdock, "Correlations of Matrilineal and Patrilineal Institutions," in *Studies in the Science of Society*, ed. Murdock.

plies universal matrilineal priority or unilinear evolution in the strict sense.⁸

It is not surprising that Professor Murdock, in this pioneering effort, should find these results consistent with the best tenets of the sociological school of Sumner and Keller. Nor is it unusual that he quotes Keller's famous statement in *Societal Evolution* to the effect that "marriage mores and property mores march together." "It is the mores arising out of direct reactions between the society and its physical environment that form the independent variable" of which Professor Lowie speaks in this connection.⁹ The present study, based on these auspicious beginnings, tests the relationship of woman's social status and the forms of marriage in simpler societies. In so doing, it provides a check, in time depth, of the general thesis of Sumner and Keller, Dr. Simmons, Professor Lowie, and Professor Murdock.

It would be well, at the beginning, to clarify terminology. A social status, as Professor Linton defines it, "is simply a collection of rights and duties. . . . A role represents the dynamic aspect of a status," and both "derive from social patterns and are integral parts of patterns."¹⁰ Throughout this paper these definitions, realistic in content, will be applied.¹¹ In setting the scene, one further quotation may be apposite. As Linton states:

The division and ascription of statuses with relation to sex seems to be basic in all social systems. All societies prescribe different attitudes and activities to men and to women. Most of them try to rationalize these prescriptions

in terms of the physiological differences between the sexes or their different roles in reproduction. However, a comparative study of the statuses ascribed to women and men in different cultures seems to show that while such factors may have served as a starting point for the development of a division the actual prescriptions are almost entirely determined by culture. Even the psychological characteristics ascribed to men and to women in different societies vary so much that they can have little physiological basis. . . .¹²

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Ever since Bachofen and Morgan posited stages in the alleged evolution of human marriage, anthropologists have been concerned with the problem of properly classifying marital types the world over. As we shall see, much of the early classification was arbitrary, antedated the scientific investigation along historical lines of the twentieth century, and amounted to little more than comparative grist to fill the theoretic mills of both the early evolutionists and their more outspoken adversaries. As all know, both Bachofen and Morgan attempted to categorize successive forms of family organization correlative, in developmental sequence, with rules of marriage. In so doing, each placed at the beginning of his evolutionary series a hypothetical state of primal promiscuity, implying a time when mankind entirely lacked definable marriage practices. In effect, their systems asserted in no uncertain terms that forms of family and marital regulation, hitherto regarded as immutable, were in reality variable over the earth's surface, were subject in the long run to sweeping modification, and had, once in the dead past, been virtually nonexistent. Such formulations, schematic though they were, contained enough documentation from preliterate life to

⁸ Summarized from *ibid.*, pp. 467-70.

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 451; Lowie, *op. cit.*

¹⁰ Ralph Linton, *The Study of Man* (1935), p. 113.

¹¹ The author is grateful to Professor Linton for helpful criticisms in the preparation of this manuscript.

¹² *Op. cit.*, p. 116.

crush the cherished belief that marriage and the family, in their modern form, were universal institutions. To the firm believer in the fundamental verity of an unchanging human nature eternally equipped with western European moral codes, the added notion of promiscuity appeared repugnant, and the variance in ethical norms seemed far below the fixed conceptions of human dignity. Consequently, the storm of criticism which greeted these positions was long and loud, and opponents, noting the hypothetical nature of the initial stage in *Mutterrecht* and *Ancient Society*, countered with the claim that, after all, marital regulation was universal in the known world, while marital forms and family organization were, on occasion, more complicated than the early systematizers had ever dreamed.

In Bachofen's *Mutterrecht*, for example, the initial state of license, inappropriately called by the classic Greek term *hetaerism*, was claimed somewhat mystically to lead in the course of time to maternal descent and maternal rule. The motivations impelling such change in woman's status were held to be a complex of developing religious ideals; for Bachofen, perhaps unconsciously mindful of the contemporary and sacrosanct version of the family, argued that, since mothers were at one time the only ascertainable parents on their own generation level, they alone could be the recipients of the awe, deference, and respect a younger generation would inevitably offer. Woman's role and woman's status were functions, not of developments in the concrete world of economic and social organization, but curiously underwent a separate transformation as functions of religious ideals arbitrarily conceived.

Morgan, attempting to encompass

"the several lines of human progress," claimed even more bluntly, certainly with less sentiment, that human marriage had a lowly beginning in promiscuity, the traces of which were still discernible in group marital arrangements among certain Australian tribes. For him, the forms of marriage had enjoyed a slow growth toward the modern monogamous type, a first step being taken when members of the human family were constrained to apply the terminology of the immediate biological family of parents and children widely among relatives, while they continued to recognize several fathers and mothers because distinct parentage in the antecedent stage was all but unknown. To Morgan's credit, it should be added, no false claims were made for existing cases of promiscuity. Nevertheless, in mid-Victorian times, it was a cardinal sin to have asserted, somewhere in *Ancient Society*, that even the modern marital forms of Europe and America had deep roots leading down to an earlier condition when mankind lacked any regulation of sexual conduct or rules of marriage.

In the subsequent search for evidence of definite marital types among non-literate peoples, the palm of authority, at least in England and on the Continent, passed from Morgan's hand to local champions of universally regulated sexual unions. Bachofen's successor and Morgan's chief European critic was J. F. McLennan, a Scotch jurist who argued vehemently against the notion of primitive promiscuity and almost quixotically for the omnipresence of the stable conjugal group.¹³ Although an evolutionist,

¹³ It is interesting to note that McLennan championed the universality of the family by providing for the universality of the stable conjugal group, not realizing that the two concepts are logically distinct (for correction see Linton, *op. cit.*, p. 173).

McLennan, unlike his predecessor Bachofen, narrowed his discussion down to modifications within the universal framework of human marriage and the family. Actually, he had little to say of the dynamics of social evolution beyond self-righteous comparisons between modern monogamy and what he termed the previous stages of polygamy. At least, he said, here was human marriage practiced everywhere, even by benighted primitives.

While not impressed by Bachofen's perfervid pleas for the sanctity of maternal rule, McLennan drily argued for a previous condition of maternal descent on similiar grounds; this time a former era of polyandrous unions made such descent inevitable. Nevertheless, for him, the origin of marital institutions went back to the beginning of human social life, being founded on the necessity of exogamy, exemplified in the custom of marriage by capture. It mattered little that such capture was practically non-existent or that exogamous tribes were difficult to find even under the spur of Morgan's rejoinders. The juristic argument had it that, since marriage began in exogamic necessity, the captive women never equaled in number the males seeking mates. The morals of savages being what they were, a necessary corollary of this myth was polyandry. To McLennan, polyandry was a crude, but nonetheless real, form of marital union.

To Morgan's claim that human marriage developed from a previous state of promiscuity, McLennan countered with a complicated attempt to adduce proof that kinship terms are largely modes of address: vocative forms which in no way indicate previous stages of social life, or indeed current ones. His *Studies in Ancient History* argued that, beneath such verbal cloaks, definite rules of mar-

riage always held sway. Of his entire critique of Morgan's position, the points which had widest circulation embodied this recognition and classification of marital forms. The concept of primitive promiscuity fell into disrepute; group marriage, noted by Lubbock in his *Origin of Civilization* (1870), was generally forgotten; and the main emphasis devolved upon McLennan's three forms of marriage: (1) polygyny, (2) polyandry, and (3) monogamy. The latter, as we shall see, came to be viewed as fixed systems, inflexible forms, and, finally, pigeonholes. Darwin's pronouncement to the effect that the family, defined by regular marital rules, was universal began to receive the widest acceptance. And, in short, the blot on the human escutcheon was thoroughly removed.

It is curious to note, however, that the reaction against evolutionism (and Morgan in particular) was achieved by means of the same comparative method evolutionists had employed, now providing solace for champions of marriage and the family through random cultural examples torn from context. It remained for Westermarck, writing in the heyday of mid-Victorian smugness, to marshal the comparative examples designed to give the final coup de grâce to Morgan's evolutionism. In a ponderous work on the *History of Human Marriage*, this celibate and scholar averred not only that mankind was fundamentally monogamous but that so were the great apes and a sizable number of four-footed creatures as well.¹⁴ The wide acclaim accorded Wester-

¹⁴ This work, now superseded by that of Gerritt S. Miller and S. Zuckerman on primate sexual patterning, was even in its own day largely beside the point, inasmuch as human social organization is based, obviously, on principles other than anthropoid. Moreover, while monogamy can be conceded the most prevalent form of human marriage, it was by no means the only one in the literature of the time.

marck was somewhat disconcerting in view of the fact that his work was comparative, a combing of the available literature for grist to fill the mill. His sources were poorly chosen, consisting largely of reports of hunters, explorers, and random commentators lacking expert knowledge. Nevertheless, one can imagine the lace curtains in many a Victorian drawing-room rustling with gentle sighs of relief, as promiscuity was routed and man's past emerged spotless from Westermarck's pen. Once again the family was made universal by the simple expedient of universal conjugality. In Westermarck there was added the chivalrous attempt to make the world safe for monogamy.

In anthropology proper the intrusion of Westermarck's sentimentalism made little impression on the technical study of marriage as molded by McLennan. While McLennan had discussed polygamy as a species of promiscuity in the moralizing scene, he insisted that both polygyny and polyandry were determined in any cultural milieu by regulations that constituted marriage of a sort. By polygamy, then, he referred to the range of nonmonogamous forms. The word "promiscuity" implied a value judgment in the spirit, if not sense, of the Spencerian holier-than-thou evolutionist. For example, he regarded polyandry as a fixed type of marriage but one approaching promiscuity in the moral sense. Nevertheless, fraternal polyandry represented an advance from a grosser stage of marital relation. Thus, the ruder form of polyandry occurred when men not brothers were selected as mates; while the less "reprehensible" brand (which followed later) was fraternal. In speaking of the Nair of India, he says: "I have called Nair polyandry a form of marriage because, in a juridical view, any relation-

ship of persons of different sexes resting on contract and approved by public opinion—by custom or law—is marriage."¹⁵ The point is that polyandry, polygyny, and monogamy became denotative categories, carefully divorced from the social setting which provides sex status and marriage rules with life and meaning. As to what constituted a *form of marriage*, such decisions were settled "in a juridical view" with the type of evidence required in a Scotch court around 1890.

Since the discovery of polygamy in McLennan's classification, the earlier controversies have abated, leaving for disputation only the question of what peoples are polygamous. A less mechanical (and more cultural) definition of terms like "polyandry" and "polygyny" has never been attempted to our knowledge, and the important distinction between such terms and nonmarital forms of multiple mating is made, as we shall see, all too infrequently. Today, more than two decades since Professor Lowie wrote that "the bilateral family . . . is an absolutely universal unit of human society,"¹⁶ anthropologists are ready to agree if the nuclear family of parents and children is implied. In regard to marital forms, however, the "juridical view" of McLennan has too often obtained in applying such terminology as "polygyny" and "polyandry"; while the cultural view, the exact native phrasing of both mating and marital practices has been, at least in a number of instances, left out of account.

THE QUESTION OF POLYANDRY

Before examining the nature of marital and nonmarital mating customs among

¹⁵ J. F. McLennan, *Studies in Ancient History: Second Series* (London, 1896), p. 63.

¹⁶ *Op. cit.*, p. 78.

tribes reported in the literature as polyandrous, it is necessary first of all to bring our account up to the present by stating a number of propositions which have become current since McLennan's time. Today, almost five decades since McLennan referred to polyandry as a major stage in the organization of both marriage and the family, anthropology is in a position to correct his definition of marriage and its particular application. This definition, stated above ("any relationship of persons of different sexes resting on contract and approved by public opinion—by custom or law—is marriage"), is restricted and arbitrary in that it mechanically applies the juridical view of the 1890's in western European civilization to practices standing without the European framework of custom and history and understandable only with reference to their own time and place. To the modern cultural historian nothing is more exasperating than to read in explorers' accounts of strange people with this or that bizarre custom, when, clearly, strangeness and the bizarre mean nothing more than unfamiliarity with meanings sensible in a more coherent account. In this sense, societies differ, and the merely bizarre culture does not exist. In describing cultural institutions, a modern sense of reality demands that the given institutions be described, not in a flat and two-dimensional catalogue or classification, but in their meaningful setting and in all its psychological depth. In respect to marital forms, likewise, the dignity of our human material brooks no mechanistic approach or arbitrarily devised classifications based on a single culture. Instead, it is the setting and meaning of these institutions which impart form and content to social activities.

In addition to sweeping generali-

zations in the form of mechanical classifications of marital types the world over, McLennan was guilty of a further assumption: namely, that polyandry was a widespread cultural phenomenon. Since the *Studies in Ancient History* first appeared, a half-century of diligent anthropological research has discovered only the smallest number of such instances, and customs akin to Nair and Toda traditional usages are found to be exceedingly rare. Furthermore, as we shall see, a certain percentage of this number hitherto regarded as polyandrous (Nair and Toda among them) have since been removed from the dwindling company of the polyandrous by more recent, and, I trust, more discriminating field workers. The present paper raises grave questions concerning the author's previous classification of the Ute as polyandrous. In a total listing which once included only a few peoples at best (the Eskimo, the poorer class in Tibet, a few tribes of southern India, the Wahuma, Marquesans, Pawnee and Wichita, Comanche, Arikara, Kitsai, and, among others, the indigent tribes of the Great Basin, like Ute, Northern Paiute, and Shoshoni), there can be no doubt of the rarity of examples for this major grouping of McLennan.

In addition to the rarity of examples, Linton has noted the rather uniform correlation with hard economic conditions and the consequent necessity of limiting population to conformity with food supply by the simple expedient of female infanticide, by all odds the most effective method short of birth control.¹⁷ The suggestion is strong that population limitation on the female side and economic scarcity are conducive to customs akin to polyandry. However, scientific

¹⁷ Linton, *op. cit.*, pp. 182-83.

method demands that we distinguish between what may be conceived to be preconditioning factors and a one-way causal relationship. Today it is known in regard to the above peoples that not all, no matter how marked by economic scarcity, sanction female infanticide. Conversely, not all societies lacking in effective surpluses allow multiple mating for women. The very fact that practically all societies of want which do recognize multiple mating on the female side of the distaff line are easily enumerated in a short list is hardly to be construed as a one-way causal relationship of simple economic determinism. Thus, while the association or correlation with economic scarcity is important, it is not alone determining. Rather, it would seem, the social recognition and sanction of multiple mating for women must further be associated with such social and economic conditions as promote at least an egalitarian position of women, in societies where their favorable status is extended into the realm of sexual conduct and where society permits the occasions when multiple choices are made by them. Such association by no means implies inflexible polyandrous marriages, fixed over long periods of time with consequent difficulties for divorce, promoting equality between the various spouses of the same sex. In contrast to McLennan's fixed idea, a stable form of marriage, or polyandry as classically defined, may not be involved at all. The question is, therefore, whether polyandry in McLennan's sense of a stable and permanent marital form may not easily be confused with customs allowing nonmarital multiple mating (extra-marital relations of a specific type) for women in societies where their status is favorable and has been, historically, extended to their sexual roles? That this has occurred in at

least a number of societies formerly considered polyandrous, the following pages will, perhaps, demonstrate.

MULTIPLE MATING FOR WOMEN DATA ON THE NAIR

Perhaps this is why the question of polyandry among the Nair is still a bone of contention, almost half a century after McLennan divulged his famous tripartite classification, using the Nair to exemplify polyandry. At any rate, opinion is divided as to whether polyandry occurs among the Nair, A. Aiyappan¹⁸ and L. K. Ananthakrishna Iyer¹⁹ claiming that it does occur, and K. Panikkar²⁰ arguing with some consistency that polyandry is probably a misnomer inasmuch as a stable conjugal group is not formed and that there is, furthermore, no nonfraternal polyandry among these people. The more ultimate problem of possible interconnections between Nair mating and marital practices and the position of woman in Nair society remains to this day vague and inconclusive, though there are indications, even in the brief accounts of Aiyappan and Iyer, of at least an egalitarian position for women.

TODA DATA

The classic example of polyandry, so called, is, of course, the Todas. Of their customs, and those of the Nair as well, W. H. R. Rivers, writing in 1916, was most explicit:

Both among the Todas and in Tibet and neighboring regions, where polyandry exists in its purest form, it is of the fraternal variety. Usually the eldest son of a family marries, and, *as his brothers grow up, they share his wife with him*. Even if one of the younger brothers takes

¹⁸ *Man*, XXII (March, 1932), 78-79.

¹⁹ *Man*, XXII (November, 1932), 269-70.

²⁰ *Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute*, Vol. XLVIII.

a wife among the Todas, she becomes the wife of the other brothers. *It is doubtful whether the recorded cases of non-fraternal polyandry should be regarded as polyandry at all.* Among the Nairs, who furnished McLennan with his pattern of this form of polyandry, a girl goes through a form of marriage with a man, *but then or later consorts with a number of men who need not be related to one another. It is a question, however, whether these men should not be regarded as cici-bei rather than husbands.*²¹

While casting doubt on the actual occurrence of polyandry among the Nair in 1916, Rivers earlier, in his volume on *The Todas*, indicated the setting of what he had called, for convenience, I suspect, Toda polyandry. Here a most striking emphasis in family organization is the insistence of the Toda upon single sociological fatherhood, a custom maintained in the face of wide sex choices and multiple mating for women. If we then follow Linton's careful definition of marriage as providing "a stable foundation for the creation and organization of a conjugal group" aside from its secondary functions of sexual gratification and the production of offspring,²² obviously this condition is met among the Toda through the fixing of fatherhood for social purposes by ceremonially "giving" the bow and arrow. The custom of deciding beforehand in multiple unions who will be the father of specific children is clearly one of determining, from the sociological point of view, which "father" is selected as the one completing a particular conjugal group.²³ When once this determination is ceremonially made, a son born years after his sociological father has died will still consider the dead man his real father unless, of course, his mother has in the meantime changed her

sociological husband by an additional ceremony. Further, we learn:

If a man is asked the name of his father, he usually gives the name of one man only, even when he is the offspring of a polyandrous marriage. . . . Often one of the fathers is more prominent and influential than the others and it is natural in such cases that the son should speak of himself as the son of the more important member of the community.²⁴

If, in view of this stable conjugal group, extending socially, as it were, beyond death and beyond the realities of physiological paternity and stabilized over time by the expedience of a ceremony, we may still speak of the Toda as polyandrous; by the same logic, or lack of it, one could call the Toda promiscuous by referring to the publicly recognized and sanctioned irregular relations between men and women in the *mokkthoditi* unions.²⁵ In the *mokkthoditi* union among the Toda, a woman may live with a man as would a real wife, the children, however, becoming by law her socially recognized husband's; or she may receive her lover's visits regularly at home without fear of social repercussions attendant on jealousy. The real fact, however, is that both the unions—the seriatim unions in which the family constellation (husband-father, wife-mother, and child) is determined ceremonially and sociologically, and which have been called in dead technical language "polyandrous," and the *mokkthoditi* relationships—all argue for a position of women among the Toda quite at variance, at least in sexual matters, from our usual notion of fixed polyandrous marriages. Indeed, in discussing the sexual roles of women among these people, Rivers finds no concept of adultery. In this regard, he writes:

²¹ "Marriage" (art.), *Hastings Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics* (1916). (Italics mine.)

²² Linton, *op cit.*, p. 173.

²³ Rivers, *The Todas* (1906), p. 517.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 516.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 526 ff.

It appears that a woman may have one or more recognized lovers as well as several husbands. . . . It appears that she may also have sexual relations with dairymen of various grades.²⁶

Later, he repeats:

So far as I could tell, the laxity in sexual matters is equally great before and after marriage. If a girl who has been married in infancy, but has not yet joined her husband, should become pregnant, the husband would be called upon to give the bow and arrow . . . and would be the father of the child, even if he were still a young boy, or if it were known that he was not the father of the child.²⁷

A more recent commentary by M. B. Emeneau, specifically on "Toda Marriage Regulations and Taboos,"²⁸ refers to polyandry along with "the institution whereby a man may take another's wife upon payment of a compensation" and mentions in addition such customs as concubinage, allowable license for both sexes equally, and the lack of any permanent tie being formed in the liaisons. These practices, together with what Emeneau describes as "irregular relations,"²⁹ suggest that Toda "polyandry," even of the fraternal variety, is so brittle and impermanent that it amounts to a series of seriatim unions defining different conjugal constellations in which a woman may at different times play a role. Here, apparently, Linton's definition of marriage cited above works somewhat in reverse order, since no conjugal groups are formed to persist in any high degree of permanency among the Toda; relativistically, however, the more permanent unions, seriatim, are the marriages, and the principal spouses are those who integrate best in prestige and over time into the family constellations.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 529.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 531.

²⁸ *American Anthropologist*, XXXIX (new ser., 1937), 104.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 108.

While this is certainly not monogamy in the western European religious phrasing of the everlasting bond, neither is it polyandry in McLennan's meaning of a permanent union of one wife, several husbands and children in common, modifying only numerically (morally) the occidental household. Rather the facts suggest a series of seriatim unions in which women, contrary to Westermarck's fixed notion of their inborn tendencies, exercise wide sexual choices, in addition to indulging in multiple mating practices. All this is, of course, socially sanctioned to a degree which hardly limits women to a narrow choice between permanent single attachments, defined once and for all, or else the social stigma of immorality. This completely single standard in regard to sexual roles would seem to imply a social status equally favorable in a culture as integrated and harmonious as that of the Toda. Unfortunately, according to his own admission, Rivers gathered little data on the social and economic position of the Toda woman. This hiatus Rivers fills, like a good many other European intellectuals, by assuming a connection between what he called polyandry and what he mentions in passing as the suggestion of a subordinate role of women.³⁰ However, the reader will do well to take this subordinate role with caution; for the most part it means unimportance in ceremonial life. Moreover, on the page before, he flatly contradicts himself by writing:

Though thus unimportant in ceremonial and of little influence in the regulation of social affairs, women have nevertheless much freedom. In general social intercourse the two sexes seem to be on the best of terms and I never saw or heard anything to indicate that women are treated harshly or contemptuously.³¹

³⁰ *The Todas*, p. 568.

³¹ *Ibid.*, p. 567.

So much could hardly be said of women's status in our own society.

KOTA DATA

When we seek further for comparable data on southern India, we find them most explicitly stated in a revealing paper by David G. Mandelbaum, "Polyandry in Kota Society," on the near neighbors of the Toda. Mandelbaum writes:

The Kotas of the Nilgiri Hills in South India are not polyandrous in the strict sense of the term. A woman may have but one husband and can acquire another only by divorce from or after the death of her previous spouse. What Kota polyandry amounts to is that the man's brothers have free sexual access to his wife, and when a man is ill or incapacitated or in any way unable to fill his husbandly duties, then his brothers take his place. The brothers are, in effect, secondary husbands.³²

Mandelbaum says that to such substitute-spouse relationships the Kotas have added, as have recently the Todas, forms of polygyny. In both groups the father is defined as sociological father, and Mandelbaum informs us that "the Todas have a form of polyandry similar to that of the Kotas."³³ The reason for Kota substitute-spouse relationships is phrased as the "absolute economic equality among a group of brothers who live together. . . . The essential economic solidarity of the fraternal group is maintained even though the brothers no longer pool the proceeds of their work."³⁴ Although this explanation accounts very well for what Mandelbaum calls "the equivalence of brothers" in Kota society, a supplementary explanation is needed to show why there exists here this insistence upon fulfilling female sex-

ual desires when a man is "ill or incapacitated or in any way unable to fill his husbandly duties." Though perhaps all too obvious, it is reasonable to suppose, nevertheless, that there are attitudes among the Kota concerning female sexuality quite different from the ones which prevailed in western European society from feudal times down to the present. And, in this case, as with the Toda, it would seem that the sexual role of women represents the dynamic aspect, to paraphrase Linton, of a favorable status.

Apparently throughout this Asiatic region which furnished McLennan with his polyandry category, multiple mating practices include the substitute-for-spouse relationship of the Kota (called "not polyandrous in the strict sense" by Mandelbaum), the seriatim unions marital or otherwise among the Toda (called by Mandelbaum "similar to the Kotas" and described by Rivers himself as the fraternal sharing of one brother's wife, relatively brittle and impermanent), and the Nair example (recorded as *cicisbeism* by Rivers and, more recently, by K. Pannikkar). That the correlations between these practices and lack of effective economic surplus impress one as being anything but fortuitous is shown by Linton for the Tibetan region, to which we briefly turn.

NOTE ON TIBET (AFTER LINTON)

In a striking demonstration of the relationship between economic conditions (property mores), on the one hand, and the regulation of marriage (marriage mores), on the other, Linton illustrates the famous Keller thesis in reference to Tibet. It should be noted, in addition, that much light is thrown on the favorable status of women as well:

In Tibet all arable land has long since passed into family holdings. Many of these

³² *American Anthropologist*, XL (new ser., 1938), 574 ff.

³³ *Ibid.*, p. 583.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 576-77.

holdings have become so small that they barely suffice to support a conjugal group and could not do so if they were further subdivided. It has become customary for one son from each family to go into religious life, thus relinquishing his claim on the family land. The other sons marry a single wife, work the family holding for the support of this woman and her children, and pass the holding on to the children intact. *In spite of female infanticide, the position of women is high. The wife usually takes charge of the finances of the family and may dominate her spouses.* That Tibetan polyandry is primarily due to hard economic conditions seems to be proved by the fact that it is characteristic only of the lower classes. Tibetans of higher economic status tend to be monogamous, while rich nobles are sometimes polygynous.³⁵

This form, then, is not universal throughout Tibetan society. It indicates, where it occurs in the economically depressed lower classes, a *relatively* favorable status for women—a position which they incidentally lose in the upper strata of Tibetan social classes. It is important to stress the relative nature of their status in the lower classes, since it is favorable only in relation to the highly disadvantageous social and economic position of the poorer males in this society. A second example of poor man's "polyandry," again limited solely to economically depressed men of the lower social strata, is found in the African example directly following. Here also "polyandry" is far from universal throughout the society but is rather a function in the limited number of cases occurring of a status for men inferior to the average "acceptable" status within the group.

NOTE ON THE WAHUMA; AFRICAN DATA
FROM NORTHERN NIGERIA

Among the Banyankole, a highly stratified kingdom of African Uganda, the Wahuma people are found to allow

the practice of poor man's "polyandry" among the very poor.³⁶ It is notable, however, that, whereas two or more clan brothers may pool their cows to pay the bride price and afterward insure the support of a single woman, the eldest brother is always the one who goes through the marriage ceremony to the exclusion of any other, and the children are considered his.³⁷

At the other end of the African continent, to the west and north, live tribes which, though not listed among the polyandrous, nevertheless are frequently mentioned as maintaining a high position of women and whose economic level is far from abundant. It would be strange, indeed, in the light of the general thesis of this paper, if they contained no practices similar to those already listed for the Asiatic continent. In the region referred to, however, in the northern provinces of Nigeria, a recognized system of wife abduction is institutionalized which, in its final results, bears resemblance both to multiple mating and to cicisbeism. In many of these tribes the equality of women in sexually and non-sexually related roles is a fact of prime importance. Thus in all the tribes mentioned below there is the strong suggestion of considerable freedom for women. In all the tribes, further, arrangements are first made with the married woman before attempting "abduction." In some tribes, like the Gwari, a woman "may have several husbands and families in different towns, living now with one, now with another, as she feels in-

³⁶ J. Roscoe, *The Banyankole* (Cambridge, 1923), pp. 123 ff. For an incisive description of political and economic pressures in this highly stratified society see *African Political Systems*, ed. Fortes and Evans-Pritchard (Oxford, 1941), chap. by K. Oberg.

³⁷ J. Roscoe, *The Northern Bantu* (Cambridge, 1915), p. 121.

³⁵ Linton, *op. cit.*, p. 183. (Italics mine.)

clined."³⁸ In other cases the limitations are somewhat more pronounced; as among the Teria, where "the runaway wife is allowed to live with her abductor for one year, and at the end of this time she must return."³⁹ Among the Jarawa, the first child born (to the "abductor") goes to the previous consort, the new husband retaining the succeeding ones.⁴⁰ That women insist upon wide sexual prerogatives in these instances is attested by Meek, who writes:

The theft of young wives from men who are getting old is especially frequent; but rather than lose the domestic services of his spouse an elderly man will often, as among the Jarawa give a young man free access to his compound, and he will, of course, have a full claim on any children which result.⁴¹

Warji women exercise free sex choice after marriage until the birth of a first child. Malabu women who have not borne children may indulge in sexual experimentation extra-maritally; and, finally, certain groups of the Yoruba allow women wide sexual freedom within a compound, provided the freedom is kept well outside the limits of close consanguinity.⁴²

In general, it may be said that the Asiatic and African data on customs of this sort leave something to be desired concerning the historic growth of multiple mating practices. There can be no doubt, however, that the similarities noted in multiple mating practices in Asia and Africa cannot be laid to unitary historical connection in all instances.⁴³

³⁸ C. K. Meek, *The Northern Tribes of Nigeria* (Oxford, 1925), pp. 197-98.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 199.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, p. 199.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 198.

⁴² *Ibid.*, p. 200.

⁴³ This caution of considering the matter of historic connection is voiced by F. Boas, "Anthropol-

When we expand our data beyond these continents to widely scattered areas in the South Pacific and America, as we do below, there is distinct evidence of lack of historic connection between the areas in which similarities in multiple mating practices obtain. To be sure, similarities within a contiguous set of tribes (southern India or the Great Basin) may point to common historical roots. Where contact is absent, however, as between areas, and when distinct tribal histories are lost in the dead past, factors other than the historic must be examined.

AMERICAN DATA: PAWNEE, SHOSHONI
UTE, ETC.

The American data on customs of this sort have as poor documentation on the historic growth of multiple mating practices, their setting, and their context as have the Asiatic and African cases. The plethora of crudely denotative terms like "polyandry" and "polygyny" and the lack of more precise information as to what they mean in native thinking strongly suggest that our work in the field of marital (and extra-marital) regulation is still molded by the secure feeling that McLennan's mechanical classification is enough and that a mere recital of his antiquated terminology explains all. In this, the present author, as we shall see, in a brief and truncated description of the major contours of Ute culture (1940) made the conventional error of applying McLennan's term "polyandry" to certain Ute practices best described in a more discriminating fashion. It is not too late to make amends, however, and perhaps they should be made for other American societies.

ogy and Statistics," in *The Social Sciences: Their Interrelations*, ed. Ogburn and Goldenweiser (1927), p. 120.

At any rate, a paper by Lesser on "Levirate and Fraternal Polyandry among the Pawnees" briefly indicates that mating is allowable among the Pawnee between a man and his older brother's wife and also between two brothers and two sisters.⁴⁴ Lesser states, further, that, theoretically at least, all sisters are viewed as possible co-wives of the eldest. However, the actual relationship to be followed is decided at the time of marriage.

The Shoshoni data on polyandry are more complete, if not clearer, and they suggest, I think unmistakably, that multiple mating is probably a temporary or makeshift arrangement made possible in large measure through the high status of women generally in their society. Steward, in writing on the subject, tells us first that among them "woman's gathering of piñon nuts and other wild seeds was every bit as important as man's hunting," perhaps even more so.⁴⁵ Elsewhere he states that equal status was achieved within the family for either sex because of the simplicity of social structure—that neither sex was dominant as a consequence.⁴⁶ The polyandry possible as a result is called fraternal; but it is also deemed a function of the family contract nature of marriage, seen in the prevalence of sororate, levirate, and preferred cross-cousin marriage.⁴⁷ Thus, a widower married his deceased wife's sister, and sororal polygyny is said to have occurred; or a widow married her deceased husband's

brother, and fraternal polyandry is said to be associated. The further statement of Steward, that group marriage is unknown, suggests as a matter of emphasis that fraternal polyandry of the above type is really a fixed marital form and not an impermanent multiple mating practice, however conditioned by egalitarianism for both sexes in respect to statuses extended to sexual roles. As proof, Steward mentions the permanency of these unions. Nevertheless, on the same page,⁴⁸ he is good enough to quote for us his Diamond Valley Shoshoni informant who "was convinced that in all polyandrous marriages, one husband was always away hunting." Surely, the length of time consumed in a hunting expedition, or a series of them, hardly argues for the permanency of such unions. Likewise in documentation, we are told of the Bannock case where each of the so-called "husbands" eventually married a different woman.⁴⁹ This again is hardly a shining example of a stable conjugal group in the process of formation, nor does it fit easily into the fixed classification which McLennan hedged about with "contract, public opinion, custom and law." Despite striking evidence of the relatively privileged position of woman in Shoshoni and other related tribes, and its ultimate extension to their sexual roles, Steward concludes that these practices, which seem common enough, are due largely to the frequent lack of jealousy on the part of the male and to his comparative unimportance.⁵⁰ Why feelings of jealousy appear to be lacking (or are repressed) must be a function, as Steward clearly states in the final analysis, of the position of woman in Shoshoni

⁴⁴ A. Lesser, *Man*, XXX (June, 1930), 98-101.

⁴⁵ J. H. Steward, "Shoshoni Polyandry," *American Anthropologist*, XXXVIII (new ser., 1936), 561.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 562; cf. the equality of sex status within the family among the linguistically related Hopi, in G. P. Murdock, *Our Primitive Contemporaries* (1934), p. 344; here the social structure is not so simple.

⁴⁷ Steward, *op. cit.*, p. 562.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 563.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 564.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*

society. The difficulty, obviously, is with McLennan's classification, which overlooks this important factor, tacitly assuming that sexual role is a moral problem in society rather than one linked, as in Linton's definition, with status. If a role represents the dynamic aspect of a status, the mystery is solved and recourse to mechanical definitions becomes useless.

In comparative notes on "Paviotso Polyandry,"⁵¹ W. Z. Park adduces data generally in agreement with Stewart's. The recorded cases, however, always involved brothers and never more than two; the group lived matrilocally.⁵² While Park insists that there is no evidence of one husband's being absent from home, the custom is not in his findings of common occurrence and is hardly the prevailing mode of marriage.⁵³ Data on "Northern Paiute Polyandry" by O. C. Stewart include the custom for only five of eleven northern Paiute bands on the basis of trait listing, with only one reference to a nonfraternal case.⁵⁴ In the main, Stewart agrees with the Shoshoni material and its interpretation to the effect that simplicity of social structure makes the relationship of both sexes to plural marriage almost identical.⁵⁵ What is meant by this simplicity is not clarified, but it is the belief of the author that difficult economic conditions (noted by Linton), scarcity of effective resources, bilateral family organization, and parity between the sexes will be found in association in more than one society. While it is plain that polyandry is not permitted in more Northern Paiute bands than allow it, a

further question is: How prevalent is this form among bands which permit it? In his *Culture Element Distributions*, Volume XVIII: *Ute and Southern Paiute*, O. C. Stewart finds polyandry permitted aboriginally in only two of a dozen-odd bands, while a note in the Northern Paiute *Records* quotes an informant: "In the old days people would not allow a woman two husbands at once."⁵⁶ That parity between the sexes in status will find expression, in some cases, in multiple mating is at least attested by the Ute data which follow, and which, I submit, are possibly similar to the Shoshonean-speaking cases recorded above.⁵⁷

In a previous publication on the Ute, the author stated:

The levirate and sororate both functioned at the death of a spouse in cases where a son-in-law or daughter-in-law was so well-liked, usually by reason of his hunting prowess or her industry at women's tasks, that the parents-in-law sought to keep them close to their camp. If remarriage to an affinal were not effected some time after the death of a spouse, however, the affinal ties dissolved completely. . . . In general, polygamy was rare because of the limitations of economy, and polyandry, except of the adulterous variety, was out of the question.

In marrying a woman who had a mature daughter, the husband often took his stepdaughter as a second wife providing she was in no way related to himself. Of all the relatively rare forms of polygamy, the sororate and mother-stepdaughter marriage were the most common.⁵⁸

While the general emphases of this discussion are correct, the purposes of the

⁵⁶ *Anthropological Records* (University of California), VI, No. 4 (1942), 296; *ibid.*, IV, No. 3 (1941), 439. Note, also, Stewart, *ibid.*, IV, No. 2 (1941), 311, in which polyandry is disallowed or uncertain in more Shoshoni bands than permit it.

⁵⁷ Data on Ute secured in two field trips (1936, 1937) under auspices of Columbia University.

⁵⁸ M. K. Opler, "The Southern Ute of Colorado," in *Acculturation in Seven American Indian Tribes*, ed. Ralph Linton (1940), pp. 151-52, 198.

⁵¹ *American Anthropologist*, XXXIX (new ser., 1937), pp. 366-68.

⁵² *Ibid.*, p. 366.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, pp. 367-68.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 368-69.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 368.

present inquiry require further amplification of Ute mating practices and marital attitudes.

To begin with, while monogamy was the ideal and usual form of marriage, both mating within the sororate and customs akin to those recorded in the literature as Shoshoni or Toda "polyandry" did exist. Their occurrence was rare, however, and they were regarded as breaches of strictly monogamic practice. Nevertheless, a word of caution must be added. It is doubtful, as a matter of fact, whether it is proper to speak at all of strictly monogamic practice in the western European sense. In the first place, the Ute stand squarely with the bulk of nonliterate societies in permitting, or at least tolerating, premarital sex relations. As regards postmarital relations, the freedom was almost as great. Since a woman, on her husband's death, conceivably might choose to marry the deceased man's brother, it was thought proper for her to look upon younger unmarried brothers as substitute spouses for sexual purposes in much the manner of Mandelbaum's Kota, Rivers' Nair cicisbei or Steward's Diamond Valley informant. Where a choice was possible between two eligible brothers of the socially recognized husband, it was customary for the woman to choose the one whose age and social characteristics most closely approximated those of the absent husband, though this rule was not always honored. Similarly, where choices between two surviving brothers of the deceased were made, the social injunction for the widow was ordinarily to marry the next in age, if she remained in patrilocal residence. More than a few informants added that emotional and social factors entered the picture in the individual case and that the choice was made in the final analysis by the woman herself

in accord with her likes, dislikes, and desires. A widow or widower young in years frequently remarried soon; the social phrasing had it that it was unhealthy, an open invitation to ghost sickness, to pine and mourn over a deceased spouse. According to two informants, instances of protracted, hopeless illness in a young woman's husband actually led to overlapping marriages with a younger, eligible brother; another consequence could be divorce and a clean break with the affinals. As Murdock has noted, the place of marital residence was also important. Thus, in cases where the woman was an industrious provider and had set up residence patrilocally, this particular Shoshonean pattern was more easily adopted.

It must be emphasized, however, that, while marriage to a deceased husband's brother was socially recognized as real marriage, the substitute-spouse relationship, though culturally sanctioned, was regarded as a form of cicisbeism. Substitute spouses did not integrate into the nuclear family in prestige, in ceremony, or in kinship; they were called by the term for in-law, not for spouse. The Ute recognized marriage to a deceased husband's brother, on the contrary, as a real union, a form of monogamic union, albeit one of a series (*seriatim*). The substitute-spouse relationship, which we earlier called "polyandry of the adulterous variety," was, then, not true polyandry but adultery allowed between siblings-in-law of opposite sex—a condition permitted more often than forbidden in nonliterate societies. The trial-marriage (*piwan'napun*) procedure through which more durable unions were effected has already been described by the author,⁵⁹ and the initial matrilineal residence, followed by alter-

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 149, 147.

nating (matrilocal *and* patrilocal) or optional (matrilocal *or* patrilocal) or independent residence, included the possibility of sexual choices within either levirate or sororate, as the case might be. The consequences, previously described in ethnographic shorthand as "polyandry" or "polygyny," are both better discussed as cicisbeism or concubinage of younger siblings-in-law. Since the Ute, further, lacked our legalistic concept of adultery as regards siblings-in-law, it is as wrong to apply the McLennan classification of "polyandrous marriage" to such unions as to view them as acts of immorality. The Ute have their own culturally phrased classification: non-marital multiple mating.

Determining sociological fatherhood in the Toda sense was complicated for the Ute by a crudely realistic notion of physiological paternity. Following the idea of the male potency's building up the embryo gradually, the Ute thought dual fatherhood was physically possible. The fact that close siblings (brothers or sisters) were of the same "blood" furnished a convenient rationalization for the sibling-in-law, substitute-spouse relationships. At least, informants agreed, close adultery could not disturb the physical or bodily symmetry of the resulting infant's physique. One of the best arguments against adultery outside the sibling-in-law relationship (for women) was the probability of bearing a child with malformed limbs or disharmonic bodily proportions. Deformities in children were laid not only to the carelessness of a woman about to give birth but to continual lack of prudence in postmarital life. While an occasional slip might be condoned, monogamy was clearly the ideal and sibling-in-law liaisons the permissible exception. And, since initial residence for newlyweds was usually matrilocal,

even the adulterous variety of substitute-spouse relationship was not feasible for a time. So much for biological paternity.⁶⁰

Sociological paternity was determined by relationships of a more strictly cultural nature, the social father being the one most important in feeding, cherishing, and training the child. Within the nuclear family, then, the one who regarded the child as a social and economic investment laid against old age and infirmity, and who received reciprocally the respect and affection growing out of the child-caring function, was the one honored by the kinship term for male parent. Since elder siblings were dominant in both economic and social affairs, only the intrusion of psychological repulsion upset the balance in favor of a substitute spouse in this mildly gerontocratic culture.⁶¹ Thus, both sororate and levirate were of the junior type; conceivably, the elder sibling rights made dual mating practices burdensome for younger siblings, and few individuals willingly suffered for long a subordinate position in household arrangements. Because marriage, in this gerontocracy, was one of the few ways a relative degree of independence was achieved, younger siblings were glad to see the makeshift plural relationships supplanted by monogamic unions of their own choosing. Polygamous patterns were temporary; sororates occurred more frequently than levirates because of initial matrilocal residence; substitute-spouse relationships easily dissolved; and mother-stepdaughter marriage, so called, soon terminated in the separate matrimony, this time real, of the young woman. It is important to note in this connection that Harris' data on the White

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, cf. pp. 133-34; see pp. 150, 153 (bottom).

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 129 ff.

Knife Shoshoni of Nevada are, so far as here described, strictly comparable.⁶²

The customs just described for a Great Basin people are obviously (1) seriatim unions, monogamic as concerns the stable conjugal group, and not dissimilar to occasional junior levirate and junior sororate marriages in our own society; and (2) sibling-in-law concubinage or cicisbeism. The latter form among the Ute is imbedded in a pattern which roughly equates age and authority, and which usually stabilizes in monogamic unions for all concerned. So far as the Ute data are concerned, and, I think, the bulk of the Great Basin material as well, there is little or no grist for McLennan's mill. Actually, fraternal marriages appear to be seriatim, marriage to one brother at a time. Informants who reported having heard of two brothers from one lineage mating with two sisters from another in trial marriage, or *piwan'napun*, insisted with greater vigor that such relationships inevitably proved temporary and were allowed only because of the extreme isolation of some family camps in aboriginal times, the distances limiting sexual choice. In such multiple matings, concubinage, or cicisbeism, the elder sibling retained dominance. The obvious implication in cicisbeism, according to informants, was not the nonexistence of male jealousy, since nonsibling adultery frequently led to murder.⁶³ Nor could one invoke here "the unimportance of the male" as a causal factor. Rather, since younger male siblings-in-law were subordinate in household arrangements, we have indirect proof of women being allowed as

wide sex choice as men, a condition of parity between the sexes exemplified in more general terms by the equality of status of Ute women, the equality of the sexes in divorce,⁶⁴ or the rule, for example, that no one might dispose of a spouse's property without prior consent.⁶⁵ As a matter of fact, the married woman in the patrilocal household could prevent any undesired imposition of will in sexual matters simply by returning alone to the family in which she had been reared—in Lloyd Warner's term, the family of orientation. In so doing, she carried along any property which represented the fruits of her labor, thus imposing hardship on the camp.⁶⁶ The fact of importance here is that there is no fraternal polyandry evidenced in McLennan's sense of fixed marital type and that genuine doubt is thrown on the occurrence of real polygyny. The criteria for marriage appear to be, first, its permanence and, second, the integration of the spouse into the nuclear family of parents and children.

THE MARQUESANS: AN EXCEPTION TO THE RULE

True polyandry, as distinct from non-marital forms of multiple mating, has been reported for the Marquesans, a Polynesian people of the central Pacific, by Linton in the volume entitled *The Individual and His Society*.⁶⁷ Here the polyandrous marriages are as stable as any other kind, the striking facts being a male-female ratio of two and a half to one, coupled with an unusually high

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 151-52.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 135.

⁶² J. S. Harris, in *Acculturation in Seven American Indian Tribes*, ed. Linton, chap. ii; see pp. 49-51.

⁶³ Opler, in *Acculturation in Seven American Indian Tribes*, ed. Linton, p. 152.

⁶⁶ Cf. R. Benedict, "Marital Property Rights in Bilateral Society," *American Anthropologist*, XXXVIII (new ser., 1936), and R. H. Lowie, *Primitive Society* (1920), p. 244.

⁶⁷ Ed. A. Kardiner (New York: Columbia University Press, 1939), pp. 137-96.

status for women. Of this position, Linton writes:

The effective power lay in the hands of the woman, since . . . she controlled not only the head husband but all the subsidiary husbands. In the ordinary household, where the head had simply picked a woman without formal ritual or gift exchange, she could leave at any time she wished. . . . The woman who was herself the eldest child had a most enviable position. She owned the establishment and ruled openly, calling husbands at will and dismissing them if they displeased her. The head husband in such cases was merely the wife's deputy, who ordered the household according to her wish and direction.⁶⁸

In addition, the inspirational priests, high in the social scale, could be women.⁶⁹ Pregnant women could subject men of the household to taboos;⁷⁰ and girls as well as boys were recognized leaders of the children's gangs.⁷¹ Finally, there were numerous cases of women who became hereditary family heads.⁷² In fact, social rank was determined by primogeniture, irrespective of sex.⁷³ The total association of marital form, sexual role, and sex status is strikingly clear.

Among these people, we learn, difficult economic conditions are common. From the narrow valleys sloping down abruptly into the sea, fishing was difficult and dangerous. The islands, subjected periodically to long and destructive droughts, experienced serious crop failures, water shortages, epidemics of hunger cannibalism, and sieges of starvation. In general, agriculture was difficult because of the steeply sloping terrain, taro and yams were unimportant, and the great dependence was on tree crops—breadfruit, coconuts, and bananas.⁷⁴

As concerns polyandry, the relative stability of the household has already

been noted. In terms of the integration of the various spouses of the same sex, Linton reports a main husband and subsidiary husbands, the latter being younger sons of lower rank attached in various households, thus excluding the possibility of fraternal polyandry; and younger sons could secede, leaving one household to join themselves to another.⁷⁵ Thus, a single household might contain as many as two or three adult males to one female, and well-to-do households might add one or two women to the establishment "some years after the initial marriage of the household head" in order to build up both its manpower and its prestige. It is important to note in this connection that the household is distinguished from the family.⁷⁶

THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE DATA

What is striking in the above material is not simply the dearth of polyandrous examples and the revision, in minor detail, of McLennan's classification which they on closer scrutiny seem to demand. More important, the data suggest that woman's social status and the sexual role accorded her in society are related facts which find perhaps their clearest expression in common in the rules and attitudes governing marital and extra-marital relations. Moreover, to paraphrase Dr. Simmons, the status of woman appears to be influenced by maintenance mores and the family organization, her position relatively high in societies lacking effective surpluses, and in such cases frequently on a plane of parity with men. If, indeed, we follow Linton's definition of marriage as universally providing "a stable foundation for the creation and organization of the conjugal group,"⁷⁷ it

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 158.

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 160.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 162.

⁷¹ *Ibid.*, p. 167.

⁷² *Ibid.*, p. 154.

⁷³ *Ibid.*, p. 150.

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 138-39.

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 155-56.

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 152.

⁷⁷ *The Study of Man*, p. 173.

becomes clear that there is little evidence of fixed and durable forms of polyandry among a good many peoples classified under this heading and much evidence that nonmarital forms of multiple mating obtain. In the sense, then, that polygamy refers to a marital form and not to an impermanent sexual attachment, it may be defined initially as connoting two or more individual biological families of parents and children actually unified or affiliated through a plural marriage. Among the Ute, for example, the functioning family is neither polyandrous nor polygynous in the strict sense of these terms but is rather the individual biological family. Where more than one nuclear family function as a unit, as in the extended family, the unification is achieved through parent-child relationships rather than by plural marriage.

It appears, therefore, that the marital relationship among many nonliterate people is not based solely on the exclusiveness of the sexual privilege. The existence of sexual freedom, premaritally, and laxity in some instances postmaritally, is enough to dispute the usual contention that sex is the single, central factor of marriage. Additional factors in the spouse relationship may be such things as economic convenience, achieved through a sexual division of labor, love of children, and the desire for personal as well as sexual companionship. At any rate, such interests figure in matrimony among the Ute. In regard to residence, the spouse not moving will have the advantage of remaining in a familiar setting with the family of orientation; but the spouse moving will have the advantage of wider sexual choices.

Finally, it should be noted that, despite its frequent mention as a form of marriage, polyandry has been reported as the norm throughout society for only two peoples—the Toda and the Marque-

sans. Even among the Toda, according to Rivers, it is doubtful whether the cases of a nonfraternal type "should be regarded as polyandry at all." And, according to Mandelbaum, who reports the similarity of Kota and Toda polyandry, it is questionable whether the Kota are "polyandrous in the strict sense of the term." The question, then, is whether polyandry has not frequently been confused with nonmarital forms of multiple mating for women in societies where their social or economic position is such that wider sexual choice is allowed or condoned, extra-maritally, than is the case generally in western European society. Only in the case of the Marquesans would it seem that polyandry almost universally throughout the society unifies two or more individual families of parents and children through a plural marriage.

The implications of these data would have limited reference were it not possible to make certain parallel suggestions in regard to the study of polygyny. It is the author's belief that polygyny, while undoubtedly more widespread than polyandry, may likewise in many instances hitherto classified or pigeonholed in typical McLennan fashion, prove to be a highly impermanent multiple mating practice and not real marriage in the sense of unifying two or more families of parents and children. Again, it could be noted that in certain societies, Ute included, where economic and social parity exists as between the sexes, multiple mating is allowed equally for both the married man and the married woman, albeit often on a temporary basis. In other examples of polygyny, as in Linton's (quoted above) of the rich nobles of Tibet, true polygyny in the sense of stable marriage actually does exist. The key to the difference between polygamy and multi-

ple mating which is not marriage is found in Linton's definition of the latter:

It [marriage] differs from nonmarital sexual relationships primarily through this factor of social recognition and through the increased duration in time which such recognition assumes. It derives its importance as a social institution from the fact that it provides a stable foundation for the creation and organization of a conjugal group. Its intrinsic functions of providing for the sexual needs of the partners and through these for the production of offspring are secondary to this.⁷⁸

If Linton's definition of marriage is correct, and if it may be applied in distinguishing between true polygyny and nonmarital multiple mating for men, certain other facts may be eventually deduced. Certainly, polygyny, if it has been confused with multiple mating as consistently as polyandry, will be found to have little correlation with an inferior status of woman in society, or will not, as Linton puts it, "necessarily imply a high degree of male dominance in the marriage relationship."⁷⁹ On the other hand, if polygyny refers only to a marital form of fair duration, employed to create, stabilize, and organize a conjugal grouping, the above correlation may be considerably stronger. The Tibetans of wealth and nobility are a case in point, where polygyny in the upper classes only marks a relatively inferior position for women in this social stratum. Indeed, Lowie in 1920 noted the parity of status between the sexes in the very simplest hunting communities, an egalitarianism which incidentally, he pointed out, did "not hold for most of the higher primitive levels."⁸⁰ Simmons found woman's position highest among collectors, hunters, and fishers, intermediate in agricultural societies, and lowest among herders.⁸¹ It is hardly

surprising to learn that this status, where it has emerged historically, is linked notably to sexual role, since the latter is one possible dynamic aspect of the former. The bearing of this view upon Professor Murdock's statement that "by and large simpler cultures tend to be matrilineal, more advanced ones patrilineal" is obvious. If it is true that "marriage mores and property mores march together," sex status will be reflected more often than not, in either category.

The data are suggestive for the field worker as well. Many ethnologists (the author included) have been unduly influenced by the neatness and apparent logic of the McLennan classification and have, consequently, failed to distinguish sharply between truly polygamous situations (real plural marriages) and extra-marital multiple mating, socially sanctioned. If this is true, the exact patterning of traits having to do with marital and nonmarital mating practices deserves more attention in ethnological reporting than a mere repetition of McLennan's simplistic terminology allows. For if role and status are connected in these aspects of culture, as in others, both must be investigated in their meaningful setting. The professional anthropologist will recognize, in addition to the distinction between plural marriage and multiple mating, two further points involved in the question of multiple unions. One is the criterion of permanence or stability in multiple matings; the other the question in polygamous marriages of the degree of equality between the various spouses of the same sex. In polygyny, for example, or in the case of Marquesan polyandry, frequently a principal spouse is present among those of the sex entering plurally into the union. The question is whether more than one spouse integrates markedly into the household in terms of prestige and fam-

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 184.

⁸⁰ *Primitive Society*, p. 201. ⁸¹ *Op. cit.*

ily functions, unifying more than one nuclear family through a plural marriage. In the Marquesan case, they do; in other situations noted above they do not. When once this distinction is made, it may be found to relate to the status and role of the sexes. To quote Professor Murdock:

The sociological school refuses to accept the dictum that cultures are mere congeries of traits assembled by the historical accidents of invention and diffusion, and it regards the repudiation of general laws or principles in the social sphere as probably unjustified and certainly premature. It prefers to assume that there is operative in cultures a tendency toward integration, a strain toward consistency. . . .⁸²

It is the author's belief, in common with the bulk of current sociological opinion, that varieties of family life and intersexual attitudes will be found in close relationship to woman's status in society, and often to her place in economic arrangements.

At any rate, we are back, after sixty-five years, to the modest contention of Morgan's *Ancient Society*, where the answer was given concerning McLennan's book on *Primitive Marriage*, and the latter's heavy emphasis on polyandry as a form of marriage. Morgan wrote: "There is no evidence of the general prevalence of Nair and Tibetan polyandry."⁸³ We are back, also, to a basic

⁸² "Correlations of . . . Institutions," *op. cit.*, p. 450.

⁸³ L. H. Morgan, *Ancient Society* (1877), p. 525. While Morgan likewise failed to distinguish between plural marriage and nonmarital multiple mating consistently, he realized the import of woman's status in regard both to marital form and to social organization, e.g., pp. 481 ff., in the Kerr edition of *Ancient Society*. As Professor Lowie notes in his *History of Ethnological Theory* (1937), Morgan repelled "McLennan's notion of polyandry as a generally significant social phenomenon." It might be well to add that Morgan dispelled such notions in favor of a more socially significant view of the relation between intersexual conduct and social organization.

tenet of current sociological thought, namely, that the social and economic position of women is fundamental in determining their status as a group in society generally, and in particular their place in marital and family relationships. Such knowledge, if demonstrated more broadly in anthropological thinking, as it has already been in its sociological counterpart, will not only make us mindful in field work of subtle distinctions between real marriage and nonmarital sexual relationships. In the long run, it should aid in bringing society beyond such neat rationalizations of social living as occur, for example, in the Code Napoléon, picturing monogamy in the distorted and ludicrous sense of a social fiction, legalized for the sole purpose, it would seem, of providing a fixed channel for the passage of property: "L'enfant conçu pendant le mariage a pour père le mari."⁸⁴

In the total study of marriage and the family, surely the contribution of anthropology will be a sharper sense of historical realism than is found either in the mechanical code or in the vulgar legalization of McLennan. In much the same sense those who relate marital form and sexual ethos solely to economic factors will be found equally guilty of having left out of account in social patterns a vivid and living reality, everywhere institutionalized and more or less integrated—the position of women in society.

REED COLLEGE

W. H. R. Rivers in his *Kinship and Social Organization* (London, 1914), after sympathetically describing the attack on Morgan's point of view, sides with the latter in stressing the close association of privileges, duties, and restrictions with social organization (pp. 6-10).

⁸⁴ "The child's father is defined as the mother's husband" (Art. 312).

COMMENT

This paper by Marvin K. Opler is a real contribution to our understanding of the forms of marriage and of the family in human societies. Particularly valuable are: (1) his re-examination of McLennan's classification of the three forms of marriage, polygyny, polyandry, and monogamy; (2) his demonstration through a critical review of alleged cases of polyandry of their divergencies from the rigid juridical type as defined by McLennan; and (3) his evidence for the scarcity of polyandrous marriage as against McLennan's assumption of its widespread prevalence.

The central thesis of the paper, however, appears to the writer to be unproved upon the basis of the evidence presented. Indorsing Linton's explanation that "population limitation on the female side and economic scarcity are conducive to customs akin to polyandry," Opler advances the hypothesis that "the social recognition and sanction of multiple mating for women must further be associated with such social and economic conditions as promote an at least egalitarian position of women, in societies where their favorable status is extended into the realm of sexual conduct, and where society permits the occasions when multiple choices are made by them."

First, in nearly all the cases examined of polyandrous behavior the evidence he presents for "an at least egalitarian position for women" appears doubtful except for the lower classes in Tibet and for the Marquesans. These two societies, however, are probably the only examples of polyandrous marriage in the McLennan sense and so will be dealt with later.

There remain nine groups with polyandrous practices surveyed in this paper (Nair, Toda, Kota, Wahuma, Pawnee, Shoshoni, Paviotso, Northern Paiute, and Ute). In four of these (Wahuma, Pawnee, Paviotso, and Northern Paiute) no data are given on the economic and social status of women. In only one (Shoshoni) of the remaining five peoples is there any direct evidence of woman's equality in social status with man. A quotation is cited from Steward that "woman's gathering of pinon nuts and wild seeds was every bit as important as man's hunting" and Opler adds "perhaps even more so." Opler does admit that Steward attrib-

utes the equality of status of either sex to the simplicity of social structure. Among the Utes the evidence of parity between the sexes consists of citing the equality of the sexes in divorce and the rule that no one might dispose of a spouse's property without prior consent. In the remaining three cases Opler has to rely upon his own inferences or upon circular reasoning from the fact of multiple mating to the assumed equalitarian status of woman. Among the Nair "there are indications . . . of at least an egalitarian position for women." Admitting that there are "little data on the social and economic position of the Toda woman," he implies a high status for her from statements by Rivers that the sexes are "on the best of terms" and that women are not "treated harshly or contemptuously." With the Kotas a passage from Mandelbaum of the custom of a brother substituting for a husband who is ill or incapacitated is relied upon as evidence for woman's favorable status.

If the data presented do not clearly support an egalitarian status for women, neither do they offer much evidence for a favorable status for them "extended into the realm of sexual conduct." Polyandrous practices appear in all but two of the nine societies to be restricted to brothers of the husband. (Among the Nair, where the evidence on polyandrous practices is conflicting, women consort after marriage with men who need not be related to each other.) The outstanding exception is for the Todas. From the evidence marshaled by Opler, this would seem to be the one instance where "society permits the occasions when multiple choices are made by them." He concludes: "the facts suggest a series of seriatim unions in which women . . . exercise wide sexual choices in addition to indulging in multiple mating practices." The fact that the Todas are an exceptional case would suggest further research to determine the particular combination of circumstances that produced this apparently unique outcome in marital and sexual relationships.

Since fraternal polyandrous mating characterizes all these nine peoples (existing as one of the forms of mating among the Todas) and is restricted to brothers in all cases but those of

the Todas and the Nair, it suggests a clue that should be followed up in further research. Given difficult economic conditions and resulting infanticide, the sharing of a wife by a group of brothers would seem a rather mutually satisfactory arrangement. In this situation it seems more appropriate to speak of the rights or the opportunity of the younger brothers of access to the wife of the oldest brother rather than of the freedom of sexual choice of the woman. Certainly there is no need to invoke an egalitarian status of woman in the economic field as an explanation of an arrangement that is limited to fraternal polyandrous mating. At the same time, there may doubtless be an enhancement of her status due to the disproportion of the sexes.

There remains for comment the marital behavior of the Tibetans of lower social strata and the Marquesans. These alone closely approximate the classical conception of polyandry as set forth by McLennan, the former of the fraternal and the latter of the nonfraternal variety. In both cases two or more husbands are married to one wife, establishing a single conjugal group maintained in the interest of the wife's children. Both with the Tibetans and with the Marquesans the status of women is unquestionably high. It is not doubtful or inferred as in practically all the other cases. Perhaps a relatively high status for women is not achieved except where polyandrous practices are integrated into a stable conjugal group.

Finally, it would be a misfortune from the standpoint of research to abandon entirely McLennan's classical differentiation of the three forms of human marriage. It is true that his classification was juridical and absolute and as such hampered rather than advanced research. His classification needs to be reoriented in terms of "ideal types" of marriage in accordance with the methodology of Max Weber. The ideal type functions in research as a construct for the purpose of analyzing behavior. Accordingly, by abstracting from the variety of the concrete reality one, two, or more significant elements, an ideal construction is created which

is uncomplicated by the influence of the other elements. Applied to marriage as a permanent union and abstracting sex and number of spouses, three ideal types can be conceived: monogamy, or the permanent union of one man and one woman; polygyny, or the permanent union of one man and two or more women; and polyandry, or the permanent union of one woman and two or more men.

The value of the ideal type is its use as an instrument of analysis and measurement. It should not be applied arbitrarily to concrete behavior but rather with insight and with discrimination. Accordingly, the validity of the ideal type does not depend upon the discovery in nature of any identity with it or even close approximation to it but rather upon the success achieved in defining and measuring phenomena by it.

Interestingly, however, the ideal type of polyandry does have two close approximations, one in the fraternal form with the lower strata of Tibetans, the other in the nonfraternal form with the Marquesans. Furthermore, polyandrous practices are found with a few other peoples where they are not incorporated into a stable conjugal group but, characteristically, this is only of the fraternal type.

The Todas constitute also, perhaps, a unique approximation of an ideal type of a wide variety of marital and sexual practices which are sanctioned for both sexes by society.

The existence among preliterate peoples, even if in relatively isolated instances, of classical polyandry, of approved polyandrous practices, and of something akin to socially sanctioned promiscuity demonstrates a variability in human marriage and mating customs almost as extreme as conceivable by the ideal-type theory. This is proof of the degree to which widely different economic and social situations can shape the form of an institution so bound up with human nature as marriage and the family.

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SPATIAL ASPECT OF THE DIFFERENTIAL BIRTH RATE

HENRY ALLEN BULLOCK

ABSTRACT

Owing to the availability of birth and population data, it was possible to study the variation of standardized rates of birth per 1,000 women aged fifteen to forty-four in a metropolitan city and to determine the extent to which specific socioeconomic variables were associated with this variation. Through the use of a mapping technique, spatial variation was tested; through the use of zero order, partial and multiple correlations, a test was made of the association of birth rates and specific socioeconomic variables. In general, it was found that births increase in rate with an increase in miles from the center of the city; that, although this pattern of increase occurred, its gradiency was not so regular as has been shown by the use of other types of social phenomena in other studies. The degree of relationship as shown by correlating standardized birth rates and specific variables differed widely. There was a negative association of these rates and the socioeconomic variables of (a) per cent women fourteen years of age and over employed, (b) per cent professional workers, (c) per cent white-collar workers, (d) median educational level, and (e) median rental rates. There was a positive association of birth rates and (f) per cent workers as craftsmen and operatives and (g) per cent homeowners. However, tests showed per cent women employed and per cent professional workers as the most reliable variables associated with the phenomena of birth. Data concerning the distribution of married women were not available. Therefore, this factor could not be controlled.

The basis for a study of the spatial distribution of births in a metropolitan city has been laid by previous demographic and ecological researches. For some time sociologists who have turned their attention toward the analysis of the different rates at which people reproduce have concluded that such a difference in rate is based on the biological and socioeconomic characteristics of the population. To arrive at this conclusion some sociologists have been concerned with the rate of reproduction and sizes of families on relief. McCormick and Tibbitts showed that households on relief rolls are distinctly above average in size. They indicate that, compared with the general population, the relief group shows a considerably larger proportion of children in both rural and urban areas.¹ Popenoe and Williams concurred in part with this conclusion in their study of 504 families who had been dependent for years on public relief in Los Angeles County. They presented evidence to show that the longer the family is dependent

on charity, the more children it produces.²

Some of these investigators have extended their research to include fertility of people of different social classes. Lorimer and Osborn, after examining a variety of sources, concluded that net reproduction varies according to occupational classes, with professional, business, and clerical groups having the lowest rates.³ So numerous and conclusive have been researches concerning differential reproduction that the assumption of its existence is unquestioned.⁴

Simultaneously with these researches have occurred the works of those human ecologists who have been concerned with the spatial distribution of social phenomena. Taking as their point of departure

¹ Paul Popenoe and E. M. Williams, "Fecundity of Families Dependent on Public Charity," *American Journal of Sociology*, XL (September, 1934), 219.

² Frank Lorimer and Frederick Osborn, *Dynamics of Population* (New York: Macmillan Co., 1934), p. 74.

³ See F. W. Notestein, "The Differential Rate of Increase among Social Classes of the American Population," *Social Forces*, XII (October, 1933), 31; T. C. McCormick and Paul Glick, "Fertility Rates in Wisconsin," *American Journal of Sociology*, XLIV (1938), 401-7.

⁴ T. C. McCormick and Clark Tibbitts, "The Relief Situation," *American Journal of Sociology*, XL (May, 1935), 760.

the early view that the city is a complex of territorial divisions sufficiently distinct in cultural composition to represent natural areas, they have shown that social phenomena are distributed over the city according to definite spatial patterns responsive to these natural areas. They have been able to show, through this research technique, the importance of place of habitation in human life. Among many other phases of human association, they have shown that crime rates, marriage and divorce rates, illegitimacy rates, insanity rates, and the relations of social classes are functionally associated with place.⁵

INTRODUCTION

This research assumes the existence of differential fertility in community life and seeks to extend the list of researches that have shown the importance of place of habitation in community organization. Accessibility of birth-registration files in cities whose census returns have been made on a tract basis makes possible the investigation of differential birth rates of areas and classes by a direct rather than an indirect method. The main objects of this research are to find what differentials in rates of birth exist within a metropolitan city, to determine the spatial pattern these rates make when they are cast upon a city map, and to see how closely these rates are associated with the

social and economic conditions of the areas in which they occur.

In order to make this analysis, the city of Houston, Texas, was selected as a research site. A duplication of records of all births occurring in the city during 1941 was made from the registration files of the city health department. Births occurring in the city, but not to residents of the city, were discarded, and the others were assigned—by use of address of mother—to census tracts. Since the 1940 census returns for this city grouped the population and specific social and economic characteristics according to census tracts, it was possible to use the population of each tract as a base for computing tract birth rates.⁶ In this instance three types of birth rates were computed. The first rate was based on the number of births per 1,000 population; the second, on the number of births per 1,000 females aged fifteen to forty-four; and the third was a standardized rate based on the number of births per 1,000 females aged fifteen to forty-four where the population for each tract and females of each age group had been equalized and where standardization was based on five-year intervals. A map of the city showing census tracts within the limits was cross-hatched on the basis of rates of the second and third types so as to test the existence of a specific spatial pattern and to indicate the extent to which that pattern would persist when the factor of age was controlled. Correlations between the birth rate for each tract (tracts having 50 per cent or more Mexican or Negro population being omitted) as based on the standardized rate and specific social and economic variables were computed so as to determine how much this spatial

⁵ See C. R. Shaw *et al.*, *Delinquency Areas* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1929); J. H. Bos-sard, "Spatial Distribution of Divorced Women," *American Journal of Sociology*, XL (January, 1935), 503-7; "Ecological Areas and the Marriage Rate," *American Journal of Sociology*, XLIV (July, 1938), 70-85; E. F. Frazier, *The Negro Family in Chicago* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1932); R. E. Faris and H. W. Dunham, *Mental Disorders in Urban Areas* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1939); W. S. Thompson, "Some Factors Influencing the Ratios of Children to Women in American Cities," *American Journal of Sociology*, XLV (September, 1939), 183-98.

⁶ U.S. Census, *Population and Housing, Houston, Texas, 1940* (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1942).

pattern of births is associated with these socioeconomic aspects of city life.

SPATIAL DISTRIBUTION OF STANDARDIZED BIRTH RATES

During 1941 there were 7,420 births occurring to women residents in the city of Houston. This means a rate of 64 per 1,000 women aged fifteen to forty-four. The white rate was 66, and the Negro rate was 53. This differential in favor of whites was dependent upon the fact that 1940 population returns did not separate whites and Mexicans in their count. Because of the absence of a population base, it was necessary to mix the births of these two racial groups in computing a rate. Since the Mexican birth rate has been shown to be considerably higher than the white rate in Texas,⁷ it is reasonable to assume that the rate of the latter has been raised by the mixture of the two races sufficiently to place it above the Negro rate.

When these birth rates are distributed according to the fifty census tracts into which the city is divided, great variations may be observed. The number of births ranges from 52 in tract 44 to 318 in tract 9. The average is 148 births per tract. The standardized rates range from 32 per 1,000 females aged fifteen to forty-four in tract 32, near the central business district⁸ of the city, to 129 in tract 48, in the southeastern periphery of the city. The distribution of rates as shown by Map I, giving the distribution of standardized birth rates, indicates a definite spatial pattern. On the whole, the highest rates are characteristic of those tracts that are not immediately adjacent to the central business district of the city. However,


this pattern appears to be complicated by a low-rate belt cutting across the northern section of the city and a low-rate area extending southwest from the central business district.

In spite of this disturbance in gradience, there is still the tendency for higher rates to be clustered about the periphery of the city and for these rates to be progressively higher at greater distances

MAP I

SPATIAL DISTRIBUTION OF STANDARDIZED BIRTH RATES ACCORDING TO CENSUS TRACTS
HOUSTON, TEXAS, 1941

(Rate per 1,000 females aged 15-44)



from the city's center. This pattern was easily recognized when birth rates were computed for areas representing zones marked according to the number of miles from the central business district. Where mile zones of the city divided a tract, an estimate was made of the proportion of that tract included within a given zone. This proportion was further used to determine that part of the population of the tract that would be used as a base for computing a rate. Zone rates for the city as a whole are shown by Table 1.

Each of these types of rates shows an irregular tendency for the birth rate to

⁷ George W. Cox, *Biennial Report of Texas State Department of Health* (Austin, Tex., 1934-35).

⁸ The central business district covers the upper half of tract 26 and about two-thirds of tract 25.

increase as distance from the city's center increases. Such a pattern of gradiency suggests that the phenomenon of birth is not only biological in nature but also cultural and very definitely associated with the ecological distribution of the city's population, institutions, and functions. There is no doubt that the element of racial colonies is operating to disturb the gradiency of this pattern. Tracts 17 and 23, located near the center of the city, compose the main Mexican area of the city and thereby increase the rate at this

TABLE 1

CRUDE, SPECIFIC, AND STANDARDIZED BIRTH
RATES ACCORDING TO CITY ZONES
HOUSTON, TEXAS, 1941

Zones (In Miles)	Rate per 1,000 Popu- lation	Rate per 1,000 Females 15-44	Rate per 1,000 Fe- males 15-44 (Standard- ized)
I.....	19	58	57
II.....	17	62	54
III.....	18	53	52
IV.....	21	79	58
V.....	25	87	79
VI.....	24	87	78
VII.....	28	99	96

point. There are four main Negro areas of the city. One, commonly known as Acreage Homes, is composed of tract 1 and located in the extreme northwestern section. A second, often referred to as Fifth Ward, including tracts 8, 9, and 18, is located in the northeastern periphery of the city. Tract 27 composes the third Negro area. It is commonly designated as Fourth Ward and is adjacent to the central business district. The fourth Negro area is made up of tracts 34, 37, and 38. It is called Third Ward and is located in the south-central section of the city.

These tracts are called Negro areas because each one is inhabited by a popu-

lation over 72 per cent of whom are Negroes. They represent, jointly, 76 per cent of the city's Negro population. They form the city's Negro communities and are thereby racial islands within the city's larger population aggregate. Since three of these eight Negro tracts had rates below the birth rate for the city as a whole, and since only one was among the ten tracts having the highest rates, the presence of Negro communities in the count did very little toward exaggerating the spatial pattern of these rates. However, it should be observed that those tracts having the lowest rates compose the fashionable River Oaks, Montrose, Southhampton, and Riverside areas. These areas represent the better residential districts of the city and foreshadow a negative relationship between births and wealth. Those tracts of the southeastern section of the city, in which rates are among the highest, are in the midst of the city's industrial and railroad area. It is here that Buffalo Bayou, which bisects the city laterally, terminates in the Turning Basin. At this geographical point the city's water front, railroads, and factories concentrate, facilitating low rental rates and, possibly, the aggregation of lower economic classes.

RELATIONS OF STANDARDIZED BIRTH RATES AND SOCIOECONOMIC CHAR- ACTERISTICS OF THE CITY

Since the spatial distribution of these birth rates suggested a relationship between births and the socioeconomic characteristics of the city, it appeared advisable to test this geographical evidence of relationship by a mathematical technique. Such a technique was based on zero order, partial, and multiple correlations between birth rates for the respective tracts and selected socioeconomic variables characteristic of each tract. The

variables selected were (a) per cent women—fourteen years of age and over—employed, (b) per cent professional workers, (c) per cent gainful workers engaged in white-collar occupations, (d) median educational level of persons

of each of these seven variables with birth rates showed inverse association in the case of the first five and positive association in case of the last two. Table 2 gives the coefficients of correlation between the birth rates and the respective

TABLE 2
COEFFICIENTS OF CORRELATION BETWEEN STANDARDIZED BIRTH
RATES AND SOCIOECONOMIC VARIABLES

Socioeconomic Variables	<i>r</i>	Coefficients	P.E.	Socioeconomic Variables	<i>r</i>	Coefficients	P.E.
a) Per cent women 14 years and over employed.....	r_{ax}	— .65	.091	d) Median educational level.....	r_{dx}	— .60	.101
	$r_{ax \cdot b}$	— .45	.126		$r_{dx \cdot a}$	— .34	.140
	r_{ab}	.56	.109		$r_{dx \cdot c}$.01	.158
	$r_{ax \cdot e}$	— .61	.099		$r_{dx \cdot e}$	— .04	.158
	r_{ae}	.33	.141	e) Median monthly rental rate.....	r_{ex}	— .59	.103
	$r_{ax \cdot d}$.53	.114		$r_{ex \cdot a}$	— .52	.115
	r_{ad}	.45	.126		$r_{ex \cdot f}$	— .31	.143
	$r_{ax \cdot f}$	— .67	.087		$r_{ex \cdot b}$	— .24	.149
	r_{af}	— .19	.152		r_{ef}	— .71	.078
	$r_{ax \cdot bc}$	— .43	.129		$r_{ex \cdot d}$	— .19	.152
	r_{ac}	.50	.119		r_{ed}	.85	.044
	$r_{ax \cdot bc}$	— .49	.120	f) Per cent craftsmen and operatives.....	r_{fx}	.58	.105
b) Per cent professional workers.....	r_{bx}	— .65	.091	g) Per cent homeowners	r_{gx}	.44	.127
	$r_{bx \cdot e}$	— .41	.132	Multiple correlations ...	R_{abx}	.73	.074
	r_{be}	.71	.078		R_{acx}	.74	.072
	$r_{bx \cdot d}$	— .32	.42		R_{adx}	.65	.091
	r_{bd}	.87	.038		R_{aex}	.77	.064
c) Per cent white-collar workers.....	r_{cx}	— .64	.093		R_{afx}	.68	.085
	r_{cx}	— .48	.122		R_{acex}	.79	.059
	r_{ca}	.50	.119		R_{bcx}	.69	.083
	$r_{cx \cdot b}$	— .30	.144		R_{bdx}	.65	.091
	r_{cb}	.75	.069		R_{bex}	.68	.085
	$r_{cx \cdot e}$	— .31	.143		R_{dex}	.60	.101
	r_{ce}	.89	.033		R_{afx}	.63	.095
	$r_{cx \cdot d}$	— .32	.142				
	r_{cd}	.82	.052				

twenty-five years of age and over, (e) median monthly rental rates, (f) per cent gainful workers engaged as craftsmen and operatives, and (g) per cent homeowners. These seven variables were selected because previous research had shown them to be associated with the ratios of children to women in some American cities.

Values secured through the correlation

variables and indicates their degree of reliability.

The correlation of birth rates and the per cent women employed yielded $r_{ax} = -.65$. Since this coefficient is dependably significant, in that it is more than four times the size of its probable error, it seems safe to conclude that the birth rates of the tracts of this city decrease with an increase of the per cent of women

employed in each tract. This conclusion is further verified by the fact that, although the coefficient is lowered in partial correlation, it remains significant when the effects of per cent professional workers, median educational level, and median monthly rental rates are respectively controlled. Elimination of the effect of per cent professional workers reduced the coefficient most, but the joint control of this variable plus per cent white-collar workers and median monthly rental rates yielded the value $r_{ax.bce} = -.49$. When we conceive of the city as a functional unity, we realize the possibility of the combined effect of these variables in relation to the birth rate. After combining each of the respective variables having dependable zero-order correlations with the per cent women employed, the coefficient was raised by various degrees. It ranged from $R_{ace} = .77$ to $R_{adx} = .65$. This means that, whereas the combination of per cent females employed and median rental rates raised the correlation considerably, the addition of the effect of median educational level to this former variable did not change it at all.

Although the correlation between birth rates and per cent professional workers was the same as that of birth rates and per cent females employed, the coefficient in the former instance was not so significant as that of the latter. It was considerably lowered when median educational level and median monthly rental rates were respectively controlled. The value for $r_{bx.c}$ was $-.41$. This means that there is only a fairly significant association between these variables when the effect of rental rate is controlled. When the influence of median educational level was eliminated, the coefficient dropped to $r_{bx.d} = -.32$. Therefore, it appears that the inverse association of birth rates

and per cent professional workers is dependent upon the effect of median monthly rental rates to a small extent and median educational level to a considerable extent. When its effect is joined with that of per cent clerical workers or median rental rates, only a slight increase is noticed in its coefficient. Its combination with median educational level creates no change whatever.

As would be expected, the pattern of relationship that exists between birth rates and per cent white-collar workers is very similar to that of births and per cent professionals. Although its value ($r_{cx} = -.64$) is reliable, it falls below significance when the effect of median rental rates or median educational level is controlled. It remains significant, however, when the effect of per cent women employed is eliminated.

The correlation of birth rates and median educational level yielded a coefficient of $r_{dx} = -.60$. Such a relationship, however, appears to depend upon per cent women employed, per cent clerical workers, and median monthly rental rates. When each one of these variables is controlled, the coefficient drops below significance. When its effect is joined with that of median rental rates the value remains unchanged.

The coefficient ($r_{ex} = -.59$) which results from correlating birth rates with median rental rates appears independent of the influence of per cent women employed. When the latter variable is controlled, the coefficient ($r_{ex.a} = -.52$) remains significant. However, this is not true when the per cent professional workers, per cent craftsmen and operatives, or median educational level are controlled.

These facts as given above mean that, although birth rates of the census tracts of this city are significantly associated with six of the seven socioeconomic vari-

ables tested, the coefficient resulting from the correlation of per cent women employed shows the most significant relationship. It persists in significance when the influences of other important variables are eliminated, and it increases decidedly when the influences of per cent white-collar workers and median rental rates ($R_{acex} = .79$) are added to it. It appears that the bulk of the variation of birth rates between the census tracts of this city can be accounted for mainly by differences in the per cent of women employed and partly by the per cent professional workers in each census tract. This conclusion differs from previous studies concerned with the correlation of fertility ratios and socioeconomic variables. Although Thompson found significant correlation between per cent women employed and the number of children under five years per 1,000 white women aged fifteen to forty-four,⁹ Whelpton concluded that the most significant relationship was found in the case of monthly rental rate.¹⁰

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

The author is aware of the fact that there are some conditions inherent in this

⁹ Thompson, *op. cit.*, p. 193.

¹⁰ P. K. Whelpton, "Geographic and Economic Differentials in Fertility," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, CLXXXVIII (November, 1936), 48.

research that may effect the validity of the conclusions drawn. The small number of tracts from which findings are drawn offers the possibility that conditions might appear in different form if the tracts were more numerous. The fact that the rates were computed only for one year hinders the conclusions that such spatial patterns and degrees of relationship as shown here would be repeated for other years. Since foreign-born constituted only 4 per cent of the city's population, it was not considered necessary that they be eliminated. It is possible, although not probable, that this judgment was inaccurate. Where gradiencey was tested by zones rate, only rates for the city as a whole were computed. It is possible that zone rates appearing in the different segments of the city—areas between main arteries that define the city's skeletal frame—might vary widely in their pattern of gradiencey. However, in spite of these disturbances, certain conclusions seem evident. First, the general variation of birth rates according to census tracts makes a spatial pattern in which the rates increase with an increase in distance from the central business district of the city. Second, this variation is associated with the social and economic characteristics of census tracts. Third, the per cent women employed is the best single index for explaining differential birth rates in this metropolitan city.

THE FRENCH REVOLUTION AND THE RISE OF SOCIOLOGY IN FRANCE

ROBERT A. NISBET

ABSTRACT

The concept of the social group, the nucleus of sociological speculation, is to be associated with the French Revolution rather than with ideas current during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. During the Revolution the church as a separate social organization was demolished and the family underwent modification, while the state triumphed at their expense. Auguste Comte was impressed by the atomization of society resulting from the disruption of these primary ties uniting men in nonpolitical society. He sought to reinstate the social group in social thought. The responsibility of sociology in the post-war world will be to rehabilitate and make meaningful these primary ties and other lesser social loyalties.

I

The influence of the French Revolution upon the foundations of sociology in France is a fact which has received somewhat less than the attention it deserves. That it is a fact of significance in the history of social theory may perhaps be inferred from the references to the Revolution which abound in the pages of the early sociologists. Indeed, as late as 1864 we find Le Play citing the Revolution as the principal source of those difficulties to which his monumental works were addressed. In the works of such earlier men as Bonald and Comte the effects of the Revolution are so manifest as to establish it as a strong influence upon their writings.

To suggest merely that the pioneers of systematic sociology were affected by this event is not, however, to cast any light upon the basic ideas of sociology. The history of any social science is less an affair of biographical facts strung loosely together by the thread of chronology than it is an inquiry into the rise and development of the central concepts of the discipline. What is important here is to show the relation between the Revolution and the emergence of those concepts which were from the outset the dis-

tinctive subject matter of sociology. What we are interested in is how the central core of sociology, in contrast to those elements which are merely peripheral and held in common with all the social sciences, came into existence.

In the case of sociology this central core, the nucleus of all its speculation, is the concept of the social group; and any investigation of the origins of systematic sociology is at bottom an inquiry into the social and intellectual conditions which resulted in the appearance of this concept. A concern with social groups, especially with those groups which are intermediate between the individual and the state, has been from the very beginning the identifying characteristic of sociological thought. From this nucleus have derived such specific interests as those embodied in the study of family, class, community, and association. From it have also derived the basic and distinguishably sociological problems of social control and social disorganization—problems which have been fundamental since Comte. Such interests and problems belong historically to sociology alone of all the social sciences, and their rise in social theory is closely connected with the French Revolution.

Historians of social thought have been prone, on the whole, to regard sociology as a logical and continuous outcome of the ideas which had commanded the intellectual scene during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Such a view, the result of an uncritical reliance upon the doctrine of continuity, is an erroneous one, for the rise of sociology involved a profound deviation from most of the ideas on society and man which had prevailed during the Enlightenment. The central importance which is given by the early sociologists to the concept of the group and to the problems which derive from this concept stands in marked opposition to the social theory of the eighteenth century.¹

Two entities dominated the social thought of the Enlightenment—the individual and the state—and, however vigorously libertarianism might war with absolutism, both sides were agreed upon the extinction of the groups intermediate between man and the state. France in the eighteenth century still possessed a large measure of medievalism—a condition reflected in its diversified legal structure, in its powerful guilds, in its communes, in the church, in universities, and in the patriarchal family. It was this assemblage of groups, this realm of intermediate society, that the *philosophes* were so eager, on the practical side, to destroy and, on the theoretical side, to eliminate from the natural law theory of society. What was desired was a rational

order in which the mobility of individuals would be unrestricted save by the wise commands of the sovereign state.²

Given the depreciation of the intermediate social groups, the rational state was the major response to the problem of order in eighteenth-century social theory. Where the faculties and rights of individuals left off, the power of the political sphere began. Constraint in the corporative sense of tradition, in the sense of *social* control, held no place in the natural-law theory of the eighteenth century. The libertarian philosophies of Quesnay, Helvetius, Turgot, and Rousseau were directed not at the idea of the state but at those intermediate groups whose relationship to the individual they identified with feudal tyranny. Theirs was an individualism in which the very power of the state suggested itself as the instrument by which their ideal could be realized. Even the family was not spared. Its economic unity was held to be an anachronism, its patriarchal structure a tyranny, and the indissolubility of marriage a contravention of natural law.³

In Rousseau's work hostility toward traditional society and the social group became almost a central theme. The ideal of Rousseau was individual freedom—freedom, however, not in the sense of immunity from political authority but in that of withdrawal from the oppres-

² See Otto von Gierke, *Das deutsche Genossenschaftsrecht* (Berlin, 1868-1913), IV, 490 f.

¹ This paper is concerned only with social thought in France. Any analysis of English or German thought would call for an examination of other issues than those dealt with here. The origins of sociology in France were characterized by a reversion, in certain respects, to ideas which had flourished during the medieval period. Comte's admiration for the Middle Ages was profound, and to no small extent this civilization served as an inspiration to his thinking. See the remarks in the *Système de politique positive* (Paris, 1852), II, 113.

³ For typical expressions of antagonism to the social group see the *Encyclopédie* (Lausanne, 1781), XIV, 892-97; Sieyès, *Qu'est-ce que le tiers état?* chap. v; Helvetius, *Œuvres* (Paris, 1795), V, 219-20. See also Condillac, *Œuvres* (Paris, 1798), IV, 388, and Diderot, *Œuvres complètes* (Paris, 1876), XVIII, 7 f. For similar views in Germany at this time see Fichte, *Werke* (Berlin, 1845), IV, 403, and Kant, *Werke* (Leipzig, 1868), VII, 120-21, 144 ff. See, on this whole subject, J. Paul-Boncour, *Le Fédéralisme économique* (Paris, 1901), especially pp. 47 f. Also von Gierke, *op. cit.*

sions of society. His principal objective came to be that of discovering a form of government in which the freedom of the individual from traditional society could be absolute. The *Contrat social* may be regarded as a prospectus of this order. There he declares that "each individual should be absolutely independent of his fellow-members and absolutely dependent upon the state. For it is only by the force of the state that the liberty of its members can be secured."⁴ The implications of such a statement are clear, and Rousseau does not shrink from them. Society apart from the state must be abrogated. "It is essential, if the general will is to be able to express itself adequately, that there should be no partial society within the state."⁵ The constraints which are resident in the groups composing intermediate society must become fused in the sovereign will of the state. All groups and social orders are atomized, all manifestations of traditional society abolished; the individual and the state are the supreme entities.⁶

II

More than any other event it was the Revolution, at the end of the eighteenth century, which led to a break with the principal assumptions of the *philosophes* and which produced the reaction out of which the basic concepts of sociology emerged. In its effect upon traditional society the Revolution may be profitably approached as a kind of embodiment of the ideas implicit in the philosophy of the Enlightenment. The legislators of the

National Assembly were no less devoted to the rights of the individual and to the unity of the state. There is the same depreciation of the social ties uniting men in groups and the identical faith in the state as the chief means of association. The Law Le Chapelier, in 1791, declared that "there is no longer any corporation within the state; there is but the particular interest of each individual and the general interest"—a statement which clearly reflects the influence of Rousseau.⁷ If it was the interest of the individual which primarily impelled the Assembly in its attitude toward the corporate groups of society, there was at the same time no lack of appreciation for the unity of the state. "A state that is truly free," it was declared, "ought not to suffer within its bosom any corporation, not even such as, dedicated to public instruction, have merited well of the country."⁸ As Saleilles has observed: "To the men of the Revolution the existence of social bodies enjoying separate rights was a philosophic, judicial, and political anomaly."⁹

With the accession to power of the Jacobins the hostility to private associations and orders reached its zenith. Jacobin nationalism

labored to root out and destroy any faction which appeared to be lacking in supreme loyalty not only to France in general but also to the particular France of the Jacobin dream—France, one and indivisible, democratic and republican, egalitarian and secular. It perceived a dangerous enemy in every person or tendency that might realize for France any other kind of

⁴ *Du contrat social*, II, 12.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 3.

⁶ On this aspect of Rousseau's thought see the Introduction by C. E. Vaughan in his edition of *Du contrat social* (Manchester, 1918). See also my "Rousseau and Totalitarianism," to be published in the *Journal of Politics*, 1943.

⁷ See *Les Associations professionnelles ouvrières*; office du Travail (Paris, 1899), I, 11 f.; also, the excellent discussion of this subject in Étienne Martin Saint-Léon, *Histoire des corporations de métiers* (Paris, 1922), pp. 623 f.

⁸ Cited by F. W. Maitland, *Collected Papers* (Cambridge University Press, 1911), III, 311.

⁹ Roger Saleilles, *De la personnalité juridique* (Paris, 1910), p. 3.

dream. It fought regionalism and "federalism" and every tendency toward provincial autonomy and away from the disciplined centralization of the state.¹⁰

If the Revolution became harsh at times, it was, after all, to use the words of Robespierre, only "the tyranny of liberty against depotism." All that stood in the way of the free individual and the unitary state must be abolished—estates, guilds, associations, church, even the family itself.

Under the impact of the Revolution the church as a separate social organization was demolished and its clergy declared to be officials of the state, subject to election by the whole citizenry. Its land was appropriated, monasteries and schools disrupted, and many other of the social aspects of religion abolished. The guilds were destroyed in the name of *liberté du travail*, and the re-establishment of economic associations "under any pretext or form whatsoever" was prohibited.¹¹ Education was declared to be the function of the state alone; universities and schools, largely autonomous under the *ancien régime*, were co-ordinated in plan, and under Napoleon in fact, into a vast governmental monopoly. The successive governments of the Revolution, believing with Danton that, "after bread, education is the chief need of the people," made certain that the people should receive only the right kind of education. Property was no less sharply modified, so far as the provisions governing its inheritance were involved. The government, taking the view that property belongs to the individual and

not to the family, proclaimed the *partage forcé*, whereby the father was obliged to will to his children equal amounts of property.¹²

The family itself underwent modification at the hands of the egalitarian leaders of the Revolution. The abundantly inscribed protests of the *philosophes* against the indissolubility of the marriage tie and the "abuses" of the paternal authority had their effect upon the legislators. Holding that the ideals of liberty and equality should prevail within the family, as elsewhere, the legislators saw little to recommend the traditional family group. Like the philosophers, they found patriarchal customs to be "against nature and contrary to reason." In the law of September, 1792, marriage was unequivocally designated a civil contract, and numerous grounds for divorce were made available for the first time in the history of France. The arguments for such measures, as Rouquet has shown, were clearly based upon an appeal to natural law.¹³ Strict limitations were placed upon the paternal authority, and in all cases the authority of the father was held void when the children reached their legal majority. Such men as Le Pelletier and Robespierre, following the precepts of Rousseau, insisted that the state should have primacy of claim upon the lives of the children; indeed, they should be taken from the family at an early age and be reared in common, so as better to inculcate on their minds the claims of the

¹² See Helen Bosanquet, *The Family* (London, 1906), p. 108, and Louis Delzons, *La Famille française et son évolution* (Paris, 1913), pp. 255 f.

¹³ Marcel Rouquet, *Évolution du droit de famille* (Paris, 1909), p. 13. Divorce became so common that in the year VI of the Republic the number of divorces exceeded the number of marriages. See Amos and Walton, *Introduction to French Law* (Oxford, 1935), p. 69.

¹⁰ Carlton J. H. Hayes, *The Historical Evolution of Modern Nationalism* (New York, 1931), pp. 52-53.

¹¹ *Les Associations professionnelles ouvrières*, I, 13-14. Not until 1848 were laws against associations relaxed. See Léon Duguit, *Traité de droit constitutionnel* (Paris, 1921-26), V, 198.

nation upon their existence.¹⁴ If such utterances are extreme, it is nonetheless true that the Revolution severely weakened the solidarity of the family in line with its general policy toward all intermediate groups. The family was considered no exception to the general principle that the individual is the true unit of the state and that all social authority must pass over into the formal structure of the state.

It was the state which triumphed at the expense of the traditional ties of religion, guild, and family; social authority was transmuted into political sovereignty. The indivisibility of the state, the supremacy of its rights, the dependence on it and it alone of all individuals—all this was accepted as axiomatic by the revolutionaries. The triumph of the popular state carried with it a flame of individualism and egalitarianism which melted the restraints and controls of traditional society. Side by side the individual and the state were held up as the supreme entities; what helped one helped the other; and between these two entities the claims of the social group were of slight avail. The nationalism which emerged from the Revolution, the worship of *l'Etat une et indivisible*, was an expression of the new relationship between state and individual. As Soltau has written, "the destruction of all intermediate groups throws the individual back on the State if he feels, as most men do, the need of something bigger than himself in which he can lose himself."¹⁵ To many of the intellec-

tuals in France the new order was a happy contrast to the *ancien régime*. All the encumbrances of feudalism had been obliterated, and the result was a united nation of free individuals.

In the eyes of a few men, however, the effect of the Revolution, far from being progressive, was nothing less than the disorganization of a sacred sphere of society. The dissappropriation of the church and the attendant depreciation of religion, the proscription of economic associations, the laws on education, and, above all, the weakening of the family would lead inevitably, it was thought, to an unmitigated anarchy. Among this minority was Auguste Comte.

III

In the impact of the Revolution upon the traditional social group may be seen much of the effective social background of the rise of sociology in France. Historically, sociology in its systematic form rests upon the concept of the social group and the problem of social disorganization. From the very outset Comte was impressed by the disorder which in his estimation had arisen from the atomization of family, church, and association. In his earliest essays Comte reveals the aims which were to govern the rest of intellectual existence. There he writes ominously of the "movement of disorganization" which has agitated society. He calls attention to the "stormy situation" and to the "anarchy which day by day invades society." "The only way of ending this stormy situation, of staying the anarchy which daily invades society . . . consists in inducing nations to abandon the negative and to adopt an organic attitude."¹⁶

What Comte means by the "negative" attitude is clear to anyone who has read

¹⁴ Philippe Sagnac, *La Législation civile de la Révolution française* (Paris, 1898), p. 307. Rousseau had insisted in his *Economie politique* that all children should be reared "dans le sein de l'égalité"; and he wrote in his *Confessions* that, when he turned his own children over to a foundling asylum, he felt that he was behaving as a true citizen and considered himself a member of Plato's Republic.

¹⁵ Roger Soltau, *French Political Thought in the Nineteenth Century* (New Haven, 1931), p. xxv.

¹⁶ *Essays* (London, 1911), p. 88.

the *Essays*. Negativism embraces all those individualistic ideas which had flowered during the Enlightenment and which were the driving force of the Revolution. He refers to Rousseau and disciples as "docteurs en guillotine" and describes their doctrines as "sauvage anarchie." For the dogmas of individualism Comte has nothing but distrust and scorn. The idea of natural rights he condemns as "immorale et anarchique." Popular sovereignty is no less fallacious, and it leads inevitably to the dismemberment of the social body. The dogma of equality is unscientific and must tend toward the isolation of individuals from one another. Nor is even freedom of thought saved from Comte's syllabus of errors. Liberty of thought is an illogical ideal and "justly deserves the charge of anarchy brought against it by the ablest defenders of the Theological school."¹⁷

Comte's critique of the Revolution and of individualism contains within it no espousal of the unlimited state. During the Revolution, as he knew, a faith in individualism went hand in hand with an acceptance of the omniscient state. Each principle was as injurious as the other to the realm of association intermediate to the state and individual. Thus he asserts that one of the great evils attending the decline of spiritual power in the modern world has been the absorption by the state of functions belonging properly to other authorities. This process, culminating in the Revolution, has led to an "administrative despotism," to an intolerable centralization of government that has accelerated the rate of moral disorganization. Comte is adamant on the necessity of the state's surrendering its spiritual, educative, and basically social functions to other, more appropriate, agencies.¹⁸

¹⁷ See the *Essays*, pp. 96-98; also the *Système de politique positive*, I, 74, 159, and 361.

It is neither the state nor the individual that Comte is primarily concerned with in his sociological system. The Revolution had demonstrated the insubstantiality of each as the base of a true social system. In its stringent legislation against the social group, against *société*, the Revolution had weakened the sources of morality and social solidarity. The essential problem, as it suggested itself to Comte, was neither political nor economic. It was *social*—social in the exact sense that it was the outcome of a disruption of those primary ties of relationship uniting men in nonpolitical society. The basic disorders of France, he felt, arose inevitably out of the isolating of the individual which had followed the drastic legislation against church, family, and community. It was the hope of rebuilding society, in the sense of intermediate society, that led Comte to the formulation of his Positive System. That he failed in his prime objective, that many of his practical proposals frequently touch upon the ludicrous, should not blind us to the significance of his contribution. Stated briefly, what Comte achieved was the reinstatement of the social group in social thought.

One is impressed by the fact that sociology arose in the first instance as a deeply conservative movement. It is traditional society which may be said to have become, through Bonald and Comte, a major sphere of sociological consideration.¹⁹ Where the Enlightenment had

¹⁸ See the discussion in the *Essays*, pp. 292-95; also the *Système de politique positive*, I, 122.

¹⁹ The influence of the Traditionalists was as great upon Comte as it had been upon Saint-Simon. "History," he writes, "has too much ignored this immortal school which arose at the commencement of the nineteenth century." To Bonald in particular, Comte owed and acknowledged an indebtedness. He grants Bonald the honor of having first founded the science of social statics and credits him even with the employment of Positive principles. See Henri Moulinié, *De Bonald* (Paris, 1915), pp. 442 f.

been indifferent to the value of such groups as family and church and to such elements as moral constraint and tradition, as well as to the whole network of small social groups, these phenomena become central in sociology. They may be said to form the basis of its preoccupation with social control and social disorganization. The problem of order in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries had been construed in the natural-law terms of individual and state. The legislative impact of the Revolution had been such as very nearly to eradicate all manifestations of society intermediate to these entities. The great achievement of the early sociologist was to rephrase the problem of order in such a way as to bring to the fore not only the ethical importance of the intermediate groups but their theoretical value in the study of man. It was precisely those areas of human association most severely treated by the Revolution which became conceptually important in sociology. The conspicuous esteem in which Comte holds religious association, the family, and the community, as well as the modes of control which these groups embody, is the source of that more dispassionate interest in these entities which has been the core of contemporary sociology.²⁰

Without deprecating the more careful orientation which the concepts of social control and social disorganization have received in the works of such men as

²⁰ Limitations of space forbid any review here of Comte's detailed treatment of these groups. The interested reader is referred to the *Positive Polity*, especially the second volume. It is a curious fact that, with the notable exception of McQuilkin De Grange, American historians of sociology have devoted far more attention to the *Positive Philosophy* than to the *Polity*. It is the latter work which Comte explicitly subtitled "traité de sociologie" and in which is to be found his sociological approach to family, community, religion, etc. European writers have been, on the whole, more appreciative of the *Polity*.

Durkheim, Cooley, and Thomas, these ideas must nonetheless be recognized as having constituted the very origin of sociology. The contribution of sociology to the study of man has lain most significantly in its insistence that men depend upon and are molded by the social groups in which they live. It is in this light that the differentiation of sociology from the other humanistic disciplines may be most clearly seen. Political theory, economics, and psychology arose in an age, before the end of the eighteenth century, when the most provocative interests were those of the state, its finances, and the individual citizen. Not until the range of traditional society in its plural forms suffered the destructive impact of the Revolution did a systematic interest in the social group arise.²¹

IV

It may be observed by way of conclusion that the continuing and even increasing importance of the study of the social group and social disorganization is a fact not unrelated to the French Revolution. It was this event, more than any other, which made certain the development and spread of individualism and nationalism in the modern world. And it has been against these powerful institutional forces that the family, church, and community have fought, on the whole, a losing battle. The investigation of the manifold problems created by the weakening of the social group has been the peculiar concern of sociology—a concern manifesting itself from Comte to the

²¹ In his account of the differentiation of the social sciences Professor House has suggested that sociology arose "when there began to exist in the western world associations of persons other than family, state, and church" (*The Development of Sociology*, p. 103). In France, however, it was not the proliferation of groups, but rather their destruction, which led to the rise of sociology.

present day in an ever growing number of studies.

The major tendencies of the modern world have worked toward the emancipation of both the individual and the state from the constraints of traditional society. If during the nineteenth century it was the individual who appeared as the chief beneficiary of history, the twentieth century has revealed the one-sidedness of this appraisal. In truth, as both Le Play and Durkheim so clearly realized, there has been a fruitful affinity between individualism and statism. The triumph of the state in recent decades has been less at the expense of the individual than at the cost of the other loyalties uniting men into groups. The fateful interaction between individualism and collectivism which was so conspicuous a feature of the Revolution has in more prolonged fashion been a notable aspect of the social and economic history of Europe since the Revolution.

The inroads of economic and moral individualism upon the community and family have left a steadily enlarging mass of people whose basic normlessness and insecurity are tragically revealed by the indices of social disorganization. The response of modern liberals has been, on the whole, in terms of the state. Yet the state by itself is not a sufficient corrective to the processes of social depletion. It may augment its police power, it may grant economic relief, it may even redistribute wealth; but it cannot in itself be a substitute for that sense of belongingness which is the basis of social order. However widespread its welfare activities, the political state is without the power to offer the psychological gratifications which come from membership in the social group—not, at least, unless it is willing to risk the possibilities of totalitarianism.

The decline of the primary group has been an ominous aspect of recent history; it is a decline which has been unchecked by the political measures so far used. By the weakening of the social group, by the loosening of the ties of custom, the rise of the atomized mass has been made possible; and herein lies not a little of the effective environment of totalitarianism. For it is a fact, made obvious by the experience of Germany, that the totalitarian leader flourishes among the rootless masses, among those individuals whose loss of social status and identification has made them the willing prey of manipulators. It is in the total state that the final decline of the social group has occurred, leaving the state as the principal—almost the sole—means of association. In the total state no group, no affiliation, may interpose itself between the individual and Leviathan; indeed, the measure of stability is the degree to which such social groupings have been obliterated or subordinated.

The responsibility of sociology to the post-war world will be clear and pressing. The problems arising out of group disorganization will have become vastly accentuated by the action of the war. The state will have grown strong by the sheer pressure of war; individuals will have become even more isolated from society and its codes. War promotes social disorganization because it withdraws temporarily from society a whole generation of younger men and because, owing to its drastic internal demands, military controls must replace the ordinary constraints of civil society. A population grown accustomed to the protective discipline of the war state may well prefer it to the uncertainties of a civil society grown weak. But this is the road to the very totalitarianism which we are engaged in destroying today. How can a

free society be maintained except on the basis of those smaller units within which exist the cultural values that men wish to be free to follow? Freedom, be it marked, is a positive, not a negative, thing.

Whatever the relation of sociology to the war, there can be no doubt as to its potential contribution to the peace. Sociology is, of all the social sciences, the one most directly concerned with that sphere of society which will have most grievously suffered the impact of the war. It is, by historical right and present interest, the social science most intimately concerned with the group. The salvation of democracy will depend to no small extent upon the degree to which we rehabilitate and make meaningful the small social units.

If the basic unit of collectivity becomes too large for the feeling of neighbourhood to work throughout its membership, democracy is killed, and tyranny inevitably ensues. . . . Leviathan cannot be governed by good men unless Leviathan itself is built upon lesser groupings, right down to the smallest, so that power and responsibility and habit of social action based on thought are diffused right through its members.²²

Here is the challenge of the post-war world to sociology. Herein lies the responsibility of sociology to democracy—a responsibility which sociology has borne implicitly since its inception in the years following the Revolution in France.

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²² G. D. H. Cole, "Leviathan and Little Groups," *The Aryan Path* (New Delhi, October, 1941).

THE PROFESSIONAL IDEOLOGY OF SOCIAL PATHOLOGISTS

C. WRIGHT MILLS

ABSTRACT

This essay in the sociology of knowledge relates the typical concepts used in the field of social disorganization to the structure of American society and the backgrounds and careers of social pathologists. It does not explicitly evaluate the worth of these concepts but characterizes the perspectives which are implied by the type and scope of problems usually considered in the literature of pathology.

An analysis of textbooks in the field of social disorganization reveals a common style of thought which is open to social imputation. By grasping the social orientation of this general perspective we can understand why thinkers in this field should select and handle problems in the manner in which they have.

By virtue of the mechanism of sales and distribution, textbooks tend to embody a content agreed upon by the academic group using them. In some cases texts have been written only after an informal poll was taken of professional opinion as to what should be included, and other texts are consulted in the writing of a new one. Since one test of their success is wide adoption, the very spread of the public for which they are written tends to insure a textbook tolerance of the commonplace. Although the conceptual framework of a pathologist's textbook is not usually significantly different from that of such monographs as he may write, this essay is not concerned with the "complete thought" or with the "intentions" of individual authors; it is a study of a professional ideology variously exhibited in a set of textbooks.¹ Yet, be-

cause of its persistent importance in the development of American sociology and its supposed proximity to the social scene, "social pathology" seems an appropriate point of entry for the examination of the style of reflection and the social-historical basis of American sociology.

mentary quotations which follow in footnotes are from the later editions of the following books: W. G. Beach and E. E. Walker, *American Social Problems* (1934); J. H. S. Bossard, (a) *Social Change and Social Problems* (1934) and (b) *Problems of Social Well-Being* (1927); C. H. Cooley, (a) *The Social Process* (1918), (b) *Human Nature and the Social Order* (1902, 1922), (c) *Social Organization* (1909); Edward T. Devine, (a) *The Normal Life* (1915, 1924), (b) *Progressive Social Action* (1933); R. C. Dexter, *Social Adjustment* (1927); G. S. Dow, *Society and Its Problems* (1920, 1929); M. A. Elliott and F. E. Merrill, *Social Disorganization* (1934, 1941); C. A. Ellwood, (a) *The Social Problem, a Constructive Analysis* (1915, 1919); (b) *Sociology and Modern Social Problems* (1910-35); H. P. Fairchild, *Outline of Applied Sociology* (1916, 1921); M. P. Follett, (a) *The New State* (1918), (b) *Creative Experience* (1924); James Ford, *Social Deviation* (1939); J. M. Gillette and J. M. Reinhardt, *Current Social Problems* (1933, 1937); J. L. Gillin, (a) *Poverty and Dependence* (1921, 1926, 1937), (b) *Social Pathology* (1933, 1939); J. L. Gillin, C. G. Dittmer, and R. J. Colbert, *Social Problems* (1928, 1932); E. C. Hayes, editor's introductions to texts in the "Lippincott Series"; W. J. Hayes and I. V. Shannon, *Visual Outline of Introductory Sociology* (1935); G. B. Mangold, *Social Pathology* (1932, 1934); H. A. Miller, *Races, Nations, and Classes* (1924); H. W. Odum, *Man's Quest for Social Guidance: The Study of Social Problems* (1927); Maurice Parmelee, *Poverty and Social Progress* (1916); H. A. Phelps, *Contemporary Social Problems* (1932, 1933, 1938); S. A. Queen and J. R. Gruener, *Social Pathology* (1940); S. A. Queen, W. B. Bodenhafer, and E. B. Harper, *Social Organization and Disorganization* (1935); C. M. Rosenquist, *Social Problems* (1940); U. G. Weatherly, *Social Progress* (1926).

¹ No attempt has been made to trace specific concepts to their intellectual origins. Only elements admitted into the more stable textbook formulations have come within my view: the aim is to grasp typical perspectives and key concepts. Hence, no one of the texts to be quoted exemplifies all the concepts analyzed; certain elements are not so visible in given texts as in others, and some elements are not evidenced in certain texts at all. In general, the docu-

The level of abstraction which characterizes these texts is so low that often they seem to be empirically confused for lack of abstraction to knit them together.² They display bodies of meagerly connected facts, ranging from rape in rural districts to public housing, and intellectually sanction this low level of abstraction.³ The "informational" character of social pathology is linked with a failure to consider total social structures. Collecting and dealing in a fragmentary way with scattered problems and facts of milieux, these books are not focused on larger stratifications or upon structured wholes. Such an omission may not be accounted for merely in terms of a general "theoretical weakness." Such structural analyses have been available; yet they have not been attended to or received into the tradition of this literature. American sociologists have often asserted an interest in the "correlation of the social sciences"; nevertheless, academic departmentalization may well have been instrumental in atomizing the problems which they have addressed.⁴ Sociologists have always felt that "not

many representatives of the older forms of social science are ready to admit that there is a function for sociology."⁵ However, neither lack of theoretical ability nor restrictive channeling through departmentalization constitutes a full explanation of the low level of abstraction and the accompanying failure to consider larger problems of social structure.

If the members of an academic profession are recruited from similar social contexts and if their backgrounds and careers are relatively similar, there is a tendency for them to be uniformly set for some common perspective. The common conditions of their profession often seem more important in this connection than similarity of extraction. Within such a generally homogeneous group there tend to be fewer divergent points of view which would clash over the meaning of facts and thus give rise to interpretations on a more theoretical level.⁶

The relatively homogeneous extraction and similar careers of American pathologists is a possible factor in the low level of abstraction characterizing their work. All the authors considered⁷ (ex-

² See Read Bain, "The Concept of Complexity," *Social Forces*, VIII, 222 and 369. K. Mannheim has called this type "isolating empiricism" ("German Sociology," *Politica*, February, 1934, p. 30).

³ H. P. Fairchild, p. vii: "Dealing with applied sociology [this book] devotes itself to facts rather than to theories." James H. S. Bossard (*o*), p. xi: "In [*Problems of Social Well-Being*] an effort was made to consider chiefly in a factual vein, certain elements which seemed of basic importance. . . ." G. B. Mangold, p. viii: "The author has tried to select that which [of factual material] best illustrates problems and practical situations."

The quotations in the footnotes are merely indications of what is usual. The imputations presented must be held against the reader's total experience with the literature under purview.

⁴ In Germany the academic division of specialties prior to the rise of sociology channeled sociological work into a formal emphasis. In America a somewhat comparable situation led to a fragmentalization of empirical attention and especially to a channeling of work into "practical problems."

⁵ A. W. Small, *American Journal of Sociology*, May, 1916, p. 785, citing an editorial in the *American Journal of Sociology*, 1907.

⁶ Such "homogeneity" is not, however, the only condition under which some common style of thought is taken on by a group of thinkers. Compare the formal conception of "points of coincidence" advanced by H. H. Gerth in *Die sozialgeschichtliche Lage der bürgerlichen Intelligenz um die Wende des 18 Jahrhunderts* (diss., Frankfurt A.M.) (V.D.I.-Verlag, G.m.b.H. Berlin, N.W. 7). The entire question of the grounding of imputations in terms of social extraction and career-lines is an unfinished set of methodological issues. In this paper the major imputations advanced do *not* proceed upon career data as much as upon the social orientation implied by general perspectives and specific concepts, and by the selection of "problems."

⁷ Information concerning twenty-four of the thirty-two authors was full enough to be considered. Five of the eight not considered were junior authors collaborating with persons who are included.

cept one, who was foreign born) were born in small towns, or on farms near small towns, three-fourths of which were in states not industrialized during the youth of the authors. The social circles and strata in which they have severally moved are quite homogeneous; all but five have participated in similar "reform" groups and "societies" of the professional and business classes. By virtue of their being college professors (all but three are known to have the Ph.D.), of the similar type of temporary positions (other than academic) which they have held, of the sameness of the "societies" to which they have belonged and of the social positions of the persons whom they have married, the assertion as regards general similarity of social extraction, career, and circles of contact seems justified.⁸

A further determinant of the level of abstraction and lack of explicit systematization (beyond which the mentality we are examining does not easily or typically go) is the immediate purpose and the type of public for which they have presumably written. They have been teachers and their specific public has been college students; this has influenced the content and direction of their intellectual endeavors.⁹ Teaching is a task which requires a type of systematization to which the textbook answers. Most of

the "systematic" or "theoretical" work in "social pathology" has been performed by teachers in textbooks for academic purposes.¹⁰ The fact that sociology often won its academic right to existence in opposition to other departments may have increased the necessity for *textbook* systematization. Such systematization occurs in a context of presentation and of justification rather than within a context of discovery.¹¹ The textbook-writing and the academic profession of the writers thus figure in the character and function of systematic theory within the field.¹² Systematization of facts for the purpose of making them accessible to collegiate minds is one thing; systematization which is oriented toward crucial growing-points in a research process is quite another. An attempt to systematize on the level of the textbook makes for a taxonomic gathering of facts and a systematization of them under concepts that have already been logically defined.¹³

¹⁰ This statement, as is widely recognized, holds in a measure for all American sociology. Cf., e.g., Pitirim Sorokin, "Some Contrasts in Contemporary European and American Sociology," *Social Forces*, September, 1929, pp. 57-58. "In America sociology has grown as a child nursed by the universities and colleges. . . . American literature in sociology has been composed largely out of textbooks."

¹¹ Cf. Hans Reichenbach, *Experience and Prediction*, chap. i. See P. Sorokin's comment, *op. cit.*, p. 59.

¹² J. L. Gillin (*a*), p. v: "My years of experience as a social worker and teacher have gone into the content and method of presentation." J. H. S. Bos-sard (*a*), p. 759: "In the preceding chapters, problems have been grouped on the basis of one underlying fact or condition. Obviously, this is an arbitrary procedure which can be justified only on the basis of pedagogical expedience"; p. xi: "The . . . is the method followed. . . . By way of defense, this seems simpler and pedagogically preferable"; p. xii: "The decision to omit them was made . . . second, because in an increasing number of colleges and universities, these particular fields are dealt with in separate courses."

¹³ Cf. Fritz Mauthner, *Aristotle*, for the pedagogic character of the taxonomic logic of Aristotle. H. P. Fairchild, pp. 6-7: ". . . the essential features of

⁸ The order of their respective experience has not been systematically considered. All career data on contemporary persons should be held tentatively: open to revision by knowledge not now publicly available.

⁹ See above. A. W. Small, p. 754: ". . . the mental experience of the teacher-explorer in the course of arriving at the present outlook of sociologists . . . has also been due to the fact that many of the advances in perception or expression have been in the course of attempts to meet students' minds at their precise point of outlook." See C. Wright Mills, "Language, Logic, and Culture," *American Sociological Review*, October, 1939, for mechanisms involved in such determinations of the thinker by his public.

The research possibilities of concepts are not as important as is the putting of the accumulated factual details into some some sort of order.

But, even though the perspectives of these texts are usually not explicit, the facts selected for treatment are not "random." One way to grasp the perspective within which they do lie is to analyze the scope and character of their problems. What, then, are the selecting and organizing principles to be extracted from the range and content of these texts? What types of fact come within their field of attention?

The direction is definitely toward particular "practical problems"—problems of "everyday life."¹⁴ The ideal of

the scientific method . . . are three in number. First, the accumulation of facts. . . . Second, the arrangement or classification of these facts according to some predetermined logical basis of classification. . . ." J. H. S. Bossard (*a*), p. 34: "It is the present contention that the scientific study of social problems which confines itself to mere description and classification serves a useful purpose."

¹⁴ M. A. Elliott, *American Sociological Review*, June, 1941, p. 317: "The only problems which need concern the sociologists' theories and research are the real, practical problems of everyday living." Queen and Gruener, p. 42: "[In contradistinction to scientific problems] social problems . . . pertain directly to everyday life. . . . Their concern is usually 'practical,' and often personal." J. H. S. Bossard (*a*), p. 32: "Frankly, applied sociology is utilitarian. It is concerned with practical problems and purposes." Gillette and Reinhardt, p. 22: "The study of social problems constitutes the heart of sociology as a science. . . . Even so-called 'pure' sociology, or theoretical sociology, more and more devotes itself to these practical problems of society."

On the other hand, such writers as Ellwood, rising to a very high level of abstraction, conceive *formally* of "the social problem." C. A. Ellwood (*a*), pp. 13-14: "Some of us, at least, are beginning to perceive that the social problem is now, what it has been in all ages, namely, *the problem of the relations of men to one another*. It is the problem of human living together, and cannot be confined to any statement in economic, eugenic or other one-sided terms. . . . it is as broad as humanity and human nature. . . . Such a statement [in terms of one set of factors] obscures the real nature of the problem, and may lead to dangerous, one-sided attempts at its solution." In terms of

practicality, of not being "utopian," operated, in conjunction with other factors, as a polemic against the "philosophy of history" brought into American sociology by men trained in Germany; this polemic implemented the drive to lower levels of abstraction. A view of isolated and immediate problems as the "real" problems may well be characteristic of a society rapidly growing and expanding, as America was in the nineteenth century and, ideologically, in the early twentieth century. The depictive mode of speech and the heavy journalistic "survey" are intellectual concomitants of an expanding society in which new routines are rising and cities are being built.¹⁵ Such an approach is then sanctioned with canons of what constitutes real knowledge; the practice of the detailed and complete empiricism of the survey is justified by an epistemology of gross description. These norms of adequate knowledge linger in an academic tradition to mold the work of its bearers. The emphasis upon fragmentary,¹⁶ prac-

social and intellectual orientation, both ways of conceiving of "social problems" are similar in that neither is of a sort usable in collective action which proceeds against, rather than well within, more or less tolerated channels.

¹⁵ See H. D. Lasswell, *Politics* (1936), p. 148; K. Mannheim, *op. cit.*, pp. 30-31; and *Ideology and Utopia*, pp. 228-29.

¹⁶ Gillin, Dittmer, and Colbert, p. 44: "There are hundreds of social problems, big and little." Queen and Gruener, p. 171: "We present here some of the problems of day by day living encountered by diabetics and cardiacs." J. H. S. Bossard (*a*), p. 33: "Certain particular social problems are coming to be reserved for applied sociology. Their selection has been determined less by logic or principle than by accident and historical development"; p. 44: "The more one deals with life's problems at first hand, the more one is impressed with their concreteness, their specificity, and their infinite variety." Gillette and Reinhardt, p. 14: "From almost any point of view there must be a large number of social problems today"; p. 15: "This book is a treatise on a large number of social problems. It does not claim to consider them all. It repeatedly recognizes the plurality of problems in its treatment of the great problems."

tical problems tends to atomize social objectives. The studies so informed are not integrated into designs comprehensive enough to serve collective action, granted the power and intent to realize such action.

One of the pervasive ways of defining "problems" or of detecting "disorganization" is in terms of *deviation from norms*. The "norms" so used are usually held to be the standards of "society." Later we shall see to what type of society they are oriented. In the absence of studies of specific norms themselves this mode of problematization shifts the responsibility of "taking a stand" away from the thinker and gives a "democratic" rationale to his work.¹⁷ Rationally, it would seem that those who accept this approach to "disorganization" would immediately examine these norms themselves. It is significant that, given their interest in reforming society, which is usually avowed, these writers typically assume the norms which they use and often tacitly sanction them.¹⁸ There are

few attempts to explain deviations from norms in terms of the norms themselves, and no rigorous facing of the implications of the fact that social transformations would involve shifts *in them*.

The easy way to meet the question of why norms are violated is in terms of biological impulses which break through "societal restrictions." A paste-pot eclectic psychology provides a rationale for this facile analysis.¹⁹ Thus, more comprehensive problematization is blocked by a biological theory of social deviation. And the "explanation" of deviations can be put in terms of a requirement for more "socialization." "Socialization" is either undefined, used as a moral epithet, or implies norms which are themselves without definition. The focus on "the facts" takes no cognizance of the normative structures within which they lie.

The texts tend either to be "apolitical"²⁰ or to aspire to a "democratic" opportunism.²¹ When the political sphere

¹⁷ C. M. Rosenquist, p. 19: "... popular recognition of any social condition or process as bad, followed by any attempt to eliminate or cure it, serves as a criterion for its inclusion in a study of social problems. The writer merely accepts the judgment of public opinion. This is the method to be followed in this book." E. T. Devine (*a*), in Note to the Second Edition: "The object of Social Economy is that each shall be able to live as nearly as possible a normal life according to the standard of the period and the community."

¹⁸ C. M. Rosenquist, p. 19: "Perhaps we may be on solid ground through a recognition of the capitalist system and its accompaniments as normal. We may then deal with its several parts, treating as problems those which do not function smoothly. This, it seems, is what the more reputable sociologist actually does." H. P. Fairchild, p. 59: "... some of the social conditions which are the natural and consistent outcome of an individualistic-capitalistic organization of industry, and hence are to be considered as normal in modern societies." Examination of discussions of such items as poverty in most of the texts confirms this assertion. J. L. Gillin (*a*), p. 495: "For serious depressions carefully planned unem-

ployment relief schemes should be formulated before the depression is felt."

¹⁹ That is, an eclecticism that does not analyze in any adequate way the elements and theories which it seeks to combine. Cf. Reuter's critique, *American Journal of Sociology*, November, 1940, pp. 293-304.

²⁰ E. C. Hayes in the Introduction to H. A. Miller, p. x: "Not political action, the inadequacy of which Professor Eldridge (*Political Action*) has shown, nor revolution, the pathological character of which Professor Sorokin has demonstrated, but social interaction, the causal efficiency of human relationships, is the predominant factor in securing both order and progress."

²¹ J. H. S. Bossard (*a*), pp. 14-15: "The constructive approach . . . may be summarized in one sentence: It is always possible to do something. . . . Such an approach represents in welfare work that hopelessly incurable optimism which in political life we call democracy." Gillette and Reinhardt, pp. 16-17: "There are no certain rules to be followed step by step in the discovery of the solution. Our best recourse is to employ scientific methods rigidly at every step . . . because of uncertain factors al-

is discussed, its pathological phases are usually stated in terms of "the anti-social," or of "corruption," etc.²² In another form the political is tacitly identified with the proper functioning of the current and unexamined political order; it is especially likely to be identified with a legal process or the administration of laws.²³ If the "norms" were examined, the investigator would perhaps be carried to see total structures of norms and to relate these to distributions of power. Such a structural point of sight is not usually achieved. The level of abstraction does not rise to permit examination of these normative structures themselves, or of why they come to be transgressed, or of their political implications. Instead, this literature discusses many

ways present, we never can be sure that our conclusions are more than approximations of the truth. . . . Since we cannot completely control their activities . . . our cures must be partial and approximate." One type of link between democratic ideology and social pathology is shown in the following quotation, wherein a condition that deviates from the former is called pathological; the quotation also indicates a typical shying-away from all orders of domination other than that type legitimated traditionally, which is left open: H. A. Miller, p. 32: "When certain . . . psycho-pathological conditions are found, we may postulate an abnormal relationship as a cause . . . the particular form of pathology which is involved in our problem may be called the *oppression psychosis*. Oppression is the domination of one group by another." G. V. Price, reviewing Queen and Gruener, *Social Forces*, May, 1941, p. 566: "Without using the word democracy in the doctrinal sense the authors have shown what its utilities are in reducing pathologies."

²² M. A. Elliott and F. Merrill, p. 28: "The pathological phases of the political process include such anti-social behavior as delinquency, crime, disorder, revolt, and revolution. Corrupt political activity is an important example of such malfunctioning."

²³ Note the identification of "political action" with legislation: Gillin, Dittmer, and Colbert, p. 94: "It is an American practice to attempt to solve any and every sort of social problem through political action. As a result, our statute-books are loaded with 'dead-letter' laws that are not enforced simply because public opinion does not respect them, nor does it feel responsible for them."

kinds of apparently unrelated "situations."

About the time W. I. Thomas stated the vocabulary of the situational approach, a social worker was finding it congenial and useful. In M. E. Richmond's influential *Social Diagnosis* (1917) we gain a clue as to why pathologists tend to slip past structure to focus on isolated situations, why there is a tendency for problems to be considered as problems of individuals,²⁴ and why sequences of situations were not seen as linked into structures:

Social diagnosis . . . may be described as the attempt to make as exact a definition as possible of the situation and personality of a human being in some social need—of his situation and personality, that is, in relation to the other human beings upon whom he in any way depends or who depend upon him, and in relation also to the social institutions of his community.²⁵

This kind of formulation has been widely applied to isolated "problems" addressed by sociologists.²⁶ And the "situational approach" has an affinity with other elements which characterize their general perspective.²⁷

²⁴ J. L. Gillin (*a*), p. 13: "Experience shows that rehabilitation is possible only when each case of poverty or dependency is taken separately and its difficulties handled with strict regard for all the attendant circumstances. . . . It must be done in terms of the individual, for . . . it cannot be done *en masse*."

²⁵ Richmond, p. 357; see also pp. 51 and 62.

²⁶ J. H. S. Bossard (*a*), p. 3: "Social problems consist of (*a*) a social situation, (*b*) which are. . . ." Gillette and Reinhardt, p. 15: "A social problem is a situation, confronting a group. . . ."

²⁷ J. H. S. Bossard (*a*), p. 57: ". . . the emphasis in our social thinking upon the situation as a unit of experience, as 'an aggregate of interactive and interdependent factors of personality and circumstance,' is in essence a recognition of the idea of the emergent. . . . Queen recognizes the implications of the situational approach very clearly in these words: 'For purposes of sociological analysis, a situation consists in relationships between persons viewed as a cross section of human experience, constantly changing. . . . Thus we make of the concept "situation" an

Present institutions train several types of persons—such as judges and social workers—to think in terms of “situations.”²⁸ Their activities and mental outlook are set within the existent norms of society; in their professional work they tend to have an occupationally trained incapacity to rise above series of “cases.” It is in part through such concepts as “situation” and through such methods as “the case approach”²⁹ that social pathologists have been intellectually tied to social work with its occupational position and political limitations. And, again, the similarity of origin and the probable lack of any continuous “class experience” of the group of thinkers decrease their chances to see social structures rather than a scatter of situations. The mediums of experience and orientation through which they respectively view society are too similar, too homogeneous, to permit the clash of diverse angles which, through controversy, might lead to the construction of a whole.

The paramount fact of immigration in American culture, with each wave of immigrants displacing the lower-class position of former waves and raising the position of the earlier immigrants, also tends to obscure structural and class positions.³⁰ Thus, instead of positional issues, pathologists typically see problems in terms of an individual, such as an im-

migrant, “adjusting” to a milieu³¹ or being “assimilated” or Americanized. Instead of problems of class structure involving immigration, the tendency has been to institute problems in terms of immigration involving the nationalist assimilation of individuals. The fact that some individuals have had opportunities to rise in the American hierarchy decreases the chance fully to see the ceilings of class. Under these conditions such structures are seen as fluctuating and unsubstantial and are likely to be explained not in terms of *class position* but in terms of *status attitudes*.³²

Another element that tends to obviate an analytic view of structure is the emphasis upon the “processual” and “organic” character of society. In Cooley, whose influence on these books is decisive, one gets a highly formal, many-sided fluidity where “nothing is fixed or independent, everything is plastic and takes influence as well as gives it.”³³ From the standpoint of political action, such a view may mean a reformism dealing with masses of detail and furthers a tendency to be apolitical. There can be no bases or points of entry for larger social action in a structureless flux. The view is buttressed epistemologically with an emotionalized animus against “particularism” and with the intense approval of the safe, if colorless, “multiple-factor” view of causation.³⁴ The liberal “multiple-factor” view does not lead to a conception of causation which would permit

intellectual tool” (S. Queen, “Some Problems of the Situational Approach,” *Social Forces*, June, 1931, p. 481).

²⁸ See K. Mannheim, *Man and Society*, p. 305.

²⁹ Queen, Bodenhafer, and Harper, p. viii: Editor’s Note by S. Eldridge: “The present volume . . . features the case approach to social problems.”

³⁰ Note the lack of structure in the conception of “class”: Gillette and Reinhardt, p. 177: “Viewing the matter historically, then, it appears that the chief cause of rigid *class systems* of society with their attendant evils is the prolonged concentration of wealth in the hands of a relatively few persons.”

³¹ See below, the concept of “adjustment.”

³² Gillin, Dittmer, and Colbert, p. 59: “The most fundamental cause of class and group conflict is the attitude of superiority on the part of one class, or group, toward another.”

³³ *The Social Process*, pp. 44–45.

³⁴ Elliott and Merrill, p. 38: “One of the most significant concepts in the understanding of social problems is the idea of multiple causation.”

points of entry for broader types of action, especially political action.³⁵ No set of underlying structural shifts is given which might be open to manipulation, at key points, and which, like the fact of private property in a corporate economy, might be seen as efficacious in producing many "problems." If one fragmentalizes society into "factors," into elemental bits, naturally one will then need quite a few of them to account for something,³⁶ and one can never be sure they are all in. A formal emphasis upon "the whole" plus lack of total structural consideration plus a focus upon scattered situations does not make it easy to reform the status quo.

The "organic" orientation of liberalism has stressed all those social factors which tend to a harmonious balance of elements.³⁷ There is a minimization of

chances for action in a social milieu where "there is always continuity with the past, and not only with any one element only of the past, but with the whole interacting organism of man."³⁸ In seeing everything social as continuous process, changes in pace and revolutionary dislocations are missed³⁹ or are taken as signs of the "pathological." The formality and the assumed unity implied by "the mores" also lower the chances to see social chasms and structural dislocations.

Typically, pathologists have not attempted to construct a structural whole. When, however, they do consider totalities, it is in terms of such concepts as "society," "the social order," or "the social organization," "the mores and institutions," and "American culture." Four things should be noted about their use of such terms: (a) The terms represent undifferentiated entities. Whatever they may indicate, it is systematically homogeneous. Uncritical use of such a term as "the" permits a writer the hidden assumption in politically crucial contexts of a homogeneous and harmonious whole.⁴⁰ The large texture of "the society" will take care of itself, it is somehow and in the long run harmonious,⁴¹ it has a "strain toward consistency" run-

³⁵ See above comments on political relevance. C. A. Ellwood (b) p. 324: "We may, perhaps, sum up this chapter by saying that it is evident that the cure of poverty is not to be sought merely in certain economic rearrangements, but in scientific control of the whole life process of human society. This means that in order to get rid of poverty, the defects in education in government, in religion and morality, in philanthropy, and even in physical heredity, must be got rid of. Of course, this can only be done when there is a scientific understanding of the conditions necessary for normal human social life."

³⁶ J. L. Gillin (a), pp. 51-128: "... the modern theory of the causes of poverty has passed beyond any one-sided explanation to a many-sided theory." The following conditions of poverty and dependence are discussed: poor natural resources, adverse climate, adverse weather, insect pests, disasters, illness and diseases, physical inheritance, mental inheritance, adverse surroundings of children, death or disability of the earner, unemployment, lack of proper wages, traditions, customs, habits, advertising and instalment buying, fluctuations between costs of living and income, inequitable distribution of wealth and income, family marital relations, political conditions, unwise philanthropy, etc. After these discussions, *family cases* are presented as "... studies in causation."

³⁷ Whereas many socialist theories have tended to overlook the elastic elements that do exist in a society. Cf. K. Mannheim, *Politica*, pp. 25-26.

³⁸ C. H. Cooley (a), p. 46.

³⁹ See Max Lerner, *It Is Later than You Think*, pp. 14-15; and *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*, article "Social Process." See documentation and consequences below.

⁴⁰ Gillin, Dittmer, and Colbert, p. 11: "All this group life is nicely woven into a system that we call society. . . ."

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, p. 15: "But the aim of society is ever directed to the task of bringing uniform advantages to all." C. A. Ellwood (b), p. 395: "Social organization may refer to any condition or relation of the elements of a social group; but by social order we mean a settled and harmonious relation between the individuals or the parts of a society. The problem of social order is then the problem of harmonious adaptation among the individuals of the group. . . ."

ning through it;⁴² or, if not this, then only the co-operation of all is needed,⁴³ or perhaps even a right moral feeling is taken as a solution.⁴⁴ (b) In their formal emptiness these terms are commensurate with the low level of abstraction. Their *formality* facilitates the empirical concern with "everyday" problems of (community) milieu. (c) In addition to their "descriptive" use, such terms are used normatively. The "social" becomes a good term when it is used in ethical polemics against "individualism" or against such abstract moral qualities as "selfishness," lack of "altruism," or of "antisocial" sentiments.⁴⁵ "Social" is

⁴² It is significant that it was Sumner, with his tacit belief in "natural" order, who set forth the phrase and what it implies.

⁴³ Gillin, Dittmer, and Colbert, p. 13: "Since a community is made up of a number of neighborhoods, it is necessary that all cooperate in order to secure better schools, improved. . . ."

⁴⁴ J. L. Gillin (a), p. 133: "Only as a passion for social righteousness takes the place of an imperative desire for selfish advantage . . . will society do away with the conditions that now depress some classes of the population and exhalt others."

⁴⁵ C. A. Ellwood (b), p. 84: ". . . increasing altruism is necessary for the success of those more and more complex forms of cooperation which characterize higher civilization and upon which it depends." G. B. Mangold, p. 17: "Without the spirit of altruism society would be but a sorry exhibition of the collective humanity that we believe has been made in the image of God." Conversely, the "anti-social" is held to include certain abstract, moral traits of individuals. Elliott and Merrill, p. 43: "An analysis of the disorganization process suggests two types of anti-social forces: (1) the consciously directed anti-social forces and (2) the impersonal organic forces which are an outgrowth of the formalism discussed above . . . to advance their own selfish ends. These men are thoroughly aware of their anti-social attitudes. Social values have no meaning for them. . . . There has often been no socializing influence in the lives of those men. . . . Cooperation, or 'mutual aid,' the implicit counterpart of effective social organization. . . . Vice areas . . . function because of human appetites, because individual desires are more deeply rooted than any sense of the social implications. . . . The prostitute exists only because she is a means to man's sensual pleasure and satiety"; p. 44: "Sin, vice, crime, corruption, all

conceived as a "co-operative" "sharing" of something or as "conducive to the general welfare."⁴⁶ The late eighteenth-century use of "society" as against "state" by the rising bourgeoisie had already endowed "society" with a "democratic" tinge which this literature transmits. (d) There is a strong tendency for the term "society" to be practically assimilated to, or conceived largely in terms of, primary groups and small homogeneous communities. Such a conception typically characterizes the literature within our purview.⁴⁷ In explaining

consciously directed anti-social forces, offer a primrose. . . ." G. B. Mangold, p. 59: "Unsocial habits lead to poverty; particularly do they degrade poverty into dependency. Chief among these vices is intemperance. Before the advent of prohibition it was. . . ." Queen, Bodenhafer, and Harper, p. 4: "When there is . . . characterized by harmony, teamwork, understanding, approval, and the like, we may speak of organization. When the opposite is true and there is a . . . marked by tension, conflict, or drifting apart, we may speak of disorganization."

⁴⁶ Gillin, Dittmer, and Colbert, p. 5: "The word [social] means conducive to the collective welfare, and thus becomes nearly equivalent to moral' [Cooley, *Human Nature and the Social Order*, p. 4] . . . it is this . . . meaning that comes closest to our interpretation . . . —'conducive to the collective welfare'—relationships, and products of relationships that are believed to foster and promote *group life*, and to insure *group survival*."

⁴⁷ J. L. Gillin (b), p. 313: ". . . personal relationships . . . are the most important ties in the social organization. . . ." C. A. Ellwood (b), pp. 3-4: "The tendency in the best sociological thinking is to emphasize the importance, for the understanding of our social life, of 'primary' or face-to-face groups"; p. 77: "Primary groups . . . are of most interest sociologically, because they exhibit social life at its maximum intensity, and because they are the bearers of the most vital elements in social life, especially the traditions of civilization"; pp. 79-80: "The chief importance of primary groups in our social life, however, is that they . . . furnish the 'patterns' which we attempt to realize in our social life in general"; pp. 84-85: "All human history has, from one point of view, been a struggle to transfer altruism and solidarity of the family to successively larger and larger groups of men"; pp. 90-91: "Primary, or face-to-face groups are the key to the understanding of our social life. . . ." Gillin, Dittmer, Colbert, p.

it, we come upon an element that is highly important in understanding the total perspective.

The basis of "stability," "order," or "solidarity" is not typically analyzed in these books, but a conception of such a basis is implicitly used and sanctioned,⁴⁸ for some normative conception of a socially "healthy" and stable organization is involved in the determination of "pathological" conditions. "Pathological" behavior is not discerned in a *structural* sense (i.e., as incommensurate with an existent structural type) or in a *statistical* sense (i.e., as deviations from central tendencies). This is evidenced by the regular assertion that pathological conditions *abound* in the city.⁴⁹ If they "*abound*" therein, they cannot be "ab-

normal" in the statistical sense and are not likely to prevail in the structural sense. It may be proposed that the norms in terms of which "pathological" conditions are detected are "humanitarian ideals." But we must then ask for the social orientation of such ideals.⁵⁰ In this literature the operating criteria of the pathological are typically *rural* in orientation and extraction.⁵¹

Most of the "problems" considered arise because of the urban deterioration of certain values which can live genuinely only in a relatively homogeneous and primary rural milieu. The "problems" discussed typically concern urban behavior. When "rural problems" are discussed, they are conceived as due to en-

282: "... the home is probably our most fundamental social institution . . ."; p. 285: "Anything that endangers the stability of the family endangers society." J. H. S. Bossard (*a*), p. 555: "Family life is the focal point of virtually all of our social problems."

⁴⁸ C. A. Ellwood (*b*), pp. 79-80: "The very ideal of social solidarity itself comes from the unity experienced in such [primary] groups." Elliott and Merrill, p. 581: "An ever-increasing number of persons living in the giant cities has become completely deracinated, cut off from all stable primary ties. They have lost not only their physical home, but often their spiritual home as well. Social disorganization breeds in these unattached masses of the urban proletariat. They furnish willing nuclei for robbery, brigandage, and revolution."

⁴⁹ J. L. Gillin (*b*), p. 411: "In the city we have a greater degree of disorganization in the sense in which we use that term"; p. 410: "... in the simple and well-organized ties of country life . . ."; p. 409: "Recreation in the country is largely home-made. . . . In the city it is professional. . . . The patterns of behavior . . . are here again disorganized and new patterns have to be found." Gillette and Reinhardt, p. 116: "Cities exhibit all the social problems, save those peculiar to agricultural extractive pursuits." H. P. Fairchild, p. 304: "Since there are no *natural* facilities available to the majority of the *denizens* of cities for the gratification of the desire for dancing, it inevitably follows that provision is made on a commercial basis" (my italics). C. M. Rosenquist, p. 47: "The controls which were effective in the small, settled farm community no longer suffice in . . . the city. To this fact may be traced

many of the conditions we speak of as social problems. . . ." W. G. Beach and E. E. Walker, pp. 102-3: "... men find their life interests and values in group membership and participation. The most influential groups are those which provide intimate, face-to-face relationships, as the family, the playground, the club, the neighborhood, and the small community. . . . Any wholesome and satisfying life must provide for a continuation of such small groups and institutional forms. . . . One of the most elusive and challenging problems arising from the growth of cities is that of preventing the complete disorganization of essential social groups. In the rural community. . . ." J. H. S. Bossard (*a*), p. 113: "The marked trend of population to the city and the rapid rise of large urban centers, together with their reflex upon the rural regions, constitute the basis of virtually every problem to be discussed in this volume."

⁵⁰ This is what Waller does *not* do in his provocative discussion of "humanitarian" and "organizing mores" ("Social Problems and the Mores," *American Sociological Review*, December, 1936, pp. 922-33).

⁵¹ J. L. Gillin (*b*), p. 407: The home "developing as . . . rural" is considered "disorganized" in the city; p. 409: "[In the city] it is only the rebel, unable and unwilling to adjust himself to machine and organization, who retains personal independence. . . . The farmer, conscious that he lives by his own thinking . . . responds to his environment with a feeling of independence—a normal response. The city worker has no keen perception of his dependence upon nature." Elliott and Merrill, p. 32: "However different their approach, the basic dilemma of civilization is the fundamental disparity of values and standards of universally accepted definitions of the situation."

croaching urbanization.⁵² The notion of disorganization is quite often merely the absence of that *type* of organization associated with the stuff of primary-group communities having Christian and Jeffersonian legitimations.⁵³

Cooley, the local colorist of American sociology, was the chief publicist of this conception of normal organization. He held "the great historical task of mankind" to be the more effective and wider organization of that moral order and pattern of virtues developed in primary groups and communities.⁵⁴ Cooley took the idealists' absolute⁵⁵ and gave it the characteristics of an organic village; all

⁵² C. A. Ellwood (*b*), p. 281: "The reflex of the city problem is the rural problem." J. L. Gillen (*b*), p. 429: "[Urbanization] which has modified the solidarity of the rural family. . . ." W. J. Hayes and I. V. Shannon, p. 22: "Contacts . . . emancipate individuals from control of primary groups . . . this leads to setting up personal norms of behavior instead of conforming to group standards." (Implies no conception of *urban* types of norms.)

⁵³ The intellectual consequences of the rural to urban drift are much wider than the perspectives noted in the literature of pathology. In more general American sociology the writings of a man like E. A. Ross are to be understood in terms of a reaction of those oriented to a farmer's democracy against the growth of big business, in its control of railroads, etc. Another division of American sociology in which America's rural past is *intellectually* evident is "rural sociology" itself. This field shows the positive side of the matter, for here the yearning for the values associated with rural simplicity and neighborliness is even more noticeable. In this literature a primary, rural heritage is taken as the source of "stability" and is conceived as the reservoir of "values." Such straddling concepts as "urban" function to limit recognition of the urban character of dominant contemporary social structures. In a historical sense we need not argue with these emphases: the underlying form of American democracy and religion, e.g., has drawn much from the dominance of a rural society. And a rapid urbanization may well be only a veneer upon masses of rurally oriented personalities. But the kind of structural stability in America which grew from rural patterns is historical. In the world today the kind of stability that can—indeed, in part has—emerged from the hunger for those primary contacts historically associated with ties of blood and closeness to soil is a streamlined variety.

⁵⁴ *Social Organization*, chap. v.

the world should be an enlarged, Christian-democratic version of a rural village. He practically assimilated "society" to this primary-group community, and he blessed it emotionally and conceptually.⁵⁶ "There is reflected here," says T. V. Smith of Cooley—and what he says will hold for the typical social pathologist—"what is highly common in our culture, an ideal of intimacy short of which we do not rest satisfied where other people are concerned. Social distance is a dire fate, achieved with difficulty and lamented as highly unideal, not to say as immoral, in our Christian traditions. It is not enough to have saints; we must have "communion" of the saints. In order to have social relations, we must nuzzle one another."⁵⁷

The aim to preserve rurally oriented values and stabilities is indicated by the implicit model which operates to detect urban disorganization; it is also shown by the stress upon *community* welfare. The community is taken as a major unit, and often it sets the scope of concern and problematization.⁵⁸ It is also within the

⁵⁵ G. H. Mead, "Cooley's Contribution to American Social Thought," *American Journal of Sociology*, XXXV, 701: "Cooley was Emersonian in finding the individual self in an oversoul." Cf. G. W. F. Hegel, *Lectures on the Philosophy of History* (London: Geo. Bell & Sons, 1884), especially pp. 39-44.

⁵⁶ Note the common association of urban "impersonality" and "formalism" with "disorganization." Elliott and Merrill, p. 16: ". . . lack of harmony between the various units of the social order is in a sense . . . exemplified by the impersonal nature of the social organization and the consequent process of social disorganization . . . [cf. C. H. Cooley, *Social Process*, pp. 3-29]"; p. 574: "There is a very close relationship between formalism and disorganization, although at first glance the two states appear to be opposite poles in the social process. They are in reality sequential steps in the same great movement of disorganization, which grows out of formalism. . . ."

⁵⁷ *Beyond Conscience*, p. 111.

⁵⁸ C. A. Ellwood (*b*), p. 12: "All forms of association are of interest to the sociologist, though not all are of equal importance. The natural, genetic social

framework of ideally democratic communities that proposed solutions are to be worked out.⁵⁹ It should be noted that sometimes, although not typically or exclusively, solutions are conceived as dependent upon abstract moral traits or democratic surrogates of them, such as a "unanimous public will."⁶⁰

"Cultural lag" is considered by many

groups, which we may call 'communities,' serve best to exhibit sociological problems. Through the study of such simple and primary groups as the family and the neighborhood group, for example, the problems of sociology can be much better attacked than through the study of society at large or association in general"; pp. 76-77: "... natural groupings, such as the family, the neighborhood, the city, the state or province, and the nation. They may be, and usually are, called *communities*, since they are composed of individuals who carry on all phases of a common life. Voluntary, purposive associations always exist within some community, whether large or small. Groups which we call 'communities' are, therefore, more embracing, more stable, less artificial and specialized than purely voluntary groups. For this reason communities are of more interest to the sociologist than specialized voluntary groups, and sociology is in a peculiar sense a study of the problems of community life." J. H. S. Bossard (*a*), pp. 49-50: "Acceptance of the community as a definite unit in social work and in social theory has become general during the past fifteen years. American participation in the World War was an important factor in bringing this about, first because the community constituted the basic expression of that democratic spirit which the war engendered, and second, the community was seized upon by the various war-time activities and drives as the most effective unit for the mobilization of the spirit and resources of the nation."

⁵⁹ Gillin, Dittmer, and Colbert, p. 15: "... *social work*, which means, scientifically developing and adjusting human relations in a way that will secure normal life to individuals and communities and encourage individual and community progress"; p. 47: "... it is important to keep in mind that the central problem is that of adjusting our social life and our social institutions, so that, as individuals and as communities, we may use and enjoy the largest measure of civilization possible, and promote further progress." M. P. Follett (*a*), Part III, has suggested that neighborhood groups be organized into political units. This would permit the expression of daily life and bring to the surface live needs that they may become the substance of politics. The neighborhood as a political unit would make possible friendly acquaintance; it would socialize people and would make for "the realization of oneness."

pathologists to be the concept with which many scattered problems may be detected and systematized. Whereas the approach by deviation from norms is oriented "ideologically" toward a rural type of order and stability, the cultural-lag model is tacitly oriented in a "utopian"⁶¹ and progressive manner toward changing some areas of the culture or certain institutions so as to "integrate" them with the state of progressive technology.⁶² We must analyze the use made by pathologists of "lag" rather than abstract formulations of it.⁶³

Even though all the situations called "lags" *exist* in the present, their functional realities are referred back, away from the present. Evaluations are thus translated into a time sequence; cultural lag is an assertion of unequal "progress." It tells us what changes are "called for," what changes "ought" to have come about and didn't. In terms of various spheres of society it says what progress is, tells us how much we have had, ought to have had, didn't have, and when and where we didn't have it. The imputation of "lag" is complicated by the historical judgment in whose guise it is advanced and by the programmatic content being shoved into pseudo-objective phrases, as, for example, "called for."

It is not enough to recognize that the

⁶⁰ J. L. Gillin (*b*), p. 97: "The 'liquor problem' is as acute in the United States today as it ever was in the past, perhaps even more so"; p. 101: "The solution must spring from an aroused and unanimous public will."

⁶¹ Cf. K. Mannheim, *Ideology and Utopia*, for definitions of these terms.

⁶² However, "lag" and "norms" are not unrelated: Quisenberry, Bodenhafer, and Harper, p. 437: "Much of the discussion of cultural lags in the family assumes some kind of normal pattern which is commonly believed to have permanent validity because of the functions performed."

⁶³ See examples given in J. W. Woodard's "Critical Notes on the Cultural Lag Concept," *Social Forces*, March, 1934, p. 388.

stating of problems in terms of cultural lag involves evaluations, however disguised. One must find the general loci of this kind of evaluation and then explain why just this form of evaluation has been so readily accepted and widely used by pathologists. The model in which institutions lag behind technology and science involves a positive evaluation of natural science and of orderly progressive change. Loosely, it derives from a liberal continuation of the enlightenment with its full rationalism, its messianic and now politically naïve admiration of physical science as a kind of thinking and activity, and with its concept of time as progress. This notion of progress was carried into American colleges by the once prevalent Scottish moral philosophy. From after the Civil War through the first two or three decades of the twentieth century the expanding business and middle classes were taking over instruments of production, political power, and social prestige; and many of the academic men of the generation were recruited from these rising strata and/or actively mingled with them. Notions of progress are congenial to those who are rising in the scale of position and income.

Those sociologists who think in terms of this model have not typically focused upon the conditions and interest groups underlying variant "rates of change" in different spheres. One might say that in terms of the rates of change at which sectors of culture *could* move, it is technology that is "lagging," for the specific reason of the control of patents, etc., by entrenched interests.⁶⁴ In contrast to the pathologists' use, Veblen's use of "lag, leak, and friction" is a structural analysis of industry versus business enterprise.⁶⁵ He focused on where "the lag" seemed to

pinch; he attempted to show how the trained incapacity of legitimate businessmen acting within entrepreneurial canons would result in a commercial sabotage of production and efficiency in order to augment profits within a system of price and ownership. He did not like this "unworkman-like result," and he detailed its mechanism. In the pathologists' usage the conception has lost this specific and structural anchorage: it has been generalized and applied to everything fragmentarily. This generalization occurs with the aid of such blanket terms as "adaptive culture" and "material culture."⁶⁶ There is no specific focus for a program of action embodied in the application of such terms.

Another model in terms of which disorganizations are instituted is that of "social change" itself.⁶⁷ This model is not handled in any one typical way, but usually it carries the implicit assumption that human beings are "adjusted" satisfactorily to any social condition that has existed for a long time and that, when some aspect of social life changes, it may lead to a social problem.⁶⁸ The notion is oriented ideologically and yet participates in assumptions

⁶⁵ *The Engineers and the Price System; The Theory of Business Enterprise*.

⁶⁶ J. H. S. Bossard (a), p. 5: "... as Ogburn put it [W. F. Ogburn, *Social Change* (1922)] to the extent that the adaptive culture has not kept pace with the material culture, the amount of social ill-being has increased relatively."

⁶⁷ J. L. Gillin (b), p. 416: "Social disorganization is a function of rapidly changing conditions in people's lives." W. J. Hayes and I. V. Shannon, p. 20: "Social disorganization is an abrupt break in the existing social arrangements or a serious alteration in the routine of group life causing maladjustment." H. W. Odum, p. 100: "... if one reviews the general categories of social problems already listed in previous chapters, it must be clear that most of them or their present manifestations are due to or accentuated by the process of social change."

⁶⁴ See, e.g., B. J. Stern's article in *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, November, 1938.

⁶⁸ The point is made and acutely discussed by Rosenquist, pp. 8-10.

similar to those of cultural lag, which, indeed, might be considered a variant of it. Such a scheme for problematization buttresses and is buttressed by the idea of continuous process, commented on above; but here the slow, "evolutionary" pace of change is taken explicitly as normal and organized,⁶⁹ whereas "discontinuity" is taken as problematic.⁷⁰ The orientation to "rural" types of organization should be recalled. In line with the stress on continuous process, the point where sanctioned order meets advisable change is not typically or structurally drawn.⁷¹ A conception of "bal-

⁶⁹ Gillin, Dittmer, and Colbert, p. 48: "Social life and its products require long periods of time to develop and ripen. . . ." Gillette and Reinhardt, p. 13: "The larger proportion of social changes are small and simple, and resemble osmosis in the field of physics and organic life." This gradualism is related to the orientation to primary group relations and experiences and hence to the "sharing" conception of the social. E.g., Elliott and Merrill, p. 11: "Assimilation, on the other hand, is gradual and depends upon some degree of contact and communication, if there is to be any vital sharing of common experience (Cf. M. P. Follett, *Creative Experience*). . . ."

⁷⁰ Gillette and Reinhardt, p. 30: ". . . the need for thought about discontinuity in industry or education and about our dependence on proper training to keep society stabilized and progressive should be emphasized"; p. 21: "The habitual, daily, routine, conventional activities of life fortunately make up the greater part of life, most of the time. Often, however, they are broken across by social breakdowns, disturbances, and dislocations and the appearance of troublesome classes of persons." C. A. Ellwood (a), p. 230: ". . . revolution is not a *normal* method of social change; . . . it marks the breakdown of the normal means of social development; . . . it is not inevitable, but may easily be avoided by plasticity in social institutions and in the mental attitudes of classes and individuals. . . ."

⁷¹ The notion of temporal contingency, at times extended to the point of historical irrationality, plays into the processual, nonstructural characteristics of the perspective; notice also its commensurability with the apolitical and one-thing-at-a-time reformism. Elliott and Merrill, p. 3: "Life is dynamic. Life is ceaseless, bewildering change, and man, armed though he is with the experience of the past, can never be certain of the future. He must recognize that the immediate present is a constantly changing frame of reference and that future prob-

ance" is usual and sometimes is explicitly sanctioned.⁷² The question, "Changes in what spheres induce disorganization?" is left open; the position taken is usually somewhere between extremes, both of which are held to be bad.⁷³ This comes out in the obvious fact that what a conservative calls *disorganization*, a radical might well call *reorganization*. Without a construction of total social structures that are actually emerging, one remains caught between simple evaluations.

Besides deviation from norms, orientation to rural principles of stability, cultural lag, and social change, another conception in terms of which "problems" are typically discussed is that of adaptation or "adjustment" and their opposites.⁷⁴ The pathological or disorganized is the maladjusted. This concept, as well as that of the "normal," is usually left empty of concrete, social content;⁷⁵ or

lems are a matter of chance for which the past offers no sure panacea."

⁷² E. C. Hayes' Editor's Introduction to U. G. Weatherly, p. xii: "Realization that progressive change is not likely to be less in the generation next to come . . . and determination . . . to promote progress, is the normal attitude for every person who is animated by generous loyalty and. . . ." Weatherly, p. 138: "Both innovation and conservatism have their value, and the balance between them, which is an ideal attitude . . ."; p. 380: "Discipline and liberation are not two antagonistic processes; they are complimentary parts of the same process, which is social equilibration. They illustrate the law of physics . . . stability is reached only by a balance of forces."

⁷³ A. Ellwood (a), p. vii: "The aim of the book is to indicate the direction which our social thinking must take if we are to avoid revolution, on the one hand, and reactions, on the other."

⁷⁴ H. P. Fairchild, p. 35: ". . . it can be safely said that maladjustments are among the most numerous and important of all forms of abnormality, frequently being so extensive as to include entire social groups or classes."

⁷⁵ Gillin, Dittmer, and Colbert, p. 536: "All social problems grow out of the social problem—the problem of the adjustment of man to his universe, and of the social universe to man. The maladjustments in these relationships give us all our social problems. . . ." H. P. Fairchild, p. 16: "While the

its content is, in effect, a propaganda for conformity to those norms and traits ideally associated with small-town, middle-class milieux.⁷⁶ When it is an individual who is thought to be maladjusted, the "social type" within which he is maladjusted is not stated. Social and moral elements are masked by a quasi-biological meaning of the term "adaptation"⁷⁷ with an entourage of apparently socially bare terms like "existence" and "survival," which seem still to draw prestige from the vogue of evolutionism.⁷⁸ Both the quasi-biological and the structureless character of the concept "adjustment" tend, by formalization, to universalize

word 'normal' carries a fairly definite and, for the most part, accurate implication to the mind of any intelligent person, it is nevertheless extremely difficult to define in concrete terms. . . . As commonly used to convey a definite idea, the word 'normal' means that which is in harmony with the general make-up and organization of the object under discussion—that which is consistent with other normal factors."

⁷⁶ Elliott and Merrill, p. 17, correctly assert that in "Edward T. Divine's discussion of 'the normal life' the norm is the healthy and uneventful life cycle of the average middle-class man or woman. These persons are never subjected to the temptations of great wealth. Neither do they come in contact with poverty, crime, vice, and other unpleasantly sordid aspects of life [*The Normal Life*, pp. 5-8]. His discussion is thus a consideration of the 'normal standards' for the several ages of the bourgeoisie. . . ."

⁷⁷ When it is so hidden; but note the heavily sentimental endowment the term may receive: R. C. Dexter, p. 408: ". . . few of the present generation of little ones, and fewer still of the next, will ever see the sun or the green grass because of the sins of their parents or the carelessness of their physician; and thanks to our increasing provision for free public education, more and more adapted to the needs of the individual child, thousands of boys and girls will become intelligent, responsible citizens, worthy of a free nation, instead of pawns for unscrupulous politicians. All this and much more is due to social adjustments, made by the unceasing effort and sacrifice of men and women who. . . ."

⁷⁸ J. L. Gillin (*b*), p. 4: "Social pathology . . . is the study of the social patterns and processes involved in man's failure to adjust himself and his institutions to the necessities of existence to the end that he may survive and satisfy the felt needs of his nature."

the term, thus again obscuring specific social content. Use of "adjustment" accepts the goals and the means of smaller community milieux.⁷⁹ At the most, writers using these terms suggest techniques or means believed to be less disruptive than others to attain the goals that are given. They do not typically consider whether or not certain groups or individuals caught in economically underprivileged situations can possibly obtain the current goals without drastic shifts in the basic institutions which channel and promote them. The idea of adjustment seems to be most directly applicable to a social scene in which, on the one hand, there is a society and, on the other, an individual immigrant.⁸⁰

⁷⁹ J. L. Gillin (*b*), p. 8: "An individual who does not approximate these [socially approved] standards is said to be *unadjusted*. If he does not concern himself with living up to them, he is said to be demoralized or disorganized." R. C. Dexter, p. 407: "In this book the term Social Adjustment has been . . . used as applying to . . . the necessary task of smoothing-off the rough edges and softening the sledge-hammer blows of an indifferent social system. The term . . . is practically synonymous with social adaptation—the fitting of man to his complete environment, physical and social alike. Until the present it has been the especially maladjusted individual or group who has received the service of 'straighteners.'" (Note *ideological* orientation of concept.)

⁸⁰ H. P. Fairchild, p. 34: "The other form of incompetence, which may be called 'maladjustment,' does not imply any lack on the part of the individual himself. . . . The man is all right, but he is not in the right place. Our immigrants furnish abundant examples of this form of incompetence. . . . But the foreigner is not by any means the sole example of maladjustment. Our modern life, particularly our modern city life, teems with cases of this sort." J. H. S. Bossard (*a*), p. 110 (under "The Immigrant's Problem of Adjustment"): "To most persons, life consists in large measure of habitual responses to the demands of a fairly fixed environment. When man changes his environment, new and perhaps untried responses are called for. New adjustments must be made, as we say." J. L. Gillin (*b*), p. 10: "Social pathology . . . arises out of the maladjustment between the individual and the social structure." Elliott and Merrill, p. 22: "Just as an effective social organization implies a harmony between individual and social interests, so a disorganized social order must involve a conflict between individual and social points of view."

The immigrant then "adjusts" to the new environment. The "immigrant problem" was early in the pathologist's center of focus, and the concepts used in stating it may have been carried over as the bases for a model of experience and formulations of other "problems." *The Polish Peasant* (1918), which has had a very strong influence on the books under consideration, was empirically focused upon an immigrant group.

In approaching the notion of adjustment, one may analyze the specific illustrations of maladjustment that are given and from these instances infer a type of social person who in this literature is evaluated as "adjusted." The ideally adjusted man of the social pathologists is "socialized." This term seems to operate ethically as the opposite of "selfish,"⁸¹ it implies that the adjusted man conforms to middle-class morality and motives and "participates" in the gradual progress of respectable institutions. If he is not a "joiner," he certainly gets around and into many community organizations.⁸² If

⁸¹ Gillin, Dittmer, and Colbert, pp. 16-17: "By *socialization* we mean the directing of human motives toward giving to 'even the least' of the members of the social whole the benefits of cultural development. Socialization is thus practically the opposite to *aloofness, selfishness, greed, exploitation, and profiteering*. It causes the individual and the group to *feel their oneness* with the social whole. . . . In brief, what society regards as *moral, i.e., good for the whole*, becomes the aim of socialized individuals and groups. This being true, the improvement of society rests to a very large extent upon *moral progress*."

⁸² See Queen and Gruener, *Social Pathology: Obstacles to Social Participation*. These authors would deny this mode of statement, but such verbal denials must be tested against what they have done and the framework they have actually employed in defining pathologies. Their criterion of the pathological is correctly indicated in the subtitle of their book. Elliott and Merrill, p. 580: "There are various criteria by which the degree of individual participation may be measured roughly . . . whether or not he votes at elections . . . the individual's ownership of real or personal property . . . the degree of specific interest in community activities may be roughly measured by the number and character of the institutions to which the individual belongs, as well as

he is socialized, the individual thinks of others and is kindly toward them. He does not brood or mope about but is somewhat extravert, eagerly participating in his community's institutions. His mother and father were not divorced, nor was his home ever broken. He is "successful"—at least in a modest way—since he is ambitious; but he does not speculate about matters too far above his means, lest he become "a fantasy thinker," and the little men don't scramble after the big money. The less abstract the traits and fulfilled "needs" of "the adjusted man" are, the more they gravitate toward the norms of independent middle-class persons verbally living out Protestant ideals in the small towns of America.⁸³

the voluntary community activities in which he participates. Communities in which there is a high percentage of individuals with a positive rating on the items listed above are logically those which are the most highly organized and efficient." (Note the character of the institutions, participation in which is defined as organized.)

⁸³ See above documentation; notice the Protestant ethical accent on *utility* and what it will do for one, apparently irrespective of social fact: Gillin-Dittmer, and Colbert, p. 106: "People who are use, ful, no matter what happens to be their race or color, come to be liked and respected. Consequently, the central aim of a sound educational program should be to teach people to be useful. (Hart, Hornell, *The Science of Social Relations*, 1927, pp. 521-524.)" In the following, note the norm of competitiveness: Elliott and Merrill, pp. 29-30: "Often, however, the individual cannot or will not compete. We then have the following pathological manifestations: ' . . . the dependent . . . who is unable to compete; the defective . . . who is, if not unable, at least handicapped in his efforts to compete. The *criminal*, on the other hand, . . . who is perhaps unable, but at any rate refuses, to compete according to the rules which society lays down.' (Park and Burgess, *Introduction to the Science of Sociology*, p. 560)." Among the traits thought to characterize "the good life from the standpoint of the individual," Odum, pp. 50-51, cites: "patience," "specialized knowledge of some particular thing," "skill," "optimism," "love of work," "dynamic personality," "moderation," "trained will power," etc. Cf., in this connection, K. Davis, "Mental Hygiene and the Class Structure," *Psychiatry: Journal of the Biology and Pathology of Interpersonal Relations*, February, 1938, pp. 55-65.

THE DISAPPEARANCE OF FOOT-BINDING IN TINGHSIEN

SIDNEY D. GAMBLE

ABSTRACT

Foot-binding among Chinese women began about one thousand years ago. It spread gradually until in 1650 it was so firmly established that the Emperor K'ang Hsi was unable to enforce a ban against it. In a group of rural families living in Tingsien, Hopei Province, less than 1 per cent of the women born before 1890 had unbound feet. Among those born after 1890, the proportion with bound feet decreased steadily until in this particular group of families the custom was entirely discontinued after 1919.

This study was part of a social survey made by the Chinese National Association of the Mass Education Movement.

The origin of the Chinese custom of foot-binding—which, until recent years, was almost universal among Chinese women—is uncertain, but apparently it began about one thousand years ago. It is first definitely mentioned in the records in connection with the court of the southern T'ang dynasty at Nanking, A.D. 937-75. This court practiced a life of luxury and enjoyed the sight of dancing girls, their feet clad with "bow-shoes," the upturned toes of which resembled the bow of a Roman galley.

One modern Chinese scholar¹ writes that during the T'ang dynasty (618-906) women slaves were usually trained as dancers. He estimates that there were over a million of them during those years. They apparently spread the fashion of small feet throughout central and southern China. The small feet of the sought-after dancers may have started the style, but it hardly explains the spread and long continuance of foot-binding, which has meant much limitation, discomfort, and pain to so many individuals over so many years.

In the twelfth century the highly influential scholar-philosopher, Chu Hsi (1130-1200), according to Dr. Lin Yutang, was "enthusiastic in introducing foot-binding in southern Fukien as a

means of spreading Chinese culture and teaching the separation of men and women."

Although apparently accepted as part of Chinese culture in central China, the custom does not seem to have penetrated northern China to any great extent under the Liao, the Chin, or the early Yuan dynasties. By the first part of the fourteenth century, however, it must have become fairly general, for Friar Odoric of Pordenone (d. January, 1331), who was in northern China for three years during the period 1322-28, says in his travelogue: "And with the women the great beauty is to have little feet; and for this reason mothers are accustomed, as soon as girls are born to them, to swathe their feet tightly so that they can never grow in the least."² Other early European or western Asiatic travelers do not comment on the custom. Some Chinese authors of the twelfth, thirteenth, and fourteenth centuries, in mentioning the practice, apparently accept it as part of their mores.

The early Ming emperors—a Chinese dynasty—did not bandage the feet of their palace women, although foot-binding was practiced by a considerable proportion of their Chinese subjects.

¹ N. C. Kuan, *Quarterly Review of Social Science* (Peiping: Academica Sinica), January, 1937.

² Sir Henry Yule, *Cathay and the Way Thither*, rev. Cordier (London: Printed for the Hakluyt Society, 1916), p. 256.

When the Manchus, who did not practice foot-binding, came into power, they endeavored to prohibit the custom among their Chinese subjects. Their first proscription was issued in Mukden in 1638. In 1645, the second year of his reign as emperor of China, Shun Chih issued another edict against foot-binding and attempted to enforce it throughout China. K'ang Hsi repeated the ban in 1662. In 1668, finding the proscription to be ineffectual, K'ang Hsi withdrew the ban and allowed his Chinese subjects to continue the practice. He could force the Chinese men to wear queues, but he could not force the Chinese women to give up binding their feet. The custom, however, was not tolerated by the Manchu emperors in their palaces or in the banners (sections of the army).

Among the Chinese, objection to the practice apparently did not begin to crop up until the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. Yüan Mei (1716-99), Li Ju-chen (*ca.* 1763-*ca.* 1830), and Yu Chenghsieh (1775-1840) all wrote against it. In 1896-98 K'ang Yu-wei (1858-1927) made it one of the reforms for which he struggled.

Many influences have combined to bring about the discontinuance of foot-binding, but the Protestant missionaries, who have steadily worked against the practice, seem to have been largely influential in gradually arousing public opinion against the custom.

The Chinese National Association of the Mass Education Movement, when making a population study in Tingsien in 1929, secured figures showing the extent of foot-binding among the 1,736 females of 515 families. These figures, when correlated with the ages of the women, show very clearly how the cultural pattern changed in Tingsien within thirty years and how foot-binding

gradually disappeared, slowly at first and then with increasing rapidity, until it was completely discontinued about 1919.

Tingsien is a rural area some 125 miles south of Peiping. The families studied were all living in villages several miles east of the hsien city. The group was representative of the general rural population, except for the fact that it contained a slightly larger proportion of families with land holdings of over 50 mu of land per family.

TABLE 1
TINGSIEN FEMALES WITH BOUND AND
UNBOUND FEET—515 FAMILIES, 1929

Age Groups	Unbound Feet	Bound Feet	Total	Per Cent Bound
Under 5....	294	294
5-9.....	169	169
10-14.....	152	9	161	5.6
15-19.....	120	29	149	19.5
20-24.....	52	77	129	59.7
25-29.....	24	106	130	81.5
30-34.....	6	97	103	94.1
35-39.....	6	103	109	94.5
40 and over.	4	488	492	99.2
Total..	827	909	1,736

Our age figures are for the usual five-year age groups used in census studies—under five, five to nine, ten to thirteen, etc. The ages have all been calculated according to the foreign method rather than the Chinese method, whereby a baby is one year old when it is born and two years old on the next Chinese New Year's Day.

Foot-binding ordinarily was started when the girls were about three years old. As this difference is relatively constant, we have not attempted to adjust our figures to allow for it. It has seemed better to use the more usual age groups.

Among the women who were born before 1890 and were forty years of age or over when the study was made in

1929, foot-binding was practically universal (99.2 per cent). One wonders how it was that four women in that group did not have their feet bound (Table 1).

For those born during the two five-year periods from 1890 to 1899, there was only a small change in the figures. However, it was enough to show that, even in the country, a few families were beginning to accept new ideas and leave their daughters' feet unbound, despite the fact that later on it might be difficult to find husbands for the girls. The proportion with unbound feet in the group born between 1890 and 1899 rose to 5 per cent.

Many new ideas came in after 1900 (Boxer year), and the spirit of change evidently reached the Tingsien countryside with considerable rapidity. Eighteen and one-half per cent of the girls born during the five years from 1900 through 1904 did not have their feet bound. In the next five-year group, 1905-9, the proportion more than doubled, reaching 40.3 per cent.

The biggest change of all came in the group born from 1910 to 1914. Those were the years of the Revolution and the founding of the Republic. New ideas were being adopted in many fields, and many old customs were breaking down. The proportion of girls with unbound

feet was 80.5 per cent—double that of the next older five-year group.

In the 1915-19 group, 94.4 per cent of the girls had unbound feet. The 5.6 per cent with bound feet were all born before 1917. All the girls under thirteen years of age were reported as having natural unbound feet.

If these figures are typical, we can say that foot-binding came to an end in Tingsien in 1919. Knowing the general conservatism of the countryside, it is remarkable to see how this old and well-nigh universal custom, which had lasted for almost one thousand years and had successfully defied imperial authority, disappeared completely in these Tingsien families in a period of about twenty years, or less than one generation.

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³ I am indebted to Dr. L. Carrington Goodrich for assistance with the reference material. The Tingsien figures were secured by field workers under the direction of Mr. Franklin C. H. Lee.

NEWS AND NOTES

RESEARCH NEWS

University of Minnesota.—Professors F. Stuart Chapin, E. D. Monachesi, and Lowry Nelson are sharing in a co-operative research study done by several social science departments of the university on the impact of the war upon small Minnesota communities. The study will also relate itself to problems of post-war planning. Professor Monachesi has helped to organize a youth survey in Austin, Minnesota.

Wayne University.—Donald C. Marsh, assistant professor of sociology, is continuing a study of "Some Aspects of Negro-Jewish Relationships in Detroit, Michigan," which he started a year ago under the auspices of the Detroit Chapter, National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, and the Detroit Jewish Community Council. Professor Marsh is being assisted by Mrs. Eleanor Paperno Wolf and Alvin Loving, graduate fellows. Part I of the study, entitled "Summary of Surveys," is now completed. This part summarizes surveys of (a) commercial establishments, (b) prices charged, (c) attitudes of Jews toward Negroes, (d) attitudes of white Gentiles toward Negroes, (e) attitudes of Negro youth toward Jews, and (f) economic data on the Negro consumer and Negro adult attitudes toward Jews in commercial relationships. The other major parts of the study are to be entitled: "II. History of Negro-Jewish Commercial Relationships in Detroit"; "III. Analysis of Negro-Jewish Attitudes"; and "IV. Conclusions."

As a result of his direction of this study and of a study made in 1926 for the mayor of Detroit's Interracial Commission, Professor Marsh is serving as consultant on interracial problems to the Mayor's Interracial Committee, the Office of Civilian Defense, the Nationalities Committee of the

Council of Social Agencies of Metropolitan Detroit, the Union for Democratic Action, and the Committee on Curricular Reorganization of the Detroit Public Schools. Professor Marsh is also aiding the City Planning Commission in the location of major highways through making available to them the results of his long-term survey of ecological trends in the city of Detroit, especially in changes in the downtown business district.

NOTES

University of Chicago.—Herbert Blumer has returned to the University of Chicago after an absence of nine months to resume his university work and his editorship of the *American Journal of Sociology*.

University of Cincinnati.—Like all others in the university, the department of sociology has been devoting a large part of its manpower to instruction for Army units, and several hours in the department of sociology are now given over to Army requirements.

The division in which sociology is especially assisting is the Army Special Training Program, which is designed for the preparation of persons for reconstruction work overseas after the war. Particular emphasis has been given to the sociological and cultural background of selected areas.

In addition, the department has been asked to assume responsibility for a special program for social work aides: a 60-hour program of work to train emergency aides in social work agencies and assistants to professional social workers. A minimum of two years' college work is expected prior to enrolment. Upon completion of 60 hours (most of which are acceptable in this emergency toward regular university degrees), a certificate is given by the university under its War Service Training Institute.

Dr. Gustav G. Carlson, assistant professor of sociology, has been granted a year's leave of absence to serve as analyst under the Office of War Information in San Francisco.

Miss Lois Elliott has been appointed as part-time instructor in sociology.

Indiana University.—Dr. Dinko Tomasic has been appointed associate professor of sociology with the duty during the war of organizing instruction in the Balkan Area project for students in the Army Specialized Training Program.

Mr. Carl W. Birky, formerly at Elmhurst College, has been appointed instructor in sociology.

An undergraduate curriculum in social work has been developed and is attached to the department of sociology, as is also the graduate training course for social work in Indianapolis. The instructors in the undergraduate curriculum are Miss Helen A. Brown, formerly of Washington University, and Mrs. Florence R. Miller, formerly of the University of Kentucky.

University of Iowa.—Margaret B. Pahlman, graduate student at the University of Chicago, has been appointed instructor in sociology at the University of Iowa.

University of Kansas City.—Ernest Mannheim has published a *Report on Delinquency* and a handbook: *Kansas City and Its Neighborhoods*. The first was released by the Kansas City Welfare Department, the latter is a joint publication of the Kansas City Council of Churches and the department of sociology.

Lynn Perrigo is on leave of absence for the present academic year. During that period he will be in charge of the regional Inter-American Institute.

University of Kentucky.—Dr. Logan Wilson, formerly an instructor in sociology at Harvard University and later head of the department of sociology at Tulane University, succeeds in this position Dr. Harry

Best, who will give more time to his research studies. Dr. Irvin T. Sanders is on leave of absence in Washington for the fall quarter in connection with post-war agricultural programs.

University of Maine.—Vincent H. Whitney, instructor in sociology, completed his work for the Doctor's degree during the summer at the University of North Carolina. His dissertation, under the direction of Professor Rupert B. Vance, was titled "The Pattern of Village Life: A Study of Southern Piedmont Villages in Terms of Population, Structure, and Role."

University of Michigan.—Dr. Robert C. Angell, who has been in Army service for the last year, has been promoted to Major and is stationed at Randolph Field, Texas. He is director of the College Training Program for the Central Flying Training Command.

Mills College.—A Workshop of Family Relationships was conducted this last summer, under Dr. Paul Popenoe, of the Institute of Family Relations of Los Angeles, Dr. John H. Furbay, director of summer session at Mills College, and Mrs. Frances Bruce Strain, author and authority in the field of sex education.

In his discussion on human biology Dr. Popenoe reviewed such topics as the physiology of reproduction, the psychology of sex differences, and the evolution of the modern family.

Mrs. Strain based her sex-guidance conferences on personal observation of the normal and spontaneous sex interests of children as they manifest themselves in everyday life, first, in the random and unapproved fashion of childhood; later, through individual and group experience into socially acceptable and approved manifestations without injury to the integrity of the original and native impulse.

In the third series Dr. Popenoe, Dr. Furbay, and Mrs. Strain presented such topics of universal interest as social dating, court-

ship, choice of mate, sterility, fertility, eugenics, war marriages, divorce, together with detailed treatment of the teaching methods applicable to these subjects. Lectures by leading authorities of the San Francisco Bay region in psychiatry, pediatrics, gynecology, religion, counseling, and sex guidance gave variety and scope to the program.

Mills College plans to offer a third workshop next summer. There will be special arrangements for observation of young children in the Mills College Nursery School to meet the needs of students in nursery-school education. There will also be open forums for the presentation and discussion of individual projects by class members; there will be continued development and guidance in program planning, evaluation of materials, books, films, and visual aids, as well as personal conferences for each student with the regular workshop leaders.

University of Minnesota.—Professor Clifford Kirkpatrick has been giving a course in survey technique in the European Area and Language, A.S.T.P.

Professor Raymond F. Sletto is supervising a new research program in child welfare for the Minnesota State Department of Social Welfare.

Professor George B. Vold has had charge of developing a four months' course in introductory sociology for students in the N.R.O.T.C. at the University of Minnesota.

National Association for Nursery Education.—The National Association for Nursery Education is holding its tenth biennial meeting in Boston, Massachusetts, October 22-25, with headquarters at the Hotel Statler. This will be a work-study conference on "The Community Serves the Child in War and Peace." Registration opens on the morning of October 22, and the first general session will be that evening on the topic, "The World Picture and the Implications for Education." The subsequent sessions will consist of study groups which will discuss child-development problems based on

actual case histories of various communities. Special features will include curbstone meetings, educational exhibits, and a public relations booth.

Northwestern University.—Thorsten Sellin, editor of the *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, has accepted chairmanship of the department of sociology for 1944-45.

University of Pennsylvania.—Professor W. Rex Crawford has been granted leave of absence to go to Brazil, where he will serve as senior cultural adviser for the United States Department of State. Professor Donald Young has been appointed to succeed him as chairman of the department.

Assistant Professor Ray Abrams appears as special editor for the September issue of the *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*. The issue is devoted to "The American Family in World War II" and includes articles by Professors James Bossard and Thorsten Sellin.

Professor James H. S. Bossard, together with Mrs. Eleanor Boll, research assistant of the Carter Foundation, are authors of a new volume entitled *Family Situations*, which has just been published by the University of Pennsylvania Press. Professor Bossard continues to serve as chairman of the social science division in the Graduate School.

Russell Sage Foundation.—Russell H. Kurtz has been appointed assistant general director of the Russell Sage Foundation. Mr. Kurtz has been a member of the staff of the Foundation since 1931, first as a research assistant and since 1935 as department director and editor of the *Social Work Year Book*.

Université Laval, Quebec, P.Q., Canada.—The Ecole des sciences sociales, économiques et politiques has just established a department of social research, made possible by a provincial government grant for that pur-

pose. The director of the school, the Very Reverend Father Georg-Henri Levesque, O.P., will head the new department with the assistance of Jean-Charles Falardeau, who has just returned from two years of study in sociology and anthropology at the University of Chicago. Messrs. Maurice Tremblay, in sociology, and Maurice LaMontagne, in economics, have also joined the staff after two years each at Harvard University. The Rev. Fr. P. G. Poulin, O.F.M., assistant director of the school, Rev. Fr. J. T. Delos, O.P., Mr. Paul-Henri Guimont, Mr. T. Paznanski, and other professors will collaborate in the work of the new department.

It has been decided to start at once upon a general survey of the industrial communities and regions of the province. The survey will be followed by more intensive studies of certain communities and of special problems which arise from the industrialization of the province of Quebec.

Mr. Everett C. Hughes of the University of Chicago spent two weeks with the staff of the school at the beginning of the session.

Wayne University.—Dr. H. Warren Dunham and Dr. Norman Daymond Humphrey, formerly instructors, have been advanced to assistant professorships, effective September 1, 1943.

The Dryden Press, 103 Park Avenue, New York, announces the publication of *Race Riot* by Dr. Alfred McClung Lee, professor and chairman, department of sociology, and Dr. Norman Daymond Humphrey, assistant professor of anthropology and sociology. The book details and analyzes the 1943 riots in Detroit, Los Angeles, and Harlem and proposes a program for easing racial tensions. It will be published on or before November 1, 1943.

Dr. H. Warren Dunham has collaborated with Dr. Samuel Waldfogel, department of psychology, in the preparation of *A Student's Manual of Mental Hygiene* for college Freshmen. It will be used experimentally in Wayne University's Freshman orientation classes.

Herman Jacobs, executive secretary, Jewish Community Center, Detroit, has rejoined the department of sociology as a special instructor, teaching a course in pre-professional social work. Mr. Jacobs is first vice-president, Social Workers' Club of Detroit; chairman, Adult Advisory Committee of the Metropolitan Detroit Youth Council; member, Mayor's Committee on Youth Problems; member, Coordinating Committee for Willow Run Area Recreational Project; and member, Advisory Committee on Interracial and Intercultural School Curriculum.

Dr. Edward C. Jandy, associate professor of sociology, taught during the summer at the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor.

Dr. Alfred McClung Lee's research reports for the United States Department of Justice in the Associated Press case have been published in a volume of exhibits submitted in the District Court of the United States for the Southern District of New York, dated May 25, 1943, Civil Action No. 19-163. Dr. Lee is professor and chairman of the department of sociology.

Wheaton College.—Dr. Paul F. Cressey is on leave of absence to teach in the Far Eastern Area School, Stanford University. He will teach modern Chinese civilization in the Far Eastern Army Training Program. During his absence from Wheaton College, classes will be taught by Dr. Theodore Sprague of Harvard University.

BOOK REVIEWS

Later Criminal Careers. By SHELDON and ELEANOR GOUCEK. New York: Commonwealth Fund, 1937. Pp. xi+403. \$3.00.

In this follow-up investigation of 500 *Criminal Careers* in their second five-year period, Professor and Mrs. Glueck have made a detailed statistical analysis with all the scrupulous care to be found in their previous work.

Of the original 510 subjects investigated in the previous volume, 454 were available for the present volume. The general aim of this research was to discover whether time brings any improvement in the conduct of ex-prisoners and, if so, what the accompanying factors are.

The major findings which the authors made, as compared with the findings of the first five-year period after release from the West Concord (Massachusetts) Reformatory, were: (1) a slight trend toward stability as indicated by less moving from place to place, some improvement in choice of neighborhood for residence; (2) improvement in the moral atmosphere of the home—general environmental conditions in the fifth year (31.0) good, as compared with 24.8 in the fourth year of the second five-year period; (3) an increase in the number of married men; (4) little change in the relationship to nearest relatives, combined with a trend toward improvement of relationships to family; (5) slight change in the economic conditions, 41 per cent receiving aid from social agencies, as against 24.3 in the first five-year period; (6) decline in meeting economic responsibilities; (7) little change in industrial occupations or skills, work habits showed definite improvement, increased steadiness of employment, trend of industrial adjustment slightly upward; (8) reduction in harmful use of leisure time, little change in religious activities, no increase in desire for educational opportunities; (9) greater amount of drunkenness with concomitant decrease in crimes against property; (10) lower percentage of convictions, little change in the frequency of convictions, 118 (32.1 per cent) nondelinquent as compared with 89 (21.5 per cent) in first period, proportion of serious offenses lower.

The authors point out that the crucial inquiry in this research is the determination of the reasons for the improvement of the subjects'

conduct. After a careful examination of 63 factors, they conclude that there is but one principal reason for this improvement and that is that the subjects were getting older, but not too old. They attempt to demonstrate the fact that such improvement as has been noted *accompanies* the aging process (maturation) and that no other factor can possibly play so significant a part in explaining the non-delinquency, at least between the ages of twenty-one and thirty-six. After the age of thirty-six the subjects tend to deteriorate, and their conduct becomes definitely delinquent so that if they have not made progress toward conformity by that age it is evident that they never will. The peak period for the tendency toward reformation appears to be the years from thirty-one to thirty-six, when the accumulation of desirable or socially acceptable characteristics is finally achieved. The greater proportion of the non-delinquents make proper use of their leisure time, while the greater proportion of the delinquents engage in harmful activities, hanging around street corners and in "dives," with undesirable companions.

The real problem, in the eyes of the reviewer, is not the accuracy of the statistical material or of the method which has been used but rather the challenging and sweeping contention of the authors that aging in and by itself accounts for the progressive decrease in delinquent behavior in the age span which they have analyzed. If their contention is correct, that age brings psychological, physiological, and social transformation, thus making for decreased criminal activity, it is perfectly logical to extend their argument to the group over thirty-six, since there must be a continuous decrease of potential in those three fields almost to the day of death. Failures, they assert, are due to mental abnormality.

The authors have neatly sidestepped criticism by insisting that aging may not be the causal factor but that "the sheer passage of time, with the maturation that accompanies it, seems to be the key to an understanding of the reasons for reformation." It might also involve limitation of opportunity to commit delinquency, since social pressure always means more to those who have shouldered economic

and social responsibilities toward others. Or it may be the belated realization that if they are ever to get started, now is the time.

J. P. SHALLOO

University of Pennsylvania

Propaganda by Short Wave. Edited by HARWOOD L. CHILDS and JOHN B. WHITTON. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1942.

This book represents the results of eighteen months of short-wave monitoring by the Princeton Listening Center. From December, 1939, until May, 1941, when the Federal Communications Commission assumed the task, the Center analyzed broadcasts from western Europe to this country. The definitive history of the propaganda of this war will not be written until after the peace. Nevertheless, the editors of this volume have succeeded in compiling a work that is both timely and a permanent contribution to the field.

The book consists of a series of well-written and interesting papers surveying the short-wave broadcasts from England, France, Germany, and Italy in terms of the devices used to influence American attitudes toward the war. An introductory chapter by Mr. Whitton and J. H. Herz summarizing the history of radio in international politics helps give the work greater unity than is usually found in such collections. The chapter on England by Daniel Katz supplements the empirical data by a penetrating critical treatment, much of which has relevance for this country. The Introduction, this chapter, and the one on "Radio Rome" by Mr. Bruno Foa should also be commended for interpreting the contents of the broadcasts in terms of their social and political background. Two further papers synthesize the data from various countries. Mr. Jacob's chapter on "Atrocity Propaganda" is concerned with a much-worked-over field, yet he has developed a classification by no means trite and has used it effectively in comparing the propaganda techniques of the various belligerents. Miss Edrita Fried discusses the techniques of persuasion.

The last chapter, by Mr. Childs, is concerned with the extent of listening to short wave by the American public. From bringing together the results of a number of polling studies, he concludes that the amount of short-wave listening is small.

Perhaps the greatest weakness of this book is that in most instances it fails to deal numerically with quantitative problems. While I do not contend that only quantitative knowledge is true knowledge or that only quantitative techniques should be applied, it does seem obvious that quantitative statements, statements about "more" and "less," about "increase" and "decrease," should be made as accurate as possible if they are to be made. Thus, when Mr. Jacob in his chapter on Nazi propaganda traces the frequency of five themes through six periods, or when Mr. Katz says, for example, "Devices of identification were used sparingly in the first phase of the war. . . . After Dunkerque, however, there is an abrupt rise," we should like to have a somewhat better idea of what the author feels to be much or little use of a device. Numbers might be approximate or inexact, but certainly less so than their absence. Mr. Childs' paper and Mr. Jacob's paper on "Atrocity Propaganda," which contains a quantitative content analysis, should be excluded from this criticism.

ITHIEL POOL

Introduction to Sociology. By L. L. BERNARD. New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Co., 1942. Over one thousand pages. \$3.75.

For me, at least, anything that Professor Bernard has written has been very much worth while. Thus a favorable mood existed for the examination of his new text. As the "outgrowth of some thirty years of active teaching"—and of numerous writings as well—the book has values which are not evident from a casual survey.

Professor Bernard thinks there are two types of elementary text:

One type attempts to present the leading principles of the several sociological subsiences, as outlined in Chapter I of this book. The other type develops a synthetic presentation of the principles basic to the whole field of sociology rather than abstracts of the several sociological subsiences. The second method is the one followed here [Preface, p. viii].

Further, he informs us that

the task set before the present volume is not primarily the discovery of what should be done to produce a better society but, rather, to ascertain how society came to be, what factors have featured in its evolution so far, and what it is like at the present time [p. 204].

These three points are expanded under three headings: (1) "The Development of Social Processes and Institutions"; (2) "The Transforming Influence of the Factors Operating To Produce Social Processes and Change"; (3) "A Cross-sectional View of Society as It Is Today, or the Functioning of Social Organization and Social Controls." And here we have the main outlines of the book.

Several minor differences between this and other texts, called "innovations," are referred to—the absence of page footnotes, for example. There is an ample bibliography at the end of each chapter, and there are the usual problems for class discussion and student investigation.

So far, in the production of elementary texts, it seems that the only guiding principle is "Every man to his own taste." For example, how much space and elaboration to what topics? What guides choice here? In the text under review the number of pages devoted to the three above-noted aspects are as follows: (1) 167 pages, (2) 588 pages, (3) say, 200 pages. In other words, hundreds of pages are used to explain and illustrate the interrelationships between the inorganic, organic, psychical, and cultural realms, and social life; but one chapter is adjudged enough for a formal statement on "Social Conflict and Co-operation," and a page is sufficient to dispose of accommodation and assimilation. The terms "contact" and "interaction" do not appear in the Index. What guiding ideas determine these proportions, emphases, and omissions? Logic? The amount and availability of scientific knowledge? Pedagogical utility? A mood? Habits of thought?

A partial answer is found in the opening lines of the Preface: "This *Introduction to Sociology* is the result of a deliberate attempt to produce a treatise on sociology . . . which is thoroughly naturalistic in its approach to the subject." Meaning, first, I suppose, that the approach is not supernaturalistic; second, that it is in harmony with the attitudes and methods of modern science; and, third, that human society is as much a part of nature as the sun and germ cells. But Professor Bernard knows as well as anyone that there is no such phenomenon as "natural" science; that there are only sciences of nature, so-called. All science is sociocultural. It could not have been predicted, no matter how exhaustive the knowledge of nature, that science would be developed. It is not illuminating to me to characterize our science as "natural," except in the second sense above.

There are no direct quotations from other

authors; and the style of writing is heavily factual. Rather lacking in light touches—relief from concentration—the book is better adapted for Seniors than for Sophomores. There are many excellent pictures and diagrams; and the cover is attractive. But it seems to me that its dimensions are too small for its bulk, making it difficult to handle while studying away from a table.

FREDERICK E. LUMLEY

Ohio State University

Sociology: A Study of Society and Culture. By KIMBALL YOUNG. New York: American Book Co., 1942. Pp. 1005.

Professor Young's *An Introductory Sociology* was first published in 1934. A revised edition appeared in 1939. In its present form the book is so extensively changed that the author presents it as a new work; in addition to other changes, it is about 50 per cent longer than the earlier editions. The book makes no pretense of developing a coherent body of social thought or of presenting a system of sociology. It is quite frankly eclectic in content, the principle of selection being, apparently, that of current interest. The first of the six parts of the book discusses selected topics from the field of culture; the second touches in a concrete way some recent historical changes in community groupings; the third presents some simple and timely information about race, population, and geographic environment; the fourth part deals with social institutions but includes, also, a chapter on social and personal disorganization; the fifth part is entitled "Some Basic Processes of Interaction"; the sixth and final part of the volume is on control and planning. The book should find an immediate and large following. The discussion throughout is concrete and sufficiently simple to be within the effortless grasp of the Sophomore, and the book is sufficiently encyclopedic to provide the teacher with an abundance of assignments.

E. B. REUTER

University of Iowa

Social Institutions in an Era of World Upheaval. By HARRY ELMER BARNES. New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1942. Pp. xviii+927.

The purpose of this book, as conceived by the author, is to provide a more ample "historical

background for the appraisal of our institutional problems and readjustments" than has yet been available in any "other book in any language" and to demand of social science and education that they prepare "a blueprint of a better social system and a realistic indication of how we may bring this into existence in a gradual, peaceful, and intelligent fashion." To this end he traces the development of our contemporary economic, political, legal, domestic, and cultural institutions, from their origins in "man's blundering efforts to satisfy the various drives inherent in human nature." These efforts have been good enough to secure physical survival, but they have not enabled man to achieve even the state described by Plato as "a city of happy pigs," much less have they enabled him to realize the potentialities in personal and social life on "the supra-pig level."

The problem of maintaining adjustment between institutions and the basic conditions of life has been a perennial one. In primitive society the rigidity of institutions was due chiefly to man's tendency to attribute social origins and social causation to supernatural powers and hence to repress freedom of speculation and invention in the institutional field as irreverence and impiety. But with the rise of secularism, vested interests have replaced belief in divine origin in providing the rationalizations conferring sanctity upon social institutions and rendering them almost as resistant to change as in primitive times.

The book is a brilliant polemic on behalf of a social science which must no longer dodge the more difficult problems of social value and social guidance. It is all the more regrettable, therefore, that the author rides his own hobbies so hard as to overlook essential facts at times and at times to end in contradiction. A few brief examples must suffice. It may or may not be true that "the modern jury trial is scarcely superior to the ordeal or trial by battle," but no discussion of the "travesty of the jury trial" should fail to recognize that the jury is of dwindling importance in criminal cases, that less than a fifth of the convictions now take place on the finding of a jury, that many states now permit waiver of jury, and that in such jurisdictions the number of jury trials tend to be negligible. In a discussion of the arbitrariness of the judge in passing sentence it is not sufficient to dismiss the suggestion that judges be deprived of the sentencing power with such remarks as "such proposals . . . have the support of many respectable and relatively conservative

persons" and "Alfred E. Smith once made such a suggestion while governor of the State of New York," without even a reference to the work of the American Law Institute in formulating the model Youth Correction Authority Act and in securing its introduction into several state legislatures and its enactment by California prior to 1942. The author acknowledges that "had Britain won a fairly rapid victory with our aid, it would have been possible to revamp democracy and capitalism on a just and efficient pattern, an achievement already made by Sweden. It would also have been possible to create a federation of Europe which might assure world peace for generations." But in later sections this acknowledgment is forgotten, and those liberals who, before Pearl Harbor, supported the efforts of the Roosevelt administration to provide the aid which might have made such a desired consummation possible, are roundly denounced for their inconsistency and intellectual confusion!

HOWARD E. JENSEN

Duke University

Rural Sociology and Rural Social Organization.

By DWIGHT SANDERSON. New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1942. Pp. xvii+806. \$4.00.

For maturity of thought and comprehensive scholarship, this book represents a landmark in the history of rural sociology. From the reviewer's point of view no other text so satisfactorily integrates the accumulated research of the last twenty-five years and sets forth its implications. The book offers a structural approach to the subject with the frank statement that the factual basis for a rural social psychology is not yet sufficiently developed to warrant its inclusion. The reviewer believes that this omission could have been justified on better grounds. Rural sociology is defined as "the sociology of life in the rural environment," an expression that would be strengthened by substituting "society" for "life." The scope of the subject is thought to be comprehensive rather than particularistic.

The author is one of those who believe that a natural science of society is possible. Because of his background in biological science, he sees the necessity for detailed knowledge of social structure as a basis for the study of function and social change. This view set forth in articles previously published provides the author with an approach that is maintained throughout the

book as consistently and completely as present knowledge will permit.

An important feature of this book is the author's insistence upon a distinction between sociology as a science and applied sociology or social technology. The latter he calls "social organization" and regards it as a mixture of art and applied science. This device is neither new nor profound, but it enables the author to avoid the perplexities of many other writers of textbooks in rural sociology who attempt to subsume under rural sociology as an applied science both scientific and social-improvement objectives.

Half of the book is devoted to an intensive analysis of rural institutions, groups, and classes. Nearly a fourth is devoted to an analysis of environmental backgrounds—physical, population, economic, cultural. An eighth of the space is given to organization and trends in relation to the great society. The documentation includes more than fifteen hundred citations of some seven hundred authors. Printing and binding are attractively and serviceably done.

C. E. LIVELY

University of Missouri

Marriage and the Child. By JAMES H. S. BOS-SARD. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1940. Pp. xv+178. \$2.00.

Marriage and the Child is made up of two parts, which, in spite of the author's attempt to give a plausible reason for their linkage in a single volume, have no relationship to each other. The first part deals historically with the child-welfare movement, both in its ideological and in its technical development. Its general thesis is that the welfare of the child has become a matter of scientific concern and has broadened its interest in recent years from such specialized groups of children as the underprivileged to all children.

The second part of the book consists of a collection of six papers upon the relationship of various factors to marriage. Chief among the factors given consideration are: age, residential propinquity, nationality and nativity, previous marital status, ecological variations in rates, and the depression. The original data in this series of chapters are from Philadelphia for four of the papers and from upstate New York for the remaining two.

The most significant section of the book is the second part in which the analysis is statisti-

cal. In general, the findings give statistical confirmation to what many sociologists have assumed upon the basis of casual observation. For example: marriage occurs most frequently in the early twenties; women generally marry younger than men; marriage occurs more frequently between persons who live close together than far apart; marriage is more frequent within nativity groups than outside; previously married persons predominately marry persons who have never been previously married; marriage rates tend to be higher among peoples of low standards of living. Important among the findings not so commonly assumed are the following: marriages are about equally divided between those in which both persons lived near each other and those in which they lived far apart (twenty or more Philadelphia blocks constituting the latter category); intermarriage occurs half of the time (that proportion of upstate New York marriages being between persons of different nationality or nativity or both); and marriage rates are higher in areas of increasing than of declining population.

The book as a whole lacks careful integration. Four of the nine chapters had previously appeared in print either in whole (essentially) or in part. This has resulted in some repetition and lack of uniformity in style of presentation. Nevertheless, the findings are of significance, and the final chapter compensates for the excursiveness of the preceding chapters by co-gently summarizing the whole of the book in terse, concise language.

ERNEST R. MOWRER

Northwestern University

Marriage and the Family. Edited by HOWARD BECKER and REUBEN HILL. Boston: D. C. Heath, 1942. Pp. xv+663. \$4.00.

This book is presented as a synthesis of materials characteristic of "family courses" and also of "marriage courses" of a more practical nature. It is likewise claimed that, through special effort, unity has been achieved in spite of the fact that twenty-seven authorities rather than one or two provide the contents of the volume.

The first claim may be readily granted. The book is exceedingly rich in content, including sections on background, preparation for marriage, physical factors, marriage interaction, problems of parenthood, family disorganization, and the inevitable prospects for the future.

Several of the chapters, as, for example, Bain's, are brilliant in content and style and go beyond the rehashing of traditional material. Others, such as those by Rockwell Smith, at best leave this reviewer cold.

The claim of organic unity is not so readily granted. One senses the valiant efforts of the editors and almost strains with them in their attempt to unify a varied content and style. It just cannot be done. Often the more original suggestions and insights are the points least integrated into a conceptual structure. Occasionally the scar of an editorial amputation seems clearly visible, as, for example, in the Hallowell chapter. The stimulating discussion of biological factors in that contribution is in no way integrated with "Physical Factors" (pp. 237-88).

But one cannot expect too much. The book is one of the best in the field. The editors have stimulated a score of essays that hang together better than most symposia; and a serious student can acquire from the book a vast amount of information concerning family relationships and some other valuable material thrown in for good measure.

CLIFFORD KIREPATRICK

University of Minnesota

The Small Community: Foundations of Community Life. By ARTHUR E. MORGAN. New York: Harper & Bros., 1942. Pp. xiii+312. \$3.00.

This volume by a well-known educator and engineer, formerly president of Antioch College and chairman of the Tennessee Valley Authority, is addressed primarily, not to sociologists or to social workers, but to civic groups and leaders interested in the improvement of rural and small-town communities. In his excellent discussion of the nature and significance of the local community the author reveals a nostalgic yearning for the simpler conditions of an earlier era dominated by rural rather than by urban ideals and ways of living. The important role of large urban units is pointed out, and the modern emphasis upon regionalism is given full recognition, without the changed position of the small community in the modern world being made clear. It is interesting to see how the older generation keeps harking back to the dreams and ideals of community organizers of former years instead of initiating a new movement vitalized

by concepts in harmony with existing conditions and ways of thinking. There is, of course, much that can be done by local leaders in the improvement of small communities, and consequently community organization is by no means entirely outmoded. The practical suggestions made by the author concerning ways and means of organizing the small community, the technique of informal community studies, and methods of improving community services should be very useful to civic clubs and community leaders. But it is regrettable that the author did not point out more clearly the changing aspects of community organization during a period when the government is accepting increasing responsibilities in the field of public welfare and is resorting more and more to centralized methods of control.

JESSE F. STEINER

University of Washington

Rural America Today: Its Schools and Community Life. By GEORGE A. WORKS and SIMON O. LESSER. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1942. Pp. xx+450. \$3.75.

As might well be expected from its authorship, this book is the best summary of the situation of and the proposals for improvement of rural education yet to appear. The first seven chapters describe the problem of rural education (consisting essentially, but not wholly, of the maldistribution of "dollars and children") and discuss the various proposals for improving the schools, including administrative reorganization, vitalizing the curriculum, expanding guidance and work programs, and training rural teachers. The remaining nine chapters are devoted largely to a treatment of the schools in relation to the rural community, with special reference to agencies of adult education, health, recreation, welfare, the library, and the various planning activities sponsored by the United States Department of Agriculture. A special chapter is devoted to the problems of rural Negro education, and one to older rural youth.

Perhaps the most significant aspect of this book lies in the treatment of the school and the educational process as an organic part of the rural community, the emphasis of the authors on the importance of a more complete integration with other agencies and institutions of the community, utilizing the rich resources of rural life

in the teaching process, and in relating school organization to the "natural social areas" of rural society.

LOWRY NELSON

University of Minnesota

Ocean City: An Ecological Analysis of a Satellite Community. By J. ELLIS VOSS. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1941.

Ocean City is a study of the specialized community center of that name located adjacent to Atlantic City. As a self-styled ecological study, it should be read and judged in terms of the methodological and conceptual frames developed by this approach to the study of the community. Unfortunately, the study is no more ecological than it is historical, economic, or sociopsychological. In fact, it is a mélange of data from these fields, placed in what is labeled an "ecological framework." In the author's words:

The object of this study was a description and analysis of the community with reference to its specificity in time and place, in order:

First, to determine what psycho-social effects have been produced by its (a) historic background, (b) the enormous fluctuation between summer and winter population, (c) its entire lack of business or industry other than that resulting from the summer vacationists.

Second, to determine what effect the ecological processes have had upon the structure pattern of the community, and the social interaction of its inhabitants [pp. 4-5, and 131].

Data were collected by means of interviews, questionnaires, and from records of establishments in Ocean City. These data covered the four institutions of commercialized recreation, government, the schools, and the family. They are presented in forty-four tables. What analysis there is, is in terms of absolute figures and percentages of a largely particular variable in a spatially defined area. The author almost completely ignores his first objective as stated in the preceding paragraph, except in a few paragraphs in the final chapter. Little is added to ecological knowledge by the material presented to answer the problem posed in his second objective.

A. B. HOLLINGSHEAD

Indiana University

Social Economics of North Dakota. By J. M. GILLETTE. Minneapolis, Minn.: Burgess Pub. Co., 1942. Pp. 245. Processed, with paper cover.

After studying the social economics of North Dakota for over a third of a century, Professor Gillette has brought up to date the social economic data for the state and has given us his interpretation of them. He describes its history and physical conditions and resources; analyzes its agriculture and other industries, showing that it must be primarily an agricultural state. Public health conditions, education, public welfare agencies, churches, recreation, and highways are each given a chapter. The book is freely illustrated with maps and graphs and has questions on each chapter for class use.

It forms an excellent reference work for any courses in social science dealing with North Dakota and should be invaluable for all government or organization executives and for state or county planning boards.

It is dedicated "To the Public Welfare of North Dakota." The author states that it is an expression of his devotion to the state, and as such it forms the ripe fruit of his long service to the commonwealth.

DWIGHT SANDERSON

Cornell University

The Family and Its Social Functions. By E. R. GROVES. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Co., 1940. Pp. 631. \$3.50.

The author of this book is concerned with the social purpose of the family and its functional relationship to other aspects of society: institutions, government, education, religion, etc. While a reciprocal relationship between the family and these other units is noted, the emphasis is on the support the family gives these units rather than on the mutual relationship among them all.

The nature of the family is discussed, interactive relationships within the family are noted, and the evolution of social thought concerning the family is reviewed. There is also a discussion of the future of the family. Lesson aids are provided, and the author has a mimeographed bibliography available for those who wish to write for it.

The author does not discuss the relationship of the family to social disorganization, but the

total interactive function of the family cannot be seen unless this is considered. Much of the human nature expressed through social disorganization was produced in socially approved areas, such as the family. This is especially true of the family now and is likely to be for some time to come. In some countries family heads have been trained only for war, and in invaded countries families are centers of hatreds and vindictive attitudes. The family has always been important in religious conflicts as well as in other conflicts, such as capital and labor. Negativistic and other attitudes created in the family find expression in alcoholism, prostitution, delinquency, family disorganization, and other deviant behavior.

L. GUY BROWN

Oberlin College

Minor Mental Maladjustments in Normal People.

By J. E. WALLACE WALLIN. 2d printing. Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1939. Pp. vi+298. \$3.00.

This volume is intended as a case book for students of psychology, education, and allied subjects interested in mental health and disorder. Each chapter consists of a series of autobiographical statements relating to a particular symptom or maladjustment. Sex problems were excluded "on consultation."

The brief statements, which should not be called case records, were obtained as a requirement from public school teachers taking courses with the author, and parts of the statements obtained have been published elsewhere, which does not help the present volume. There is no criticism or discussion, but some suggestive questions and references on the particular symptom or disorder are given in most of the chapters.

It is emphasized that the subjects were normal or superior persons, but there is no explanation of what the author means to convey by this. In fact, the majority of the cases do not seem to differ from the patients who come seeking psychiatric help every day of the week. It would be interesting to know by what standards many of them are normal. Certainly, many

seem to have been greatly handicapped and disturbed in the processes of life and work.

The first chapter will be confusing to many students when they read of the complexity of mental disorders on one page and on the next get the impression that a simple explanation can be readily found for the majority of them. The volume is incomplete in many respects as a case book.

DAVID SLIGHT

University of Chicago

The Field of Social Work. By ARTHUR E. FINK. New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1942. Pp. iv+518. \$3.00.

This book gives a cross-section of case work, group work, and community organization in nontechnical language for the college student interested in the field, for the beginning worker, for the layman who is called upon to support social work, and for the board member. "Each chapter begins with a short historical account of the development of the work, proceeds to an analysis of philosophy and practice, and concludes with a discussion of job requirements, professional associations and training, and trends." Case materials, provided by practitioners, are included.

In showing the historical development of the three social-work processes, Mr. Fink has revealed the influence of sociology, psychology, biology, medicine, psychiatry, psychoanalysis, economics, and cultural anthropology. The author would have greatly increased the value of his book had he analyzed each social-work situation, revealed the common denominator of interactive factors, and then stated the role of each one of the above disciplines in pre-social-work training. Contrary to the statements of many social workers, it is possible to be quite as specific regarding requirements for social work as it is for medicine. Just any background will not do if one is interested in the welfare of the client.

In a course designed to introduce the field of social work to undergraduates this will be a valuable book.

L. GUY BROWN

Oberlin College

CURRENT BOOKS

- ALLEN, DEVERE. *The Caribbean: Laboratory of World Cooperation*. New York: League for Industrial Democracy, 1943. Pp. 40. \$0.15.
- ANDERSON, W. A., and SANDERSON, DWIGHT. *Membership Relations in Cooperative Organizations*. (Department of Rural Sociology, Mimeo. Bull. 9.) Ithaca: Cornell University Agricultural Experiment Station, 1943. Pp. ii+32.
- BARON, JOSEPH L. (ed.). *Stars and Sand: Jewish Notes by Non-Jewish Notables*. Philadelphia: Jewish Publishing Society of America, 1943. Pp. xvii+555. \$2.50.
- BONGER, WILLEM ADRIAAN. *Race and Crime*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1943. Pp. x+130. \$1.50. Translated from the Dutch by Margaret Mathews Hordyk. This is a translation of a classic work by the Dutch sociologist, Bonger, published originally in 1939. Following a general discussion of race and crime, the majority of the book is taken up with case studies on the criminality of various racial stocks.
- BONNET, HENRI. *Outlines of the Future World Organization Emerging from the War*. Chicago: World Citizens Association, 1943. Pp. vii+128. \$0.25. A discussion of post-war organization from the angle of collective security.
- BOWMAN, ALLEN. *The Morale of the American Revolutionary Army*. Washington: American Council on Public Affairs, 1943. Pp. 160. Cloth, \$2.50; paper, \$2.00. A case study of the experiences in maintaining allegiance and discipline in the Revolutionary army. There is discussion of the physical and psychological factors affecting the morale of the troops. The nature of absenteeism and desertion among the soldiers is considered. The author discusses the various devices employed to maintain the morale of the soldiers.
- CHILD, IRVIN L. *Italian or American? The Second Generation in Conflict*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1943. Pp. 208. \$2.75.
- DAVIDSON, HELEN H. *Personality and Economic Background: A Study of Highly Intelligent Children*. Morningside Heights, New York: King's Crown Press, 1943. Pp. x+189. \$2.25.
- DE KRUIF, PAUL. *Kaiser Wakes the Doctors*. New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1943. Pp. 158. \$2.00. A journalistic account of the medical plan at the Kaiser shipyards.
- DELANEY, ELEANOR C. *Latin America: A Source Book of Instructional Materials*. New York: Bureau of Publications, Teachers College, Columbia University, 1943. Pp. viii+67. \$0.60.
- DE MARCO, ROLAND R. *The Italianization of African Natives: Government Native Education in the Italian Colonies, 1890-1937*. New York: Bureau of Publications, Teachers College, Columbia University, 1943. Pp. xvii+150. \$2.35.
- DIVISION OF RESEARCH, WORK PROJECTS ADMINISTRATION. *Vocational Training and Employment of Youth*. ("Research Monographs," Vol. XXV.) Washington: United States Printing Office, 1942. Pp. xxxii+152.
- EAST, ALLAN. *A History of Community Interest in a Juvenile Court: Positive and Negative Manifestations during the Period 1885-1942 in Multnomah County, Oregon*. Portland: Oregon Probation Association, 1943. Pp. iii+30. \$0.50.
- ELLWOOD, CHARLES A. *Sociology Principles and Problems*. New York: American Book Co., 1943. Pp. viii+408. \$1.80.
- FISHER, DOROTHY CANFIELD. *Our Young Folks*. New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1943. Pp. xviii+329. \$2.75.
- FISHMAN, NATHANIEL. *Married Woman's Bill of Rights*. New York: Liveright Publishing Corp., 1943. Pp. xiii+282. \$2.50. The legal rights of married women with respect to separation, divorce, property, adoption of children, names, etc.
- FRANKLIN, JOHN HOPE. *The Free Negro in North Carolina, 1790-1860*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. Pp. x+271. \$4.00.
- GARRISON, CURTIS WISWELL (ed.). *The United States, 1865-1900: A Survey of Current Literature with Abstracts of Unpublished Dissertations*. Fremont, Ohio: Rutherford B. Hayes-Lucy Webb Hayes Foundation, 1943. Pp. ix+177.
- GOLDBLATT, DAVID. *The Jew and His Language Problem*. 1411 Vyse Avenue, New York: David Goldblatt, 1943. Pp. 202.
- GROVES, ERNEST R. and GLADYS H. *Sex in Marriage*. New York: Emerson Books, Inc., 1943. Pp. 224. \$2.00.
- GWYNN, J. MINOR. *Curriculum Principles & Social Trends*. New York: Macmillan Co., 1943. Pp. xix+630. \$3.50. The major topics dealt with are: "The Evolution of the Curriculum"; "New Factors in Curriculum Development"; "The Modern Movement for Curriculum Revision"; "The Elementary-School Curriculum"; "The Secondary-School Curriculum"; and "Looking to the Future in Curriculum Revision." Intended as a text, it is illustrated and has an extensive bibliography.

- HARING, DOUGLAS GILBERT. *Blood on the Rising Sun*. Philadelphia: Macrae-Smith Co., 1943. Pp. xii+239. \$2.50. A discussion of the dominant beliefs and convictions held by the Japanese people and an account of how such ideas came into being and acceptance.
- HARPER, ALLAN G.; CORDOVA, ANDREW R.; and OBERG, KALERO. *Man and Resources in the Middle Rio Grande Valley*. ("Inter-Americana Studies," No. 2.) Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1943. Pp. viii+156. \$2.25.
- HILL, HELEN. *The Kitchen in War Production*. ("Public Affairs Pamphlets," No. 82.) New York: Public Affairs Committee, Inc., 1943. Pp. 29. \$0.10.
- HISS, PHILIP HANSON. *A Selective Guide to the English Literature on the Netherlands West Indies: With a Supplement on British Guiana*. New York: Netherlands Information Bureau, 1943. Pp. xiii+129. \$0.75.
- HITTI, PHILIP K. *The Arabs: A Short History*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1943. Pp. ix+224. \$2.00.
- HOLT, L. EMMETT, JR. *Holt's Care and Feeding of Children*. New York: D. Appleton-Century Co., 1943. Pp. xv+321. \$2.00.
- HUDSON, MANLEY O. (ed.). *World Court Reports: A Collection of the Judgments, Orders and Opinions of the Permanent Court of International Justice, Vol. IV: 1936-1942*. Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1943. Pp. xvi+513. \$2.50.
- JAEGER, WERNER. *Humanism and Theology*. (Aquinas Lecture, 1943.) Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1943. Pp. 96. \$1.50. The Aquinas Lecture presented before Marquette University in 1943.
- KINSLEY, PHILIP. *The Chicago Tribune: Its First Hundred Years, Vol. I: 1847-1865*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1943. Pp. xv+381+vii. \$5.00.
- KORSON, GEORGE. *Coal Dust on the Fiddle: Songs and Stories of the Bituminous Industry*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1943. Pp. xvi+460. \$3.50. A collection based on field work and recordings in most of the bituminous mining districts of North America. Introductory chapters on mining life and the growth of mining folklore and song. Songs arranged by themes: disaster, love, and courtship, etc.
- LATTIMORE, OWEN. *America and Asia: Problems of Today's War and the Peace of Tomorrow*. Claremont, Calif.: Claremont Colleges, 1943. Pp. vi+52. \$1.75. Contains two essays: "America's Part in the Pacific War" and "Problems of Peace beyond the Pacific." A brief Foreword is contributed by Admiral H. E. Yarnell.
- LAWSON, MURRAY G. *Fur: A Study in English Mercantilism, 1700-1775*. ("History and Economics Series," Vol. IX.) Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1943. Pp. xxiii+140. \$1.75. A careful study of the fur and hat industry in England in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries to illustrate the operation of mercantilism.
- LEVY, HAROLD P. *A Study in Public Relations: Case History of the Relations Maintained between a Department of Public Assistance and the People of a State*. New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1943. Pp. 165.
- LIEBESNY, HERBERT J. *The Government of French North Africa*. ("African Handbooks," No. 1.) Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1943. Pp. 130. A brief treatment of the peoples and institutions in Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia.
- LUCAS, HENRY S. *A Short History of Civilization*. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc., 1943. Pp. ix+994. \$4.50.
- MACCURDY, J. T. *The Structure of Morale*. New York: Macmillan Co., 1943. Pp. vi+224. \$2.00. Based on lectures given to members of the English armed services. Discusses the nature of fear, the relation of morale to national objectives, and various of the problems of morale that are dependent upon social organization and leadership.
- MACLATCHY, JOSEPHINE H. (ed.). *Education on the Air: Thirteenth Yearbook of the Institute for Education by Radio*. Columbus: Ohio State University, 1942. Pp. ix+310. Condensation of a series of articles and lectures on radio in wartime and on the educational uses of radio.
- Mexicans in the United States: A Bibliography Compiled by the Division of Labor and Social Information of the Pan American Union*. ("Bibliographic Series," No. 27.) Washington: Pan American Union, 1942. Pp. 14. \$0.10.
- MORGAN, WILLIAM HENRY and MILDRED INSKEEP. *Planning for Marriage: Outlines for Discussion by Young Men and Women*. New York: Association Press, 1943. Pp. 85. \$0.50.
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- MURPHY, JOHN. *Lamps of Anthropology*. Manchester, England: Manchester University Press, 1943. Pp. ix+179. 7/6 net.
- Postwar Planning in the United States: An Organization Directory*. (No. 2.) New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1943. Pp. xvi+101. \$1.00.
- Report of the Joint Bolivian-United States Labour Commission: Labour Problems in Bolivia*. (English and Spanish texts.) Montreal: International Labour Office, 1943. Pp. v+45. \$0.50.
- Report of the Post-war World Committee: Transition from War to Peace*. Washington: Catholic Association for International Peace, 1943. Pp. 47. \$0.10.

- ROE, ANNE. *A Survey of Alcohol Education in Elementary and High Schools in the United States*. New Haven: Quarterly Journal of Studies on Alcohol, 1943. Pp. 132. \$1.00.
- SAARINEN, ELIEL. *The City: Its Growth, Its Decay, Its Future*. New York: Reinhold Publishing Corp., 1943. Pp. xvi+380. \$3.50.
- Schools of Social Work in Latin America*. Washington: Pan American Union, Division of Labor and Social Information, 1943. Pp. 21. \$0.10.
- SISTER M. GRACE MADELEINE. *Monetary and Banking Theories of Jacksonian Democracy*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1943. Pp. xi+186.
- SPENCER, GWLADYS. *The Chicago Public Library: Origins and Backgrounds*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1943. Pp. xvii+473. \$4.50.
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- STEWART, MAXWELL S. *Jobs and Security for Tomorrow*. ("Public Affairs Pamphlets," No. 84.) New York: Public Affairs Committee, Inc., 1943. Pp. 30. \$0.10.
- STRECKER, EDWARD A., and APPEL, KENNETH E. *Discovering Ourselves: A View of the Human Mind and How It Works*. New York: Macmillan Co., 1943. Pp. xix+434. \$3.00. This is the second edition of a work which appeared in 1931. Its treatment centers around emotional life and the way in which feelings influence thinking and judgment. It is popularly written. The Appendix includes a series of questions designed to aid the reader in securing the full appreciation of the points dealt with in the book.
- SWARTHOUT, GLENDON. *Willow Run*. New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Co., 1943. Pp. 237. \$2.50. Written by a riveter at the Willow Run plant and relates his observations of his fellow-workers. A portrayal of workers' attitudes in a wartime plant.
- THOMSON, S. HARRISON. *Czechoslovakia in European History*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1943. Pp. viii+390. \$3.75. This book traces the history of Czechoslovakia from the Middle Ages down to the present time. The major emphasis is placed upon the period from 1914 to date. The treatment is particularly in terms of the relationship of Czechoslovakia to other European countries. A select bibliography is included.
- TUBBS, RALPH. *Living in Cities*. Harmondsworth, Middlesex, England: Penguin Books, 1942. Pp. 51. 1s. 6d.
- VALLE, JOSÉ. *Rural Credit in El Salvador*. ("Series on Cooperatives," No. 20.) Washington: Pan American Union, Division of Agricultural Cooperation, 1943. Pp. 17.
- WALLIS, WILSON D. *Messiahs: Their Role in Civilization*. Washington: American Council on Public Affairs, 1943. Pp. 217. Cloth, \$3.00; paper, \$2.50.
- WHYTE, JOHN. *American Words and Ways: Especially for German Americans*. New York: Viking Press, 1943. Pp. xvi+184. \$2.50.
- WILLIAMS, ERNEST W., JR. *The Outlook for Domestic Air Transport*. ("Planning Pamphlets," No. 21.) Washington: National Planning Association, 1943. Pp. 30. \$0.25.
- WOLFF, WERNER. *The Expression of Personality: Experimental Depth Psychology*. New York: Harper & Bros., 1943. Pp. xiv+334. A presentation of experimental evidence on the revelatory side of personality. Consideration is given to bodily expression in the form of voice, gait, and gesture, with a treatment of the individual's judgment of himself along the line of self-recognition. The concluding part of the work is concerned with personality diagnosis. The concept of Gestalt psychology provides the dominant theme of the work.
- WRIGHTSTONE, J. WAYNE; LEGGITT, DOROTHY; and REID, SEERLEY. *Basic Social-Science Skill: Finding, Evaluating, and Using Information*. New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1943. Pp. x+181. \$1.20.



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IN THIS ISSUE

Professor Porterfield's article on "Delinquency and Its Outcome in Court and College" compares delinquency among children of different social backgrounds. Professor Porterfield is now teaching sociology at Texas Christian University. He is the author of *Creative Factors in Scientific Research* and a *Students' Guide to a Decade of Concepts in Sociology*.

Dr. Runner's article, "A Personality Analysis Test," deals with the statistical results from a sample application of a new personality test which utilizes the theories of several psychologists and some concepts of sociology. Dr. Runner is co-author, with E. B. Reuter, of a textbook on the family. Margaret Aikins Seaver collaborated on the article.

Dr. Bushee's study of "The Church in a Small City" is part of a more comprehensive survey of Boulder, Colorado, which he is now conducting. Dr. Bushee is professor emeritus of economics and sociology at the University of Colorado. He has published books on *Principles of Sociology* and on *Social Organization*.

Dr. Kollmorgen, at present the research director of the Tennessee State Planning Commission, has published a number of studies of cultural-agricultural islands in the South. The present article dealing with "The Agricultural Stability of the Old Order Amish and Old Order Mennonites of Lancaster County, Pennsylvania," explains this phenomenon in cultural terms.

"Differential Reproduction in the United States," by Christopher Tietze, M.D., compares paternity rates for occupational classes. Dr. Tietze is a research associate in the School of Hygiene and Public Health of Johns Hopkins University.

Professor Nimkoff contributed an article on "The Family" to the special issue of May, 1942, of this *Journal*. He has written a book on *The Family* and is co-author, with Dr. Ogburn, of a text on *Sociology*. The present article deals with "Occupational Factors and Marriage." Professor Nimkoff teaches sociology at Bushnell University.

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By JULIAN HERMAN
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
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DELINQUENCY AND ITS OUTCOME IN COURT AND COLLEGE

AUSTIN L. PORTERFIELD

ABSTRACT

This study is based on a statistical comparison of the delinquencies of college students with those of children in the juvenile court. It notes the similarities of their behavior and the differences in outcomes, and it attempts to interpret these similarities and differences. The differential court appearance of the two groups is interpreted as growing out of the friendlessness of the court children and the social unimportance of their families. The differences in the after-careers of the two groups are explained by the increasing segregation and cumulative frustration of the less favored children, as compared with the expanding range of social participation enjoyed by the college students. But the theory leaves ample room for the concept of "white-collar criminality."

This study of delinquency and its outcome in court and college is based on a statistical comparison of the delinquencies of college students with the delinquencies of children who were brought to the juvenile court; it attempts a tentative explanation of the similarities and differences. The data were secured from the study of 2,049 alleged delinquents in the Fort Worth area¹ and of 337 college students, alleged not to be delinquent, in three schools of northern Texas. They include information on the pre-enrolment behavior of 200 men and 137 women and on the post-enrolment behaviors of one-half of the men.²

¹ The cases chosen for study constituted the entire case load of the local "Juvenile Court" for 1931, 1933, and 1935. The period of study was 1941-42. The time intervening provides a follow-up period. The resident cases numbered 1,155; nonresident cases, 894.

² The information on the college students was secured in two separate investigations. In the first, made in 1940-41, the data were secured on the pre-enrolment behavior of 100 men and 137 women. The second, made in 1941-42, obtained information

I. SIMILARITIES IN THE DELINQUENCIES OF THE TWO GROUPS

The court cases, as analyzed, were charged with fifty-five specific offenses, varying all the way from "shooting spitwads at a wrestling match" to murder. But they had no monopoly on such offenses; for the students, replying through schedules presented by our investigators, freely reported delinquencies of the same kind, largely without interference from the courts. These questionnaires, listing in one section the fifty-five specific offenses for which children were brought to court, were presented personally by the investigators and returned anonymously by those to whom they were presented. Table 1 gives results indicative of the universal prevalence of past delinquency among college men and women.

A well-adjusted ministerial student said he had indulged in twenty-seven of the fifty-

on both precollege and college delinquencies of 100 men. The investigators were Dick Jay, Clada Jones, Duncan Sanders, and Trotter Adams.

five offenses; and a successful pastor, also a student, reported committing twenty-eight of the delinquencies which have irritated some part of the community so much that it has annually brought at least 1,400 children to the police station and/or the juvenile court.

TABLE 1

PERCENTAGE OF STUDENTS REPORTING THE COMMISSION OF ONE OR MORE OF THE FIFTY-FIVE OFFENSES CHARGED AGAINST CHILDREN IN THE COURT AND THE AVERAGE NUMBER OF OFFENSES REPORTED BY EACH

Offencing Group	Number in Group	Percentage Reporting one or More of the Offenses	Average Number of Offenses Reported
Precollege men.....	200	100.0	17.6
College men*.....	100	100.0	11.2
Precollege women†.	137	100.0	4.7

* See n. 2, above.

† See n. 2, above.

The offenses of the college students were apparently as serious, though probably not so frequent, as those of youth in court, even when allowances are made for the difficulty of defining the items of the questionnaire in a way that would communicate to the student what the behavior was on which the information was being sought.³ Any doubt as to whether the students were fair representatives of those who enrol in college will be dispelled by a study of Table 2.

³ Space limits in the questionnaire confidentially presented to the students precluded adequate definition of all the offenses about which inquiry was made. In a letter to the author Professor Ernest W. Burgess comments that, under stealing, for example, "the students may include thefts that are likely to be regarded as childhood pranks or stunts (as taking things for souvenirs)." Professor Burgess has made a good point, but it should also be remembered that what the complainant considers a stunt may vary with both the status of the child and the character of the complainant. Such stunts get some children into the juvenile court. See pp. 206-7 of this paper.

TABLE 2

AVERAGE NUMBER OF OFFENSES REPORTED BY VARIOUS STUDENT GROUPS AMONG 100 MEN AND 137 WOMEN IN PRECOLLEGE DAYS, AND THE PERCENTAGE REPORTING ONE OR MORE OF THE OFFENSES

GROUP	PERCENTAGE REPORTING ONE OR MORE OF THE OFFENSES		NUMBER OF PERSONS		TOTAL OFFENSES		OFFENSE AVERAGE	
	Males	Females	Males	Females	Males	Females	Males	Females
Freshmen.....	100.0	100.0	25	56	479	203	19.2	3.6
Sophomores.....	100.0	100.0	17	22	307	97	18.1	4.4
Juniors.....	100.0	100.0	28	33	496	229	17.7	6.9
Seniors.....	100.0	100.0	26	26	432	124	16.5	4.8
Graduates.....	100.0	4	45	11.2
Athletes.....	100.0	100.0	43	23	954	124	23.3	5.4
Class Officers*	100.0	100.0	48	77	723	427	17.0	5.5
Honor students†	100.0	100.0	41	91	717	418	18.0	4.6
Musicians.....	100.0	100.0	9	18	151	88	16.8	4.9
Ministerial students.....	100.0	31	412	13.4
Family income:								
Below \$500.....	100.0	100.0	3	2	45	6	15.0	3.0
\$500-\$999.....	100.0	100.0	15	10	247	39	16.5	3.9
\$1,000-\$1,499.....	100.0	100.0	21	29	345	134	16.4	4.6
\$1,500-\$1,999.....	100.0	100.0	17	27	293	79	17.2	2.9
\$2,000-\$2,499.....	100.0	100.0	21	25	398	123	19.0	4.7
\$2,500 and over.....	100.0	100.0	19	41	328	300	17.0	7.3

* In high school and/or college.

† In high school and/or college. Observe that a student may be an athlete, a class officer, and a musician, etc., at the same time.

TABLE 3

THE DELINQUENCIES OF 200 COLLEGE MEN AND 137 COLLEGE WOMEN COMPARED WITH THE
DELINQUENCIES OF 1,866 BOYS AND 183 GIRLS WHO WERE CHARGED IN THE
JUVENILE COURT WITH CERTAIN SPECIFIC OFFENSES

OFFENSES BY TYPES	PERCENTAGE OF STUDENTS						PERCENTAGE OF JUVENILE COURT CASES CHARGED WITH THE OFFENSE	
	Reporting the Offense			Charged with the Offense				
	Precollege		College Men	Precollege		College Men	Boys	Girls
	Men	Women		Men	Women			
Acts of public annoyance:								
Disturbing church	7.0	2.9	2.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.2	0.0
False fire alarms	8.5	3.5	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.0
Tripping trolleys	13.5	0.7	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.3	0.0
Disturbing (miscellaneous)	26.0	8.8	8.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.0	1.1
Throwing at cars	28.0	7.4	16.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.2	0.0
Shooting staples	35.0	0.0	8.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.2	0.0
Driving noisily by schools, churches	37.0	4.4	13.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.0
Shooting in the city:								
A "nigger shooter"	39.5	6.6	10.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.3	0.0
An air rifle	45.0	5.1	12.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.0
Fireworks in public buildings	49.5	8.8	42.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.0
Spitwads at others' displeasure	77.0	29.9	20.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.2	0.0
Percentage charged in court: totals	0.0	0.0	0.0	2.8	1.1
Violations of traffic laws:								
Drunken driving	22.0	0.0	18.0	*	*	*	0.3	0.0
Hanging on cars, trucks	46.5	12.4	25.0	*	*	*	0.2	0.0
Reckless driving	51.5	22.6	30.0	*	*	*	0.1	0.0
Speeding	67.5	46.0	55.0	*	*	*	0.1	0.0
Miscellaneous	67.5	51.8	61.0	*	*	*	0.2	0.0
Percentage charged in court: totals	31.0	7.3	28.0	0.9	0.0
Malicious mischief:								
Setting fires in buildings	13.0	1.5	14.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.2	0.0
Breaking furniture	27.5	6.6	18.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.0
Breaking fences, doors	29.0	5.8	18.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.2	0.0
Breaking windows	36.5	2.2	11.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.0	0.0
Painting, flooding rooms	40.0	17.5	36.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.0
Miscellaneous	42.5	10.2	35.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	3.0	0.0
Breaking street lights	47.0	8.7	13.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.4	0.0
Percentage charged in court: totals	0.0	0.0	0.0	5.0	0.0
Encroaching by—								
Tampering with property	21.0	2.9	6.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.2	0.0
Prowling	29.5	9.5	16.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.2	0.0
Trespassing	57.5	16.7	28.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.8	0.5
Slipping into theater	62.5	10.2	29.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.4	0.0
Percentage charged in court: totals	0.0	0.0	0.0	2.6	0.5
Personal affronts and injuries (except homicide):								
Extortion threats	0.5	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.0
Assault (clubs, knucks)	3.0	1.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.3	0.0
Ordinary fighting	61.5	5.8	25.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.0	5.4
Abusive language	79.0	36.5	80.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.3	0.5
Percentage charged in court: totals	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.7	5.9

* See totals below.

TABLE 3—Continued

OFFENSES BY TYPES	PERCENTAGE OF STUDENTS						PERCENTAGE OF JUVENILE COURT CASES CHARGED WITH THE OFFENSE	
	Reporting the Offense			Charged with the Offense				
	Precollege		College Men	Precollege		College Men		
	Men	Women		Men	Women			
Vagabondage:								
Suspicious character	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	9.0	4.9
Vagrancy	4.0	0.0	4.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.3	0.0
Begging	5.5	0.0	3.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.5	0.0
Peddling, no license	5.5	0.0	5.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.2	0.0
Runaway, wandering	14.5	4.3	2.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	42.0	31.5
Stranded transiency	14.5	0.0	12.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	†	†
Truancy	42.5	34.3	28.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.0	1.1
Loafing in a pool hall	48.0	0.0	46.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.3	0.0
Percentage charged in court: totals	0.0	0.0	0.0	53.3	37.5
Liquor violations:								
Illegal manufacture	8.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.2	0.0
Illegal possession	35.5	2.9	47.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.0
Buying as a minor	38.0	2.2	53.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.0
Drunkenness	39.0	2.9	43.0	0.5	0.0	0.0	0.8	1.1
Percentage charged in court: totals	0.5	0.0	0.0	1.2	1.1
Theft:								
Auto theft	0.5	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.9	0.5†
Bicycle theft	0.5	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	2.5	0.0
Theft of tools, money	5.5	0.0	1.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	3.8	0.0
Burglary	7.5	0.0	4.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	7.0	0.0
Shoplifting	10.0	1.5	5.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	10.0	11.4
Miscellaneous, petty	23.0	8.8	11.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	2.7	4.1
Stealing melons, fruit	69.0	16.0	15.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.3	0.0
Percentage charged in court: totals	0.0	0.0	0.0	27.2	16.0
Dishonesty (other than stealing):								
Forgery	2.5	5.1	1.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.2	1.6
False collection	8.0	2.2	10.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.2	0.0
Possessing stolen goods	20.0	3.6	14.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.4	0.0
Passing slugs, bad coins	24.0	0.0	14.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.0
Gambling	58.5	17.4	60.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.7	0.0
Percentage charged in court: totals	0.0	0.0	0.0	2.6	1.6
Sex offenses:								
Attempt to rape	5.5	0.0	3.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.0
Indecent exposure	24.5	2.2	23.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.0
Extramarital coitus	58.5	0.7	59.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.5	11.4
Percentage charged in court: totals	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.7	11.4
Other cases:								
Carrying concealed weapons	14.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.2	0.0
Homicide, murder	0.5	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.2	0.5§
Homicide, negligent	0.5	0.0	0.0	0.5	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.0
Incorrigible	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.4	10.3
Neglected, abused, etc.	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	12.0
Miscellaneous appearance in court	2.0	0.0	4.0	0.0	2.1
Percentage charged in court: totals	2.5	0.0	4.0	2.0	24.9

† See "Runaway."

‡ As accomplice.

§ Self-defense.

Table 2 shows that the offenders included men and women who have attained various collegiate levels, class officers, honor students, ministerial students, athletes, and musicians and constituted a cross-section of the student bodies from which they were chosen. Careful comparison shows no surprising differences.

The proposition that the delinquencies of college students were apparently as serious as those of children in court finds much

support in studies as Clifford R. Shaw's, *The Jack Roller*, *The Natural History of a Delinquent Career*, and *Brothers in Crime*, which indicate not only habitual criminal behavior in court cases, but many unrecorded offenses. But no records are available on the extent to which students have become habituated to a given offense, except that many students in our study were still committing in college the offenses which they reported for the precollege period.

TABLE 4

FREQUENCY WITH WHICH OFFENSES OF VARIOUS TYPES WERE REPORTED BY AND CHARGED AGAINST THE AVERAGE 100 COLLEGE MEN COMPARED WITH THE FREQUENCY WITH WHICH THE SAME OFFENSES WERE CHARGED AGAINST THE AVERAGE 100 BOYS IN COURT

TYPE OF OFFENSE	FREQUENCY WITH WHICH REPORTED BY THE AVERAGE 100 MEN STUDENTS		FREQUENCY WITH WHICH CHARGED AGAINST THE AVERAGE 100 MEN OR BOYS			NUMBER OF TIMES REPORTED BY 100 STUDENTS FOR EACH TIME CHARGED AGAINST 100 BOYS IN COURT	
	Precollege	College	Precollege	College	Boys	Precollege	College
Acts of public annoyance.....	366.0	131.0	0.0	0.0	2.8	130.7	46.8
Traffic violations.....	255.0	189.0	31.0	28.0	0.9	283.3	210.0
Malicious mischief.....	235.5	145.0	0.0	0.0	5.0	47.0	29.0
Encroaching.....	170.5	79.0	0.0	0.0	2.6	65.6	30.4
Personal affronts.....	143.0	105.0	0.0	0.0	1.7	84.1	61.8
Vagabondage.....	134.5	100.0	0.0	0.0	53.3	2.5	1.9
Liquor violations.....	120.5	143.0	0.5	0.0	1.2	100.4	119.4
Theft.....	116.0	36.0	0.0	0.0	27.2	4.3	1.3
Dishonesty, except theft.....	113.0	99.0	0.0	0.0	2.6	43.4	38.1
Sex offenses.....	86.5	85.0	0.0	0.0	0.7	123.7	121.4
Other cases.....	15.0	4.0	2.5	4.0	2.0	7.5	2.0
All types of offenses.....	1,755.5	1,116.0	34.0	32.0	100.0	17.6	11.2

support in the comparisons made in Table 3, which presents the percentage of college students who reported committing specific offenses and the frequency with which children have been charged with these offenses in court. How frequently the students have indulged in the delinquencies they have reported would be difficult to determine. It is highly probable that many of the court children have habitually committed a greater average number of the delinquencies designated than the students. The hypothesis that they have done so has backing in the data obtained in such

In order to systematize and later to summarize the data in Table 3, the specific acts have been classified roughly into eleven different types. The writer attaches no great significance to these categories. He merely finds them convenient for the immediate purpose. Table 3 also shows the few instances in which college students have been to court for their offenses.

The relative impunity with which students have been able to commit delinquencies may be further emphasized by dividing the percentage of court children charged with each type of offense into the number of

offenses reported by the average 100 college men in each category. The data are not strictly comparable; and the frequency ratio reflects two variables other than impunity: first, the types of offenses which the students are most likely to commit and, second, the types of delinquency which are most likely to get children into court. These results may be observed in Table 4.

Obviously, this table does not indicate the relative delinquency of men students and the court group because there is a quite complete list of delinquencies by college students and only the one offense for which

But the student record is probably complete. Six per cent of the students reported jail experience before, and 7 per cent after, enrolment. All cases but one, however, in each category involved a traffic offense.

The data given so far indicate strongly two conclusions: first, there are great similarities in the behaviors of college students and in cases that are complained about in the juvenile court; second, there is a wide difference in the extent to which the two groups are brought to court for the same offenses. In the presence of these similarities in behavior, how may we account for the difference in frequency of court appearance?

TABLE 5
PERCENTAGE OF STUDENTS AND JUVENILE
COURT CASES DETAINED OR IMPRISONED

GROUP DETAINED	PERCENTAGE DETAINED OR IMPRISONED IN—		
	Jail	Training School	Penitentiary
Juvenile court:			
Boys.....	42.6	13.0	9.0
Girls.....	31.0	9.3	?
Students:			
Precollege men....	6.0	0.5	0.0
Precollege women..	0.0	0.0	0.0
College men.....	7.0	0.0	0.0

the majority of boys was brought into the juvenile court, but it does show that the former have much greater immunity than the latter. Outside of receiving traffic tickets, the college student's experience with the courts is negligible. The contrast remains just as glaring in the comparative detention and imprisonment experience of the two groups studied. Table 5 presents this contrast. The figures represent a minimum for the court group's experience in jails in Tarrant County and in prisons in Texas. Nobody knows how many of the nonresident, or local cases either, may be in the prisons of other states or have had experience in other jails, for our information is incomplete. The training-school commitments are those from Tarrant County only.

II. FACTORS IN THE DIFFERENTIAL COURT APPEARANCE OF CHILDREN

The similarities in the behavior of the two groups are not unfathomable. Delinquents are not a subspecies of *Homo sapiens*; neither are the "best" citizens. The antisocial behaviors of both students and court children suggest the same fundamental wishes: new experience, adventure, stimulation, challenge, recognition, personal response—in short, the whole range of the human emotions. Differences in outcomes grow out of variations in the social configurations of which members of the contrasted groups form parts.

The differential court appearance of the two groups might, in part, be due to a greater persistence in certain types of delinquency on the part of the less favored children. But reflection on the data leads to several hypotheses and to further research. The varying socioeconomic status of the families, family disorganization, the character of the complainant, the nature of the complaint, and the situation in which the act is committed—all seem to be important in the result.

a) *Socioeconomic status as a factor.*—No close relation exists between income and misbehavior, at least where actual deprivation is not involved.⁴ In our culture, however,

⁴ See the income levels of students in Table 2. Nearly 63 per cent of the 1,155 resident cases appear-

there is a distinct relation between income and social status, particularly if the gap is as wide as that between the two groups compared. Members of the unfavored group may be hauled into court because they are on a lower level in the community than the police who arrest them. They are of less social importance than the clerks and managers of five-and-ten-cent stores who turn them in for petty shoplifting. They are no more significant socially in the community than the neighbors, park attendants, and other individuals who complain about them. Hence, it is not altogether facetious to define the juvenile delinquent as

a friendless young person who does not live in a good home or in a college dormitory; who is not old enough to enter business or a profession for himself, or to run for the legislature; but who has offended some part of a rather peevish and irresponsible community, and been charged with the necessity for being responsible and other than peevish himself.⁵

b) *Family disorganization as a factor.*—Family disorganization is a factor in the low social status and friendlessness of the child. Only 16 per cent of the college students, as

ing in the juvenile court were identified in the social service exchange as coming from families who were clients of relief agencies. Less than one-third, 31.3 per cent, of the first offenders unrecorded as social-agency clients reported employment of the head of the family. Only 29.7 per cent of the first-offenders so recorded reported employment of the family head, while among the repeaters identified as clients of social agencies only 26.8 per cent reported such employment.

⁵ Austin L. Porterfield, "Youth Behavior and Welfare Survey of Fort Worth and Tarrant County," p. 3 (prepared in mimeographed form from data referred to in n. 1, above, for the Fort Worth Council of Social Agencies). While the author was re-writing the quotation above, a college boy exploded a cannon firecracker in a near-by dormitory room. Incidentally, also, one of the local bank tellers, who volunteered to follow up the case of one boy, has himself absconded with several thousand dollars of the bank's money; and several of the trustees of one of the colleges whose students are being compared with the delinquents appropriated about a half-million dollars of the school's endowment to their own uses. One of the trustee defendants has committed suicide. The socially important, if flagrant enough in their offenses, suffer more or less, too.

compared with 50.6 per cent of the court cases from families of known status, came from broken homes.⁶ In the low-income group, if the father is dead or the parents divorced, the economic and also the social status of the family are lowered still further. But the social status of families of higher incomes, such as those of precollege students, is not correspondingly reduced in case of a break in the family.

Moreover, the remaining parent of the low-income court case, whether father or mother, has a hard time keeping the family together. Boys are permitted to "run loose." If the father has deserted, the mother is in a particularly difficult position, economically and in prestige. In any event, the children become more friendless in a community not alert to their needs.

But the effect of family inadequacy and disorganization shows up more clearly than anywhere else in the attitudes of parents toward their children. It would be a rare parent in the college group who would report a child as incorrigible or actively disclaim him when he is in trouble. In the cases under study it did not happen. Yet 1.4 per cent of the boys and 10.3 per cent of the girls in court were charged with incorrigibility. In addition, parents often disclaimed their children or gave them no support when they were reported by others to the court. Twelve per cent of the girls in court were "neglected, mistreated, or abused."

Parents frequently complain to the court about a child's disobedience even though the data make it perfectly clear that the parental personality merits no respect. Parents were either the original or joint complainants in 123 out of 1,500 cases studied to determine the character of the complainant and the nature of the complaint. . . . Many parents fail to realize the significance of the court-experience for the

⁶ Homes of college students have been broken more than five times as often by death as by divorce; of children in court, less than twice as often. First-offenders' families were broken forty-six times and repeaters' families seventy times by divorce for each one hundred times by death. In more than 17 per cent of the court cases the fathers were dead.

child. One mother, hearing that her son had been detained, wrote, "Keep him in jail a few days; it might do him good." Another wrote, "Could you not send her to the training school without the expense of sending her back to C—? We just have enough to eat, and that is all."⁷

c) *Neighborhood and community disorganization as factors.*—Accentuating the friendlessness of the child is the fact that he lives in an impoverished, disorganized area;⁸ that he does not have the opportunity, if the incentive, to participate in character-building, recreational, and socioreligious activities; and that he is educationally retarded.

The delinquent belongs to almost nothing but a spontaneous play-group that often ripens into a gang and gets in the way of others.⁹ The opportunities of the precollege group for social participation are much better.¹⁰ The cases coming into court are socially uprooted and without direction or protection at home or abroad; and they are abroad much of the time, because there is nowhere else for them to be and nothing else for them to do, moving under the exact conditions most favorable for their arrest.

d) *Character of complainant and complaint*

⁷ For many concrete examples see the author's article, "The Complainant in the Juvenile Court," in *Sociology and Social Research*, XXVIII (1944), January issue.

⁸ Delinquency areas in Fort Worth, as elsewhere, are areas of high incidence of relief, adult arrests, suicides, venereal disease, rent eviction, and poor housing, where all improvements on the lots are worth less than \$1,250.

⁹ Less than 40 per cent of the resident cases were "lone-wolf" offenders; and less than 58 per cent of the runaways "ran away" alone.

¹⁰ More than 90 per cent of the college group had parents who belonged to some church; and more than 90 per cent of the college students say they continue to belong; and two out of three affirm they still go to church several times a month. But less than 46 per cent of the court cases reported a family interest in church. Seventy per cent of the college students, as compared with less than 10 per cent of the court cases, have belonged to character-building groups. In education, the latter are retarded an average of more than three semesters.

as a factor.—Seven out of ten of the children in court were charged with "acts of public annoyance," "encroaching," "malicious mischief," "personal affronts and injuries," "violations of liquor laws," "sex offenses," and "vagabondage," as defined in Table 3. But more than seven out of ten of the offenses reported by the precollege group fell into these categories, with only one case, so far as known, being arrested or brought to court for such acts. Except for incorrigibility and suspicious character, the only instances in which charges against children exceeded the admissions of precollege students were in auto and bicycle theft—a slight excess.

The greatest differential behavior rests in the broad classification of "vagabondage," to which belonged so many of the children "abroad without direction or protection."¹¹ A friendless child, loitering in the railroad yards, hopping freights, going to the next town or state, wandering in the streets, becomes a "runaway" or a "suspicious character." Falling into the hands of police, he cannot give a good account of himself. Frequently a boy was taken to the city jail for the night, then placed by the juvenile court in the county jail for a few days, and then sent home on the highway with a "We presume he is on his way!" Who could be more friendless?

Many complainants were individuals with the same or slightly better social status than that of the court child. Their character is best gauged by the nature of their complaints, which indicate that those with whom the child comes into conflict are often themselves criminalistic or, at best, petty, peevish, and irresponsible. Such individuals were complainants in one hundred and seventy-nine cases.

Merchants were also among irresponsible

¹¹ Of the 1931, 1933, 1935 cases studied, 42 per cent were called "runaways," and 9 per cent, "suspicious characters." By 1941 the number of "suspicious-character" arrests had not decreased; but the "runaways," through reclassification, relief from depression, or both, were about one-third of the earlier number.

complainants in reporting juvenile shoplifting:

Two stores reported 62 per cent of all such cases. Thus, if there are areas in which delinquents live, there are also areas in which they perform their anti-social acts; areas favorable for such behaviors. One of these, a chain store, filled with things prized by the child, in easy reach of the child, reported 43 per cent of the shoplifting. But its competitors in the field were conspicuous for few references to the court. The other area is a large general store with a huge business volume. The children of the dispossessed flock to these stores; and out of these wonderlands they try surreptitiously to emerge with candy, knives, dice, cheap rings, erasers, french harps, fishing corks, a single orange, etc. One boy stole a jew's-harp and was sent to the training school. From the same store a boy stole some marbles; and both mother and store co-operated in sending the boy to the training school at the age of eight years. At best, neither did anything to prevent it.¹²

In the light, then, of the data, it appears that the court child is from a socially unimportant family, that he is friendless, or often "wounded in the house of [those who ought to be] his friends." Even school principals sometimes join the latter group. But the college child, who behaves in much the same way, has friends at home, at school, at church, among club leaders, and on the playground; and his family has many friends. The same peevishness and irresponsibility is not displayed toward him as toward his less fortunate brother. While the parents of the latter may be asking the court to send him to the training school, the parents of the former are planning to send the lucky boy to college.

III. FACTORS IN THE DIFFERENTIAL AFTER-CAREERS OF THE TWO GROUPS

"After-career," as used here, means more than divergent social behavior; for, though

Table 3 indicates that the behavior of the college group improved somewhat after enrolment, the improvement is not remarkable. But the differential outcomes of the two groups are very great; Table 5 indicates, in part, how great. The college group will probably rise to positions of honor as often as the court group will sink into ignominy. How may we account for this difference in results?

The theory offered here involves a differential range of social participation, accompanied by progressive segregation and cumulative frustration for the court group. The association of the college student has been distinguished from that of the court cases as much by having a wider and more versatile range as by anything else. His participation in group life has not been limited to a group and cultural level so low and impoverished as that of the less fortunate child. He, too, has taken excursions into the underworld and has seen the chief of police drunk at the 399 Club, but he also moves in highly respected circles in the community. Thus his interests are expanded, while the court child is becoming increasingly segregated to one type of culture in which his association is not merely preferential: it is forced—the only way of group life known or open to him. When the other boy graduates from high school, he goes to college. In college he feels that he "has a future," that his life will unfold in a socially respected, if not always uprightly conducted, vocation and a home of his own. He will have status in the community, and the range of his social participation will grow.

What the court child faces is progressive segregation, in which the court experience is itself a step, and cumulative frustration, which increases through the very attempts he makes to escape.¹³ At eighteen—the age of the highest incidence of arrests throughout the nation, but the age at which the other

¹² See "The Complainant in the Juvenile Court," *Sociology and Social Research*, January, 1944, for fuller details. Is the shabbier child watched more closely than the better-dressed child in a store? Ten per cent of the men students reported pre-enrolment shoplifting.

¹³ For the author's concept of frustration see "The Problem of Response to Personality Frustration: A Concrete Example," *Social Forces*, XXI (1942), 75-81; also his "A Century of Frustration," *Social Science*, XVII (1942), 132-42.

boy is becoming established in college—he faces multiplying barriers between him and the satisfaction of his wishes by socially acceptable methods. “Deviation pressures”¹⁴ operate to drive him out of the field of normal striving—they were doing so before he came to court—to the use of antisocial methods in the achievement of his goals. He, too, needs security, enlarged experience, status, family, vocation, and significance. But society denies him these satisfactions; and, when he falters, offers him instead a court record, a training-school committal, fear, isolation, and complete rejection. The medicine is worse than the disease. Before court and after, we have expected him to go from a broken or inadequate home, through impeded preparation and distorted education, into an occupation and well-adjusted home of his own. Now, at the age when he should enter through these doorways, he faces further frustration in the event that he seeks fulfilment except through the patterns of crime—and there also.

Jimmie, the boy who “got into his auntie’s way while she was running a pleasure house on East Daggett,” went from her to the court, to the training school, to the penitentiary. Now an alumnus of the latter, he visited the writer’s class in criminology several times. Upon his return from the training school, he was “hounded by the police” everywhere he went, “beaten in jail,” and “falsely accused of stealing a company car with the name of the company written all over it.” “I am dumb, but not that dumb,” he said. Coming back from prison, he found that his wife had run away with another man—a great blow to Jimmie’s pride. Still he wants to get a job and “go straight.” But nobody wants him with a prison record. The writer encourages him to be patient, to “show

his stuff,” and not to give up with the idea that “the cards are stacked against” him. Jimmie can only ask, “Whether I give up or not, aren’t they?” What can the writer reply?¹⁵

In the meantime, the college man has had time to “mature.” The same thing holds if the youth enters employment with a role acceptable to both himself and society without going to college. He passes the crises of moving in “unstructured fields” and settles down to “systematic behavior,” which, in its outward appearance at least, has the community’s approval.¹⁶ But the other boy, before he reaches Jimmie’s age—twenty-seven—may have settled down to some “systematic behavior” which the community thinks of as criminal.

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¹⁵ Cf. “The Complainant in the Juvenile Court,” *Sociology and Social Research*, January, 1944.

¹⁶ The author is in thorough agreement with Edwin H. Sutherland’s theory of “White Collar Criminality,” advanced in his presidential address to the American Sociological Society and published in the *American Sociological Review*, V (1940), 1-12. As to “maturation” and “settling down,” Sutherland uses the terms in the sense of becoming a confirmed criminal. He writes (*Principles of Criminology* [New York, 1939], pp. 199-200): “A boy who is reared in an area of high delinquency reaches criminal maturity at an early age, perhaps by twelve or fourteen . . . , because criminality has become an integrated part of his personality, and no crisis upsets him.” But crises must not be minimized at fourteen or at any other age as a factor in the cause of a criminal career. If Glueck and Glueck are right in their theory that many criminal careers “run their course,” like measles or mumps (see *Later Criminal Careers* [New York, 1937], pp. 105-6, 108-23), the more fortunate child has the advantage in the crises of youth. He has the support of organized society’s “rites of passage.” But the “white-collar criminal” matures, too, in Sutherland’s viewpoint, without always reaching maturity, as the Gluecks use the term.

¹⁴ Cf. Lowell J. Carr, *Delinquency Control* (New York, 1941), pp. 98-149.

A PERSONALITY ANALYSIS TEST

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ABSTRACT

This is a description and preliminary statistical study of a personality inventory of 239 items representing the everyday experience of normal people. It is interpreted according to the theories of Freud, Korzybski, Simmel, Lewin, and others, and in terms of certain concepts of interactional sociology. Twenty-seven variable factors are measured by short, overlapping subtests. Two of these factors are considered as basic to the rest and are used to define five types of personality.

The statistical results on a selected sample of 350 cases indicate significant differences (1) among the five basic types, (2) between adolescents and adults, (3) between men and women, and (4) between well-adjusted and "problem" personalities.

The questions which compose the personality inventory¹ to be described here deal almost entirely with the everyday situations which arise in the life of the ordinary person. It is the intention of these questions to discover some of the more important attitudes which determine the individual's relationship to the other persons in his immediate social environment and his role in the more inclusive social group. Perhaps it would be correct to say that the particular attitudes which are to be measured here are those which might be most likely to become values to the associates.

This aim has a twofold purpose: (1) to give the individual himself some insight as to the way in which his attitudes and resulting behavior affect other people and his place in society and (2) to furnish the outsider with some basis for prediction as to his social attitudes and the manner of his approach to his life-problems. The questions and their answers cover much such a range of facts as an interested associate might discover for himself if given sufficient time and opportunity to note the behavior of a given individual as he reacts to the values of his more immediate environment. The conditioning facts upon which the attitudes and behavior may be based, such as intelligence, physical appearance, social or educational

level, and the like, must be determined by other means.

The analysis of this problem, which is essentially that of determining the course of the interaction between the individual and certain elements of his environment, has here been broken up into three parts: (1) the determination of the attitudes of the individual toward the self and the role in the group; (2) the determination of the attitudes toward the various other persons of his social world and toward society in general; and (3) the emphasis which he places upon certain environmental values and the nature of his approach to his life-problems and goals. To these ends several different systems of concepts make a useful contribution.

Thus, much of the analysis of the self and the more intimate relations of the affectional life, as well as the basic idea for the general classification of personality, have been taken from psychoanalysis; the attitudes toward the status of the self and the role in the group have been derived from Simmel and the Adlerian psychology; certain aspects of the relation between the person and his environment have utilized Lewin's field theory and Korzybski's work in semantics; while the concepts of goal and the end products of adjustment have been taken from Blatz and others. In addition to these, the concepts of sociology and psychology have been drawn upon for the definition of the attitudes showing the more general approach to life-problems and society in general.

In all, twenty-seven attitudes, assumed

¹ The Personality Analysis Test, in a revision made after several months of preliminary investigation, has been administered to more than a thousand persons and a preliminary standardization made on a controlled sample of 350 cases.

to be particularly significant in the differentiation and understanding of normal personalities, are given a specific definition in this test and are measured by means of small, selected batteries of questions. As used in this sense, the attitudes are here called the "variable factors of the personality." A discussion of the factors used in this analysis may help to make clearer the point of view of the test.

In working with so large a group of variable factors it was found helpful to represent each by a symbol which would, if possible, show something of the dynamics of the attitude which the particular factor sought to measure. Thus, in the following definitions, it will be noticed that the group of self factors are designated by an *S* with appropriate modifying signs; the factors which involve attitudes toward persons are designated with a *P*; and the factors showing group attitudes with a *G*. All others are indicated by single letters taken from the key word in the definition.

In each of the factor definitions an example is given of one of the questions from the particular subtest in question, and a significance ratio is indicated. These ratios were obtained from a comparison between the 15 per cent (about 60) top scores on each factor and an equal number of the lowest scores. (A description of the sample used for this purpose follows later in this paper.) The significance ratios may be taken as an index to the relative discriminatory value of the questions with reference to the factor in question. No question has been retained in this test which shows a significance ratio of less than 3.5, and the mean ratio for all questions is about 7.0.

The following is a list of definitions of the twenty-seven personality factors used in this test.

I. ATTITUDES TOWARD THE SELF

- S* Self-focus. The interest of the self in the self and its own attributes and possessions as apart from other selves. 22 questions. *Example*: "Do you usually plan your clothing carefully

before buying it?" Significance ratio, 6.0.

- S*— *S* minus. The feeling of self-inferiority or inadequacy which may result in anxiety, particularly with reference to social values.

26 questions. *Example*: "Do you often go over and over in your mind some failure on your part to do things correctly?" Significance ratio, 14.3.

- S*+ *S* plus. The tacit assumption of self-superiority. Many of the "ego-preserving" mechanisms belong in this category.

18 questions. *Example*: "Do you sometimes make sarcastic remarks to show people where they belong?" Significance ratio, 12.1.

- S*+*S*— *S* plus *S* minus. The conflict between the assumption of superiority and the feeling of inferiority which the attitude of others forces upon the individual. The result of this conflict is irritability or touchiness.

15 questions. *Example*: "Do you tend to resent unasked advice?" Significance ratio, 9.5.

- O* Obstinacy. This factor is closely allied to the self-factors. It is defined here as the resistance of the self against the encroachments of others. Secondarily it indicates a habitual resistance to change.

20 questions. *Example*: "When you have decided that you are going to do a certain thing, do you strongly resist anyone who tries to make you change?" Significance ratio, 11.7.

- **S*+ Starred *S* plus. True superordination with the acceptance of its duties and responsibilities, as opposed to the false superiority of the *S*+ mechanisms. It is probably the most important factor in group leadership. A high development of this factor usually indicates a socially dominant personality.

19 questions. *Example*: "Do you rather often find that you are the one to organize a group of people and decide when and where they shall meet or work, etc.?" Significance ratio, 10.4.

*S— Starred *S* minus. The co-operative attitude. The willing subordination of the self to the group interest or to the leadership of others. It implies active group participation as opposed to the passive anxiety of the *S*— factor.

17 questions. *Example*: "Are you likely to be irritated at people who interrupt your work or plans?" (To be answered in the negative.) Significance ratio, 8.1.

The last two factors are taken as general indicators of the role in the group.

II. THE ATTITUDES TOWARD OTHER PEOPLE AND TOWARD THE GROUP

P+ *P* plus. Sociability. General interest in people as such. The positive vector toward social contacts.

20 questions. *Example*: "Do you often go to see your friends?" Significance ratio, 12.1.

P— *P* minus. Social withdrawal or social isolation. (Social isolation is also shown by the relative absence of the *P*+ factor.) The negative vector toward social contacts.

27 questions. *Example*: "Do you take a good deal of time and trouble to keep up your friendships with people?" Significance ratio, 11.0.

G+ *G* plus. Group participation and, by implication, conformity to the group standards and ideals. This is the in-group factor, while that which follows is the out-group.

12 questions. *Example*: "Do you feel that you are a real part of the social life around you?" Significance ratio, 12.0.

G+*G*— *G* plus *G* minus. The conflict between nonconformist behavior and the wish to belong fully to the group. Feelings of guilt and fear which accompany failures to conform to the mores. This group of questions has considerable diagnostic value in the determination of the "problem" personality.

15 questions. *Example*: "When you have done something you shouldn't do, do you feel as though someone has

seen you and knew all about it?" Significance ratio, 12.0.

*P*_s Sympathetic attitude toward persons. Social rapport. The questions, on the whole, deal with the more intimate or primary group contacts.

18 questions. *Example*: "Do you give those you live with more praise than criticism?" Significance ratio, 6.2.

K The competitive attitude. The spirit of rivalry. The active wish for supremacy by means of self-effort and self-improvement. The questions of this section show an energetic drive for success.

16 questions. *Example*: "Are there usually one or two persons whom you are trying to surpass in some way?" Significance ratio, 21.2.

*P*_d Wishful destruction of the good or status of other persons, leading to social aggression. The fighting spirit. Like competitiveness, it represents an energy expenditure and may be considered as good if the goal is worth fighting for.

28 questions. *Example*: "Is it sometimes rather a pleasure to you to hold out against someone and prove he is wrong?" Significance ratio, 13.1.

N Negativism. Contrariness. The negative or contrary attitude, as defined by the questions of this section, is not so active and dynamic as the two just preceding. It is a habitual attitude of opposition to persons or to the established order. Studies not yet completed seem to indicate that this factor is a characteristic component of both the artist's and the scientist's personality pattern. It may show a readiness for originality of thought.

19 questions. *Example*: "Do you dislike doing just what is expected of you?" Significance ratio, 9.0.

*C*_r The critical attitude. Habitual criticism of persons and social values, which may grade over into attitudes of suspicion. It frequently takes the form of an *S*+ effort to enhance the feeling of self-superiority. It is mostly a speech-behavior type of accommodation. Like negativism, it may be

the essential component of some types of constructive work, as, for instance, literary criticism.

21 questions. *Example*: "Have some wrongs been done to you in the past which you have not been able to forget?" Significance ratio, 10.6.

The last four factors show a tendency for the individual to define his own role in the group in terms of opposition to it. The first two—competitiveness and aggression—are a more dynamic form of attempted adjustment than are the last two. Reference to Figure 3 and Table 3 shows a considerable difference between a group of problem cases and a group of successful personalities on each of these factors except competitiveness. All four are probably to be regarded as evidence of an existing lack of adjustment along with an effort to overcome it.

The next two factors represent a quite different effort at accommodation, inasmuch as they indicate a wish to be more comfortably a part of the group rather than separated from it.

X Exhibitionism. Showmanship. As developed by the questions, this section shows only the socialized and more useful form of what may or may not be a basic exhibitionism. However, a high development of this factor does indicate clearly the pleasure in showing the self to advantage before an audience of some kind, along with the active and constructive effort to do so.

21 questions. *Example*: "Do you enjoy being the center of attention of a whole group?" Significance ratio, 12.0.

D Overdependence. As defined here, the habitual wish to have other people conform to the self rather than for the self to make an effort to adjust to others. This section was intentionally built to show such an overdependence upon the services or affection of other people as might always be interpreted as unadjustive in a mature person. There is nothing good to be said for a high development of this factor, which shows a significance

ratio of 11.0 in the difference between the problem and the success groups.

29 questions. *Example*: "Do you sometimes measure someone's affection for you by how much he or she is willing to do for you?" Significance ratio, 12.2.

The last factor in this section shows the fluctuation of wish now toward and now away from the social group and other individuals.

P+P- Ambivalence. Moodiness. The conflict in the attitudes of attraction and repulsion with reference to other persons or an oscillation of mood regarding them. It has proved to be highly characteristic of the adolescent personality and is probably always significant of some degree of emotional unadjustment. In the problem-success groups it shows a significant ratio of difference of 9.7. 21 questions. *Example*: "Are you a little jealous sometimes of the people you admire most?" Significance ratio, 11.4.

III. THE APPROACH TO THE SOLVING OF LIFE-PROBLEMS

I Initiative. Action based upon a "good idea." This factor has proved to be one of the best indicators of the energetic approach to the life-problems. Unfortunately, the questions in this section fail to show intellectual activity. This factor may be interpreted as a good or a bad feature in the personality, depending upon the uses to which it is put.

20 questions. *Example*: "Do you often spend a good deal of time working on some new idea?" Significance ratio, 8.0.

Per Perseverance. As defined here, the selection of relatively distant goals and a disciplined and continuing effort to achieve them. The problem-success groups show a difference of only 2.2 in the significance ratio, hence it is not taken as a criterion of adjustment. An overdevelopment of

this factor may produce an inflexibility in the adjustive process which causes trouble.

20 questions. *Example*: "Do you usually make your plans for a long way in advance and then stick to them?" Significance ratio, 9.8.

This question overlaps with the basic *R* factor where it shows a significance ratio of 7.0 (see definition of *R* factor).

Cs Common sense. The "practical" or sensible attitude. This factor was designed to show the adjustment to the conditions of the here-and-now as opposed to fixations on the past. The problem-success groups show a difference of 8.3 on this factor, in favor of the successes.

21 questions. *Example*: "Are you often a little reckless of consequences in the way you behave?" (To be answered in the negative.) Significance ratio, 12.7.

The affirmative of this question has a significance ratio of 8.0 in the basic *Z* group of questions (see definition of *Z* factor).

A Adaptability. Flexibility of approach to the immediate annoyances of daily life. This factor shows the second highest significance ratio of difference between the problem and the success groups.

32 questions. *Example*: "Are you likely to be irritated at people who interrupt your work or plans?" Significance ratio, 9.7.

Although by far the greatest emphasis of this test is on the relationship between a given individual and his social environment, two factors are added to give a brief view of the attitudes toward money and toward material values (things). Both of these factors are important in the Freudian concept of personality types and are closely related to the basic *R* and *Z* factors, which are here used in the primary classification of personality described at the end of this section.

M Attitudes toward money. Parsimony. The care with which small sums of money are guarded and become an

object of concern. The development of this factor has been found to be quite independent of the economic level or financial needs of the person. It is a personality function and is designed here to show the "parsimony" which is one of the factors of the classical "anal triad" of psychoanalysis.

12 questions. *Example*: "Are you rather careful in stores to make sure that you are not cheated?" Significance ratio, 21.2.

T The attitude toward things, i.e., toward the material values of the environment. The questions include two divergent aspects of this materialistic attitude: (1) the creatively active and manipulatory interest and (2) the more passively possessive interest in ownership.

16 questions. *Example*: "Do you usually take the time to keep your possessions neatly put away where they belong?" Significance ratio, 15.4.

Two more factors, with a more far-reaching significance than any of those so far defined, remain to be discussed. These factors are designated as the *R* (routine response) and the *Z* (zestful or impulsive response). They were developed in the effort to use the two-fold psychoanalytic division of the neurotic personality as the basis for the classification of personality in this test, according to the assumption that the difference between the neurotic and the normal is one of degree only.

According to psychoanalytic theory, the first of the two major types, called the "anal," is defined as follows:

"(a) Orderliness (bodily cleanliness, reliability, conscientiousness in performance of petty duties)—in an overaccentuated form, pedantry; (b) parsimony, which may become avarice; (c) obstinacy, which may become defiance and perhaps also include irascibility and vindictiveness. These three factors are found regularly together."²

² Healy, Bronner, and Bowers, *The Structure and Meaning of Psychoanalysis as Related to Personality and Behavior* (New York: Knopf, 1931), p. 318.

In this test these three basic factors have been designated as *R*, *M*, and *O*, while their overaccentuation has been defined in other factors already defined, such as perseverance (*Per*), irritability (*S+S-*), and social aggression (*Pa*).

The "oral" personality is the second of the two types. It is said to be characterized by a greater impulsiveness and spontaneity of behavior. The basic wish of this type of personality is "to incorporate certain elements of the environment," i.e., to become one with them or to make them part of the self. This impulsive response to the environment has been designated in the test as the *Z* factor (*zest*).

As applied to test scores this sort of classification necessitated that for the anal character the *R-M-O* triad of factors (ritual-parsimony-obstinacy) should be high and the *Z* (*zest*) low, while for the oral character the *Z* should be high and the *R-M-O* low. However, since the four factors occurred in all sorts of proportions, the system led to an unworkable complexity in the accurate separation of the two major types of personalities. But experience seemed to show increasingly that the contrasting ideas of ritualistic or routine response (*R*) versus zestful, impulsive response (*Z*) to the environmental values were of such great significance in the interpretation of normal personalities that they came to be used alone as the quantitative basis for the classification of personality.

R AND *Z*

The *R* factor is defined in the test by a small battery of fifteen questions with a reliability coefficient of .89, as calculated by the split halves (odd-even) method; the *Z* factor by eleven questions with a reliability coefficient of .91. The two factors correlate at $r = -.33$. In the *R* battery the question showing the greatest significance ratio of difference between the personalities with a high *R* and those with a low *R* is: "Is it hard for you to keep your things neat all the time?" Significance ratio, 8.8. The most significant *Z* question is: "Does it come

natural to you to be thrifty?" Significance ratio, 13.0.

At the present time all personalities are classified in this test on the basis of the relative degree to which these two factors are developed. Figure 1 shows the method of classification. Four major classes are defined by the four quadrants of a scatter diagram the axes of which are the means of the *R* and *Z* raw-score distributions. In order to increase the differentiation between these four classes, the scores falling near the center of the diagram were separated into a fifth class.




FIG. 1.—The division of personality into five classes. The axes of the diagram are drawn at the means of the distributions of the two basic factors, *R* (routine responses) and *Z* (impulsive responses). Each of the four quadrants defines one class, while the scores near the intersection are taken as a fifth class. The asterisks show the means of the classes.

It will be seen that, according to this scheme, Class I consists of those personalities with a highly developed *Z* factor and a low *R*, hence referred to as the "high *Z*"; Class II is the reverse and shows a high *R* and a low *Z*, referred to as the "high *R*"; Class III is high in both the *R* and the *Z*, called the "high *R-Z*"; while Class IV is low in both and is called the "low *R-Z*." Class V is near the mean of both factors and is designated as the "middle class."

Since the distribution of the scores of both the *R* and the *Z* factors is but slightly skewed, it follows that, at least for the sample used in this determination, the number of cases falling within each of the four quadrants is about the same. The central

group, forming Class V, was arbitrarily defined in such a way as to include about one-fifth of the total number of cases, in order to keep the five classes alike in number.

Such is the general theory on which this test of personality is based. The test itself consists of some 230 questions to be answered by "Yes," "No," or a question mark. A preliminary questionnaire as to the facts of the family background, economic and religious status, etc., introduces the test, and a final section as to vocational preferences and early memories is designed to give a hint as to the present wishes and the nature of the past history.

The use of so large a number of variables makes it necessary for many questions to receive a scoring according to more than one point of view. For the purposes of this test it is felt that this plural scoring and overlap of factors offers considerably more of advantage than of disadvantage. The understanding of the complex of the total personality is felt to be increased by the interlocking interpretation, since personality probably represents a continuum rather than a series of mutually exclusive categories.

In order to study the results of the test, a sample of 350 cases was selected from the first few hundred tests to be administered. Several months of intensive preliminary investigation and many conferences both with known and with unknown personalities had seemed to show that the classification of personality on the basis of the type of response to environmental stimuli, i.e., the routinized (*R*) versus the impulsive (*Z*), was of basic importance. Hence the sample was made up with an equal number of personalities drawn from each of the five basic classes just described. Each of these five groups was composed of 35 men and 35 women, with a wide spread as to age and cultural factors and with each of the five groups as nearly like each of the others as possible. Taken as a whole, the sample undoubtedly leans toward the more literate section of the general population; but the inclusion of a rather large number of mature workers, such as clerks, mechanics, farmers,

small businessmen, and the like, keeps it from being heavily overloaded with highly educated persons or those of college age.

In making up the sample the degree of adjustment was also controlled to a certain extent. Only four personalities known to have been institutionalized for lack of adjustment to society were included. Except for these, the "problem" personalities were all of the usual, everyday sort of unadjustment, such as men who want to leave their wives, persons who are unable to find satisfying employment, and women who find no satisfaction anywhere. At the other end of the success-problem distribution, only a few conspicuous successes are included. All the rest are presumably within a normal range of adjustment, though the differences have proved to be considerable.

With such a sample of 350 cases, evenly divided as to sex and personality classification, a preliminary statistical investigation of the test results was made. Since the purpose of any personality test must be that of showing differences between individuals or groups, this investigation was directed primarily to the discovery of the discriminatory value of this test. The first major question to be answered was this: Is the differentiation of personality into five classes valid, and if so what is the nature of the differences between them?

In order to answer this question the five groups of personalities were studied separately with reference to each of the twenty-five factors other than the *R* and the *Z*, which form the basis of the division. The means, standard deviations, and standard errors of the mean were calculated for the twenty-seven factors both for the entire sample and for each class separately. These relationships are shown graphically in Figure 2, in which the means of each class are expressed as *z*-scores of the total distribution. In Table 1 the differences between the five classes are indicated by the significance ratios, only those at the 5 per cent level of confidence (1.9) or better being recorded. This table shows that, except for the definitive *R* and *Z* factors, the *T* factor (interest

in things) is the most discriminatory of class differences, followed by the *M* (care of money), *Cs* (common sense), *Pd* (social aggression), *S* (self-focus), and *S+S-* (irritability).

factors, shows an equally marked middle-of-the-road tendency with reference to all the factors, with the exception of the social dominance factor (**S+*), in which it is of the lowest rank.

TABLE 1

DIFFERENCES BETWEEN EACH OF THE FIVE CLASSES OF PERSONALITY AND EACH OF THE OTHERS, AS SHOWN BY THE SIGNIFICANCE RATIOS AT THE 5 PER CENT CONFIDENCE LEVEL OR BETTER

About 70 per cent of the possible values yield ratios of this degree of difference. The mean ratio for all differences is 4.2. The greatest difference, both in number and in the mean difference, occurs between Classes III and IV, that is, between the high *R-Z* and the low *R-Z* groups.

Factor	Class I and II	Class I and III	Class I and IV	Class I and V	Class II and III	Class II and IV	Class II and V	Class III and IV	Class III and V	Class IV and V
Adaptability (<i>A</i>)		3.5	3.5		3.9	3.6		7.6	5.4	
Critical attitude (<i>Cr</i>)	2.9	6.2			3.9	4.5	2.5	8.3	6.0	1.9
Common sense (<i>Cs</i>)	10.2	2.0	6.5	5.9	8.5	4.1	4.7	4.1	4.1	
Overdependence (<i>D</i>)		2.7	2.9	2.1	4.5			6.2	5.2	
Group conformity (<i>G+</i>)	6.7	2.2	2.9	2.8	4.0	3.6	3.5			
Guilt attitudes (<i>G+G-</i>)	2.2	4.8			2.6	3.2		5.9	4.3	
Initiative (<i>I</i>)		3.0						3.0		
Competitiveness (<i>K</i>)		4.0	2.1		3.2	2.6		6.6	3.8	2.6
Care of money (<i>M</i>)	19.2	6.3	10.0	9.3	11.1	7.0	8.2	3.5	3.0	
Negativism (<i>N</i>)	5.3		4.9	2.8	6.6		2.3	6.2	4.0	2.0
Obstinacy (<i>O</i>)		5.4	3.0		4.8	4.0	3.0	9.5	7.3	
Sociability (<i>P+</i>)	2.1		2.5	2.3						
Social withdrawal (<i>P-</i>)		2.0			3.0			4.8	2.3	
Ambivalence (<i>P+P-</i>)	2.0	3.4	3.7	2.2	6.2			8.5	6.4	
Social aggression (<i>Pd</i>)	3.1	2.7	5.7	2.9	6.4	2.7		9.4	6.0	2.6
Social sympathy (<i>Ps</i>)			3.5		2.2			3.8		2.3
Perseverance (<i>Per</i>)	8.9	7.6		6.0		7.7	3.0	6.4	1.9	4.7
Routine response (<i>R</i>)	25.0	22.0	4.4	13.0	3.6	20.0	12.0	17.0	8.4	5.2
Self-focus (<i>S</i>)	4.9	8.2		1.9	3.5	6.7	3.0	10.0	6.5	3.6
Self-superiority (<i>S+</i>)		4.2	3.4		6.2	1.9		8.2	6.4	
Self-inferiority (<i>S-</i>)		2.2	3.0		3.2	2.1		5.6	3.8	
Irritability (<i>S+S-</i>)	2.8	2.3	5.6	3.0	5.8	3.4		9.5	5.8	2.5
Self-reliance (<i>*S+</i>)	2.4		2.5	2.8	2.0			2.4	2.6	
Co-operativeness (<i>*S-</i>)	1.9	2.3	3.3	2.3	4.3			6.1	4.8	
Interest in things (<i>T</i>)	15.0	13.0	3.0	8.5	2.6	12.0	6.2	9.9	3.9	5.8
Exhibitionism (<i>X</i>)	2.7		4.9	2.9	5.5			5.9	3.5	
Impulsive response (<i>Z</i>)	30.0	5.3	25.0	16.0	23.0	4.6	13.0	18.0	10.0	8.0
Mean	5.7	4.3	4.1	3.2	5.0	3.8	2.5	7.0	4.4	2.2

From Figure 2 it is apparent that the greatest difference is between Class III, in which both the *R* and the *Z* factors are high, and Class IV, in which the *R* and the *Z* are both low. There is a similar, though rather less extreme, difference between Classes I and II—the high *Z* and the high *R* classes. Class V, which is composed of those personalities which show neither a clearly marked development nor a repression of the basic

Of the 270 possible chances for difference between the five classes, 187, or about 70 per cent, show a difference at the 5 per cent level of confidence or better, with a mean difference of 4.2 when all ratios are included.

A study of the standard deviations of all the factors shows that of the five classes the high *Z* (Class I) is significantly the most variable, with a mean S.D. of 3.57, a standard deviation of the S.D.'s of .97, and a

mean significance ratio of difference of 7.5 in favor of its greater variability. The low R - Z (Class IV) is the least variable, with a mean S.D. of 3.01, a standard deviation of .68, and a mean significance ratio of difference of 7.4 in favor of its lesser variability.

CLASS I—THE HIGH Z

From the data already given it follows that to know only that a given personality belongs to Class I with a high Z and a low R is to know very little about it. Both the statistical and the case work show that some of the most badly adjusted of the problem per-




FIG. 2.—Differences of pattern shown by the five classes of personality. The means for each class on each factor are recorded here in terms of z -scores of the total distribution. The greatest difference is seen between Classes III and IV, that is, between the high R - Z and the low R - Z groups. Class V, which is defined as the middle class on the R and Z distribution, is seen as intermediate throughout the entire length of its pattern. Factors marked with a (+) are active or dynamic in nature as defined by the test. Factors with a (−) are passive in nature.

From these data it may be concluded that there are statistically significant differences between the five groups of personality. The usefulness of the general classification as described here is equally clear in the study of the individual case. The failure of a given pattern to conform to certain of the class means or tendencies may be quite as significant for interpretation as are the conformities. A very brief account of the characteristics of each of the classes may serve to make the differences more clear.

sonalities belong to this group, as well as some of the most completely adjusted and creative ones. In the successful patterns of this class the "stabilizing" factors shown in Figure 2 are usually extremely high, while the "unstabilizing" factors are shown shrunk practically to nothing. In the unadjusted personalities of this class it is the reverse which is true. As a class the high Z is one of opposite extremes. The mean curve for the class does not give a true picture of it. Even on the nonsocial T count (interest in things) the same tendency prevails. Thus Figure 2 shows that in general the response

of the members of this class to the material environment is low, but a special study showed that many artists belong to this high *Z* type and have a high *T* count, which, in this group, is highly diagnostic.

CLASS II—THE HIGH *R*

This class, composed of the personalities with a high *R* and a low *Z* factor, corresponds rather closely to the psychoanalytic type known as the "anal retentive." When the patterns of the members of this group were arranged in order of a decreasing difference between the *R* and the *Z* factors, that is, when the *R* is shown accompanied by an increasing proportion of the *Z* factor, the unstabilizing factors showed an increase in the degree of their development, and the patterns took on some similarity to those of the high *R-Z* group. The "pure" high *R*'s are low in variability and well adjusted. When the *Z* enters, the trouble begins. However, taken as a whole, the members of this high *R* group are cautious (the *M* factor has been found to give an excellent indication of the cautious approach to life-problems); slow to respond to environmental changes, as would be expected from the high *R* and the low *Z*; meticulous of material details; emotional concerning their possessions, which have been said to serve almost as extensions of their own egos (passive *T* factor); skilful in handwork and material manipulations which they characteristically enjoy (creative *T*); persevering (*Per*) in pursuit of their goals which are "practical" in nature (*Cs*). Socially they are conservative (high *G+*), critical (*Cr*), and self-focused (*S*).

The weakness of this group may lie in the relative inflexibility of the approach to life-problems, as indicated by the extreme height of their "virtues," as well as the very moderate development of the factor of adaptability (*A*). The dominating wish of the members of Class II would certainly seem to be for security.

CLASS III—THE HIGH *R-Z*

In this class the high *R* organization of the life-pattern in accordance with habit and

regularized routines of activity is in conflict with the high *Z* impulsive response to the immediate environmental stimuli. The conflict of these opposite "drives" produces a personality which is characteristically dynamic and intense. (It is possible that this class corresponds to the psychoanalytic "oral biter" when the *Z* is dominant over the *R*, and to the "anal explosive" when the *R* dominates the *Z*.)

Conference work has shown that it is difficult for these high *R-Z* personalities to focalize upon a single goal and choose a vocation. They seem to have many gifts and great energy, but in many cases they are unwilling to stick to any one line of effort. In some cases of maladjustment the approach to life is distinctly oscillatory, first highly "moral," then equally "immoral" for a time, but with no satisfaction in either phase. Other cases show a continuous conflict between the two halves of their nature. They are characteristically nervous and intense in manner. It is interesting to note that they frequently report nervous indigestion. The adjusted members of this high *R-Z* group, who have focalized their goals and reached a fairly stable balance, are found often to be rather stern and uncompromising idealists and formalists.

Although some of the men in Class III are very successful indeed, very few of the women are so. No contented housewife has yet been found among the women of this class. In this connection it seems probable that in many cases it is recognition which is the dominant social wish. It is the larger audience which attracts them. They are ambitious, and, with a suitable goal, tireless in their pursuit of social recognition. It may be the difference in opportunity which explains the difference in adjustment between the men and the women of this group.

Although no detailed study has as yet been made with delinquents, it is perhaps worth mentioning that a small sample from a state reform school for girls and of a few delinquent boys all fell into this class of the high *R-Z*.

Figure 2 shows that the members of this class might be hard to get along with. An

i
ncomplete study of married couples indicates that frequently people of this type of personality are found married to those of Class IV, the most restrained and unemotional of all the type groups.

CLASS IV—THE LOW *R-Z*

This is, on the whole, the safest and best of the five classes, with more of the adjustive and less of the unstabilizing attitudes than any of the others. Very few problems and a high proportion of successful cases have been found here. If many of the unstabilizing factors may be regarded as the potential source of "emotional" conduct, then the low *R-Z* personalities are characteristically unemotional in behavior. This is exactly the impression they give in person. They are typically controlled, quiet, reserved persons. It will be noticed that both the *P+* and the *P-* factors of social advance and retreat, respectively, are lower for this group than for any of the others. Perhaps this adds up to some degree of social independence. This seems to be the most rational of the groups. Many good students have been found here. The only "fault" in the personality of this group taken as a whole may be a slight reserve in social relations which may prevent a full range of social contact and, perhaps, tend to limit the area of success.

CLASS V—THE MIDDLE GROUP

This class, it will be remembered, was devised primarily as a buffer group, standing at the center of the distribution of *R* and *Z* scores and serving to make the separation of the four basic classes more certain. It has little distinctive class character and seems to represent a middle tendency throughout the whole range of factors. It is, however, more like Class IV than any of the others, and it is possible that both of these classes represent an early repression of the more extreme emotional tendencies which characterize the other three classes. Taken as a whole, the persons in Classes IV and V may lack "drive" and the energetic pursuit of given goals.

If, then, one is justified in assuming that the class means give some indication of in-

dividual tendency, then one has a quick clue to certain conflicts or striving in cases where the pattern fails to conform to the class standard. In conference this sort of analysis yields excellent results and produces rapport very quickly.

Experience indicates that in the individual case it is simpler and more meaningful to compare the pattern with that of the class to which it belongs than to compare each variable factor separately, whether by percentiles or by *z*-scores, with the general population means.

DIFFERENCES BETWEEN MEN AND WOMEN

Only seven of the twenty-seven factors showed a significant difference between men and women. In order of their difference these are as follows:

	Significance Ratio
Self-reliance (<i>*S+</i>)	7.4†
Competitiveness (<i>K</i>)	6.2†
Self-inferiority (<i>S-</i>)	4.7‡
Self-superiority (<i>S+</i>)	3.8†
Initiative (<i>I</i>)	3.7†
Social aggression (<i>Pd</i>)	3.1†
Overdependence (<i>D</i>)	3.1‡

† In favor of the men.

‡ In favor of the women.

These findings seem to indicate that men are significantly more dominant and self-reliant (**S+*); more competitive (*K*); that they feel less passively inferior (*S-*); are more assuredly superior in attitude (*S+*); show more initiative (*I*); are more aggressive toward other people (*Pd*); and show less of overdependence upon others (*D*). All this seems quite in accordance with the general impression concerning the differences between the sexes. To the question of whether these differences are inherent in the male or the result of environmental circumstance, this test offers no answer.

PERSONALITY DIFFERENCES DUE TO AGE.

When this test was given to some 200 junior and senior high school pupils, the scores were found to be sufficiently different from those of the adults as to require a completely new set of standards to be made.

The figures for this difference have not yet been prepared for publication, but it can be stated that the whole series of unstabilizing or emotional factors ran much higher in this adolescent sample than in the adult. When drawn up and compared with adult standards, most of the adolescents look like problem cases. And perhaps they are. It is interesting to note that the basic factors, *R* and *Z*, showed no significant difference between the adolescent and the adult standards, and the stabilizing factors of adaptability, perseverance, and the like were similar in the two groups. Many conferences have been held with adolescents who have taken the test, and the results seem to work out as well with this age group as with the older people.

VOCATIONAL CHOICE

Although a good deal of work has been done in studying the relationship between the personality pattern as shown by this test and the vocational allocation or choice, there has been no completed study as yet which is ready for publication, though a detailed study of this kind is now being made. There is a good deal of evidence to show that certain types of pattern are best suited to certain types of work. A determination of the *R* and *Z* balance alone is sufficient in many cases to determine the general sort of vocation which is likely to conform most readily to the given type of personality. The ability to endure or enjoy routine (*R*) and to care for a recurring round of petty detail is in itself of far-reaching importance in the matter of vocational assignment. On the other hand, the ability to meet and enjoy a constantly changing situation (*Z*) is almost equally important.

SUCCESSFUL VERSUS PROBLEM PERSONALITIES

It is, of course, obvious that one of the major purposes of a personality test is the differentiation between the successful or well-adjusted personalities and those which are unsuccessful or problems either to themselves or to others.

In order to test out the possible usefulness of this test in this regard, a tentative reconnaissance experiment was made with two contrasting groups taken from the basic sample of 350 cases which was used for the rest of this study. Seventy-three cases for whom there was outside evidence of poor adjustment were compared with 87 personalities who were thought to be well adjusted. (Part of the study was made with a group of 111 cases.) The available evidence for the selection of the cases was, in many cases, very meager, and unquestionably the two groups are not mutually exclusive. It was often difficult to distinguish between people who have situational problems and those who have problem personalities. For example, two married couples who had come for help with their domestic incompatibilities were included in the group of problem cases; but, if the test results can be relied upon at all, in the one case it was the husband who was the problem, and in the other it was the wife (who had, incidentally, been the one to do the complaining). However, since the study could have no significance if test results were to be used as criteria of the state of adjustment of the personalities involved, both husbands and wives were included in the problem group. Because of these possibly mistaken initial classifications, the results are less clear cut than they might have been with rigorously chosen groups. However, the experiment does at least show a method which might be perfected for giving a quick working hypothesis concerning the probability of success or of problem tendencies of an unknown personality.

Both groups were studied with reference to the twenty-five variable factors other than the basic *R* and *Z*, and in eighteen of them a significant ratio of difference as good as or better than about the 1 per cent of confidence was found. Table 2 shows that the most discriminatory factors as between success and problem personalities are (1) overdependence (*D*), (2) adaptability (*A*), and (3) emotional ambivalence (*P+P-*).

When the distributions of scores on the

eighteen discriminatory factors for both groups were studied, it was found that values at a distance of about $.5\sigma$ above and below the mean on each factor might be taken as critical scores for problem or successful personalities, respectively. Scores falling between these two critical points (about 40

areas of probable success or difficulty with reference to the whole range of factors. By this means any given raw score can immediately be subjected to the success-problem criterion. Thus, on the factor of adaptability (*A*), the critical score for problems is from 17 raw-score points downward, while

TABLE 2

MEANS, STANDARD DEVIATIONS, STANDARD ERROR OF THE MEANS, AND SIGNIFICANCE RATIOS OF DIFFERENCE BETWEEN A GROUP OF 73 PROBLEM PERSONALITIES AND 87 SUCCESSFULLY ADJUSTED ONES

Only the eighteen factors showing a significance ratio of difference at least as great as 3.8 are used as criteria of adjustment.

FACTOR	PROBLEM GROUP <i>N</i> = 74			SUCCESS GROUP <i>N</i> = 87			RATIO OF DIFFER- ENCE
	Mean	S.D.	σ	Mean	S.D.	σ	
Adaptability (<i>A</i>)	16.0	4.8	.5	22.8	4.4	.4	10.7
Critical attitude (<i>Cr</i>)	10.6	3.6	.4	6.2	2.9	.3	8.5
Common sense (<i>Cs</i>)	11.4	3.8	.4	15.3	2.6	.2	8.3
Overdependence (<i>D</i>)	12.2	4.7	.5	5.5	3.3	.3	11.0
Group conformity (<i>G+</i>)	6.0	2.6	.3	8.7	2.3	.3	6.6
Guilt attitudes (<i>G+G-</i>)	6.6	2.9	.3	3.3	2.2	.3	7.2
Initiative (<i>I</i>)	10.9	3.6	.4	12.5	3.2	.3	3.0
Competitiveness (<i>K</i>)	8.4	3.2	.4	7.4	2.9	.3	2.1
Care of money (<i>M</i>)	5.3	3.1	.4	5.6	3.3	.3	0.5
Negativism (<i>N</i>)	7.6	3.3	.4	4.4	2.7	.3	6.7
Obstinacy (<i>O</i>)	9.9	3.3	.4	5.5	2.9	.3	9.1
Sociability (<i>P+</i>)	10.4	3.8	.4	12.8	3.2	.3	3.8
Social withdrawal (<i>P-</i>)	11.1	4.6	.5	6.2	3.6	.3	7.5
Ambivalence (<i>P+P-</i>)	9.5	4.1	.5	4.2	2.7	.3	9.7
Social aggression (<i>Pa</i>)	13.0	5.6	.6	7.4	4.0	.4	7.5
Social sympathy (<i>Ps</i>)	9.6	2.7	.3	9.6	2.6	.2	0.3
Perseverance (<i>Per</i>)	11.4	3.6	.4	12.4	3.1	.3	2.2
Self-focus (<i>S</i>)	11.3	3.5	.4	7.6	3.0	.3	8.0
Self-superiority (<i>S+</i>)	9.2	3.4	.4	5.6	2.9	.3	7.3
Self-inferiority (<i>S-</i>)	11.4	4.9	.6	4.9	3.2	.3	9.7
Irritability (<i>S+S-</i>)	6.7	3.2	.4	2.8	2.3	.2	8.9
Self-reliance (<i>*S+</i>)	10.2	3.9	.5	11.8	3.0	.3	3.0
Co-operativeness (<i>*S-</i>)	9.4	2.9	.3	12.2	2.5	.2	7.7
Interest in things (<i>T</i>)	8.8	3.7	.3	8.5	3.3	.3	0.6
Exhibitionism (<i>X</i>)	7.1	3.3	.4	4.2	2.4	.2	6.4

per cent of the total on a normal distribution) would be considered as neutral for prediction. Figure 3 shows the way in which this separation is made. The vertical lines represent the range of raw-score values of each factor. The figures on these lines represent the appropriate raw-score values of about $.5$, 1 , and 2σ distances above or below the mean, respectively. The critical values are indicated by the hachures which outline

for successes it is from 23 upward; and the neutral zone lies between these points, which are each at approximately $.5\sigma$ distance from the mean at 20.

In testing the adjustment of any given case it is necessary only to find where the raw scores for the eighteen significant factors fall with reference to the two critical points. The difference between the total number falling within the problem zone and

THE CHURCH IN A SMALL CITY

FREDERICK A. BUSHEE

ABSTRACT

The results of this study would indicate that churches in small cities show more vitality than those in rural districts and are in some ways healthier than those in large cities, though interest is manifested more in church attendance than in church membership. Sunday schools still attract a good-sized membership taken altogether, but the larger churches admit a definite falling-off of interest in them. In general, financial support of churches is good. Several denominations are raising more money than ever before. Churches which are conservative in belief seem to have a more loyal membership, including the young people, than the liberal churches; but their smaller size may partially explain this. The liberal churches find their chief problem is holding the interest of the young people; and the larger churches are evidently carrying too many inactive members on their lists.

Studies of churches as social institutions have been made in rural districts and to some extent in large cities; but similar studies for small cities have not been undertaken, although it is probably true that the small city represents a more normal social life than either the great city or the rural area.

Boulder, Colorado, has a census population of 12,958, but the city boundaries are so restricted that a considerable number of inhabitants who participate in its activities reside outside these boundaries and should for all social purposes be included among its citizens. This larger center has a population of 16,377 and an adult population (over fourteen years of age) of 13,039 and represents approximately the area which the churches serve. Boulder also, being the seat of the state university, has 3,000 non-resident students, and for certain purposes this number will be considered in the work of the churches; but, inasmuch as many students go home over the week ends, it would be an exaggeration to say that the churches serve a population of over 19,000. Unless otherwise stated the population figures used will include the regular residents only.

If we omit the Salvation Army, which is hardly a church organization although it undertakes to hold Sunday services, Boulder has twenty-three churches. There is therefore one church to every 712 of the total population, or to 566 of the adult population. This may not seem large when com-

pared with the country as a whole which, according to the religious census of 1926, has a church for every 344 of the population. But there is a great difference between cities and rural districts. Cities of 25,000 inhabitants and over have one church for every 1,000 of the population, while in the rest of the country the number is one church to 240 inhabitants. Boulder lies between the rural areas and the large cities in the relative number of its churches.

The total church membership is 5,805, or 35.4 per cent of the total population and 44 per cent of the adult population fourteen years of age and over. Comparisons of church membership are often confusing because churches report their membership on different bases. I have included only the resident adult membership. The adult membership was obtained by using the number of those confirmed in the Catholic church lists instead of those baptized as ordinarily reported, and by excluding infants from the Lutheran memberships. The *Census of Religious Bodies* has attempted to solve this difficulty by dividing the church members according to age, but a large percentage of churches fail to make such returns. Fry¹ has estimated adult membership for 1926 for the country as a whole and finds that 55 per cent of the adult population are on the church rolls; but in the western states

¹ C. Luther Fry, *The United States Looks at Its Churches* (Institute of Social and Religious Research, 1930), p. 7 and Appen., Table I.

the number falls to 40 per cent. These figures would be comparable with 44 per cent for Boulder except that the census gives total membership rather than resident membership. The largest church membership is found in the southern and eastern states and the smallest in the Far West, with the exception of Utah, which counts nine-tenths of its adult population on the church rolls.

A comparison of church members with total population was made for 1930 by Brunner and Kolb² in their study of 140 villages, which included 2,245 churches. They found that in all the villages church membership was 32.9 per cent of the total population, and in the villages of the Far West only 21 per cent. The 1936 *Religious Census*, which furnishes only incomplete returns, gives an estimated 34 per cent of adult members in the total population. Another survey of 179 counties³ reported a Protestant membership of only 20 per cent of the total town and country population, which would compare with 30 per cent for the Protestant membership of Boulder.

It is commonly supposed that Negroes belong to churches to a greater extent than do whites and that the percentage is somewhat larger for the country as a whole. However, the excess is confined wholly to females, the male population showing a smaller percentage than the whites. Boulder has too few Negroes in its population to yield significant returns, but with a total number of 135 they attempt to support two churches, one with a membership of 21 and the other of 40, making the membership 45 per cent of the Negro population.

The size of the individual churches in Boulder varies greatly as does the size of denominations in the country as a whole. Three churches have a membership of over 800, six of from 200 to 450, and thirteen of less than 100, while nine range from 12 to 50

members. Inasmuch as one church per 1,000 inhabitants is considered normal, if it is to have a sound economic basis for survival, Boulder may be considered to be somewhat overchurched. But a more serious problem concerns the size of the churches. Rural sociologists have found that churches with fewer than 100 members are weak churches and are more likely to fail. Large churches are growing churches because they offer newcomers better plants and a wider range of activities.

Brunner and Kolb⁴ found that the number of village churches with fewer than 100 members dropped, between 1924 and 1930, from one-half to two-fifths and that the decline was proportionately greater in the rural group. In Boulder over one-half of the churches have a membership of fewer than 100, and one-third fewer than 50. However, of these last, four have a considerably larger attendance than membership, so that membership should not be accepted as the sole index of strength. No denomination is represented by more than one church, and in general the denominations that are strong in the country as a whole are also strong in Boulder. The chief exceptions are the Christian Church and the Seventh Day Adventist Church, which rank among the leading churches in Boulder.

The sex of church members in Boulder is even more preponderantly female than in the country as a whole. In both the 1926 and 1936 censuses the ratio of females to males was 5 to 4, while in Boulder it is over 6 to 4. In the state of Colorado the ratio is only slightly over 5 to 4. There is, to be sure, an excess of females in the total population, but it amounts to only 16 per cent as against an excess of 50 per cent in the churches. The sex ratio varies greatly, however, among the different denominations as it does in the rest of the country. The Christian Church and the First Free Methodist Church have a virtual equality of the sexes, and the Lutheran churches show only a small excess of females. On the other

² E. de S. Brunner and J. H. Kolb, *Rural Social Trends* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1933), p. 216.

³ Horace B. Hawthorne, *The Sociology of Rural Life* (New York: Century Co., 1926), p. 360.

⁴ *Op. cit.*, p. 217.

hand, among the larger churches the Episcopalians and the Congregationalists list more than twice as many women as men in their memberships, and the Baptists and Adventists only a little under 2 to 1.

Church attendance is even more significant than membership as an index of vitality, and in this respect Boulder makes a favorable showing. The average church attendance is 3,678, which is 19 per cent of the total population, including students, and 22.9 per cent of the adult population. Attendance of university students is in most cases based on estimates rather than on actual count, but the returns indicate that approximately 17 per cent of the students attend church. Inasmuch as many students go away to their homes over the week ends, it would seem probable that the interest of university students in the church does not differ greatly from that of the rest of the adult population.

Comparisons of church attendance here with other districts are hard to obtain, partly because few surveys have been made within recent years and partly because they are not all conducted on the same basis. In this survey the figures given are for average attendance. Other surveys have canvassed the inhabitants to ascertain from them the frequency of their church attendance. Inasmuch as the persons inside the churches are not quite the same each Sunday, average attendance would be larger than the numbers claiming regular attendance but smaller than the regular plus the occasional attendants as obtained by the declarations of individuals.

Apparently church attendance has fallen off in the United States over a period of twenty or thirty years so that some allowance should be made for comparisons with surveys of an earlier period. According to a report of Babson's Committee,⁵ church attendance in the country as a whole has dropped from 120 per thousand in 1939 to 108 in 1935. In this study I find no confirmation

of such a small church attendance and none appears in other similar surveys which have been made. The Springfield Survey reported 16 per cent of the Protestant population as attending church. Gill and Pinchot,⁶ in their studies of Windsor and Tompkins counties, found that church attendance had fallen off more than church membership. In Windsor County, in 1908, 19 per cent of the Protestant population attended church "regularly or frequently" as compared with 26 per cent in 1888. Professor Lynd obtained reports of church attendance in "Middletown" for one month and found that the average attendance was 14.3 per cent of the total population.⁷ Hawthorne reports the results of several local studies.⁸ In Montgomery County, Maryland, the average attendance was 13.4 per cent of the entire population. In northeastern Minnesota 33 per cent of the population were said to attend regularly, and in three rural townships of Iowa 22 per cent were regular attendants. A part of these differences may be due to different methods of conducting surveys, but when all due allowance is made it would appear that church attendance, while varying considerably in different sections of the country, has not fallen to the point indicated in the Babson report.

A comparison of church attendance with membership instead of with total population is sometimes made and is helpful, though of course churches are not organizations in which attendance is confined to membership. Gill and Pinchot⁹ found that in six rural churches in Ohio attendance was 25.7 per cent of membership. A similar comparison for Boulder would give 63.3 per cent if the Catholic church were included. Attendance at Protestant churches, which

⁶ C. O. Gill and Gifford Pinchot, *The Country Church* (New York: Macmillan Co., 1913), pp. 22 and 77.

⁷ Robert S. Lynd and Helen M. Lynd, *Middletown* (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1929), p. 529.

⁸ *Op. cit.*, p. 129.

⁹ See A. W. Hayes, *Rural Sociology* (New York: Longmans Green & Co., 1929), p. 416.

⁵ See Hornell Hart, "Religion," *American Journal of Sociology*, XLVII (May, 1942), 891.

is probably more comparable, is 51 per cent of the membership. However, this excess is sufficiently large to suggest that resident adult membership, as used in this study, provides a smaller base than that usually given by churches in their membership reports.

The capacity of the churches in Boulder, if combined in a grand total, would seem to be ample for all the needs of the city. The seating capacity of all churches together is 6,710, which would accommodate half of the adult population and about 40 per cent of the total population. Narrowing the comparison down to those supposed to have shown some interest in the church, we find that the churches could accommodate all their members and still have 900 seats to spare. Compared with attendance on an average Sunday, 3,000 vacant seats would be available, so that 80 per cent more could be accommodated than normally attend. However, total seating capacity is of little significance because seating capacity is a problem for each individual church. Some of the small congregations have taken abandoned churches or meeting places much too large for their present needs, and some of the new churches were naturally built with seating capacity ample for future growth. In these cases excess seating capacity is no indication of a decline in interest and activity on the part of the congregations.

The actual situation with regard to both seating capacity and attendance is better brought out by a consideration of individual cases. While seating capacity of all churches together is greater than membership, five churches, all large, have a seating capacity less than membership, and in two other cases seating capacity is practically the same as membership. Two churches have a seating capacity below average attendance. The Catholics overcome this difficulty by holding three masses each Sunday and the Seventh Day Adventists ordinarily have to bring extra chairs to accommodate their adherents. Most of the other large churches present at least an appearance of vitality. Five of the Protestant churches have an at-

tendance of between 200 and 400, and four others of between 100 and 200. Nevertheless, of the five large Protestant churches, three have an attendance of only about one-half their membership, and one of only one-third its membership. Although several of the large churches admit a decline in attendance and interest since the twenties, most of the churches report increases for the last few years.

A good index of church activity is to be found in the various subordinate organizations within the churches. Many members who do not attend church services regularly are nevertheless active in one or more societies. These organizations have received scant notice in local surveys, though Brunner and Kolb,¹⁰ in their village and country churches, mention them briefly. They report that 70 per cent of the churches have such organizations, and they average two and one-half to a church. In Boulder eighteen of the twenty-three churches have a total of seventy subordinate organizations, and they average three to a church. They vary from one in some of the small churches to six in four churches and ten in one of the largest churches.

The aggregate membership of these seventy organizations is 3,467 as against a church membership of 5,805. However, inasmuch as some of the members, mostly women, belong to more than one, the gross membership is larger than the number of separate individuals belonging. In addition to this duplication, between 300 and 400 nonmembers have joined one or more of the subordinate societies, and most of those for college students are not composed of local church members. Notwithstanding these complications, a fairly accurate estimate would indicate that about one-third of the church members belong to the subordinate groups. This would make two-thirds of the 3,467 members of all these organizations church members and one-third nonchurch members.

These organizations, as might be ex-

¹⁰ *Op. cit.*, p. 219.

pected, are carried on by women to a much greater extent than they are by men; in fact, their preponderance here is even greater than in the church membership. Of the seventy organizations, thirty-four, or nearly one-half, are for women, seven are for men, and twenty-nine for both sexes. Membership in some of those for both sexes could not be obtained by sex, but from those reporting it appears that at least 70 per cent of the members are women as compared with 60 per cent of the church membership.

The activity and usefulness of these groups may be judged somewhat by attendance at meetings. Combining all these societies we have an average attendance of 56 per cent as against church attendance of 63 per cent of members. However, inasmuch as attendance in these groups is in most cases, though not in all, confined to members, whereas church attendance is not, it seems probable that the interest of church members in the regular church services and in the work of the subordinate organizations does not differ materially. A noteworthy difference in attendance exists between large and small organizations. The former, namely those with a membership of seventy-five or more, get out only half of their members at meetings, whereas the latter have an attendance of two-thirds of their membership. Combining societies according to sex divisions yields no significant differences in attendance, although men's societies have a slightly better attendance, notwithstanding the fact that they are usually large. Their attendance averages 58 per cent, women's organizations 56 per cent, and those for both sexes 55 per cent. It is possible that the better attendance at the men's meetings is due to the fact that they are more generally of a social nature; but it is not true that men's brotherhoods are usually successful. Two of the largest churches have flourishing men's clubs, but in two or three other churches those that were started have been given up for lack of support, and only six churches have any at all. Many churches feel that the diminishing interest of the young people is their most serious problem.

This study shows, however, that there is no lack of loyalty on the part of those who do join young people's societies. These, excluding the college groups, report an average attendance of 75 per cent of their membership, which is the highest of any of the divisions. The difficulty, of course, is that the membership is small, not that there is any lack of interest shown by those who belong.

The purpose of all the organizations is primarily the support and upbuilding of the churches themselves, though their methods vary greatly. Some are primarily social and may in addition have educational programs. Others are primarily money-raising groups, and the social feature is incidental. A large number exist expressly for the purpose of holding the interest of the young people. Nine organizations are chiefly for college students and fifteen are for the high-school or teen-age group. Many do not confine themselves to one activity but stand ready to assist the church in any way that the need presents itself. It would be impossible to classify these societies according to a single activity or objective, though in a broad way they may be classified according to their general purposes. At least three-quarters of the organizations are directly engaged in the upbuilding of the local church. Eleven, or 16 per cent, are missionary societies, intended, of course, to extend the influence of a denomination though not primarily concerned with the welfare of the local church. Not more than 10 per cent devote themselves chiefly or wholly to philanthropic activities outside the church, though it is true that during war periods many have engaged in Red Cross or similar types of work. From this analysis it would seem that the churches, like many other institutions, were self-centered in their activities. Churches attempt chiefly to build up their own organizations and are not generally centers for social and philanthropic work in a community. It is possible that in this age of specialization other institutions are better fitted to carry on social work than are the churches; but there seems to be plenty of work not now accomplished which some of

the churches could assume. Thorndike¹¹ suggests that churches should spend a larger amount of money for welfare work in their own cities and even outside the limits of their cities, but, while the churches do encourage their members to support charitable agencies as individuals, they seldom give as organizations for such purposes.

The Sunday school has always been considered an important church activity because of the influence it exerts upon the rising generation and through it on the future growth and prosperity of the church. All the churches in Boulder conduct church schools except the Latter Day Saints and they have had them in times past. The Catholics have a parochial school which takes the place of a Sunday school, while the Adventists have a flourishing Sabbath school and a parish day school besides.

The Sunday school enrolment in Protestant churches is 3,249, or 19 per cent of the total population. Brunner and Kolb¹² found an enrolment of 16 per cent in 1930 in the 140 villages they studied. Fry¹³ compares Sunday-school enrolment with the total population under nineteen years of age, which is of little significance because of the large number of adult classes included; but he estimates that for the country as a whole not more than 44 per cent of the youth under nineteen is enrolled in Sunday schools. In Boulder, however, the same comparison gives 74 per cent. Of course this figure does not mean that three-quarters of the young people are enrolled in Sunday schools, but it does indicate that a larger proportion is enrolled here than in the rest of the country. A recent survey of the activities and interests of high-school students in Boulder shows that 52 per cent attend Sunday school at least occasionally.

Another interesting comparison is that between Sunday-school enrolment and church membership, for it gives a rough in-

dex of religious education within the churches, and it also shows whether church schools vary with the size of the churches. In Boulder, Sunday-school enrolment in the Protestant churches is 67 per cent of church membership. Douglas¹⁴ found that the church-school enrolment in city churches averaged 63 per cent of church membership. The St. Louis Survey¹⁵ shows that the average Sunday-school enrolment for nine of the largest denominations during the three-year period of 1917-19 was 72 per 100 church members. Two denominations had a larger Sunday school than church membership and two had enrolments of less than 50 per cent of church membership.

Churches in Boulder vary greatly with regard to the relative size of their church schools. In general, to be sure, the large churches have large schools, but not by any means proportionately in order of their size. While, on the average, church-school enrolment is 67 per cent of church membership, six churches have larger schools than church membership, and all of these, except the Church of the Nazarene, are small churches. Eight schools fall between 70 and 100 per cent of church membership, and of these four are large churches. Six schools are less than 50 per cent of church membership and three of these are small and three medium size.

Actual attendance at church schools is probably of greater significance than enrolment from the point of view of religious instruction. And in the reports of various surveys on church-school attendance there is greater uniformity than in almost any other form of church activity. In Boulder the average attendance is 60 per cent of enrolment, and Douglas¹⁶ found the average attendance in all four types of churches which he studied to be 61 per cent of the enrolment. The St. Louis Survey,¹⁷ however,

¹⁴ H. Paul Douglas, *One Thousand City Churches* (New York: Doubleday, Doran & Co., 1926), p. 351.

¹⁵ H. Paul Douglas, *St. Louis Church Survey* (New York: Doubleday, Doran & Co., 1924), p. 192.

¹⁶ *One Thousand City Churches*, p. 351.

¹⁷ *Op. cit.*, p. 192.

¹¹ E. L. Thorndike, *Your City* (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1939), p. 160.

¹² *Op. cit.*, p. 235.

¹³ *Op. cit.*, p. 58.

gives an attendance of 68 per cent for forty-two Sunday schools reporting. And Morse and Brunner,¹⁸ in a study of 179 counties, found that two-thirds of those enrolled in Sunday schools attend. In a study of 109 schools in industrial villages Brunner¹⁹ found the attendance to be 64.6 per cent of enrolment.

In Boulder, church-school attendance, like enrolment, varies considerably in the different churches. The range is from 40 per cent to 93 per cent of enrolment. Seven churches report an average attendance of over 70 per cent. The Seventh Day Adventist Church, which maintains one of the largest church schools in the city and a home-study class besides, claims an average attendance of 93 per cent. Only one church has an average attendance of less than 50 per cent. Inasmuch as the church school enrolment in Boulder is higher and the percentage of attendance somewhat lower than in other places, an obvious conclusion to be drawn would be that enrolment lists were not kept up to date and continued to carry the names of persons who had dropped out entirely. This supposition is partly confirmed by the ratio of attendance at the different churches. Of the fourteen churches having the largest enrolment compared with membership seven have an attendance below average; but none of the six churches having an enrolment of less than 50 per cent of church membership had an attendance below average.

The *United States Census of Religious Bodies* reports that Sunday schools in most of the churches are decreasing in membership, the decrease between 1926 and 1936 being 12.6 per cent. And in Boulder a decrease is found in six churches which are the older and larger organizations. However, four churches claim increases and the remainder see no marked change either way. These differences in church-school activity are hard to explain. Douglas thinks they are

due partly to differences in church policy, but in Boulder they seem to be one good index of the condition of the churches. In virtually all cases churches having a small attendance compared with membership are also the ones having either a small school enrolment or else a small school attendance. Further, the growing church schools are the ones with a high average attendance. Beyond these points it is difficult to explain the differences in church-school activity; but it is possible that they may be traceable to internal conditions not reflected in statistical summaries.

A detailed analysis of church finances has not been attempted in this survey, but total sums raised by the Protestant churches were obtained for purposes of comparison, though two of the small churches do not have budgets and could not give accurate reports. Three churches receive aid from outside sources, so that the total expenditures of the churches is not quite the same as the amount raised in Boulder. The total amount expended by the churches reporting was \$109,494, or \$22.45 per member. This seems to be more than was raised in other districts surveyed, according to reports available. In the country as a whole, according to the census of 1926, the average church expenditure was \$18.44 per member. Urban churches raised \$21.50 and country churches \$13.27 per member. The Rocky Mountain states rank the lowest of any section of the country, urban churches raising \$16.88 and the rural only \$9.50. Douglas,²⁰ in his study of city churches, found the average expenditure of all churches in 1922 was \$18.17, and per capita benevolences were \$11.52. In Springfield, Massachusetts, the average expenditure for 36 Protestant churches in 1921 was \$17.64 per member. According to the St. Louis Survey,²¹ church expenditures increased from \$18 per capita in 1899 to \$21 in 1919. Churches in small places raise still less. Brunner²² reports that in 1929 indus-

¹⁸ See Hawthorne, *op. cit.*, p. 360.

¹⁹ E. de S. Brunner, *Industrial Village Churches* (Institute of Social and Religious Research, 1930), p. 136.

²⁰ *One Thousand City Churches*, pp. 206 and 345.

²¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 179.

²² *Op. cit.*, p. 146.

trial villages gave \$14.74 and agricultural villages \$16.89 per member for church purposes. These comparisons are made, to be sure, with surveys taken some time ago; but, inasmuch as church expenditures per member were more in the twenties than they are now, the comparisons would not favor present-day churches. The 1936 *Census of Religious Bodies* gives such incomplete returns that even estimates are hardly worth making; but from the figures available it appears that churches raised no more than \$10 per member in that period, and the same figure would hold for the western states.

To give a correct picture of the situation in Boulder it must be said that the large average per capita receipts are due to the remarkable record of one church, the Seventh Day Adventist. This church, which practices tithing, raised \$40,000 with a membership of 530, which is almost four times the budget of the churches next in line. Under these conditions averages may give a distorted picture. The rest of the churches in Boulder raised only \$15.50 per member, which approximates the amount raised in other cities in the mountain area.

Inasmuch as churches are supported by voluntary contributions instead of taxes, we have come to look on church incomes as measures of the generosity of churchgoers; but with the older established churches internal costs tend to become stabilized and even expenditures for missionary and philanthropic purposes are likely to be apportioned and become part of a regular budget. Consequently it would not be incorrect to look on church incomes as costs of maintenance rather than attempts to raise indefinite amounts for good causes. From this point of view it is interesting to find that costs of maintenance for small churches are much more per capita than those for large churches. Churches with memberships of less than one hundred cost \$31 per member as against \$21 for churches of over two hundred members. And if we again omit the Seventh Day Adventists, the cost is only \$13 per member. Thus, small churches are relatively costly institutions and at the same

time have smaller plants, inferior facilities, and are much more likely to fail. Such a comparison of church budgets might be invalidated by the existence of debts, but in Boulder most of the church buildings are free of debt, and those that are not are among the larger churches and the debts are not considered burdensome.

Expenditures for churches in the country as a whole increased during the early part of the century, reaching a maximum in the twenties. This was followed by a sharp decline during the depression years and then by a recovery, which has not yet reached the maximum point of the twenties. In Boulder six churches, including the older and larger organizations, follow this pattern. On the other hand, eight churches have recovered entirely from the depression and are raising more money than ever before. The other churches are either too small or too recently organized to afford a comparison.

The analysis of the survey so far has been an attempt to compare general conditions in Boulder churches with those in other districts, together with comparisons between the churches themselves chiefly on the basis of size. But the situation may be further clarified by dividing the churches according to belief. Most of the churches, though not all, might be separated into two contrasting types. Nine churches, representing the large national organizations, are liberal in belief and follow established religious practice. Another nine are fundamentalist in belief and evangelistic in their methods. The interest of the comparison lies wholly in percentages, for the absolute numbers involved are quite dissimilar. The first group contains 3,708 members and the second 902, all but two in the latter group being small churches. Church attendance at the liberal churches is only 45 per cent of membership, whereas attendance at the fundamentalist churches is equal to the membership. In Sunday-school enrolment the liberal churches have the largest schools, but nevertheless they amount to only 57 per cent of church membership, with an average attendance of 53 per cent of enrolment; while

the church-school enrolment of the conservative group is 114 per cent of membership and the average attendance 76 per cent of enrolment. With regard to finances these two groups raise approximately the same amount of money, though the first group contains four times as many members as the second. This means \$14 per member for the first group and \$56 for the second. But here again the second group profits by having the Adventists on their side. The other churches in the group raised \$28 per member.

Perhaps an explanation of these differences should not be attempted. There may be a number of factors involved. Is it possible that liberal churches have less control over their members than authoritarian churches? Many think that absolutism and authority in a church are attractive to the majority of adherents. Others believe that the large churches are in the doldrums so far as activities are concerned; that they add to their membership but are satisfied with present achievement in activities and are consequently slipping back. Perhaps the larger churches have necessarily a more heterogeneous membership and include many who manifest no permanent interest in church work. If the membership is larger than it should be, then the percentages indicating activities would automatically be low without reflecting on the interest of the membership as a whole. If these comparisons seem to indicate too many inactive members in the larger churches, it should be remembered that the previous comparisons with other cities and districts, which showed a comparatively smaller church membership than church attendance, would indicate that Boulder churches as a whole contained no more dead wood than churches in other cities.

This study would suggest that one of the greatest problems of all large churches is to sustain the interest of the members they already have, yet strangely enough none of the ministers interviewed seemed to recognize this as a major problem. The Adventist pastor, however, whimsically remarked that

if he had any more members he would not know what to do with them; and he advocated dividing the church to make possible more intense personal work among the members. To be sure, all ministers assume that their chief task is to build up their churches; but there are differences in methods of doing this. The facts show that a small organization with a united loyal membership is more effective than a large organization with an indifferent membership.

The problem most generally recognized by the ministers themselves was that of holding the interest of the young people, a problem which is reflected in many cases in the decline of church schools. Some attributed this to lack of leadership, and others thought it came from defects in home life and education. Some of the pastors, usually connected with the more conservative churches, claimed that they were generally successful with the children of their own members; but they complained of the rapid changes in the population of the city which took away young people and in many cases the adults also. A pastor of a small church said that only three of the members of his church present in 1937 were still living in the city. Only one or two ministers mentioned finances as a serious problem, even though some of the churches still have building debts.

In summarizing the results of this study, it does not appear that Boulder, representing a small city, merely holds a midway position between rural districts and large cities in church activities. It has characteristics of its own which might or might not be similar to other small cities if information from them were available.

In the comparison of churches to total population, Boulder does rank between rural and urban districts. It has more than one church to every one thousand of population, which is the proportion for cities of twenty-five thousand and over and is the standard of safety set by experts. A peculiar characteristic is the large number of small churches in the city. More than half have fewer than one hundred members, a number

which has been taken as the dividing line between strong and weak churches.

Church membership is not large as compared with the country as a whole, partly because it is confined to resident adult membership; but even so it is higher than that for rural areas and compares favorably with membership in other sections of the Far West. The small membership here compared with the East may be attributable to less interest on the part of the men, for the ratio of females to males in the membership is higher than for the rest of the country and also for the state as a whole.

Church attendance is high when compared with membership and makes a favorable showing even when compared with total population. This is one indication that the church membership rolls do not contain an unusually large number of inactive members, though some of the large churches seem to have an excess.

In the case of church schools the situation seems to be reversed. With them the enrolment is high, but the attendance is slightly below average for large cities. There is a definite decline in church-school activity in the older churches, and the problem of interesting the young people is a serious one; but this situation does not appear to be true with the fundamentalists.

Finally, the finances of the Boulder churches are good, the amount raised per member being higher than the average for large cities, not to mention those for rural areas.

This leads to the conclusion that, if Boulder is representative, then the strength of the churches in small cities has not deteriorated to the extent that it has in rural sections, and they are in many cases stronger than those in large cities.

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THE AGRICULTURAL STABILITY OF THE OLD ORDER AMISH AND OLD ORDER MENNONITES OF LANCASTER COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA

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ABSTRACT

The stability of the Pennsylvania German farmers has frequently been noted. The various socioreligious groups comprising this large ethnic body, however, are characterized by unlike degrees of stability. In general, the sectarians have been more stable as farmers than the church people. The Old Order Amish and Old Order Mennonites of Lancaster County epitomize this stability. Their unusual persistence as farmers can definitely be traced to a socioreligious program whose guiding principles are separation from the world and nonconformity to the world. The desire to perpetuate old values and old patterns has made farming the preferred way of life, and all members are required to live in rural areas. Centuries of persecution in Europe contributed to their excellence as farmers.

Previous reports dealing with the Pennsylvania German farmers have pointed out the remarkable stability of these people in their preferred way of life.¹ Within this large ethnic group, however, there exist subgroups, really socioreligious groups, that have been even more stable than the Pennsylvania German farmers as a whole. In general, the sectarians—Amish, Mennonites, Dunkers (or Brethren), and Yorkers—are more stable as farmers than the church groups, who are predominantly Lutherans and German Reformed. Of these sectarians, the Old Order Amish and Old Order Mennonites of Lancaster County, Pennsylvania, are perhaps the largest core of extremely orthodox sectarians in the United States.

Numerically, the Old Order Amish and Old Order Mennonites are not particularly impressive. The former number about 3,500, and the latter somewhat over 1,000. While the Old Order Amish still constitute a majority among the Amish element in the county (about 5,000), the Old Order Mennonites are a small minority of the total number of Mennonites in the county (about

15,000). The two Old Order groups occupy a triangular area which has its western terminus near the city of Lancaster and is about 15 miles wide at the eastern boundary of Lancaster County. It forms part of the Lancaster Limestone Plain.

The sequence of occupancy of the Lancaster Limestone Plain reveals an interesting history of population displacement and a curious relation between stability and religious tenets. Although German-Swiss Mennonites were the first to occupy some of this limestone land (first settlers came in 1710), English Quakers and Episcopalians and Scotch-Irish Presbyterians also settled on the plain in sufficient numbers to support at least a score of meetinghouses and churches. These buildings now stand as monuments to communities that have come and gone. There are also in this part of the limestone plain several Lutheran and German Reformed churches. Formerly the members of these denominations, almost entirely Pennsylvania Germans, were nearly all farmers. Today nearly all the farms they once operated are in the hands of the Pennsylvania German sectarians, and the membership of these rural churches is almost completely nonfarm. The Old Order Amish, who now constitute the larger of the two Old Order groups on the limestone plain, did not settle there until 1757 and after. Their present dominance, therefore, results not from an initial advantage of earliest settlement but

¹ See, e.g., Emil Meynen, "Das pennsylvanien-deutsche Bauernland," in *Deutsches Archiv für Landes- und Volksforschung*, II (July, 1939), 253-92. For other reports and studies commenting on this characteristic see Meynen's *Bibliographie des Deutschtums der Kolonial-zeitlichen Einwanderung in Nordamerika, insbesondere der Pennsylvanien-deutschen und ihrer Nachkommen, 1683-1933* (Leipzig, 1937).

from a constant displacement of other groups in an area where land values have long been unusually high. The stability of the Amish following the displacement of other groups is perhaps shown most conspicuously by the preponderance of only about a dozen family names among the 5,000 members of the several Amish sects, nearly all traceable to Colonial immigrants.

Even among the sectarians, differentials in rural stability are apparent. Instability increases as factions or subgroups in the denominations become more liberal. The most conservative denominations—namely, the Old Order Mennonites and Old Order Amish—are the most stable, whereas factions that have broken with the conservative elements and have become more “worldly” have taken on more and more the characteristics of the larger society which surrounds them. Since the most conservative sectarian groups follow a rather severe religious code, conflicts and splits occur, and the factions compromising old disciplines find themselves less stable than the nonyielding groups.

At the close of the Colonial period there were about 100,000 Pennsylvania Germans in the state of Pennsylvania. They comprised about one-third of the population of the state. Somewhat more than one-third were of English origin (Quakers and Episcopalians), and somewhat less than one-third were Scotch-Irish (Presbyterians). At first these various ethnic groups were scattered rather indiscriminately over the less rugged lands of southeastern Pennsylvania. The Pennsylvania German farmers, however, soon showed a tendency to gravitate to the limestone valleys, which contained some of the better soils on the Eastern Seaboard; and in the course of time virtually all these better lands in Pennsylvania and in some adjacent sections in Maryland and Virginia fell into their hands.

Although numerous examples of this displacement can be found in practically every county in southeastern Pennsylvania, this change of occupancy is most conspicuous in the Cumberland Valley west and south of Harrisburg and in the Kishacoquillas Valley

of central Pennsylvania. One writer states that this change was “so completely effected that in most parts of the valley [Cumberland] scarcely any memento remains of the first settlers, except the names on a few old grave-stones.”² This sequence of land occupancy in time converted the rural part of southeastern Pennsylvania into a section known as Pennsylvania Germanland.

Since about 1900 another change has become apparent. Secularization of education and the spread of higher education, which have led to the acceptance of urban ideals, have served to erode old values and a rural philosophy of life. The Lutherans and German Reformed, who in the main took over the Cumberland Valley, have responded more freely to these changes than have the sectarians, with the result that they have become somewhat less stable. Today one finds Italian and Polish immigrants operating farms which for generations were handed down in Lutheran and German Reformed families. Some of the farms long operated by these people are now the country estates of urbanites from Philadelphia, New York, Lancaster, Reading, and other cities. The sectarians, who resisted the secularization of schools and higher education more vigorously, have been more stable, particularly the two Old Order groups on the Lancaster Limestone Plain and adjacent areas.

Some of the qualities of the Old Order Amish and Old Order Mennonites that make for cohesiveness and stability are peculiar to their culture pattern. Others have long characterized all Pennsylvania German farmers.³ The Pennsylvania Germans were

² Thomas H. Burrowes, *State Book of Pennsylvania* (1846), p. 30. See also John Stewart, “Scotch-Irish Occupancy and Exodus,” *Papers of the Kitchittinny Historical Society*, 1899, pp. 14-28; Sylvanus Stall, “The Relation of the Lutheran Church in the United States to the Lime-Stone Districts,” *Lutheran Quarterly*, XIII (1883), 509-15; Henry F. James, “The Kishacoquillas Valley,” *Bulletin of the Geographical Society of Philadelphia*, XXVIII (1930), 223-39.

³ See the following by Richard H. Shryock: “British versus German Traditions in Colonial Agri-

the first farmers in this country to develop outstanding farm improvements, particularly barns to shelter stock; they were among the first to develop diversification and constructive farming practices; they were small-farm-minded, avoiding plantations and large commercial farms; they avoided slavery completely, unlike some ethnic groups in and near Pennsylvania;⁴ they were largely self-sufficient in their food supply, which included an unusual variety of vegetables, cheeses, and meats; they were more cohesive than some other ethnic groups, and this made possible a helpful program of mutual aid; they resisted secularization of schools and looked askance at higher education, which they feared threatened their chosen way of life; they were dominated by a prurient, antiurban Christian phi-

losophy of life. A common language set them apart from the English-speaking groups, served as an essential vehicle to perpetuate old values and patterns, and became in itself not only an index of cultural survival but also a cherished tool to be preserved.

As members of the Pennsylvania German ethnic group, the Amish and Mennonites share the culture aggregates that have given stability to the whole group. It is onto the general cultural framework of this whole group, therefore, that we must add details and refinements to understand the relatively greater stability of the Old Order Amish and Old Order Mennonites. These differences grow largely out of a literal observance of certain scriptural admonitions.

Mennonites and Amish are nonresistant people, refusing to bear arms and to enter the armed forces of the government. As factors in their stability, however, their principles of nonconformity to the world and separation from the world are even more important, because they provide unusually resistant bulwarks to acculturation or melting-pot concepts. An examination of the culture based on these concepts gives essential clues to the agricultural stability of the people who have clung to them.

While nonconformity serves to differentiate the Old Order Amishman from individuals outside the group, it also serves to standardize and regularize practices and customs within the group. By established customs within the group, differences with outsiders can be made uniform and so provide definite criteria as to who belongs and who does not. Uniformity within the group is insisted upon also for the sake of Christian unity and harmony, an ideal based on the Scriptures. Departures from required practices are considered expressions of pride, and pride is proscribed by the Bible. The individual who takes liberties with reference to details of the approved garb or other conventions of the group lays himself open to serious disciplinary action by fellow-churchmen.

Details in the practice of nonconformity

culture," *Mississippi Valley Historical Review*, XXVI, No. 1 (June, 1939), 39-54; "The Pennsylvania Germans in American History," *Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography*, LXIII, No. 3 (July, 1939), 261-81; "Cultural Factors in the History of the South," *Journal of Southern History*, V, No. 3 (August, 1939), 333-46; and "The Pennsylvania Germans as Seen by the Historian," chap. ix in *The Pennsylvania Germans*, ed. Ralph Wood (Princeton, N.J., 1942), pp. 239-58. In the last-mentioned publication see also chap. ii, "The Pennsylvania German Farmer," by Walter M. Kollmorgen, pp. 29-55.

See also Heinrich H. Maurer, "Studies in the Sociology of Religion," *American Journal of Sociology*, XXX (1924-25), 424-25; Thomas J. Wertenbaker, *The Founding of American Civilization: The Middle Colonies* (1938), chap. viii, "From Rhine to Susquehanna," pp. 256-93, and chap. ix, "Volkskunst," pp. 294-346; Walter M. Kollmorgen, *Culture of a Contemporary Rural Community: The Old Order Amish of Lancaster County, Pennsylvania* ("Rural Life Studies," No. 4 [Washington: U.S. Department of Agriculture, Bureau of Agricultural Economics, 1942]); Meynen, "Das pennsylvanien-deutsche Bauernland," *op. cit.*

⁴Slavery was never common in Pennsylvania because "the Germans turned their backs upon it from the first" and "the Quakers opposed slavery after a while." See Edward Raymond Turner, "Slavery in Colonial Pennsylvania," *Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography*, XXXV (1911), 141-51. Had different ethnic groups prevailed in early Pennsylvania, the history of slavery in that state might well have been different.

are not readily appreciated by individuals who have not come in close contact with these sectarian people. On the Lancaster Limestone Plain there are at least a score of these groups, and most of them have a multiplicity of distinctive characteristics that differentiate them from other groups. A citizen of Lancaster County may readily identify the specific sect of a man, woman, or child by certain features in the garb. The more liberal the group to which the individual belongs, the less conspicuous the nonconformity becomes, even dwindling sometimes to the point of free individual choice in clothing and the complete absence of any distinguishing feature.

Nonconformity is, of course, expressed in numerous ways. Old Order Amish men and boys wear their hair long, banged across the forehead and at the sides and back of the head. It may be parted only in the middle. Married men wear beards, but the mustache is forbidden. Young, unmarried men shave. The outer clothes of men are usually tailored at home and are always patterned alike. Dress coats may not have lapels or outside pockets and are equipped with hooks and eyes instead of buttons. Only broadfall trousers are worn. Shirts are also tailored at home, and neckwear is prohibited. Even suspenders are homemade.

Women's wear among the Old Order Amish, like that of the men—as well as that of boys and girls—conforms to an approved pattern. Dresses are patterned alike, and only several conservative plain colors are approved. Printed dress goods are prohibited. "Store hats" are taboo. Only regulation bonnets and prayer head coverings are worn. Women comb their hair alike, part it only in the middle, and never curl it. They may not patronize beauty shops.

Other regulations forbid the Old Order Amish to equip their homes with telephones, electric lights, window curtains, standard carpets (only rag carpets are approved), and a full complement of bathroom fixtures. Tractors may be used only for belt power.

Similar practices of nonconformity are observed by the Old Order Mennonites but

with certain distinctions. Old Order Mennonite men do not wear beards (or mustaches). Their hair is banged shorter than that of the Old Order Amish, but "fancy" hair parting is prohibited. Their outer clothes, like those of the Old Order Amish, are usually made at home; but the cut and style, while again alike for different age groups within each sex, are unlike those worn by other nonconformist groups or non-sectarians. Unlike the Old Order Amish, these farmers do use tractors for field work. However, telephones, electric lights, fancy carpets, window curtains, and "fancy" bathrooms are also forbidden in their homes.

To a traveler passing through Lancaster County the horse-and-buggy mode of travel of the Old Order sectarians is conspicuous against the prosperous appearance of the farms in this agricultural garden spot. This mode of travel is another expression of nonconformity with the world, but within the respective groups there is again uniformity of vehicles. Married Old Order Amishmen—identified by their beards—use gray, boxlike carriages without dashboards and whip-sockets. The unmarried, beardless young men use topless buggies. Black, boxlike carriages and standard two-passenger buggies are used by Old Order Mennonites.

Experience has demonstrated to the Old Order sectarians that a life of nonconformity can best be perpetuated in rural areas. Accordingly, the great majority of them are farmers, while a few engage in such farm service activities as blacksmithing, quarrying and selling limestone, repairing harness, and building and repairing buggies. All of them live in rural places, including crossroads trading-points. Aged Old Order Mennonites and Old Order Amish do not leave the farm when they retire. Instead they remove to a separate part of the spacious houses on their farms, or they find other small country homes in which to spend their declining years. In rural places the nonconforming ways of these sectarians are least disturbed by the curious, and members are less tempted by the fashions and conspicuous consumption of the world.

Merely to live in rural places, however, does not fully satisfy the principle of separation from the world, as practiced by these sectarians. Only with respect to economic activities do they mix somewhat freely with "the world." Socially they are self-contained. Religious services—which the Old Order Amish conduct in their homes and barns and the Old Order Mennonites in plain meetinghouses—visiting, and Sunday evening singings for young people constitute almost the total of their social life. All these activities are limited to the group. Its members may not attend theaters or parties sponsored by nonmember neighbors. The exclusion of nonmembers from their social life and avoidance of outsiders provide remarkably effective cultural insulation against outside influences that might weaken traditional values.

The sectarians, like the Pennsylvania Germans in general, have always believed in education to a degree of competence in the three R's. Since familiarity with the Bible was considered essential, they preferred the parochial school to the public school. Moreover, in the parochial school the German language could be taught, which not only was the language of Luther's Bible but was the known and handy vehicle for all folk values. During the last half of the nineteenth century, however, state legislation pushed the public school to the fore, and the parochial school declined rapidly. The one-room rural public school became an integral part of every Pennsylvania German farming community.

Acceptance of the little red schoolhouse, however, did not result in full or ready acceptance of every innovation sponsored by the advocates of "higher and better" education. The consolidation of rural schools and laws requiring youngsters to attend high school in particular have been fought in Pennsylvania Germanland. This area is still noted for the large number of labor permits granted to boys and girls fourteen and fifteen years of age which excuse them from school attendance.

Resistance to modern trends in school

buildings and to attendance at high school is epitomized among the Pennsylvania Germans by the Old Order Amish and Old Order Mennonites and is definitely related to their agricultural stability. Their observance of the principles of nonconformity and separation have naturally intensified conflicts with state programs of education. Reduced to its simplest terms, this conflict springs from the natural desire of the sectarians to perpetuate their peculiar way of life, for which a rural environment seems essential. The Pennsylvania German farmers in general and the sectarians in particular have been dominated by an agrarian philosophy, while education in this country has carried with it an urban philosophy of life which frequently destroys the bond between the farmer and his land. It is significant to note that among the various socioreligious groups comprising the Pennsylvania Germans agricultural stability has been in inverse proportion to the acceptance of "more and better" education.

The children of the Old Order Amish and the Old Order Mennonites attend local grade schools, but they do not attend high schools. Children who have passed the eighth grade are put to work in the home or on the farm; work permits are obtained for children who fail to pass the eighth grade by the time they are fourteen years of age. The parents maintain that a youngster is made or ruined for farming during his adolescent years and that high school definitely ruins him for farming. High schools, they insist, make youngsters lazy and soft—at least too lazy to farm. They insist that you learn a job by doing it—not by reading about it—and that this is the way farming must be learned, during the formative years. The same reasoning is applied to household tasks.

Consolidated schools and high schools present many problems to a nonconforming group. In a local one-room school where a sizable portion or a majority of the local school children come from conservative sectarian homes, their nonconformist practices, as represented by homemade clothes, for

instance, are not conspicuous. The children therefore take them for granted and accept them as part of their life-program. Children who become accustomed to the speedy, efficient transportation of school buses in consolidated districts may well be reluctant to return to the horse-and-buggy mode of travel insisted upon by the church. In these larger schools there are also electric lights, bands, orchestras, stage plays, and sports activities not approved by the sectarians. Children who daily are exposed to conveniences and activities not approved by their sect may well acquire the tendency to conform to the world rather than be nonconforming in the required manner.

Practices of nonconformity and separation from the world need not in themselves necessarily result in good farming, but in the garden spot of Lancaster County they have served as a constant stimulus to good farming. Only by superior farming practices could an expanding community assure its security on the land. Equally, and perhaps more, important is the fact that these people have for centuries been conditioned to superior farming methods. The genesis of these superior practices is to be found in the conflicts and tragic persecution which marked the history of these people in central Europe several centuries ago.

The Old Order Amish and Old Order Mennonites of Lancaster County are, with few exceptions, descendants of the Swiss Brethren, an Anabaptist religious group which came into existence shortly after 1520, during the Zwinglian reformation. Its religious principles of adult baptism and nonresistance set it in conflict with both the powerful religious authorities and the government. The prevailing churches at the time practiced infant baptism, and departures from this practice led to stern measures of punishment, even death. On the other hand stood government authorities, ruling by "divine right," engaged in almost constant warfare on their own behalf or in behalf of conspiring rulers. Kings, dukes, or noblemen in need of funds would induct soldiers by bribes or force and then hire

them out as mercenary soldiers, not infrequently to opposing armies. To a nonresistant people this meant almost constant persecution, and as a result they became a refugee people in various parts of the Rhineland area of central Europe.

At times, when more drastic forms of persecution were not inflicted on the Brethren, they were subjected to nuisance regulations. In many places they were forbidden to meet openly for religious services. In some they were forbidden to live in villages (agricultural villages) or in cities; in others they were forbidden to engage in nonagricultural activities. In some places they were driven from their holdings; in others they could not enlarge their holdings. In some sections they were required to pay unusually high rent for land they operated, and on various pretenses tribute money was exacted from them. A type of law known as *jus retractus* made it possible to reclaim land sold to the Brethren by returning the sum for which the land was originally sold, regardless of what improvements had been effected.

During the early, most troubled period the Brethren found it difficult, indeed, to engage in productive enterprise anywhere. However, abuse short of the death penalty served as a stern taskmaster, and in time these people earned the reputation of being the most successful farmers in Europe.⁵

Some of the Brethren, for instance, were driven from the relatively fertile valleys of Switzerland into mountain retreats, where they eked out a precarious existence on small plots of poor ground. To survive on these poor soils required unceasing labor and programs of farming that built up poor land and maintained fertility. The iron hand of tradition in farming had to be cast aside; new and better methods had to be devised. As a result the persecuted Brethren were among the first in central Europe to experiment with new methods of fertilizing the land, of feeding cattle, and of plant-

⁵ For a more detailed description of this interesting phenomenon see Ernst H. Correll, *Das schweizerische Täufermennonitentum* (Tübingen, 1925).

ing new crops. When seclusion was no longer necessary, many of them removed to better farming sections, mainly the Rhineland of Germany, where they applied with remarkable results what they had learned in the poorer farming sections. Their diligence was soon noted, as were their improved techniques of farming. In time they were sought out as tenants, particularly by owners of large estates.

The unusual store of information of the Brethren on farming matters resulted partly from the fact that, as one large socioreligious brotherhood, its scattered settlements up and down the Rhineland kept in touch with each other, and members spent much time visiting each other. New, improved practices were noted, discussed, and perhaps adopted. The Brethren, therefore, had a greater farming horizon or conception of what was going on in the agricultural world than the more provincial peasant, who rarely, if ever, got far away from his home and acres.

As the movement of the Swiss Brethren spread in the Upper Rhineland area, a similar Anabaptist religious movement started in the Netherlands. Here the group became known as "Mennonites," after Menno Simons, an outstanding leader. When the Swiss Brethren came to America, by way of Holland, they were frequently referred to as "Mennonites" by outsiders who were not familiar with their separate origin. In time, all the Brethren that came to this country assumed that name except one schismatic group, which at the close of the seventeenth century became known as the "Amish," in deference to their leader, Jacob Ammann.

The cleavage among the Brethren that gave rise to the Amish resulted largely from different opinions and practices with regard to a disciplinary measure known as "shunning." The Brethren all believed that members who had committed grievous sins should be excommunicated, but there was no full agreement as to what constituted "grievous sins" and how promptly the ban was to be applied. Moreover, once the ban was applied, what attitudes and relation-

ships should be maintained toward the excommunicated person?

Jacob Ammann and his followers took an uncompromising stand on the question of prompt and rigid application of the ban and its social complement of shunning, a potent disciplinary device still used with greater promptness and effectiveness by the Old Order Amish than by the Mennonites generally. Members who depart from approved practices—for instance, by buying an automobile, installing a telephone in the home, or wearing nonapproved clothes—are subject to the ban and shunning. A banned member is consigned to the devil and his host and is shunned socially. Intimate or normal association with him is forbidden, even to his own family; and this holds for husbands and wives. A separate table is prepared for the shunned member of a family, and conversation with him is prohibited. At such times so oppressive and sad an atmosphere prevails in the house that, unless the shunned person joins another church and social group, he soon makes amends, asks for forgiveness, and resumes the prescribed life of nonconformity and separation from the world.

In recent decades the displacement of nonsectarians and liberal sectarians from the Lancaster Limestone Plain has been stimulated by the high price of land in this community of Old Order Amish and Old Order Mennonites. In a general way this price structure is pyramidal. On the periphery of the combined Old Order communities the price of land approaches the economic value; but in the center (really somewhat north of the center) it is easily twice as high as the true economic value of the land, as that term is generally understood and applied. Prior to the present war situation, land appraisers for loan companies evaluated the land in the Lancaster Limestone Plain at \$100-\$150 per acre. Toward the center of the combined communities, however, farms were selling in the late depression years for \$300-\$500 per acre.

These high values result from a centripetal pressure on the land by the Old Order

sectarians. These Old Order farmers seek centrally located lands because, where their church members are most concentrated, separation and nonconformity are practiced with the least difficulty and are most easily perpetuated. Since their members constitute a plurality or even a majority centerward, the threat of consolidated schools and even compulsory high-school attendance is minimized. (At least until recently, youngsters in Pennsylvania were not required to attend high school if such an institution did not exist in the local township or was in other respects not easily accessible.)

There are several distortions in the pyramidal land-price structure of the combined communities. One distortion results from the location of the city of Lancaster immediately west of the communities. Because of the proximity of this city, advantages in markets and shopping are reflected in the value of farm land.

Another distortion occurs in the contact zone between the Old Order Amish and Old Order Mennonites. Some of the highest prices for land have been paid here—up to \$500 per acre in pre-World War II days. Local informants claim that these exorbitant prices result from a form of rivalry between the two farm-bound sectarian groups and their competition for land. Although the two groups find it mutually advantageous to prevail together locally in order to thwart the inroads of worldly ways and devices, they are nonconforming to each other and are socially distinct. When their social survival is threatened by programs from without, such as contemplated laws requiring high-school attendance, these groups join forces. Yet, for the centrally located farms, they are strong competitors.

A central location is not so essential for the somewhat more liberal sectarians who have adopted the automobile and whose programs of separation from the world and nonconformity to the world are less severe. The greater mobility provided by the automobile has enabled them to purchase the lower-priced lands on the margin of the combined communities while continuing to

attend their established meetinghouses, which are becoming more and more surrounded by Old Order sectarians. This is particularly true of the liberal Amish, whose church body is small and who have only three meetinghouses in the eastern part of Lancaster County. For these reasons concentrations of Church Amish have developed to the southeast and northeast of the combined Old Order communities. In these areas there has been a displacement in recent decades of nonsectarians by schismatic sectarians seeking cheaper land. Consequently, communities of church people in these peripheral places, mainly Presbyterians and Episcopalians, are declining.

In terms of place stability consider, for instance, the position of a liberal sectarian or nonsectarian farmer who has so far maintained his holdings in the combined Old Order communities. Old Order sectarians stand ready to pay him from \$300 to \$500 per acre for land which can be matched by equally productive land 20 or more miles away at \$100-\$150 per acre. By selling his farm and moving only a short distance he can double his holdings in acres. The temptation to do this is particularly strong when additional land is sought for children. Thus the high land values serve as a strong inducement for nonsectarians and liberal sectarians—those with automobiles—to sell their farms and move out of the community.

The agricultural history of the Pennsylvania Germans is but one of many examples of the fact that agricultural patterns, like cultural patterns, are the product of the past and, as such, are centuries old. While new conditions in this country, particularly frontier conditions, impinged on traditional practices and served to modify them, the framework of these patterns nevertheless was resilient and retained much that reflected Old World backgrounds.

The Pennsylvania German farmers generally were stable in their chosen way of life because their value systems reflected centuries of relatively successful farming, because traditional values had not been corroded by a casual form of rationalism which

condoned continual exploitation of the land (skinning the soil), and because the life they valued had a definite prurural, antiurban orientation. In this country these values and practices were implemented by the definite objective of preserving a traditional culture in competition with other culture groups in an emerging society.

For the church people, however, the defenses against acculturation and blending were not so specific as for the sectarians and were therefore more vulnerable. The Lutheran farmer, for instance, wanted to preserve and perpetuate his rural way of life, his religion and language; and he soon learned that to preserve these separately he needed to preserve all of them. This he attempted to do, and did with remarkable success. However, barriers between the in-group and out-group, although formidable, were not impassable; and association did take place, including acculturation. Moreover, departures from accustomed ways, though not welcomed, did not meet with such fatal consequences as they did and

still do among the sectarians. The Lutheran could be saved, if not for time, at least for eternity, in any language and any honorable vocation, so long as doctrinal points were not compromised.

The sectarians could not well afford such an accommodating attitude if their peculiar way of life was to be preserved. They were shielded by more specific defenses against outside influences. To them the biblical decrees were specific in requiring members to live lives of separation from the world and nonconformity to the world. Other decrees fortified a way of life which put these requirements into practice, including the requirement that followers live in rural areas only and engage mainly in farming. Imperative strategic retreats were accommodated with the greatest reluctance, lest a minor concession lead to a major rout. To date, the observance of the Old Order has kept these people on the land and, indirectly, has been a boon to good, constructive farming.

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DIFFERENTIAL REPRODUCTION IN THE UNITED STATES

PATERNITY RATES FOR OCCUPATIONAL CLASSES AMONG THE URBAN WHITE POPULATION

CHRISTOPHER TIETZE

ABSTRACT

Nuptial, general, gross, and net paternity rates based upon information collected by the National Health Survey of 1935-36 are presented for occupational classes among the urban white population of the United States. The use of nuptial paternity rates standardized by age of husband is criticized. Gross and net paternity rates for occupational classes are compared with the gross and net reproduction rates for educational and income classes computed by Karpinos and Kiser from the same material.

Karpinos and Kiser¹ have presented data on class differences in reproduction among the urban white population of the United States based upon information collected by the National Health Survey. They have expressed their findings in terms of age-standardized nuptial and general fertility rates, as well as of gross and net reproduction rates by family income and by educational attainment of women.

In the present paper this material will be supplemented by an analysis of the reproduction of *occupational classes* in terms of *paternity rates*. Paternity rates are computed by relating births to the male, rather than to the female, part of the population in which they originate. Their use appears indicated when differential reproduction is to be studied in terms of a variable which is principally an attribute of the male sex. This applies in the case of groupings along occupational lines. It may be worth mentioning that as early as 1914 the Registrar-General for England and Wales² published

rates of legitimate births per 1,000 married men under fifty-five years of age for many occupations and for broad occupational classes. The term "paternity rate," however, was not used at that time.

Four types of paternity rates will be presented in this report: nuptial, general, gross, and net. Nuptial paternity rates per 1,000 married men under fifty-five years and general paternity rates per 1,000 men twenty to fifty-four years, regardless of marital status, are annual rates, standardized for age, and correspond to nuptial and general fertility rates. Gross and net paternity rates, on the other hand, are rates referring to a generation and are conventionally expressed in relation to one newborn individual. They correspond to gross and net reproduction rates, with the difference that they indicate the average number of sons per man rather than of daughters per woman.

The present study refers to the same population that was the basis for the work of Karpinos and Kiser, that is, to the approximately 2,250,000 white persons included in the urban sample of the National Health Survey made during the fall and winter of 1935-36. The scope and methods of this survey and its limitations have been described elsewhere³ and need not be discussed again at

¹ B. D. Karpinos and C. V. Kiser, "The Differential Fertility and Potential Rates of Growth of Various Income and Educational Classes of Urban Populations in the United States," *Milbank Memorial Fund Quarterly*, XVII, No. 4 (October, 1939), 367-91. The outstanding findings of this study are restated in C. V. Kiser, *Group Differences in Urban Fertility* (Baltimore: Williams & Wilkins Co., 1942), chap. vii.

² *Seventy-fifth Annual Report of the Registrar-General of Births, Deaths, and Marriages in England and Wales (1912)* (London: H.M. Stationery Office, 1914), Tables XV, XVI, and XVII.

³ St. J. Perrott, C. Tibbitts, and R. H. Britten, "The National Health Survey: Scope and Method of the Nation-Wide Canvass of Sickness in Relation to Its Social and Economic Setting," *Public Health Reports*, LIV, No. 37 (September 15, 1939), 1663-87. See also Kiser, *op. cit.*, chap. i.

this point. Suffice it to say that the data for this paper were compiled partly from the original fertility tabulations carried out by the United States Public Health Service in co-operation with the Milbank Memorial Fund and partly from the eleven volumes of *Statistics of Family Composition*⁴ published by the Bureau of Research and Statistics of the Social Security Board. It is the pleasant duty of the author to thank Dr. Selwyn D. Collins, Mr. Clyde V. Kiser, and Mr. Barkev S. Sanders, connected with these organizations in the order named, for their help in obtaining the necessary data, as well as for their valuable criticism and advice.

The broad occupational classes used in this report are based upon the more detailed groupings developed by Dr. Alba M. Edwards⁵ at the Bureau of the Census. The following list compares the two classifications.

Broad Classes	Alba M. Edwards' Classification
Professional.....	Professional persons
Business.....	Wholesale and retail dealers
	Other proprietors, managers, and officials, except farmers
	Clerks, salesmen, and kindred workers
Skilled and semiskilled.....	Skilled workers and foremen
	Semiskilled workers in manufacturing
	Other semiskilled workers
Unskilled.....	Unskilled workers except farm laborers and servants
	Servants
Other and unknown.....	Farmers
	Farm laborers
	No occupation
	Unknown occupation

Each of the broad classes covers, as far as possible, a man's whole occupational career. No paternity rates are presented for the

⁴ *Statistics of Family Composition in Selected Areas of the United States*, Vol. I: *Detroit*; Vol. II: *Boston*; Vol. III: *Buffalo*; Vol. IV: *Chicago*; Vol. V: *New York*; Vol. VI: *Philadelphia*; Vol. VII: *Cleveland*; Vol. VIII: *St. Louis*; Vol. IX: *Pittsburgh*; Vol. X: *Los Angeles*; Vol. XI: *The Urban Sample* (Washington: Social Security Board, Bureau of Research and Statistics, May, 1941, to March, 1943).

⁵ A. M. Edwards, *A Social-Economic Grouping of the Gainful Workers of the United States* (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1938).

small and heterogeneous group "other and unknown."

All computations were made, and results are presented separately, for the aggregate of the ten largest cities included in the National Health Survey and for the other urban places. These ten largest cities with a population of 500,000 or more are New York, Chicago, Philadelphia, Detroit, Los Angeles, Cleveland, St. Louis, Boston, Pittsburgh, and Buffalo.

The ideal starting-point for the computation of paternity rates would have been a distribution of births by occupation and age of father. Such a distribution, however, was not available and had to be estimated by the following procedure. The original fertility tabulations give the number of nuptial births in 1935 by race and occupational class of the head of the household, who is generally, but not always, identical with

the father of the child. The all-urban volume of the *Statistics of Family Composition*⁶ contains a table of husband-and-wife families by occupation of head and age of wife, or in other words, of wives by occupation of husband and age. That part of this table which refers to women under forty-five years can be compared with the table of wives by occupation of head of the household, nativity, color, and age presented in Kiser's book on fertility differences.⁷ This comparison

⁶ Vol. XI, Table 57. ⁷ *Op. cit.*, Appen., Table 4.

can be made for only the total urban population of all races. It permits the computation of correction factors which were applied to the white births. The result is shown in Table 1. The adjustments are small for the four major occupational classes, but the group "other and unknown" is reduced to less than half its size. This is undoubtedly due to the presence of numerous households in which the nominal head was an elderly

TABLE 1
NUPTIAL WHITE BIRTHS DURING SURVEY YEAR
BY OCCUPATIONAL CLASS OF HEAD OF
HOUSEHOLD AND OF FATHER

Occupational Class	Tabulated by Class of Head of Household	Adjusted to Class of Father
Ten largest cities:*		
Professional.....	714	734
Business.....	3,742	3,831
Skilled and semiskilled...	6,528	6,604
Unskilled.....	1,508	1,509
Other and unknown.....	325	139
Total population...	12,817	12,817
Other urban places:		
Professional.....	964	1,000
Business.....	5,177	5,348
Skilled and semiskilled...	8,398	8,572
Unskilled.....	2,085	2,105
Other and unknown.....	706	305
Total population...	17,330	17,330

* New York, Chicago, Philadelphia, Detroit, Los Angeles, Cleveland, St. Louis, Boston, Pittsburgh, and Buffalo.

widow without occupation, the mother or the mother-in-law of the child's father.

The distribution of the births in each occupational class by age of father was estimated by the "indirect" or "substitution" method from tabulations of married white males by occupational class and age in the *Statistics of Family Composition* and a standard series of age-specific nuptial paternity rates patterned after the rates observed in the four most highly urbanized states⁸ in

⁸ Rhode Island, Massachusetts, New York, and New Jersey. For a description of the substitution method as applied to the computation of paternity rates see C. Tietze, "The Measurement of Differential Reproduction by Paternity Rates," *Eugenics Review*, XXX, No. 2 (July, 1938), 101-7.

1930. It is felt that a reasonable estimate of the distribution of nuptial births by age of father has thus been made.

Age-specific general paternity rates were computed by relating these estimated numbers of births to all males regardless of marital status. The few births to fathers less than twenty years old were combined with the quinquennium twenty to twenty-four years. The population data were again taken from the *Statistics of Family Composition*. Examination of Table 2,

TABLE 2
PER CENT DISTRIBUTION OF SURVEYED URBAN
WHITE MALES BY OCCUPATIONAL CLASS IN
QUINQUENNIAL AGE GROUPS

Age (Years)	Profes- sional	Busi- ness	Skilled and Semi- skilled	Un- skilled	Other and Un- known	Total
20-24.....	3.5*	29.2*	35.9*	11.5	19.9	100.0
25-29.....	7.1	35.0	44.0	9.8	4.0	100.0
30-34.....	7.6	35.5	46.6	8.8	1.4	100.0
35-39.....	6.5	36.3	46.7	9.2	1.3	100.0
40-44.....	6.0	35.6	46.6	10.4	1.4	100.0
45-49.....	5.8	33.7	47.0	11.8	1.6	100.0
50-54.....	5.7	33.3	46.2	12.7	2.1	100.0

* Adjusted: professional, 7.0; business, 35.0; skilled and semiskilled, 43.1 per cent.

based upon the total urban sample, shows that in the age group twenty to twenty-four years a much greater proportion of all individuals is listed under "other and unknown" than at later ages. The apparent reason is that these young men were either still at school or else had not yet been able to secure gainful employment. As practically all these persons were unmarried, it was necessary to distribute them among the major occupational groups. This was accomplished by doubling the number of males twenty to twenty-four years in the professional class and increasing the numbers in the business and skilled/semiskilled classes by one-fifth. No change was made in the unskilled class. The exact amount of these adjustments is not very important, as their total effect upon the general, gross, and net paternity rates is small. They result in a reduction of 7-9 per cent in the professional class and of only 2-4 per cent in the two other groups.

The standard populations used for the age adjustment of the nuptial and general

paternity rates are the married white males under fifty-five years and the total white male population twenty to fifty-four years as enumerated in the United States in 1930. The sex ratio used in the computation of gross and net paternity rates is that observed in 1935 among urban white births: 104.84 boys to 100 girls. The numbers of males in quinquennial age groups in the stationary populations necessary for the computation of net paternity rates were estimated from the United States Preliminary Life Table for White Males, 1930-39,⁹ in combination with the author's life-tables for social classes in England.¹⁰ It seemed a reasonable procedure to let each occupational class deviate by the same percentage from the national average, as its counterpart did in England.

Paternity rates given for the urban white population as a whole do not refer directly to the sample enumerated by the National Health Survey in which the cities of more than 500,000 inhabitants are heavily over-represented but have been adjusted for city size by assigning the proper weights to the aggregate of the ten largest communities and to the other urban places, corresponding to the Census of 1930. A more refined adjustment based upon several classes of cities by number of inhabitants and by geographic region could not be carried out with the available population data.

It should be strongly emphasized, and carefully considered in the interpretation of the absolute levels of all rates presented in this report, that in conformity with the paper of Karpinos and Kiser *no adjustment* has been made for *extranuptial births*, nor has the *underenumeration of births* in the National Health Survey been allowed for. Exnuptial births are comparatively rare among the white population of this country. They amounted to only 2.31 per cent of all white

births in urban areas in 1935.¹¹ Failure to report births to enumerators of the National Health Survey is a more serious source of error. The extent of this deficiency can be estimated and seems to be about 10 per cent for whites in the whole urban sample.¹² It is generally believed that both exnuptial births and failure to report are more common in the lower than in the upper social-economic groups. If that is so, then not only are the rates presented here somewhat too low but there is also a bias in the direction of understatement of class differences.

A synopsis of paternity rates is presented in Table 3. If attention is directed toward

TABLE 3

NUPTIAL, GENERAL, GROSS, AND NET PATERNITY RATES AND THEIR RELATIVE VARIATIONS AMONG THE SURVEYED URBAN WHITE POPULATION BY CITY SIZE AND OCCUPATIONAL CLASS

Occupational Class	Nuptial Paternity Rate	General Paternity Rate	Gross Paternity Rate	Net Paternity Rate
Ten largest cities:				
Professional.....	76.5	40.3	0.69	0.62
Business.....	73.3	42.6	0.72	0.65
Skilled and semiskilled.....	86.3	55.0	0.93	0.81
Unskilled.....	104.0	59.0	0.99	0.82
Total population.....	83.2	49.6	0.84	0.72
Other urban places:				
Professional.....	80.8	46.2	0.78	0.71
Business.....	71.2	47.3	0.79	0.71
Skilled and semiskilled.....	83.0	61.3	1.02	0.89
Unskilled.....	98.8	67.2	1.11	0.93
Total population.....	80.2	55.0	0.92	0.79
Urban white population*:				
Professional.....	79.5	44.3	0.75	0.68
Business.....	71.8	45.9	0.77	0.69
Skilled and semiskilled.....	84.1	59.2	0.99	0.86
Unskilled.....	100.5	64.5	1.07	0.89
Total population.....	81.1	53.3	0.89	0.77
Relative variations*:				
Professional.....	98	83	84	89
Business.....	89	86	87	90
Skilled and semiskilled.....	104	111	111	112
Unskilled.....	124	121	120	116
Total population.....	100	100	100	100

* Adjusted for city size.

the patterns of nuptial and general paternity rates, two outstanding differences are seen.

⁹ *United States Life Tables, 1930-1939 (Preliminary)* (Washington: Bureau of the Census, July 21, 1941).

¹⁰ C. Tietze, "Life Tables for Social Classes in England," *Milbank Memorial Fund Quarterly*, XXI, No. 2 (April, 1943), 182-87.

¹¹ Bureau of the Census, *Birth, Stillbirth, and Infant Mortality Statistics, 1935* (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1937), Table R.

¹² Kiser, *op. cit.*, chap. ii.

First, the nuptial rate is higher for the professional than for the business class, whereas the general rates show the inverse relationship. Second, in all classes except the professional group the ten largest cities have higher nuptial rates than the other urban places, but their general rates are uniformly lower. The reason for this discrepancy is the higher proportion of married males in the business class as compared with the professional class and in the smaller cities as compared with the larger ones. This is shown in Table 4. It should be remembered that

TABLE 4

PERCENTAGE MARRIED AMONG SURVEYED URBAN WHITE MALES BY CITY SIZE, OCCUPATIONAL CLASS, AND AGE

Age (Years)	Professional	Business	Skilled and Semi-skilled	Unskilled	Total Population
Ten Largest Cities					
20-24.....	8.7*	13.4*	19.0*	16.7	15.7
25-29.....	45.5	51.8	58.9	50.4	53.3
30-34.....	70.2	73.2	76.0	67.3	73.5
35-39.....	80.1	82.1	83.1	78.6	82.0
40-44.....	82.7	85.2	84.3	72.5	82.8
45-49.....	84.4	86.6	85.6	80.3	84.8
50-54.....	82.1	85.4	83.4	75.2	82.5
Other Urban Places					
20-24.....	10.6*	20.0*	29.4*	30.0	24.7
25-29.....	54.0	61.4	69.3	59.4	62.1
30-34.....	73.5	79.0	80.7	71.6	78.2
35-39.....	80.7	85.9	85.4	81.0	84.4
40-44.....	83.0	87.3	85.4	73.6	84.3
45-49.....	84.6	88.4	86.5	79.2	85.7
50-54.....	84.3	86.9	83.8	74.9	83.2

* Based on adjusted total numbers of males.

the percentages given for the age group twenty to twenty-four years are based on the adjusted total numbers of males and are therefore themselves estimates. The differences in percentage married tend to decline with increasing age, suggesting postponement of marriage rather than permanent

celibacy. Nuptial paternity rates, standardized for age of husband, make no allowance for variations of age at marriage and

TABLE 5

COMPARISON OF GROSS AND NET PATERNITY AND REPRODUCTION RATES AND THEIR RELATIVE VARIATIONS AMONG THE URBAN WHITE POPULATION BY OCCUPATIONAL CLASS, EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT, AND ANNUAL FAMILY INCOME

OCCUPATIONAL CLASS	PATERNITY RATES		RELATIVE VARIATIONS	
	Gross	Net	Gross	Net
Professional.....	0.75	0.68	84	89
Business.....	0.77	0.69	87	90
Skilled and semiskilled	0.99	0.86	111	112
Unskilled.....	1.07	0.89	120	116
Total population..	0.89	0.77	100	100
EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT	REPRODUCTION RATES*		RELATIVE VARIATIONS	
	Gross	Net	Gross	Net
College.....	0.57	0.52	70	74
High school.....	0.77	0.68	95	97
Seventh or eighth grade	1.00	0.86	123	123
Under seventh grade...	1.18	0.97	146	139
Total population..	0.81	0.70	100	100
ANNUAL FAMILY INCOME	REPRODUCTION RATES*		RELATIVE VARIATIONS	
	Gross	Net	Gross	Net
\$3,000 and over.....	0.46	0.42	57	60
\$2,000-\$2,999.....	0.61	0.55	75	79
\$1,500-\$1,999.....	0.70	0.63	86	90
\$1,000-\$1,499.....	0.86	0.75	106	107
Under \$1,000 and total relief.....	1.17	0.96	144	137
Total population..	0.81	0.70	100	100

* From Karpinos and Kiser, *op. cit.*

therefore give a distorted picture of nuptial reproduction. This is also true for nuptial fertility rates, standardized for age of wife. The author believes that this distortion

could be avoided by keeping constant the *duration* of marriages rather than the age of either spouse, but the data necessary for such calculations are usually not available.

Turning, now, to the three types of paternity rates based on total rather than married males, we find very similar patterns of class differentials among general and gross rates and a somewhat smaller range for net rates. This was, of course, to be expected. The largest gap appears between the business class and the skilled and semiskilled workers. The patterns are very similar in the large cities and the other urban places.

Of great interest is a comparison of the paternity rates for occupational classes with the reproduction rates for educational and income classes presented by Karpinos and Kiser. This comparison is carried out in Table 5 in terms of gross and net rates. The paternity rates for the total urban white population are about 10 per cent higher than the corresponding reproduction rates. This is due to the surplus of adult females in cities. The comparison is therefore more fairly made in terms of relative variations, taking the values for the total population as 100. The class differential appears largest

between income classes and smallest between occupational classes, with the grouping by educational attainment of women in a middle position. It is almost certain that the very low reproduction rates at the higher income levels are partly due to the presence at these levels of a large proportion of families with working wives or unmarried daughters and other female relatives contributing to the family income. Families with young children, on the other hand, are more likely to receive relief than other couples in similar circumstances. The reproduction rates of women with college education may be depressed by the low proportion married in certain occupational groups, such as female teachers. Finally, it should be remembered that the "unskilled" group in the occupational classification includes not only laborers, generally known to be very prolific, but also the "servant classes," which tend toward much smaller families. Failure to marry at all, too, seems to be more common in this country among laborers and service workers than in all other occupational classes of the male population.

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OCCUPATIONAL FACTORS AND MARRIAGE¹

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ABSTRACT

An analysis of the marital status of a hundred matched cases in each of six different occupations in *Who's Who, 1942-1943* (artists, business executives, college professors, engineers, military officers, and physicians), reveals that two of the groups—the artists and the military men—have a rate of bachelorhood in excess of that of the general population, while the other occupations are underrepresented among the unmarried. Differences in age at marriage do not appear to be an important cause of the variations noted. The artists also have the highest rate of remarriage, but the military men have the lowest rate. An attempt to account for these variations in terms of current theories of the relation of occupational factors to marriage reveals some of the limitations of these theories.

Recent discussions have developed the theory of the relation of occupation to marital adjustment. One phase of the theory is that occupations characterized by marked physical mobility and by slight group control tend to show a high degree of marital instability, whereas occupations subject to stationary employment and community supervision have low rates of marital maladjustment.² Mobility is thought to be bad for marriage because it means (1) frequent uprooting of individuals, which attenuates group ties, (2) the separation of family members, and (3) the development of divergent patterns of behavior.³ When the happiness ratings of husbands in a considerable number of occupations were examined, it was noted that the proportion of happy marriages was very high among schoolteachers and very low among traveling salesmen.⁴ These rat-

ings are explained in terms of the theory that traveling salesmen are among the most mobile and the least supervised persons in our population, while teachers are among the least mobile and the most highly controlled. The two factors of physical mobility and social control are not unrelated, since it is difficult to exercise control over individuals whose work keeps them on the move.

The theory expounded above leads to the question as to whether occupations are selective of personality traits. For instance, does the occupation of traveling salesmen in general attract persons who have habits and attitudes which distinguish them from those, let us say, who go into teaching? If such selection does occur, the further question may be asked: What significance, if any, do the selected traits have for marriage? Terman has presented some evidence showing that the happily married are more emotionally stable and more highly socialized than the unhappily married,⁵ and Winch's studies⁶ suggest that these attributes are probably of premarital rather than of postmarital origin. If oc-

¹ A project of Sociology 307, Bucknell University, 1942. The assistance of Mary Orso, Anne Stevenson, Jeanne H. Thomas, and Dorothy Wolfe is acknowledged.

² Ernest W. Burgess and Leonard S. Cottrell, Jr., *Predicting Success or Failure in Marriage* (New York: Prentice-Hall, 1939).

³ Harvey J. Locke, "Mobility and Family Disorganization," *American Sociological Review*, V (August, 1940), 489-94.

⁴ Richard O. Lang, "The Rating of Happiness in Marriage" (unpublished Master's thesis, University of Chicago Libraries, 1932).

⁵ Lewis A. Terman, *Psychological Factors in Marital Happiness* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1938).

⁶ Robert Winch, "Personality Characteristics of Engaged and Married Couples," *American Journal of Sociology*, XLVI (1941), 686-97.

cupations are selective of personality traits, as some believe, then the effect of the occupation itself may be largely limited to reinforcing an already existing tendency in the individual toward marital stability or instability. In the possible selective influence of occupations we thus have a second highly important aspect of the theory regarding the relation of occupation and marital behavior.

The influence of occupational factors upon marital behavior is further examined in the present study, covering a hundred cases in each of six different occupations in *Who's Who, 1942-1943*, or a total of six hundred cases in all.⁷ The occupational groups selected for study (artists, business executives, college professors, engineers, military officers, and physicians) were chosen from a list of occupations represented in *Who's Who* because they were assumed to vary sufficiently in respect to such factors as mobility, social control, and personality traits as to make possible some analysis of the relation of these factors to marital behavior. Military officers are engaged in work characterized by relatively great mobility,⁸ as are also certain groups of artists, such as actors and concert musicians. Artists are subject to relatively

little social control of their sex conduct, partly because of the general feeling that they are temperamental (the personality factor), and therefore strict conformity to the general family mores is not to be expected of them. College professors and physicians, by contrast, remain comparatively stationary in their work and are subject in their moral conduct to considerable community control. The characterization of business leaders and engineers is not so clear, but they are thought to be subject to somewhat more moderate control because they are not so much in the public eye as are teachers and doctors and do not serve so extensively as "models."⁹ Since these characterizations of the six groups are based not on measurements but only on consensus, they are not set forth here as certainly valid. Many questions can be raised about them which, in turn, tend to reflect unfavorably upon the utility of the theories expounded in the first paragraph. Indeed, one purpose of this paper is precisely to raise such questions.

MARITAL STATUS

The data in *Who's Who* make possible a comparison of the proportions of single and married persons in these six occupational groups. The findings on marital status are given in Table 1, which shows the number who are single, the number married once, and the number married more than once.¹⁰ It is not known what percentage of the marriages represent unbroken unions, because the data on reported divorces are probably inadequate. In this six-hundred-case sample,

⁷ The cases, matched for age, are selected from a random 20 per cent sample of the six occupational groups in *Who's Who, 1942-1943*. The use of biographies in *Who's Who* may be presumed automatically to afford some control over the factor of income; not that all persons included have the same incomes but that they are probably all, or nearly all, economically secure. It would have been desirable to match the cases for church affiliation, but information on this question was generally lacking in the biographies.

⁸ The judgments here recorded represent the consensus of the five persons who participated in the study, but these judgments are not unlike those which one finds in the literature of the subject generally.

⁹ Richard LaPiere and Paul Farnsworth, *Social Psychology* (rev. ed.; New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1942), p. 120.

¹⁰ Since 100 cases are involved for each profession, the numbers in the first six columns may also be read as percentages.

which includes 553 persons who were reported as married at least once, only five divorces are recorded.¹¹ While it is likely that this group has more than an average number of unbroken marriages,¹² it is unlikely that the number would be as low as is suggested by the reported number of divorces. Indeed, the high rate of remarriage shown in Table 1 suggests the contrary, since it is not likely that the

TABLE 1*
MARITAL STATUS OF 100 PERSONS IN EACH OF
SIX OCCUPATIONAL GROUPS IN
Who's Who, 1942-1943

OCCUPATION	MARITAL STATUS			TOTAL
	Single	Married Once	Married More than Once	
Artists.	15	65	20	100
Businessmen. . . .	5	83	12	100
College professors	5	84	11	100
Engineers.	3	83	14	100
Military men. . . .	12	83	5	100
Physicians.	7	77	16	100
Total.	47	475	78	600

* If the difference between the numbers single of any two occupations is 6 or more, the chance of getting in other samples of 100 a difference of 0 or a reversal is about 1 in 20. For the percentage married more than once, the differences between the percentages of the military men and the others are the only ones that are significant.

opportunity for remarriage would in so many instances be accounted for by the bereavement of a mate, even if we make allowance for the fact that *Who's Who* is selective of older people. The evidence suggests concealment of information regarding divorce, which is interesting because it shows that divorce is still felt to be an embarrassing experience, despite

¹¹ Two artists, two businessmen, and one physician.

¹² Most of those in *Who's Who* are college graduates, and college graduates have markedly lower than average divorce rates.

its increasing acceptance, which we note in the rising divorce rate.¹³

Since the persons listed in *Who's Who* are those who have achieved occupational distinction, an interesting question is whether promise of exceptional achievement acts as a deterrent to marriage. The evidence in Table 1 suggests that the answer is "No." Only 8 per cent of these noted persons are unmarried, as compared to around 10 per cent of the general population of about the same age.¹⁴ Unfortunately, there are no comparable data available for an unselected group representing the six occupations.

When the records for the different occupations are examined, they show that two of the groups, the artists and the military men, exceed the rate of bachelorhood in the general population. The artists contribute one-third of all the single persons in the sample, or about twice their share, and the military are not far behind with one and one-half times their share. Physicians have just about their share, while college professors, businessmen, and engineers are underrepresented among the unmarried, but the differences between these groups are not so significant as are the differences between all of them, on the one hand, and the artists and military, on the other.

AGE AT MARRIAGE

It is known that the probabilities of marriage are affected by the age at marriage, the chances of marriage falling with an advance in years. Artists and

¹³ Contrary to common belief, marked sensitiveness about divorce is reported to exist even among motion-picture actors and actresses (see Leo Rosten, *Hollywood* [New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1941]).

¹⁴ Ernest R. Groves and William F. Ogburn, *American Marriage and Family Relationships* (New York: Henry Holt, 1928), p. 335.

the military, we have seen, have a relatively large proportion of single persons. Does this mean that they marry at a later age than doctors, college professors, engineers, or business executives? The data in Table 2, showing the distribution of marriages by age at marriage for the six occupations, indicate that the answer is "No." In spite of first impressions, there is not much difference between the different groups. In all cases the means and the medians fall in the twenty-six to thirty age group, and for five of the six groups this is also the modal class. Only

of the same occupational groups we do not know, although it is known that professional groups tend to marry later in life than the general population. In the United States in 1920, 6.5 per cent of males under twenty were married, and nearly one-half (48.8 per cent) of the twenty-five-year-olds likewise, as compared to about one-quarter (24.6 per cent) of the twenty-five-year-olds in *Who's Who* under consideration. It is interesting to find that persons who show promise of success do not marry early. The finding is perhaps not so surprising

TABLE 2
AGE AT FIRST MARRIAGE OF 536 PERSONS IN SIX OCCUPATIONS, *Who's Who*, 1942-1943

OCCUPATION	AGE								TOTAL
	Under 20	20-25	26-30	31-35	36-40	41-45	46-50	Over 50	
Artists.....	3	19	28	7	11	7	1	3	79
Businessmen.....	4	33	28	19	8	2	0	1	95
College professors.....	0	17	42	23	8	3	1	1	95
Engineers.....	0	26	38	13	8	8	2	1	96
Military men.....	0	12	43	18	4	5	1	1	84
Physicians.....	0	18	36	18	11	2	2	0	87
Total.....	7	125	215	98	50	27	7	7	536

in the case of the businessmen does it drop below—to the twenty to twenty-five age group. This is probably explained by the fact that a business career does not so often require preliminary extensive schooling as does college teaching, medicine, or engineering. In business, too, the monetary rewards probably come more quickly where there is outstanding ability than in the case of the other occupations.

An interesting fact is that only seven of these distinguished persons were married under twenty years of age, or only a little more than 1 per cent of the total sample of 536 cases. How these figures compare with those for the rank and file

for the four of the six professions which do not have a single marriage for persons under twenty, namely, college teaching, engineering, the military, and medicine, because all these require considerable preliminary training. It is, however, interesting to find that only four business executives and three artists in this sample were married before they were twenty, for these fields do not so often require long periods of preparation.

REMARRIAGE

The data on remarriage bring out the highly interesting fact that these exceptionally successful professional people are, as a group, not exceptional in the

number of remarriages they make. Only 13 per cent were married more than once, whereas, of white men in general marrying in 1939, 15.5 per cent had been previously married.¹⁵ These figures are interesting in view of the belief held in some quarters that the marriages of famous people are less stable than those of the generality of mankind. It is said that fame turns their heads and makes them difficult to live with.¹⁶ If this is so, it does not show in the statistics of remarriage.

The artists have the greatest number of remarriages, one-quarter of the total number, or 50 per cent more than their share. Business leaders, college professors, and engineers have just about their share, while doctors have one-fourth more than theirs. However, the most striking finding in this connection concerns the military, whose remarriage rate is only 5 per cent, which is less than half that of college professors and businessmen and less than a third that of physicians and surgeons.

OCCUPATIONAL MOBILITY AND MARITAL STATUS

How shall we account for these variations? Consider first the possible influence of the factor of mobility. According to the theory stated in the first paragraph, currently viewed with favor, the occupations characterized by the highest degree of mobility would be expected to show the lowest number of marriages. The artists and the military do have the highest proportions unmarried, and these

are commonly thought to be the two most mobile groups under consideration, hence the least subject to conventional control. The evidence therefore appears to give some support to the theory.

However, further examination of the data reveals certain irregularities and inconsistencies. The military, like the artists, have a high rate of nonmarriage, why not also, then, a high rate of remarriage, to agree again with the artists? Actually, as we saw, the military have the smallest number of remarriages of any of the six groups. Why this should be so is not clear. The military may be better adjusted in their marriages, or they may be less inclined to remarry after divorce or bereavement than the other groups, or the military code may frown on divorce. If the mobility of military life furnishes a welcome respite from the tension of unhappy marriage when it occurs, then the military would have less need for divorce. The armed services also take care of the physical needs of the men for food and shelter, and they have less need to remarry on this score. If the public is also tolerant of unconventional sex behavior where the military is concerned, this too would be a factor.

The above argument, based on the theory of mobility, is not entirely convincing, however. If the mobility of military life succeeds in greatly limiting remarriage, why does it not also more effectively prevent marriage itself? Table 1 shows that, for the military, the rate of "married once" is equal to that of businessmen and engineers and higher than that of physicians. It is possible that those military men who marry are highly stable. This could be explained in two ways. First, the high rate of nonmarriage among military men may mean that those who do marry are highly

¹⁵ *Preliminary Marriage Statistics for 26 States: 1939* ("Vital Statistics-Special Reports," Vol. XV [Washington, D.C.: Bureau of the Census, December 30, 1941]), p. 81.

¹⁶ This charge is made by the former wife of a famous novelist (see Ursula Parrott, *Ex-Wife* [New York: Cape, 1929]).

selected types, well suited to marriage. Second, marriage for the military seems to involve "marriage against odds," in that the policy of the services is not to encourage marriage,¹⁷ and the occupation itself is not particularly conducive to family life. These factors might act as deterrents and result in the selection of the best prospects for marriages.

Thus it appears that the theory of the relation of occupational mobility to marriage, while of value, is weak in part because there are varieties of mobility, with different effects, which the theory as currently stated does not recognize. The mobility of the military would seem to be unlike that of the artists in this important respect, that it is physical without being social. That is to say, the military officer in his movements from place to place is more likely to maintain social relations with those of his own class, while the artist may move on a variety of social levels. The effect of such a difference would be to subject the military man to a greater measure of social control, exerted partly by society in general and partly by his own group, which has a code of its own. In other words, high physical mobility need not mean little social control.

The problem is further illuminated by the finding that physicians have the second highest rate of multiple marriages, suggesting possibly a relatively high rate of marital instability. The physician in his sex life is subject to considerable community control, since he is regarded as a public servant, and the effect of such control might be expected to stabilize his affectional life. On the other hand, it is generally acknowledged that the practice of medicine, with its

irregular hours, calls away from home, and close physical contact with members of the opposite sex, is not especially conducive to family solidarity. In this case we have a considerable degree of mobility, of a kind different from that of the actor or the military man, and the mobility is linked to considerable social control, the two influences tending perhaps to neutralize each other.

Our discussion to this point may be summarized by saying that the problem of the relation of occupational mobility and social control to marital behavior is complicated by the fact that there are not just one type of mobility and one type of social control. There are, rather, several types of each, which means there is considerable variation in the possible patterns of interrelationship between the two factors. For this reason, the theory of the relation of mobility and social control to marital behavior, when stated in simple, generalized form, tends to be somewhat unrealistic.

PERSONALITY AND MARRIAGE

Let us consider also the theory of occupational selection of personality traits as related to marital behavior. In terms of this theory we might seek to explain the high rates of nonmarriage of artists and military men by saying that these occupations recruit a disproportionate number of nonmarrying types, that is, persons not emotionally suited for marriage. For example, it may be speculated that the military services, being one-sex groups, attract a large number of single men who contract habits of the single life for a long time. As for the artists, they have a reputation for being "temperamental," by which is meant, presumably, that they are often relatively emotionally unstable, and there is some evidence to support this

¹⁷ This is illustrated by the peacetime policy of forbidding midshipmen to marry for two years after graduation from Annapolis.

belief.¹⁸ There is also some evidence that, in general, the emotionally more stable men tend to marry and that the less stable tend to remain single.¹⁹ The high rates of nonmarriage of artists may thus reflect high rates of emotional instability.

The theory that occupational differences in marital behavior may in some important measure be ascribed to the selective influence of occupations is an intriguing theory, but one that is subject, in the present state of our knowledge, to a number of serious limitations. The first is the difficulty of determining what manner of selection actually takes place in a particular occupation. Although a considerable literature has grown up around the attempt to meet this problem, the results are not very satisfactory. There are studies purporting to show that members of different occupations differ in intelligence²⁰ and in

opinions, interests, attitudes, values, and the like.²¹ A number of vocational-guidance tests aim to determine the extent to which one's interests agree or disagree with those of successful men in a given occupation. One striking defect of these tests is the rather arbitrary generalizing of traits on the basis of a few noted responses. The subject is tested in only a few selected situations, and even here the testing is done on a symbolic or verbal level rather than on a behavioral one. Failure to recognize the above considerations makes most present personality tests of doubtful validity.

If accurate measures of personality traits were available, the further problem of determining the significance of these traits for marriage could be tackled with greater confidence. An interesting beginning has been made by Terman,²² who reports correlations between marital happiness and a number of personality test items; but again the difficulty lies in the questionable validity of these items. Considerable improvement in personality testing will be required before the relation of personality traits to various types of marital behavior can be stated in measurable terms. This approach, however, appears to hold great promise.

BUCKNELL UNIVERSITY

¹⁸ Otto Klineberg, *Social Psychology* (New York: Henry Holt, 1940), p. 476. One study of introversion reports that interpretive actors and artists tend to be "dangerously introverted" (R. M. MacNitt, *Personality and Vocational Guidance Tests* [3d ed., 1936]).

¹⁹ "Why Married People Live Longer," *Statistical Bulletin* (Metropolitan Life Insurance Co.), XXII, No. 11 (November, 1941), 4.

²⁰ On the whole, these studies of comparative intelligence pertain to socioeconomic differences rather than to occupational differences on a given socioeconomic level and hence are not pertinent to the present paper, but there are some exceptions. For example, Fryer reports that engineers who took the Army Alpha tests during World War I had a somewhat higher mean score than physicians (D. Fryer, "Occupational-Intelligence Standards," *School and Society*, XVI [1922], 273-77). Marital happiness and intelligence have been shown by Terman to be positively correlated, but the differences reported above between engineers and physicians are probably too slight to be significant in this connection.

²¹ Representative examples are Edward K. Strong, *Vocational Interest Blank*; also "Permanence of Vocational Interests," *Journal of Educational Psychology*, XXV (1934), 336-44; Gordon W. Allport and Floyd H. Allport, *The A-S Reaction Study (A Scale for Measuring Ascendancy-Submission in Personality)*; and P. E. Vernon and G. W. Allport, "A Test of Personal Values," *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, XXVI (1931), 231-48.

²² *Op. cit.*

IN MEMORIAM

FRANZ OPPENHEIMER, 1863-1943

EDUARD HEIMANN

Franz Oppenheimer has passed away in his eightieth year—poor, lonely, and proud, as he had lived. His lifework is by far the most elaborate system of sociology ever written; in its final version it consists of four monumental volumes totaling four thousand pages, comprising sections on general sociology, political science, economic theory and policy, and social history. In his general sociology Oppenheimer introduces himself as, and remains throughout, the firm and militant believer in the coincidence of individual reason with universal welfare, in the grand style of heroic, revolutionary, eighteenth-century liberalism; this is his greatness and his tragedy. In the section on political science—an early, sketchy version of which has been translated as *The State*—Oppenheimer traces the origin of the state to the origin of slavery arising from the subjugation of one tribe by another tribe, but he also shows that organized exploitation establishes a community of interest, however limited, between the parties and that the legal character of the state gradually reduces its oppressiveness. In the system of economic theory the same theme reappears in

translated form. Only in a slave society can it occur to a man to seize more land than he can till himself; thus the system of big landed property perpetuates serfdom after its legal repeal by preventing the legally free from reaching the real freedom of the independent peasant. It causes the flight from the land to the relative freedom of the urban labor market, where this influx depresses wages and produces a class profit. On the contrary, the abolition of big landed property by its transformation into co-operatives would absorb enough proletarians to drive wages upward and eliminate class profit and capitalism, thus leaving a really free market. Finally, in his social history from earliest ages on, Oppenheimer illustrates his thesis by means of such an example as the Colonial United States as the utopia where land settlement in gigantic measure deprived feudality of its serfs and made country and town free and prosperous.

A great man has died, but his lifework stands, a comment to his constructive power. Let us begin to study it.

NEW SCHOOL FOR SOCIAL RESEARCH

LETTER TO THE EDITOR

DEAR SIR:

The exigencies of war have forced many university professors to transfer their academic activities to new fields. I am one who was trained in history, was asked to pinch-hit in sociology, and survived the experiment, which proved a fascinating and profitable experience. There were several reasons for this. First, this kindred subject had been regarded by me as a kind of stepchild in the family of social sciences, but my self-complacency vanished in direct ratio to the rapidity with which the ignorance of my adopted field was dispelled. To see how sociologists had made use of the findings of psychologists, biologists, economists, geographers, anthropologists, and others was extremely illuminating. With this abrupt and unsolicited initiation into the productive scholarship of a sister-science, I quickly discovered that either sociology had come of age in the last twenty years or I had substituted prejudice for information in the past few months. Certainly, I cannot return to the domain of Clio, the muse of history, without a better understanding of that province, for to be even an embryonic sociologist is to be a better historian.

Though the better appreciation of sociologists and their field was the greatest boon of this adventure, it also afforded other enlightening results. In the second place, it gave me a new slant on students. Each member of the class prepared a sociological autobiography in which he depicted himself as the result of the interplay of the four basic factors in the social life of man. The exercise was essentially a superficial effort by the students to apply certain sociological concepts to their own experience. Obviously, no great truths were revealed, yet many students admitted obtaining a more vivid grasp of the fundamentals on which the science of group behavior rests as well as a new understanding of their own experience. This was the first attempt of the majority of the class to reflect on their personal relations with primary and secondary groups and on the influence of their biological and social heritages. They found such an intellectual inventory startling often, exciting frequently, and fun most of the time. For the instructor it provided a new insight into the personnel of the class and also revealed unsuspected trends in youthful thinking.

Many a student wrote revealingly of his relationship with various groups—his family, his

fraternity, his Sunday-school class, his dramatic club—and also of his association with certain dominant personalities, such as a teacher, a brother, a sweetheart. Furthermore, this exercise, or perhaps the study of sociology itself, seemed to prompt students to seek their professor's counsel on various subjects. Certainly, while I was teaching this course, more students than ever before consulted me on a variety of matters ranging from how to study to how to handle a mother-in-law. This youthful eagerness for guidance was to me a surprising and humbling experience. Any adult with a fair amount of common sense might venture advice to a student on how to get along with a fussy roommate. But when a disturbed youth asks help on how to handle a difficult parent, one feels the need for the training of a skilled psychiatrist or perhaps longs for the excessive self-assurance of Dorothy Dix.

A third consequence of this academic jaunt was the conviction that a sabbatical interchange of personnel between departments in a university might have real merit; that is, at least for those who are curious enough to try it and pertinacious enough to survive it. Some of us recall that in our first postdoctorate years we were fanatically devoted to delving deeper and deeper into the special corner of our own particular field. We bristled at the quip that research was "knowing more and more about less and less." Exploring occasionally our colleague's intellectual domain seemed a wasteful effort that lacked point. Yet such academic explorations often diminish the smugness of middle-age professors, revive their intellectual curiosity, and frequently enrich considerably their fund of knowledge.

Then, too, even the students might profit by the periodic transplanting of their instructors, who would have to assimilate a new background of fact, often employ a new technique in imparting it, and perhaps become revitalized in the process. While such an undertaking is physically taxing, it is also mentally challenging and intellectually invigorating.

Such a plan has many possibilities. But learned professors and able administrators would doubtless veto such a scheme as impractical and unscholarly. Perhaps they would be right, but at least this historian is grateful that sociology beckoned her.

MARGUERITE HALL ALBJERG

Purdue University

NEWS AND NOTES

RESEARCH NEWS

Wayne University.—Dr. Fritz Redl, associate professor of group work and sociology, wrote an article on "The Zoot Suit, an Interpretation" for the October *Survey Graphic*. Dr. Redl served as a consultant on child guidance last summer to the Government Housing Project at Vanport, Oregon, a Kaiser Shipyard project.

Under the joint auspices of the Detroit Council of Social Agencies and the School of Public Affairs and Social Work at Wayne University, Dr. Redl launched this fall an extensive experiment that is known as the "Detroit Group Work Project." The first aspect of this experiment consists of diagnostic group work along these five lines: (1) intensity check on existing symptoms and traits, (2) specification of existing symptoms and traits, (3) testing methods of control, (4) group sensitivities and social allergies, and (5) character study and personality analysis. The other aspect, clinical group work, consists of efforts of these sorts: (1) to draw out shy children, (2) to organize the aggression of hyperactive children, (3) to socialize the emotional reactions of children with a low skill in "living together," (4) to open up interest and activity areas which so far have been handicapped by emotional blockage, and (5) to offer treatment support. The children who will serve as subjects in this experiment are referred through youth-serving agencies, not directly by parents.

NOTES

American Sociological Society.—Following is the tentative program of the Thirty-eighth Annual Meeting to be held in New York City, December 4 and 5, 1943.

SATURDAY, DECEMBER 4

8:30 A.M.

Registration

9:00-10:00 A.M.

Business Meeting for reports of committees and representatives of the Society

10:00-12:00 A.M.

Social Research, Raymond V. Bowers, National Headquarters, Selective Service System, *Chairman*

"A Controlled Analysis of the Relationship of Guided Participation in Extra-curricular Activities to the Scholastic Achievement and Social Adjustment of College Students," Reuben Hill, University of South Dakota; "Techniques of Social Reform: An Analysis of the Dry Movement," Alfred McClung Lee, Wayne University; "Reliability of the Idea-centered Question in Interview Schedules," Morton B. King, Jr., Camp Shelby, Miss.

Social Theory, J. O. Hertzler, University of Nebraska, *Chairman*

General Topic: Some Contributions of Social Theory to Post-war World Organization

"The Minimal Institutional Essentials for World Organization," Cecil C. North, Ohio State University; "Regionalism and a Permanent Peace," Harry E. Moore, University of Texas; "World Planning: What Is Involved?" J. O. Hertzler, University of Nebraska; "Global Opinion and the Maintenance of Peace," Richard T. LaPiere, Stanford University

Population, Calvin F. Schmid, University of Washington, *Chairman*

General Topic: International Implications of Recent Population Trends

"Population Trends in the Soviet Union," Frank Lorimer, American University; "Population Trends in Japan," Jesse F. Steiner, University of Washington

Discussant: Henry Pratt Fairchild, New York University

Social Psychology, Edgar A. Schuler, United States Department of Agriculture, *Chairman*

General Topic: The Social Psychology of Americans: Nationalist versus Internationalist Implications

"Attitudes Held by Intellectuals," Robert K. Merton, Columbia University; "Attitudes Held by Farmers," Carl C. Taylor, United States Department of Agriculture; "Attitudes Held by Negroes," E. Franklin Frazier, Howard University

1:00-3:00 P.M.

General Session, Edmund deS. Brunner, Columbia University, Presiding

Community Organization for War and Post-war Activities

"In Urban Areas," Mrs. Wladislava Frost, area supervisor, District of Columbia Office of Civilian Defense; "In Rural Areas," B. L. Hummel and John R. Hutcheson, director, Virginia State Extension Service

3:00-5:00 P.M.

Community and Ecology, Rupert B. Vance, University of North Carolina, *Chairman*

"The Ecology of Political Parties: A Case and a Critique," Rudolf Heberle, Louisiana State University; "Geopolitics and the Theory of Regionalism," Werner J. Cahnman, Fisk University; "Metropolitan Ecology and Rural Regionalism: A Needed Integration in Theory," James A. Quinn, University of Cincinnati; "The Relation of Human Ecology to General Sociology," Milia Alihan, New York City

Sociometry, C. P. Loomis, United States Department of Agriculture, *Chairman*

General Topic: Measurement of Standards and Levels of Living

"What Level-of-Living Indices Measure," Margaret Jarman Hagood and Louis J. Ducoff, United States Department of Agriculture; "Regional Variations in Levels and Standards of Living: White Farm Families," Edgar A. Schuler, United States Department of Agriculture

The Family, M. C. Elmer, University of Pittsburgh, *Chairman*

"Changing Cultural Problems in American Family Life," Margaret Mead, American Museum of Natural History; "Needed Legislation Relative to the Family," John S. Bradway, Duke University; "How Can the Family Best Meet the Repercussion of the

War?" James H. S. Bossard, University of Pennsylvania

4:30 P.M.

Meeting of the Executive Committee

8:00 P.M.

General Session, George A. Lundberg, Bennington College, Presiding

Papers by Read Bain, Robert S. Lynd, and George A. Lundberg

SUNDAY, DECEMBER 5

9:00-10:00 A.M.

Business Meeting of the Society

10:00-12:00 A.M.

Latin America, T. Lynn Smith, United States Department of Agriculture, Presiding

"Locality Group Structure in Latin America," C. C. Taylor, United States Department of Agriculture (Argentina); N. L. Whetten, University of Connecticut (Mexico); T. Lynn Smith, United States Department of Agriculture (Brazil)

General Session: Post-war Society (chairman to be selected)

Papers by Dudley Kirk, Robert M. MacIver, F. Stuart Chapin, and William F. Ogburn.

1:00-3:00 P.M.

Population, Calvin F. Schmid, University of Washington, *Chairman*

General Topic: Methodology and Policy

"Internal Migration during the War: A Methodological Analysis and Critique," Philip M. Hauser, United States Bureau of the Census; "Potentialities for Demographic Research from the Records of the Immigration Service," E. P. Hutchinson, United States Immigration Service; "Some Programs Leading to a Positive Population Policy," T. J. Woof-ter, Jr., Federal Security Agency

Sociological Measurement, Harry W. Alpert, Office of War Information, *Chairman*

"The Measurement of Morale," Arnold Rose, Special Services Division, War Department; "Foundations for the Scaling of Attributes," Louis Guttman, Cornell University; "Statistical Measurements of Trends in Musical Tastes," John H. Mueller, University of Indiana

Community and Ecology, Rupert B. Vance, University of North Carolina, *Chairman*

"The Old New Orleans and the New: A Case for Ecology," Harlan W. Gilmore, Tulane University; "The Urban Adjustments of Rural Migrants," Howard W. Beers, University of Kentucky; "The Pacific Coast Community at War," Calvin F. Schmid, University of Washington

General Discussion (discussion leaders to be selected)

3:00-5:00 P.M.

Social Research, Raymond V. Bowers, National Headquarters, Selective Service System, *Chairman*

General Topic: Statistics in the Government Service

"Co-ordination of Government Statistical Programs," Stuart A. Rice, United States Bureau of the Budget; "Methodological Problems in Government Statistical Programs," W. Edwards Deming, United States Bureau of the Census; "The Operation of a Government Statistical Program," Kenneth H. McGill, National Headquarters, Selective Service System

Social Psychology, Edgar A. Schuler, United States Department of Agriculture, *Chairman*

"Attitudes of Americans Regarding Selected Foreign Countries," Jerome Bruner, Office of Public Opinion Research, Princeton University; "The Attitude of Economic Restrictionism and Its Implications," C. Arnold Anderson, Iowa State College; "American Personality Stereotyping and Its Implications," Leonard S. Cottrell, Special Services Division, War Department

Criminology, Thorsten Sellin, University of Pennsylvania, *Chairman*

"Crime and the Frontier Mores," Mabel Elliott, University of Kansas; "The Deterrent Effect of Corporal Punishment for Crime," Robert G. Caldwell, University of Delaware

4:30 P.M.

Meeting of the Executive Committee

Drake University.—Dr. Joseph B. Gittler has accepted an appointment to the department of sociology.

Friends University.—In co-operation with the Civilian Public Service Division of the

Selective Service System, Friends University has set up a Reconstruction Program. Part of it is a social service reconstruction program which is also a sociology major under the supervision of the head of the department, Dr. Egon E. Bergel. This program also introduces a new course, "European Social and Cultural Patterns," given by Dr. Bergel.

Harvard University.—Publication of *Russia and the United States* by Pitirim A. Sorokin has been announced by E. P. Dutton & Co. for January, 1944. The Italian Committee of Liberation in Italy has made arrangements for the translation and publication of Professor Sorokin's *Contemporary Sociological Theories* in Italian. A new edition of the *Encyclopedia Americana* contains an article by Professor Sorokin on "Sociology" which replaces a previous article on the subject. Walter I. Firey and G. H. Grosser have been respectively reappointed and appointed teaching fellows in the department of sociology. Professor Georges Gurvitch has been appointed a research fellow of the university.

University of Kansas.—Victor E. Helleberg passed away October 8, 1943, at the age of eighty-two. He came to the University in 1910 and retired in 1937. He published the volume *The Social Self* in 1941. An alumnus of Yale University and with a law degree from the University of Cincinnati, Professor Helleberg took his graduate work in sociology at the University of Chicago from 1906 to 1910, serving as instructor in sociology from 1908 to 1910. A man of broad interests, strong convictions, and forceful personality, Professor Helleberg had a profound influence on many students.

Kent State University.—James T. Laing has been named one of a commission of fifteen members in Portage County set up for the purpose of study and control of juvenile delinquency in the county. The commission is headed by Juvenile Judge George McClelland.

John F. Cuber is a contributor to the timely issue of the *Annals of the Academy of Political and Social Science*, "The Family in World War II," published in September.

William S. Shepherd has been promoted to the rank of assistant professor.

Harley O. Preston, on leave with the Army Air Corps, has recently been transferred from Kelly Field, San Antonio, to Miami Beach, where he is engaged in setting up a new research unit.

Laval University (Quebec, P.Q., Canada).—The School of Social Sciences, founded five years ago, entered upon a new phase at the beginning of the current session with the organizing of two new departments.

The first is a department of social research, under the direction of Rev. Fr. G.-H. Lévesque, O.P., director of the School. The assistant director is M. J.-C. Falardeau, who has just returned from two years of study in sociology and anthropology at the University of Chicago as a fellow of the Royal Society of Canada. A generous subsidy from the provincial government of Quebec permitted the establishment of this department. It gives a new orientation to instruction and research in the social sciences in French Canada. Professor Everett C. Hughes of the University of Chicago taught in the School for six months last winter and has since visited it in an advisory capacity. The new department has a triple aim: (1) to assure all students of the School a general training in the scientific observation of social problems; (2) to prepare investigators especially trained in modern techniques of research; and (3) to direct fundamental studies of the rural and urban problems of contemporary French Canada.

The second new department is that of social service. It will be directed by Rev. Fr. Gonzalve Poulin, O.F.M., with the assistance of M. Roger Marier, who has just returned from advanced study at the Catholic University in Washington, D.C. In addition to the regular theoretical and practical courses in social work, this department will

undertake a series of special courses on the problems created by the war and on the urban problems of the French-Canadian world. There will be close collaboration between the two new departments and the others of the School.

M. Maurice Tremblay, sociologist, and M. Maurice Lamontagne, economist, have both joined the staff this session. Both have just returned from two years of study at Harvard University.

Macalister College.—Dr. Samuel A. Strong has accepted an appointment as professor and head of the department of sociology.

Northwestern.—Thorsten Sellin has accepted chairmanship of the department of sociology, 1944-45.

Pan American Union.—Robert C. Jones attended the Inter-American Demographic Congress held in Mexico City, October 12-20. The congress was divided into three principal sections: demography, ethnology and eugenics, and political demography.

Russell Sage Foundation.—The Russell Sage Foundation has completed publication of its first series of eight "Occasional Papers" dealing with the administration of relief abroad. These papers bring together reports, unpublished or difficult to obtain, of earlier experience in foreign relief, from World War I to World War II, from Spain and occupied France to China. The "Papers" are under the general editorship of Donald S. Howard, assistant director of the Foundation's Charity Organization Department.

Rutgers University.—Georges Gurvitch, director of the French Sociological Institute—(Ecole Libre des Hautes Etudes), New York City, and former professor of sociology at the University of Strasbourg (France), is from October 1, 1943, in charge of Area Study (France) of the A.S.T. Program.

BOOK REVIEWS

Origins of American Sociology: The Social Science Movement in the United States. By L. L. and JESSIE BERNARD. New York: Thomas Y. Cromwell Co., 1943. Pp. xiv+866. \$6.50.

This is a remarkable book. It has long been known to most teachers and advanced students of sociology in this country that the discipline had its origins, in considerable part, in the interest in practical "social problems" and the possibilities of social reform which flourished through the middle of the nineteenth century. The story of these origins, however, has never been adequately told, much less documented, until now. The Bernards, with enormous industry expended over many years, have done with great thoroughness the research needed to produce a really reliable, adequate history of one of the most central lines of antecedents of twentieth-century American sociology—that line of antecedents that may be designated as the "social-science movement," culminating in the activities of the American Social Science Association (1865-1909).

The authors regularly capitalize the words "Social Science," when they are employed in this volume to designate a certain movement or current of social thought in the United States (it had its counterpart, though a somewhat less massive one, in England). This is a sound practice, as is their general handling of the subject; the phrase "Social Science," during a period of fifty years or more, had for the literate classes in the United States a special meaning, quite different from the sense in which the phrase, without capitals, is sometimes used today as equivalent to "the social sciences." Nineteenth-century "Social Science" was, especially in its beginnings in the forties, a loose, unintegrated mixture of metaphysical speculation about human history, destiny, welfare, and the nature and method of science, with social idealism and various specific reform projects. The movement in which these elements were involved gradually became partially integrated and unified, especially after the formation of the American Social Science Association; and then almost immediately began to disintegrate, particularly through the secession from the parent-organization of a

number of bodies of more specialized purpose—the National Conference of Charities and Corrections (later, Conference of Social Work), the American Historical Association, the American Economic Association, and, by proliferation from the American Economic Association, the American Political Science Association and the American Sociological Society. Still other specialized organizations can be traced in some fashion or other to the Social Science movement, notably the American Statistical Association. The Bernards hold, however, and quite justifiably, that the American Sociological Society may be regarded as the most direct successor to the American Social Science Association and that the Social Science movement provided the most central origins of what eventually became sociology in the United States. They attribute more original influence in the formation of the movement to Comte than the present reviewer would concede, but that difference of opinion does not detract seriously from his estimate of the value of the book; it would be at most a question of relative emphasis.

This book and Small's *Origins of Sociology*, which describes certain nineteenth-century German antecedents of American sociology, complement each other nicely; both need to be supplemented by some account of the way in which the more theoretic phases of sociological thought in this country have been affected by comparatively recent German and French works. But the present work is an extremely valuable contribution to our knowledge of the process of development by which sociology in the United States came to be what it is today. There is a section on the early courses in Social Science and Sociology offered in American institutions of higher learning, the substance of which has been available in journal articles, but which it is convenient to have incorporated in this volume, the more so since the authors are able to show a direct connection between the Social Science movement and the early college courses. There are indexes of subjects and names which appear to be adequate.

FLOYD N. HOUSE

University of Virginia

The Family and Democratic Society. By JOSEPH KIRK FOLSOM. With chapters in collaboration with MARION BASSETT. New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Pp. xiii+731. \$4.00.

Folsom answers Lynd's question, "Knowledge for what?" with the statement that he is interested in knowledge that will make marriage work. He lists sensible Do's and Don't's (pp. 358-62, 655, 659, etc.) to guide the perplexed. He poses as the two major unsolved problems of family life in a democracy (1) "How can people find the mates who will assure monogamous, creative, enduring love in time to bear children in early adult years?" and (2) "How can we harmonize the need for adult achievement and self-realization, especially of women, with the needs of young children for that almost continuous attention which their development apparently requires?" (p. 662). To the first of these, Folsom suggests six possible solutions, four of which are impracticable in our culture, leaving (a) scientific selection at the outset and (b) training in marital adjustment as the two most likely to work. In discussing these policies, Folsom presents a comprehensive analysis of the whole problem of sexual values (in contradistinction to sexual behavior) (pp. 668-75). One infers that he would favor not a "free and easy" sex policy (p. 670) but one of sex affirmation rather than one of sex denial—a policy which would make sex respectable rather than funny or vulgar, free it from shame or horror, develop its greatest satisfactions, and associate it with the interesting, the beautiful, and the inspiring. In pursuing this discussion, Folsom refutes a number of popular beliefs with respect to the dire effects of sex relations on mind and body.

The second great problem, how can each generation develop best without sacrificing anyone to any other, is answered in part by the suggestion that if both parents shared the drudgery and confinement and preoccupation with detail which raising children involves, both would be the gainers, first, by relieving the mother of a great frustrating load and, second, by giving the husband more of his wife's companionship (p. 678).

Folsom concludes his valuable book with the suggestion that perhaps it is time for democracy to play its trump card, "which is a positive, constructive policy toward companionship and affection between the sexes" (p. 680). If we

want a democracy, we must create the kind of personality that functions best in a democracy, and this can be best done by encouraging love. To those who object that romantic love is already overstressed in our society, Folsom might reply that the kind of love he has in mind is a broader, more mature, and more adult type of relationship.

But, as the title of this book suggests, it deals not only with the family but with democratic society as a whole as well. Folsom has read widely in this field, and everything which bears on the great issues of the day—from semantics to household storage problems—he has incorporated in his book. Most of us believe in the things he believes in and want the things for our culture that he wants. But not all of us will be satisfied with his treatment. For example, many of us are as troubled as Folsom by some of the theoretical objections to democratic freedom (p. 237). Yet we would like something a little more substantial to reassure us than simply Folsom's statement that they are not true. Folsom also has faith that, inasmuch as all modern societies—even authoritarian ones—depend on science, the nondemocratic ones must of necessity perish by the sword of science, since "science leads toward individualism and freedom" (p. 238). It is true that science is an acid corrosive of tradition. But it can be just as corrosive to democratic institutions as it is to authoritarian ones. Furthermore, we are now familiar with the phenomena of airtight compartments. Science might intellectually convince the Japanese that their emperor was not the son of heaven (Folsom's illustration, p. 238); nevertheless, they might continue to believe in his divine powers, just as millions of Christians know scientific biology and yet believe in the virgin birth. It would be wonderful to share Folsom's faith in the liberating force of science; it doubtless gives courage and drive to students who catch it from their teacher.

There are other minor points which one might take issue with, but the book as a whole is so meaty, so applicable, and so genuinely helpful that it would be cavilling to dwell upon them. Every course in marriage and the family would certainly profit by extensive assignments in this valuable book.

JESSIE BERNARD

Lindenwood College

Nation and Family: The Swedish Experiment in Democratic Family and Population Policy.

By ALVA MYRDAL. New York and London, 1941. Pp. xv+441. \$4.00.

This is an enlarged and re-written edition of the author's earlier study, *The Crisis in the Population Question*, which was written in collaboration with Dr. Gunnar Myrdal and appeared in Stockholm in 1934. The work is divided into two parts. The first deals with the problems of setting up a population policy and the principles which should guide such a policy; the second, with the program of the Swedish Population Commission. Just at the time the program was being initiated World War II broke out, and Sweden had to devote her resources to national defense.

At the beginning the author makes clear that her book is "practical" or "political" and not simply "theoretical" or "factual" and that it is an investigation of "planned social action in the field of population in terms of goals and means." Thus, disclaiming the so-called objectivity of most social scientists who "drive their values underground" and try to "appear scientific by omitting certain basic assumptions from the discussion," the author declares that the purpose of investigating the population problem is to reintegrate the family into the larger society and to create, where necessary, collective devices that will give the individual the security which was formerly enjoyed in the family. The investigation seeks to determine how these goals can be achieved through the democratic process. Because of a number of factors—historical, economic, political, and cultural—Sweden is especially favored as a field in which to carry on such an investigation.

The population problem, therefore, conditions "the life of the individual just as it determines the welfare of nations" and "touches sex life and the institution of the family as well as national production, distribution, and consumption." The truth of this conclusion is established in a number of chapters dealing with population trends, changes in family life, and qualitative changes in population. Since Sweden has population statistics extending as far back as 1750, it was possible to show that, from 1750 to 1850, population increase was "coupled with the risk of pauperization," while the increase from 1850 to 1910 was associated with

economic expansion and a rise in the standard of living. However, after 1910 the improvement in family welfare was associated not only with economic expansion but with a decline in the growth of population. The decline in the growth of population was due to changes in family life: a low marriage rate and family limitation and a decline in illegitimacy as a result of the spread of knowledge of birth control. The utilization of birth control reflects an individualization of life-patterns which is not only characteristic of the middle class but extends to the working class. Since changes in the population of Sweden were such as to forecast the liquidation of the nation, politicians as well as experts and the educated public became concerned with the population problem. Moreover, since in Sweden politics "has been brought under the control of logic and technical knowledge, the population problem has become a matter of social engineering." Therefore, it was possible to set up goals and to educate the public regarding means of attaining these goals.

The second section of the book is an analysis of the program of the Swedish Population Commission, which was set up after the nation realized that the population problem was a matter of national survival. The program involved education for family life, plans for housing and health, provisions for children and broken families, security for the handicapped, and recreational facilities. It was proposed to incorporate sex education into the educational program for children and to rid sex of the taboos which were held to be responsible for the double standard, venereal diseases, and other vices associated with sex. In short, the program is designed to place social life, including the economic system as far as distribution is concerned, on a rational basis. Therefore, the author does not hesitate to state that the program involves collectivism. However, whatever collectivism is contained in the program rests upon pragmatic rather than doctrinal grounds and is part of the means required for attaining the goals which are set up.

Although some social scientists would challenge the author's general position with reference to the role of value judgments in social research, no one can object to her making explicit the premises and value judgments underlying this study. In fact, one of the positive contributions of the book is its attempt to relate

social research to a social problem in the same manner in which the physical scientist relates his researches to a problem. The book provides some notion of the interaction between the social scientist and the social forces with which at the same time he must work. Probably the relatively easy success which the sponsors of a rational population program had in getting it adopted accounts for the optimism concerning the achievement of the goals set up. The program assumes that, through education and the inculcation of rational attitudes, persons may be brought to subordinate individualistic desires and rationally conceived interests to social aims. Thus, the downward movement of the birth rate which is attributable largely to the development of individualistic and rational attitudes could be reversed through making the individual aware of rationally conceived social purposes. This might be possible in a culturally homogeneous country like Sweden with a high level of social intelligence, but it appears doubtful in the more complex and less homogeneous countries of the Western world. Nevertheless, this book is a distinct contribution in the field of population, for the population problem is studied not as a purely physical phenomenon but in relation to economic forces, sex and family behavior, and the interplay of political factors.

E. FRANKLIN FRAZIER

Howard University

Victory over Fear. By JOHN DOLLARD. New York: Reynal & Hitchcock, 1942. Pp. 213. \$2.00.

While its jacket calls this book "scientific," it is actually a "popular" or selling book with the sincere purpose of humanizing knowledge by avoiding "scientific jargon." There is a great deal of repetition and dilution and some rambling—all probably inevitable in this sort of thing. Some sociologists I have known may find it useful to them not as sociologists but as human beings with troubles of their own. I would not call the book *unscientific*, but there are many dogmatic, unsupported, partisan passages, predictive assumptions, or merely therapeutic suggestions or hortatory statements. Many of the specific steps suggested should be definitely useful, but they often stop just short of the convincing final step or evade the alternative failures.

On a few points the reviewer would have to differ. Effective self-study can be done not only alone (if others are felt inimical) but in a quiet group (if the others are felt friendly and likewise examining their selves). The test of the failure or success of one's thinking does not necessarily lie entirely in overt action. "Fierce joy" seems hardly the feeling to get merely from standing to one side and looking at one's self, in order to "unlax" a fear. And if joy comes only after deprivation, which I doubt, the aforesaid fierce joy could only come after long refraining from self-study!

A neurotic is all too likely to complicate his case by overidentifying himself with various cases presented in a book such as this, without outright encouragement to do so. He is also all too inclined to personify his devils without the encouragement of such phrases as "struggling with malignant forces" and "control of the evil forces."

Dollard occasionally misses a trick or two, I think. Since a book like this creates a presumption in the reader that everybody has his fears, how about discussing the fear of *fear*? Again: we do find fear inhibiting overt anger when the fear is fear of the consequences of expressing anger; but when the anger is itself based on a fear, as is usually the case, then anger is a screen for a more or less concealed fear, and, if the situation becomes a conflict of fears, the dangers of transferring resentment to a scapegoat as a result of one's fearing to express it against the original offender are not sufficiently stressed. On the other hand, Dollard seems at some points to assume a fixed quantum of "aggression" or of "sex," i.e., unconvertible specific energies (or instincts?) which cannot be sublimated but only expressed or suppressed. He does not pretend to decide between fear of a wrong decision (timidity, hesitancy) and fear of vacillation and of a resulting reputation of weakness and the consequent compensatory stubbornness, or fear of being thought weak because stubborn. These are complications that Dollard does not go into.

Dollard includes as bringer-down-to-date addenda some paragraphs on not being afraid to hate the Axis which will date the book. Allowance is made neither for those who conscientiously consider fear of hating a legitimate fear, for those who honestly do not hate their "enemies," nor for those who believe hate futile, unnecessary, wasteful, dangerous, and stupid. There are debatable assumptions that

the restraints of peace are sickly; that "stamping out" is a feasible or permanently effective way of dealing with a caste, race, or any other diabolized group produced by a complex cultural-economic situation-process; or that effective war, or even production morale, cannot be maintained without hate, cannot be developed on a cool-blooded or intelligent basis such as is already replacing sentimental fears and revenges in the treatment of domestic criminals.

It is also debatable whether many people could imagine greater damage from shells and bombs than actually occurs; whether the pain of injuries does not last long; whether our army is thoroughly trained and the smartest army; whether our school system is the most advanced; whether the simple American knows what he is fighting for; whether post-war America will still have ample natural resources.

This reviewer, however, agrees heartily that we must watch well that the army does not become too strong a force after the war, that the four unfreedoms of violence, want, persecution, and bigotry are real dangers, and that each has a correspondingly valid fear, removable only by far-seeing statesmanship, widespread sacrifice, and the organization of maximum production for peace.

TOM ELLIOT

Northwestern University

The Meaning of Intelligence. By GEORGE D. STODDARD. New York: Macmillan Co., 1943. Pp. 504. \$4.00.

Testing of intelligence has been going on for enough years to satisfy most of us as to its permanence. The practice seems to be useful, in spite of the uncertainties about the meaning of the results. In dealing with the complexities of life and people, we have to simplify and classify, and the tests help us to do this.

When the question of the meaning of the tests is raised, however, we find no clear answer in the research and no general agreement among the research workers. There are those who avoid the problem by saying that intelligence is whatever the intelligence tests measure, but, as Stoddard says, "this may be a good cliché now, but how could it be helpful to persons starting out to build tests?"

The author was until recently the director

of the Iowa Child Welfare Research Station and a champion of one of the contending factions in the dispute which has become known as the "Iowa controversy." The argument centers about the mutability of intelligence. The Iowa group and their supporters found evidence that improved conditions of living increased the level of intelligence as measured by tests. Their opponents question the techniques and arguments employed and cite studies which reach opposite conclusions. The fight continues, and scientific opinion is still divided on the question.

The sociologist is more likely to incline toward Stoddard's side on the issue, not merely because of freedom from biological bias, but more because he is by virtue of his study aware of the complex and subtle interconnections between social experience and mentality. The more we become familiar with such influences, the more hopeless it appears to attempt to measure such a thing as innate intelligence that is independent of experience. Stoddard, referring to such an effort as a "chasing of the will-o'-the-wisp," states:

To throw out experience is to throw out a proper source of nourishment to a growing mentality. We shall never succeed in measuring differences in physique ascribable to differences in nutrition if we measure only persons who live on potatoes

With a slight modification in language, the gap between long-held concepts in psychology . . . and the position we are taking in this volume may be bridged: *the aim of intelligence tests is to provide materials such that differences in experience that do not contribute to differences in intelligence will be minimized.* It should never be the aim of intelligence tests to reduce all differences in experience to a minimum, for in this way we turn away from essential meaningfulness. The aim always is to measure ability, regardless of the way in which it was developed. We may be confident that the type, richness, and duration of experience are built into the very structure of intelligent behavior. . . . There is no neurology as yet subtle enough to distinguish the intellectually deteriorated escapist of today from himself of yesterday who had not then embraced spurious substitutes for logic [pp. 124-25].

In psychology, disparate levels of discourse on many occasions have been hopelessly intertwined, there being no better illustration of this than the history of the concept of IQ constancy: some teachers, believing in it, have marked Johnnie, once and for all, as *dull* or *bright*. Clinical and educational psychologists have called upon everything from genealogy to psychoanalysis to explain, or explain away, radical IQ changes, especially if found along a constantly diminishing or accelerating line. *The*

simple truth is that the IQ, as frequently envisaged, is a myth: it is deus ex machina—something apart from and independent of actual organic and cultural events. The IQ, some feel, is fixed: what varies is the relationship of an individual to it, such variation being a product of invalidity in the test and idiosyncrasy in the child—given a perfect test and an ever-normal child, the IQ would be constant! This view, as we have seen, is untenable, unrealistic, and unnecessary [p. 258].

Stoddard devotes a chapter to the explanation of his own elaborate definition of intelligence, in a discussion which is of much value whether or not the definition is regarded as satisfactory. Throughout the book he has his say on such topics as the physiological basis of intelligence, the uses of tests, the question of growth in intelligence, and educational and social implications of his point of view. There is comment and interpretation of the research on these topics for the purpose of showing that his thesis fits in with all that has been solidly demonstrated.

The work is, on the whole, an able, well-organized, and in places sparkling exposition of the systematic view of the members of the rebellion in educational psychology. It is a statement that calls for respect, whatever our prejudices on the issues may be, and which deserves to be known as an important work.

ROBERT E. L. FARIS

Syracuse University

Survey of Objective Studies of Psychoanalytic Concepts: A Report for the Committee on Social Adjustment. By ROBERT R. SEARS. New York: Social Science Research Council, 1943. Pp. xiv+156. \$1.25.

Dr. Sears was asked to make a survey of the scientific literature which could serve as a test for the principal Freudian concepts and arrive at a basis for deciding which of Freud's novel ideas remain useful in the general study of behavior. This is a timely service and is a part of a contemporary general interest in making a fusion of the different approaches to human psychology.

The experimental work does not yet cover nearly all the points of psychoanalytic theory, and some of the experiments do not really come to grips with what Freud meant. A consider-

able amount of the experimental material, also, is simply not conclusive, and much that is remains, nevertheless, thin. For these reasons we cannot say that the score is anywhere near complete.

As far as this report goes, Freud is not by any means destroyed but is considerably short of triumphant. In general, it may be fair to say that the more unique and distinctly "Freudian" ideas do not stand up to the tests as well as do the more general conceptions which are probably in the public domain to such an extent that it is hardly accurate to refer to them as "Freudian." For example, a certain degree of sexual interest and behavior among children is shown to be common, which is in agreement with Freud but also with many non-Freudians and pre-Freudians. The more distinctly "Freudian" belief in the commonness of the "castration complex" does not find support here. "It seems probable that Freud's notions about children's attitudes toward sex were based on a small sample that was far from characteristic of contemporary American children" (p. 136). Other mistakes resulting from generalizing from a single culture are noted.

The report is fair to both sides of the issue, but it could possibly have undertaken to scour some of the conceptions even more vigorously. In dealing with fingernail-biting, for example, Dr. Sears finds that "the resistance to modification indicates a strongly motivated response having an oral orientation" and does not discuss the possibility that nails may be bitten for reasons other than pleasant sensations in the mouth, though he does refer to the immediate stimulus as being fear, excitement, nervousness, and self-consciousness, and adds: "Any interpretation of these stimuli in sexual terms would be purely gratuitous" (p. 11).

The principal omissions concern the re-examination of orthodox concepts by contemporary analysts, which have not been sufficiently put to experimental test, and the literature on aggression and substitution, which the author is summarizing elsewhere.

Unquestionably the report is a valuable piece of work. There is much worth-while untangling of ideas, some clear conclusions, a number of suggestions for further research, and a bibliography of over a hundred items.

ROBERT E. L. FARIS

Syracuse University

The Structure of Netherlands Indian Economy.

By J. H. BOEKE. New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1942. Pp. x+201.

Native Labour in South Africa. By SHEILA T.

VAN DER HORST. London: Oxford University Press, 1942. Pp. xii+340.

The Making of Modern New Guinea, with Special Reference to Culture Contact in the Mandated Territory. By STEPHEN WINSLOW

REED. Philadelphia: American Philosophical Society, 1943. Pp. xxii+326. \$4.00.

These three books deal with a crucial aspect of the problem of empire; namely, the loosening of native peoples from their traditional tribal or village life and their induction into a new order of things dominated by the invading people. Boeke and Van der Horst treat especially the initiation of natives into a money economy. Reed, whose study concerns people much more primitive to start with and an area not yet so intensively exploited by Europeans, devotes more attention to the general culture of the natives. Neither the differences of emphasis nor the variety of situations described can or do obscure the fundamental identity of the processes or problems involved; and, no matter what ideological chart may guide post-war attempts to deal with the colonial areas and native peoples, the fundamental problems raised in these books—and in a host of others like them—will remain to plague both administrator and student of society for a long time.

Boeke, professor of tropical economics at Leyden until the invasion, illuminates his facts with a theoretical framework which should be of use to all students of similar situations. He introduces his work with a clear statement of the assumptions upon which classical "Western" economic theory rests: that the economic subject (*a*) has unlimited wants, (*b*) lives in a money economy, and (*c*) is individualistic. These principles, he maintains, do not hold in the East, where the wants of the individual are limited by tradition, money is of minor importance in the economy, and the individual is bound to his kin or village group by traditional claims which inhibit free bargaining and free movement. He describes the indigenous village community in the terms of Ferdinand Tönnies.

The first problem of that purest of all economic men, the Westerner who seeks his fortune abroad in a few years of the prime of his

life among strange people to whom he owes no moral claim and in a climate he detests and fears, is to pry loose from the native communal society wage-workers to produce goods for a competitive world market. Boeke describes in detail the devices to which the agents of empire had to resort to this end. Herein lies the well-known paradox of the European economic man; devoted as he is to a doctrine of laissez faire, he generally has had to resort to its opposite—political means of one sort or another—to get the labor wanted from natives. The devices have included the levying of taxes which can be paid only in money got by wage work, labor contracts which it is a penal offense for the worker to break, and many others somewhat less direct in their operation. Eventually, a proletariat is created; a mass of people who, though their wants are still limited, can satisfy those wants only by disposing of their labor in the wage-work market because they no longer have a place in any of the traditional village or kin systems. If not willing individualists in their mentality, they must be so in practice because they belong to no supporting moral community.

Boeke carries his story through to the eventual land and population problems and to the series of reforms proposed for stabilizing the colonial economy and the place of the native in it. In this case—and I suspect in most similar ones—there came a phase in which large numbers of the natives lived inescapably in and by the new economy, yet were relegated by a variety of circumstances to the lower positions in it. Such circumstances include their own standards of living and education and all the handicaps of people just emerging from a more primitive world; but in the Netherlands Indies, as in all other cases of which the reviewer has any knowledge, they include determined measures of the dominant European group to keep the positions of greater profit and of control in their own hands.

Van der Horst, with somewhat less of theoretical consideration but in greater historical detail, does for South Africa what Boeke has done for the Netherlands Indies. In South Africa, unlike the Indies, there is a considerable body of European skilled labor. This group has used every means possible to prevent the native Negroes from competing with them in the skilled occupations. Hence, in South Africa one finds developed to the highest degree legal re-

strictions upon the movement and economic activity of the natives. But, in broad outline, the two situations are comparable.

Reed, an anthropologist, deals in much more detail with the geography and with the native cultures of his chosen region. But his special problem is the "Kanaka revolution." The essence of this revolution is that there is now being developed, between the old native tribes and the Europeans, a third group, the Kanaka, who are detribalized, pidgin-speaking natives. This composite group is becoming a caste in a social and economic system dominated by Europeans. They may well become the nucleus of a new culturally and politically self-conscious people.

These books, and the problems with which they deal, suggest some remarks on the much talked-of integration of the social sciences. The anthropologist has been, by sheer necessity of working alone in the field as well as by inclination, a one-man integration of the social sciences. He could not wait for an economist, a historian, a political scientist, and what have you, to come out to his remote corner of the world. In the Western world everyone is sufficiently the economic man to allow the economist to act as if all people were completely so. Taking the cue from him, the rest of the social scientists can make their own assumptions and treat their chosen activities and institutions each according to some special frame of reference and by use of certain techniques thought to be especially appropriate. This way of proceeding may not be entirely satisfactory, but it is the usual one. In those areas of the world where populations are in process of passing from the simpler tribal and folk order of things to the more "rational" capitalistic industrial order, the interweaving of the economic with the political and the moral is so intricate that one has to separate the threads by a conscious and tedious effort of thought and observation. The native institutions have each such a multiplicity of functions that they cannot be dealt out one by one to the various specialists, on the assumption that each of them has a single function known in advance. The economist has to discover the economic aspect of a number of institutions. So, likewise, would it be with any other specialized social scientist who would venture into the maze of these great frontiers of races, peoples, and cultures.

Perhaps the real integration of the social sciences, and at the same time a clearer con-

ception of the several different systems of concepts and analysis essential to study of any society, may come through the back doors of the world rather than through the front doors of universities. It would be a fitting irony if academic *laissez faire* fell on the same frontier post as its practical counterpart.

EVERETT C. HUGHES

University of Chicago

Inter-American Statistical Yearbook, 1942. Edited by RAUL C. MIGONE. Buenos Aires: El Ateneo; New York: Macmillan Co., Rio de Janeiro: Freitas Bastos & Cia, 1943. Pp. 1066. \$10.

An ever increasing interest in problems of the American hemisphere gives the greatest importance to this yearbook, now in the second year of its publication. The information has been gathered under the direction of Mr. Raul C. Migone, an official of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Argentina, with the collaboration of experts from different countries. The documental sources have been the official publications of the statistical offices from all the American republics and some international books of well-established reputation. The technique of presentation of the tables is the same that has been used in some international books from Europe.

In this second year of its publication the yearbook shows a great improvement, and some new tables have been provided. Of greatest importance are those concerning inter-American trade. Since this trade has developed as a result of the war, the tables show a new direction in the activity of the Latin-American republics.

The yearbook presents information about population, production, industry, transportation and communication, commerce, social affairs, banking, finance, education, military power, sanitation, and international co-operation. In many instances the editors have been compelled to make special researches in order to reduce to tables facts that have not previously been presented in international publications.

The book has the great value of timeliness. The relationships among the American nations are of particular interest today. To study not only our trade but even our political developments, both now and in the future, we must be

able to handle easily all the figures concerning the social and economic life of this hemisphere. The editors understand this need and have started with the ambition of creating a vast enterprise and with the idea of giving us a timely service.

Only in these days has it become possible to prepare a book of this type. Formerly, in many countries, the statistical yearbooks were published only after years of delay. In some countries none are published, or, if published, include misinformation because of the lack of official organization for collecting the material. In the last ten years this situation has been modified, and at present we have already in some of the Latin-American republics yearbooks with all the necessary characteristics of accuracy, timeliness, and comprehensiveness.

Obviously, not all the figures have the same accuracy. Figures about international trade may be controlled by the customs, and those about public finance, banking, and monetary systems may be checked; but the census of population cannot present the same accuracy. The same is true of information about social developments, in which the calculations must be made on the basis of scientific estimations.

The editors must confront all these difficulties and overcome them, as in many other publications of the League of Nations, the International Labour Office, the Pan American Union, the Pan-American Sanitary Bureau, and the Department of Commerce of the United States. All those books have been a source of information for the editors and a very great help.

The *Inter-American Statistical Yearbook* is a necessary reference work and one to have great importance in the future. But it would have been a better plan to have published editions in each of the four languages—Spanish, English, Portuguese, and French—in order to reduce the format and make the book more popular. The present publication in one single volume of the same text in the four languages makes the book so heavy, and expensive, as to discourage the prospective reader. Furthermore, we feel that it should be sufficient to print the book in the three main languages of this hemisphere: English, Spanish, and Portuguese. The tremendous importance and help of books like the *Statements Yearbook* or of the *World Almanac* is due to the fact that they are handbooks, notwithstanding the tremendous amount of information they contain. The increasing collaboration among

American countries makes it imperative that the man on the street be able to handle at any time the vital statistics of all of our nations.

GERMÁN ARCINIEGAS

Mills College

The Japanese in South America. By J. F. NORMANO and ANTONELLO GERBI. New York: John Day Co. (under the auspices of the International Secretariat, Institute of Pacific Relations, in co-operation with the Latin American Economic Institute), 1943. Pp. x+135. \$1.75.

Aside from a sketchy introductory chapter on Japanese migration to and trade with both Central and South American countries, the work, despite its title, is concerned exclusively with Brazil and Peru, the two countries which contain all but 9,000 of South America's Japanese population of 201,000. Both Normano's essay on Brazil and Gerbi's on Peru are concerned for the most part with problems of Japanese immigration and Japanese trade. It can hardly be said that these cover more than a fraction of the total Japanese problem in South America, considered sociologically, politically, or economically.

Within the limits of the statistical data available, both authors have done a creditable job. Both have been conscious of the inadequacy of their materials and circumspect in making final judgments. Almost every conclusion must be withheld when, to take the extreme example, one of two official figures shows the value of Peruvian exports to Japan as more than twice the other. More emphasis might have properly been placed on (1) methodological problems and (2) criticism and evaluation of data.

Normano describes the early encouragement of Japanese immigration to Brazil by both countries, the organization of the Japanese settlements in both central and northern sections of the country, and their predominantly agricultural economy and extreme self-sufficiency. He also writes briefly of the course of anti-Japanese sentiment and of the peculiar wartime position of the minority group. Gerbi, in a longer essay on the far less complex situation in Peru, traces early migration in some detail, reviewing with interesting results the theory that Incas originally came from Japan. He

points out that the Japanese in Peru (more like the Chinese in America) have turned largely to retail trade, personal service, and small industry rather than to agriculture. He discusses Peruvian restrictions on Japanese trade and immigration, trade restrictions being partly the result of pressure by English competitors.

Normano's description of the tightly knit communities of Japanese in Brazil brings to mind interesting parallels to the so-called "little Tokyo's" on our own Pacific Coast. The Brazilian communities are more isolated, physically and culturally, than any in the United States ever were. Normano speculates, on the basis of this isolation, that both Japanese immigration and trade "may well have been intended to fulfill other than purely economic functions" and "the immense Japanese concessions . . . may have been intended as a springboard for aggression by air." Similarly, Gerbi states: "The ordinary Peruvian knows that most Japanese are ready to sacrifice themselves for their fatherland. He knows they all are imbued with the traditional ideals of fanatical patriotism and devotion to the Emperor."

These statements may be true. But no statistical data, or case history, or record of any kind is brought forward in substantiation. They are a type of a priori assertion that social scientists should avoid.

MORTON GRODZINS

University of California

Brazil under Vargas. By KARL LOEWENSTEIN. New York: Macmillan Co., 1942. Pp. xiii + 361. \$2.75.

Karl Loewenstein's book would make valuable complementary reading for sociologists who have also read Donald Pierson's *Negroes in Brazil*. Pierson deals with race and class relations between Negroes, mulattoes, and "whites" in Bahia and touches only slightly upon other aspects of Brazilian life as well as upon race and class relations in other parts of Brazil. Karl Loewenstein deals with Brazilian life as a whole. He presents himself as a "constitutional lawyer . . . compelled to convert himself into the sociological analyst who is as much interested in how political processes are operated as in judicial blueprints lifted from the statute book." In five chapters—"The Heritage of the Past," "The Constitution of the Estado Novo,"

"The Defense of the State under the Vargas Regime," "Public Opinion Management and the Dynamics of Social Life under Vargas," and "The Balance Sheet of the Regime"—he gives a well-rounded picture of an authoritarian but not totalitarian regime. Chapter iv should be of special interest to social psychologists and chapter iii to those sociologists who specialize in race and culture contacts. It is especially chapter iii which complements Pierson by focusing attention upon the major minority problem of Brazil—which is not the Negro but the vigorous German minority in Santa Catarina and Rio Grande do Sul. Unfortunately, Loewenstein does not mention at all the role the Negro is playing in Brazilian life, just as Pierson neglects any other phenomenon but Negro-white relationships. Yet this reviewer would throw out the suggestion that the "liberal" attitude of Brazilians toward culturally assimilable mulattoes and Negroes might stand in close correlation to the difficulties they are facing from their culturally more conscious German and Japanese minorities. The fact, related by Loewenstein, that a North Brazilian, that is to say, largely colored, army unit has been stationed in Blumenau would seem to throw light on the interconnectedness of the two major phenomena of race and culture contact in Brazil. Holding this together with Pierson's admission that there is a considerable amount of anti-Negro feeling in southern Brazil, the conclusion offers itself that this feeling indicates a nationality rather than a race conflict. Taking one more step, one might then come to wonder whether a device such as using colored troops as agents of forced Brazilianization in a district chiefly inhabited by Germans will not inflame opposition rather than quench it. Furthermore, the question comes up whether oppression of cultural symbols, especially language, along with the oppression of subversive political activities, will break up group cohesion or whether it will tend to fortify it. It is along these lines that further research should be valuable.

WERNER J. CAHNMAN

Fisk University

Brothers under the Skin. By CAREY MCWILLIAMS. Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1943. Pp. 325. \$3.00.

McWilliams militantly upholds the thesis that we in the United States cannot continue

to treat the problem of each of our colored minorities in isolation from those of the others. In the past we have allowed each region which had such a minority not only to deal with it in its own way but to dictate to the country at large—in varying measure—the national policy with respect to the given minority. This has been so, he maintains, even when our relations with other nations have been at stake.

The groups dealt with are the “colored” elements of the American population—the Indians, the Mexicans, the Chinese, the Japanese, the Negroes, and several smaller groups. The author presents a brief history of each group, its present economic and social situation—especially as affected by the war—the relation of each to the others, and the national problems involved and the manner in which each is inextricably bound to international problems. The Indian and the Mexican in our midst complicate our relations with Latin America; the Chinese and Japanese, our relations with the Orient; the Negroes, our relations with all the “colored” peoples of the world.

McWilliams does not claim to make a contribution to the theory of race relations; in fact, he is rather impatient with the great expenditure of money and effort upon study of race relations without equivalent effort in action. But he demonstrates a very wide and thorough knowledge of such study and has, in fact, made a contribution to comparative study of race relations by showing, as he does, the similarities between the patterns of relations which have grown up between the dominating “whites” and each of the colored minorities in this country.

On the practical front it is to be hoped that his attack upon a subtle and insidious form of isolationism will have some effect. I refer to the isolationism which consists in believing that each of our race problems can be dealt with locally without national repercussions and nationally without international repercussions. The conclusion is, of course, not to abstain from attempts at local solution but to make those local solutions contribute accumulatively to larger solutions.

EVERETT C. HUGHES

University of Chicago

Jews in Spain: Their Social, Political, and Cultural Life during the Middle Ages. By ABRA-

HAM A. NEUMAN. 2 vols. Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society of America, 1942. Pp. xxxi+286; xi+339. \$2.50 each.

The author calls this work “a social-cultural study.” Emphasis is placed upon the institutions, laws, and customs of the Jews in Christian (not in Moslem) Spain in the thirteenth and fourteenth, and partly in the fifteenth, centuries. In Volume I the author deals with such topics as the role of the Jews in the administration of taxes, forms of Jewish self-government, economic conditions, and monetary institutions in general; in Volume II he deals with moral conditions, marriage customs, family life, education, and charities; he closes with a detailed treatment of relations between Jews and Christians and between the Jews and the king. The whole work is well written and based on good though somewhat restricted sources and amply annotated. It is a welcome sign of the growing recognition among Jewish scholars of the necessity of re-writing Jewish history as a social rather than a literary history and of laying more and more emphasis upon the dispassionate description of Jewish-gentile relations. But the step from a social history to a sociological interpretation has still to be taken. It must be realized that Jewish-gentile relations are mutual and, therefore, cannot be understood if judged from a Jewish point of view only. Finally, the comparison in the Preface between old Spain and modern Germany calls for a rejection. It is certainly unwarranted to say that “the ghosts of medievalism have been fantastically brought to life in Germany” after 1933. Rather the opposite is true: the last remnants of medieval self-government have been destroyed.

WERNER J. CAHNMAN

Fisk University

The Jew and His Language Problem. By DAVID GOLDBLATT. New York, 1943. Privately published. Pp. 202.

The thesis that the Jewish people cannot survive the death of Yiddish is advanced in this book. Mr. Goldblatt upholds Yiddish as the product of eight centuries of Jewish life and hence a part of the “Jewish soul.” He says that many of the great Jewish rabbis of the last four hundred years have come from Yiddish-speaking homes. Not only does the retention

of Yiddish serve as an antidote for "Reform Judaism"—the acceptance of Christianity—but it also acts as the strongest barrier to intermarriage between Jews and non-Jews, since intermarriage is "detestable" to the Yiddish-speaking group (p. 27). He further maintains that the Jewish "tenacity to life" is in large measure due to the retention of Yiddish and its associated traditions.

In succeeding chapters the author speaks convincingly of the importance of Yiddish as a living language. Far from considering it merely a dialect of German, he sees it as a richly expressive European tongue, having a distinct individuality and capable of indefinite expansion to keep pace with modern times. In its flexibility, he claims, Yiddish is in striking contrast to Hebrew, which, though poetically beautiful, cannot be adapted to the age of the printing press and the scientific laboratory.

In the United States, the author feels, the problem of the lack of understanding between the Yiddish immigrant generation and their American-born children could be solved by teaching Yiddish in the Jewish schools, by encouraging the speaking of Yiddish in homes where parents do not understand English as well as their children do, and by publishing standard books of reference in the Yiddish language.

The author's assumptions lead him to divide the peoples of the Western world into two groups: "the Jews"—inspiration of the world, from whom all that is best in civilization has sprung—and "the Aryans"—what is left. These unfortunate deductions, representing another version of the Aryan-Jewish racial dichotomy so ardently championed by Adolph Hitler, are the worst features of the book. From the scientific viewpoint, the best that can be said about the volume is that it calls attention to the little-known problem of the relation between language use and the assimilation of minority groups. From the popular standpoint, the book is to be praised for encouraging the study of Yiddish not only as a useful modern language but as a rich storehouse of Jewish culture.

GEORGE C. BARKER

University of Chicago

The Canadian Born in the United States. By LEON E. TRUESDELL. ("Relations of Canada

and United States Series.") New Haven: Yale University Press, 1943. Pp. xvi+263. \$3.00.

Dr. Truesdell traces the contribution of Canadian immigration to American growth from 1850 to 1930. Every category of the census classification is covered for English and French-Canadian born and for second-generation Canadian stock, including age, sex, patterns of settlement, rural and urban distribution, citizenship, marital status, literacy, occupation, home tenure, and size of family, which are tabulated and cross-tabulated for the United States, for states, and for selected counties and are excellently illustrated by maps and charts. In addition, many comparative data are presented from Canadian sources, which are set against similar materials from other countries furnishing large-scale immigration to this country.

While the major object of Dr. Truesdell's analysis is to bring together all census statistics bearing on Canadian born and Canadian stock in the United States, his data have interest beyond mere enumeration. The fact that the first and second generation of Canadian origin in this country in 1931 exceeded one-third of the Canadian population at that date illustrates the enormous drain of the United States on Canada. Only Ireland and Norway had larger proportions of their population in the United States. A revealing glimpse of the effects of ethnic interaction appears in data on Canadian literacy. While 47.2 per cent of French-Canadians in 1931 had learned English, only 3.7 per cent of the English-Canadians had learned French. For the province of Quebec, where the French are dominant, the percentages were 39 and 28.7 per cent, respectively. For the rest of Canada other than Quebec the French-Canadian population learning English rises to 81.8 per cent, while the English-Canadian population learning French falls to 1.6 per cent. Practically every section is similarly pregnant of social implication.

JOHN W. BERRY

Eureka College

Modern Japan and Shinto Nationalism. By D. C. HOLTOM. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1943. Pp. x+178. \$2.00.

The present study deals largely with the developments in Shinto since Aston's day, espe-

cially with some of the more recent trends in state Shinto. The author also gives an excellent description of the way in which both Christianity and Buddhism in Japan have been strongly modified during the past decade to conform with some of the basic tenets and practices of state Shinto—stress on patriotism, filial reverence for the imperial family, and bowing before Shinto shrines. There is a final chapter on the overseas expansion of state Shinto, especially as it has been carried to Manchukuo, Korea, and Formosa.

The general thesis of the book is that Shinto, originally a pantheistic body of folk beliefs and practices, has been deliberately molded since 1868 by high government officials to become a unified state religion with strong positive sanctions for emperor reverence (the emperor is the divine father of his people), warrior bravery (through deification of the souls of soldiers who die in battle), and overseas expansion (through theological interpretations of early semihistorical records of the eighth century). The study brings out well the curious fundamental literalness with which passages in the early records (Kojiki and Nihongi) are quoted as historic dogma and used as religious sanctions.

The author makes a careful distinction between state and sect Shinto.

The study is well documented and the thesis is well knit. The only possible exception that can be taken to it is that, in stressing the growth in the state Shinto and Japanese nationalism, the existence of many skeptics in urban middle-class Japan tends to be overlooked and that little is said of the existence of the older forms of popular Shinto in the rural areas where state Shinto is still more the concern of officials and teachers than of the people at large.

JOHN F. EMBREE

University of Toronto

Melanesian Pidgin English: Grammar, Texts, Vocabulary. By ROBERT A. HALL, JR. Baltimore: Linguistic Society of America, 1943. Pp. 159. \$2.50.

This volume is one of the very few, and up to now probably the best, objective description of the grammatical patterns of a language of the pidgin type. Aside from its adequacy by the standards of technical linguistics, the volume raises two points of special interest to the sociologist.

First, there is the question of the nature of the pidgin speech community. Hall raises this question by stating that Melanesian pidgin is a language which has no native speakers. Consequently, he accepts the slightly variant patterns of English and of native Melanesian speakers as being both within the normal range. Bateson, who was one of Hall's informants, disagrees on this point. He believes that pidgin is primarily a lingua franca used by natives of different linguistic groups and that the pidgin spoken by English speakers is an attempt to approximate native speech. That is to say, native speakers of English speak pidgin with a foreign accent. The reviewer is inclined to favor Bateson's attitude on this point.

Second, there is the question of the status of Melanesian pidgin as a language. Most writings on pidgin jocosely describe it as a corrupt or inadequate variety of standard English—in short, as a kind of baby talk. Hall shows clearly that the grammatical patterns, though relatively lacking in complexity, are so internally consistent and so different from those of standard English that pidgin must be considered as a separate language. In other words, the Melanesian no more becomes a childish sort of European by adopting English vocabulary than he does by adopting English food, clothing, or tools. It is the European, not the native, who equates "primitive" with "childish."

The sociological implications of the use of pidgin by English speakers, especially those who were the first to enter the Melanesian area and presumably were largely responsible for originating pidgin, are interesting material for speculation. Could it be, for instance, that speaking pidgin was for these people an escape from even that minimum of disciplined maturity necessary to cope with adult speech, just as adopting the life of a Melanesian trader may have been an escape from the rigors of civilization? If this should be so, the native has spoiled the game, as do some children faced with adults who talk baby talk, by endowing the language with an integrated character which its originators never meant it to have.

A. M. HALPERN

University of Chicago

The Negro's Share: A Study of Income, Consumption, Housing and Public Assistance. By RICHARD STERNER. New York: Harper & Bros., 1943. Pp. xii+433. \$4.50.

Dr. Sterner came with Dr. Myrdal to the United States from Sweden to assist in the study, under the latter's leadership, of the Negro in America, sponsored by the Carnegie Corporation. He has presented in this monograph a careful, detailed analysis of occupation and employment, of family composition, income, and expenditures, and of public relief and welfare services as they apply to Negroes, with comparable material on whites. That the Negro's income is less, his living conditions inferior, and his participation in social welfare programs unequal in view of his greater need—in short, that the Negro's share in goods and services is appreciably less than that of the whites—is attested by copious and at times meticulous statistical evidence. Thirteen pages are required just to list the tables included. The situation depicted is well known to American sociologists, especially to students of race relations. They may, nevertheless, find the book useful as a handy, reliable reference for up-to-date statistics on these matters.

MAURICE R. DAVIE

Yale University

Cultural and Racial Variations in Patterns of Intellect: Performance of Negro and White Criminals on the Bellevue Adult Intelligence Scale. By SOLOMON MACHOVER. ("Teachers College Contributions to Education," No. 875.) New York: Teachers College, Columbia University, 1943. Pp. 91. \$1.60.

Using the Bellevue Adult Intelligence Scale on samples of Negro and white criminals, Machover applied a statistical treatment known as "discriminant function in connection with multiple correlation," for the purpose of discovering if there are different patterns of subtest abilities for northern and southern Negroes, for Negroes and whites, and for criminals and noncriminals. Within the conditions of the material and the method, the project was successful and showed that the cultural differences between northern and southern Negroes produce the greatest contrast in "patterns of intellect" and that criminal versus noncriminal comparison yields less, and Negro-white contrast least of all. There are some interesting ways in which the southern Negroes show superiority to the northern Negroes in some of the subtests.

The tests and the method of study are described fully, and related research is discussed. There is a bibliography of sixty-nine titles related to the field of interest.

ROBERT E. L. FARIS

Syracuse University

Australian Native Policy: Its History Especially in Victoria. By EDMUND J. B. FOXCROFT. Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1941. Pp. 168. \$2.50.

The author discusses the attempts made during the past century to civilize the aborigines of Australia. Some of the experiments were thorough and were entered into with enthusiasm; but, despite the good intentions, the mistaken policies did not prevent the degeneration, decline, and virtual extinction of natives wherever they have come into contact with Europeans. Foxcroft states that the native problem is not a simple one, for the two cultures were incompatible, and, in view of the backwardness of anthropology, an adequate native policy was impossible in the nineteenth century. He concludes that the remaining natives (about one-fourth of the original number) should be isolated until an adequate program can be provided on the basis of scientific study. The treatment is historical and is apparently based upon rather formal data compiled by administrators which does not give insight into the process of transition and cultural change. Nor does the book take account of the native's point of view or his personal or cultural reaction to the policy.

LEWIS C. COPELAND

Fisk University

The Caribbean: Laboratory of World Cooperation. By DEVERE ALLEN. New York: League for Industrial Democracy, 1943. Pp. 40. \$0.15.

This is a vigorously written pamphlet by the editor of the *Nation*, mainly focused around the formation of the Anglo-American Caribbean Commission and the tasks of social reconstruction with which they are confronted. It deals, therefore, not with the Caribbean region as a whole but with the English and American pos-

sessions only and more especially with labor problems in Jamaica, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands, along with the land problem which is so closely connected with it. It is very outspoken in its criticism of economic imperialism and the plantation system. The serious student will appreciate the bibliography at the end, although Lord Olivier's *Jamaica—the Blessed Island* and Rogler's *Comerio: Study of a Puerto Rican Town* are lacking.

WERNER J. CAHNMAN

Fisk University

"Schools of Social Work in Latin America."

Prepared by ROBERT C. JONES. Washington, D.C.: Division of Labor and Social Information, Pan American Union, 1943. Pp. 21. \$0.10.

This mimeographed pamphlet, prepared by Mr. Robert C. Jones for the Pan American Union, gives a general account of the development of schools of social work in Latin America which began with the establishment of Junta Central de Beneficencia in Santiago, Chile, in 1925, and provides a brief description of the twenty-seven schools of social work south of the Rio Grande.

Professional education for social work in Latin America is in general more elementary than in this country. Most of their courses would, in the United States, be the social science courses which we regard as highly important but preprofessional. A better integration of social science material and method with professional courses in school work is highly desirable, and the Latin Americans may show us how to do that; but up to the present their curriculums have been lean in professional content.

R. CLYDE WHITE

University of Chicago

Man and His Habitation. By RADHAKAMAL MUKERJEE. New York: Longmans, Green & Co., 1942. Pp. xv+317. \$3.50.

This book is especially informative on the development, the distribution, and the ecological basis of the villages of India and the transition of villages into towns and cities. The author

glorifies the village as "one of the most enduring and universal collective patterns of living" and claims that more than five-sixths of the world's population lives in villages. Such villages may have up to twenty thousand inhabitants, and the author rightly suggests that mere number is not an adequate distinction between village and town or city; machine industry with increased physical and social mobility is more important. He suggests ecological planning of the *region*, consisting of the central city, the subsidiary towns, and the agricultural villages. The book is a valuable contribution to urban economics and sociology but is opinionated in its contrast between the "moral country and the wicked city." The author himself (p. 224) advises caution on this point.

GEORGE S. WEHRWEIN

University of Wisconsin

Married Woman's Bill of Rights. By NATHANIEL FISHMAN. With an Introduction by DOROTHY KENYON. New York: Liveright Publishing Corp., 1943. Pp. xiii+282. \$2.50.

A book dealing with legal problems and bearing an expression of Dorothy Kenyon's approval is taken up with confidence that the law will have been intelligently and honestly examined and presented. The reader is sure that there will be nothing of the specious pretentiousness of Blackstone's misrepresentation in 1763, when he wrote complacently that "so great a favorite hath the female sex ever been with the laws of England," after just having shown how under the law prevailing at that time marriage had the effect of reducing a married woman to a legal nonentity except for the purpose of continuing the title to real property for the sake of transferring it to the heir. Personal property, except paraphernalia, and the management of real property passed at once on marriage to the husband. To be sure, if the wife survived the husband, she received dower or a life-estate in one-third of his real property; if he survived her, he obtained (provided a child was born alive) "courtesy," or a life-estate in all her real property. Of course, the rich can generally find a way around hard laws, and so the courts of equity devised procedures for making husbands

assume obligations in order to enjoy equitable rights; but only the rich with landed estates got into equity, and for other women marriage wiped out acting capacity, including the right of access to her children. Such law was of feudal origin and wholly unsuited to American conditions, and the able men of New York had no hesitation in initiating change, just as the fair-minded fathers in Virginia rejected the principles of primogeniture, which preferred the eldest son and any son to any daughter.

Mr. Fishman had a good time writing the book, and it should find wide use in those colleges in which are given courses on family law as well as by women's clubs studying family problems and by schools of social work in whose curriculums attention is given to questions of adoption, illegitimacy, and the effect of mental disease on acting capacity. From the point of view of current concern perhaps the last chapter, which is devoted to citizenship, is most pertinent. In this chapter the author reviews the so-called "Cable Acts" and expresses great confidence in the influence of women under the authorities bestowed by those acts on the future relationships between and among nations. It is not surprising when he has had the benefit of Miss Kenyon's council that the author cherishes confident hope as to the effect of women's influence, and it is likewise to be profoundly and sincerely hoped that his confidence in the effect of women's participation in community development may be found, as the years go by, to be justified.

S. P. BRECKINRIDGE

University of Chicago

Radio and the Printed Page: An Introduction to the Study of Radio and its Role in the Communication of Ideas. By PAUL F. LAZARFELD. New York: Duell, Sloan & Pearce, 1943. Pp. xxii+354. \$4.00.

This is a statement of the diverse roles of print and the radio by an uncommonly resourceful and inventive investigator. Sixty tables, each one reporting an enormous amount of conscientious research, supply the answers to all sorts of questions. The work is a Baedeker to the world of radio listeners, their income, age, sex, where they live, and what they say about books and radio programs. The inquiry is ad-

ressed to people who hope to use radio in the cause of popular education.

Roughly speaking, the American people are divided into readers and listeners. The readers like newspapers and books and a few radio programs that are described as "serious." The listeners, on the other hand, are ill at ease in the world of print. They are the fans; they listen to everything but the programs the readers like. The fans are young, which suggests they adopted the radio early in life and then never acquired facility in reading. But the radio is not so much to be blamed for competing with print as it is to be credited with doing something—a dubious something, perhaps—to widen their world, which print probably would never have done anyway. The best prospects for education by the radio are the marginal listeners who exhibit mild intellectual interests and welcome encouragement and direction.

The knowledge about people that one gains at the end of all this ingenious searching might be described as documented common sense. Much is proved that until now was suspected only, and this will make the book very useful. Yet, to get new insight into communication, research must begin a layer deeper, on analytical and conceptual ground. It would begin with a profounder analysis of the central ideas—the conception of the "serious" and the "popular." If the serious and the popular were described in terms other than themselves—probably by use of the concept of "the public"—many of the facts so painstakingly established would show new relationships with one another; and that is the beginning of new knowledge. In the course of such an analysis the tormenting task of setting up significant categories for classifying radio programs and newspaper items would probably solve itself.

HELEN MACGILL HUGHES

Chicago

Social Thought among the Early Greeks. By JOSEPH GITTLER. Athens, Ga.: University of Georgia Press, 1941. Pp. xii+272.

Gittler's book is essentially an anthology, interspersed with chapter introductions and brief explanatory comment, and with a short general Introduction of seventeen pages. There are some appendixes, made necessary by the

fact that no selections from the social thought of Plato, Aristotle, and the Hellenistic age are included. Twenty pages of notes are given, and virtually all of these are bibliographical or explanatory—they are in no sense critical. A good index of both names and subjects is provided.

No reviewer is at liberty to take an author to task for failing to write the book which the reviewer would like to have seen written. The most that can be done is to evaluate the author's achievement in terms of the goal he has set himself. From this standpoint it must be said that, as an anthology taking in a reasonable number of the better-known Greek writers, the book is fairly successful. Even an anthology, however, must be understood by the reader, and it is here that Gittler falls short. He says in his Introduction that he has "kept the sociology-of-knowledge method in mind in presenting this study." He then hastens to say that "no attempt was made to go all the way with the sociology-of-knowledge method." No one could expect him to go all the way, but one might expect him to keep the method obviously in mind. There is no real sociology of knowledge in the book. This is a hard saying, but let the reader compare it with the writings of Glotz, Gernet, Winspear, Landsberg, or even the outmoded Jowett, and the deficiency will be striking. There is not only a lack of analysis of the sophists and metics but also no attention is given to the major ideological cleavages of Dorism and Ionism. Further, struggles of caste and class, although mentioned here and there, are quite inadequately represented. Further, the radical exponents of natural law as opposed to convention do not appear; Antiphon, for example, is conspicuous by his absence, although a part of the Attic age (why so serious an omission?). Adequate reference to him, as in Ranul's book, for example, would necessarily have brought in many of the considerations of sociology of knowledge; explicit reference to the method, in this case, would not have been necessary.

As to sociology-of-knowledge method, it is all too apparent that Gittler's acquaintance with it is limited to the Mannheim school. The far more significant work done by the French in this field has been totally ignored. Perhaps this should not be taken too much amiss, for current American discussion centers around Mannheim so exclusively that Gittler may be pardoned for following the prevailing fashion.

There is no question that the topic chosen is of vital significance; instead of running after the Zuni and the Kwakiutl, we can learn much more that is significant if we study the antecedents of our own civilization. As one of the first works by an American sociologist in this field, *Social Thought among the Early Greeks* deserves close attention and wide use—if only we remember that it is subject to all the limitations of a pioneer venture.

HOWARD BECKER

University of Wisconsin

American Agriculture, 1899-1939: A Study of Output, Employment and Productivity. By HAROLD BARGER and HANS H. LANDSBERG. ("Publications of the National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.," No. 42.) New York: National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc., 1942. Pp. 435+54 tables+charts+4 appendixes. \$3.00.

This volume is essentially a commentary on the agricultural census from 1899 to 1939, a span which is divided at mid-point into two dissimilar periods over which the authors lay a pattern of trends. They describe the trends of agriculture as a whole and of the crops separately and assemble the data conveniently in tabular form and in charts. This is well done, although, for the most part, the going is heavy.

When the authors attempt to draw conclusions, the frequent apologies for the census data (well founded, to be sure) and the "ifs," "buts," and assumptions (not too well founded, perhaps) leave this reviewer with an uneasy feeling regarding the appearance of verity, adorned with the trappings of statistics. One feels at the conclusion that he has received Gobbo's instructions to "turn down indirectly into the Jew's house."

One interesting feature of the volume is an extensive note by one of the directors of the bureau who takes the authors over the jumps. Anyone using the book critically will be well advised to read this note first. It contains this paragraph:

My judgment is that the last chapter of this book—the argument and conclusions—is subject to three serious kinds of weakness in respect of scientific method. In what follows I am concerned, first, with the validity of the methods used by these authors in deriving their conclusions, and, second, with the

presentation of a different approach, of apparently equal propriety, which leads to precisely opposite conclusions. In the light of the first I conclude that the conclusions presented in the last chapter are opinions, rather than scientific forecasts; in the light of the second I conclude that one opinion is as good as the other.

RUSSELL H. ANDERSON

Museum of Science and Industry
Chicago, Illinois

A Short History of Civilization. By HENRY S. LUCAS. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc., 1943. Pp. ix+994. \$4.50.

This volume, designed as an elementary survey course of lectures, brings fresh vigor and enthusiasm to bear upon that none too easy task of stirring the Freshman mind to thought. Avoiding the dreary convention of merely cataloguing names and events, it seeks to drive home the lesson that culture, regarded as "a common way of living and thinking," in the last analysis depends upon how man conceives his "nature, purpose and mission." Religious beliefs, artistic achievements, and scientific thought are therefore kept in the foreground, while the background is painted in terms of economic and technological progress, with politics taking a secondary place. Thus it is shown how developments in horse-breeding, and consequent improvement in communications and the mobility of armies, made possible the rise of the greater ancient empires of the Middle East. The eighteen chapters dealing with primitive and ancient cultures admirably co-ordinate historical and anthropological teaching and form the best-balanced section of the book. In the treatment of the last three centuries so much stress is laid upon scientific and philosophical thought and its impact upon religious faith that there is little space left for analysis of the actual social effects of shifting values. The few pages devoted to modern political problems are tentative and ambiguous.

SYLVIA L. THRUPP

University of British Columbia

Men of Substance: A Study of the Thought of Two English Revolutionaries. By W. K. JORDAN. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1942. Pp. x+283. \$3.00.

This volume, by the author of *The Development of Religious Toleration in England*, somewhat fills the gap in our knowledge of significant theorists just preceding Hobbes and Harrington. The two "men of substance," Henry Parker and Henry Robinson, were representatives of a responsible landed gentry and a rich merchant class, respectively, both deeply concerned with the issues of England's civil war. In their religious thought, Parker was Erastian, Robinson against any sort of national church and for complete freedom of belief and organization; both were anticlerical and particularly hot against the arrogance and rigidity of the Presbyterians. In their political theory, both saw Parliament as the emergent holder of sovereignty, and Parker, especially, is noteworthy for his anticipation of the doctrine of ministerial responsibility. Both were convinced that England must build her governmental arrangements on the requirements of the new merchant class; and here Robinson is convincing in his arguments for a thoroughly planned economic life and very forward-looking in his advocacy of free trade, a national bank, merchant courts, employment exchanges, and many measures now called "social services." They were both, as the author says of one, "early and significant harbinger[s] of modernity," not at all nostalgic for the past but full of energy for shaping a new world.

The volume is a piece of thorough scholarship and, at the same time, good reading.

GLADYS BRYSON

Smith College

Kaiser Wakes the Doctors. By PAUL DE KRUIF. New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1943. Pp. 158. \$2.00.

Kaiser Wakes the Doctors is a work with a purpose. The message of this little book is that Americans, without government subsidies, can provide adequate medical care for themselves through a voluntary insurance system. The history and operations of the group medical insurance plan now in use by the Kaiser enterprises is presented as a model which may be followed by other industries and even by nonindustrial communities.

A sociologist, interested in controlling human behavior, might like to know a little more about the methods whereby the Kaiser medical

plan was presented to the workers and accepted by them before they could have had extensive firsthand experiences with its advantages. Dr. De Kruif, however, is not writing for sociologists. He is pointing out to the people of the United States a way in which the benefits of modern medical science may be made available to all of them at a nominal cost. (The Kaiser workers actually paid seven cents a day.)

Prepaid medicine, as De Kruif is careful to indicate, is not "socialized" or "government-subsidized medicine." It is medicine for and by the people.

Because *Kaiser Wakes the Doctors* is really a tract dealing with an important problem of our society, and because it presents one solution to the problem it poses, it is to be hoped that this book will have a wide general circulation.

ETHEL SHANAS

Chicago

The Road We Are Traveling, 1914-1942: Guide Lines to America's Future as Reported to the Twentieth Century Fund. By STUART CHASE. New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1942. Pp. 106. \$1.00.

The Twentieth Century Fund has embarked on a series of exploratory reports on post-war problems. Stuart Chase, in this readable little volume, is supposed to explore "basic issues and fundamental trends." The idea to start post-war planning with an analysis of the pre-war developments and of the forthcoming trends is a very commendable one indeed. But the way this fundamental job is tackled here is not only extremely dilettantish but actually misleading and can only serve specific propaganda purposes.

The major part of the book is devoted to a survey of economic and social history from 1914 to 1942. It takes a prolific writer with few inhibitions to make such an attempt, and on a world-wide scale at that, in some ten thousand words. It presents the pre-New Deal era as a rotten system bound for disaster, and the New Deal, although without "considered philosophy behind it" (p. 45), as the final solution. Without discussion, the current arguments in favor of the New Deal are taken for granted, and, what is worse, they are offered as the outstanding "trends" of the period under review. No attempt is made to distinguish between

"trends" brought about by emergencies and temporary in nature and others. The result is a *mixtum compositum* of predominant facts and wishful ideas, all marshaled for the purpose of providing the basis, at the end of the book, of an open propaganda for the benefit of economic and social *planning*, in the sense of that word in which its political protagonists use it at present.

MELCHIOR PALYI

Chicago

Guide to Life and Literature of the Southwest. By J. FRANK DOBIE. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1943. Pp. 111. \$1.00.

This is a selected, annotated bibliography of life and literature of the Southwest, the bibliography of a course of that title which Dobie teaches in the University of Texas. The best part of the far too short volume is the Introduction, which gives evidence of Dobie's intense love for the area. The classification is topical under such titles as "Indian Culture," "The Santa Fe Trail," "Pony Express," "Mining and Oil." The volume is weakest in the section on fiction. There seem to be no provincialisms in the area, no distinction between cattle range and pueblo country, and no coastal plain versus canyon country. But the volume is so genuine, so unpretentious, that no one has the right of criticism. It is what it is, refreshing and a hugely valuable addition to American bibliography. One likes the book and the author.

RODERICK PEATTIE

Man and Resources in the Middle Rio Grande Valley. By A. G. HARPER, A. R. CORDOVA, and K. OBERG. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1943. Pp. 134. \$2.25.

This too brief volume contains an extraordinary number of facts. Shorn of literary effort, it is packed with details. It is the story of the area most continuously farmed in our country, a land of three cultures—Indian, Spanish, and Anglo-American. The facts of soil erosion are as stark as the mesquite hills. Here are geography, economics, and sociology intimately related. The latter part of the book is

constructive. The intricate problems are being intelligently approached. Be it noted that the problems are physical and economic, not ethnic. The book should be widely read for its lessons in democracy as well as in conservation.

RODERICK PEATTIE

Problems of a Changing Social Order. By JOHN M. GILLETTE and JAMES M. REINHARDT. New York: American Book Co., 1942. Pp. xiv+824.

This is a concrete, factual, and elementary text on social problems based on an earlier book—*Current Social Problems*—by the same authors. The present volume is divided into six major parts. The first part, introductory in character, is followed by nine chapters on geographic, economic, and population phenomena. Six chapters are given to the discussion of health and its preservation, four to problems of race and immigration, and three to family and child welfare. The final section on social control includes chapters on public opinion, crime, alcoholism, and domestic and international order.

E. B. REUTER

State University of Iowa

Levels of Integration in Biological and Social Systems. Edited by ROBERT REDFIELD. ("Biological Symposia," Vol. VIII.) Lancaster, Pa.: Jacques Cattell Press, 1942. Pp. vi+240. \$2.50.

This volume contains a collection of papers prepared for the fiftieth anniversary celebration of the University of Chicago in September, 1941. The total program, of three sessions, grew out of plans for separate programs by biologists and sociologists, who discovered, when these plans were well advanced, that the seven papers planned for the biologists' program and the four planned for the social scientists' program were all concerned with one aspect or another of the question, "How are parts constituted into wholes throughout the range of life-forms?" This question is attacked from the standpoint of the organization of cells into the body of a metazoan organism, from that of "animal societies," and from that of the student of human societies, primitive and modern.

The average sociologist, if there be such a person, will doubtless be most interested in

R. H. Lowie's paper, "The Societies of Primitive Man," and R. E. Park's "Modern Society"; and, next to these, his attention will be drawn to the other two papers originally planned for the social science program, "Basic Comparisons of Human and Insect Societies," by Alfred E. Emerson, and "Societies of Monkeys and Apes," by C. R. Carpenter. He will discover, however, that Robert Redfield, who edited the volume, has written for it a most excellent and illuminating Introduction, in which he has skillfully pointed out how each of the papers contributes to the general theme, and from this Introduction the reader may be led to examine the earlier papers more carefully than he had at first intended. What the biologists' contributions to this symposium tend to reveal is, not only the ways in which animal societies resemble and are different from human societies, but how much the body of a many-celled animal resembles a society made up of separate organisms. The comparison of a society to an organism, after a period in which it was strongly deprecated, by sociologists at least, seems to be enjoying something of a renaissance, initiated, perhaps, by the publications of C. M. Child, who is cited by several of the contributors to the present volume. Students of human society will doubtless continue to differ greatly among themselves as to the stimulus they seem to derive from the organic analogy, but surely those who do find it stimulating are entitled to make what use they can of ideas suggested to them in this way.

It may be that, as the reviewer once heard Sapir remark, what such comparative studies as these help us to see is just what the fundamental possibilities of structure in living matter are; and such possibilities, once known, may be as relevant to the problems of the sociologists as to those of the physiologist or anatomist.

FLOYD N. HOUSE

University of Virginia

Slaves Need No Leaders. By WALTER M. KOT-SCHNIG. New York: Oxford University Press, 1943. Pp. xv+284. \$2.75.

Dr. Kotschnig has undertaken the staggering task of "answering the Fascist challenge to education." His book is divided into two parts; the first deals with the history of European and American education since the end of World War

sessions only and more especially with labor problems in Jamaica, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands, along with the land problem which is so closely connected with it. It is very outspoken in its criticism of economic imperialism and the plantation system. The serious student will appreciate the bibliography at the end, although Lord Olivier's *Jamaica—the Blessed Island* and Rogler's *Comerio: Study of a Puerto Rican Town* are lacking.

WERNER J. CAHNMAN

Fisk University

"Schools of Social Work in Latin America."

Prepared by ROBERT C. JONES. Washington, D.C.: Division of Labor and Social Information, Pan American Union, 1943. Pp. 21. \$0.10.

This mimeographed pamphlet, prepared by Mr. Robert C. Jones for the Pan American Union, gives a general account of the development of schools of social work in Latin America which began with the establishment of Junta Central de Beneficencia in Santiago, Chile, in 1925, and provides a brief description of the twenty-seven schools of social work south of the Rio Grande.

Professional education for social work in Latin America is in general more elementary than in this country. Most of their courses would, in the United States, be the social science courses which we regard as highly important but preprofessional. A better integration of social science material and method with professional courses in school work is highly desirable, and the Latin Americans may show us how to do that; but up to the present their curriculums have been lean in professional content.

R. CLYDE WHITE

University of Chicago

Man and His Habitation. By RADHAKAMAL MUKERJEE. New York: Longmans, Green & Co., 1942. Pp. xv+317. \$3.50.

This book is especially informative on the development, the distribution, and the ecological basis of the villages of India and the transition of villages into towns and cities. The author

glorifies the village as "one of the most enduring and universal collective patterns of living" and claims that more than five-sixths of the world's population lives in villages. Such villages may have up to twenty thousand inhabitants, and the author rightly suggests that mere number is not an adequate distinction between village and town or city; machine industry with increased physical and social mobility is more important. He suggests ecological planning of the *region*, consisting of the central city, the subsidiary towns, and the agricultural villages. The book is a valuable contribution to urban economics and sociology but is opinionated in its contrast between the "moral country and the wicked city." The author himself (p. 224) advises caution on this point.

GEORGE S. WEHRWEIN

University of Wisconsin

Married Woman's Bill of Rights. By NATHANIEL FISHMAN. With an Introduction by DOROTHY KENYON. New York: Liveright Publishing Corp., 1943. Pp. xiii+282. \$2.50.

A book dealing with legal problems and bearing an expression of Dorothy Kenyon's approval is taken up with confidence that the law will have been intelligently and honestly examined and presented. The reader is sure that there will be nothing of the specious pretentiousness of Blackstone's misrepresentation in 1763, when he wrote complacently that "so great a favorite hath the female sex ever been with the laws of England," after just having shown how under the law prevailing at that time marriage had the effect of reducing a married woman to a legal nonentity except for the purpose of continuing the title to real property for the sake of transferring it to the heir. Personal property, except paraphernalia, and the management of real property passed at once on marriage to the husband. To be sure, if the wife survived the husband, she received dower or a life-estate in one-third of his real property; if he survived her, he obtained (provided a child was born alive) "courtesy," or a life-estate in all her real property. Of course, the rich can generally find a way around hard laws, and so the courts of equity devised procedures for making husbands

assume obligations in order to enjoy equitable rights; but only the rich with landed estates got into equity, and for other women marriage wiped out acting capacity, including the right of access to her children. Such law was of feudal origin and wholly unsuited to American conditions, and the able men of New York had no hesitation in initiating change, just as the fair-minded fathers in Virginia rejected the principles of primogeniture, which preferred the eldest son and any son to any daughter.

Mr. Fishman had a good time writing the book, and it should find wide use in those colleges in which are given courses on family law as well as by women's clubs studying family problems and by schools of social work in whose curriculums attention is given to questions of adoption, illegitimacy, and the effect of mental disease on acting capacity. From the point of view of current concern perhaps the last chapter, which is devoted to citizenship, is most pertinent. In this chapter the author reviews the so-called "Cable Acts" and expresses great confidence in the influence of women under the authorities bestowed by those acts on the future relationships between and among nations. It is not surprising when he has had the benefit of Miss Kenyon's council that the author cherishes confident hope as to the effect of women's influence, and it is likewise to be profoundly and sincerely hoped that his confidence in the effect of women's participation in community development may be found, as the years go by, to be justified.

S. P. BRECKINRIDGE

University of Chicago

Radio and the Printed Page: An Introduction to the Study of Radio and its Role in the Communication of Ideas. By PAUL F. LAZARSFELD. New York: Duell, Sloan & Pearce, 1943. Pp. xxii+354. \$4.00.

This is a statement of the diverse roles of print and the radio by an uncommonly resourceful and inventive investigator. Sixty tables, each one reporting an enormous amount of conscientious research, supply the answers to all sorts of questions. The work is a Baedeker to the world of radio listeners, their income, age, sex, where they live, and what they say about books and radio programs. The inquiry is ad-

ressed to people who hope to use radio in the cause of popular education.

Roughly speaking, the American people are divided into readers and listeners. The readers like newspapers and books and a few radio programs that are described as "serious." The listeners, on the other hand, are ill at ease in the world of print. They are the fans; they listen to everything but the programs the readers like. The fans are young, which suggests they adopted the radio early in life and then never acquired facility in reading. But the radio is not so much to be blamed for competing with print as it is to be credited with doing something—a dubious something, perhaps—to widen their world, which print probably would never have done anyway. The best prospects for education by the radio are the marginal listeners who exhibit mild intellectual interests and welcome encouragement and direction.

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HELEN MACGILL HUGHES

Chicago

Social Thought among the Early Greeks. By JOSEPH GITTTLER. Athens, Ga.: University of Georgia Press, 1941. Pp. xii+272.

Gittler's book is essentially an anthology, interspersed with chapter introductions and brief explanatory comment, and with a short general Introduction of seventeen pages. There are some appendixes, made necessary by the

I, while the second is devoted to a consideration of the problems of reconstruction in the post-war period.

Although the first part is necessarily brief in its description of the main educational developments of Britain, France, the United States, Russia, Germany, and Italy since 1919, it does present for the general reader a valuable survey of the special educational problems that have confronted each of these nations. And it serves, in addition, to illustrate the important differences in tradition and educational purpose that are characteristic of these countries and presents an important aspect of the post-war problem. In discussing the "Fascist war on education," the author has given the most comprehensive account extant of the effect of Nazi occupation on the education of the various conquered countries, relying as he does on the most recent information received by various agencies connected with the respective governments-in-exile.

It is, however, in the second part that Dr. Kotschnig has made a real contribution to the problems of post-war reconstruction. He dismisses at the outset the various proposals of a "Carthaginian peace" and insists that educational reconstruction in continental Europe must effectively banish the previously prevailing provincialism and establish instead an education for an international order. Such an education should recognize differences between nations in terms of the contribution each can make rather than in terms of the nationalist or chauvinist slant of much of pre-war education. In this sense the author calls on educators and students "for active participation in international affairs in a spirit of understanding and compassion."

It is impossible to list here the concrete proposals which Dr. Kotschnig submits beyond stating in general that all indicate his well-known competence in the special educational problems of the European nations and of the United States, as well as his realistic understanding of the sociopsychological problems involved. It is unfortunate, however, that he has confined the latter discussion in large part to a consideration of the "middle class" instead of differentiating between the social and psychological problems of the various strata of European society. Whenever he addresses problems of this second order, the author seems to have recourse to terms and ideas that are derived from the humanistic tradition of the middle class, a point that should be mentioned despite

the obvious difficulties which stand in the way of a more comprehensive approach. Dr. Kotschnig also indulges in a discussion of the "German national character"; it is disappointing that he should have yielded to the fashion of the times in this respect.

In approaching post-war educational problems, the author advances educational principles that attempt to strike a balance between the dilemma of "progressivism" versus "medievalism" by appealing to the civilizing traditions of western European humanism, with the expectation of finding there the material for the values and beliefs of tomorrow rather than the values themselves. The book was motivated, as the author states at the end, "by the conviction that time is running short." It has the great merit of having put the post-war educational problems squarely within the framework of social reconstruction as a whole. In doing so, the author has confined himself to the discussion of desirable educational policies; he has not attempted to analyze the chances for their adoption.

REINHARD BENDIX

Chicago

The Conflict between the California Indian and White Civilization, Vol. I: *The Indian versus the Spanish Mission*. By S. F. Cook. ("Ibero-Americana," No. 21.) Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1943. Pp. 194. \$2.00. Vol. II: *The Physical and Demographic Reaction of the Nonmission Indians in Colonial and Provincial California*. ("Ibero-Americana," No. 22.) Pp. 55. \$0.50. Vol. III: *The American Invasion, 1848-1870*. ("Ibero-Americana," No. 23.) Pp. 115. \$1.25. Vol. IV: *Trends in Marriage and Divorce since 1850*. ("Ibero-Americana," No. 24.) Pp. 29. \$0.35.

The avowed purpose of Mr. Cook's work is the "examination of the reaction of a primitive human population to a new and disturbing environment" (I, 1), and, as such, the treatise constitutes a study in "human ecology." Evidently an enormous amount of research has gone into the production of the data which concern the main topic, namely, the decline of the California Indian population. The principal factors in this decline are classified into "physical" or "biological" (*passim*), such as casualties due to war and to "social homicide" (III, 9), disease, and dietary change, and into "secondary," "social,"

or "cultural" (*passim*), such as modifications of the labor, sex, punishment, property, language, and religious systems. In view of the historical and statistical character of the work, much space is given to the description of sources (for Vols. I and II, mainly documents in the Bancroft Library of the University of California; for Vol. III, contemporary newspaper files; for Vol. IV, the probate proceedings of the Bureau of Indian Affairs) and to the generally convincing justification of their statistical-speculative use. Although documents that lend themselves to large-area and long-time statistical analysis are scarce, the author has managed to give valuable approximate information concerning the quantitative and, frequently, even the qualitative importance of the factors mentioned. It appears that imported disease was by far the most significant single cause of the tremendous decline of the Indian population.

In the discussion of culture factors, Mr. Cook's theory, drawing heavily on animal ecology, biology, and even chemical kinetics (III, 11-12), appears clumsy and but loosely connected with the documentary analysis it purports to illuminate. The absence of references to modern anthropology and sociology and the failure to utilize such concepts as "acculturation" or "culture change," to mention but two, are striking. Nevertheless, Mr. Cook's work is valuable to the sociologist as a sourcebook for the history of the California Indian. Perhaps the most interesting section deals with the changes in the general labor system, from Indian to Spanish to Anglo-American, and with the analyses of the "communal," "peonage," and "free" types of Indian labor (III, 46-75). The four volumes abound in references to source materials as well as in direct, often vivid, quotations. They contain numerous highly informative tables. A few maps and an index would have helped the reader considerably in orienting himself among the mass of facts unearthed by the author.

KURT H. WOLFF

Chicago

American Words and Ways: Especially for German Americans. By JOHN WHYTE. New York: Viking Press, 1943. Pp. xvi+184. \$2.50.

For a sociologically minded reader the second part of this rather unpretentious publication is of special interest. It deals with "Social Forms

and Social Customs in America" and "Differences in National Characteristics and Temperament." Most of the observations and remarks, formulated in a very detached way, appear to be correct and adequate and will certainly be very helpful as information for cultured immigrants. However, some critical comments are not quite out of place.

First, the author tends sometimes to characterize as specifically "American" certain traits which are rather Anglo-Saxon; this applies, for instance, to the "avoidance of controversial tone" and to the "repressing of deep emotions." On the other hand, certain traits which the author characterizes as specific German are rather generally Continental-European, or at least not specifically German; thus, for instance, "sharing of deep emotions" is as characteristic of the Russians as of Germans, if not more so.

Second, the author does not take sufficiently into account certain elements of false perception which permeate all intergroup relations. In general, we tend to perceive in others certain traits which we overlook in ourselves. Thus, to take an example, "the others" appear to us mostly more "regimented" than we are ourselves. For our own regimentation is usually interiorized and is therefore experienced not as regimentation but rather as "freedom."

Finally, the author seems to overlook a certain moral ambiguity in the process which we call euphemistically "adjustment." He does not realize sufficiently that what from the one side appears as a successful adjustment may appear from the other side as lack of personal integrity, as distortion of the own personality, and sometimes even only as mimicry in order to survive. It would be, therefore, advisable to draw a distinction between a pseudo-adjustment on the level of external behavior and a real adjustment (or maladjustment) on the level of internal attitudes.

Gustav Ichheiser

Coal Dust on the Fiddle: Songs and Stories of the Bituminous Industry. By GEORGE KORSON. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1943. Pp. 460. \$3.50.

Folklore generally grows up in isolated non-industrialized, nonliterate communities whose cultural roots go deep into the soil. Workers in coal mines, living in company houses, have fewer cultural attachments than most peoples. Yet all

isolated groups tend to build a culture of some sort. The coal miners, living in remote settlements, cut off from the rest of the world by poverty and illiteracy as well as by physical distance, and made up in the early days, at least, largely of foreigners, many of them Welsh with a strong tradition of song, have built up a body of beliefs, songs, and ballads highly expressive of life in and around the mines. The ballad-singer who composed ballads on local happenings was an important figure in the community, and he usually enlivened the union meetings. The importance of the union in the camp life of the coal miners is brought out by Mr. Korson, who not only collected the songs and stories (which he arranged by such themes as "Love and Courtship," and "Struggle for a Better Life") but interestingly sketched in the social background which gives them meaning. This volume should be of interest not only to students of popular literature but to all those who wish to gain some insight into the motivations of a little understood group in American life, that of the soft-coal miners.

MARGARET PARK REDFIELD

Chicago

Blood on the Rising Sun. By DOUGLAS GILBERT HARING. Philadelphia: Macrae, Smith & Co., 1943. Pp. xii+235. \$2.50.

Among the many books dealing with the thinking of the Japanese this volume deserves a superior place. It is not an exhaustive history of Japanese life or a journalistic treatment but is, instead, a simply written and penetrating analysis of the Japanese mind. The author shows the central role played by the cult of the Emperor and traces the way in which this cult has been manipulated since the overthrow of the Tokugawa shogunate to become the screen for a calculated program of nationalistic expansion. To the complete obedience of the citizen inculcated by the cult of the Emperor has been added the readiness toward ruthless and "Spartan" behavior imbedded in feudal traditions. The outcome is a psychology of complete allegiance, of ready sacrifice of the person, or unquestioned homage to a totalitarian rule, of an ethnocentric conviction in the supreme destiny of the Japanese, and of a self-justifying ruthlessness. Yet, despite such an apparently tough and unyielding psychology, other tendencies, as the author indicates, have been present in

Japanese thinking. The great interest in Wilsonian democracy after the first World War, the gratitude for foreign relief in 1923, and the expression of liberal thinking by various groups in recent decades suggest that the Japanese national psychology might have been different if the Japanese Exclusion Act had not been enacted and if the great depression of 1929-33 had not occurred. These reflections suggest, also, that there are some lines of thought and feeling which might be nurtured and utilized in the reorganization of Japanese national life along democratic lines.

HERBERT BLUMER

University of Chicago

Personality and Economic Background: A Study of Highly Intelligent Children. By HELEN H. DAVIDSON. New York: King's Crown Press, 1943. Pp. x+189. \$2.25.

The problem of Davidson's study was to discover what differences in highly intelligent children are associated with income level. One hundred and two New York City children were studied, ranging in I.Q. from 120 to over 200. About half were from the Lincoln School, representing higher-income groups, and half from the Speyer School, where those in low-income classes are found. A thorough examination of the variation of measurements of many kinds, according to income, was made through the use of analysis of variance.

The results are too complex to summarize here, but the contrasts were either slight or negligible for the most part. The Rohrschach tests yielded almost entirely negative results. In such matters as political attitudes, type of reading preferred, and things the children would like to buy, there were some income differences; but, on the whole, the differences were small, even though statistically significant.

The author does not claim that her failure to demonstrate more significant differences is proof of their absence. It is likely that more elaborate study would unearth more results, and yet there is not much reason to expect income to be of great importance of itself when many other more effective factors are eliminated.

There is a review of the literature on the problem and a bibliography of 116 items.

ROBERT E. L. FARIS

Syracuse University

Intercultural Education in American Schools, Proposed Objectives and Methods. By WILLIAM E. VICKERY and STEWART G. COLE. New York: Service Bureau for Intercultural Publications (Harper & Bros.), 1943. Pp. 214. \$1.00.

This small volume is the first in a series of manuals for teachers dealing with race relations and problems in America. Certain basic concepts such as culture, prejudice, and acculturation are taken up briefly, but the main body of the work is devoted to a discussion of the responsibility of the schools as leaders in giving education which is genuinely democratic and to the methods for carrying out such education. The problem is dealt with honestly. The position of the Negro is recognized as of paramount importance, but the difficulties of other minority groups are recognized. Along with many other helpful suggestions for interesting students, teachers are urged not to use textbooks but to direct students' attention to concrete materials, preferably taken from the local community. One lack of the present volume is the absence of any reference to autobiographical and other firsthand expressive materials which often serve to give a deeper insight into the attitudes of cultural minorities than comments by outsiders or even than superficial direct contacts. This may be dealt with in one of the other manuals.

MARGARET PARK REDFIELD

Chicago

The Economics of War. By HORST MENDERSHAUSEN. New York: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1943. Pp. xiv+390. \$2.50.

Mendershausen wrote one of the first comprehensive American treatises on war economy in World War II. This writer reviewed the first edition in the *American Journal of Sociology* of January, 1941. At that time there was too much emphasis in European experience in World War I and too little on current American economic developments. The revised edition is streamlined. The plan of the book ("War Potential," "War Economy," "International Economics of War," and "Post-war Economy") is the same. A novel and interesting feature is the discussion of the "war-production cycle" divided into "preparation phase (guns and butter); transition phase (more guns, less butter); total war

phase (guns and dry bread)." The reviewer would have liked to see an adequate treatment of the possibility of post-war inflation in the "post-war" chapter. When discussing population after the war, Mendershausen did not deal with recent changes of great importance, such as deportations and forced labor, which have a deep effect on post-war developments.

Mendershausen's book ranks undoubtedly among the best of its kind. He deserves a special nosegay for amalgamating principles and policies. He strikes a happy medium which enables both economists and military men to benefit from his analysis.

HENRY SIMON BLOCH

University of Chicago

Our Marching Civilization. By WARREN DWIGHT ALLEN. Stanford University, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1943. Pp. xii+112. \$2.50.

This work is a plea for the application of the principles of music to the problem of world organization. To one who has read Mr. Allen's *Philosophies of Music History*, which is the best exposition of music theory in its relation to ideological and social backgrounds that has yet appeared, this ecstatic little volume will come as a distinct disappointment. Today the world is disunited, states the author. "Since the problem of unity has been solved in art and music but not in religion and politics, a musician may venture some suggestions on this subject." Such claims, which will make many a musician blush, are then buttressed by lofty metaphors, easy analogies, and facile generalizations. There are certain "principles," asserts the author, which pervade both music and society. The "virtuoso" principle dominated both music and politics in the nineteenth century. The polyphonic principle, which represents co-operation and integration, manifested itself in polyphonic music simultaneously with the co-operatively built Gothic cathedrals. The author concludes that some system of world order, such as proposed by Ely Culbertson, derives support from the symphonic principle and that Vienna, where the symphonic style achieved its richest development, must still be reckoned with as the nerve center of the world federation. The peace can be won only if we act "in the spirit of the great symphonists—Haydn, Mozart, Beethoven, and Washington, Lincoln, and Roosevelt" (p. 83).

This work is announced as a fragment of a larger project on music and society. Let us hope that there is still time for the remaining volumes to be directed into more functional, and less heroic, channels.

JOHN H. MUELLER

Indiana University

Pennsylvania German Literature: Changing Trends from 1683 to 1942. By EARL F. ROBACKER. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1943. Pp. 202. \$2.50.

This volume is written as a literary history, but to the geographer-reviewer it is a fine study in provincialism. If a measure of provincialism is found in the strength and solidarity of group ideas, then here is regionalism par excellence.

The history of the evolution of the regional ideas is indicated by the chapter titles: period of religious significance; transition (more lusty than spiritual) of language consciousness, of local color, and of a sense of folk solidarity. There are two appendixes—tempting suggestions for research and selections from the literature to exemplify the stages of development. No less interesting is the exhaustive Bibliography, which, incidentally, demonstrates the need for this particular volume. More than that it shows the wealth of this interesting aspect of Americana. The volume is critical and scholarly and convinces one that it is wrong to say,

Bald alle Leute in dem Land
Hangen das Deutsche an die Wand.


RODERICK PEATTIE

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IN THIS ISSUE

"Was There a Prehistoric Trend from Smaller to Larger Political Units?" by Hornell Hart and Donald Taylor, applies a statistical prediction technique to archeological and anthropological data and emerges with a hypothesis which the authors apply to the current world situation. Professor Hart teaches sociology at Duke University. Donald Taylor teaches sociology at Randolph-Macon College.

William T. Fontaine has been a Rosenwald Fellow and is at present a fellow of the American Council of Learned Societies. He is head of the department of social science at Southern University of Louisiana. His article deals with "Social Determination" in the Writings of Negro Scholars."

Professor Ogburn contributes to this issue a statistical study of "Marital Separations" based on census data. He develops from the data a new concept of marital separations closely connected with current conditions in our society.

"Predicting Adjustment in Marriage from Adjustment in Engagement," by Professor Burgess and Paul Wallin, discusses some of the results of Professor Burgess' latest research project on marital adjustment.

"Single or Triple Melting Pot?" is the second article contributed to the *Journal* by Ruby Jo Reeves Kennedy based on her studies of marital patterns in New Haven.

"The Role of the Frame of Reference in the War and Post-war Economy" is written by George Katona, a member of the Cowles Commission. Mr. Katona has recently published the economic and social-psychological study, "War without Inflation."

Walter R. Goldschmidt is an associate social science analyst in the Bureau of Agricultural Economics. The data for his article on "Class Denominationalism in Rural California Churches" were gathered during a study of the social structure of a rural California community.

Marianne Marschak, who analyzes "German Fiction Today" in this issue, received her Ph.D. at Frankfurt-am-Main and contributed sketches and other literary material to the *Frankfurter Zeitung* and the *Berliner Tageblatt*. She worked with Hans Speier on the research project on totalitarian communications in New York City and on radio content analysis at Columbia University's Office of Radio Research.

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By HANS KELSEN
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University of São Paulo, Brazil

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ARNA BONTEMPS, in a review in the *New York Herald Tribune*, says: "*Negroes in Brazil* is the result of long study and a complete familiarity with the country and the people . . . he selected the seaport city of Bahia. Here in microcosm, he examined the whole scope of race contact in a city about the size of Seattle or Indianapolis, located in a state that has been called the 'Virginia' of Brazil."

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WAS THERE A PREHISTORIC TREND FROM SMALLER TO LARGER POLITICAL UNITS?

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ABSTRACT

As a step toward more trustworthy social prediction, especially in the field of international relations, this article demonstrates the reliability, validity, and intercorrelation of indices of political and of technological development among forty-six representative modern preliterate peoples. A rating scale for technological development, applicable to either modern or prehistoric peoples, is presented, and its validity is demonstrated. A rating scale indicative of the geographical extent of political development is also presented. These scales are applied in two independent studies, one covering five peoples described by Murdock; the other covering thirty-one other preliterate peoples. Each of these studies shows a high positive correlation between technological and political development among primitive peoples. A regression formula is derived from these studies. When applied to prehistoric epochs, this method shows that the area controlled by any one people has increased at an accelerating rate of speed during prehistoric as well as during historic times.

What sort of world government, if any, can be realistically hoped for after the war is over? Some idealists take it for granted that the only right course is to work for a world-wide, democratic commonwealth as an immediate objective. Some thinkers who pride themselves on their realism assume that world federation is an impossible dream and that the United States must safeguard her future as best she can in a world in which nationalistic rivalries and ruthless power politics are certain to keep international conflict chronic.

If any beginnings of scientific prediction are to be developed in the field of international relations, it is necessary to study past trends and to reduce available data to regressions or to some other form of predictive hypotheses whose validity can be tested mathematically or by some other trustworthy logical technique. For historical

periods it is possible to make reliable estimates of the land areas of outstanding governments and to show that, both in European-American culture history and in that of Asia, record-breaking areas controlled by any single government have increased at accelerating rates of speed (13).^{*} But what of *prehistoric* epochs?

Prehistoric technological developments, like historic political development, did progress at accelerating rates of speed (14). Archeology provides evidence of technological evolution from Eolithic to Paleolithic, to Neolithic, and to Metal ages. It is possible to estimate within reasonable limits the dates at which mankind in various parts of the earth began to use chipped flints, harpoons, bows and arrows, polished flints,

^{*}Numbers in parentheses refer to works cited in the bibliography at the end of this article.

bronze, and iron. Various other archeological evidences of technological development are available. But prehistoric political institutions have left behind no indubitable material evidences of their possible evolution. If we are to obtain any indication of prehistoric political development, it must be indirectly, by the study of modern preliterate peoples. The present paper is a contribution toward deriving such evidence.

The attempt to apply statistical methods to ethnological research is not unprecedented. Unwin (40) attempted to prove by statistical correlations that among civilized and uncivilized peoples there is a close relationship between sexual opportunity and cultural conditions. Hobhouse, Wheeler, and Ginsberg (16) attempted to correlate the development of material culture of "simpler" peoples with their social and political institutions. Kroeber (22) has attempted to develop a method for rating cultures as to their "intensity." Klimek (20) made a statistical study of California Indians, with a Preface by Kroeber. The present study attempts to carry such methods further, with more explicit and precise definition of variables and with derivation of statistical prediction coefficients, verified by two independent studies which were both made, as nearly as possible, by the same method. This study is directed explicitly toward obtaining light upon the problem stated at the beginning of this article.

The general method of the paper is to construct indices of the technological and of the political development of forty-six tribes or peoples (chiefly preliterate), to work out the correlations which exist between these indices, and to draw tentative conclusions as to the relationships which these correlations seem to indicate. The work has been done in two separate studies, the first, by Hart, covering fifteen peoples, and the second, by Taylor, covering thirty-one peoples. The result of the two studies are then compared, and conclusions drawn from their combined findings.

DEFINITION OF RATING SCALES USED IN THIS STUDY

The prehistoric technological scale.—The first problem was to devise a rating scheme by means of which the degree of technological advancement can be estimated, both for modern preliterate peoples and for prehistoric peoples whose cultures are known only through archeological remains. Table 1 summarizes the working-out of such ratings by Hart with respect to fifteen peoples described by Murdock (27). These ratings have been based upon the readily identifiable artifacts or technological traits possessed by peoples of various prehistoric culture levels, as set forth by Boas and associates (4, pp. 20, 26, 30-32, and 179-93). For each people considered, the possession of a given artifact or culture trait is noted by a plus sign (+) and the absence of that trait by a minus sign (-). If neither the presence nor the absence of the artifact or trait is asserted in the sources consulted, the space is left blank. For each culture period the score of a given people consists of the number of +'s divided by the number of +'s plus -'s. The only exception is that, for every culture epoch more primitive than the one in which a given people has its largest number of items, the presence of plus signs is assumed for that people unless minus signs occur. Unless the presence or absence of a grand total of three or more of the listed artifacts or traits was specifically noted about a people, that people was excluded from consideration.

The political rating scale.—The second problem is to develop a scale for rating the degree of political development shown by a given people. A preliminary survey of the data available about the fifteen peoples studied by Hart showed that several types of suborganization occur. One type consists of organizations founded upon residence and geographical groupings. A second consists of organizations founded upon real or fictitious kinship relations. These usually cut across geographical and residence boundaries. Still other organizations are

TABLE 1*

TECHNOLOGICAL RATINGS OF FIFTEEN MODERN PRELITERATE PEOPLES DESCRIBED BY MURDOCK
ON THE BASIS OF THEIR POSSESSION OR LACK OF CULTURE ELEMENTS
CHARACTERISTIC OF VARIOUS PREHISTORIC EPOCHS

PREHISTORIC CULTURE EPOCHS AND ELEMENTS	SELECTED PRELITERATE PEOPLES													
	Semang	Tasmanians	Witots	Aranda	Crows	Samoans	Polar Eskimos	Haidas	Iroquois	Hopi	Hottentots	Dahomeans	Ganda	Aztecs
Mousterian (<i>ca.</i> 50000 B.C.†):														
Flaked stone tools	—	+	—	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Aurignacian, Solutrian (<i>ca.</i> 13500 B.C.†):														
Pressure chipping	—	—	—	+	+	+	—	—	+	+	—	—	+	—
Hafting	—	—	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Stone lamp	—	—	—	—	—	—	+	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Needle	—	—	—	—	+	+	+	—	+	—	+	—	+	+
Magdalenian (<i>ca.</i> 8500 B.C.†):														
Stone dish, mortar, etc.	—	—	—	—	+	—	+	+	—	+	+	—	—	+
Spear-thrower	—	—	—	+	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Harpoon	—	—	—	—	—	—	+	+	+	—	—	+	+	—
Azilian, Tardenoisian (<i>ca.</i> 7000 B.C.†):														
Bow and arrow	—	—	—	—	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Fishhooks	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	+	—	+	—	+	—
Dogs	+	—	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Early Neolithic (<i>ca.</i> 5750 B.C.;† 10000 B.C.†):														
Domesticated animals	—	—	—	—	—	+	—	—	—	+	+	+	+	+
Crude pottery	—	—	+	—	—	—	—	—	+	+	+	+	+	+
Full Neolithic (<i>ca.</i> 4500 B.C.†):														
Varied crops	—	—	—	+	—	—	—	—	+	+	+	+	+	+
Elaborate pottery	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	+	+	—	+	+	+
Polished stone	—	—	—	+	—	+	—	+	+	+	—	—	+	+
Loom	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	+	—	+	—	+
Hammered metal	—	—	—	—	—	—	+	+	—	+	—	+	+	+
Bronze (<i>ca.</i> 1750 B.C.;† 2500 B.C.†):														
Iron (<i>ca.</i> 750 B.C.;† 4000 B.C.†):														
Historical (<i>ca.</i> 500 B.C.;† 3000 B.C.†):														
Written language	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	+
Number possessed (+) ÷ number possessed plus number lacking (—)														
Mousterian	0.5	1.0	0.5	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0
Aurignacian, Solutrian	0.5	1.0	0.5	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	0.5	1.0	1.0	0.7	1.0	1.0	1.0
Magdalenian	0.5	1.0	0.5	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	0.5	1.0	1.0	0.5	1.0	1.0	1.0
Azilian, Tardenoisian	0.5	1.0	0.5	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0
Early Neolithic	0.5	1.0	0.5	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0
Full Neolithic	0.5	1.0	0.5	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0
Bronze	0.5	1.0	0.5	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0
Iron	0.5	1.0	0.5	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0
Historical	0.5	1.0	0.5	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0
Total rating	0.5	1.0	1.5	2.5	3.3	3.6	3.9	3.9	4.7	5.5	6.2	6.5	6.7	7.0

* Source: Boas (4, pp. 174-75) and Murdock (27)³

† Dates are for West Central Europe.

‡ Dates are for Egypt and the Near East.

based on religion, occupation, or avocation. However, since the present study is concerned with possible trends toward larger and larger geographical areas, we are interested here only in the series of organizations based upon spatial areas. The other types of organization are therefore ignored in the following rating scheme.

Geographical and residence groups, among any people, are built up by a serial process of compounding. A number of mother-child groups may be organized into one household; a number of households may be organized into one local community or one clan; a number of clans or communities may be organized into one tribe or city; a number of tribes or cities may be organized into a district federation or a county; a number of such federations or counties may be organized into a state or nation; a number of states or nations may be organized into an empire or federated commonwealth; a number of empires and commonwealths might be organized into a regional, continental, or hemispheric union; and a number of these superstates might be organized into a world government. What we are seeking is a rating scheme which will at least roughly indicate the distance at which a given people is located along the scale from the simplest mother-child residence group to a world government.

Our first step toward developing such a rating scheme is to set up illustrative definitions of various levels of residence-geographical groupings. The following are the ones initially proposed in the present study:

Family.—A married woman or unmarried mother, those of her own minor, unmarried children who live with her, her husband or husbands (if living with her), plus any other children, adult males, unmarried adult females, or aged persons who regularly share the same hearth as their principal center of residence.

Household.—A group composed of more than one family, living under one common roof or in one continuous building.

Clan or local community.—A group smaller than a tribe, composed of more than one family, living in two or more separate buildings within sight (or else within a stone's throw) of some

one point, having a common clan or community name possessing exclusively from other clans or communities, a continuous geographical area, and functioning to some degree as an economic, judicial, political, or military unit.

Tribe or city.—A group made up of more than one clan or community, having a homogeneous culture, including a common name, a common language, military unity, a tribal chieftain or city executive, and a continuous area held exclusively from other tribes or cities. For a tribe the tests of unity are usually language, in-group ethic, and military solidarity; for a city it is usually continuity of built-up area and of local governmental authority.

District or county.—A continuous geographic area in which more clans or local communities exist than in any one tribe or city, functioning in economic, political, judicial, or military matters to some extent as a unit, and constituting an essential intermediate political unit between tribe or city and state or nation.

State or nation.—A continuous or discontinuous geographic area, including more than one district or county, having a common name, an executive head, common military or police forces (or both), and a unified judicial system.

Empire or federated commonwealth.—A group of states or nations having a common name, a common executive head or a joint legislative body or both, some degree of common military or police functioning (or both), a unified judicial system, and other common objectives toward achieving which the component states or nations co-operate in systematized ways.

It is obvious that considerable difficulty will be experienced in determining whether a given political unit in a given preliterate people should be considered as a clan or a tribe, a tribe or a district, a district or a state, etc. But this is not a crucial difficulty. The essential thing is to determine, for each people rated, the number of successive levels on which simpler political units are organized into more inclusive political units. For each people it must be determined what successive levels of political organization actually exist, and these are to be designated by the terms commonly employed in referring to the organizations involved.

The rating scheme is based upon identifying the several successively inclusive

levels of political organization for each people, recording certain stated facts about the functions of each group, of its council and of its executive, and the number of

people consists in the weighted total. To illustrate the method, Table 2 shows the working-out of the ratings for one of the politically simplest and one of the most politi-

TABLE 2
PROCESS FOR RATING COMPLEXITY OF POLITICAL ORGANIZATION
APPLIED TO THE TASMANIANS AND THE INCAS

RESIDENTIAL AND GEOGRAPHICAL GROUPS	TASMANIANS			INCAS							
	Fam- ily	Sub- tribe	Tribe	Fam- ily	Dec- ury	Clan	Phra- try	Tribe	Prov- ince	Quar- ter	Em- pire
<i>Group exists</i>	5*	2, 6	2	411	410	416	416	416	416	416	416
Functions:											
Joint migration			5								
Property holding	6		2	411		416					419
Other economic				420	425	419	425	425			419
Political											
Judicial police											
Military			2, 3								417
<i>Council exists</i>											416
Functions:											
Economic											
Political											
Judicial police											
Military											
<i>Chief recognized</i>			3	411	416	416	416	416	416	416	416
Functions:											
Owner or trustee group property				420							
Other economic				411							417
Political				415	425	416	416	416	416	416	417
Judicial police									416		
Military			3						416		
<i>Other officers</i>											
Economic; technical						416			425		425
Political											
Judicial											416
Military											418
Total points	2	1	6	7	4	6	4	4	6	3	11
Weights	1	2	3	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
Weighted totals	2	2	18	7	8	30	16	20	36	21	88
Final rating			22								226

* Page references are to Murdock (27).

types of officers other than the chief executive. The existence of each structure and each function or officer on a given level counts as 1 point. The total of points on the lowest level (either the family or the household if the two are not distinguished from each other) is given a weight of 1; the total for the next higher level is given a weight of 2, for the next level 3; etc. The rating of a

cally complex among the peoples rated by Hart. The numbers given in the body of the table refer to the pages in Murdock (27) on which the items referred to are stated to exist. In view of the basis on which the ratings are constructed, it is evident that the higher the rating on political complexity, the larger the geographical area over which the people hold sway.

Limitations of ethnological reports.—Taylor found that most anthropological documents do not contain sufficiently detailed and exhaustive information to enable even the simple rating scheme of the present study to be applied. Some documents stress political organization but fail to report technological facts. Others reverse the emphasis; and still others neglect both aspects or give very little information.

Another difficulty is the lack of uniformity in the use of concepts among the anthropologists. Even within the same documents some authors interchange such terms as "household," "clan," "group," "tribe," etc., until it becomes impossible to make any rating. At times there is also disagreement among different reporters as to what is to be found in various tribes. The neglect to report important facts is also common, as well as the confusing of the time of appearance of different elements within a tribe. Some writers report a certain political organization and also certain technological equipment but fail to state the time period; further research shows that the two elements do not correspond in time.

Klimek (20), in his statistical study of the California Indians, reached conclusions similar to the foregoing:

This quantitative survey revealed at once the extent of deficiencies in existing knowledge. . . . Even in intensive ethnographic monographs, items are simply overlooked. The ethnographer is particularly interested in some things and forgets to inquire about others, or he inquires about a certain thing, receives a negative reply, and fails to include this in his report. . . . California ethnology has been prosecuted more systematically than that of many regions; for more than thirty years each investigation has been a part of a continuous program; and yet we were appalled at the frequency with which a given specific item was represented by data from only a dozen, or not more than three or four, of the sixty tribes dealt with.

The failure of sources to report absence of given artifacts suggests that a revised new system of scoring the technological index may be desirable. Because Taylor

found very few negatives reported, the items for each period in his ratings generally result in the score of 1 or 0. Since there are only eight periods, his total scores tend to cluster into only eight groups. However, if the system of rating were increasingly refined, there would be fewer and fewer anthropological documents available that could offer the necessary information.

Testing the validity of the technological ratings.—In order to ascertain to what extent the prehistoric technological rating scale actually reflects the degree of technological development of a people, Hart constructed a more general index, applied it to the fifteen people he was studying, and correlated the ratings with those obtained on the prehistoric index. The procedure, in brief, was as follows.

After experimenting with various tentative rating schemes, it was found that the most reliable results were obtained by using three supplementary indices: one of industrial level, one of the character of dwellings, and one of mathematics, writing, and science. For "industrial level" a rating of 2 was assigned to any people who had no domesticated dogs and no preservation of food. The following counted toward a rating of 4: minor uses of dogs (such as eating them or hunting with them); storage of wild nuts or seeds or use of pemmican; trade in the form of barter but no money; and one or two specialized crafts. The following counted toward a rating of 5: use of dogs for herding or sledge-pulling; smoking or drying of meat or fish; elaborate barter or use of cowrie shells or other nonmetallic forms of money; or having three, four, or five specialized crafts. The following counted toward a rating of 6: use of gold dust for money or having six, seven, or eight specialized crafts. For nine or more specialized crafts a rating of 7 was given. Each people was given a rating representing the average value of the pertinent characteristics noted in the descriptions of that people's culture.

For character of dwelling a rating of 1 was given for having no dwelling but caves; 2, for having only windbreaks; 3, for hav-

ing lean-tos; 4, for simple tepees or huts; 5, for crude planks and crude masonry; 6, for refined woodwork and moderately developed masonry, for snow houses, or for specialization of buildings into five or more different uses; and 7, for refined or elaborate stone masonry.

For symbolic thinking (mathematics, science, and incipient beginnings of written language), being able to count not farther than 4 was credited with a rating of 1; counting at least to 5 but not farther than 20, and telling time only by sleeps and moons, were credited toward a rating of 2; counting beyond 20 but not beyond 99 was credited toward a rating of 3; counting as far as 100 but not farther than 999, use of the drum telegraph, and telling the time by the height of the sun were credited toward a rating of 4; counting to 1,000 or beyond, the use of pictographs, and employment of simple astronomical instruments was credited toward a rating of 5; use of ideographs and elaborate astronomical calculations were credited toward a rating of 6; and use of phonetic writing counted toward a rating of 7.

For the fifteen peoples studied by Hart these general technological ratings are shown in Table 3 (which reports also the prehistoric technological and the political ratings for all the forty-six peoples included in the entire study). When the averages of the three supplementary technological ratings are correlated with the "prehistoric" technological ratings for the fifteen peoples, the Pearsonian coefficient of correlation is .87. Even when based on so small a number of tribes, the chances are 99 in 100 that the true correlation between these two technological indices lies between .52 and .97 (12). We can have confidence, therefore, that these two indices tend to measure the same basic characteristic or group of characteristics. Applying the Spearman-Brown prophecy formula (41, p. 117), $(r_{100} = \sqrt{r_{x_1 x_2}})$, we find that the correlation of either of these indices with a theoretically perfect index of technological development would be $\sqrt{.87}$ or .93. In other words, our index of prehis-

toric technological development is highly reliable.

TABLE 3
SUMMARY OF TECHNOLOGICAL AND POLITICAL RATINGS ON FORTY-SIX (CHIEFLY PRELITERATE) PEOPLES

PEOPLE (1)	CONTINENT (2)	SOURCES (3)	RATINGS		
			Techno-logical		Political (6)
			General (4)	Pre-historic (5)	
Adamanese	Oceania	28*	3.3	19
Aranda	Oceania	27	2.7	2.5	20
Aztecs	N. America	27	6.2	7.0	146
Bagesu	Africa	32	6.0	24
Bakitara	Africa	33	7.0	118
Bakyiga	Africa	32	7.0	23
Banyankole	Africa	34	7.0	60
Bavenda	Africa	34	7.0	132
Bemba	Africa	30	6.5	91
Bushmen	Africa	36	4.0	15
Chocataw	N. America	5	6.0	46
Cochin	Asia	8	8.0	74
Crows	N. America	27	4.3	3.3	32
Dahomeans	Africa	27	5.1	6.5	150
Dakota	N. America	25	5.0	31
Eskimo (Polar)	N. America	27	4.0	3.9	4
Fox	N. America	24	6.0	41
Ganda	Africa	27	5.2	6.7	138
Goodenough Islanders	Oceania	19	3.5	17
Haidas	N. America	27	3.7	3.9	37
Hopi	N. America	27	5.4	5.5	58
Hottentots	Africa	27	4.1	6.2	61
Ibo	Africa	1	7.0	30
Incas	S. America	27	5.7	7.0	226
Iroquois	N. America	27	3.7	4.7	135
Kazak	Asia	8	6.5	45
Kgatla	Africa	37	7.0	71
Kiwai Papuans	Oceania	23	3.8	16
Kwakiutl	N. America	8	4.3	17
Kwoma	Oceania	42	6.0	47
Lango	Africa	6	6.0	29
Lepchas	Asia	11	6.5	37
Mailu	Oceania	35	6.0	43
Maori	Oceania	26	5.0	37
Masai	Africa	39	6.0	37
Nankanse	Africa	29	7.0	72
Palute	N. America	8	5.0	16
Popoluca	N. America	10	6.0	39
Samoans	Oceania	27	4.4	3.6	75
Semang	Asia	27	2.3	.5	20
Tarahumara	N. America	3	5.7	27
Tasmanians	Oceania	27	1.8	1.0	22
Tikopia	Oceania	7, 31	5.0	25
Tungus	Asia	8	6.0	21
Witotos	S. America	27	4.0	1.5	30
Yoruba	Africa	8	8.0	101

* See Bibliography at end.

Testing the reliability of the political rating scale.—The ratings reported by Hart were tested in a preliminary way by being com-

pared with findings reported by various members of a course in anthropology at Duke University. All the ratings of these fifteen peoples, both by Hart and by the students, were based upon Murdock (27).

Taylor tested his understanding of the rating schemes by making independent ratings of four of the tribes already rated by Hart (Tasmanians, Crows, Dahomeans, and Incas) and found that his ratings were practically identical with Hart's. In seeking data on which to make his own ratings, Taylor assembled large numbers of monographs, definitive studies, and anthropology texts. Each one of them was scanned, and, if it appeared that sufficient material was available, a rating was made. Very few of the books had the necessary information. Each tribe was scored on the political and the prehistoric technological indices separately and without comparison of the two series. Only after the total of thirty-one tribes had been rated were the results of the two indices compared. This procedure was followed in order to minimize the danger that ratings on political complexity for any given tribe might be influenced subconsciously by ratings previously given that tribe on technological development or vice versa.

The above precautions, however, are only incidental. A more operational test of the reliability and the validity of the ratings must be sought in the relationships between the two kinds of ratings, as found by Hart and Taylor separately.

CORRELATIONS BETWEEN POLITICAL AND PREHISTORIC TECHNOLOGICAL RATINGS

When the political ratings of column 6 in Table 3 are plotted against the prehistoric economic ratings of column 5, it becomes evident that the relationship is curvilinear. The logarithms of the political ratings, however, have an approximately linear relationship with the prehistoric technological ratings. This is evident from Figure 1, in which the political ratings are plotted on a logarithmic scale. The ratings of the fifteen tribes studied by Hart are represented by

+'s; the ratings of the thirty-one tribes studied by Taylor are represented by o's. The Pearsonian correlation coefficients between prehistoric technological ratings and logarithms of political ratings are .72 for the peoples studied by Hart and .61 for the peoples studied by Taylor. Either one of these correlations by itself creates a fairly strong presumption that a real statistical relationship exists between the characteristics reflected by the technological and by the political ratings. Taken together, we may consider that these correlations establish a good *prima facie* case. Using the *Z* transformation, we may deduce that, no matter how large a number of primitive peoples were studied with the thoroughness characteristic of the Murdock data and the Hart ratings, there is not one chance in a hundred that the true correlation would be as low as .25.

It will be noted in Figure 1 that the Polar Eskimos (designated by the lowest + on the chart) are far out of line from the other peoples rated. Applying the standard error of estimate, we find that so low a political index would be associated by chance with so high a technological index only once in about five hundred cases. It seems highly probable, therefore, that the Polar Eskimos are a special case, which does not properly belong in the same category with the other fourteen peoples rated by Hart from the Murdock data. When we examine the data more closely, we find a clear and reasonable explanation for this deviation. The Polar Eskimos were more extremely isolated than almost any people on record. When first visited by explorers, the group contained only 271 people. In their Arctic isolation they had been so out of touch with the rest of the world that they supposed themselves to be the only people in existence (27, pp. 192, 218). Under such circumstances no elaborate political structure could arise. Complex governments involve compounding of clans, tribes, and nations, and this can occur only where large populations are interacting politically. But the rigors of the environment made it essential to maintain

a high degree of technological efficiency in hunting, housing, and clothing.

If we exclude the Polar Eskimos, the correlation between prehistoric technological indices and political indices for Hart's remaining fourteen peoples becomes .93, with

But, when we turn to the data collected and analyzed by Taylor, we find a somewhat different relationship. For Taylor's thirty-one cases the correlation between the prehistoric technological indices and the logarithms of the political indices is .61,




FIG. 1.—Regression lines for predicting political ratings from prehistoric technological ratings: upper line based on fourteen tribes studied by Hart (excluding Polar Eskimo), indicated by X's; lower line based on 31 tribes studied by Taylor, indicated by O's.

a probability of 99 in 100 that the true correlation lies between .61 and .98. The regression formula for predicting political ratings becomes

$$\log Y_c = 1.145 + .1447 X. \quad (1)$$

That formula is represented by the upper regression line in Figure 1. It fits the data represented by the X's, excepting the Polar Eskimos.

and the regression line is represented by the equation

$$\log Y_c = .5304 + .1760 X. \quad (2)$$

This equation is represented by the lower regression line in Figure 1. The slope is almost the same as in the regression derived from Hart's fourteen cases, but the level is different. The average technological rating for Taylor's tribes is 5.9. Substituting that

value for X in equation (1), we obtain 1.999 as $\log Y_c$, which gives us 99.77 as the predicted political rating for such a group, on the assumption that it corresponds in character with Hart's fourteen tribes. But the observed average logarithm of political ratings in Taylor's tribes was 1.570, giving a political rating of 37.15, which is 42.62 lower than the expected value. In other words, the data on the fourteen tribes (excluding the Eskimo) described in Murdock produce political ratings more than twice as large, on the average, as the data collected by Taylor from miscellaneous sources. The explanation for this difference seems to be that Murdock's descriptions of his tribes are much more exhaustive, thorough, and complete than the descriptions collected by Taylor. Completeness of data would increase the number of group organizations, officers, and functions noted for a given people and hence increase the political ratings. Since the technological traits are much more material and objective in character than political relationships, they are less likely to be omitted, though even here Taylor's sources are obviously less exhaustive than Murdock's.

The conclusion which emerges from the foregoing analysis of political and prehistoric ratings is that a definite correlation exists, as proved independently by the two studies; that the relationship is probably best represented by regression equation (1); and that the meaning of this equation is that, among peoples who are not geographically isolated, the higher the technological development of a people, the larger the areas over which they exercise political control. This relationship has thus been demonstrated for the peoples least affected by infiltrations of modern culture. It is a universal relationship, not dependent upon time. Since the scale employed to measure technological development depends upon the kinds of evidence available for prehistoric peoples, we may apply our formula to calculating the approximate degree of political development characteristic of various prehistoric technological eras.

THE POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT OF PREHISTORIC EPOCHS

Now let us apply our regression formula (1) to the estimation of the degrees of political development most probably associated with various prehistoric levels of technology, as indicated by archeological evidence. This analysis will be made by two methods. The first consists in ascertaining descriptively, from the foregoing formulas, what general types of political organization probably existed at representative dates in the past. The second method consists in attempting a quantitative estimate of the amount of territory controlled by typical governmental units at selected prehistoric dates. Both methods will be applied along the time scale available in West Central Europe, where prehistoric data are most abundant. The descriptive analysis of the most probable prehistoric political organization at selected dates is as follows.

First, let us inquire what was most probably the level of political organization on the Mousterian level of technology, approximately fifty thousand years ago in Central Europe. The prehistoric technological index for that period on our rating scale is 1. Substituting this value in equation (1), we get $\log Y_c = 1.290$. This represents a lower index of political organization than that of any of the peoples described by Murdock, including the Australian Aranda or the primitive Tasmanians. In the Mousterian age the typical political set-up probably consisted in a village-clan organization, with some simple and loose tribal unity in times of war or of other general crisis.

Suppose we move along in prehistory to the Azilian-Tardenoisian period, *ca.* 7000 B.C., or nine thousand years ago, in West Central Europe. Four-fifths of the time between the Mousterian epoch and our own day had already elapsed. The prehistoric technological index was 4. This would correspond with $\log Y_c = 1.724$, indicating a typical level of political development a little below that of the Hopi or the Hottentots. Each of these peoples had a fairly

highly developed tribal organization, with a tribal council exercising various governmental functions.

As a third point on the curve of prehistoric political development let us take the Bronze Age, *ca.* 1750 B.C., in Central Europe. The prehistoric technological index for this epoch is 7, corresponding with a political index represented by $\log Y_e = 2.158$. This corresponds with the type of organization represented by the Aztecs.

Between the approximate dates 50000 B.C. and 7000 B.C. in Central Europe, therefore, the degree of political development most probably typical progressed from the village-clan level to the tribal or league-of-tribes level. From 7000 to 1750 B.C. the development moved on from the tribal or league-of-tribes to the small-empire level. In terms of areas controlled by the largest governments probably in existence at each of these three prehistoric dates, the increase in the 43,000 years from 50000 to 7000 B.C. was undoubtedly less than the increase during the 5,250 years from 7000 to 1750 B.C. In other words, the growth in the geographical size of prehistoric governments seems clearly to have been at an accelerating rate of speed. This corresponds with findings, to be published later, showing that the geographical size of political units during historic times has also been increasing with accelerating speed.

The above analysis in descriptive terms can be supplemented by analysis of three estimates of areas actually controlled by single political units at different levels of technological development as measured by the "prehistoric" rating scale. Judging from data presented in the foregoing descriptive analysis, the maximum area controlled by any single government in Mousterian times, about 50000 B.C., it is likely to have been approximately of the same order in size as the amount of territory controlled by single political units among aboriginal Australians. This was about from 4,000 to 10,000 square miles, according to Lips (4, p. 491).

Other food-gathering peoples of exceedingly simple technological development, such as the Tasmanians, the Veddas, the Botocudos, and the Fuegians, are stated by the same authority to have had similar levels of political organization. We may, then, take 7,000 square miles as a rough approximation to the maximum amount of territory controlled by individual governments fifty thousand years ago in Europe.

As our second point on the curve of prehistoric political developments for this quantitative estimate of areas, let us take the Early Neolithic, *ca.* 5500 B.C. in West Central Europe, or approximately 10000 B.C. in Egypt. This period has a prehistoric technological rating of 5. This corresponds with $\log Y_e = 1.869$ —which is lower than that of the Iroquois (whose prehistoric technological rating was 4.7). Now the Iroquois are famous for their League of Nations. This league had a council which decided matters by a unanimous vote. Member-nations could go to war without the consent of the league if the war did not interfere with league interests. The Iroquois League was formed about A.D. 1570. When it was first known to white men, it was composed of five tribes and occupied the territory extending from the east watershed of Lake Champlain to the west watershed of the Genesee River, and from the Adirondacs southward to the territory of the Conestoga Indians, who lived on the Susquehanna River and its branches (17). This territory covered approximately 22,500 square miles. After the coming of the Dutch, from whom they acquired firearms, the Iroquois were able to extend their conquest until their dominion was acknowledged from the Ottawa River to the Tennessee, and from the Kennebec to the Illinois River and Lake Michigan—a territory approximating 560,000 square miles. This twenty-five-fold increase illustrates once more the relationship between technology and political power. Given a political organization which has the culture patterns necessary for establishing government on a fairly complex level, the addition of a marked technological advan-

tage (such as firearms) may increase a group's power of conquest many fold.

However, the rifle belonged to the machine age, not to the Early Neolithic level on which the Iroquois lived before borrowing firearms from the Dutch. The territory of the five nations, therefore, with its approximately 22,500 square miles, represents the best evidence available as to the maximum geographical sway attained in the technological level which existed in Central Europe *ca.* 5500 B.C. and in Egypt *ca.* 10000 B.C.

For our third point we may take the Iron Age, which developed about 750 B.C. in West Central Europe. The prehistoric technological rating of 8 for the Iron Age would correspond with a political index represented by $\log Y_c = 2.303$, which is approximately equal to the 2.35 of the Incas. Now the Incas, before the coming of the white man, controlled an area equal to about 600,000 square miles (21).

During the 44,500 years from 50000 to 5500 B.C. in Central Europe, then, the increase in maximum area controlled by any one government was in the general neighborhood of 15,500 square miles. During the 3,750 years from 5,500 to 750 B.C. the gain was in the general neighborhood of 577,000 square miles. For the earlier period the rate of gain was approximately 0.3 square mile per year; during the later period it was approximately 154 square miles per year, or nearly five hundred times as great. Even more emphatically, therefore, this quantitative estimate confirms the conclusion that, in prehistoric as well as in historic times, areas controlled by any one government have been increasing with accelerating speed. The indicated acceleration is so great that fairly large errors might exist in the estimates of early areas without altering the general conclusion.

The reader must not be confused by the fact that modern preliterate peoples are being used as a gauge of prehistoric political development. We are concerned with three abstract variables—technological develop-

ment (as measured by indices available for prehistoric peoples), political development in terms of geographical units, and time. We first established the reliability of the prehistoric technological index. We then proved that technological development (as measured by the prehistoric index) correlates fairly closely with geographical political development. Lastly, we have shown that increase in the size of areas controlled by any single political unit has been accelerating with respect to time.

The time scale used was related to West Central Europe. But our conclusions can be checked by tying in this trend with the earliest data available from ancient history. Our earliest reliable knowledge of history is related to Egypt and the Near East, from 3000 to 1500 B.C. At that time Egypt and the Near East were in the Bronze and Iron Age, with hieroglyphic and cuneiform writing, a knowledge of astronomy which included an estimate of the length of the year as 365.25 days, preservation of grain and other foods, elaborate specialization of crafts, use of hewn stone, and the building of elaborately specialized buildings. The Incas and Aztecs were quite comparable with these Near Eastern nations in technological development. New World metallurgy was more primitive in some respects, and the Incas had no ideographic writing, but the Mayas of Mexico had developed an astronomy which estimated the length of the year more accurately than did that of the ancient Egyptians (14, p. 250). The Egyptian empire of 1,450 B.C. had an area of approximately 690,000 square miles. This compares with the Aztec League of about 475,000 square miles and the Inca empire of approximately 600,000 square miles. In other words, both in the Old World and in the New, the dawn of history, with elaborate architecture, use of metals, and accurate astronomical measurement of the length of the year, coincided with the achievement of governments ruling over maximum areas of about half a million square miles for any single empire.

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"SOCIAL DETERMINATION" IN THE WRITINGS OF NEGRO SCHOLARS

WILLIAM T. FONTAINE

ABSTRACT

Absolute truth is, at best, a regulative ideal, a goal infinitely remote that man would approach with ever increasing hope. All knowledge is conditioned by incompleteness of development and by perspectives which the plastic human organism acquires in interaction with environment. Negro scholars propound a knowledge reflecting resentment of the caste-like status forced upon their group. Bias is not deliberate, but there exists an unconscious attitude of immediate group defense. This narrows the scholar's angle of vision. His knowledge is affected in "form" and in "content." Analytical categories are preferred to morphological, environment to heredity. Exceptions have logical priority over quantitative majorities. Range of validity is narrowed, since the mentality of the opponent is not understood through sympathetic interchange of attitudes.

During the 1930's scholarly literature came to the forefront as a form of expression of the Negro of the United States. The place once monopolized by poets and novelists such as Claude McKay, Countee Cullen, Langston Hughes, and Walter White must now be shared with the men of the schools. Sociologists, anthropologists, educators and psychologists, historians, editors of scholarly journals, and scientists of the past decade have produced a literature which, for quality as well as bulk, is unmatched in the intellectual history of the Negro.

Factors accounting for this emergence of the Negro scholar include (1) the great increase in the number of Negro college graduates, a fact fully appreciated only when it is realized that Negroes earned college degrees in greater numbers during the eleven-year span 1926-36 than for the entire hundred-year period from 1826 to 1926;¹ (2) the doctoral and post-doctoral study by Negroes in the universities of Europe and America; and (3) the establishment of the Negro as a fruitful subject of research by recognized scholars. It is interesting also to note with Charles Beard that during the "Midpassage" the American people generally turned to "brain-trusters," the debacle caused by the depression obliging pragmatic Americans to intrust recovery to speculations of "the man of knowledge."

¹ Charles S. Johnson, *The Negro College Graduate* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1938), p. 10.

The Negro scholar has arrived. But what of his knowledge? Does he seek truth disinterestedly or does he have an ax to grind? Is there any correlation between his knowledge and the position occupied by the Negro in the American social order? Is his knowledge "socially determined"?² Is it possible that sociopsychological factors such as resentment, aggression, rage, and the desire for equality make the mental set of the Negro scholar one of immediate group defense?

This paper proposes to answer the foregoing questions by analysis of the more outstanding works in fields of greatest interest: sociology, anthropology, educational psychology, history and historiography, and biology.³ Attempt will be made to show a

² "Social determination" as used here means that there is a correlation between the knowledge propounded by Negro scholars and the social situations confronting the Negro group. This correlation amounts to functional dependence. Mechanical, cause-effect sequence, however, is not meant. The extent to which a body of knowledge is affected by social interests or any extra-theoretic factors is a matter of empirical investigation (see Karl Mannheim, *Ideology and Utopia*, trans. L. Wirth and E. Shils [New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1936], p. 239).

³ Specifically, the studies analyzed and considered are the following: E. Franklin Frazier, *The Negro Family in Chicago, The Negro Family in the United States*, and *Negro Youth at the Crossways*; Charles S. Johnson, *Growing Up in the Black Belt*; Allison Davis, "The Distribution of the Blood Groups and Its Bearing on the Concept of Race," *Sociological Review*, January, 1935; W. M. Cobb, "The Physical Constitution of the American Negro," *Journal of*

relation of functional dependence between the social situation confronting the Negro group and much of the knowledge cultivated by its scholars. It is contended that such a relation is revealed in (a) categorical apparatus, that is, the scholar frequently employs *analysis*, since in this way he can break up such morphological conceptions as "race" "race soul," "Negro," and "white" and recombine the resulting data in a manner precluding racial distinctions and inequality; (b) the selection of certain data as logically prior, as, for example, the citation of the abilities of the few "exceptional" Negroes as of greater significance for the problem of racial equality than the evidence presented by the shortcomings of the many; (c) the selection of theories obviously supporting group interests, viz., environment in preference to heredity; and (d) the narrow scope of observation and the consequent effect upon range of validity.

The mind of the Negro scholar is fundamentally the same as any other. It is a historical phenomenon, existent in and subject to the influences of its epoch. It both conditions and is conditioned by its social position. As a Negro, the scholar has faced discrimination against his race, and his experiences consciously and unconsciously have engendered psychoses centering around fear, rage, repression, aggression, security, status, and equality. As undergraduate and graduate student, he learns that certain kinds of knowledge lend support to race discrimination. Before attempting to place himself in the position and attitude of those

who subscribe to this knowledge, he brands it as inimical to the interests of himself and his group, and he launches forthwith into its refutation. The scholar thus becomes "defensive" before he has understood that his attitude is but one of several from which knowledge relevant to the problem might be propagated. If he would assume the attitude of his opponent and view the question from that side, both his and the opponent's conclusion would appear in broader perspective. The fact that the majority of scholars have been trained in a psychological tradition that casts mind in the role of supratemporal judge pronouncing universal truths with every utterance prompts them all the more to confer absolute truth upon their immediate "defensive" knowledge. When it is considered, too, that the vast majority of Negro scholars are forced to seek employment in the South, the sociopsychological significance of the above facts becomes even greater. Upon the soil of ancestral slave generations, some of whom are still alive, they face a social situation of inferior status, of economic, political, and civil discrimination, of sexual repression, of insult to self and Negro womanhood, and, above all, of the threat of mob murder without recourse. In the South and, with some reservation, in the North the Negro is considered an out-group, a counterrace. The knowledge of the Negro scholar, in the larger number of cases, is a counterknowledge propagated from an immediate "defense" perspective; it is a particularized knowledge reflecting the angle of vision from which it has been generated. Nevertheless, it is not unique in this respect. All knowledge contains a measure of perspective. Every generation is limited, first, by the necessarily incomplete development of knowledge up to that time; second, by the plastic nature of mind itself; and, third, by the inseparable connection of feelings, emotions, moods, interests, and beliefs with the so-called purely logical processes of thought. In the activity of knowing, no *pure* reason or transcendental self remains poised in passionless objectivity while recording an

Negro Education, Vol. III (1934); Horace M. Bond, *Education of the Negro in the American Social Order*; Martin Jenkins, "The Mental Ability of the American Negro," *Journal of Negro Education*, Vol. VIII (1939); Carter G. Woodson, *The Negro in Our History and The African Background Outlined*; Charles H. Wesley, *The Collapse of the Confederacy* and "The Reconstruction of History," *Journal of Negro History*, Vol. XX (1935); W. E. B. Du Bois, *Black Reconstruction*; L. D. Reddick, "A New Interpretation for Negro History," *Journal of Negro History*, Vol. XXII (1937); Ernest E. Just, *Biology of the Cell Surface*; and Julian Lewis, *The Biology of the American Negro*.

external world in itself. Such a view fails to take into account the interactional theory of personality. It fails to consider, too, the perseveration of unexpressed wishes and the causative significance of these unconscious forces in the activity of thought. Moreover, in those sciences dealing with the action of human beings, neutrality and disinterested curiosity are for the investigator a psychological impossibility. Says Lynn in *Knowledge for What*:

"Pure scientific curiosity" is a term to which students of semantics should turn their attention. There is "idle" curiosity and "focused" curiosity but in the world of science no such thing as "pure curiosity" [pp. 182-83].

The analysis set forth here is, therefore, for purposes of revelation, not ridicule. Negro scholars have wrought well. The question is not whether it is right or wrong for them to plead the cause of their group but to what extent there is a correlation between the group wish for equality and the knowledge produced by its scholars. It may be contended that the scholars occupy different social positions. Within the Negro community this is unquestionably true, but the range of variation within the nation at large is slight. Before the bar of American public opinion a Negro is a Negro. Regardless of complexion, education, wealth, achievement, refinement, whether he is northern or southern, urban or rural, his social position is restricted to a caste-like condition. It may be contended that Negro scholars react differently to this caste-like status imposed upon themselves and their brethren, that there may be some who, instead of propounding knowledge consistent with group interests, consider themselves above the herd and proclaim the justice of the Negro's plight. No outstanding scholar holding such a view appeared in the 1930's. If, on the contrary, variation in reaction be cited on the ground that some reveal less emotion and consequently a broader perspective than others in their writings, then this is indeed true. As the discussion proceeds, certain authors will be singled out to show how the influence of existential factors

upon their writings has been more or less peripheral, while for others significant penetration into both "form" and "content" will be uncovered.

SOCIAL DETERMINATION AND CATEGORICAL APPARATUS

After investigating the programs and apologetics of diverse social groups, Karl Mannheim concluded that there was a correspondence between the social position of a group and the method employed in its supporting body of knowledge.⁴ The thought style of the conservative Rightists made use of such categories as race, race soul, and race morality. Its categories were most frequently "morphological," seeking rather to preserve the data of experience in all its uniqueness rather than to break them up so as to render the possibility of contrary interpretation. On the contrary, the thought style of the parties of the Left was most frequently analytical. These parties sought by a counterthought to break down the morphological classifications into units so as to recombine the units in a manner affording intellectual support for its social goals.

The analytical attack of Negro scholars is directed against such morphological concepts as race, race morality, race ability, and superior races and the concept of "genes" as immutable sources of characteristics distinguishing racial types. While numerous examples of morphological thought occur in the writing of Negrophobes such as Madison Grant and Stoddard, it is in Spengler that the classic example is found; for example, Spengler's conception of "a morphology of world history" in terms of race souls: Apollonian, Magian, Faustian. It is this habit of the morphological thought style to lump the entire Negro group into an "undifferentiated mass" that riles Frazier in his *The Negro Family in Chicago*. Therefore, just as Mannheim's hypothesis would lead one to expect, Frazier's thought *breaks up* this "undifferentiated mass" into seven zones; the morality of those in each zone is then related by means of the category of

⁴ *Op. cit.*, pp. 264 ff.

causality or functional integration to environment rather than to the morphological category, race. So likewise the anthropologist, Allison Davis, in his article on "Race and Blood Groups" *breaks up* the classifications of peoples in terms of morphological characteristics by showing the inconsistency of these characteristics, first, with the data of the isoagglutination blood group reactions and, second, within themselves. He analyzes the several methods employed throughout the history of taxonomy and shows how they fail to account for all members of the hypothetical type. He analyzes and uncovers the variegated character of so-called "distinct races" and shows how the possible appearance even of a future pure race is now precluded by the principle of genetic segregation. This breaking-up of the the morphological category of race is followed by recombining the data in such a way as to bring out the functional relation of different types to such environmental factors as ocean barriers, mountain ranges, and social prohibitions. Similarly, the psychologists, Bond and Jenkins, analyze the test scores of the Negro group and the white so as to break each up into intragroup data; the rank of each individual is then functionally related to factors in his social environment. The historiographers, Wesley and Reddick, analyze history as conceived under the form of Nordocentrism;⁵ the data of world history are then recombined so as to include the facts and role of the Negro. Cobb, the physical anthropologist, contends that morphological differences in peoples do not constitute functional disadvantages. Differences are explained by relating them to the different environments in the original habitats of the people. The physician, Lewis, breaks down the concept "Negro" into intragroup units.⁶ He then shows the variation in the incidence of

tuberculosis and other diseases upon each unit. Lewis is a very cautious scholar and never hesitates to present both sides of the question, but that the variant reactions of different Negroes are functionally related to socioeconomic factors is unmistakably the author's conclusion. The biologist, Just, *analyzes* "genetic continuity" and the so-called "individuality" of the gene in the light of cell division. His conclusion is that each division proportionally destroys "individuality" and continuity. The determinative forces of heredity are then located in the ectoplasm, the outermost layer of the cell surface, a habitat closest to environment and the influence of forces in the external world.

"SOCIAL DETERMINATION" AND LOGICAL PRIORITY OF THE "EXCEPTION"

Those who contend that the Negro is immoral, criminal, or intellectually inferior usually support their claims with abundant statistics. What is true of the majority they ascribe to the group as a whole; their actions are functions of the biological type, of "natural impulses." While this manner of thinking stresses the failings of the rank and file of Negroes, the counterthought of the Negro scholar emphasizes the accomplishments of exceptional Negroes. In the one case, these latter are relegated to incidental value or explained where possible in terms of admixture of "white blood"; in the other, they are the actualized potentialities of each member of the group. Again; on the one hand, the majority of Negroes are socially disorganized and are said merely to be living out their brutish nature; on the other, the Negro scholar declares these same Negroes to be hampered by great environmental disadvantages, despite which considerable numbers achieve the fuller life. Each looks at the data from his own position and selects from them the type affording an explanation consistent with his interests.

Bond and Jenkins bear out the above conclusions in their stress upon the achievements of the few exceptional Negroes making high scores on the intelligence tests. Lewis, in

⁵ The Nordocentric history picture looks upon all history as revolving about Europe as the home of the white races (see Oswald Spengler, *The Decline of the West*).

⁶ Julian Lewis, *The Biology of the Negro* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1942), p. 19.

refuting the contentions of Casper and Pinner that there exists a genotypic difference between the high resistance of the whites to tuberculosis and the low resistance of Negroes, cites as evidence the presence of fibrotic reactions which, though exceptional, are yet found in Negroes. However, it is in Frazier that the emphasis upon the exceptional Negro is most pronounced. Frazier says definitely that he seeks to ascertain the causes and conditions enabling a small element of Negroes of Chicago to make favorable adjustments to urban civilization.⁷ When he has uncovered such factors as occupational level, length of residence in Chicago, free or slave ancestry, he then interprets the relative progress or disorganization of the entire seven zones of the Negro community in terms of these alterable environmental factors. Thus all the data of every zone are seen as in a flux tending toward the higher zones. Favorable or unfavorable environment speeds or retards the process. The Negro scholar does not look upon the exceptional Negro as a sporadic incident; he is rather a sort of terminus toward which all Negroes are moving, some more retarded than others by environmental handicaps.

SOCIAL DETERMINATION AND THEORIES SELECTED

Without exception, Negro scholars prefer "environment" to "heredity" to explain such phenomena as racial types, comparative incidence of diseases, differences in levels of social organizations, personality, and intelligence. The relation of environment to "defense" of race is made obvious by the fact that it enables ascription of the shortcomings of Negroes to external handicaps, and it counterattacks the arguments of those who point to innate incapacity.

Biologists and scientists of closely related fields take the lead in this matter. Cobb contends that Mendelian principles fail to give adequate explanation of the American

Negro as a phenomenon of hereditary processes. He is interested in refuting the contentions of Hrdlička, Steggerda, and Davenport that Negro-white crossings are undesirable, since the products are disharmonic combinations. These latter contend that in accordance with Mendel the traits of whites tend to be inherited as a whole and the race traits of the Negro likewise. The specificities of one group do not fit in with those of the other so as to produce desirable types. Thus the offspring suffer such physical handicaps as short arms and long trunk and legs; or the brown crosses are frequently "wuzzleheaded." Obviously, such a principle supports laws forbidding intermarriage as well as social segregation of the opposite sexes of the two races. It also carries implications of inequality. Cobb answers by challenging the validity of the Mendelian theory. His attack, however, is confined to citation of contrary theories—the argument of Castle that Mendelism does not account for the inheritance of "the more general and fundamental characters."⁸ Cobb's opposition to Mendelism is, in truth, twofold: (1) the observation that the measurements of Davenport and Steggerda refute rather than validate the principle, since there is not a high variability among Jamaica browns in those traits which are marked differentials between whites and blacks, and (2) the citation of authorities opposing a strict, Mendelian interpretation of the physical traits of the American Negro.⁹

Consciously or unconsciously, the Negro biologist Just completes this "defensive" attack upon the Mendelian theory of inheritance. The contempt of Just for race prejudice has been attested to by those who knew him best.¹⁰ It is not meant that he deliberately sought to destroy Mendelism because of a desire to defend the Negro. Deliberation itself never brings into the focus

⁸ W. M. Cobb, "Physical Constitution of the American Negro," *Journal of Negro Education*, Vol. III (1934).

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 355.

¹⁰ F. R. Lillie, "Ernest Everett Just," *Science*, January, 1942.

⁷ E. Franklin Frazier, *The Negro Family in Chicago* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1932), p. 247.

of attention all the forces sustaining it. Deeper-rooted experiences arising out of collective living and funded in the organism, though unconscious, are powerful determiners of thought. As for practical interests influencing the truths of the scientist, witness the statement of the biologist, Dr. Francis Sumner, who cites his conferees as having "too much sense to believe in a disinterested love of some abstraction called Truth or Science."¹²

Just attacks Mendelism at its basis. It is for him a problem of cytology. He asks: "Is heredity explicable by unit characters, genes, archtypal units, self-sustaining and passed down in holistic, immutable state from generation to generation?"

In the place of Mendelian explanations of heredity, Just proposes a theory of "genetic restriction." The determinative factors of heredity are located not within the sequestered nucleus but in the outer cell surface. Cytoplasm and, specifically, the ectoplasm take precedence over the inner chromosomes and genes. To support this theory, Just advances the following evidence: (1) the nucleus of the cell (in which reside the gene and chromosomes) may be removed from the egg at the onset of the fertilizable condition and embryos produced from the cytoplasm alone; (2) the so-called "genetic continuity" and "individuality" of the gene and chromosome are not consistent with the facts of cell division; (3) experiment reveals the function of genes to be to "act only through binding of potencies in such wise as to free the cytoplasm-located factors of heredity; and (4) such phenomena as polyembryony, merogony, haploid parthenogenesis, experimental and natural polyploidy, asexual reproduction by budding and fragmentation, regeneration of lost parts, and sex and hermaphroditism are better explained by "genetic restriction." His attitude toward the gene theory is best expressed in the following statement: "Untutored savage man made his god as big as possible because his god could do every-

thing. It remained for the geneticist to make one of molecular size, the gene."

The Weltanschauung of Just is environmentalistic. Time, the rate and rhythm of change, contains the very secret of life. Life arose originally as an emergent from the nonliving environment. Mind, too, knows its environment because it sprang from that source.¹³

Lewis, who is always meticulous in giving due weight to both sides of a question, has a decided preference for environment. In the first place, he defines hereditary factors in such a way as to reveal their natural and environmental origin.¹⁴ Differences between races that are inheritable are biological, anatomical, physiological, and chemical; all these are probably the result of adaptation to environment. Second, he includes under the category "environmental" not only "living conditions" but also "the habits and effects reflecting the mentality of races." Notation of the significance of environment for the mentality of races is subsumption under that category of one of the crucial factors employed by those who argue for the hereditary character of racial abilities and disabilities. Third, Lewis observes that the immunity of certain races to certain diseases is "an acquired racial immunity." The implication is that in time other races will build a similar immunity. At the basis of these thoughts lies a Weltanschauung similar to that of Just: Reality is time, change, the mobile interplay of environment-produced organism with its environment in an increasingly favorable adaptation. Lastly, Lewis announces as his purpose not only to point out differences but to *explain* them. The implication is that existing explanations based upon racial types are inadequate and that explanations are needed that will enable eventual eradication of the disease and *ipso facto* of the supposed racial differences. Finally, the significance of environment for the question of

¹² Ernest E. Just, *Biology of the Cell Surface* (Philadelphia: P. Blakiston's Sons & Co., Inc., 1938), p. 307.

¹³ *Op. cit.*, p. ix.

¹⁴ *Biological Symposia*, II, 18.

differences in the reactions of races to diseases is revealed in the statement that "one must determine first of all in each case if the disease behavior cannot be accounted for by the kind of houses people live in or the kind of work they do or the food they eat."¹⁴

As with the biologist, so with the sociologist, anthropologist, educational psychologist, and historian, environmentalism holds sway. Frazier accounts for the social disorganization of the Negro community by pointing to such determining factors as the economic struggle, recency of migration to Chicago, difference in the social controls of the Deep South and those of the new urban environment, and disparity in the cultural heritage of various groups of Negroes. In his later work, *The Negro Family in the United States*, the division of contemporary Negro society into a "brown middle class" and a "black proletariat" is based upon class rather than upon race. It is not approximation to the white type that has placed the browns in the middle class and the blacks in the lowest class. Both classes have emerged as a result of historical and socioeconomic factors. The ideals of the brown middle class are not "Negro" ideals; they reflect the diverse background of the components and much borrowing from the white leisure class as well. The ideals of the white leisure class are largely a function of the economic substructure. The outlook of the black proletariat is beginning to approximate that of white industrial workers; the fundamental basis of the latter is economic. Ultimate reality is concrete and empirical rather than a mysterious biological essence. In his *Negro Youth at the Crossways*, Frazier, so to speak, takes the bull by the horns. He devotes an entire section of the Appendix to the question of heredity versus environment. His counterattack is directed against McDougall's "unwarranted assumption that the Negro has a strong instinct of submission."¹⁵ He replies that

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. x.

¹⁵ E. Franklin Frazier, *Negro Youth at the Crossways* (Washington, D.C.: American Council on Education, 1941), p. 276.

physique, temperament, and intelligence are modified and influenced by social interaction. The original nature of the individual does not enter into the organization of his personality as a fixed quantity determining his responses to the culture. Motives, wishes, attitudes, and traits are emotions and impulses which "have been organized and directed toward goals in the course of social interaction."

Johnson's *Growing Up in the Black Belt* is also environmentalistic in perspective. In speaking of the personalities of Negroes of the Deep South, the author says:

The racial position of Negroes in the South is a part of the institutional organization of the South and reflects a long history of racial conflicts and accommodations. The attitudes and the behavior prompted by them may be said, in turn, to be a reflection of general economic and cultural factors.¹⁶

The fears, wishes, and emotional tensions centering about survival, security, and status are environmentally, not biologically, determined. Johnson relates personality to the will not only "to survive" but to "achieve a career." The achieving of a career definitely attaches the plastic tendencies of original nature to the conditioning influences of social goals.

The educational psychologists, Bond and Jenkins, emphasize environmental handicaps as determining factors in the low test scores of southern Negroes and southern whites. The anthropologist, Davis, cites from Hogben a passage supporting his contention that human conduct is to a considerable degree a function of environmental factors.¹⁷ Davis also gives prominence to geography as a factor significant for the development of physical differences among human beings. Cobb points out a functional connection between certain differential char-

¹⁶ Charles S. Johnson, *Growing Up in the Black Belt* (Washington, D.C.: American Council on Education, 1941), p. 276.

¹⁷ Allison Davis, "The Socialization of the American Negro Child and Adolescent," *Journal of Negro Education*, VIII (1939), 266 n.

acteristics of Negroes and development of the group in a previous habitat.

With some reservations the story is the same with the historians. Woodson clings to the idea of an immutable "African background"¹⁸ or folk soul; but, when it is of advantage to his counterknowledge (and this is frequent), he appeals to environment as an explanation of the shortcomings of Negroes.¹⁹ Du Bois' *Black Reconstruction* envisioned in the Marxist dialectic a principle whereby the racial interpretation of the events of that era might be supplanted by one that did less violence to the capabilities of Negroes. Negroes were not naturally timid; they fled to the Union armies; they initiated a general strike. The excesses of the Reconstruction were not confined to Negroes or to the South; they were nationwide, world wide. They were a part of the Gilded Age, the noontide of capitalism and imperialism. The Negro was a pawn in the game of exploitation, not a people doomed innately to timidity, ignorance, and shiftlessness. Wesley's monograph on *The Reconstruction of History* contains much that is indicative of an environmentalist perspective. The contention that history should not be "narrow," "tribal," or "nationalist" but a "concept for which world history is as important as the history of a nation or a group" obviously opposes the "race-soul" point of view. Wesley desires a history that is "the study of the past as it is," history-as-actuality, concrete, empirical phenomena, not the recasting of these phenomena in the form of some fantastic racial or national prototype. Wesley says it is in keeping with fact to demand that history be reconstructed "so that Negroes shall be known on a higher level than jokes and minstrels," for from the earliest periods of American history Negroes have been associated with all forward trends. The argu-

ment counterattacks the conception of the Negro as innately humorous by appealing to external fact. He further contends that Negroes should be looked upon as Americans rather than as Negroes, an idea that supplants biological classification with cultural. In his *Collapse of the Confederacy* Wesley cites, among others, the importance of the decline of morale as a factor contributing toward the defeat of the South. It must not be supposed that an innate desuetude of spirit determined this decline. Rather was it the deterrent effect of the oligarchic slave system itself. Hinton Helper and many of the apologists of the poor whites had nothing to fight for. Reddick's article, "A New Interpretation for Negro History," contends that economics should be the basic frame of reference for construction of the history of the Negro in the United States. Thus the movement toward emancipation during the Revolution ought to be attributed to the decline of demand over against the supply of the colonial staples in a world market; the North-South conflict of opposed economic systems; the political parties to the economic interests represented by them, and the Negro as a pawn for consolidating Civil War gains; the post-Civil War history of the Negro to a "rather blatantly aggressive industrialism conditioned by the interplay of population movements, the resistances of public opinion and the unchanneled labor protests, plus the rise in southern life and politics of the yeoman white leadership with its appeals to tradition and sympathy."²⁰ The major contribution of Reddick is his criticism of the Negro historian and the uncovering of biases emanating from theology and the ideology of liberalism. Similarly some few Negro scholars—Abram Harris,²¹ the econ-

¹⁸ C. Woodson, *The African Background Outlined—African Survivals* (Washington, D.C.: Association for the Study of Negro Life and History, Inc., 1936), p. 478.

¹⁹ Carter G. Woodson, *The Negro in Our History* (New York: Association Publishers, 1941), p. 9.

²⁰ L. D. Reddick, "A New Interpretation for Negro History," *Journal of Negro History*, Vol. XXII (1937).

²¹ Abram Harris and Sterling D. Spero, *The Black Worker* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1931); Abram Harris, *The Negro as Capitalist* (Philadelphia: American Academy of Political and Social Science, 1936).

omist; Ralph Bunche,²² the political scientist; and Frazier, the sociologist²³—have adopted the perspective that views the race problem as a class problem. Thus they tend to rise above the narrow “defense” perspective and, from the broader view afforded by the transracial position, are able to see the angle of vision accruing to much race scholarship. The term “class,” however, is conceived environmentally and not biologically.

RANGE OF VALIDITY

It is perhaps clear by now that there is a correlation between the practical interest in group status and the knowledge propounded by Negro scholars. Analysis is used frequently because it breaks up such morphological conceptions as “race” and enables reclassification of data in terms of meanings more favorable to the Negro. This intellectual phenomenon has its parallel in social action which aims to break up the status quo. Logical priority is conferred upon “exceptions” rather than the quantitative majority, for the exceptional Negro is living evidence of the ability of the Negro to take his place in Western civilization. He is an example of what all Negroes might become. Environmentalism is preferable to geneticism, since the former ascribes the shortcomings of Negroes to a nonracial factor and, simultaneously, implies demand for social reforms. It remains to discuss the epistemological significance of this correlation and its bearing upon the validity and truth of the knowledge.

As related above, social forces habituate the scholar to an immediate, “defense” reaction. Since this is his mental set, he fails to assume ideationally the attitude and mentality of the opposite group.²⁴ Thus he does not see the problem as the others see it,

²² Ralph Bunche, *A World View of Race* (Washington, D.C.: Associates in Negro Folk Education, 1930).

²³ E. Franklin Frazier, *The Negro Family in the United States* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1940).

²⁴ For the conception of “immediate” knowledge as narrow in contrast to the wider knowledge de-

and their perspective is excluded from his purview. His “defense complex” frustrates his very aim (a firmer, more inclusive truth than that of his opponent), for the comprehensiveness of experience and the range of validity of knowledge are directly related to breadth of perspective. If one knows a problem from only one angle of vision when there are many, one’s knowledge is obviously limited. The epistemological consequences of this for the knowledge of Negro scholars are: (1) absence of the awareness and, consequently, of the analysis of certain aspects of the problems that arise when experience is extended to comprehend the mentality of the opposite group; (2) an instantaneous and aggressive “drive” to reject the opponent’s knowledge even before considering its implications as support for the position of his own group; (3) failure to evaluate his conclusions critically and systematically from the perspective of the opponent, a condition that renders him blind to the implications his own knowledge may have as support for the position of the opponent; and (4) preclusion from experience of a great vista of relevant data which, if not obtained by conscious, systematic role-taking, may come into experience only through laborious, random thinking. The discussion immediately following illustrates this “particularity.”

Cobb’s *Physical Constitution of the American Negro* is a good example of a counter-knowledge which, because it is ideationally bound to its own role of group defense, fails to turn the knowledge of the opponent to its own advantage. It also shuts out of its experience the wide variety of data likewise accruing to the broader perspective.

A major interest of Dr. Cobb is to show that race-crossing is not dysgenic. In reply to the contention of the Jamaica study that crosses between whites and blacks are frequently “wuzzleheaded” or disharmonious combinations, he responds, inconsequenti-

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rived from the “delayed response” see George H. Mead, *Mind, Self, and Society*, ed. Charles W. Morris (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1934), pp. 98, 109, 177 (n. 254).

ally, that insufficient examples are given. He adds also that individuals with long arms and short legs suffer no functional disadvantage. Such thinking may be styled "fortuitous refutation"; it is catch-as-catch-can, void of a definite locus from which it may generate and anticipate systematically arranged objections to its own knowledge. Hence it seizes now upon this thought, now upon that, and very often misses the thought most vital to its argument. Had Cobb assumed ideationally the attitude of the scholars of the Jamaica group looking upon their own knowledge as well as at his criticism, instead of the particularized attitude of defense by direct refutation, his thought would have been broader and of greater effect than a mere tit for tat.

Since Cobb's article is dominated by environmentalism as opposed to genetic determination, it is not surprising that consideration of the possibility of genetic factors as determining the "wuzzleheadedness" of the brown does not enter his experience. Inclusion of that factor would have admitted of an explanation in terms of both heredity and environment and still along lines favorable to his social position. In a society in which race-crossing is frowned upon, sexual relations between the groups, for the most part, do not take place under eugenic conditions. The participants are frequently the sexually abnormal, the venereally diseased, and in many instances blood relatives (e.g., mating of the sons of planters with their half-sisters by plantation concubines). This opens up the significant question of correlating the subnormal intelligence of black-white crosses with intelligence, health, and blood relationship of the parental stocks. It is to the merit of the biologist Lewis that, in discussing the comparative reactions of Negroes and whites to diseases, he enters sympathetically into the evidence presented from both sides. He cites evidence that favors the Negro and that against. Where scientific basis is lacking, he merely states facts and suspends judgment.

Ideational assumption of the attitude of

the opposite group would have brought within the experience of the educational psychologist such considerations as the following: Does not overstressing of environment as determinative of human conduct unduly minimize the creative power of mankind in general and of the Negro in particular? Granted that the low scores of Negroes are indicative of poor support and prejudice on the part of the whites, do they not also indicate the inability of the Negro to master adverse conditions? In fact, many examples show that the immediate environment of the Negro is more directly his creation than that of the white man. It is conceivable that other races under identical or even more severe conditions might attain a greater degree of internal organization and improvement than the Negro. Preoccupation with the mentality of his own, as it opposes the genetic explanations of the other, group delimits the data and range of possible explanations.

The historiographer who would reconstruct history so as to change the stereotyped opinion the world has of the Negro might pause to consider whether the mentality of the opposite group might not consider his task presumptuous. Stolberg's article on "Minority Jingo" suggested this very thing.²⁵ Undeniably, the achievements of Negroes have not been given their place in world history; but to set up the social demands of a race (though ever so noble) as axioms according to which history is to be interpreted (Wesley) is to predetermine the historian to selection of certain events and suppression or distortion of others. Preoccupation with a racially pointed "reconstruction of history" blinds the historian to the fact that his extravagant praise of the trivial makes his knowledge as well as his group the easy target of the "debunker." Interchange of his immediate, defense attitude with that of the opposite mentality would afford acquaintance with and anticipation of the reply of the "debunker," with consequent repudiation of the knowledge

²⁵ Benjamin Stolberg, "Minority Jingo," *Nation*, July, 1931, 1937.

that would make his a target, or inclusion of it with adequate protection. The historian would do better to "paint his gray in gray" rather than in a false gold easily tarnished by the heat of satire.

In the work of Frazier, absence of thorough explanation of the numerous mulattoes in the more advanced "zones" as well as their prominence as leaders in the lesser "zones" leaves openings for objections by the Nordacist. Is it possible that *analysis* has consciously or unconsciously halted here? Is it possible that analysis is functionally dependent upon group interest to the extent that it is a noetic instrument breaking up the data only to the point at which they may be conveniently recombined in a manner consistent with social objectives? The major argument of Dr. Frazier's book is that the social organization or disorganization of the Negro group is not determined by genetic or racial factors. The obvious question posed by the opposite social group to Dr. Frazier would be: Granted that there are varying "zones" of social disorganization within the Negro community, is it not true that those individuals most closely approximating the Nordic type are culturally superior? Is this not a correlation between racial characteristics and degree of social organization? Dr. Frazier states that in some cases the mulatto is vocationally preferable and that this gives him an advantage. But he also says that the inhabitants of the higher "zones" are more ambitious and energetic, just as are certain individuals in any community. The question hinges, then, upon relation of environment to ambition, industry, etc., a problem scarcely touched upon.

If it be assumed that group welfare has consciously or unconsciously motivated the biological hypotheses of Dr. Just (and the Nordophile would so assume, witness Spengler's distinction between Faustian and Magian nature knowledge), then his minimizing of the strictly genetic factors of heredity might provoke the following question: Granted that the gene may lose individuality with each cell division, still the

portion remaining may have the power of approximate regeneration—a phenomenon as feasible as regeneration of lost parts by the total organism. Cell division need not destroy the "individuality" or "genetic continuity" of genes and chromosomes. The sources of the morphological characters distinguishing human races are genetic units, passed down holistically from generation to generation.

The following question arises in connection with Davis' article on blood groups. Is it not possible to analyze the isoagglutination blood reactions themselves and find criteria for racial difference? Perhaps the reaction for members of one race differ from another? Speed of clumping, stability, or other factors may constitute differentials. While such suggestions often border upon the absurd, their mention must be considered relevant, since the mentality of the Nordophile, as most race-thinking, abounds in absurdity.

In the far greater number of cases studied the Negro scholar has risen above the narrow racist perspective such as was characteristic of the imaginative writers of the "Negro Renaissance."²⁶ He no longer overtly postulates a separate group of race values according to which all things Negro are apotheosized. He attempts to follow scientific procedure and keeps before him the ideal of truth independent of perspective. But he is unaware of the determinative significance of social forces especially for the historical-cultural sciences, the sphere of knowledge in which discussion of the race problem, for the most part, falls. Born and confined to a milieu within which struggle against out-group and counterrace status has been waged for generations, his action and thought have become interwoven with "defense mechanisms." The defense has become a "fixed response." As a result, though his analyses propose to observe sci-

²⁶ For the race-centered thought of the "Negro Renaissance" see Charles S. Johnson, "The Possibilities of a Separate Black Culture," in *Race Relations*; cf. also Alain Locke, "The Negro—New or Newer," *Opportunity*, January, 1939.

entific method and fact, still they too readily oppose before they have understood, or they halt the analytical attack consciously or unconsciously at those points most convenient for recombination of the data in accordance with group interest. The ruling group cites the failures of the masses of Negroes; the scholar retaliates with the achievements of the exceptions as indicative of the potentialities of these masses. The former again stresses inborn, racial inequalities; the latter replies with environmentalism. Both have failed to recognize that their knowledge is part of the knowledge of a "public," that such knowledge is dialectical in nature, and that its range of validity is directly pro-

portional to the breadth of its role-taking in an "interchange of attitudes." Recognition of this will not only prove a logical technique for systematic anticipation of objections thereby promoting cogency of argument; it will be an instrument for improvement of racial understanding. Sheer, empathetic assumption of the attitude and mentality of one race by the other is creative overcoming of culturally rooted complexes and prejudices. "Talking past one another" will be reduced and bases established for community of meaning and actual living.

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"SOCIAL DETERMINATION" IN THE WRITINGS OF NEGRO SCHOLARS TWO REJOINDERS

I

E. FRANKLIN FRAZIER

It would not be difficult to show that the research interests of many Negro scholars have been "socially determined." For example, in his autobiography, *Dusk of Dawn*, Du Bois shows how, because of his racial identity, he was led first to study the Philadelphia Negro and later to inaugurate the Atlanta University studies of Negro life. In the graduate schools of the country the Negro is often expected and encouraged to devote his time to the study of the Negro. However, Mr. Fontaine is not concerned with these more or less obvious phases of "social determination" but rather with the more subtle aspects of the intellectual outlook of Negro scholars and the conceptual tools which they employ. Armed with the concepts of the sociology of knowledge he undertakes to show that the "mental set" of the Negro scholar is determined by "such psychosocial factors as resentment, aggression, rage, and the desire for equality."

In order to prove his thesis, the author does not utilize social-psychological data such as could be found in the printed works of Du Bois or might have been secured from the other scholars whose works he examined. Perhaps, he failed to use such empirical data because, as he asserts, the Negro scholar may be unconscious of the "social determination" of his scientific conceptions. If Mr. Fontaine is correct, I am

sure that this was true of the late Dr. Ernest Just, who would have been surprised to learn that his work in cytology, some of which was done in collaboration with Professor Lillie, was due to an unconscious attempt to locate the hereditary forces in the ectoplasm because it was closest to the influence of the environment! Dispensing with psychosocial data, the author attempts to establish his thesis by showing "the functional dependence between the social situation confronting the Negro group and much of the knowledge cultivated by its scholars." This is shown, according to the author, by the "categorical apparatus" employed; "the selection of certain data as logically prior"; "the selection of theories obviously supporting group interests"; and the narrow scope of observation. No one can deny that Mr. Fontaine has exhibited considerable ingenuity in showing that the works of certain Negro scholars possess these characteristics. But the ingenuity which he exhibits is on a purely verbal level, for his analyses fail to meet the requirements of even a formal analysis of the works which he considers. The mechanical manner in which he utilizes the concepts of the sociology of knowledge makes his analysis appear at times as a logomachy. In fact, he may object to my using the word "analysis" to describe his treatment of the works of Negro scholars, since the use of *analysis* by Ne-

gro scholars is one of the evidences of the "social determination" of their thinking. However, since Mr. Fontaine (I presume) is a Negro, he, too, is subject to "social determination."

It is unnecessary to show the futility of the author's speculations concerning why Just became interested in cytology. Probably if he had known of the work of the late Dr. Imes in physics, he could have worked out some ingenious reason to explain the interest of the former in the infra-red rays. I shall limit myself here to some remarks on what the author has said concerning the work of Negroes in the field of the social sciences and psychology. It is not difficult to explain the scientific outlook of the Negro scholar and the conceptual tools which he utilizes. If, as the author states, the Negro scholar has arrived, he has only become a competent thinker and craftsman. The techniques and conceptual tools which he uses have been acquired during the course of his education. Doubtless, he has made some worth-while contributions in the various fields, but so far he has not broadened our own intellectual vistas or forged new conceptual tools. That the majority of Negro psychologists and social scientists are environmentalists simply means that they have taken over the viewpoint prevailing today. I say "the majority of Negro psychologists and social scientists" because there are some who believe in biological determinism. However, it seems that the author is not concerned with material which he cannot use to prove his thesis.

Since the author has singled out my two books on the Negro family for study, it will not be considered out of place for me to make some comments concerning these works. My interest in the study of the Negro family began while I was the director of the Atlanta School of Social Work. Through the reading of the works of Burgess and Mowrer, I developed the idea that a more fundamental knowledge of the processes of disorganization and reorganization of Negro family life than was in existence at that time should be made available for social workers. Subsequently, when I entered the University of Chicago, I was very much impressed by the ecological approach to the study of social phenomena. One day in "The Temple," as the old social research laboratory was called, I separated the data on Negro homeownership from similar data for whites according to zones of urban expansion in order to find out if the rates

for Negroes showed a gradient as did the figures for the total population. Thus I discovered the zones in the Negro community which became a frame of reference for my other data on the family. Somewhere in my unconscious I may have been trying to break up a "morphological category," but, as far as my conscious self was concerned, I was engaged in what Lin Yutang has called "playful curiosity." Moreover, instead of building a defense for the disorganization of Negro family life, I accepted it as a fact and documented it, with the result that I was attacked as a "prejudiced Texas cracker." In my later work, *The Negro Family in the United States*, I attempted only to show how the Negro family had developed in the environment of the United States. I was criticized by Negroes because I did not represent Negro women as martyrs in their relations with southern white men, and I was criticized by some whites for being "too damned objective." But Mr. Fontaine wants to know why I did not study the influence of genetic or biological factors on the organization and disorganization of Negro family life. The answer is simple. I did study the racial or biological factor, color, where it was relevant in a sociological and cultural analysis. Then there was the prosaic fact that I found mulatto and pure black families that were well organized and mulatto and pure black families that were completely disorganized. Therefore, my "playful curiosity" was stopped when I began to speculate on the role of white and black genes in family organization.

This negative criticism of the article by Mr. Fontaine does not mean that the contributions of Negro scholars could not be studied profitably from the standpoint of the sociology of knowledge. Such a study would require, first, a more fundamental knowledge of the "social position" of the various Negro scholars than the author of this article possesses. To assume that the "social position" of all Negro scholars is identical indicates a lack of an understanding of the viewpoint of the sociology of knowledge. A study of this type would require a better understanding of the works of Negro scholars than the author has exhibited. It is misleading to lump together, as the author has done, objective studies which simply reveal variations in the intellectual and cultural development of Negroes and those which are obviously defensive and chauvinistic and emphasize achievements that have no meaning except within the black ghetto. For example, to say that both Profes-

sor Bond and Dr. Woodson emphasize the *achievements* of the Negro is a complete misrepresentation and confusion of the viewpoints of these two scholars. Finally, such a study would explain a writer like William H. Thomas, a mulatto, who did not *analyze* the "morphological category," Negro race, but found in it an adequate explanation of the immorality and the

degradation of the Negro. Such a study may even explain the mixed-blood's "wuzzleheadedness," a term which was not clear to me when I read the work by Staggerda and Davenport but which now is beginning to have a meaningful content.

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II

E. B. REUTER

Mr. Fontaine has advanced the thesis that the work of the Negro scholars is functionally dependent upon the social status of the Negro in the American culture; in consequence, the body of research tends to be a defense of the racial group rather than a disinterested search for truth. To this position, one gives at least a qualified assent; it is exceptional rather than usual for students of social reality to rise to a truly objective level of analysis. But the proposition assimilates the Negro scholar to, rather than differentiates him from, the current level of scholarly procedure.

In demonstration of his position, the author asserts that the socially determined bias of the Negro scholar is revealed in his selection of data, his choice of theories, his manipulation of concepts, and in his restricted orbit of observation; he surveys the studies by Negro scholars to show their biases and to show how these limit the validity of scholarly pronouncements.

It would seem that the author's survey illus-

trates his thesis but does not prove it. At most it shows a correspondence between social status and the theoretical position occupied. This does not demonstrate a functional dependence. It may very well be that the Negro scholar occupies the position that he does because the weight of evidence makes any other position untenable. The great majority of white scholars occupy substantially the same position. Presumably, they reach conclusions inimical to their racial status by an objective examination of the evidence. In the absence of conclusive evidence, we may not assume that white scholars reach a position on the basis of evidence and that Negro scholars reach the same position because of their social bias. This is not to deny that there are many Negro students who are unable to recognize and discount their biases, but the Negro group has no monopoly on undisciplined and incompetent scholars.

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MARITAL SEPARATIONS

WILLIAM FIELDING OGBURN

ABSTRACT

About one in twenty families in the United States in 1940 is broken temporarily or permanently by the separation of husband and wife other than through divorce or death. The characteristics of the separated and the divorced are somewhat alike as to absence of children, occupation, employment of wives, nativity, and urban residence. Separations are more numerous among non-whites, in cities, among childless couples, and in service occupations and are higher than average among the low-income groups of the laboring class.

The United States Bureau of the Census published, in 1935, figures on the number of families in 1930 in which either the husband or the wife was found not living at the family residence and in which there was neither death nor divorce. These data were recorded by the Census coders as families with "spouse absent," as contrasted with families in which both husband and wife were present, families in which one mate was divorced, and families in which the mate is widowed. Not much attention seems to have been given by sociologists to this information. For 1940 the Bureau of the Census has published similar information, but with many cross-classifications with other characteristics. It is therefore possible to analyze these important data of 1940 further.

THE CONCEPT OF SEPARATION

I shall call those cases where the husband or wife is not living at the family domicile and is neither divorced nor widowed as "separated." They are separated, since they are not living together.

In the past the term "separation" when applied to marriage has meant departure from bed and board by one mate with the intention of being divorced or of remaining separated. This concept is certainly applicable now to one type of separation of husband and wife. It was especially suitable in an agricultural society where there was little individual travel or migration, where most of the jobs were on farms, where a woman could scarcely get a job and had to be supported by a husband or a relative,

where husbands and wives were more or less essential to the running of a farm, and when there were few cities with hotels, restaurants, processed foods, laundries, hospitals, clothing stores, and places to work outside the home. In such a society, if husbands and wives did not live together, a long-continued separation was implied. The Census term "spouse absent" in those days would have meant probably such a permanent parting of husband and wife.

No doubt in a large number of cases today the meaning of separation is that described above. What proportion of cases where the spouse was absent is this type of separation the enumerator did not ascertain. But we know there are other types of separation. There are cases (a) where the spouse is an inmate of an institution, such as a prison or a hospital for mental disorders, (b) where the husband is in the armed forces, (c) where a sailor is away for a long time at sea, (d) where the spouse is living in another nation, and (e) where the husband or wife is working in another locality with the idea of returning sometime. All these types of separations are included in the Census term "spouse absent." What proportion of all cases these represent is not known. The matter will be considered in a later paragraph. Indeed, the purpose, in part, of this paper is to inquire into the question of whether the class "spouse absent" has the characteristics of the class "separated," implied by the earlier use of the term.

In any case, it should be noted that the

term "spouse absent," or "separation," as I shall call it, truly implies a broken home, irrespective of whether or not a permanent separation was intended at the time it occurred. It is a broken home and may be even more socially significant than a home broken by divorce or by widowhood. Such a broken home is socially significant, since a mate is deprived of the association with the other partner and their happiness, health, and well-being are affected accordingly. Furthermore, where there are children, they do not have the advantage of the daily expression of love and counsel of a mother or father. A divorced or widowed spouse may remarry, which is not the case with the separated couples. A home broken because of a "spouse absent" is a significant social concept, whatever may be the reason for the absence.

EVIDENCE ON THE CONCEPT OF SEPARATIONS

There were in the United States in 1940 between 1.5 and 1.6 million husbands with wives absent and approximately the same number of wives with husbands away. We may say, therefore, that there were 1.5-1.6 million separated couples. The number of separated couples is 5.4 per cent of the number of married couples living together. Expressed in another way, there is 1 separated couple for every 18 or 19 married couples living together. This fact, of great significance for the sociology of marriage and the family, is new and was not known a decade ago.

Of these broken homes, 0.3 million were broken because one mate was in a prison or insane hospital.

With regard to that class of separations in which one spouse was living in a foreign country, such as the case of an immigrant who left a mate behind, it is known that there were 225 thousand immigrants whose spouses were absent. Probably nearly all of these were absent for the same reasons that the spouses of nonimmigrants were absent. If 10 per cent were still in the country of origin, there would be 23 thousand.

As to the wives whose husbands were in

the armed forces, it may be observed that the Census was taken in April, 1940, six months before the passage of the Selective Service Act and a year and a half before we entered the war. At that time the Census records only 14 thousand married soldiers, sailors, marines, and coast guards with wives absent. Of sailors and deck hands, the Census lists 3 thousand married with wives absent. Only 20 per cent of these sailors were married, and only one-third of those married were reported as living away from their wives.

Thus there were probably around 1.2 million homes broken for causes other than crime, insanity, seafaring, war, and immigration. These were homes broken, in the main, temporarily, because a spouse was working in another locality or because it was a lasting "separation," preceding a divorce, annulment, or a permanent dwelling apart. We have no statistical estimates of the number broken temporarily because a spouse was working in another locality, but the analysis which follows will present evidence to indicate that it was a small proportion.

Before presenting this analysis, we may make an observation on the concept of a home broken temporarily because of employment of a mate elsewhere. One situation is that, say, of a husband from Kentucky working in Detroit who expects to bring his wife to him or to return to her in the course of time. There are at all times probably a substantial number of such cases. However, the husband does not always return, nor does he invariably have his wife join him. There is some unintentional drifting apart, especially on the part of individuals with low incomes who cannot travel much and who are not accustomed to writing letters. In other words, permanent separations in modern urban society may begin without any intention of permanency. It is therefore more difficult in modern times to draw the line between a separation which is permanent and one which is not than it was in an agricultural era.

THE NUMBER OF BROKEN MARRIED COUPLES

With the foregoing idea of a broken marriage the statistics of the number of broken couples may be presented. In 1940, for every 100 married men in the United States living with their wives, there were 15 husbands or men who had been married whose wives were away because of separation, divorce, or death. Among women there are 28 wives and former wives living without husbands for every 100 married women living with their husbands. The greater number of women without husbands is due in the main to the number of widowed women. There are over twice (2.66 times) as many widowed women as widowed men. The death rate is higher for men, but, as has been shown elsewhere, widowed men tend to marry younger single women.

If the widowed are omitted from the calculations, on the assumption that death is inevitable while separation and divorce are not, it is found that, for every 100 married men living with their wives, there are 7 or 8 (75 per 1,000) separated and divorced men, or about 1 to 13. Among women there is a slightly higher ratio, 1 to 12; or for every 100 wives living with their husbands there are 8 or 9 (84 per 1,000) divorced or separated women. There are about a third more divorced women than there are men, owing to the fact that divorced women are less likely to remarry. In 1940, then, there was one divorced or separated man to every 12 or 13 married men; and the same ratio held for women. Thus there was approximately 1 divorced or separated person to every 6 married couples.

BROKEN FAMILIES

We have been discussing broken married couples. A married couple with or without children is not exactly the same always as a family group, as the Bureau of the Census uses the term "family." For instance, a "family" group in the Census terminology may mean two married couples living together, where the husband of one of the couples is a family head. There were, for instance, 28.6 million married couples

living together in 1940 in the United States, but only 26.7 million unbroken "families." There were thus 1.9 million more married couples than families, who were presumably living with other family groups or in lodging houses, hotels, and institutions. So, also, there are families in the Census classification with a widow as family head. But there are also widows living in other families but not as head.

As to the separated "families," there were in 1940 in the United States more than 1.5 million separated men, but only 0.45 million separated men who were heads of "families." Similarly, there were 0.79 million separated women who were heads of "families." There were then 1.24 million broken "families," which was 1 "family" broken by separation to every 23 unbroken families. The number of broken families with a separated mate as head is 2.1 times as large as the number of broken families with a divorced person as head. There were, then, slightly fewer "families" broken by separation, 1 in 23, than there were broken married couples, 1 in 18 or 19. These figures give us information never known before about the extent of homes broken by separation.

SEPARATED COUPLES BY AGE

The meaning of marriage and family is different for different ages of married persons. Oddly, it is the very young married persons who are most often separated. Of young men, fifteen to nineteen years of age, for 100 married and living with their wives there are 27 living away from their wives. Of those twenty to twenty-four years old, the number is 7. The lowest number at any age group is 4.6 at thirty to thirty-four years. The number rises slowly and stays around 5 up until sixty-five years of age. At eighty to eighty-four years, the number separated per 100 is 8, and it is 12 beyond eighty-five years.

Among women the curve is high in the early years of married life and in old age, and hence like that of the men, but not so high in youth as for males and higher than

for men in old age. Why there is not quite so much separation for young married women fifteen to nineteen years old (9 per 100 married couples) as for men may be explained by the fact that girls marry older men, who should be able to meet the economic needs of a family better than boys who marry in the teens.

It is also possible that there is some mis-mating in these years which is responsible for the spouses' living apart, although the percentage of divorced persons from fifteen to nineteen and from twenty to twenty-four years of age is not particularly large. In the very old age groups the separations would seem to be for economic or health reasons rather than because of sexual difficulties or personality differences.

It is also possible that the explanation of the large number of separated older couples lies in the accumulation of their numbers as the years go by. Those who separate and do not become divorced remain separated, and new separations may be added faster than the deaths and divorces.

The curve of separated persons by ages in percentages is a long, low *concave* curve with high rates at the end for youth and at the end for age. The curve for divorced persons is a long, low *convex* curve; there are few divorced persons per 100 married couples living together among the young or among the very old. The age of minimum separated persons is from thirty to thirty-five years of age. The age of maximum divorced persons is thirty-five to thirty-nine for women and fifty to fifty-four for men, though the periods when the greatest number of divorces occur would be earlier.

CHILDREN AND SEPARATION

It is known that divorces are much more frequent among couples without children than in homes with children. We should expect the same in the case of separation, unless separations were merely temporary absences of a mate away on business or for some other reason. Some light on this question is found in the Census data on size of "families" classified as broken and

unbroken. Of the unbroken "families" with head and mate living together, 26.7 million in number, 41 per cent had no children under eighteen years old, whereas 59 per cent of the broken "families" with a separated mate as head had no children under eighteen years of age. Thus the broken "families" have fewer children than the unbroken. The percentage of broken homes, 59, without children in which a separated person is head is similar to the 67 per cent of broken families with a divorced person as head having no children under eighteen years of age. Separation or "spouse absent" is thus like divorce in occurring where there are few children.

We have shown the percentage of "families" broken by separation who had no children. We want now to inquire into the "married couples" broken by separation with reference to children. There were 1.2 million of these broken "families," representing also about 1.2 million broken "married couples," which, however, are not all the broken married couples. There were upward of 1.5 million broken married couples, of whom, then about 0.3 million were not living as heads of families. Did these 0.3 million have children under eighteen? We do not know, though we know that they do appear in the Census as heads of families. If they had no children, then of all these 1.5 million broken married couples 33 per cent had children. If they had the same number of children per family as the "families" broken by separation, then 41 per cent had children. It seems probable that from 33 to 41 per cent of separated couples had children, though there could have been a larger percentage. There were probably fewer children per broken married couple than per broken "family" with a separated mate as head.

RACE

The non-white population, largely Negro, have a much higher ratio of separations than do the white. Indeed, the rates of separated to married couples among the non-white is about three times as high as

among the whites. For every 100 husbands living with their wives among the non-whites, there are 14 (13.6) separated men, whereas among the whites the number is 5 (4.6). Among non-white women, for every 100 married couples there are 17 (16.7) separated wives, a substantially higher number than among the men. Two possible explanations are that there may be some mixed marriages and also there may be better reporting among the women than among men.

The non-whites represent a lower economic class and hence a class with not so much money for purchasing divorces as the whites. Yet the ratio of divorced to married is very nearly as large among the non-whites as among the whites. Hence the price of divorce in relation to income hardly explains the large number of separated among the non-whites. The non-whites may migrate a good deal as common labor, and, not being adept with pencil and paper, separated couples may not keep in touch by writing and thus drift apart. Then, too, there may be different sex habits among the non-whites, owing to factors other than income and migration.

The foreign-born in the United States, on the other hand, have fewer separations than do the native whites of native parentage. For the age group thirty to thirty-four years old living in cities, the ratio of husbands with wives absent to 100 couples among the foreign-born married men is 16 per cent smaller than among the native whites of native parentage of comparable age and residence, while among women the ratio is 28 per cent less. This difference between the sexes is due in part to the fact that there are fewer foreign-born wives with husbands absent than there are foreign-born husbands with wives not present, while the reverse is true among the native whites of native parentage. Some foreign-born have spouses in the old country. Very probably more foreign-born men marry native-born wives than there are foreign-born women married to native-born husbands.

The fact that immigrants to this country have fewer separations than do natives may be due to the stronger family system in foreign lands, and it may be due to religion. This religious influence probably finds expression in the scarcity of divorce among the foreign-born, which is only about one-half that found among the natives of native parentage of comparable ages with urban residences, as measured by the aforementioned ratios. But these religions do not actually forbid separations as they do divorces, although they may oppose separations; and what little correlation there is between divorce and separation, as will be shown later, is negative. But, while the divorces are 50 per cent less, the separations among the foreign-born are from 15 to 30 per cent less than among the natives of native parents.

URBAN-RURAL RESIDENCE

On the farms there is less separation than in the cities, as would be expected. For every 100 married native white couples on farms there are 3 (2.7) husbands with wives not present, while in urban communities there are nearly twice that many, 5 (4.9). Urban residences are those over 2,500, and hence include many towns. In a very large city, New York, there are 6 (6.2) native white men with wives absent for every 100 married couples.

There appears to be a tendency for separated wives to migrate from the farms to the city (more than separated husbands). On farms there are only 2 native white women with husbands absent per 100 couples, while in a large city, New York, there are three times as many, 6.4. For men there are only twice as many.

The pattern of separated persons according to residence on farms and in cities is much the same as the pattern of divorced persons. There are fewer divorced persons in the country and fewer separated persons. Also the ratio of divorced heads of families to separated heads of families on farms (1 to 2.8) is similar to that in cities (1 to 1.8). So, too, the correlation between the sepa-

rated by states on farms and in cities is about the same as the correlation between divorced. There is, therefore, a similarity between divorced and separated. On farms 1 wife out of 34 married native white women is either divorced or separated, while in a large city, as, for example, New York City, there is 1 out of 13.

There is not a great deal of difference in separations in the different regions of the United States when factors are held constant such as age, nativity, and urban-rural residence, except that the separated persons are greater in percentages in the West than in the North or the South.

MIGRATION AND SEPARATION

Probably some separations occur because a husband or a wife moves away to another locality for work or to get far away. On this theory we should expect the growing communities to have somewhat more separated persons than those increasing less rapidly, though, if only one separated person moved, this would not be the case. The states that have grown most rapidly do have more separated persons. The correlations are of the order of $+ .5$, about the same for both men and women. On the other hand, with cities over 100,000 inhabitants the association is slight, being of the order of $+ .2$. It is not clear why these cities over 100,000 should show less association than do states. There are, however, more divorced white women in these cities that have grown most rapidly, the correlation being $+ .4$. The correlation for white divorced men is $+ .3$. Again it is not known why growing cities should attract more divorced women than divorced men, or why these cities should attract divorced persons more than separated persons.

DIVORCE LAWS AND SEPARATIONS

A question that readily arises is: Are there more or fewer separations in states in which divorced persons are few than where they are numerous? One theory is that stopping divorces increases the number of separations. On this theory, South Caroli-

na, which permits no divorces, should have a large number of separated persons, but the ratio of separated men to married men in South Carolina is about the same as that for the United States. New York State, which has strict divorce laws, has more than the average number of separated men, but so do the Pacific Coast states with easy divorce laws. Another theory is that the conditions that encourage divorces also encourage separations. Perhaps these forces counteract each other. In any case, the correlation between divorced men and separated men is 0 for the 47 states, Nevada omitted. Likewise, there is no correlation by cities. However, when the rate of growth is held constant, there is a correlation of $- .5$ for the states but none for cities, since the growth of cities is not related to the number separated. There does not seem to be much, if any, correlation between the number separated and the numbers divorced on the basis of cities or states.

EMPLOYMENT AND SEPARATION

When a farm wife in the agricultural era separated from her husband, she was supposed to have returned to her family, as there were few opportunities of making a living. In an industrial age, this situation is changed, and we should expect a large percentage of separated women to be employed or seeking work, unless the absence of the husband was temporary. This is the case. Forty-eight per cent of married women with spouses absent were employed regularly or on relief work or were seeking employment. There is no such high percentage among unseparated wives, among whom only 13 per cent are employed or seeking employment. Of the remaining 52 per cent of separated wives not employed or seeking employment perhaps some have gone back to live with relatives, some have children supporting them, while others are supported by their absent husbands. The separated give evidence of economic distress almost to the same extent as do the divorced and widowed, though the latter group are older. This is shown by the

number of those seeking work and employed on relief in 1940 per 100 regularly employed. For the separated there are 22 per 100 and for the widowed and divorced, 24. The economic difficulties of the separated women is indicated by the fact that about one-half (52 per cent) of married women seeking work are away from their husbands, while only 15 per cent of married women at work are away from their husbands.

There is other evidence of the relation of jobs to separations. Those cities that have the largest number of unseparated married women employed also have the largest number of married women separated from their husbands. The correlation is $+.58$. We cannot tell from this correlation whether the jobs encourage women to separate or whether after separation they go to cities to seek work where other women have found it. But we do note that, of the married women at work, 15 per cent were away from their husbands, while 34 per cent of the married women seeking work were away from their husbands. This may indicate that they left home for other reasons than having jobs in other localities or that they were left by their husbands and then began seeking employment. That there is a relationship between employment of married women and separation is also shown by the fact that of married women not at work only 4 per cent are separated, while of the married women at work 15 per cent are separated. Also those cities that have the greatest percentage of separated women working also have the greatest percentage of separated wives, with a correlation for 91 cities of over 100,000 inhabitants of $+.5$. Thus employment of married women, of separated women, and separations tend to be found in the same cities.

There are still other economic aspects of the separated shown in the data of the Census. It is recalled that a large number of young married persons live in the same household with the father of the husband or wife. In such cases these young married people are much more often separated than

is the case of the older couple. Thus among the 27 million families with a husband as head, there were 1.6 million married couples living in the same household and 0.36 million married persons with a spouse absent. These married persons living with the head were all related to him, presumably most of them his sons and daughters. Of these second families in the household, 18 per cent were separated, as compared with 1.8 per cent of the first families with a male as head. There were a few families in this two-or-more-family group of homes where the young couple were from fourteen to seventeen years old. Fifty-seven per cent of these were separated.

OCCUPATIONS AND SEPARATIONS

In the publications of the Census of 1940 there are data showing the number of separated married couples by the occupation of the spouse. These data are interesting in themselves. They show, for instance, that there is a large amount of separation in families where the husband's occupation is that of canvasser or solicitor, but that there is a low rate among mail carriers. Similarly, the percentage is high among farm laborers but low among farmers. We can only speculate as to the reasons for these and other differences.

Perhaps of some social significance is the fairly high rate of separations among laborers. Of the married male laborers (not divorced or widowed) in the labor force, 6 per cent are separated, as compared with 2.4 per cent with proprietors, managers, and officials. Farmers and farm managers have a very low rate of 1.4 per cent, while among married couples with the male head in domestic service, the percentage separated is 16. High rates are found among actors, musicians, dancers, and showmen, proprietors of eating places, canvassers, peddlers, structural metalworkers, laundry operatives, operatives in tobacco manufacture, soldiers, sailors, boarding-house keepers, janitors, cooks, housekeepers, servants and waiters, fishermen, longshoremen,

and lumbermen. Low rates exist among clergymen; professors; dentist; lawyers; farmers; managers and officials in finance, insurance, real estate, manufacturing and transportation; power-station operators; foremen; operatives of machinery and paper products and printing.

In looking over this list of occupations with high and low separation rates, there are a number of occupations for which, it was recalled, the Bureau of the Census worked out divorce rates in 1909 for the period from 1887 to 1906. Comparing the Census list of 1909 for divorces with the Census list of 1940 for separations, it was found that there were 35 occupations which were probably fairly equivalent classifications in both periods, as, for instance, physicians and surgeons. There was some similarity in the ranking of the two lists. Thus actors are high in divorce rate and in separation rate, and clergymen are low in both. There are, however, exceptions; farm laborers are low in divorce rate but high in separation rate. The two series are 40 years apart, and the relationship is not linear, yet the correlation is .3. Again, the characteristics of the separated, that is, those families with a "spouse absent," is somewhat like those of the divorced.

CONCLUSIONS

From the Census of 1940 there are new and important data on the number of separations of husband and wife, which show that there is 1 such broken home to approximately 20 unbroken. These homes are thought to be broken for the following reasons: imprisonment, hospitalization, preparation for war, sailing the seas, residence in a foreign land, temporary employment elsewhere, and a permanent separation. There appear to be about 1.2 million homes broken because of temporary employment elsewhere and because of permanent separation, or about 1 in 25. The characteristics of the separated couples in regard to the employment of wives, the scarcity of children, the nativity of the couples, urban-rural residence, and occupations are somewhat like the characteristics of divorced couples. Thus it may be inferred that a large proportion of the separated are permanent separations or at least have some characteristics of the permanently separated. Separations are more numerous among non-whites, in cities, in the young and old age groups, in rapidly growing areas, among childless couples, in the service occupations, and higher than average among the low-income groups of the laboring class.

PREDICTING ADJUSTMENT IN MARRIAGE FROM ADJUSTMENT IN ENGAGEMENT

ERNEST W. BURGESS AND PAUL WALLIN

ABSTRACT

Previous studies have demonstrated the possibility of predicting success or failure in marriage from background and personality factors. The present study reports an attempt to predict marital adjustment from adjustment of the couple during engagement. An engagement adjustment scale was devised, similar to the standard marriage adjustment scale and validated by securing statistically significant differences in mean adjustment scores between broken and nonbroken engagements for men of 146.4 and 153.1 and for women of 144.2 and 153.2, respectively. The reliability of the scale is indicated by a correlation of responses from a retest seven months later of $.75 \pm .05$ for the men and $.71 \pm .06$ for the women. The correlation between the engagement adjustment scores of the members of the 505 couples was $.53 \pm .03$. The feasibility of predicting marital adjustment from engagement adjustment was shown by a correlation of $.43 \pm .04$ for the men and $.41 \pm .04$ for the women between the engagement adjustment scores and marital adjustment scores secured three years after marriage. Improvement of the engagement adjustment score should increase its value as a predictive instrument. Combining the engagement adjustment score with the background score and the personality score should improve the efficiency of predicting before marriage the marital adjustment of engaged couples.

Several studies¹ have been made to determine the factors associated with marital adjustment, or success.² The two most comprehensive and systematic were by Burgess and Cottrell³ and by Terman and his associates.⁴ These two investigations, based, respectively, on Illinois and California samples of married couples, were explicitly concerned with testing the feasibility of predicting success or failure in marriage. Both evolved scales for measuring the marital success of their subjects and found an association between these measures and a large number of social and psychological variables.⁵ Weights roughly commensurate with the extent of the association were

assigned the significant variables, and the couples were scored on each of the items. The total score of a couple on all the items constituted its prediction score.⁶ The correlation between the prediction and marriage adjustment scores was .61 for the Burgess-Cottrell couples⁷ and .54 and .47 for the husbands and wives of the Terman group.⁸

Both studies thus demonstrated the possibility of predicting success or failure in marriage on the basis of information available before but secured after marriage.

⁶ Burgess and Cottrell (*Predicting Success or Failure in Marriage*, pp. 269-89) calculated a joint prediction score for each of their couples, whereas Terman (*op. cit.*, pp. 358-59) derived a separate score for husband and wife.

⁷ This was the maximum correlation obtained by adding contingency scores, based on postmarital items, to the prediction scores. The correlation between prediction scores alone and adjustment scores was .56 (*Predicting Success or Failure in Marriage*, p. 328).

⁸ Terman obtained this correlation by including in his prediction scores selected personality items. There is some question as to whether personality items obtained after marriage should be included in a prediction study based on married couples, since it has not yet been shown that they are unaffected by marriage or by events occurring after marriage. The correlation between adjustment scores and prediction scores, exclusive of these items, was .35 for husbands and .29 for wives (Terman, *op. cit.*, p. 360).

¹ See E. W. Burgess and L. S. Cottrell, Jr., *Predicting Success or Failure in Marriage* (New York, 1939), pp. 350-61, for a review of these studies.

² The terms "marital adjustment," "happiness," "satisfaction," and "success" are used interchangeably in this article for convenience of discussion.

³ *Op. cit.*; see also E. W. Burgess and L. S. Cottrell, "The Prediction of Adjustment in Marriage," *American Sociological Review*, I (1936), 737-51.

⁴ L. M. Terman *et al.*, *Psychological Factors in Marital Happiness* (New York, 1938).

⁵ The variables were assumed to be present before marriage and uninfluenced by the postmarital experiences of the couples. Furthermore, it was assumed that postmarital reports upon premarital variables would not be affected by postmarital experience.

Whether, however, the predictive items derived from these studies of married couples will show the same relation to marital happiness when tested on engaged couples is yet to be seen. Such a test is now being made by the writers in a study of a thousand engaged couples.⁹

The present paper is not concerned with investigating the efficacy of the predictive factors established by earlier studies. These studies have been described here in order that their procedure may be contrasted with the approach to marital prediction presented in this report. As indicated above, past research in marriage prediction has proceeded from the assumption that variables of a social or psychological character present before marriage could be found which would account for the variability in marital happiness of couples and that, accordingly, their identification would allow for the prediction of marital success or failure. The study reported here is an investigation of the extent to which marital happiness can be forecast from a knowledge of adjustment in engagement. It differs from preceding studies in that it took as its point of departure the assumption that for most couples in our society marriage is a continuation of a premarital interpersonal relationship which, on the average, is not radically altered by marriage. From this it followed that an appraisal of the adjustment reached by couples before marriage might provide an approximate indication of the adjustment they would achieve after marriage. The engagement period was selected as most appropriate for the assessment of premarital adjustment on the ground that, by the time of their engagement, the relationships of most couples are likely to have been more or less stabilized as compared with the state of flux characteristic of the period when the members of couples are becoming acquainted, exploring each other, and determining whether they desire to proceed to marriage.

The subjects of this study of the relation between adjustment in engagement and

marriage are 505 couples who participated in the research during their engagement and then again approximately three years after marriage. They are part of an original sample of a thousand engaged couples selected for a larger study of engagement and marriage.¹⁰

While engaged, the couples filled out eight-page schedules which included a series of questions intended to evaluate their satisfaction with their engagement relationship. Separate schedules were used for each member of a couple, thus providing a separate measure of the engagement satisfaction of the man and the woman.

The schedules were distributed largely through sociology and psychology classes of colleges and universities in metropolitan Chicago. Students were asked to place the schedules with engaged persons of their acquaintance, an engaged person being defined as one who had a formal or informal understanding with a member of the opposite sex that they would marry at some future date.

To the best of our knowledge, the large majority of the schedules were answered independently by the members of the couples as requested and then mailed directly to the research project.¹¹ Assurance was given of the confidential treatment of all information. Moreover, subjects had the option of answering schedules anonymously or signing their names (*a*) to indicate willingness to be interviewed or (*b*) to facilitate reaching them after marriage. Thirty-five per cent of the men and 39 per cent of the women chose to remain anonymous.¹²

¹⁰ Of the remaining 495 couples, 40 filled out schedules after this tabulation, 123 broke their engagements, 26 have been separated or divorced, 8 have one member deceased, 6 are still engaged, and 292 for various reasons have not yet filled out marriage schedules.

¹¹ This judgment is based on (*a*) the responses of a sample of the 1,000 couples who were asked whether they had conferred in filling out the schedules and (*b*) on certain internal evidence from the schedules.

¹² A comparative study of the characteristics of the anonymous and nonanonymous subjects led to the conclusion that there were no significant differences between their responses to the schedule (see

⁹ "One Thousand Engaged Couples" (unpublished study).

At the time of filling out the schedules, the members of the couples on the average had known each other 45.0 months, had been keeping company 31.5 months, and had been engaged 13.2 months. They were living in the Chicago metropolitan region and were almost entirely in the age range from twenty to thirty. Three-fourths of the young men and not quite two-thirds of their fiancées were at the college level of education, and the remainder were nearly all high-school graduates. Forty-nine per cent of the men were Protestants, 14 per cent were Catholic, 18 per cent were Jewish, and 13 per cent reported no religious affiliation.¹³ The corresponding percentages of the women were 54, 13, 18, and 8. They were all of the white race, approximately 60 per cent being the offspring of parents both of whom were native-born. The large majority of the subjects were from lower-middle-class and upper-middle-class families, and their fathers were primarily in business or the professions.

Two methods were employed for keeping in touch with the couples to obtain their cooperation in the follow-up marriage phase of the study. The majority gave their names and addresses through which they could be reached some years after marriage. But for these couples as well as for the others who wished to remain anonymous, a second method of maintaining contact was used. All persons who distributed schedules to couples were asked to fill out forms containing (1) their own names and addresses through which they could be reached in the future, (2) the code number listed on each schedule they distributed, and (3) some identifying sign (nicknames, initials, etc.) for each couple to whom schedules were given—a sign which would enable the distributors to remember to whom they had given the schedules. At the time of the fol-

low-up marriage study, letters were sent to the schedule distributors, requesting them to ask the consent of the anonymous couples to having their names given to the research project for the follow-up study. Permission to do this was secured from almost all the anonymous couples.

The marriage schedules were filled out under supervision. This was considered essential, first, to eliminate the possibility of collaboration between husbands and wives and, second, to encourage frankness in the subjects, since the conditions under which they filled out the schedules protected them from the contingency of being asked to show their spouses what they had written. In most instances couples worked on their schedules as members of groups, the husbands and wives being in separate rooms. When completed, the schedules were given directly to the supervisor. When couples were not in groups, they answered the schedules either at home or in the project office but always in the presence of a supervisor to whom the schedules were given on completion.

The marriage schedules were eighteen pages in length and, like those used in the engagement period, included a series of questions the answers to which provided a measure of each subject's satisfaction with his or her marital relationship. The schedules were filled out by the couples after approximately three or four years of marriage. The data presented below consequently constitute a study of the relation between adjustment in engagement and adjustment after three years of marriage.

ADJUSTMENT IN ENGAGEMENT

The questions used for appraising adjustment in engagement and the scores assigned to various possible responses to the questions were as follows:

1. In leisure time do you prefer to: be "on the go" all or most of the time (M 3, W 3);¹⁴ stay at home all or most of the time (M 10,

Paul Wallin, "The Characteristics of Participants in a Social-Psychological Study" [unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Chicago, 1942], chap. iii).

¹³ Fifty-nine men and women did not answer the question.

¹⁴ The figures in parentheses are the scores for the various responses. The "M" score is that of the man, the "W" score is that of the woman.

- W 10); fifty-fifty reply or equivalent (M 5, W 5); emphasis on stay at home (M 7, W 7); man and woman differ (M 4, W 4).
2. Do you and your fiancé(e) engage in interests and activities together? All of them (M 10, W 10); most of them (M 6, W 6); some of them (M 2, W 3); few or none (M 0, W 0).
 3. Do you confide in your fiancé(e)? About everything (M 5, W 5); about most things (M 2, W 4); about some things (M 0, W 2); all other replies (M 0, W 0).
 4. Does your fiancé(e) confide in you? About everything (M 5, W 5); about most things (M 3, W 3); about some things (M 0, W 2); all other replies (M 0, W 0).
 5. Frequency of demonstration of affection shown fiancé(e). Practically all the time (M 10, W 10); very frequent (M 8, W 8); occasionally (M 2, W 3); all other replies (M 0, W 0).
 6. Are you satisfied with the amount of demonstration of affection? Responses of a couple were here scored as a combination. Both satisfied (7); one satisfied, other desires more (3); one satisfied, other desires less (2); both desire more (4); one desires less, other more (1); both desire less (0).
 7. Extent of agreement between couple on money matters, matters of recreation, religious matters, demonstrations of affection, friends, table manners, matters of conventionality, philosophy of life, ways of dealing with their families, arrangement for their marriage, dates with each other. Extent of agreement on each of these eleven issues was indicated by a check on a scale ranging from "always agree" to "always disagree." The scale points and their values for each item are: always agree (5);¹⁵ almost always agree (4); occasionally disagree (3); frequently disagree (2); almost always disagree (1); always disagree (0). The total points on the above items were multiplied by 1.65 to give a total agreement score.
 8. Do you ever wish you had not become engaged? Never (10); once (5); occasionally (1); frequently (0).
 9. Have you ever contemplated breaking your engagement? Never (10); once (5); occasionally (1); frequently (0).
 10. What things annoy you about your engagement? If "none" or its equivalent (10); one thing mentioned (7); two things (1); three or more (0); if "its length" only is mentioned as annoyance (9); if "being separated" is cited (8); "length" and "separation" (7); "length" and one other annoyance (6); "separation" and one other annoyance (5); two or more annoyances and "length" and/or "separation" (1); "length" and "separation" and one annoyance (3); question left unanswered (4).
 11. What thing does your fiancé(e) do that you do not like? "None" written in (7); one thing mentioned (5); two (1); three or more (0); question left blank (4).
 12. Has your steady relationship with your fiancé(e) ever been broken off temporarily? Never (10); once (5); twice (2); three or more times (0).
 13. If you could, what things would you change in your fiancé(e)? (a) in physical condition or appearance; (b) in mental or temperamental or personality characteristics; (c) in ideas; (d) in personal habits; (e) in any other way.
 14. If you could, what things would you change in yourself?

Questions 13 and 14 were treated as a unit in the scoring. If "no change" desired in self and fiancé(e), score given is 10; otherwise 2 points are deducted from 10 for each desired change mentioned, five or more changes getting a 0 score. If both questions are left unanswered, the score is 5; if either is left blank, 2 points are deducted from a total of 7 for each change mentioned.

These questions and the scores given the various possible responses are roughly similar to those of the Burgess-Cottrell marriage adjustment scale, from which they were adapted.¹⁶ The questions making up the latter were used because they appeared equally relevant for measuring adjustment in engagement. The corresponding scores were employed as a matter of convenience, since arbitrary or more rigorously derived weights would in all likelihood have yielded similar results.¹⁷

¹⁶ *Predicting Success or Failure in Marriage*, pp. 63-68.

¹⁷ For the findings of an empirical investigation of this point see *ibid.*, pp. 67-68.

¹⁵ On this and all following questions men and women were scored identically.

Having formulated the questions for the engagement adjustment inventory and having determined upon the scores, it was possible to examine the responses of the couples, to score and total them, and thus to obtain a numerical measure of the adjustment of each of the men and women. The adjustment scores of the 505 couples of this study and the 1,000 couples of the more inclusive study referred to above are shown in Table 1.

TABLE 1
ENGAGEMENT ADJUSTMENT SCORES OF 505
COUPLES AND OF 1,000 COUPLES IN
THE LARGER STUDY

ENGAGEMENT ADJUSTMENT SCORE	505 COUPLES				1,000 COUPLES			
	Men		Women		Men		Women	
	No.	Per Cent	No.	Per Cent	No.	Per Cent	No.	Per Cent
180-189....	20	4.0	14	2.8	36	3.6	28	2.8
170-179....	71	14.0	77	15.2	136	13.6	145	14.5
160-169....	101	20.0	118	23.4	199	19.9	202	20.2
150-159....	121	24.0	113	22.4	227	22.7	220	22.0
140-149....	92	18.2	98	19.4	180	18.0	188	18.8
130-139....	46	9.1	37	7.3	96	9.6	91	9.1
120-129....	25	4.9	26	5.1	58	5.8	54	5.4
110-119....	17	3.4	16	3.2	40	4.0	43	4.3
100-109....	9	1.8	3	0.6	19	1.9	14	1.4
90-99....	3	0.6	3	0.6	9	0.9	15	1.5
Total..	505	100.0	505	100.0	1,000	100.0	1,000	100.0

An examination of the distribution of scores of the smaller and larger samples reveals that the two are quite similar and that in both there is little divergence between the score distribution of the men and women. The table reveals further that in all four distributions there is an evident skewness in the direction of the higher adjustment scores indicative of good adjustment. In some part, this probably can be attributed to the fact that good adjustment was a selective factor making for participation in the study.¹⁸ Another factor which may contribute to the skewness is the reluctance of certain persons to admit explicitly—even to themselves—that they have become implicated in an unpleasant or unsatisfactory engagement relationship.

¹⁸ This was established in a study of the characteristics of participants and nonparticipants in the research (Wallin, *op. cit.*, chap. ii).

An interesting question may be raised as to the degree of correspondence between the adjustment of the men and women of the couples in the engagement period. This was determined by correlating the adjustment scores of the men and women. The association found for the 1,000 and the 505 couples was, respectively, $.57 \pm .02$ and $.53 \pm .03$. This association is less marked than might have been expected.¹⁹ It indicates that the satisfaction with the engagement of one member of a couple does not insure the satisfaction of the other; that one may be satisfied and regard the relationship favorably while the other is dissatisfied.

Two important questions in regard to the measures of engagement adjustment are: (1) How valid are they, that is, do they discriminate between the well and poorly adjusted engaged couples? and (2) How reliable are they, that is, do persons repeating the test after a lapse of time tend to get approximately the same scores? The data available in this study indicate affirmative answers to both questions.

The validity of the measures was investigated by comparing the scores obtained by 123 couples who severed their engagements with those of 877 couples who continued to marriage. It was anticipated that if the engagement adjustment scale possesses any validity, persons who broke their engagement would generally have lower adjustment scores than those who did not. This expectation was borne out, as can be seen from an examination of Table 2.

In the case of both the men and the women, a larger proportion of those from broken engagements fall in the low adjustment score groupings and a smaller proportion are found in the high groupings. Of the men who broke their engagements, 14.6 per cent have scores of 119 or under, as compared with 5.7²⁰ of those whose engagement was unbroken. The corresponding percent-

¹⁹ In part this is probably due to the unreliability of the measures. Nevertheless, it indicates an appreciable degree of independence between the engagement satisfaction of couple members.

²⁰ C.R. 2.7.

ages for the women are 17.1 and 5.8.²¹ On the other hand, only 28.5 per cent of the men and 21.9 per cent of the women from broken engagements have scores of 160 or over in contrast to 38.3²² and 39.7²³ per cent of the men and women who were members of unsevered relationships.²⁴ Finally, the mean adjustment scores of men from broken and nonbroken engagements were 146.4 and 153.1,²⁵ respectively. The means for the women were 144.2 and 153.2.²⁶ These find-

The reliability of the engagement adjustment scale was studied by having 81 couples fill out an abbreviated schedule containing the adjustment questions some time after they had answered the original schedule.²⁸ Adjustment scores calculated from the former were correlated with those of the latter, yielding a coefficient of $.75 \pm .05$ for the men and $.71 \pm .06$ for the women. This indicates a satisfactory degree of reliability for the adjustment scale.

TABLE 2

ADJUSTMENT SCORES OF MEN AND WOMEN
OF BROKEN AND NONBROKEN
ENGAGEMENTS

ADJUST- MENT SCORE	MEN				WOMEN			
	Broken Engage- ment		Non- broken Engage- ment		Broken Engage- ment		Non- broken Engage- ment	
	No.	Per Cent	No.	Per Cent	No.	Per Cent	No.	Per Cent
180-189....	2	1.6	34	3.9	2	1.6	26	3.0
170-179....	12	9.8	124	14.1	9	7.3	136	15.5
160-169....	21	17.1	178	20.3	16	13.0	186	21.2
150-159....	30	24.4	197	22.4	30	24.4	190	21.7
140-149....	16	13.0	164	18.7	22	17.9	166	18.9
130-139....	13	10.6	83	9.5	16	13.0	75	8.5
120-129....	11	8.9	47	5.4	7	5.7	47	5.4
110-119....	10	8.1	30	3.4	13	10.6	30	3.4
100-109....	6	4.9	13	1.5	2	1.6	12	1.4
90-99....	2	1.6	7	0.8	6	4.9	9	1.0
Total..	123	100.0	877	100.0	123	100.0	877	100.0

ings on the difference in adjustment scores of the two types of engaged persons indicate that the measure of adjustment differentiates with appreciable accuracy between the extremes of adjustment in engagement. In future studies, however, it would be desirable to make a more refined test of its validity.²⁷

²¹ C.R. 4.3.

²² C.R. 2.2.

²³ C.R. 3.2.

²⁴ As was to be expected, the intermediate scores from 120 to 160 do not differentiate so well between the broken and nonbroken engagement.

²⁵ C.R. 3.3.

²⁶ C.R. 4.5.

²⁷ One such test would be to correlate the adjustment scores with adjustment ratings of friends of the couples.

ADJUSTMENT IN MARRIAGE

The marriage adjustment of the subjects was measured by the questions comprising the Burgess-Cottrell scale. Since the questions and their weights are reported in full elsewhere,²⁹ they will not be given here. Discussion of the validity and reliability of the marriage adjustment measures is also omitted because they are considered in detail elsewhere.³⁰ Suffice it to say that the marital adjustment scale was found reliable and valid enough to warrant its being used in studies of marriage adjustment.

The subjects of this report answered the marriage schedule after approximately three years of marriage. Their replies to the adjustment questions were scored, and their total scores are shown in Table 3. These scores, like the engagement scores, are skewed in the direction of good adjustment. Such a positively skewed distribution has been found in other studies of marital adjustment. Four possible explanations of this phenomenon are: (1) there may be a selection in marriage studies of the more happily married or better-adjusted couples;³¹ (2) a large proportion of the more poorly adjusted

²⁸ The mean interval between the time of the first and second schedules was 7.5 months for the men and 6.8 months for the women.

²⁹ Burgess and Cottrell, *Predicting Success or Failure in Marriage*, pp. 64-65.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 70-72.

³¹ This may be inferred from the fact that, as already reported, comparison of the characteristics of participants and nonparticipants in the study of engaged couples showed that the more poorly adjusted were less likely to participate (see Wallin, *op. cit.*, chap. ii).

couples do not proceed to marriage;³² (3) couples who are separated or divorced may not be included in this study;³³ and (4) admission of failure in marriage in our society is difficult because of the cultural emphasis on success, and hence persons may consciously or unconsciously judge their marriages as more successful than they are.

The marriage adjustment scores further parallel the engagement scores in that they, too, reveal a marked degree of independence

TABLE 3
MARRIAGE ADJUSTMENT SCORES
OF 505 COUPLES

ADJUSTMENT SCORE	MEN		WOMEN	
	No.	Per Cent	No.	Per Cent
180-189.....	90	17.8	92	18.2
170-179.....	101	20.0	128	25.3
160-169.....	101	20.0	107	21.2
150-159.....	71	14.1	70	13.9
140-149.....	61	12.1	45	8.9
130-139.....	38	7.5	32	6.3
120-129.....	24	4.7	15	3.0
110-119.....	10	2.0	10	2.0
100-109.....	5	1.0	2	0.4
90-99.....	4	0.8	4	0.8
Total.....	505	100.0	505	100.0

between the adjustment of the members of couples. The correlation between the marital success scores of the husbands and wives is $.41 \pm .04$. This is somewhat lower than the correlation of $.59$ ascertained by Terman for his 792 couples.

RELATION OF ADJUSTMENT IN ENGAGEMENT TO ADJUSTMENT IN MARRIAGE

Having secured a measure of the adjustment of the subjects in engagement and marriage, it was possible to test the hypothesis that the former is positively associated with the latter and that, therefore, it can serve for purposes of predicting marital

³² It will be recalled that the 12.3 per cent of our original sample of 1,000 couples broke their engagements. If these 123 couples had married, it is likely that they would have had low marriage adjustment scores.

³³ This report does not include 26 cases of separation and divorce, whose marriage adjustment would be low.

success or failure. The engagement and marriage scores were correlated and yielded correlations of $.43 \pm .04$ and $.41 \pm .04$ for the men and women, respectively. These correlations are consistent with the hypothesis being tested and indicate the utility of measures of adjustment in engagement for forecasting adjustment in marriage. Although the correlations with marital adjustment are not high, they compare favorably with those for background and personality factors obtained in the Burgess-Cottrell and Terman studies.³⁴ It seems probable that efficiency in prediction may be increased by the combined use of engagement adjustment scores with background and personality scores in the prediction of marital success.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

This study has demonstrated the possibility of predicting marital success by a procedure differing from that used by previous investigators.

An engagement adjustment scale was devised similar to the marriage adjustment scale prepared by E. W. Burgess and L. S. Cottrell. The validity of the scale was indicated by the statistically significant differences in mean adjustment scores between broken and nonbroken engagements for men of 146.4 and 153.1 and for women of 144.2 and 153.2, respectively. The reliability of the scale is shown by a correlation between the first and second filling-out of the schedules about seven months later of $.75 \pm .05$ for the men and $.71 \pm .06$ for the women.

Measures of the adjustment in engagement and after three years of marriage of 505 couples were found to be significantly associated ($r = .43 \pm .04$ for the men and $.41 \pm .04$ for the women).

This finding emphasizes the need for further studies of adjustment in engagement. Improvement of the measure of engagement adjustment may well result in securing higher correlations with measures of adjustment in marriage.

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³⁴ See first paragraph of this article.

SINGLE OR TRIPLE MELTING-POT?

INTERMARRIAGE TRENDS IN NEW HAVEN, 1870-1940

RUBY JO REEVES KENNEDY

ABSTRACT

In New Haven a "triple-melting-pot" type of assimilation is occurring through intermarriage, with Catholicism, Protestantism, and Judaism serving as the three fundamental bulwarks. Catholics mostly marry other Catholics; Jews almost always choose Jewish mates; while Protestants prefer non-Catholic Gentiles. Our statistics show a marked adherence to these religious choices. Thus the different nationalities are merging, but within three religious compartments rather than indiscriminately: with Protestant British-Americans, Germans, and Scandinavians intermarrying mutually; Catholic Irish, Italians, and Poles forming a separate intermarrying group; and Jews remaining almost completely endogamous. A triple religious cleavage rather than a multilinear nationality cleavage, therefore, seems likely to characterize American society in the future. When mixed marriage does occur, it would appear that the relative strength of each religion can be gauged by the type of ceremony employed to sanction such unions. In New Haven, Catholics are the most successful in having their marriages to persons of other faiths performed by their own clergymen; Protestants are considerably less insistent on their own type of ceremony in mixed marriages; while Jews show the lowest frequency in this respect.

Most authorities on population problems agree that intermarriage is the surest means of assimilation and the most infallible index of its occurrence. America has long been described as a great and bottomless melting-pot into which have been thrown peoples from all parts of the world. Boiling and seething there together, they will, it is believed, ultimately lose all distinguishable marks of their diverse backgrounds; and some fine day American society will become one homogeneous group—a single amalgam blended of the many and varied types brought to our shores by the great waves of immigration of the past century. "Here individuals of all nations are melted into a new race of man, whose labours and posterity will one day cause great changes in the world."¹ This blending-together, this ironing-out of cultural disparities, is, in the final stages, to be accomplished through intermarriage.

Speculations concerning the actual amount of intermarriage which has already taken place are mostly impressionistic, for too few statistical studies have been made to warrant valid generalizations.

The present study set out to investigate

what has actually been happening with reference to intermarriage in New Haven, Connecticut, for the last seventy years. Records of 9,044 marriages in New Haven were examined; and those of 1870, 1900, 1930, and 1940 were isolated for detailed scrutiny. Marriages increased from 920 in 1870 to 1,770 in 1900, to 2,538 in 1930, and to 3,816 in 1940. Our fundamental interest is in discovering whether general intermarriage or stratified intermarriage is taking place, that is, whether intermarriage is producing a complete mixture or several layers of mixture. In short, is American society really a single melting-pot or one with two or more separate compartments, each producing a special blend of its own?

Full investigation of this highly important problem involves the answering of a series of questions, so that no possibly significant factor may be neglected. These questions and their best order of treatment, in our opinion, are as follows:

1. To what extent do individuals marry within their own culture group?² Which groups seem least and which most inclined to intermarriage? Is ethnic endogamy becoming more or less prevalent with the passage of time? What

¹ J. Hector de Crèvecoeur, *Letters from an American Farmer* (London, 1782), quoted in C. Wittke, *We Who Built America* (New York: Prentice-Hall, 1940), p. 42.

² Interracial marriages (Negro-white) are negligible, constituting less than one-tenth of 1 per cent of the total cases: none in 1870 and 1900, 2 in 1930, 3 in 1940.

variations appear between the several ethnic groups in this regard? Do the sexes differ in their behavior on any of these points?

2. When out-marriage does occur, is group preference discernible? That is, when individuals of any ethnic group marry out, do they demonstrate pronounced likes and dislikes for specified other groups? What reasons can be discovered for these preferences?

3. How does religious affiliation influence tendencies toward in- or out-marriage?

Taking up the first set of questions, we find that ethnic endogamy has been customary in New Haven for the last threescore and ten years. The partners in more than two-thirds (69.23 per cent) of all couples during this period were of the same national derivation. The in-marriage rate, however, though high throughout, shows a steady decline from 91.20 per cent in 1870 to 75.93 per cent in 1900, to 65.80 in 1930, and to 63.64 per cent in 1940. The slackening rate of decrease after 1930 may indicate that a relatively permanent pattern of ethnic endogamy has now been established.

Although in-marriage has declined, it still continues to be an important determinant in the selection of mates, as is indicated by its high rate in 1940. Moreover, through the years the tendency toward in-marriage has remained stronger and more persistent in some groups than in others. Seven white ethnic stocks figure importantly in the composition of New Haven's population.³ Five of these—Jews, Italians, British-Americans, Irish, and Poles—have steadily maintained high in-marriage rates, while two—Germans and Scandinavians—have shown pronounced tendencies toward exogamy (see Table 1).

The in-marriage rates of males and females during this seventy-year period have been remarkably similar. The decline has been virtually the same for both—from 91.74 in 1870 to 63.12 per cent in 1940 for grooms, and from 90.65 in 1870 to 63.66 per cent in 1940 for brides. However, sex differ-

entials do appear among some of the ethnic groups. British-American, Jewish, and Italian brides have shown a stronger tendency than their male counterparts to marry within the group, whereas the contrary is true of the Irish and Poles. Among Germans and Scandinavians no sex differences appear in the in-marriage rates (see Table 1).

This leads us to the second set of queries posed at the beginning of this paper, i.e., those having to do with group preferences in out-marriage. We find that the five largest nationality groups in New Haven represent a triple division on religious grounds: Jewish, Protestant (British-American, German, and Scandinavian), and Catholic (Irish, Italian, and Polish). Whether single or multiple mixture is occurring in New Haven may be discovered by an analysis of preferential marriage groups chosen by persons marrying "out." Thus, if Irish, Italians, and Poles (all mainly Catholic nationalities) marry mostly among these same three groups, while British-Americans, Germans, and Scandinavians (all mainly Protestant nationalities) marry mostly among themselves, then we shall have good proof that assimilation through intermarriage is occurring along three vertical lines—Jewish, Catholic, and Protestant—and not generally and indiscriminately. We shall, in other words, be able to state that, *while strict endogamy is loosening, religious endogamy is persisting and the future cleavages will be along religious lines rather than along nationality lines as in the past*. If this is the case, then the traditional "single-melting-pot" idea must be abandoned, and a new conception, which we term the "triple-melting-pot" theory of American assimilation, will take its place as the true expression of what is happening to the various nationality groups in the United States. This is the hypothesis which we believe the present paper proves true.

Intermarriage is indeed of the triple-melting-pot variety in New Haven. In 1870, 99.11 per cent; in 1900, 90.86 per cent; in 1930, 78.19 per cent; and in 1940, 79.72 per cent of the British-Americans, Germans,

³ In 1930, of a total population of 163,000: Italians, 50,000; Irish, 35,000; Jews, 25,000; British-Americans, 20,000; Germans, 10,000; Poles, 6,000; Scandinavians, 3,500. Negroes number 5,300.

TABLE 1
PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF IN-MARRIAGE BY NATIONAL
ORIGIN GROUPS, 1870, 1900, 1930, 1940

	Total	1870	1900	1930	1940	Males 1870-1940	Females 1870-1940
Jewish.....	94.72	100.00	98.92	95.00	93.70	94.14	97.93
Italian.....	85.12	97.71	86.71	81.89	78.92	84.96
British-American.....	67.50	92.31	72.00	58.82	54.56	63.12	68.59
Irish.....	64.53	93.05	74.75	74.25	45.06	69.41	60.59
Polish.....	57.71	100.00	68.04	52.78	61.43	53.80
German.....	47.44	86.67	55.26	39.84	27.19	45.24	45.66
Scandinavian.....	42.65	40.00	82.76	33.73	18.46	41.51	41.90
Total.....	69.23	91.20	75.93	65.80	63.64
Male.....	69.41	91.74	75.45	65.85	63.12
Female.....	69.44	90.65	76.41	65.75	63.66

and Scandinavians intermarried among themselves. Likewise, in 1870, 95.35 per cent; in 1900, 85.78 per cent; in 1930, 82.05 per cent; and in 1940, 83.71 per cent of the Irish, Italians, and Poles chose mates from among themselves. The Jews are the most endogamous of all groups except Negroes. In the rare instances when they do marry out, they prefer British-Americans, Germans, and Scandinavians (non-Catholics) to Irish, Italians, and Poles (Catholics) (see Table 2).

The fact that the intermarriage rate among Irish, Italians, and Poles in 1870 and 1900 was lower than that among the three non-Catholic groups was owing to the virtual absence of Italians and Poles in New Haven in those years. Since the Irish constituted virtually all the Catholics in the city in 1870 and 1900, any non-Irish mates they chose were, perforce, Protestants. In later years the rate of endogamy within the three Catholic groups exceeded that within the three non-Catholic groups (1930—Protestants, 78.19 per cent, Catholics, 82.05 per cent; 1940—Protestants, 79.12 per cent, Catholics, 83.71 per cent). This would seem to indicate the apparent eagerness of the Irish to secure Catholic mates even at the cost of marrying into recently arrived groups with relatively low social prestige.

Wessel says that the scarcity of marriages between Irish and Italians in Stamford, Connecticut, is owing to the lower so-

cial status of the latter group; and on the basis of this explanation she remarks: "We find elsewhere that continued residence in

TABLE 2
PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF INTERMAR-
RIAGE ACCORDING TO RELIGIOUS SIMI-
LARITY AND DISSIMILARITY, 1870-1940

Year	British- American, Scandina- vian, German	Italian, Irish, Polish	Jewish
1870:			
Protestant..	99.11	4.65
Catholic....	0.89	95.35
Jewish.....	100.00
1900:			
Protestant..	90.86	14.22	1.18
Catholic....	8.00	85.78
Jewish.....	0.14	98.82
1930:			
Protestant..	78.19	17.68	1.70
Catholic....	21.36	82.05	1.29
Jewish.....	0.45	0.27	97.01
1940:			
Protestant..	79.72	11.52	3.62
Catholic....	18.80	83.71	2.06
Jewish.....	1.48	4.77	94.32

America is necessary to wipe out cultural differences. It may indeed wipe out religious differences too."⁴ Our material causes us to

⁴ B. B. Wessel, *An Ethnic Survey of Woonsocket, Rhode Island* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1931), p. 150.

believe that the latter is not happening in New Haven. Cultural lines may fade, but religious barriers are holding fast. As the Italians have gained residential tenure (and economic prestige) in this city, their marriages with the Irish have rapidly increased, rising from 7.8 per cent in 1900 to 10.4 per cent in 1930 and to 19.8 per cent in 1940.

In New Haven there has also been an increase, though not so marked, in Irish-Polish marriages, from 2.83 per cent in 1930 to 5.88 per cent in 1940. We regard the lower rate of Irish-Polish as compared with Irish-Italian marriages as owing primarily to the greater number of Italians. The relatively lower economic status of the Poles may also be a factor.

While, as has been shown, the Irish, Italians, and Poles show a pronounced tendency to intermarry among themselves, a fair number of them marry into other groups (see Table 2). The same is true of the British-Americans, Germans, and Scandinavians. Noteworthy is the fact, however, that in both instances the rate of marriage outside the religious boundary has remained relatively unchanged for the last decade; if anything, there has been a slight movement in the other direction.

This indication of the correctness of our hypothesis led us next to examine the specific groups with whom intermarriage occurred. If out-groups preferences are based upon religious similarities, as we have suggested, then certain marked likes and dislikes should appear in the various intermarriage rates. Table 3 compares the "expected" preferences and the actual preferences (in rank order) for each year and each group.

This table, by itself, would seem to throw doubt upon our hypothesis that religious preference rules out-marriage choice. The Irish, for instance, next to marrying themselves, should have preferred Italians and Poles, who are predominately Catholic. Instead, through the years they have given second preference to British-Americans and have also favored Germans over Poles, who are Catholic almost without exception.

Therefore, in the case of the Irish we raise this query: Why so many marriages with British-Americans and Germans and so few with Poles? Again, British-Americans deviated from expectation in several instances, particularly in their marked tendency to choose Irish as marriage mates.

Seeking explanations for these and the other irregularities disclosed in Table 3, we analyzed all marriages according to the type of ceremony used to sanction them (see Table 4).

Catholic nuptials have sanctioned the majority of Italian, Irish, and Polish in-marriages from 1870 to 1940, while non-Catholic (Protestant or civil) ceremonies have predominated among the in-marriages of British-Americans, Germans, and Scandinavians. Virtually all the Jewish in-marriages from 1870 to 1930 were solemnized by rabbis (see Table 4). The drop from 99.58 per cent in 1930 to 75.96 per cent in 1940 of Jewish services for Jewish in-marriages is almost entirely owing to civil ceremonies. This may indicate a marked movement away from the synagogue and its traditional ritual among the Jews. But our material emphatically does not suggest an appreciable decrease in Jewish endogamy. Table 4 also shows that Catholic ceremonies predominate in the out-marriages of Poles, Italians, and Irish and are increasing in the latter two groups. Likewise, more than half of the out-marriages of the British-Americans, Germans, and Scandinavians since 1870 have been sanctioned by non-Catholic services. It is clear, thus, that religion is an important factor in marriage, whether endogamous or exogamous.

While it is true that Italians, Irish, and Poles often marry British-Americans, Germans, and Scandinavians, the majority of such unions are sanctioned by Catholic nuptials. Thus the Irish, in choosing more British-American and German than Italian and Polish spouses, are not giving up Catholicism at all but are bringing over increasingly large proportions of these non-Catholics to their church (in the case of the British-Americans from 48.14 per cent in 1900 to

73.52 per cent in 1940). "Bringing over" is what really happens, for the non-Catholic partners to such unions must promise that British-Americans or Germans is more desirable to the Irish than marriage with Italians or Poles because the former two

TABLE 3
RANK-ORDER DISTRIBUTION OF EXPECTED AND ACTUAL PREFERENTIAL
MARRIAGE GROUPS, 1870, 1900, 1930, 1940

	Irish	British-American	German	Scandinavian	Italian	Polish
Expected.	Ir, It, P, G, Br-A, Sc	Br-A, G, Sc, Ir, It, P	G, Br-A, Sc, Ir, It, P	Sc, Br-A, G, Ir, It, P	It, Ir, P, G, Br-A, Sc	P, It, Ir, G, Br-A, Sc
Actual						
1870.	Ir, Br-A, G, Sc	Br-A, G, Ir, Sc	G, Br-A, Ir	Sc, Br-A, Ir	It
1900.	Ir, Br-A, G, Sc	Br-A, Ir, G, Sc	G, Br-A, Ir, Sc	Sc, Br-A, G, Ir	It, Ir, G	P
1930.	Ir, Br-A, G, It, Sc, P	Br-A, Ir, G, Sc, It, P	G, Br-A, Ir, Sc, It, P	Sc, Br-A, G, Ir	It, Ir, Br-A, G, P, Sc	P, Br-A, It, Ir, G
1940.	Ir, Br-A, It, G, P, Sc	Br-A, Ir, G, It, P, Sc	Br-A, G, Ir, It, P, Sc	Br-A, Sc, Ir, P, It, G	It, Br-A, Ir, P, G	P, It, Br-A, G, Ir

TABLE 4
PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF PREDOMINANT TYPE OF CEREMONY FOR IN- AND
OUT-MARRIAGES OF THE SIX MAJOR GROUPS, 1870, 1900, 1930, 1940

YEAR	PER CENT CATHOLIC			PER CENT NON-CATHOLIC			PER CENT HEBREW
	Irish	Italian	Polish	British- American	German	Scandinavian	Jewish
In-marriage							
1870.	93.18	98.94	86.54	100.00	100.00
1900.	93.01	90.93	100.00	100.00	88.89	100.00	100.00
1930.	90.90	80.76	69.84	91.56	83.67	92.85	99.58
1940.	94.78	85.04	75.00	79.83	83.86	100.00	75.96
Out-marriage							
1870.	55.00	94.12	73.33	66.67
1900.	54.33	33.33	78.72	79.80	90.00
1930.	67.77	56.25	58.06	57.34	60.81	83.63	77.77
1940.	71.41	62.44	54.41	56.43	57.82	83.01	35.71

offspring born to them will be brought up in the Catholic faith. While the person immediately involved need not actually become a convert, he does so vicariously, through his children.

It would seem that marriage with either

groups are older, more firmly established residents of New Haven, and enjoy greater social status and economic security than the more recently arrived immigrants. Especially desirable, it would appear, is marriage with the British-Americans, because they,

though not the largest groups in the city,⁵ represent the ideal of assimilation sought by all other ethnic groups. Therefore the Irish, by marrying British-Americans in Catholic ceremonies, accomplish the twofold purpose of blending into the dominant culture group and at the same time preserving their own religious heritage as typified by the use of Catholic nuptials. Marriage with Italians and Poles, on the other hand, satisfies only the second of these desires.

The pattern of Irish preferential out-groups continued unchanged until 1930, when Italians slipped in ahead of Scandinavians; while in 1940 Italians moved up again ahead of Germans, and Poles superseded Scandinavians. This breakdown of an old pattern seems to indicate the willingness of the Irish to marry Italians and Poles (Catholics) in preference to Germans and Scandinavians, but not in preference to British-Americans, who represent the epitome of "real American" culture. Still, even in this case, the Irish win the better of a compromise by bringing over to their church as many as possible of these non-Catholics, a practice which is increasing with the passage of time (see Table 5).

The Italians and Poles also would probably prefer British-American, German, and Scandinavian spouses if such marriages did not involve giving up Catholicism. But, being of recent immigrant origin, still bearing many foreign characteristics, and standing very low on the scale of social status, they are far less successful than the Irish in bringing over the older, Protestant groups to their church in marriage. The Italians and Poles have much less to offer in the way of social prestige and economic security than the Irish, and their general standard of living is still considerably lower than that of the older groups.

The Irish, however, have advanced swiftly since their arrival as starving émigrés in the middle of the last century. As a matter of fact, were it not for their firm adherence to Catholicism, the Irish would long ago

have merged into and become a part of the dominant culture group. Many authorities have recognized and stressed the effect of Catholicism upon the character and degree of Irish assimilation.

Woofter says that prejudice "has shifted from Germans to Irish, from Scandinavians to South Europeans. The despised alien of yesterday becomes the 100 per cent American of today and joins the native-born in scorn of freshly arrived nationals."⁶ Part of the Irishmen's rapid absorption of American culture was undoubtedly due to the fact that they, unlike all other non-British immigrants, encountered no language difficulty, for, as one authority says, "ignorance of our language is an important barrier to assimilation. . . . Generally speaking, adherence to a foreign language within a country tends to cocoon an ethnic group and keep it alien."⁷

On the other hand, it is understandable that the southern and eastern European immigrants, with recent peasant backgrounds and strange languages, as well as Catholic religion, do not make very eligible or desirable marriage partners for the groups already long settled and well established in New Haven. There is, in other words, nothing much in their favor from the viewpoint of the British-Americans. However, their Catholicism does appeal to the Irish and to some extent to the Germans, a minority of whom are Catholic themselves. We can note the consequence of this situation in the fact that, until 1940, Italians selected Irish mates in preference to any other outsiders. In that year, however, they married more British-Americans than Irish (see Table 3). Nevertheless, although the proportion of Catholic nuptials sanctioning marriages of Italians with British-Americans increased from 26.32 per cent in 1930 to 50.68 per cent in 1940, these are far lower than the corresponding proportions of Catholic weddings in unions

⁶ T. J. Woofter, *Races and Ethnic Groups in American Life* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1933), p. 207.

⁷ W. S. Smith, *Americans in the Making* (New York: D. Appleton-Century Co., 1939), pp. 147-48.

⁵ With their 20,000 members they are the third largest group in the city.

of Irish and British-Americans, which may be a matter of temporarily slighting religious conviction in favor of assimilation, as reached 69.30 per cent in 1930 and 73.52 per cent in 1940 (see Table 5). Therefore, it the Irish were probably doing back in 1900,

TABLE 5
PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF OUT-MARRIAGES ACCORDING TO TYPE OF
RELIGIOUS CEREMONY, 1870, 1900, 1930, 1940

GROUPS	1870	1900	1930	1940	1870	1900	1930	1940
	Catholic				Non-Catholic			
<i>Irish with:</i>								
Italian.....		100.00	72.73	78.72			27.27	21.28
Polish.....			83.33	71.42			16.67	28.58
British-American.....	11.11	48.14	69.30	73.52	88.89	51.86	30.70	26.48
German.....	100.00	44.45	65.21	75.60		55.55	34.79	24.40
Scandinavian.....	100.00		14.30	16.67		100.00	85.70	83.33
Jewish.....								
<i>Italian with:</i>								
Polish.....			50.00	75.61			50.00	24.39
British-American.....			26.32	50.68		100.00	73.68	49.32
German.....	100.00		58.34	47.85		100.00	41.66	52.15
Scandinavian.....				50.00			100.00	50.00
Jewish.....								
<i>Polish with:</i>								
British-American.....			37.50	36.58			52.50	63.42
German.....			100.00	62.50				37.50
Scandinavian.....				25.00				75.00
Jewish.....								
<i>British-American with:</i>								
German.....		12.20	32.69	31.95	100.00	87.80	67.31	68.05
Scandinavian.....			18.51	11.11	100.00	100.00	81.49	88.89
Jewish.....								
<i>German with:</i>								
Scandinavian.....		33.33	8.33			66.67	91.67	100.00
Jewish.....								
<i>Scandinavian with:</i>								
Jewish.....								
	Jewish				Non-Jewish			
<i>Jewish with:</i>								
Irish.....				33.33			100.00	66.67
Italian.....			100.00					100.00
Polish.....			100.00					100.00
British-American.....		100.00	100.00	50.00				50.00
German.....			100.00	100.00				
Scandinavian.....								

looks as though the Italians are not only less influential than the Irish in "bringing over" British-Americans to their church but also more willing to surrender on this point and participate in non-Catholic ceremonies. It

when less than half (48.14 per cent) of their unions with British-Americans were sanctioned by Catholic nuptials. Perhaps, as the Italians advance economically, become more Americanized, and therefore more eligible

marriage partners, they, too, will be in a stronger position to demand Catholic services of their non-Catholic mates. The increasing rate of Catholic services for Italian out-marriages (from 56.25 per cent in 1930 to 62.44 per cent in 1940) indicates that this trend is already under way (see Table 4). Decreasing Italian-German and Italian-Scandinavian marriages and increasing Italian-Polish unions suggest that the Italians, like the Irish, probably prefer Catholic to non-Catholic mates, even though they will often sacrifice this desire for the sake of marriage with British-Americans.

Not until 1930 did Poles marry non-Poles in any appreciable numbers. In that year their preferential marriage groups were British-Americans, Irish, and Italians; in 1940, unions with Italians exceeded those with British-Americans, while the Irish dropped below the Germans. The increase of Polish-Italian marriages may be attributed to the similarity of the two groups in religion, economic status, and length of residence in America. The Irish, however, differ from the Poles in all respects excepting religion. The fact that Catholic nuptials sanction fewer in- as well as out-marriages among the Poles than in the case of either the Irish or the Italians may be interpreted as indicating weaker allegiance to Catholicism on the part of the Poles. If this is true, then it seems quite probable, as their economic and social status in New Haven improves, that they will show a stronger tendency to intermarry with British-Americans, Germans, and Scandinavians than either the Irish or the Italians, who are evidently much more insistent upon Catholic wedding services.

Although there is a strong—and a slightly increasing—tendency for British-Americans, Scandinavians, and Germans to marry among themselves, an examination of the specific groups with whom they intermarry raises this question: Why do they marry so many Irish, Italians, and Poles? British-Americans have consistently given first and second preference in out-marriage to Irish and Germans, respectively, since 1870;

while Scandinavians held third place until 1940, when they were superseded by Italians and Poles (see Table 3). The preferential groups of the Germans and Scandinavians have been virtually the same as those of the British-Americans (see Table 3).

British-Americans, Germans, Scandinavians, and Irish are the oldest, the economically most progressive, and the socially most prominent groups in New Haven's population. S. Koenig in a recent study of ethnic groups in Connecticut industry comments:

The analysis demonstrates quite definitely the superior position held by certain groups, notably the British-Americans, in Connecticut industry. The latter clearly predominate in the most remunerative fields and position. The groups from northern and western Europe, namely, the Irish, Swedes, and Germans, and to some extent, the French-Canadians, as a rule, tend to gravitate toward jobs generally offering greater security and higher remuneration. On the other hand, the groups who originally came from eastern and southern Europe, namely, the Poles, Lithuanians, Ukrainians, and Italians, tend to be in fields usually requiring less skill and to occupy positions offering less security, remuneration, and status. . . . In general, it may be said, that aside from the British-Americans, who undoubtedly appear as the leaders in industry, those groups which have been here longest or have become more acculturated have reached a higher level in the occupational ladder, at least insofar as industry is concerned.⁸

New Haven was one of the six cities included in Koenig's survey. Thus, on economic and social grounds, it would be surprising indeed were British-Americans, German, and Scandinavians not to intermarry with the Irish, whose only important point of divergence from themselves is religion. The increasing tendency of the older groups to marry Italians is probably owing in a large part to sheer numerical pressure, since the Italians constitute a third of New Haven's population. The British-Americans who marry Italians probably do not represent the most prosperous and socially secure members of

⁸ "Ethnic Groups in Connecticut Industry," *Social Forces*, Vol. XX, No. 1 (October, 1941).

this group. Evidence for this statement is found in another New Haven study which revealed that in both 1930 and 1940 Italians showed a marked tendency to "neighborhood" marriage, i.e., to choose their mates from within five, ten, and twenty blocks.⁹ This is attributable in part to their high intermarriage rate, for the Italians cluster in a certain few sections of the city. But premarital residential propinquity also characterized Italian out-marriages, as is shown in the fact that in 74.6 per cent of such unions both parties lived within twenty blocks, and 49.2 per cent within ten blocks of each other before marriage. Since the predominantly Italian-populated sections are among the poorest and most congested in the city and residentially least desirable, we are justified in inferring that the British-Americans, Germans, and Scandinavians who dwell there have an economic status similar to that of their Italian neighbors.

Returning now to the queries posed earlier in this paper, we may summarize thus:

1. The increasing intermarriage in New Haven is not general and indiscriminate but is channeled by religious barriers; and

⁹ R. J. R. Kennedy, "Residential Propinquity and Ethnic Endogamy," *American Journal of Sociology*, XLVIII, No. 5 (March 1, 1943), 580-84.

groups with the same religions tend to intermarry. Thus, Irish, Italians, and Poles intermarry mostly among themselves, and British-Americans, Germans, and Scandinavians do likewise, while Jews seldom marry Gentiles.

2. When marriage crosses religious barriers, as it often does, religion still plays a dominant role, especially among Catholics. The high frequency of Catholic nuptials sanctioning the out-marriages of Irish, Italians, and Poles implies that their choice of spouses is determined largely by the willingness of their non-Catholic mates to be brought over to the church. Indeed, Catholic nuptials are increasing in marriages of Catholics with non-Catholics.

On the basis of the evidence disclosed in this analysis of marriage records, our main conclusion is, therefore, that assortative mating rather than random intermarriage has been occurring in New Haven since 1870 and that assimilation in this city is of a stratified character. The "melting-pot, general-mixture" idea popularized by Zangwill and supported by others has failed to materialize in this particular community. Religious differences function as the chief basis of stratification.

VASSAR COLLEGE

THE ROLE OF THE FRAME OF REFERENCE IN WAR AND POST-WAR ECONOMY

GEORGE KATONA

ABSTRACT

Viewing a situation or problem within different frames of reference—either appropriate or inappropriate—may account for different reactions to the same economic situation and different answers to the same economic problem. A new experience can be fully understood only if it is placed in the proper framework. In the light of these psychological principles it appears more probable that, after the war, wartime economic habits will be completely discarded than that they will persist. To achieve economic behavior appropriate to the requirements of an unstable and changing post-war world is a major task of social education.

The purpose of this paper is to show what role the frame of reference of important economic groups plays in determining economic decisions and actions, especially in times of rapid changes such as occur in war and post-war economy. An attempt will be made to indicate that changes in the field conditions may require changes in the frame of reference—in other words, that one framework may be adequate for coping with certain field conditions but not with others. The argument will be presented that real understanding of new experiences is possible only if they are placed in a framework appropriate to them. Instead of discussing these issues theoretically, concrete and specific examples will be analyzed to illustrate, amplify, and support the points made.

That different behavior in the same objective situation—that is, different responses to the same stimuli—frequently occurs, depending, for example, on the past experiences, the personality, the desires, or the expectations of the responding persons, is commonplace. Yet economic thinking is frequently governed by the implicit assumption that new stimuli predetermine the prevailing response to them. Thus manufacturers and farmers are said to react to price increases by increasing their sales or production, or businessmen to react to the imposition of price ceilings by selling their merchandise at the ceiling prices. In the analysis of such actions the manner in which differences in motives and attitudes may affect or alter business decisions is usually neglected. The following example of two

different decisions taken under similar circumstances is selected to point to the significance of linking economic and psychological analysis and to introduce the term "frame of reference."

Of two manufacturers of men's shirts, one, at the beginning of 1943, had lowered the quality of his product in order to save a few cents in the cost of each shirt. He had done this by buying cheaper fabrics, cutting down on workmanship, and eliminating collar linings. The other manufacturer had done nothing of the sort; in the autumn of 1943 he was still making the same quality shirt as he had a year before.

Why had the first manufacturer changed the quality of his product? He explained his decision thus: "Every student of economics will readily understand that the function of a businessman is to make as much profit as possible. Likewise, there is no doubt about the fact that we have now what is called a seller's market; orders on hand are much larger than our current output, although we are working at full capacity. We could sell much more than we produce, but due to the war we cannot increase our output. Finally, there is price control: we are forbidden to raise our prices even though some of our expenses have increased and our customers would be willing to pay higher prices. I have been in business for 20 years; I always charged the highest price the market could bear; now for the first time I am forbidden to do so. Isn't it natural that I should save what I can on my expenses? Before the war competition made such savings impossible, but now in a seller's market, it's different."¹

¹ The Committee on Price Control and Rationing at the University of Chicago, of which the au-

In studying the business policy of the second manufacturer one might have expected to find certain differences in his market which would explain why he had acted differently. But this man described his business situation in the same way as his competitor. He could sell whatever he could produce at high prices, but, of course, he is subject to ceilings. True, some expenses increased; but, because of large volume and steady production, business is not unprofitable. "Price control is a good thing," said the second manufacturer. "It applies to the fabrics I buy as well as to the shirts I sell, and runaway prices would hurt my business. What I am most interested in is keeping the goodwill of my customers, which I am going to need very much when the war is over. That is why I scrupulously watch the quality of the fabrics I buy, and why the workmanship of my shirts will not deteriorate as long as I can help it."

The two manufacturers are in the same situation. To put it in psychological terms, they react to the same stimuli, namely, to demand exceeding supply and to price ceilings. Yet they react differently. Why? Because their frame of reference differs. In explaining his business conduct the second manufacturer spoke of the war, of inflation, and of what would happen after the war; while the first one never mentioned any post-war problems and spoke of the war as if it were nothing but another upward swing in a business cycle. The business decisions by the first manufacturer are made within his old, traditional, pre-war context; what the economist calls "maximizing profits" rules his frame of mind. The second manufacturer, however, lives in a new "field"; within the war framework, costs, prices, and profits have acquired a new meaning. Business conduct appears to be determined by such changes in the frame of reference.

The example of the two shirt manufacturers is a rather complex one. The main-

tenance of pre-war norms and goals as against the acquisition of a new outlook during the war may have been but one respect in which their frames of reference differed. A short-term as against a long-term point of view may have constituted another difference between them, which is, of course, not peculiar to war conditions; considering the future implications of our actions, as against living for the moment only, often results in different conduct under similar conditions. Another difference between the frames of reference of the two manufacturers may have been that one had a broader horizon than the other in realizing the effects of his actions on other people or on the entire community. The role of the absence or presence of such realization may be further illustrated by the fact that in the first few months of 1943 some people were hoarding canned goods and a few months later soap, because they considered nothing but their personal well-being at the given moment; other people, although aware of possible future shortages, abstained from hoarding because they considered what would happen if everybody were to act similarly.

To state the thesis as to the role of the frame of reference in more general terms: All experience is organized within a framework. A stimulus does not give rise to an isolated experience; the meaning of the stimulus changes according to the greater whole of which it is a part. The response, in turn, is determined by the role and function of the stimulus within its setting. It follows that stimulus A may elicit different responses if it is perceived or understood as part of the whole X or of the whole Y. The properties of the whole situation, the way of understanding that situation of which the stimulus forms a part, are decisive in determining our action.²


thor of this article is codirector of study, gathered material through case studies on motives, decisions, and actions of businessmen under the impact of war regulations. The references to the two shirt manufacturers are condensed and simplified from that material, after eliminating confidential information that might serve to identify the respective firms.

² The argument in the text is based on research of Gestalt psychologists. "In different whole situations, an A changes necessarily as part, in its role and function" (M. Wertheimer, *Social Research*, II [1935], 357). Concerning the usage of the concept "frame of reference" in psychology, see K. Koffka, *Principles of Gestalt Psychology* (New York, 1935). This concept has been applied to economic behavior


One frame of reference may be inappropriate and inadequate for a given task or a changed situation, while another frame of reference may be the appropriate one or may fit a new experience. The example of the two shirt manufacturers is perhaps not fully suitable to illustrate the criteria which determine, in some cases at least, whether or not the organization of an experience within a framework is appropriate. The clearest example of the distinction between appropriate and inappropriate frames of reference is provided by analyzing the process of solving problems or answering difficult questions; for the solution of a problem often consists in reorganizing a given frame of reference or in finding the appropriate frame of reference for a new and puzzling experience.³ The analysis

in G. Katona, *War without Inflation: The Psychological Approach to Problems of War Economy* (New York, 1942). We cannot attempt here to discuss the history of the concept "frame of reference," since this would require a separate article.

³ Support for this proposition of Gestalt psychology can be presented by reference to a problem taken from an entirely different field. N. R. F. Maier (*Journal of Comparative Psychology*, X [1930], 142) presents the following task: Here are nine points:



The problem is to draw four straight lines, passing through each of the points, without lifting the pencil and without retracing. The solution is difficult because most people see the nine points as a square with a center point and try to solve the problem within the perceptual frame of the square. The solution



consists in "going out of the frame"; it requires supplanting an inappropriate frame by an appropriate one. In this example the rigid frame of reference which makes it difficult and often impossible to solve the problem is brought about by a law of perception (seeing symmetrical points as a unified figure with fixed boundaries).

of different answers given to the same question will permit us to go a step further, namely, to demonstrate the relation between placing an experience in its appropriate framework and understanding it.

The following question was asked in a nationwide poll in the fall of 1942: "If income taxes are increased next year, will this affect prices in general, or won't it make any difference to prices?"⁴ A substantial number of people answered that (a) raising income taxes would not make any difference to prices. Some people argued that (b) if taxes are raised, prices will go up, because taxes are business costs, and higher costs mean higher prices. Others again concluded that (c) under present conditions increased income taxes would help to keep prices stable or—other things being equal—would even lower prices: money available for spending is curtailed by additional income taxes; with higher taxes, less money competes for the limited wartime supply of consumer goods.

The three different answers to the same question show what is meant by lack of understanding (answer a), misunderstanding (answer b), and real understanding (answer c). Let us analyze, first, lack of understanding as illustrated by the assertion that higher income taxes would not affect prices. According to the classical theory, it is always the new, the unfamiliar, which we do not understand. Suppose someone reads the Latin words *vis major* for the first time. He does not understand them. Then he looks in the dictionary and finds the definition "act of God." By repeating "*vis major*—act of God" several times, by forming an association between the two, he makes sure that the next time he reads those Latin words he will understand them. Understanding, according to the classical theory, is the result of association.⁵

⁴ The question was asked in connection with a survey initiated by the Office of War Information concerning the people's knowledge of, and their attitudes toward, anti-inflationary measures.

⁵ This theory is based on the traditional analysis of learning to read, according to which that process consists in forming an association between three elements—a printed or written word, its sound, and its meaning. "To give meaning to an object one must form associations with it" (H. B. Reed, *Psychology of Elementary Subjects* [New York, 1927]). P. W. Bridg-

More and more evidence seems to indicate that this theory is, to say the least, one-sided. Understanding in typical and most important instances is not obtained by forming a connection between the new and the familiar. And what we do not understand is not necessarily new or unfamiliar. To those who said that raising income taxes would not affect prices, the two ideas "tax increase" and "price movement" were not unfamiliar and mere repetition of the two ideas would not have brought about an understanding of the problem. Lack of understanding results not merely from the absence of any connection between two experiences but also from the absence of a frame within which an experience finds its place. Understanding may be lacking with respect to familiar matters, such as prices and taxes, just as well as to new discoveries, such as radar and airplanes.

Lack of understanding is overcome by viewing previously unrelated items as integral parts of the same context. The greater context may, however, not be the appropriate one. In that case misunderstanding may result. One typical instance of misunderstanding is characterized by the carrying-over of a framework, a principle, a general consideration, which is appropriate in situation X, to situation Y without regard to the different requirements of the two situations. In considering the problem of higher taxes, for instance, some people recalled that "wage increases tend to cause price increases, because wages are costs, and what is one man's cost is the other man's price" and concluded that "taxes, too, are costs and therefore tax increases would also cause price increases."

man gives a modern version of the theory in dealing with the process that brings about understanding, namely, explaining: "The essence of an explanation consists in reducing the situation to elements with which we are so familiar that we accept them as a matter of course, so that our curiosity rests." (*The Logic of Modern Physics* [New York, 1937], p. 37). From the thesis that explaining and understanding consist in reducing an unfamiliar situation to familiar elements, Bridgman concludes that "the feeling of understanding is as private as the feeling of pain" (in an article incorporated in the book *Freedom: Its Meaning*, ed. R. N. Anshen [New York, 1940], p. 532).

The analogy between wage increases and tax increases, however, cannot provide the adequate frame for solving the problem presented, because it does not clarify the relationship between wartime tax increases and price movements. Within the inappropriate frame of reference the essential relationship is not properly established: while higher wages would result in an increase in the wage-earners' purchasing-power, higher income taxes would have the opposite effect. Misunderstanding is characterized by lack of structural clarity, despite the presence of a seemingly unifying framework; the relation of the parts to one another is not clarified, the parts do not fit, and "gaps" or unsolved problems remain.

On the other hand, by viewing both tax increases and price movements within the context of available purchasing-power, not only are the two items related, but their meaning and mutual relationship are properly established. Having a frame of reference in which tax increase means diminution of spendable money, the correct answer to the question about the effect of higher income taxes on prices may be found easily. Real understanding requires the integration of all data in such a way that the gaps are closed. To be fully understood, a problem or an experience must be fitted into its proper and consistent context, and its role within that context must be clarified.⁶

Understanding, in the sense of acquiring a general orientation that determines the appropriate place of the data of experience, may perhaps not be needed for our everyday conduct in normal times. Our habits, that is,

⁶ The author's book, *Organizing and Memorizing* ("Studies in the Psychology of Learning and Teaching" [New York, 1940]), constitutes a study of acquiring experience by understanding, as contrasted to learning by memorizing (blind repetition, drill). While the latter consists of the attaching of new contents or responses to old contents or stimuli and the strengthening of the connection between them, understanding is reached when a given material is organized or reorganized in a way appropriate to it. Appropriateness of organization does not depend on the private feeling of an individual but is determined by the relation of the parts to their whole.

the application of customary frameworks to the situations confronting us, may be sufficient and adequate guides of conduct if our world is stable and unchanging. But sudden and fundamental upheavals, such as the onset of the depression of the 1930's or the transition to total war or the eventual transition to peace, may require the ability to reorganize experiences, as well as the ability to acquire an understanding of the requirements of new situations.

The lack of realization of changed field conditions or the improper carry-over of an old customary framework to a new situation could be illustrated by some of the examples already cited. But the role of understanding during the economic upheavals brought about by total war may perhaps be shown more clearly by discussing a new problem.

In the summer of 1943 spokesmen for the farmers used the following argument in support of their demand for higher farm prices and the abolition of the Office of Price Administration: "When supply and demand ruled the market, food was plentiful; when the O.P.A. set ceiling prices on corn, meat, and eggs, shortages became the rule; this proves that the mechanism of supply and demand cannot be replaced by government fiat—prices therefore should again be determined by supply and demand, and everybody will get what he wants." The fundamental problem involved in this argument is that the concepts "supply and demand" are used as if they operated in the same way in war as in pre-war times; the pre-war determination of prices by fluctuations of supply and demand is carried over to war conditions. It is overlooked that in times of peace the tendency toward equilibrium works smoothly: if demand rises, small price increases suffice to enlarge supply, and vice versa (except under monopolistic conditions). During total war, however, demand of the armed forces expands greatly, while supply is inelastic: price increases often do not enlarge the supply, which is limited by the available production facilities and man-power. Demand is also inelastic during the war inasmuch as price increases do not reduce the government's purchases. Under such conditions, in contrast to pre-war conditions, free-market forces would not bring about a stable equilibrium between supply and demand (except perhaps at extremely high prices which

would suffice to exclude the demand of large parts of the population, in other words, to reserve the available supplies to the wealthiest segments of the population).

The more general conclusion to be drawn from the example just presented is the following: viewing wartime price control as nothing but artificial interference with the free market indicates a lack of realization of changed field conditions; for, in times of war, military demand and the conversion of factories to military output transform the traditional mechanism of the free market, even in the absence of price control. In order to understand the price movements during total war a frame of reference is required which necessarily differs from the pre-war frame, inasmuch as it must encompass and integrate such new factors as growing demand by the army and lack of man-power. Price control must be placed in its proper frame before it is possible to appraise whether specific price regulations were well or badly prepared and administered. The result of an understanding of the functions of price control, arrived at by viewing price control as a part within its proper frame of reference, is not a set of rigid rules but flexible and adaptable knowledge. By understanding we do not learn that "price ceilings are necessary whenever demand exceeds supply," but we do acquire the ability to apply principles to different circumstances and to find out, under given future conditions, what factors make it advisable, and what factors inadvisable, to impose maximum or minimum prices.⁷

⁷Limitations of space make it impossible to analyze the reorganization of a frame of reference which has been recently accomplished by some experts with regard to the proper function of government deficits and taxes and which likewise should result in flexible and adaptable knowledge. Because public debt was considered in the same light as private debt, deficits were traditionally held to be unsound and dangerous. The accomplishment of Keynesian economists in this respect is not the discovery of the principle that "government borrowing is sound" but rather the enlargement and reorganization of the context within which public debt must be appraised. If such a full understanding of deficits is achieved, it can be applied to different

Let us turn now to the role of real understanding in post-war economy. Which of the following three broad alternatives will we face when hostilities cease: Will wartime habits, ways of thinking and acting, be carried over to the post-war situation? Or will they be supplanted by the pre-war framework? Or will there be an attempt to organize post-war experiences in a manner appropriate to whatever conditions may then exist?

Those who explain human conduct by the persistence of oft repeated recent habits would support the first alternative. A staunch associationist, for instance, might argue that during the war millions of people will have acquired the habit of saving, of not spending money on new cars, radios, home utensils, and other durable goods, and of letting the government decide how much they should buy and what prices they should pay. Therefore, according to this theory, after the war the habit of saving and of submitting to controls and planning will continue to prevail.⁸

circumstances; under some it will yield the conclusion that a deficit is dangerous and unnecessary; under others, that it is sound and necessary (cf. D. M. Wright, *American Economic Review*, September, 1943, p. 577, and the literature quoted there). Similarly, taxes were traditionally viewed from the angle of the government's need for money. More recently they are viewed within the context of spending by taxpayers: if it is desirable that the taxpayers should have less money to spend, taxes should be increased; if they should have more money to spend, taxes should be decreased (cf. A. P. Lerner, *Social Research*, February, 1943).

⁸ Such predictions follow not only from the theory of the classical nineteenth-century associationists but also from the writings of several modern scholars: "The most certain and dependable information concerning what a man will do in any situation is information concerning what he did in that situation on its last occurrence." "The greater part of all that we can predict of the individual man is predicted in terms of the association of specific features of response with specific features of a situation" (E. R. Guthrie, *The Psychology of Learning* [New York, 1935], pp. 228 and 19). According to Guthrie, "repetitiousness is the outstanding characteristic of human behavior," while Thorndike and most of the conditioned-response psychologists maintain that "learning in the spheres of interest and action is caused largely by repetition and re-

ward" (E. L. Thorndike, *The Psychology of Wants, Interests, and Attitudes* [New York, 1935], p. 160), or "Responses become attached to stimuli only when they are practiced with reward" (M. A. May, *A Social Psychology of War and Peace* [New Haven, 1943], p. 53). The practical conclusions to be drawn from the latter theory may be somewhat different from those of classical associationism; possibly, according to the reward theory, an enduring habit of saving may be established during the war, but hardly one of not buying automobiles or drinking little coffee. Yet, with regard to the essential point discussed in the text the conclusions of the two theories are the same: rational behavior and sudden learning are a priori excluded by both. Action based on the requirements of a situation and on the anticipation of its effects differs from that based on (a) repetition, (b) repetition plus reward, or on (c) following suggestions blindly.

From this point of view there might be justification for the fear of certain Latin-American countries that they might lose part of their post-war market because during rationing the people in the United States would get used to drinking little coffee and eating little beef.

However, from the point of view of the theory which maintains that conduct depends on the given frame of reference, such predictions as to the persistence of wartime habits do not follow. Two other possibilities appear more probable. One of them is that we shall discard our wartime behavior suddenly and completely, as having been imposed upon us by the war and nothing but the war. Many slogans, currently used and accepted, make it probable that this will be the case. At present we buy war bonds to pay for planes, ships, and tanks. We approve of rationing because the growing requirements of the armed forces have curtailed the supplies available to civilians. We approve of price control because at a time when factories are producing war goods we cannot leave prices to the free play of market forces. Some of us drive less, buy fewer gadgets, and spend less in order not to deprive our soldiers of what they need. Therefore, the day hostilities cease, we may stop saving, may try to buy all the goods we have missed during the war, and may demand the prompt abolition of all wartime controls as well as the balanc-

ward" (E. L. Thorndike, *The Psychology of Wants, Interests, and Attitudes* [New York, 1935], p. 160), or "Responses become attached to stimuli only when they are practiced with reward" (M. A. May, *A Social Psychology of War and Peace* [New Haven, 1943], p. 53). The practical conclusions to be drawn from the latter theory may be somewhat different from those of classical associationism; possibly, according to the reward theory, an enduring habit of saving may be established during the war, but hardly one of not buying automobiles or drinking little coffee. Yet, with regard to the essential point discussed in the text the conclusions of the two theories are the same: rational behavior and sudden learning are a priori excluded by both. Action based on the requirements of a situation and on the anticipation of its effects differs from that based on (a) repetition, (b) repetition plus reward, or on (c) following suggestions blindly.

ing of the government budget. Such conduct, arrived at without a real understanding of the functions of saving and spending, of rationing and price-fixing, and of government deficits, may be appropriate under certain post-war conditions but may be catastrophic under others.

Then, finally, there is one other possibility: instead of either the persistence of the war framework or the revival of the pre-war framework, it may be that we shall realize the requirements of the field in which we shall live after the war. If during the war we have not just mechanically submitted to regulations imposed upon us but have learned to understand what functions such experiences as government spending and individual saving have within their appropriate context, then there is a good chance that after the war we shall grasp the need for a proper frame of reference. That frame may not be one of peace alone but may be one of industrial reconversion, or perhaps of abundance of money and threatening inflation. No simple customary rules of conduct can be set for such complex field conditions. Learning to act in a certain definite way—for example, to follow a habit of saving—would not help. Intelligent behavior, adapted to the needs of a given situation, is, however, not impossible, because fully understood experiences are not carried over mechanically but can be applied to changing conditions.⁹

Realizing certain requirements of the post-war situation and adopting a frame of reference appropriate to them do not, of course, preclude genuine and violent disagreements and controversies. Convictions of different groups, such as those who propose to depend on "governmental planning" or those who prefer to rely on "free enterprise," can and should clash in the post-war world because both these and many other proposals may be

rooted in an endeavor to understand the given situation. The point to be made is that there can be no sound basis either for reliance on the efficacy of government controls merely because some of them worked in wartime or for faith in freedom from government interference merely because that was successful under certain pre-war conditions. Rational behavior implies the conviction that criteria exist for an intelligent decision between several alternatives, and it also implies the earnest endeavor to find out what decision or action is proper in the given situation.

The difficulties any post-war government will face in attempting to gain the people's co-operation based on the understanding of the situation and of the governmental policies should not be underestimated. The task of explaining to the public why certain measures were taken and why it should respond to those measures in a certain way has hardly been accomplished successfully during the war, as indicated, for example, by the partial failure of certain price and rationing regulations and the existence of black markets. Yet wartime patriotism and the imminence of danger serve to discourage shortsighted egotistic interests and to promote the acceptance of public duty and the willingness to sacrifice. The conflict between our desires and reality may be more acute after the war, and the endeavor for understanding may be impeded by emotional reactions against controls previously endured, by the urgent wish for change and for absence of restraint after long submission to regulations.¹⁰

The task of the teacher and the molders of public opinion is, then, to help the public to gain a general orientation for war and for post-war conditions. By making use of conceptual tools developed by the scholar and the research worker, writers and teachers

⁹ Applying an experience intelligently, in contrast to carrying it over mechanically, is the main result of "understanding," as shown by experiments described in Katona, *Organizing and Memorizing*, pp. 127 ff.

¹⁰ In *Wartime Prosperity and the Future* (New York: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1943), p. 31, W. C. Mitchell discusses the customary reversal in the citizen's attitudes at the end of wars and points out under what conditions such a reversal may be avoided.

must help others to acquire appropriate frames of reference for new experiences, in order that more and more people may learn to see why and how certain forms of behavior fit into the requirements of the situation, while others do not. Since the situation may

change rapidly, the appropriate conduct may also change. It is not rigid principles that must be taught and spread but rather the willingness and the ability to understand.

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CLASS DENOMINATIONALISM IN RURAL CALIFORNIA CHURCHES

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ABSTRACT

Class segregation in a rural community under industrialized agricultural economy permeates all institutions and is characteristic of its religious life. Whereas older Protestant churches fulfil the religious needs of the upper class, the evangelical sects serve the laboring group. These evangelical sects develop in response to the general social barriers of the poor in a society dominated by pecuniary values, and at the same time they serve the psychological needs of an ostracized group by asserting another value system in a putative, heavenly society. Class denominationalism, as a church problem, must be viewed as a part of the general problem of class discrimination.

Richard Niebuhr furnishes us with a text so eminently apropos that I cannot but introduce my discussion today with his words:

Denominationalism in the Christian church is . . . an unacknowledged hypocrisy. It is a compromise made far too lightly, between Christianity and the world. Yet it often regards itself as a Christian achievement and glorifies its martyrs as bearers of the cross. It represents the accommodation of Christianity to the caste system of human society. It carries over into the organization of the Christian principle of brotherhood, the prides and prejudices, the privilege and prestige, as well as the humiliation and abasements, the injustice and inequalities of the specious order of high and low wherein men find the satisfaction of their craving for vainglory. The division of the churches closely follows the division of men into the castes of national, racial, and economic groups.²

The social caste system—more properly here a class system—is thus served in the California rural communities by Christian denominationalism. This was implicit in a statement of the minister of the élite church in a California town who

said that the churches there “tend to represent the different elements in the San Joaquin Valley.” In order to appreciate this, some knowledge of the social structure of such rural communities is necessary.

A recent study of one such town showed clearly that its population was divided into a series of social strata. The most important single cleavage separates an upper from a lower class; members from outsiders; employers from employees. These two groups are distinguished by their manner of life, their material wealth, and their occupations. The implications of this division reached into every nook and cranny of their lives—even into their religious convictions and observances.

The community investigated was one of the many places at which people have congregated in the San Joaquin Valley—places hardly distinguishable to the casual observer from one another. It serviced a rural area where fruits, vegetables, and fibers were grown by intensive irrigated farming, with the help of many harvest hands. The privileges of the major institutions of the community—clubs, churches, official and quasi-official bodies—were the prerogative of a certain segment of the population which

¹ This material was prepared for the Regional Land Tenure Conference arranged by the Farm Foundation for the Department of Town and Country Work, Home Missions Council and Federal Council of Churches, Berkeley, February 10, 1943.

² H. Richard Niebuhr, *The Social Sources of Denominationalism* (New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1929), p. 6.

may be designated as the *nuclear* group. Remaining on the social peripheries was the large body of unskilled labor that had come to the community in search of work and settled there. These *outsiders* were Mexicans, Negroes, and whites. The Mexicans and Negroes formed subcommunities of their own, but the whites had no rallying cry, no sufficient commonality, other than their depressed economic conditions, to form any such integrated whole. The social picture, then, may be visualized as one where a nuclear population maintained the vestiges of community life and where peripheral to this nucleus was the laboring population, who accepted the social value system of that nuclear population and strove to achieve some measure of recognition in it. The nuclear group itself is divided into higher and lower strata, and the white outsiders may be ranged according to the degree in which they have achieved some entry into the community as such.

Where industrialized farming occurs, even the smallest town is likely to be so large, in terms of population, that it is impossible for all to know one another, even casually. Thus the values by which men are judged and placed in the social scheme by their neighbors are monetary ones—symbols of wealth and well-being. And, in turn, the major criterion of the social worth of a person is his occupation—the means by which he achieves or aspires to wealth and well-being. It is the quick reference by which the individual is assigned his proper social place. The ethnologist has frequently found that among primitive peoples the stranger's position in a community is determined by his establishing real or fictitious blood-relationship to someone already known. Essentially the same function is served in our society when we ask a newcomer, "What do you do?" For in the

answer to that question lies our first determination of his social position. It is, therefore, logically and empirically justifiable to use occupation as the criterion for showing social class distinction.

Modifying the classification of Alba M. Edwards,³ five occupational groups, ranked roughly according to social worth, were used: (a) professionals, managers, and proprietors, (b) farm operators and managers, (c) clerical and other white-collar workers, (d) skilled labor, (e) unskilled labor. Persons were then classified according to the *Dictionary of Occupational Titles* published by the Department of Labor in 1939.⁴

However imperfect such a classification may be for the finer distinctions in the social hierarchy, the social position of the unskilled laborer is very clear. While some skilled workers have not achieved membership in the nuclear community, very few unskilled workers have. Again, the professionals, managers, and proprietors (along with a few operators of large ranches) clearly form the élite in the society, even though some so classified, such as teachers and some ministers and proprietors of stores which serve the laboring class, do not achieve such standing.

There are ten churches serving whites alone in the community. These several denominations are ranked in the social hierarchy; the nuclear and outside population are, for the most part, served by separate religious bodies. Of the ten Christian groups, nine are Protestant. The Catholic church very nearly represents a cross-section of the churchgoing

³ *A Social-Economic Grouping of the Gainful Workers of the United States, 1930* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, 1938).

⁴ Prepared by the Job Analysis and Information Section, Division of Standards and Research.


population, a fact to which I shall return later. The Christian Science church will be eliminated from the discussion because there are but eleven members of known occupation. It serves exclusively the nuclear group.

Of the eight remaining churches, four serve the nuclear population and four the outsider element (Chart I). The first are

against almost half (42 per cent) of the latter. The obverse of these distinctions is shown in the incidence of the professional managerial category, for a fourth of the nuclear congregations fall into this category as against only 3 per cent of the outsider congregations.

On this chart also appear two bars which represent, respectively, the Catho-

CHART I



the Congregational, Methodist, Baptist, and Seventh-Day Adventist. The outsider four are the Nazarene, Assembly of God, Church of Christ, and Pentecostal. Chart I shows by means of bars the occupational characteristics of the membership of the different classes of denominations. The first bar shows that only a third of the membership of the nuclear churches are laborers, whereas laborers comprise three-fourths of the outsider congregations. Agricultural workers make up but 6 per cent of the former as

lic membership and the total white and Mexican churchgoing population. The similarity in the proportions is striking; the class exclusiveness of the Protestant churches does not appear. There are, no doubt, many reasons for this difference between Catholicism and Protestantism. The fact is, however, that the Catholic church is more tolerant—using the term in the mechanical sense here—than are the Protestant congregations. This does not, however, belie the general thesis regarding class distinctions. Remembering

that the laborers in the Catholic congregation are almost exclusively Mexicans, the priest's statement is illuminating:

There is a large Mexican colony but there are also many Germans. There used to be one service in Spanish for them, but we have discontinued that. We make no distinctions between the two groups. Once a year we have a Spanish Mission for the Mexicans, which lasts a week.

The Mexicans are children of nature, and do not take their religion very seriously. They have a kind of inferiority complex and feel that they are looked down on. Many of the Mexicans have devotions in their own homes—they have little altars. They like the trimmings better than the essentials; it is better that way than if they had nothing.

We have card parties and socials to raise money. The Mexicans do not come to these. They would rather be with their own kind. Every once in a while, usually in the spring, they have a fiesta. They have a good time. Some of the others come—it is open to everyone.

Thus the Catholic church accommodates two social classes which, nevertheless, maintain their social distance.

There are finer gradients in the social value of the different denominations (Chart II). Of the four Protestant churches serving the nuclear population, one is definitely for the élite. Fifty per cent of its membership is in the entrepreneurial-professional occupation category, and only one person is an unskilled laborer. Its building is the most imposing, its grounds the best kept, its appointments the finest. Its leading patron is president of the biggest business enterprise in the community. For a long while a silent pressure brought all the teachers into its fold. The other churches serve more fully the middle rungs of the social hierarchy.

The Methodist group has few unskilled laborers, the Baptist more; yet both have but 40 per cent who regularly

do manual work. The Seventh-Day Adventists are composed largely of farm operators, most of them having small units. Since a large proportion of their congregation is drawn from outside the community, it is difficult to assess their social position accurately.


A similar social gradation obtains among the outsider sects. The proportion of laborers increases as one reads from left to right on Chart II, and similarly the proportion of professionals and white-collar workers declines, so that in the Pentecostal church only one person is not a laborer and almost all are farm hands. Because of certain theoretical and practical considerations, this group calls for further discussion.

More or less independently, the sociologists of religion have come to recognize that sectarian development springs up largely among the socially disinherited. The precedent for this in Christianity is common knowledge. This has been characteristic of reformation movements. Probably no movement better exemplifies this fact than the development of evangelical religious sects in the impoverished areas of America. A further corollary of this social fact is that these churches, as they grow older, slough their emotional appeal and ascetic character and develop more ordinary middle-class standards. The several churches in the community represent such social gradients, not only documenting this established sociological fact but furthering its implications. For the processes described for the origin of the sects and their transformation to denominations may occur in the adoption of churches into a community. In this California rural community we can see this evolution quite clearly, for its process is foreshortened.

There are, then, four Protestant churches serving the religious needs of the outsiders. In order of the appearance in the community, they are the Assembly of God, the Nazarene, the Church of Christ, and the Pentecostal. Except that there is little to differentiate the first two, this is also their order of social worth, measured either by their appur-

tracted most of the transient migratory workers. Most of the transient migratory type were attracted by this kind of leadership, but my predecessor and I—now I don't want to put it so you misunderstand—but our special appeal is to the middle class. Poor people get a sensual or physical thrill and in that there's an attraction. I have had a frank Pentecostal preacher tell me that many of his congregation come to church just for that thrill. That is shallow thinking. These poor folks get no other thrill out of life,

CHART II



tenances or by the occupational characteristics of their congregations. The development of the Nazarene church is the most interesting, for in ten years this sect has grown from meetings in private homes to the use of a tent, then successively into two small buildings; and now it is housed in a plant which, with the parsonage, is valued at \$20,000. Lest one feel that this is merely the result of puritan frugality and asceticism, the social implications may be stated in the pastor's own words:

The first two ministers here were just farmer-preachers who had had no education. They at-

tracted most of the transient migratory workers. Most of the transient migratory type were attracted by this kind of leadership, but my predecessor and I have appealed to a more sturdy and consistent type of people. We are given to the sane, intelligent presentation of the Gospel Truths.

No more perfect statement of the theory could possibly have been made: origin in the "sensual and physical thrill" of the disinherited "transient migratory type," and growth in the "sane, intelligent" appeal to the "sturdy" middle class. And all this was accomplished in the short span of a decade! Though this preacher disclaimed labor adherents, a quarter of his congregation were un-

skilled workers and two-thirds were skilled or unskilled; his statement is merely a further assertion of middle-class status.

There is more evidence. The Assembly of God church is a Pentecostal sect, though the minister said, "We don't call ourselves Pentecostal because of their extremist attitudes." As a nation-wide sect it grew out of rebellion against "modernism" and "higher criticism." The local congregation, developed in part out of a rebellion against the Germanism of the local Baptist church, was established by a lay minister. It drew to it many migratory workers, so that, though this preacher also disclaimed such membership, a fifth of its congregation is unskilled labor and 60 per cent are workers of some sort. It has grown in size and wealth, and in restraint, with the result that an avowedly Pentecostal group has split off.

This schismatic Pentecostal group is made up entirely of laborers, of whom 82 per cent are unskilled. Its ministers have always been lay people—farm laborers, in fact. At first they met in a tent; now they have a dingy frame building. For the social cause of the schism the statements of the lay minister are definitive:

There is no difference between our church and the Assemblies of God except that we believe that the spirit has the right of way. The council has tightened down, and are becoming formalized. Back East they are still free, but here (especially in Southern California) many of the churches have tightened down. Educated ministers and college students who were stiff shirts came in and some of the people fell for it.

In other words, formalization dulled the fine edge of emotional fervor and left a hollow mockery in the eyes of the dispossessed. So they have had to seek another outlet. One member had shifted to the newer Pentecostal group because

at the older one "they set you down"—that is, "they won't let you get up and shout when you get the spirit, and that is not right."

We may review this process in more general terms. An evangelical church enters the community, appealing to the "sensual," and draws a group of underprivileged and emotionally starved to its fold. They are zealous; and, donating freely of their small earnings, they erect a church on a "faith basis." It grows under the impetus of lay participation and the emotional release it offers; and as it grows its coffers increase, and its building, outgrown or outmoded, is replaced with a grander investment. Now it is unseemly for such an affluent organization to be served by an uneducated minister who, it is argued, cannot devote full time to the congregation; and so a preacher is hired from the seminary of its parent or affiliate church. Education vests *de facto* authority in the minister's hands, inhibiting the congregation by precept if not by direct effort. The minister, perhaps a member of a democratic ministerial association, has, or acquires, the standards of the middle class. He adopts a "sane, intelligent presentation of the Gospel" which results in the "setting-down" of the fervent and the inhibition of the spirit. The appeal is directed more and more to the "stabler element" who have made peace with their milieu and who, having acquired some of the wherewithal to be worldly, are less tempted by asceticism. But there are some whose economic situation has not advanced along with the rest of the congregation or with the church itself. Their need for emotional release is not met; furthermore, they find themselves in an inferior economic position to their fellow-members. They split off into a sect where "the spirit has the right of way"

and their fellows are of the same social class, and the cycle is complete.

We see, therefore, that the church recognizes the social cleavages of the community it serves and that each congregation is quite precisely ranked according to that social worth. The cause for this sectarian split along class lines is economic, its aspects twofold: social and psychological. Let us examine these aspects individually, though they are interrelated phenomena. In a society which makes overt expression of the hierarchy of its members in terms of traditional and invidious social values, the individual seeks the companionship of those who reinforce his own position. He wishes to associate neither with those who are his betters in the established scheme of things nor with those who are "beneath him." The evidence of this in the community studied is clear.

The minister of the élite church, when asked why there were no farm laborers in his community, pointed to the church and said: "You can see why they don't come here. They don't come here because they feel uncomfortable. They are more at home in the Church of Christ because it is more like their homes. They can live in a tent and feel comfortable there."

The word of the minister for this is confirmed by the laborers themselves. One explained why she refused an invitation to a nuclear church by saying that "they are good members, but we are poor people and everybody that goes there is up-to-date." Another said: "To tell the truth I don't like the Baptists here because they are a different class of people and I'd rather stay around my own class." This woman had made the shift from Baptist to Pentecostal despite the fact that she didn't "like all the ways they believe in the Pentecostal church."

A third said: "We were Baptists back home, but we don't go to any church out here. We don't have the clothes. Back home there were little old meetings and you could go any old way. When you're just raised up with folks it's different from the way it is here."

There is statistical evidence for this shift away from churches which in California serve the nuclear population to those which serve the outsiders. Of the 51 recent immigrant white workers interviewed, 25 had been members in their former residence of churches such as Methodist and Baptist—churches which, in this community, serve the nuclear group. Of these 25, only 1 still attends such a church, while 12 have joined or are attending the outsider denominations and 12 report no attendance whatsoever. There are no shifts in the opposite direction.

The psychological factor in class denominationalism is the special psychic appeal of different modes of religious services. What is there in the emotionalism of the outsider churches which at once so attracts the poor and so repels the well-to-do? It has been explained as entertainment, as sensual thrill, as a release for people whose life is humdrum at best, oppressive as a rule. So is drinking, and so are the other forms of worldly pleasure which they are denying themselves. This reasoning is not false, but it does not go far enough. The appeal of the emotional religion and the asceticism for the disfranchised is this: It denies the existence of this world with its woes; it denies the values in terms of which they are the underprivileged and sets up in their stead a putative society in the Kingdom of God, where, because of their special endowments (which we call emotionalism), they are the élite. It is the society of the saved. Millenarianism is of the

essence, for it is thus that the putative society is created; asceticism is the denial of the world in which they have been denied; and emotional participation is public acclamation of their personal acceptance into this world of superreality. Clark has pointed out evidence for this in the differing nature of hymns between the churches of the poor and those of the well-to-do.⁵ It is a frequent refrain in the sermons. In one outsider sermon the preacher derided the "bluebloods of Kentucky," for, he said, in heaven everybody is a "blueblood." But this imputation of equality is spurious, for it is made clear that such a station in afterlife is the prerogative of those who are saved. Testimonials are rich in the expression of this feeling; in one agonized prayer delivered in the Pentecostal church was heard: "Sometimes I think I am worth nothing to the Lord or to anybody else, but when I realize what I am in His eyes, it makes me want to pray all the more."

The existence of class denominationalism in the community under study and the essentially economic causes for its existence have been demonstrated. There remains a question—a moral one. Is the sectarian character of rural-community Christianity, this class denominationalism, in essence an evil one? Niebuhr, as the text quoted at the outset makes clear, so regards it. And, indeed, the Christian viewpoint—the attitude fostered in the teachings of Christ—can hardly be otherwise.

Class denominationalism is not a cause but a result. The economic classes

of the California rural scene permeate every phase of life, and the causes lie deep in the industrial character of the farm economy. The essential class phenomena of money values, invidious discrimination, and conspicuous display developed from a similar cause in a New York community fifty years ago.⁶ The nuclear group and the outsider of the California community are not merely levels of prestige. They are classes whose economic interests are in direct conflict. These conflicts have led to bloodshed and violence, to drink and despair, as well as to religious fanaticism.

It is neither sufficient nor reasonable to say, "Christianity, mend your ways; bring your house in order." Class denominationalism is no leak in the dike of democracy to be plugged by a boy's thumb. Yet the conscience of the church is involved. Since the course of industrialization in farm production as well as in urban life is set and since its fruits are many and good, there can be no turning back to bucolic simplicity. Economic classes exist, but they may be open or closed; the social distance between them may be great or small; underprivilege may be severe or mild. If Protestantism would avoid these evils of class discrimination within its own ranks, it must fight against social discrimination outside its confines. To do this it must support those measures by which the underprivileged groups—in California rural communities, the farm laborers—may obtain a fair share of the perquisites of worldly life.

⁵ Elmer T. Clark, *The Small Sects in America* (Nashville, Tenn.: Cokesbury Press, 1937), p. 272.

⁶ James M. Williams, *An American Town* (privately printed, 1906).

GERMAN FICTION TODAY: STATE CONTROL AND PUBLIC DEMAND

MARIAN MARSCHAK

ABSTRACT

The present study is an effort to analyze German fiction to find out (1) the dominant themes in the fiction and (2) what light it throws on the thinking and feeling of the German people. It covers the years 1933-41.

Since 1933 the Nazis have tried to direct German writing and reading. Have they succeeded? Writing can be controlled, but the reader's taste cannot be commanded. Here is one region still open to the free will: one cannot be forced to go to a theater or to read a book.

The writer in a totalitarian country has to follow both the police and the public; but, in the balance of forces between writer, censor, and reader, the reader has a remarkable weight. He can still ignore a book or make it famous. He can create a literary fashion.

We shall see that on the whole the officially fostered literature tries to attract the reader by displaying a "German reality" in which Nazi virtues struggle and prevail. But we shall also see that what seems to be a sizable proportion of readers has responded by favoring romantic fantasies, adventures, and historical fiction—the distant, the dreamy, the impossible.

To list a few samples of the "official" pattern:

1. The hero, mistreated by Weimar Germany, is being rescued by the "New Order" (*Der Innere Befehl*, F. F. V. Unruh; *Karges Land*, Gerhard Ringeling; *Schicksal einer Frau*, Edith Mikeleitits).
2. The hero, mistreated by the big towns, finds peace on the land, in his home village (*In einem kühlen Grunde*, Anton Gabele; *Das Land der Zwerge*, Konrad Beste).
3. A man who belongs to two countries or two races must always be unhappy ("Balade am Strom," Roland Betsch).
4. A certain German district and its population are glorified, preferably a district not yet well known, treated as a "stepchild"

by literature (*Die Pottersleute*, Walter Vollmer).

5. A certain social class is exalted; at first chiefly peasants, later on other classes (e.g., the skilled worker in: *Ein Deutscher fand zurueck*, Karl Miedbroth).

Fiction belonging to the last two groups is in line with the efforts of the Nazi party to woo particular sections of the population. A new *Gruppenempfindlichkeit* ("group-sensitiveness") has been discovered and is respected and nursed. The Butcher's League had a modern play closed, in which a butcher is pictured as a brutal person. The Chamber of Commerce in a certain town rejected a novel because the local landscape was called "unattractive."

The goal set above all others was *Gegenwartsnaehe* (literally, "present-time nearness"), or *Wirklichkeitsnaehe* (roughly, "realism"). A new type of story was invented and christened "fact report" (*Tatsachenbericht*)—a fictitious plot, presented as a news report. Through the use of the present tense, photographs, and maps some kind of reality was sought. The *Voelkischer Beobachter* launched a big contest for the best novel "depicting the experience of our time." The fashionable monthly magazine, *Die neue Linie*, in its annual prize contest for a story on "German reality" offered, in 1940, additional prizes for "every prize story completed during active military service." *Wirklichkeit* became the password in the literary field, combined with words like *unmittelbar*, *konkret*, *hart*, *existentiell*, *tathaft*, *herb*; it even appears as *Vollwirklichkeit* (Ruediger, *Die Literatur*, June, 1941).

It is hardly necessary to point out that this "reality" cannot be real. Concentra-

tion camps and pogroms are not described in German novels. One critic even complains that the conflict between the young and ambitious peasant and the village organization remains hidden. The peasantry lives in a peculiarly idealized atmosphere; the village seems an idyll set up for sunrises, and one wonders why so many move into towns (*Die Literatur*, February, 1941).

Historical reality itself had to be remolded; persons, ideas, and events had to be shown in a new light. In a story about the famous Carpet of Bayeux (*Die neue Linie*, 1942), William the Conqueror becomes the forefather of Hitler, and the Normans, the ancestors of the Nazis. The Normans, one learns, had then (in 1066) to defend European unity against English "insular particularism." In spite of his nickname "the Conqueror," William did not undertake his campaign because of his greed for land. He was, in fact, entitled to the English throne and was in the right. The Normans were excellent soldiers, the English a "militarily worthless crowd." The story goes on to say that, after the conquest, the English army was "firmly organized" (*straff organisiert*) and a people's kingdom was erected, supported not by the feudal clique but by the masses (*breite Massen*). This was followed by "England's glorious age, a period of honesty inside and of successes outside the country." Thus historical writing was attuned to the educational efforts of the government.

Goebbels declared that every good book is a political book. Did the German reader agree? How does the official pattern compare with the actual pattern of reading?

The literary output of a certain period reflects the reader's mind at that time. A publisher will print a book only if it seems likely to attract a great number of readers. Most authors will write with the same view. In a totalitarian country, writer and publisher must observe the official trend (often reinforced by government subsidies and orders) as well. If in spite of this a literary line which differs from the official one is

maintained, this gives some indication of the public's influence.

Of a sample of twenty-nine short stories published in 1940 in the *Berliner Lokalanzeiger*, the *Deutsche Wochenschau*, and even in Goebbels' own weekly, *Das Reich*, only three could in any sense be called "ideological": in "Schwaebles neue Hosen" the seamstress of a pair of soldier's pants gets married to its owner; in another story a young soldier sacrifices his furlough so that an older one can see his new baby; the third depicts a family conflict in a district where Germans and Slavs are mixed. Fifteen of the remaining twenty-six stories take place in faraway countries. Except for this fact, all the sampled nonideological short stories could have been written in pre-Hitler days, in or outside of Germany: the regular short stories of love, childhood, friendship, queer adventure and comical errors, good deeds and tragic incidents.

Out of one hundred and four novels published in 1939 and advertised in 1940 in *Der Buchberater* and *Deutsche Buecher*, only twenty-four fit somehow into the official pattern. The remaining books do not show much in the way of modern Spartanism: a luxurious upper class is depicted with approval, a world of general managers and their ladies, of "fashionable drawing rooms, theater boxes, and white-tied masculinity" (to quote a German critic). Their struggles are private ones (love, marriage, friendship, professional conflicts). The problems of the lower classes are equally innocuous. Dreams of owning "a good restaurant in Cuyaba" or "a little hotel" are common, or "an automobile instead of a pushcart" (the dream of a housepainter). In these cases the author and the public, rather than having to write and read about "German reality" and the new German virtues, show a tendency to get away from them. They seem to long for times and lands where other laws prevail.

Literary prize contests are particularly significant. The prize committee (which, in the case of *Die neue Linie*, included members of the German Academy of Writing) certainly has to make its decision with an

eye on propaganda rather than on profits. Yet, even here, deference was shown to the public's taste.

In 1941 *Die neue Linie* offered a prize for a short story which would express "the spirit of present-day Germany." A story called "Shipwreck" won the first prize of 600 marks. Here is the plot:

The hero, dressed in white flannel trousers and a black dinner jacket, is chatting on deck with Miss Phips, an American lady who wears a pretty playsuit, when the "Marylane" goes down somewhere between Cape Verde and Buenos Santos. The hero and Miss Phips swim for a long time, keeping up a light, amusing conversation, until an Italian submarine rescues them. The submarine had drifted off, having been badly tied up at the pier, and there is only one guard on board, a diver who understands nothing about navigation (these remarks on the Italian war fleet are the only indications of the "present time"). Idyllic weeks on the submarine follow, until, to their regret, they are sighted by a steamer.

This was found to represent best "the spirit of present-day Germany" in the second year of the war! The editor, somewhat embarrassed by the outcome of the contest, comments on the story's "genuine and realistic humor which today must be highly valued." Only one of the prize stories chosen deals with war, and even then it happens in a "strange region between reality and dream." The same tendency was found in other stories submitted in the contest: "a definite trend toward unreality and a world of fantasy, a will to neglect the pure reality of facts and to look for deeper reality in free, in-between regions. . . ."

The "away" tendency of the German public can be seen on all sides. Books for young people like the "Leather Stocking Tales," Andersen's fairy stories, and many other fairy stories and books on animals are being published in "editions for grown-ups." The classical writers are being read again, after having been unpopular for a long time. "Goethe, Schiller, Kleist, Storm—sie gehen weg wie frische Sommeln" ("they sell like

hot cakes") (*Die Literatur*, November, 1939).

There is a great number of reports and "fact reports" from all fronts and all forces, but the poetical imagination has retreated to remote regions. Perhaps some of the vigor which pushed German soldiers forward in 1940 stemmed from the same root—to give up the present existence and storm into faraway countries. The performance of tanks and rubber boats inspires a poetical German soldier with tones of medieval mysticism:

Mitten im Tode waren wir im Leben

Herr: Dank Deinem Sommer

Diesem Sommer Dank

Denn keinen groesseren hast Du gegeben

Dem der berauscht aus seinen Bechern trank.

"In the midst of death we were in Life.

Thank you, Lord, for your summer.

Thank you for this summer.

For us, intoxicated with its goblets,

it was the greatest summer you have given."

One type of fiction, which had existed before 1933, has become a dominant fashion only during the last six or seven years. Since 1935 a steadily increasing flood of historical biographies, period studies, and prehistoric fiction has streamed into the German book market. Out of eighty-three nonideological novels, advertised in two booksellers' periodicals, forty-two are historical fiction. A small number of them have obviously been written with an eye on official requests; Caesar, Bismarck, Theodoric, and Napoleon are "sponsored" by the government. The bulk of the historical fiction is of quite a different type. It describes human rather than political conflicts. The heroes are technicians, doctors, inventors, or they are poets, painters, philosophers; the poet Buerger in *Die Gleichen* by Moritz Jahn; the poet Schubert in *In Fesseln frei* by Heinrich Lilienfein; the poet-painter Friedrich Mueller in *Der Maler in Flammen* by Eduard Koewel; Schiller in *Leidenschaft* by Norbert Jacques; and the philosopher in *Kant als Mensch* by Alfred Treptow.

Historical fiction provides another path by which one may forget reality. Reading a novel means passing through the emotions of an imaginary person, living another person's life. If the hero has once actually existed, his image is more genuine. To take part in this hero's life and to submerge one's self in the past make the deception more complete, the distance from today greater.

The phrase "flight into history" came up and was openly discussed. In June, 1941, five essays were published in literary magazines, entitled: "History in the Novel," "Remarks on Historical Writing," "Limits and Freedom of Historical Fiction," "The Writer and His Time," and "On Historical Fiction"—a debate comic in its solemnity.

First of all, the historical tide was declared dangerous; it made the modern world and present-day men appear too dull in comparison with the adventurous past. This attack provoked two contradictory answers. One literary critic wrote that too much security prevails among us; property is safe, trains are punctual, social work, police, and fire brigades prevent "sensations and surprises." It is natural to long for danger (e.g., *Kampfsport*) and to find pleasure in remembering times of insecurity. This was denied by another critic: far from suffering from too secure a life, people longed, on the contrary, for "escape from themselves." Historical novels keep one away from the "all-too-actual (*Allzutäglichem*) from which we suffer." Historical reading is a counteracting force to "the heavy shocks to which our generation, more than many earlier ones, has been and still is exposed, that make them tired and unwilling to fight. . . ."

The authorities were right in watching the historical output. Historical writing can become a fighting weapon, not only for the defense of the ruling group (as in the story of William the Conqueror) but also against it. Backed by historical facts, the writer can establish values and passions contrary to the official code. By selecting historical events parallel or strictly opposed to the present time, he can illuminate his own

world. All this he is free to do within certain limits; censorship would set in if the parallel came too close.

How great are the possibilities within these limits is shown by an article entitled "The Napoleon Legend," which appeared in August, 1939, in *Die deutsche Rundschau*. The historical vogue had then just produced fifteen books on Napoleon, all more or less along official lines. The author, under the pretext of putting right the picture of Napoleon, quotes from the writings of a contemporary, Graf Schlabendorf (1750-1824). The effect is a portrait of Hitler's Germany. In the France of that time, everything was done "through fear and terror." Napoleon's words were believed to be "oracular and infallible." Spies were everywhere, censors mutilated books, "voluntary" contributions were forced upon the citizens. About Napoleon's end, it is said that it was "brought about largely through his wanton inroads into the territory of conscience and mind. . . ." A similar course is clearly pursued in a historical study in a Vienna magazine in 1939 under the title "The Punishing of the Leading Classes of French Society in the Revolution of 1789" or "The Terror Regime of 1789." Both articles were reprinted, soon after their publication, in a German magazine similar to the *Reader's Digest*—an indication of their general interest.

The reader has influenced the literary production decisively. His taste has had to be respected by both author and authorities. While *Die neue Linie* was looking for a "realistic" story, it held a contest for the best cover. This contest shows once more the reader's preference. The cover must, above all, "catch the eye of the beholder," please the public. As to the theme of the cover, there was only the one request (obviously official), that it should refer to the war; the word "symbolically" was added—a concession to the public. Small reproductions of ideal covers followed. One is described as: "Wartime, Autumn, 1940. The woman's thoughts are with the soldiers." The artist has painted in the right foreground, in a

gleaming red tone, a woman's head in half-profile. The girl looks toward "the distance where, with the unreality of a dream, marked only in weak brush strokes, marching soldiers and riders pass by against a turquoise background." Out of nine covers in 1940, eight displayed the war in the foreground: bombers in a spring sky, a rider storming with his sword, two soldier's heads in helmets. In 1940, the war was to appear on "a turquoise background," in "weak brush strokes" in accordance with the public's taste.

I have before me a letter dated October, 1941, written in Germany by a middle-class woman with intellectual ambitions; her husband is in the army. She writes that she has become crazy about classical music—Mozart, Beethoven, Schubert, Haydn. Only three or four years ago she liked song hits better. Just now she also has discovered Stifter, "good old Stifter," whom she once found terribly boring. But now she loves to read his "leisurely description of a leisurely time." She will have a few people in on

Sunday afternoons for reading and music. She will start with Goethe's letters. . . .

The German reader's preferences are still at variance with those of his government. One cannot compel people to read, and their buying power is still a power. The reader has behaved like a child who refuses food that is not to its taste. The parents have to compromise on the feeding plan. Thus the reader's diet has only a meager proportion of straightforward ideological writings. The bulk of it is provided by non-"political" books, by books written in or about the past, tales of faraway countries, stories of private joys and sorrows, dreams. Occasionally even a criticism of the present time, disguised as history, is published and read.

The authorities have tried and are still trying to bring the public's thoughts back to the new values and "realities"—a hard task. It is possible to control people's speech, but it is not easy to regiment the silent processes of the mind.

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

NEWS AND NOTES

RESEARCH NEWS

Pi Lambda Theta.—Pi Lambda Theta announces two awards of \$400 each, to be granted on or before September 15, 1944, for significant research studies in education. A study may be submitted by any individual whether or not engaged at present in educational work, or by any chapter or group of members of Pi Lambda Theta. An unpublished study on any aspect of the professional problems of women may be submitted. No study granted an award shall become the property of Pi Lambda Theta, nor shall Pi Lambda Theta in any way restrict the subsequent publication of a study for which an award is granted, except that Pi Lambda Theta shall have the privilege of inserting an introductory statement in the printed form of any study for which an award is made. Three copies of the final report of the completed research study shall be submitted to the Committee on Studies and Awards by August 1, 1944. Information concerning the awards and the form in which the final report shall be prepared will be furnished upon request. All inquiries should be addressed to the chairman of the Committee on Studies and Awards.

NOTES

Acta Americana.—*Acta Americana*, a new inter-American journal, published in Mexico, D.F., by the Inter-American Society of Anthropology and Geography, devotes a part of its space to sociological materials, especially those most closely related to problems in anthropology and geography. Scholarly articles on problems in the Americas in English, Spanish, Portuguese, and French are accepted for publication. Sociological news and items of Pan-American interest may be sent to the collaborating editor for sociology, Dr. Leonard Bloom, department of anthro-

pology and sociology, University of California, Los Angeles 24, California.

American Sociological Society.—The officers of the American Sociological Society for 1944 are: Rupert B. Vance, University of North Carolina, *President*; Read Bain, Miami University, *First Vice-President*; Carl C. Taylor, U.S. Department of Agriculture, *Second Vice-President*; Conrad Taeuber, U.S. Department of Agriculture, *Secretary-Treasurer*.

Duke University.—Professor Howard E. Jensen has been appointed professor of sociology and mental hygiene in the Duke University School of Medicine. In addition to his duties in the department of sociology, he is serving as sociological consultant to the psychiatric clinic and is collaborating with the staff of the department of psychiatry in the training of medical students in that field.

Professor Charles A. Ellwood has recently received from South America a Spanish translation of his *History of Social Philosophy*. The translation was made at Santiago, Chile, in 1939. It is Number 54 in a collection called "Studium," which includes a great number of modern writers, such as Emil Ludwig, Nicholas Berdief, and Aldous Huxley. All the numbers of this series are "pirated" editions, as South American countries generally do not adhere to the international copyright law. The copy was sent to Professor Ellwood by Dr. John P. Gillin, associate professor of anthropology in the department of sociology, who is now connected with the American Embassy in Lima, Peru, on temporary leave of absence. The translation was made by Armando Gonzales. It is the fourteenth translation which has been made of Professor Ellwood's books, four being in German, four in Japanese,

four in Chinese, one in French, and one in Spanish.

Professor Ellwood has again contributed the article on "Sociology" in the *Annual* of the *Encyclopaedia Americana*, which is scheduled for publication in March, 1944.

University of Kansas.—Recently, on the recommendation of the department, a "Junior Curriculum in Professional Social Work" was initiated. It is expected that eventually a graduate school of social work will be established.

Three members of the staff are engaged in different phases of the war effort. Dr. Carroll D. Clark is captain in the Army Air Forces, stationed at Selman Field, Monroe, Louisiana, where he is wing planning and training officer for the Pre-flight School. Dr. J. Mapheus Smith is on leave, serving as chief of the Occupational and Re-employment Section of the Division of Research and Statistics of the Selective Service System, at national headquarters in Washington. Dr. Marston M. McCluggage is lieutenant (j.g.) in the Navy and is serving as executive officer in the Navy V-12 Unit, College of St. Thomas, St. Paul, Minnesota.

During the past summer Dr. Mabel A. Elliott, with the aid of a research grant by the university, made case studies of women offenders at the Federal Women's Industrial Reformatory at Alderson, West Virginia, and at the Municipal Women's Prison in New York City.

Michigan Sociological Society.—Leonard C. Kercher, Western Michigan College of Education, was elected president at the fall meeting of the Michigan Sociological Society, held on Friday, November 26, in Ann Arbor. Other officers elected were: Henry Warren Dunham, Wayne University, Vice-President; Norman Daymond Humphrey, Wayne University, Secretary-Treasurer; Amos H. Hawley, University of Michigan, and Alfred McClung Lee, Wayne University, members of Executive Committee.

The program of the meeting was as follows: Vernon Fox, psychiatrist, Michigan

State Prison, Jackson, "The Classification System at Jackson Prison"; Edward C. Jandy, Wayne University, discussant; Edward J. Humphreys, psychiatrist, Michigan State Home Training School, Coldwater, "Sub-average Groups in the Organization of Society"; Gunnar Dybwad, University of Michigan, discussant; Amos H. Hawley, University of Michigan, "Ecology and Human Ecology"; Ernest B. Harper, Michigan State College, discussant; panel discussion of "Sociological Implications of the Race Riots in Detroit," led by Norman Daymond Humphrey, Wayne University, and participated in by Richard Myers, University of Michigan; Leonard C. Kercher, Western Michigan College of Education; H. K. Fox, Adrian College; A. D. Vestesk, Jackson Junior College; Isaac Franck, Jewish Community Council of Detroit; and Frank Hartung, Wayne University. Albert H. Burrows, Northern Michigan State College of Education, gave a public lecture on "Social Problems of the Northern Peninsula," which was sponsored jointly by the Society and the University of Michigan.

A. E. Wood, University of Michigan, presided at the meetings.

University of North Carolina.—In line with his recommendation for an expanding program in regional research and widening opportunities for the utilization of research materials in the field of education, planning, and regional development, Howard W. Odum announces the return of Gordon W. Blackwell to the University of North Carolina Institute for Research in Social Science as research professor, elected also as director of the Institute, the duties of which he will take over at an early date.

Katharine Jocher and Lee M. Brooks have been promoted from associate professorship to professorship in the department of sociology.

Rupert B. Vance's book on *All These People: A Study of the Nation's Resources in the South* is now in press and will appear in the spring.

The American Family Magazine Book

Foundation announces the publication of a special volume, *Understanding Marriage and the Family*, in honor of Ernest Rutherford Groves.

Harold D. Meyer has been appointed by Governor Broughton as executive secretary of the North Carolina Recreation Committee.

The University of North Carolina Press has announced the publication date of Howard W. Odum's *Race and Rumors of Race: Challenge to American Crisis* as December 1. His volume, "The Way of the South: A Biography of the Southern United States," will not be published by Macmillan until next year.

Pennsylvania State College.—George E. Simpson, who has been promoted to the rank of professor of sociology, is serving as acting head of the department of sociology.

Linville F. Watson has been appointed instructor in sociology.

Professors Kingsley Davis and Wilbert E. Moore are on leave for the current academic year. They are doing research work in the

Office of Population Research, Princeton, N.J.

Temple University.—James W. Woodard was recently elected president of the Philadelphia Anthropology Society.

Negley K. Teeters has been named as a consultant in the Division of Prison Industries of the War Production Board.

Social Welfare Council (Orange, New Jersey).—Dr. Paul Cressey, formerly of New York University, has joined the Social Welfare Council.

Sociology Department, Wayne University.—Dr. Norman Daymond Humphrey, assistant professor of sociology, is serving as director of research for the Metropolitan Detroit Council of Social Agencies. He has charge of co-ordinating the research activities of the Council and of its 160 member-agencies. Dr. Humphrey continues in his status as a full-time member of the Wayne University teaching staff. He has an article, "On Assimilation and Acculturation," in the November issue of *Psychiatry*.

BOOK REVIEWS

The Strategy of Terror. By EDMOND TAYLOR.
Rev. ed. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co.,
1942. Pp. 279. \$2.50.

In the future development of sociology, documents like Edmond Taylor's *The Strategy of Terror* will play a role similar in importance to that played by faithful descriptions of the animal body in the development of the biological sciences. In fact, some accounts by foreign correspondents are more helpful for the understanding of social dynamics than many pedantic writings by experts supported by exact but often irrelevant statistical data. The particular merit of Taylor's book is that it belongs to the few writings by foreign correspondents which deal not primarily with external events but with psychological facts. Aside from its value as a historical document, it is of great interest to the student of social psychology. It describes in great detail, mostly on the basis of diary notes, the extensive use of propaganda by both the Germans and the Allies as an introduction to World War II.

Taylor knows well that psychological warfare is not a new device and that it was not invented by Hitler and his staff of psychological experts and then imitated by the English, French, and American governments. He is well aware of the fact that the war drums, war dances, and war attire of the savages are nothing but more primitive varieties of psychological warfare aimed at bolstering the spirit of one's own warriors and undermining the morale of the enemy. The ominous sound of the tom-tom in the jungle is the primitive counterpart of intimidation by radio and the press. Appeasement techniques such as fraternization, deceptive flattery, and bribery of leaders, subleaders, or the *soldatesca* by gifts and promises are as old as war itself. Taylor shows that all these psychological techniques have been employed by the Germans methodically, consciously, even scientifically. Particularly fascinating is Taylor's description of the "phony war," in which the use of psychological warfare surpassed even that during the months before the outbreak of World War I.

Taylor's main thesis is that this war, like

every other, is not merely a question of numbers, technical equipment, or even production but is also a war of wills. "We cannot lose this war until we have lost it in our minds, and we shall never do this unless we want to." Undermining the enemy's determination, its will to win, is the major goal to which all military operations are subordinated. Taylor demonstrates his thesis convincingly by the collapse of France, which he witnessed with seeing eyes. Among the causes of the French collapse he gives major credit to the success of the corrosive and dissolving techniques of German propaganda. Like many other observers of the battle front, however, Taylor has the tendency to overevaluate somewhat the significance of the German psychological techniques. Even so, he senses that the success of these attacks upon the morale of the opponent does not depend so much upon the techniques employed as upon the pre-existing state of mind of the opponent. The history of events since his book was first published has demonstrated this fact. The same Axis methods which succeeded in undermining the morale of the French, and which were also successful to some extent in this country in postponing our participation and thus giving the Axis a definite initial advantage, produced just the opposite effect in England. The partial success of the Axis psychological warfare is due not to its excellence and scientific precision but to the susceptibility of its victims. In fact, the vicious battle cry "Huj! Huj!" of the pagan cavalryman of Arpad was probably more effective in paralyzing the opponent than Hitler's choking voice through the radio or Lord Haw Haw's sarcastic messages. The specific effectiveness of the psychological warfare against France would be better understood if Taylor's book were read in conjunction with another masterpiece of psychological reporting, Elliot Paul's *The Last Time I Saw Paris*. The morbid pacifism of France and its internal psychological disintegration during the thirties made it an easy prey to Hitler's psychological warfare. In mass psychology the same principles are valid for the crowd as for the individual. The techniques of psychological warfare are com-

parable to those of hypnosis. The hypnotist, too, uses persuasion and a soothing appeal to human dependence as well as command and intimidation. However, the old popular belief that the hypnotist must possess unusual magnetic qualities has been long ago repudiated. We know today that it is not the masterful techniques or the magnetic personality of the hypnotist but the receptiveness of the hypnotized which explains the phenomena of hypnosis. Anyone can learn the techniques of hypnosis, but not everyone can be hypnotized—only the person who longs for the total abandonment of self-control. Upon the healthy individual the histrionic behavior of the hypnotist has nothing but a comical effect, just as the maneuvers of the German psychological experts served only to amuse the British populace.

In the last chapter, the most impressive, Taylor draws a parallel between the psychological climate of France and America. Comparing the "Munichois press" in France with the isolationists in America, he writes:

You will find the same bitterness, the same reckless disregard of the national interest, the same demoralizing predictions of defeat and disaster, the same sinister hints of revenge upon the war-mongers. You will even find many of the same themes and verbal formulas which derive from the willingness of the appeasers in both America and France to incorporate German propaganda material in their campaigns and the psychological fact that the arguments for cowardice are basically the same in all tongues and at all times.

According to Taylor:

The more bitter the struggle and the social tension, the better the field for German propaganda, for each side will be looking abroad for ideological allies, and, given Hitler's record—with the exception of the trifling interlude from August 1939 to June 1941—nothing is easier than to convince the forces of the right that Nazi Germany is such an ally. Then the task of the Nazi propagandist is simply to transpose the class-war in the victim country from a conflict over social reform to a conflict over foreign policy, i.e. relations with Nazi Germany and the Axis generally.

Since Taylor's book was published, however, the American psychological scene has changed considerably. Not that internal social and ideological tensions have lessened, but there are definite signs that they are receding in relation to the will to win. There is no use denying that the steadfast resistance of England to Hitler after Dunkirk gave this country opportunity

and time to overcome its initial confusion and to fortify itself against the dissolving techniques of Hitler's psychological warfare.

FRANZ ALEXANDER, M.D.

Chicago, Illinois

Civilization. Edited by GEORGE P. ADAMS, WILLIAM R. DENNES, and STEPHEN C. PEPPER. ("University of California Publications in Philosophy," Vol. XXIII.) Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1942. Pp. 190. \$2.00.

This volume contains seven lectures given before the Philosophical Union of the University of California in 1941. All are by members of the philosophy department of the University except the first, which is by V. F. Lenzen, professor of physics. Under the title, "Science and Social Context," this lecture deals with the controversy over the historical genesis of modern science, particularly in the age of Newton. It is clear, informative, and scholarly within the limits set by its length. The author develops a suggestion of Edgar Zilsel that in astronomy the dominant motive was intellectual, and even somewhat mystical, but that mechanics was dominated by practical interests. This last is the meaning of "social context" in the title; this is misleading, since other human interests depend rather more on the social context than do those usually classed as economic. In stating that "the increase in population during the nineteenth century made necessary improvement in agriculture and stock raising" the author shows the strangely naïve idea of causality in social phenomenon which students in this field must apparently expect from natural scientists—and perhaps try to explain as a part of their own task.

The philosophical lectures of the volume deal with more or less general, or special, problems connected with the concept of civilization; naturally, a brief review cannot do justice to them individually. The second lecture, by Stephen C. Pepper, on "The Conditions of Social Control," is the only one in which the main argument seems to the reviewer definitely muddled. Through the common practice of using the editorial "we" in an uncritical way (pointed out by Dr. Melden in his lecture), the author ignores the question of who is to control whom and the vital distinction between control in the transitive and instrumental meaning and

individual and group *self-control*, which is the real problem in free society. This involves leadership but not control. In the fourth lecture, by D. S. Mackay, on "Organization and Freedom," the reviewer finds it difficult to follow a coherent thread of argument, though it contains a wealth of penetrating observation as well as evidence of thoughtful reading. The author states as his main theme the difference between "open" and "closed" society and the tendency of every social organization to become closed, to individualize and differentiate itself, and to become antagonistic to other organizations. He also points out the tragic fact that, even internally, "social organization is inherently opposed to the kind of organization that pertains to individual growth and learning," and tends to "the elimination of interests that are not exclusively devoted to the survival of the organization." Sixth in the series is a lecture by Dr. A. I. Melden on "Judgments in the Social Sciences." It is an able discussion of the problem of objectivity of judgments in this field, largely taken up with a destructive criticism of Mannheim's position; similarities in that of Dewey are brought out.

The main theme of the volume is dealt with more explicitly in the three lectures not already commented upon. It is the twofold problem of the meaning of civilization and of the terms "lower" and "higher" as used in connection with different civilizations. The subject is discussed in rather general terms in the third lecture, "The Idea of Civilization," by G. P. Adams. The treatment expounds much wisdom, without recourse to technical philosophical distinctions; this is the only one of the philosophical lectures which does not arouse the sympathy of the reader for an audience expected to follow the argument on oral presentation. The main theme is the necessity of using value judgments and meanings in the discussion of human institutions and social structures; in other words, the impossibility of *wertfreie Wissenschaft* in connection with man. The reviewer has particularly enjoyed the concluding remarks, in which the author pays his respects to naturalistic theories of value and points out the unfortunate feature of our modern intellectual tradition, which has given to knowledge (in the meaning of natural science) a monopoly of all available objectivity, logically releasing the springs of action and the choice of ends from the control of any significant objective content.

The problem of the objectivity of value, specifically in connection with the ranking of

civilizations, is treated in a more technical way in the remaining two lectures. The fifth in the series is by E. W. Strong, under the title, "Civilizations in Historical Perspective." Its direct theme is the relation between "civilization," as used in the singular, with differences in degree, and as used in the plural, implying differences in kind; or, more explicitly, "the consequences for valuation of [this] pluralistic description." It is an impressive historical and critical study. An introduction mentioning the conception of civilization in Condorcet and Toynbee, and more fully discussing W. H. Chamberlin's article, "Europe's Revolt against Civilization" (*Harper's*, December, 1940), is followed by a critique of Spengler, as a representative of one of three ways of escaping from valuational relativity while using a pluralistic description. The method depends on laying claim to a "time-free perspective." The second and third methods of maintaining this distinction are, respectively, setting up an objective scale of values and forming a conception of civilization-as-such, growth of which is progress, identified by a universal succession of stages or by some index. These two methods derive from an explicit differentiation between civilization-as-fact and civilization-as-ideal, originally introduced by Guizot, who is credited with setting the problem of whether the idea of numerous civilizations for historical description is reconcilable with that of civilization as a unitary ideal. This polarity between plural-descriptive and singular-normative does not seem at all rigorous to the reviewer. The second and third projects of escape are discussed, without clear separation or sequence, in connection with the work of Alfredo Niceforo and of Professor Adams. Consideration of various positions leads the author to the conclusion that Hegel's idea of a world-historical spirit offers the only historical way of transcending valuational relativity. (Platonic realism would be a possible nonhistorical method.) In a short concluding section the author returns to the idea of revolutionary breakdown in European civilization as a basis for definition of the concept. He comes out with a position on valuational relativity which may be described as open-minded, "agnostic," or reluctantly and apologetically pluralistic. We cannot say positively that German National Socialism is barbarism and not a new civilization.

What we have designated as the main theme of the book is formulated in the title of the last lecture—"Conceptions of Civilization:

American Society in Wartime. Edited by WILLIAM FIELDING OGBURN. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1943. Pp. vii + 237. \$2.50.

This rather slender but meaty volume exhibits, in moderation, the merits and defects of practically every book that is in the nature of a symposium, being made up of papers written by a number of authors who formulated their respective contributions with little or no consultation. It contains the text of lectures delivered at the University of Chicago, on the Charles R. Walgreen Foundation, in the autumn of 1942 (according to the editor's Preface); there is internal evidence, however, that some of the authors revised their manuscripts for publication, to take into account data which became available later. If one may venture to restate the title of the volume as "The Effects of World War II upon American Life," then there are obvious omissions; economic and political effects in the narrow sense are almost completely omitted, and there is no paper concerned with the effects of the war upon religious organization and institutions. On the other hand, there are a few overlappings; for example, Burgess, in his paper on the family, repeats briefly certain points made by Ogburn in his paper on population.

The papers range from matter-of-fact reporting and cautious forecasting of the proximate future (as in Ogburn's paper on "Population," Burgess' on "The Family," Wirth's on "The Urban Community," Lowry Nelson's on "Farms and Farming Communities," and Samuel A. Stouffer's on "Social Science and the Soldier") to more searching theoretic analysis and speculation (W. Lloyd Warner on "The American Town," in part; Ellsworth Faris on "The Role of the Citizen"; R. E. Park on "Racial Ideologies"; E. H. Sutherland on "Crime"; and Herbert Blumer on "Morale"). Robert Redfield's thoughtful paper, "The Japanese-Americans," is a courageous presentation of considerations and a point of view which have been widely neglected or overruled in the months of shock and war enthusiasm that have followed the Pearl Harbor disaster.

On the whole, however, these papers form a competent and enlightening treatment of the effects of the present war upon the life of this country, including both effects that have already developed and those that are still to be anticipated. In the absence of materials better adapted to such use, this volume might well

serve as textbook or required reading for part of a college course on the sociology of war. Though the book is small, the very brief Index provided scarcely seems adequate.

FLOYD N. HOUSE

University of Virginia

French Canada in Transition. By EVERETT C. HUGHES. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1943. Pp. 227. \$2.50.

This is largely a study of Cantonville, a community typical of French Canada in transition. Part I deals with "Rural Quebec as Background"; Part II with "Cantonville, an Industrial Town," 91 per cent French Canadian, the population of which increased from 2,605 in 1911 to 19,424 in 1937; Part III, dealing with the metropolis, Montreal, contains a concluding chapter which interprets with rare insight and skill the trends and tensions previously described. Appendixes contain data on the relative strength of ethnic groups in rural and urban Quebec since 1871, on industrial positions held by the non-French, and a bibliography.

"The society of rural Quebec is one of land-holding families" settled on self-sufficient farms producing their "own labor force by a tremendous rate of natural increase." As property, the farm is indivisible. Though only one son inherits, the family unit is *solidaire*. All families are attached to the parish, which coincides with community. Here, too, there is security, common interest, warmth of feeling, and rich ceremonialism fortifying common effort.

Surplus population from these homogeneous communities migrates to growing industrial areas. In Cantonville, as elsewhere, the rank and file of workers are French Canadian, while managerial positions are held by an alien ("British") minority, and business controls originate in home plants in the United States and England. The "industrial hierarchy" is thus marked by an ethnic difference maintained in other communal institutions and, with minor exceptions, in voluntary organizations. Schools throughout Quebec are not only Catholic and Protestant; they are differentiated as French or English. Language and culture together constitute the powerful determinant in almost all relations.

In town, tensions associated with rapid industrialization arise; antagonism toward the employer who happens to be non-French finds

primitive expression. The roles of family and parish change. The city parish is no longer a community. Its integrity "as an institution dealing . . . effectively with all people within a circumscribed territory is put to great strain." Smoldering strife accompanies the nonaccommodation between cultural groups differently oriented to major values in life. There is resistance to controls—commercial, "imperialistic," non-Catholic—imposed by an ethnic minority and there is fear of British domination, of Americanization, and of the Jew, who is identified with English and American enterprise.

Hughes presents the issues with such sensitive insight that the monograph becomes a necessary handbook for social scientists interested in French Canada or in sociological procedure. Chapter xix, "Quebec Seeks a Villain," contains as keen an analysis as can be found of aggressive group behavior under conditions of uncertainty and frustration.

BESSIE BLOOM WESSEL

Connecticut College

Italian or American? By IRVIN L. CHILD. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1943. Pp. vii+208. \$2.75.

In New Haven, Connecticut, the old Yankee stock is in the minority, virtually submerged in a mixture of foreign nationalities. The Italians of the first and second generations are almost as numerous as the native whites. The processes by which they move toward assimilation are worthy of study, and Dr. Child has made a useful contribution in this respect.

The method is primarily that of the participant observer. The author mixed informally with New Haven Italians, talked, ate, and lived with them, and conducted formal as well as informal interviews and life-history statements. His principal interest seems to have been to find and explain types of reactions of Italian males to the native American culture. These types, designated the "rebel reaction" (deserting Italian ways), the "in-group reaction" (preserving Italian ways), and the "apathetic reaction" (indifferent), are described and illustrated with quoted statements and conversations. This material is interesting and easy to read. The book could well have included more of it.

The contribution that psychology has to make to such questions is given a lengthy treat-

ment, and it is clear that the author believes in its value. The sociologist and the anthropologist are always eager for help from this science and perhaps should not look a gift horse in the mouth. But what we receive is of little help if the structure is flimsy. In this case there seems to be a foundation of psychology that is reasonably firm, but the extension of it to the behavior of the second-generation Italians appears to get too far out in front of science. The theoretical material is based to a considerable extent on the principles of learning which have been enunciated by the Yale group. The principles of reinforcement, of extinction, of avoidance learning, and of generalization and differentiation are applied to the three reaction types mentioned above.

It is hard to quarrel with the discoveries that both animals and humans may in simplified situations repeat actions that are rewarded and avoid situations in which their knuckles are rapped. It is also plausible that these reactions are present in the highly complex forms of human behavior, though it may often be difficult or impossible to say in a particular case what are the rewards and punishments that enter into the determination of actions. The principle of extinction states that "acts whose performance is not followed by attainment of an anticipated goal are less likely to be performed in the future"; but in the case of the magic of preliterate healing specialists, or, for that matter, of our cold remedies, it is hard to say what the reward is without being tautological. This is the classical difficulty that has previously enmeshed those who sought such simple pleasure-pain formulas for all human actions. It is not against the rules to revive a point of view which has been examined and discarded, but the revival might be expected to have some new forms of support. These are not in evidence here.

There is reference to experiments with a "conflict board" which enables the psychologist to classify four or five different reactions to a standard conflict situation. These would be relevant to the assimilation aspect of the study if they could be related to the three "reaction types" of second-generation Italians; but, apart from their use as analogy, no such relation is established. There is also reference to experimental evidence that "behavior which leads to a reduction in anxiety will be reinforced"; but a study of the definitions of the key words shows that this means little more than that persons characteristically look ahead to avoid troubles.

In general, the laboratory psychology that is presented is pretentious in this context, and the elaboration of it approaches pseudo-science.

The real contribution, however, is in the material gathered, and this is not less valuable merely because the theoretical treatment is fragile.

ROBERT E. L. FARIS

Syracuse University

Personality and Social Change. By THEODORE M. NEWCOMB. New York: Dryden Press, 1943. Pp. x+225. \$2.50.

It has been observed that the experience of spending several years in college generally makes students somewhat less conservative in their political views. Bennington College, though scarcely a hotbed of sedition, appears to have somewhat more of this effect than do most other colleges. Why this is so, and how the process works, is brought out fully in the present study.

Dr. Newcomb spent four years and what appears to be an impressive amount of labor to make the story complete. The two principal devices are attitude scales (several kinds) and personal interviews. Even the conclusions are too numerous to be fully stated here, but the main findings can be summarized. The Bennington students made a change in each year of their college career in the direction which is called political and economic progressivism. Most of this change was kept at least as long as three or four years after graduation. Not all students changed to the same degree, however, and it is cleverly shown that in this community it is not the negativistic minority fringe which constitutes the liberal or radical element but rather the more popular, conforming, sociable students. The relatively inactive and less popular students are the most conservative and remain so. The explanation is to be found to a considerable extent in the fact that Bennington, a new and small college, is more than usually isolated from outside influences and therefore is an exceptionally integrated community. The unusually youthful and politically leftish faculty gives more than the customary amount of attention to making the students aware of the world developments. There is thus formed a community in which progressive attitudes are the prevailing ones, and the more normal students gradually make an adaptation and par-

tially desert the upper-middle-class prejudices they acquired in their homes.

The method of research is more important than the conclusions, however. It is not so much the elaborateness of any technique that impresses as the ingenuity and initiative with which the author pursues each residual question until he reaches a satisfactory answer. He does not represent that his data are typical or that all questions are disposed of, but he goes well beyond the point at which many would consider a study adequate. He makes available some objective knowledge about the relations of community life, roles, and attitudes and shows how more such knowledge can be unearthed.

ROBERT E. L. FARIS

Syracuse University

To Stem This Tide: A Survey of Racial Tension Areas. By CHARLES S. JOHNSON and ASSOCIATES. Boston and Chicago: Pilgrim Press, 1943. Pp. x+142. (Paper.)

Race Riot. By ALFRED MCCLUNG LEE and NORMAN DAYMOND HUMPHREY. New York: Dryden Press, 1943. Pp. xii+143. \$1.50.

These are reports to the public on certain current interracial developments in this country.

Mr. Johnson's work covers the country at large with respect to racial tension in industry, in rural districts, and on public carriers. Other chapters present cases of police mistreatment of Negro civilians and soldiers. Attention is given to the peculiar sources and kinds of friction characteristic of the various regions of the country. The last chapter discusses post-war problems of racial adjustment. Appendixes contain the proposals of two southern conferences, one Negro and the other white, for interracial co-operation.

The survey does not attempt to be exhaustive; apparently the aim was to put vividly before interested persons a gallery of pictures of action on the racial front in wartime America. If that was the aim, it is attained.

Race Riot tells the story of the Detroit troubles of June, 1943. The authors are to be congratulated for having gone after the matter with speed and vigor. It is a public service to report with care and impartiality such events as these. Various public reports, newspaper

accounts, and the testimony of many eyewitnesses were used as evidence. The account is sprinkled with comment on the nature of riots and with comparisons with others and concludes with a chapter of suggestions as to the prevention of race riots.

The authors of *Race Riot*, although wisely refraining from the attempt to develop some important new theory concerning mass violence, have presented in a semipopular way the more important things that are known of excited collective behavior.

EVERETT C. HUGHES

University of Chicago

Leadership and Isolation: A Study of Personality in Inter-personal Relations. By HELEN HALL JENNINGS. New York: Longmans, Green & Co., 1943. Pp. xv+240. \$3.00.

Observation and even measurement of traits of persons is a well-developed practice in social psychology, but it is not quite such an easy thing to apply techniques of measurement to the more complicated conceptions of personality as a role in a group. Jennings manages, however, to make a very successful investigation of the roles of leader and of "isolate" through the use of sociometric methods. Her results sound almost as if they had been written under the guidance of Cooley—which may be a tribute both to Cooley and to her.

The subjects were 133 girls and young women in the New York State Training School for Girls. They were allowed to make choices concerning which of their acquaintances they would like to have sit by them, and which they preferred to avoid, and on the basis of such choices and rejections several types and degrees of "overchosen" and "underchosen" are worked out. The conclusions emerge quite neatly and are satisfactorily supported by the statistical analysis. Some case studies add a rounded image of the results and afford some relief in a discussion otherwise heavy with figures and new language.

There seem to be two principal kinds of isolates. One kind is in a way unselfish and spends her time trying to do kindnesses for others but is such a doormat that she is unchosen though not particularly disliked. The other kind is self-centered and awkwardly aggressive and is seldom chosen and frequently rejected. The persons chosen frequently, the leader types in

this sort of community, are those who are aggressive enough to push themselves ahead but at the same time are solicitous of others—and skilful in both respects. This is in agreement with the advice in most of the "How To Win Friends" books and also with traditional or folk sociology. The methods used in making the study are novel, however, and it may be that we are observing in such studies the development of some valuable machine tools of sociological and social-psychological research.

ROBERT E. L. FARIS

Syracuse University

Social Factors in Crime: As Explained by American Writers of the Civil War and Post Civil War Period. By ELLEN ELIZABETH GUILLOT. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1943. Pp. x+197.

The author attempts to cover the thinking of social reformers in America on the question of the nature and direction of the social causes of crime. It is presumed that the reformers represent the very great majority of persons at the time who gave serious thought to the problem of crime. I am always at a loss, in evaluating social history studies, to know whether the student has tapped all the areas where thinking on the subject was done or got published.

But, taking the coverage and the sampling as they are, we are presented with a group of activists in the 1860-85 period who believe strongly that crime is induced by social factors. Some of the activist thinkers of the time even used statistics to back up their reflections, although the statistics on crime were handled indiscriminately. For, in those days, the evaluation of the worth of criminal statistics, in terms of uniform reporting, accuracy, and consistency, was not appreciated.

The reformer-writers of the period made honest efforts to be factual and made logical connections between cause and effect. The status of knowledge of the operation of social causes of crime is not a great deal more primitive than the status of knowledge about crime determination today. The reformers failed to study individual cases and to make factor analyses from case studies. Some of their conceptions are a little out of line with more refined notions today—for example, the effect of civilization as compared with patterns of behavior

and culture conflict. While we today have sharper conceptional tools and better research technique, the reform-minded American writers of the period covered made a very good showing.

WALTER C. RECKLESS

Ohio State University

Population Problems: A Cultural Interpretation.

By PAUL H. LANDIS. New York: American Book Co., 1943. Pp. xii+500. \$3.75.

Somewhat of a gap exists between the concepts of population study and those of the wider field of sociology, of which it may best be considered a part. Landis notes this, referring to the sway which biological, economic, and geographical notions have held here as compared with other branches of sociology, and he proposes, as the subtitle implies, to bring population into the fold. This proposal seems an excellent one; the concept of culture, whose usefulness has spread from ethnological beginnings to the farthest reaches of social science, should also be of help in population, which merely applies a specialized technique, the statistical, to a particular segment.

This latest *Population Problems* speaks of a threefold perspective enjoined by the subject: (1) the factual data; (2) the interpretation of the human behavior involved (theory); and (3) the social action either now taking place or called for (policy). The theory which the author is prepared to take seriously is not for the most part given in the early section devoted to theory (Malthus and Gini) but is interlarded, as befits empirical treatment, with the facts presented through the middle sections which constitute the main bulk and substance of the book. Most of what we now look for in a text on population is covered here: trends and differentials in birth and death rates and their presumed causes; the development of the United States population to its present age and sex composition; functional (i.e., occupational) distribution; and international and internal migration and the demographically relevant characteristics of the migrants. The emphasis in the data at least, if not in the speculations, is more than usually American; it contains extensive references to regional conditions. Such detailed study of local circumstances seems to this reviewer richer in possibilities of meaningful results than broad conclusions from data whose homogeneity is left unexamined. Its relegation of conventional theory to a minor section, and

in particular its dealing with Malthus in perhaps the shortest space on record; its nonmention of the optimum theory of population; its disregard of positive eugenics; its relatively brief references to population pressure and war—these may indicate the approach.

The data are rather more secondary than is usual; the simplest references even to the census or vital statistics are always mediated by some authority. Perhaps a textbook by a newcomer has the advantage that there is less danger of amplification of private hobbies and a fairer perspective on the field; if so, the book under review offers this advantage. It gives the effect of a compilation from a good filing system of contemporary work, with the corresponding merit that the documentation is most thorough and the range of illustration very wide. The nonintervention of the author at the level of statistical manipulation and his very explicit use of the unimpeachable notion of culture in his organization and discussion make the book highly suited to all teaching purposes. Amateurishness does, however, show through in a few places, particularly in the references to life-tables (pp. 186 and 219-20).

The program outlined in the early pages will give most sociologists the feeling that this is the kind of book on population they themselves would like to write. The performance may leave the more critical feeling that they have not yet lost their chance. Only those who deeply value the cultural approach can enter into the disappointment, not that Landis' contribution is not so great as other books but that it is not greater. This is partly, of course, because on major points scholars (outside of the Axis countries) have generally attained a cultural viewpoint without stressing the fact—thus most would agree with him that the last fifty years' decline in fertility is unrelated to fecundity; that our low death rates are due to the way we now live rather than to changes in our hereditary constitution; and that the age-sex distributions of a community are the result of our notions of man's and woman's work and the way in which our society provides particular opportunities in one place rather than another. On minor points throughout, however, suggestive explanations are offered which do give familiar data a wider meaning.

NATHAN KEYFITZ

Dominion Bureau of Statistics
Ottawa

Our Young Folks. By DOROTHY CANFIELD FISHER. New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1943. Pp. xviii+329. \$2.75.

The author, best known as a novelist, writes not as a specialist but as an interested citizen of broad social sympathies, whose knowledge has been strengthened by membership on the American Youth Commission of the American Council of Education. Mrs. Fisher's whole approach to the problems of youth is realistic and sensible. She does not sentimentalize, and she does not want to coddle youth and smooth the way. The satisfactions to be gained from life come from usefulness and the knowledge that a job has been well done; therefore, jobs, training for jobs, and provision for creative leisure are the answer.

Although the book covers the conventional subjects of education, work, vocational and marital problems of girls, and leisure, it is pointed toward the future of the late 1940's and the 1950's. Vocational testing, the N.Y.A., the C.C.C., and summer work camps are discussed for the light they shed on future problems. In the section on girls she pointedly suggests the advisability of a more realistic education than the present one, which places the girl in a subordinate economic position, emphasizes fashion and the joys of spending, and ties the young wife and mother too closely to her growing children and piecemeal volunteer community jobs. For all, either in work or in leisure-time activities, she advocates the development of skills—the ability to do something well—as the road to the finest satisfaction.

RUTH SHONLE CAVAN

Rockford, Illinois

American Negro Slave Revolts. By HERBERT APTHEKER. New York: Columbia University Press, 1943. Pp. 409. \$4.50.

In this book on the colonization of Africa, Sir Harry Johnston stated that the Negro was a "born slave" and enumerated, among the qualities which fitted him for his naturally servile condition, the Negro's "great physical strength, docility, cheerfulness of disposition," and "short memory for sorrows and cruelties." Although the experiences of the slaves on the African coast, and even the experiences of slave-buyers and of slaveholders in the United States, would have contradicted Johnston's preconceptions, the notion has been generally ac-

cepted in this country that Negroes responded to their enslavement with passivity and docility. In order to give a more realistic account of the response of the Negro to enslavement, Dr. Aptheker has made a thorough and comprehensive study of practically all the available sources of information bearing on the question. He reaches the conclusion that "discontent and rebelliousness were not only exceedingly common, but, indeed, characteristic of the American Negro slaves."

Although this conclusion is at variance with the generally accepted opinions concerning the contentedness of the slaves, even southern writers and government officials, as the author shows, were constantly aware of the possibility of insurrections. Publicity in regard to unrest and discontent among the slaves was avoided because of its effect upon the slaves. Nevertheless, there was a widespread and constant fear of rebellions. The elaborate machinery of control was based upon the assumption that "social inertia" was not sufficient to maintain the subordination of the slave population. The constant recurrence of rebelliousness among the slaves all over the South justified this assumption of the white masters. That these slave rebellions were more frequent than our inadequate sources of information have led us to believe is proved by the documentation of the numerous cases of rebellions described by the author. In his detailed accounts of the Vesey and Turner insurrections the author has corrected Drewry's misleading and inadequate history of the Turner affair.

The information contained in this book will provide a corrective for the tendency on the part of sociologists to overemphasize the accommodation of the Negro to slavery, although they generally recognize that there were forces within the slave system tending to cause discontent and unrest. As the author shows, the Negro slave was not as completely isolated as is often assumed. He was affected by the urbanization of the South, and political opinions and currents of thought from outside did not fail to reach his ears. Moreover, his attitude toward slavery was influenced by his physical condition, which was constantly affected by economic conditions, while the very system of coercion was an irritant tending to create dissatisfaction. It is obviously impossible to prove on statistical grounds whether discontent and rebellion were characteristic of the slave. We know that slavery was not a perpetual race riot and that

under certain conditions slavery became a social, as well as an economic, institution. Yet, from the wealth of materials analyzed by the author, it appears that he has proved that coercion played as important a role in maintaining slavery as did such social factors as tradition and custom and habits of subordination.

This book, which treats a neglected phase of the Negro's adjustment to American life, is an important contribution to the literature on the Negro. Although it deals with the slavery period, it contains much information which might aid our thinking today concerning the so-called "adjustment" of the Negro to his subordinate status in the South.

E. FRANKLIN FRAZIER

Howard University

Planning for the South: An Inquiry into the Economics of Regionalism. By JOHN V. VAN SICKLE. Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 1943. Pp. 255. \$2.75.

It is appropriate that this thoughtful analysis of the South's economic position and program for its improvement should come from Vanderbilt University, which earned a reputation as the center of a rather obtuse kind of southern agrarianism in the early 1930's. Professor Van Sickle is not an "agrarian"—in fact, he is a southerner of only five years' standing—so that his regionalism is, as he says, intellectual rather than emotional. His concern is with the inequality that has characterized persistently the South's relative position; and his problem is to discover whether this persistence is due to faulty social controls at the local and national levels and, if so, what planned changes in these controls might reduce the regional differentials.

He finds certain steps which the states can take. The first is to stop the misuse of land, using the tools of land classification and rural zoning, which he prefers to the present federal land program of "expensive educational bribes." Next there is a revision in the present system of land taxation, which he feels tends to promote tenancy and concentration of land ownership. Tenancy can also be ameliorated by state reform of tenant contracts and state reinforcement of the Bankhead-Jones Act program. His formula for dealing with the racial problem is "equitable segregation," on the theory that greater progress will result "if it is clear that the end goal is the establishment of equality of op-

portunity between two distinctive groups and not an attempt to blur the obvious distinctions between the groups."

As for federal policies and their relation to the South, he is generally favorable to the Social Security Act program, though dubious as to the value or wisdom of unemployment insurance, which, in any case, leaves so many of the South's workers uncovered. He likewise approves federal public works but believes that the concept should be expanded to include work on private properties, so that work relief and farm adjustment goals can be merged. But he classes as "federal obstructions" to the South five federal policies or programs: the protective tariff; the railroad freight-rate structure; the Fair Labor Standards Act; collective bargaining legislation; and housing subsidies. His belief in the necessity of wage differentials for the South is primarily responsible for his position on the third and fourth points. Finally, there is an exceptionally interesting chapter analyzing federal grant-in-aid policy from the southern viewpoint, which argues for revision of grant formulas so as to promote regional equalization.

The book is, of course, special pleading. But few will deny that the South is a special economic problem. And, keeping in mind some of the programs which have been advanced for the South in the past, one may feel it fortunate that the pleading in this case comes from such a reasonable and competent source.

C. HERMAN PRITCHETT

University of Chicago

The Negro in Colonial New England: 1620-1776.

By LORENZO JOHNSTON GREENE. New York: Columbia University Press, 1942. Pp. 404.

This is another account of a subject about which there has been little available information. The author has shown that, while the Negro slaves that were imported into New England were not numerous, they exerted an important influence upon the economic, political, and social life of the region.

New England merchants entered the slave trade in response to the growing demand for slave labor in the West Indies and the plantation colonies of the South. A smaller and less profitable market existed in New England, where slaves were employed in a variety of occupations, ranging from unskilled labor to posi-

tions as managers of farms, warehouses, and ships.

Of special interest to students of the social sciences are the chapters dealing with the slave family and the relationship of master and slave. The slave family of the period showed an interesting adaptation to the puritan, patriarchal pattern of family life of the region.

The work reflects a careful and painstaking investigation of available sources of data.

HARRY J. WALKER

Chicago

The Free Negro in North Carolina: 1790-1860.

By JOHN HOPE FRANKLIN. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1943. Pp. viii+271.

The publication of *The Free Negro in North Carolina* should provide a welcome addition to knowledge of an interesting historical problem. As the author has pointed out, not since the publication of John H. Russell's *Free Negro in Virginia* (1913) and James W. Wright's *The Free Negro in Maryland* has there been a definitive study of this problem.

What makes the free Negro a subject of unusual interest is the fact that this group occupied an anomalous position in the slave system and was constantly regarded as a threat to the system itself.

The work includes an account of the legal, economic, and social status of the free Negro in the state. It presents also an account of the growth, manner of recruitment, and distribution of the free Negro population.

Although through law and custom the movement and activities of free Negroes were considerably restricted, they enjoyed in the state a freedom not usually found in other sections of the country. However, economically they were a generally poor group. Competition with free white artisans acted to limit the number engaged in skilled pursuits. Such education as they received came largely through the system of apprenticeship, although some religious groups, particularly the Quakers, made some effort to provide education for them.

The liberalism which characterized North Carolina in its treatment of free Negroes was reflected in the slowness with which proscriptive legislation was enacted during the period and also by the laxity in its enforcement. It was not humanitarian sentiments which accounted for

this liberalism but, rather, the instability of a system which was of doubtful economic value.

The author suggests that a knowledge of the problem of adjustment of this group in the social order will contribute to an understanding of the problem of racial adjustment of today. One fails to find in the work, however, any specific indications of the nature of such contributions. Some suggestion, for example, of the significance of this group in the subsequent development of social classes in the Negro population would be of great interest to students of the problem of race.

The author is to be commended for the meticulous care with which data were assembled from unsuspected and out-of-the-way sources and for the scholarly piecing-together of these data to tell something of the story of the free Negro in North Carolina.

HARRY J. WALKER

Chicago

The Spirit of Enterprise. By EDGAR M. QUEENY.

New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1943. Pp. x+267. \$2.00.

This book by Edgar Monsanto Queeny is essentially a defense of business against a possible encroachment on its prerogatives by governmental activities. He bases his contentions largely upon his own concept of the logics of the present administration and upon his own interpretation of "much of the testimony and monographs of the Temporary National Economic Committee." He tries to be objective in his analysis, but his own personality is so strongly reflected throughout that the book is more of a portrayal of his own attitudes than an objective analysis of the spirit of enterprise. When he wrote the book, it was almost unnecessary for him to write the Preface; and, if he wrote the Preface first, it was almost unnecessary for him to write the book. The content of the one is implicit in the content of the other.

He shows a surprising naïveté in his description of himself and of why he felt called upon to publish his concept of the spirit of enterprise and also in his choice of evidence used in support of his concept.

In the first sentence of his Preface he says, in confiding to a friend: "I intended to buckle on my armor and break a lance in defense of business." This is the crusader speaking, whom he later recognizes in himself when, after reading some of the more radical treatises on eco-

nomics and comparing then with the more traditional, he says: "I recognized my two selves: a crusading idealist and a cold, granitic believer in the law of the jungle."

In his book he makes the direct statement: "Businessmen do not think on emotional grounds. Reason dominates their thinking." In the next paragraph, in speaking of the chemical industry, he states: "They know that the progress is quickest after painstaking proof in the pilot plant—the small-scale experimental plant—and they know that the cheapest experiment is not even in the pilot plant but in the laboratory, where mistakes are cheapest." He goes on to say: "In contrast, New Dealers, many of whom are underpaid and underworked professors of law, economics and sociology, have theory as their forte. They deal in the abstractions and unrealities of the academic world. They have had no commercial experience and are unconvinced of the necessity of experimenting on a small scale. Rather their scientific investigation consists of discourse." He seems to fail to realize the extent to which he himself deals in abstractions and perhaps unrealities in his book.

If Mr. Queeny were an obscure individual, his book might be read with emotional satisfaction by many who were conditioned to a philosophy of laissez faire and resisting social change. Mr. Queeny states that the accountability for what he says is his alone, but he is an not obscure or isolated individual. He is or has been a director of the National Association of Manufacturers and of the National Industrial Conference Board, as well as chairman of the board of a large and important industrial enterprise. If a prominent business executive ventures into a field of analysis without assembling and interrelating at least enough types of events to give his generalizations a reasonable validity, then not only does he open himself to the charge of superficiality, but, by implication, such a charge might readily be carried over by the reader to the groups of which he may be a member.

It is this possible extension by readers of Mr. Queeny's concepts as typical of those held by leaders of other enterprises that makes his book particularly untimely. There appear on all sides evidences that business leaders are increasingly aware of the necessity of objective, scientific analysis of the relational character of economic and other social events. It is unfair to the far-seeing, analytical businessman of to-

day to have one of his group occupying a position of prominence write such a superficial and crusading book. The title of the book itself, with the use of the definite article, implies that the spirit of enterprise, as Mr. Queeny describes it, is the spirit of business in general. Such does not seem to be a valid hypothesis.

JOSIAH O. LOW

Chicago

The Age of Enterprise. By THOMAS C. COCHRAN and WILLIAM MILLER. New York: Macmillan Co., 1942. Pp. x+393. \$3.50.

This book is an important study of the effect of business enterprise on the behavior of people in all segments of the United States from the early days of our country's development to the present time. It gives much evidence of the interconnectedness between business enterprise and the way people live, and also of the domination of business ideology in molding many of our attitudes and evaluations.

By a diligent search "through existing monographic material in American history, economics and related social subjects" the authors have been able to induce valuable generalizations relating not only to many of the ways in which business enterprise has operated but also—and more important—to the way in which business enterprise has directed the course of our culture.

Technically, the authors may be correct when they say, "It is not a book of original research"; but, with an ability to see new relations between known events, as well as an ability to draw new generalizations from such relationships, they have made the book an interesting study. The book is well organized; the Bibliography is extensive and useful; and the Index is adequate. The frequent use of quotations from contemporary sources, which the authors use "as illustrations of conditions or opinion at any given time" lends much to the interest of the reader. As a vast amount of material is condensed into 358 pages of text, it is to be expected that some readers will take exception to the adequacy of some of the evidence presented.

The creation of extensive sales organizations by many investment bankers for distribution of securities directly to investors during the first quarter of this century is not adequately treated. In the chapter on "The Climax of Finance Capitalism" the authors could be criti-

cized for their selection and naming of two particular firms as examples of older conservative houses that aped the methods of the head of one of the largest banks in New York in the late 1920's in the use of such sales organizations "seeking customers all over the country." In the same chapter they allowed an unfortunate error to be made in the title of the power company in Georgia which was "one of the companies at the bottom of the Insull Empire."

Such criticisms, however, should not mar the over-all value of the book; and the hope of the authors that their effort may lead to further and more intensive research on the influence of business on the form of our social structure seems justified.

JOSIAH O. LOW

Chicago

Vocational Interests of Men and Women. By EDWARD K. STRONG, JR. Stanford University, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1943. Pp. xxix+746. \$6.50.

This book is a report of nearly twenty years of work with the Strong Vocational Interest Inventory. That a thick book, full of tables and figures and references to publications by the author and many other workers, can be written about this one instrument of psychological research and vocational guidance is a proof of the importance of the measurement of interests. This book brings up to date the work summarized by Professor Strong in 1931 in his *Change of Interests with Age*. It is a book for the specialist.

The Strong Vocational Interest Blank is a 400-item inventory which asks the subject about his likes and dislikes concerning occupations, school subjects, activities, peculiarities of people, and requires him to rate himself on a number of abilities and characteristics. The subject's responses are compared with the responses of successful people in various occupations. The hypothesis is made, for guidance purposes, that a pattern of interests similar to that of successful people in a given occupation is an indication that the subject will like that occupation and will be a success in it. Strong has spent a great deal of time in improving his inventory and in

deriving norms for various occupational and other groups of people. Consequently, the instrument has been very widely used for educational and vocational guidance. The men's blank can now be scored for 39 occupations; the women's blank, for 18 occupations.

Of most interest to sociologists are Strong's findings on differences of interest patterns between various social groups. The chief differences of this kind reported in the book are differences between the sexes, between age groups, and between socioeconomic groups. Strong has developed M-F (masculinity-femininity), IM (interest maturity), and OL (occupational level) scales. All scales are simply special ways of scoring the same inventory, based upon an item-analysis procedure.

The OL scale represents relatively recent work and will, no doubt, be developed further. Scales have been worked out for several middle-level occupations, such as printer, policeman, carpenter, office man, musician, and farmer. It is now possible, by using the OL scale, to tell whether a person's interests are similar to the interests of people of high, middle, or low occupational status. It is also possible to advise him with respect to a limited number of middle-level occupations. This has importance for educational and vocational guidance, where more and more attention is being devoted to guiding young men and women into the middle- and lower-level occupations. The development of middle-level scales on the Strong Inventory is a symptom of the change of vocational guidance from its earlier preoccupation with guiding all people into the upper-level occupations.

Part I of the book is a general introduction, dealing with the nature of interests and their role in guidance. Parts II and III deal with the occupational and the three nonoccupational scales. The use of interest measurement in guidance is the general theme of Part IV. Part V outlines the attempts which have been made to differentiate those with superior occupational or scholastic success from those who are inferior. Part VI reports the recent research on differentiation among members of the skilled trades. Part VII deals with technical problems of constructing and scoring an interest inventory.

ROBERT J. HAVIGHURST

University of Chicago

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IN THIS ISSUE

The University of Chicago Press published Professor Hans Kelsen's latest book on *Society and Nature* this past December. Professor Kelsen is a famous authority on international law; he pioneered the sociological investigation of this field with his *Der Sociologische und der Juristische Staats Begriff*. He teaches political science at Berkeley.

Former president of Czechoslovakia, Eduard Beneš discusses the postwar status of small nations in Europe. In addition to being a foremost European statesman, Mr. Beneš is an eminent student of international affairs, especially as they concern small nations.

The problem of planning in the postwar world is discussed by Charles E. Merriam, professor emeritus of political science at the University of Chicago and well-known political scientist. Professor Merriam was of the late National Resources Planning Board.

Frank H. Knight, economist at the University of Chicago, writes in this issue on "Human Nature and Democracy." His most recent book treated the nature of democracy. Professor Knight is well known, in addition, for his many economic treatises and for a collection of essays entitled *The Ethics of Competition*.

C. J. Friedrich, of the Harvard department of political science, supplements his recent book, *The New Belief in the Common Man*, with an article on the "Role and Position of the Common Man in the Postwar World." Professor Friedrich is known for his writings on foreign policy, on *Responsible Bureaucracy*, and on the problems of control in radiobroadcasting.

George T. Renner is professor of geography at Teachers' College, Columbia University. He writes in this issue on "Natural Resources in the Postwar World." His latest books have been

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By HANS KELSEN

University of California

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THE STRATEGY OF PEACE

HANS Kelsen

ABSTRACT

A study of the evolution of law reveals a process of constant centralization in which the juridical and executive functions are centralized before the legislative function. This principle, applied to the problem of international law, would indicate the establishment of a world court with power to arbitrate all disputes among its members as the logical final step. A further recommendation of this procedure is the fact that in the past it has only been in a world court that sovereign nations have been willing to bind themselves to the rule of decision by a majority rather than to the rule of unanimous decision.

I

If there is in American public opinion any complete agreement, it is in the conviction that the war in which this country is involved will end with a victory over National Socialism, fascism, and military dictatorship wherever they appear in the world and that this victory will enable us to establish a new world order from which war will be definitively excluded—a new international community the prosperity of which will be guaranteed by a permanent peace, which, as Point VI of the Atlantic Charter says, “will afford to all nations the means of dwelling in safety within their own boundaries, and which will afford assurance that all the men in all the lands may live out their lives in freedom from fear and want.”

Such an order is possible only under three fundamental conditions. First, the new order must guarantee to all nations the right “of access, on equal terms, to the trade and to the raw materials of the world which are needed for their economic prosperity,”

as Point IV of the Atlantic Charter declares, and must secure “improved labor standards, economic adjustment and social security,” as Point V of the Atlantic Charter proclaims.

Second, there must be, as far as possible, political and economic homogeneity among the states forming the new community. There is as little reason to expect communistic or state-capitalistic states and states with a liberal economic system to exist side by side, even in a fairly loose international organization, as to expect democratic and autocratic states to combine in an enduring union. As far as this condition is concerned, a great difficulty arose when the Soviet Union became a full ally of Great Britain and the United States of America in the war against Germany. We must reckon with the necessity of admitting the Soviet Union into the new international community; and it seems not very likely that the Soviet Union, especially after a victory in which she had a great share, will abandon her communistic and authoritarian regime.

However, this difficulty is perhaps not so insurmountable as it seems at the present time. On the one hand, the economic system of the Western powers has a clear tendency toward state capitalism; and, on the other hand, a victory of the democratic states will strongly influence the political system of the Soviet Union, whose written constitution already has a democratic character. It will only be necessary to conform the political practice in the Soviet Union to the wording of its constitution.

Third, there must be satisfactory regulation of the territorial relations of the states forming the community. This kind of regulation is possible only if it is conducted as extensively and honestly as possible according to the principle of self-determination of the peoples. Where minorities are unavoidable, they are to be organized as entities with constitutional rights. The treaty establishing the international community will grant them the status of personality in international law, so that they will have the right to call upon an international court in case of the violation of the provisions for the protection of minorities..

The principle of self-determination implies "the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live," as Point II of the Atlantic Charter declares. It is, however, almost impossible to found the peace on this principle. Of course, the peace treaty will immediately restore Norway, Denmark, Belgium, Holland, Luxemburg, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and Greece as independent states in full accordance with the free will of the peoples concerned. These peoples will undoubtedly re-establish their democratic constitutions or will enact such where before the war more or less fascistic elements prevailed, as, for instance, in Poland and Greece. But the major part of Europe offers no guaranty that its peoples will voluntarily and spontaneously return to democracy and peaceful co-operation with the other peoples. Let us constantly keep in mind that there exist in Europe 80 million Germans, more than 40 million Italians,

26 million Spaniards, 14 million Rumanians, 13 million Hungarians, who have lived for years under more or less totalitarian regimes. Especially the youth of these countries, educated by National-Socialistic and fascistic teachers, does not know the ideal of democracy and international peace. Let us not forget that Hungary, Bulgaria, Slovakia, Croatia, and Finland are now fascistic states or are under the influence of Germany and Italy and that, last but not least, in France, which now has a purely autocratic constitution, a great part of the population has, rightly or wrongly, lost its faith in democracy. As far as Japan is concerned, we all know that she is and has been for many years under a military dictatorship and that the younger generation is completely alienated from democratic and pacifistic ideas.

Immediately after the war it will not be possible to organize this better world for which we are hoping. A transitional period will be necessary, characterized by the following facts: complete disarmament of all states now under National-Socialistic or fascistic regimes or under military dictatorship; and political and military control of these territories exercised by a body of representatives of the United Nations—above all, in order to win the population of these countries for democracy and international co-operation and to educate their youth for these ideals. No illusion is more dangerous than to assume that those Germans and Italians, those Spaniards, French, and Rumanians, and those Japanese—more than 200 million people—are democrats and pacifists and that only their dictatorial masters prevent them from having the same political organization as this country or Great Britain. Not less dangerous is the illusion that it will be—if possible at all—an easy task to re-educate these peoples by means of an educational system which, at least at the beginning, will have a compulsory character.

II

How long will this transitional period last, and what is to be the political form of

the union which finally will be established? The first question cannot be answered now. Everything depends upon circumstances which cannot be foreseen today. As far as the second question is concerned, two different plans are suggested: one is, to re-establish the League of Nations; the other, to create a completely new international organization. The difference between the two plans, however, is not so great as might appear at first sight. For, should the League of Nations be revived, it could never be the old; it must be an entirely reformed League of Nations. And, if a new international organization is to be established, the lessons which can be drawn from the breakdown of the old League will be indispensable for building up the new community.

The decisive question as to the constitution of the new league refers to the degree of centralization which will and can be realized in the new community. It is the question of whether this community will or can have the character of a federal state or only that of an international confederacy of states. There is no doubt that the aims of the intended organization would be achieved in the best and most effective way if this community were organized as a federal state, meaning the establishment of a world government, a world parliament, and a world administration—which would, of course, be incompatible with the national sovereignty of the member-states of the union. On the basis of our experiences with attempts to create international organizations the idea of a world federal state must be considered to be a utopian scheme. The difficulties in organizing such a world state on a democratic basis are—at least at the present time and in the near future—almost insurmountable. I should like to mention only a few points. A world parliament in which all the United Nations are represented according to their aggregate numerical strength would be a legislative body in which India and China had about three times as many deputies as the United States and Great Britain together. The central organs of the world state were to have about the

same jurisdiction as the national government in the United States. Hence, the United States, which is itself a federal state, could not become a member of the world federal state without a radical change in its own constitution.

The government of a sovereign state is, by its very nature, inclined to resist any restriction of its sovereignty; and to become a member of a federal state means to give up completely one's sovereignty. The resistance to such a state suicide must, of course, reach the highest degree just immediately after a victorious war, which inevitably increases the nationalistic feelings of the people.

Certainly, the restriction of self-determination which a federal constitution imposes upon the member-states is opposed by the great advantages associated with the advanced technique of centralization. But these advantages weigh little when the right of self-determination is in question—the right of self-determination of a people imbued with a strong feeling of nationalism, based on the common possession of a language, religion, culture, and long and glorious history. Opinions may differ as to the value and justification of nationalism, but one must reckon with this phenomenon as with other decisive facts if one is proceeding to the establishment of a universal community of states. This is especially true if it is to comprise nations so different from one another in their language, religion, culture, and history, in their political and economic structure, and in their geographic situation as the United States of America and South American and European states.

If a federal state comprising all these states or a great number of them is proposed, the examples of the United States and Switzerland are usually referred to, to show that these difficulties are not insuperable. But these examples prove little. In both instances close relations had long existed among the members that were ultimately united into a federal state; in both cases a confederacy had immediately preceded the federal state. In the case of the

United States, essentially an English-speaking, preponderantly Protestant population was involved; their common economic and political interests led to the common political act of breaking away from the British mother-country. The Swiss federal state does present a union of several ethnic groups very different as to language and culture. But it was only insignificantly small portions of three nations separated from them by historical and political circumstances, not these mighty nations themselves, that united to form a relatively centralized community. And this community is probably held together less by inner forces than by the external pressure that the political system of the great powers neighboring Switzerland bring to bear on this little state. A radical change in the mutual relations of these powers would decisively affect the very existence of the Swiss federal state. Finally, it must not be overlooked that, in the case of Switzerland, as in that of the United States, geographically immediately contiguous territories were united to form the territory of a single state, and that, on this score alone, it is quite a different proposition to unite into a single state nations of Europe and states of the American continent, separated, as they are by the ocean. To base the hope of the erection of such a federal state on nothing but the example of the United States and Switzerland is a dangerous illusion.

Still, the aim must not be regarded as unattainable. It is quite possible that the idea of a universal world federal state will, after a long and slow development, be realized, especially if this development is furthered by conscious political work in the ideological field. It is quite unlikely, however, that within a short time great powers like the United States of America, Great Britain, or France will unite with dwarf states like Denmark, Norway, or Switzerland—republics and hereditary monarchies from one day to the next—to form a federal state and submit their governments to a common government in which all these states share. It is more than likely that

this aim can be reached only by a series of stages. From a strategic point of view, the only serious question is: What is the next step to be taken with a view to success on this road?

III

The establishment of a league which shall assure peace in a more effective way than did the League of Nations, is a problem of social and especially of legal technique. This problem can be solved only on the basis of a careful study of the natural evolution of law. To be sure, the laws determining social evolution are not so strict as biological and physiological laws. The human will directed to a certain end is able to shape social life arbitrarily, but only to a limited extent. Hence a social reform has more chance of success if it follows the tendencies hitherto exhibited by social evolution.

It is therefore necessary to know these tendencies. The evolution of law from its primitive beginnings to its standard of today has been, from a technical point of view, a continuous process of centralization. It may also be thought of as a process of increasing division of labor in the field of the creation and application of law. The functions of law-creating and law-applying, originally performed by all members of the community, have been gradually passed on to specified individuals and are now executed exclusively by them. In the beginning, every individual subject to the legal order participates in all the functions of creating and applying the law. Later, special organs develop for the different functions. In the field of law the same process takes place as in that of economic production. It is a constant process of centralization.

This process is characterized by the surprising fact that the centralization of the law-applying function preceded the centralization of the law-creating function. Long before special legislative organs come into existence, courts are established to apply the law to concrete cases. The law thus applied is customary law. Customary law

forms an important part of the legal order, even in technically highly developed legal communities.

The procedure of applying general legal norms to concrete cases involves three distinct phases: first, the conditioning facts must be established, especially the delict, the concrete violation of law; second, the sanction provided by the general legal norm must be ordered to be applied to the concrete case; third, this sanction must be executed against the individual responsible for the delict. The three stages of this procedure do not necessarily become centralized at the same time. Historically, the centralization of the first two stages has probably preceded the centralization of the third stage. The centralization of the employment of force—that is, the procedure by which a concrete sanction is executed against the responsible individual—seems to be the last step. The application of law by courts replaces the legal status of self-help by blood revenge.

It seems, however, that the state of self-help was only gradually eliminated. In the early days the courts were hardly more than tribunals of arbitration. They had to decide only whether or not the delict had actually been committed, as claimed by one party, and hence whether or not one party was authorized to execute a sanction against the other if the conflict could not be settled by peaceful agreement between them. To bring about such a peaceful agreement enabling the vendetta to be replaced by wergild was probably the first task of the tribunal. Only at a later stage does it become possible completely to abolish the procedure of self-help according to which the sanction is executed by the individuals whose interests have been violated by the delict. The execution of the sanction by a central organ of the legal community authorized to punish the guilty individual presupposes a concentration of the means of power—the existence of a central organ with all these means of power at its disposal. To centralize the execution of the sanctions provided by the legal order, the legal communi-

ty needs not only courts but also a powerful administration.

A legal community which has an administration and courts is a state, but a central organ of legislation is not an essential requisite of a state. The jurisdiction of state courts is older than state legislation.

The fact that the application of law is centralized much earlier than the creation of law is of the greatest importance. It seems to manifest a certain regularity of evolution, originating in the sociological and especially in the sociopsychological nature of law. We may therefore presume, with a certain degree of probability, that the development of international law has the same tendencies as the development of national law. There is, perhaps, in the social field a certain analogy with the phenomenon called the "biogenetic law," that is, the law according to which the human embryo in the womb passes through the same stages that man as a species has passed through in the process of evolution from a lower to a higher stage of life. Thus, perhaps the law of the universal, the international, community has to pass through the same evolution through which the law of the partial community, national law, has already passed. In fact, the first organized communities of international law, the first relatively centralized unions of states, are organizations the function of which is to settle conflicts. The first central organs in international life are international tribunals, instituted by international treaties. The function of these tribunals is confined to the decision of whether or not in a concrete case the right of a state has been violated by another state. The decisions of these courts are not executed by a central executive power. In case the other state does not execute the decision of the court, the application of the sanction is reserved to the state whose right has been acknowledged by the court.

As a rule, the international court is not competent to decide all the disputes which may arise between the contracting parties; its competence is usually restricted to cer-

tain disputes exactly determined by the treaty of arbitration; and this treaty is normally valid for a limited period of time only.

These facts show clearly that the law of the interstate community develops in the same direction as the primitive law of the prestate community. They also suggest the direction in which a relatively successful attempt may be undertaken to secure international peace by emphasizing and strengthening the given tendency toward centralization. Natural evolution tends toward an international judiciary. The first step toward an enduring peace must be the establishment of an international community the members of which are obliged to submit all disputes arising among them to a permanent international court and to respect the decisions of this authority. The chief thing is to subject as many states as possible to the authority of an international court competent to decide all conflicts arising among them. So far, no such enterprise has been successful, perhaps because it has not been seriously attempted. Until this end has been attained, however, the other, much more far-reaching one, cannot possibly be achieved, namely, the establishment of a community of states subjected to a central administration with centralized executive power at its disposal, or even the establishment of a world legislature. According to the pattern of the evolution of national law, centralization of the judiciary must precede centralization of legislative and executive power.

IV

The proposition that the next and most important step toward international peace is the establishment of an international court with compulsory jurisdiction is confirmed by the experiences of the League of Nations. This union of states, which was, so far, the biggest international community founded to secure international peace, has failed completely. Its breakdown is attributable to various causes. One of the most important causes, if not the decisive one, is

a fatal fault of its construction—the fact that the authors of the Covenant placed at the center of this international organization not the Permanent Court of International Justice but a kind of international administration, the Council of the League of Nations. The Assembly of the League (its other organ), placed beside the Council, gives the impression of an international legislature. The dualism of administration and parliament was probably more or less distinctly present in the minds of the founders when they created two main organs of the League.

It might have been foreseen from the very beginning that a world government would not succeed if its decisions had to be taken unanimously, binding no member against his will, and if there were no centralized power to execute them. It is not to be wondered at that a world parliament, or whatever the Assembly of the League of Nations may be called, can be of only nominal value when the principle of majority is almost completely excluded from its procedure. Yet in the sphere of international relations the majority principle is, with one exception, without application. This exception is extremely significant, however. It is the procedure of international courts. Here, and here alone, is the majority principle generally accepted. If two or more states submit their disputes to the decision of a court of arbitration, they presuppose, as a matter of course, that the decision may be arrived at by a majority of votes. Subjection to the majority vote of an international court is not considered incompatible with the sovereignty and equality of the states. Subjection to a majority vote of any other organ, however, is generally rejected, for the reason that such subjection is incompatible with the sovereignty and equality of the states. This is of the greatest importance, since, according to the Four-Power Declaration signed at Moscow, November 1, 1943, the international organization to be established for the maintenance of international peace and security shall be "based on the principle of the *sovereign*

equality of all peace loving states." If the international organ instituted by an international treaty has not the character of a court, the contracting states always insist upon their right to be represented on it during the procedure by which the binding norm is created and on their right not to be bound against their will. On this point the attitude of states toward international courts is, as a matter of fact, wholly different from their attitude toward all other international organs. In establishing an international community this difference should be carefully taken into account. It was clearly manifested at the foundation of the League of Nations. The majority principle, systematically excluded from the procedure of the Council and the Assembly, has been introduced without any difficulty into the constitution of the Permanent Court of International Justice.

A critical analysis of the Covenant and an impartial examination of the activity of the League show that it would have been more correct to make the principal organ an international court rather than an international administrative organ. Of all the political tasks intrusted to the League by its constitution, only the function stated in Articles XII-XVII, concerning the settlement of disputes, has been fulfilled with a certain degree of success. The results obtained in this field, however, are not in proportion to the extensiveness of the organization or to its bureaucratic machinery. The reason is that neither an international administrative organ, such as the Council of the League of Nations, nor a sham parliament, such as the Assembly, is fitted for this task, which by its very nature can be satisfactorily performed only by an international court.

The Covenant of the League placed the Council, not the Permanent Court, at the center of its international organization because it conferred upon the League not only the task of maintaining peace within the community, by settling disputes and by restricting the armament of the member states, but also the duty of protecting them

against external aggression. This protection of member-states against external aggression was all the more necessary because disarmament was set up as a main object of the League. The constitution of an international community can oblige a member-state to restrict its armament to a considerable extent only if this state can reckon upon efficacious help from the community in case it should be attacked by another state not belonging to the community and therefore not obliged to disarm. This is possible only if the disarmament of the members is accompanied by an armament of the community, that is, if an armed force is formed which is at the disposition of the central organ. Such a centralization of the executive power is not possible within an international-law community and is therefore not provided by the Covenant of the League. If it is impossible to establish an armed force for the community of states—in other words, if it is not possible, to establish a federal state—then the assistance rendered by the community to a victim of external aggression can consist only in the obligation of the other members to defend the attacked state. Under such circumstances the duty of disarmament becomes contradictory to the necessity of defense against external aggression. Nevertheless, the Covenant of the League puts the duty of disarmament in the foreground. The subject of disarmament, forming the first duty of the members of the League, is placed immediately after Articles I-VII, which deal with the organization of the League.

The duty of a state which is a member of a universal international community to defend another member-state from attack by a nonmember is very problematic, especially if the international organization embraces many states which have no common frontier, if these states have joined—in the first place—for the purpose of maintaining peace among themselves and if, aside from this purpose, they have no political interest in common that might unite them against the aggressor. It may be very difficult for a government to fulfil a duty to defend a

member-state—to enter into war against a state with which it is on good political and economic terms—especially if the aggression is based on grounds not entirely disapproved by the public opinion of the state obliged to give its succor. The situation of Great Britain and France in the conflict between Czechoslovakia and Germany—a situation which led to the treaty of Munich—is a characteristic example. Treaties obligating the contracting parties to a joint war against third states are efficacious only if concluded between states having more interests and more important interests in common than those which form the basis of a universal international community. It is therefore not surprising that not only the provision of the League Covenant concerning disarmament but likewise the provision concerning mutual defense against external aggression (Art. X) has completely failed. The obvious violation of the territorial integrity of a member-state, even the total destruction of its political independence, as the result of external aggression was not even made a subject of deliberation within the League—and that despite the wording and the spirit of Article X. Such was the case in regard to Austria, Czechoslovakia, and Poland. Let us not forget that it was just on account of Article X of the Covenant that the United States of America refused to enter the League.

The duty of taking part in a military action—in a war—can be imposed upon the members of an international community even if the only purpose is to maintain peace among the members. The duty is required to meet the case of a member-state which, in violation of the constitution, resorts to war against another member-state or refuses to carry out the decision of the international court instituted by the constitution. Such action has the character of a collective sanction. From the point of view of the political ideology at the basis of the international community, it is totally different from a defensive war against a non-member state. As a matter of fact, the League of Nations, in spite of its complete

failure in the cases of external aggression, has at least made certain efforts to fulfil its duty in the cases of illegal aggressions undertaken by member-states against other member-states. This was the case in regard to Manchukuo, Abyssinia, and Finland.

The experiences of the League of Nations show that it is necessary to make a clear distinction between the maintenance of internal peace and protection against external aggression and that it is hardly possible to fulfil the second task by the specific means at the disposal of a universal international organization embracing many different states. It is a task with the fulfilling of which an international court has nothing to do. It is a function that lies beyond the possible activity of an international court, even beyond the power of a universal union of states the centralization of which does not exceed the degree compatible with its international character. As long as it is impossible to constitute this union of states as a federal state, it seems to be more correct to limit its task to the maintenance of internal peace and to leave protection against external aggression to political alliances between the member-states. These alliances may even have the character of permanent unions, much more centralized than the wider League. Such a closer union may be established especially by the United States of America and the British Empire and must be established if these states accept the responsibility of political control of the vanquished countries. Such a closer union may be established by all the states of the American hemisphere and must be established if, for one reason or another, the effect of this war should be the economic and political unification of the European continent or the Pacific area.

The constitution of the wider league, leaving protection against external aggression to regional organizations, should try to establish the strongest possible guaranty to maintain peace within the League: the obligation of the member-states to submit all their disputes, without exception, to the compulsory jurisdiction of an international

court and to execute in full good faith any decision of the court. That means that the members of the League agree to abandon the use of force in their mutual relations, as Point VIII of the Atlantic Charter postulates, except against a member which in disregard of its obligation refuses to execute a decision of the court or resorts to war or reprisals against another member without being authorized by a decision of the court.

If the treaty constituting the international community does not establish a central executive power, an army, navy, and air force of the league, independent of the armed forces of the member-states—a central armed force at the disposal of a central government—the decisions of the international court can be executed against a member-state only by the other members of the community—if necessary, by the use of their armed forces under the direction of an administrative organ, such as the Council of the League of Nations. The covenant of the league may determine the size and the organization of the armed force which each member-state has to keep in readiness to execute the collective sanction according to the orders of the council. The council may be authorized by the covenant to appoint an organ whose function should be to control the military obligations of the member-states and, if a military sanction is to be executed, to appoint a commander-in-chief of the league. But the council of the new league should be only an auxiliary organ of the Court. The fact that its task will chiefly be to execute the decisions of a court will facilitate considerably the composition and particularly the procedure of this administrative organ, especially as its decisions must be adopted according to the majority-vote principle.

A new League of Nations whose central organ would be an international court with

compulsory jurisdiction would constitute extraordinary progress in the field of international organization. It would be the technical realization of an idea which the Kellogg Pact first tried to put into operation—the elimination of war as an instrument of self-help. The Kellogg Pact could not succeed because it pursued its end with technically insufficient means. The league here proposed would be an intermediate stage between the old League of Nations and a future world federal state with a world government—an intermediate stage which is inevitable in the natural evolution of international law—and which is the next step, not the last one. After we have succeeded in establishing an international community uniting the most important states of the world under a covenant instituting compulsory jurisdiction and after this political system has worked successfully for some time, we can try to make a further step; we can hope to succeed in organizing a centralized executive power, a world police, and later perhaps a world administration under a world parliament.

The forces working for world peace should not be directed to aims which, in view of the present state of international relations, are not yet attainable. No attempts at reform should be undertaken which are doomed to failure—however good may be the intention of the intellectual proponents and of the governments—for their failure would create terrible disappointment, and disappointment, as the experiences with the League of Nations show, breeds isolationism.

Let us rather mobilize the energies of those who are wedded to the idea of peace for the establishment of an international court with compulsory jurisdiction, thus preparing the indispensable prerequisite for the achievement of any further progress.

THE POSITION OF THE SMALL NATION IN POST-WAR EUROPE¹

EDUARD BENEŠ

ABSTRACT

Nationhood is an absolute value. It is a profound mistake to suppose that small nations are bound to disappear in post-war Europe or that their continued existence is necessarily disadvantageous. The diversity of European culture is a political fact which can be ignored only with disaster. The principle of flexible confederation is probably the best solution to the economic problems of the small states. The minorities problem will have to be solved through an international organization for their protection or perhaps through population transfers. Only a system of general security sincerely and honestly supported by all the powers, both great and small, can give us a hope for future peace.

Very often in public discussions we meet with rather a skeptical attitude toward small nations in Europe. For many students of politics the whole question seems to be a very difficult problem involving the future of Europe and future peace in general. The Peace of Versailles, which established the democratic political system in Europe on a larger scale, liberated and unified several new smaller nations and changed the map of Central and Eastern Europe completely. But as early as 1922 a reaction took place in the form of Fascist and dictatorial movements.

This reaction was noticeable in Europe in three directions: a revolt against democracy as a regime and a system in domestic as well as in foreign policy; a revolt against the independence of small nations and against the idea of the League of Nations, which guaranteed their independence; and a revolt against laissez faire economics.

In part this was a revolt against a particular type of nineteenth-century liberalism; in part it was a revolt against an undeveloped type of political democracy which, as for instance in France, degenerated completely politically and morally in the last thirty years into a decadent democracy.

To be discontented with an inadequate concept of decadent democracy and with haphazard economic methods is all to the

good, and all of us in Europe agree today that post-war democracy must be reformed and fundamentally changed both politically and economically. But the withdrawal from Woodrow Wilson's stand on the independence of the smaller states and nations and from the idea of their collective security and the League of Nations has had some disastrous consequences. Nationhood—I emphasize it—nationhood, like personal freedom, is an absolute value. Those in Europe who ignored it or held it in little esteem were building upon shifting sands and were preparing new and terrible catastrophes. In my opinion, the consequence of this threefold revolt on the European continent—the revolt against democracy as a domestic and foreign policy, the revolt against the League of Nations—brought us into the second World War.

I was neither an outright opponent nor an admirer of the Treaty of Versailles or of the other peace treaties; I have always admitted that they were not perfect. But, on the whole, they brought Europe further on its historic way toward democracy and freedom, and they produced a new political map of Europe vastly superior to the old. That is why I defended the new European juridical status of 1919. In the broadest essentials the post-Versailles map followed the lines of nationhood. Here and there it was difficult, even impossible, to fix a frontier that was ethnographically correct. In some instances there was a serious lack of geographical, economic, or political balance. While the Germans, for instance, came late

¹ This article by Dr. Eduard Beneš was first presented as an address to the Council on Foreign Relations in Chicago on May 22, 1943, and subsequently released in the *News Flashes from Czechoslovakia under Nazi Domination*, No. 187, May 31, 1943.

into the overseas colonial field, they had long ago established landlocked colonies or settlements in various parts of the European continent. These settlements were bound to provoke friction and difficulties whenever the Pan-Germans demanded racial unity and domination. Here and there difficulties were unavoidable, and a major dispute between Turkey and Greece concerning minorities was solved in 1922 only by a drastic transfer of populations. In 1919 there was no country in Europe without its racial minorities—not even Germany or Italy.

Granting these imperfections of the peace treaties, too, I admit that the small nations must take their share of responsibility for the ultimate failure of the Versailles settlement. They sometimes upheld their own political and economic sovereignties in too rigid a manner. They were sometimes too exclusive and too suspicious of one another. Time and again they ignored the pressing need for fuller collaboration with their neighbors. But, while I admit this fact, I am bound to say that, in my opinion, a far heavier share of the responsibility for the fact that peace was not safeguarded belongs to the Great Powers of Europe and of the world. There were, of course, major obstacles. The legislators of the United States did not ratify the Versailles peace settlement, and it was quite impossible to maintain the equilibrium of peace on the European continent so long as Soviet Russia, the greatest land power in Europe and in the world, was treated as an outsider who did not belong to the European continent at all. Uncertainty and disillusionment prevailed, and the powers now known as the Axis powers were soon deliberately disturbing what was left of the European equilibrium.

In 1932 as a new member of the Council of the League, I, together with some other delegates, protested in Geneva against the Japanese occupation and annexation of Manchuria and asked the Assembly for vigorous action against the aggressor. I feared that if aggression were unchecked in the East there would come a time when aggression would be unchecked in the West.

But the policy of appeasement prevailed even at that time. Manchuria was the prelude to Abyssinia. I fought again resolutely in Geneva against the Italian Fascist aggressor, with partial success only; and Abyssinia became the prelude to another criminal act—the occupation of Austria—and to the German attack on Czechoslovakia and other European countries in 1938 and 1939.

When Hitler came to power in Germany, I knew what to expect. I had already made a thorough study of the repellent *Mein Kampf* in 1923–24. Hitler, preparing for his later aggressions, tried to woo me with promises and convince me with threats. Beginning in 1934, he made several overtures to me directly through his emissaries, while I was foreign minister and later president of the Czechoslovak Republic. But I consistently refused to meet him or to conclude a separate bilateral agreement with him outside the framework of the Locarno Treaty, the League Covenant, the Briand-Kellogg Pact, or the entire system of alliances Czechoslovakia had in 1935. I knew that his seeming favors were a screen to hide his real purpose and that, unless he was dislodged from power in time, there would be a terrible war in Europe.

There is no need for me to recall the details of the Manchurian and Abyssinian crises, of the occupation of the Rhineland, of the destruction of Austria, and of the Czechoslovak crisis in September, 1938. This succession of events produced a desperate international situation in which the small nations became merely the pawns in a game of power politics in the hands of the dictators. Poland, Belgium, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Denmark, Yugoslavia, and Greece were occupied. Nearly eight years before, Pierre Laval had treated Abyssinia as a pawn. Today he has made a pawn of his own great and stricken country. A clear proof was given to the world that, after all, peace is indivisible and that the insecurity of the smaller nations will always mean the insecurity of the Great Powers as well.

The lack of intervention in 1936 when

Hitler entered the Rhineland and the Munich Dictate in September, 1938, were major disasters not only for France and Czechoslovakia, respectively, but for the whole world. Frederick the Great, Bismarck, and Hitler all struck at Central Europe before they struck elsewhere. The destruction of Poland, Denmark, Norway, Holland, Belgium, Luxembourg, Yugoslavia, Greece, and, finally, of France followed as a natural consequence of this policy, and then, for a certain time, Great Britain and the entire British Empire were in mortal danger.

The conclusion I draw from this sequence of events is this: the respect and the maintenance of the independence of the small European nations and states are now and will be in the future vital to the peace of Europe and of the world. In a free Europe there can be no such thing as a vassal state or a hierarchy of states, as the Nazi "new order" would propose, because true nationhood and democracy go together. The Europe of tomorrow must be democratic and therefore cannot tolerate any *Herren-volk* rule over smaller peoples.

I think that this view is now wholeheartedly accepted by all free nations and that we all are very well aware of our weaknesses and mistakes in the past. The question now is: What can we do to avoid them in the future? The principle of freedom for these occupied smaller nations is again fully acknowledged. Abyssinia is already liberated. The European democracies are in full alliance with Soviet Russia, which is fighting with us for the same principles. The United States has initiated the policy of the Atlantic Charter and is an ally of the occupied small countries. China is taking a place in world politics, to which she is fully entitled as a very great power. When we try to reorganize Europe and the world after the collapse of the Axis powers, what will happen to the smaller states?

There is, as I have already said, still a skeptical attitude toward them. Books and articles have been published recently in England and in this country considering either their future independent status or

their grouping into federation and confederation or even the need for dividing Europe into spheres of influence, so that, after all, vassal states are to be dependent upon their powerful neighbors. In some of the arguments or criticism of the policy of the smaller states I detect a certain impatience with, and contempt for, the smaller nations. From time to time I still hear the argument that, after all, the Germans are a great people and should have the right to direct the life of their smaller neighbors, which—according to different voices—have not always behaved reasonably, etc.

Politically, these conceptions are, I think, a profound mistake which, if put into practice, will carry us into a new world-war catastrophe. The existence of smaller states may have disadvantages, but it has its advantages, too. The smaller nations and states have their important contributions to make to the world culture and peace. Holland, shaking off the shackles of Spain, was a small but a great country. For centuries Poland and Bohemia both had highly developed cultures which flourished naturally and properly only when they were free. Although Spain ceased to be a world empire, she was, nonetheless, free to develop her own culture on her own soil. When two years ago the Germans pushed their way through Greece, none could forget that, although the Greeks were numerically a small people, they gave posterity a profound spiritual heritage.

This historical truth has its value even in the twentieth century, in spite of the extraordinary technical advancement of our age. There exist small nations and states from which even great nations such as present-day Germany and Italy could learn and profit a great deal in every branch of spiritual and material human life.

For the final settlement of the status of the small European nations after the present war, federative or confederative plans have been discussed in the course of the last two years, and even international organizations similar in constitutional structure to the Soviet Union or the United

States of America have been taken into consideration. We all know the most important arguments for this solution: that small states readily exaggerate their sovereignty; that they easily become the prey of their mighty neighbors; that in our times the economic life of nations needs a large sphere and very active intercourse, which is impossible in the geographical limits of small nations; etc.

Let us examine these arguments briefly from the point of view of principles. Although I personally favor a United States of Europe similar to the United States of America, I am certain that it is impracticable at the present time. Europe is not yet prepared for it. While it is true that air transport, economic necessities, and other technical issues have revolutionized our ideas of speed and space and while it is true that Europe must develop progressively, more along federal than along national lines, we must think in terms of realistic conditions and present possibilities of the European continent and in terms of organizations which promote and not retard, which conserve and not destroy, European national cultures. Whether good or bad, whether agreeable or disagreeable, national diversity in Europe is one of the most powerful factors in European politics. It is a moral and political reality and is indestructible. The attempt to disregard it in the future reorganization of Europe would end in fatal disaster. There is, therefore, no other way than to take this factor into account and reorganize Europe better, using it as a basis.

Sometimes I wish that the advocates of federal union of Europe would pay more attention to the special kind of unity which bears the name of the British Commonwealth of Nations. One of the many merits of the British Commonwealth is its refusal to make a fetish of federalism. It is a loose—and, for that very reason, a strong—association of equal partners, each vitally concerned with its own regional problems, but each collaborating willingly within the Commonwealth. The flexibility of the British Commonwealth is something which

arouses the admiration of every Continental European. This flexibility is due not only to British statesmanship and the highly developed political sense and experience of the British people but also, and more so, to other very important factors in politics: geography, national tradition and culture, earlier developments, special social and economic conditions, etc. It is because I consider these same factors that I do not propose to imitate blindly this British, or any other, example in a special European Continental case of small Central European states and nations. As I have just explained, there is such great national diversity on the European continent that it cannot be destroyed or liquidated. It can and must be reasonably organized, however, not into mechanical unity but into an effectively collaborating body or organism. To this viewpoint I should like to state the following facts.

After the present war again there will be in Europe three categories of states and nations: great powers, confederated blocs of nations, and individual small states and nations. Geography and historical developments set limits to the natural regions in which the principle of ethnographic frontiers can be applied, on the one hand, or in which neighboring countries can usefully co-operate in a federal or confederated bloc, on the other. As I have already remarked, political sovereignty was frequently carried to absurd limits after the last war in Central Europe, and this is no less true of economic sovereignty. To my mind, the idea of confederation is, therefore, a sound and fruitful idea for the nations on the European continent. The members of our Government believe also that our confederation with Poland will benefit our Polish neighbors no less than ourselves.

But we want our system to be flexible and adapted to the natural conditions of our nations and regions; to geography, national tradition, social and economic structures, earlier developments, etc. We believe it to be eventually acceptable to other Central European states which have democratic

governments. I am not authorized to speak on behalf of other nations; and, therefore, I am not going to discuss a great scheme embracing the whole of Central or Northern and Western Europe or other great European regions. I regard these political plans as possible and useful steps toward a more harmonious unification of Europe as well as eventual safeguards of small-nationhood. But every nation must decide democratically for itself.

I know very well, too, that this regard for nationhood can be carried to absurd limits. The Axis created a separate state of Croatia, which its puppet king has not dared to visit, and their efforts to destroy Czechoslovak unity by creating a separate state of Slovakia have been pitiable, for there are natural and inseverable bonds between the Czechs and the Slovaks. But every separate nation can and should be trusted to provide for regional or decentralized administration wherever it is justified. The post-war Czechoslovak Republic will certainly amend her constitution to give broader powers to local administrative authorities. Other European nations will adapt their internal conditions to be in accordance with new post-war necessities.

For all these reasons the smaller nations in the Europe of tomorrow will and must live in their independent states. They can, and several of them certainly will, form larger units, and these, in turn, will perhaps be later banded together into larger blocs in a new European and world organization comparable to the League of Nations. Democratic regional decentralization in those free states will be necessary and inevitable.

But regional decentralization is one thing, and the claim of a minority to form a state within a state is another. After the first World War the question of minorities was one of the most important features of European politics. I want to emphasize this fact, however, that this question of minorities will be with us even after the present war is over. There will still be national minorities in all the European states. Yet, every well-balanced state can and must

establish a regime and administration which will enable minority citizens to live in freedom and with dignity, as they do here in these United States.

After the last war an international organization for the protection of minorities was established and began functioning. Yet when we consider that Germany in particular and other states in general made this international system an instrument of their own policy against majorities, for the destruction of the smaller Central European states from within, we must concede that it was a failure. It is not easy to say how this very difficult question will be solved. Czechoslovakia will face this question squarely and accept the international solution which will be agreed upon by all other nations.

If a solution of the minority problem is impossible in this manner, I am prepared for the grim necessity of population transfers. These population transfers were made on several occasions since the end of the last war. They are, in general, not popular. They cannot always settle the problem completely, for, as a rule, some part of the minority remains in the original state. They can create many hardships and even injustices. But I am bound to say that they may be worth while if they help establish a more permanent equilibrium and a lasting peace.

Before concluding, I should like to indicate certain principles which will perhaps be applied in the peace to come, when the security of the smaller states has been established and the idea of federation or confederation put into practice in reorganized post-war Europe.

1. I admit that the European system of 1919 developed into a kind of exaggerated local nationalism, cultivated by the small European nations as well as the great. I believe that this local nationalism after the present war should be reasonably limited, but I resolutely refuse to accept another even more dangerous exaggeration, which would simply wipe the smaller states off the map of Europe. There must be no return to

the pre-war habit of placating a strong aggressor by sacrificing a small nation. The danger of such a recurrence is a strong argument for the creation of a new and real system of post-war collective security for small and great nations and states alike, one which would safeguard the freedom of anyone against an aggressor.

2. It is no mere phrase that we are now fighting for the political, cultural, and spiritual freedom and independence of smaller nations and that small states will again exist in Europe after the present war. We must realize that the present war will cause great social developments and economic and technical changes in post-war Europe and that the present internal social and political structure of the small nations will also be transformed. Their internal structures will be strongly accommodated to one another. If we profit by the post-war changes and definitely settle certain territorial and national quarrels between the small European nations, it will help us to take completely into account the past mistakes of exaggerated political and economic sovereignty, the need for proper political and social security, and the imperative necessity of creating a more permanent equilibrium of political peace and economic collaboration in Europe. Under these conditions we shall find a way of facilitating and expediting the development toward the confederative blocs on the European continent immediately after the German collapse.

3. It would be a mistake, leading to disaster, to try to combine the national states into purely mechanical units. If we force those states which do not wish to live together to create larger inorganic units—inorganic morally, ideologically, politically, geographically, and economically—they would be again dismembered on the first occasion of an unexpected international conflict. These new units must be based on fully democratic principles of policy and on the freely expressed will of the nations concerned. They must be organic, logical, internationally and geographically sound, and adapted to the new post-war political, so-

cial, and economic conditions. The individual members of the confederative unit must be politically completely equal; they must have a similar social structure and a truly democratic constitution.

4. It would be a further mistake to attempt to establish new international units without making necessary arrangements with the great European Allies beforehand, with Great Britain, on the one side, and the Soviet Union, on the other, for they both have vital interests on the European continent. We must not, of course, forget that France will remain a great country and that she must again play her part on the Continent after the present war. New units which could be considered as new instruments of European power politics of one great power against the other cannot and must not be established. We must not, for example, try to create a confederative bloc of small nations in Central Europe as a barrier between post-war Germany and Russia and hostile to both. Such a conception of the new organization of the smaller European nations would mean preparing for a new European war.

5. We should, I think, maintain the present war community of the United Nations as a basis for the peace organization of the post-war world. This community has the great advantage of having the United States of America and the Soviet Union as original members. With the approaching victory other nations will certainly join us. I consider it the duty of this great association of powers to prepare the way for an agreement regarding the fundamental issues of the peace to come and for a general system of security as soon as possible—certainly before the war is over. Their plans should be ready when the time comes for negotiating armistice conditions, which, in my opinion, will be more important than the peace negotiations, which this time will probably begin two or three years after the armistice is signed.

The tendency to regard small states and nations as the causes of wars or international disputes is an exaggeration or a gen-

eralization of individual isolated facts. It was not the small states and nations which devised nazism and fascism; it was Germany and Italy. It was not Austria and Czechoslovakia that attacked Germany in 1938, and it was not Greece that attacked Italy in 1940. It was Japan, a great power, which attacked Pearl Harbor. Small states are not in any way more dangerous to peace and political and economic international co-operation than big countries are. On the contrary, very often large states make small states a pretext for settling their own accounts with their strong neighbors. In the last war and in the present one Germany attacked Belgium solely with a view to crushing France and England. Can anyone be so naïve as to suppose that if there were no small states next to the two great ones, there would be no disputes between the two great big states and that the danger of an international conflict would be nonexistent? And, if a small state does exist, is it to be deprived of freedom and existence as a state simply because it is small?

Let us not, therefore, regard the existence of small European states either as a great problem or as the cause of wars, or as an obstacle to future peace in Europe and in the world. It is a problem, but it is one which can and must be solved properly, justly, and tolerantly along the lines which I have described. Merely to suppress the problem of small states would not strengthen peace but would weaken and destroy it.

Finally, that which was true as regards peace in the history of mankind in the past will always be true in the future. After the present war we shall again establish new frontiers and new international conditions. We shall set up a system of security, and we shall disarm and punish the war culprits. This peace will not be perfect, any more than it was perfect after the last war. Yet, if a new catastrophe were to ensue, it would come, not because we shall make a bad peace and set up a bad system of security in the world, but because our successors in the

leadership of the nations will again allow recognized international rights to be cynically infringed upon; because they will allow signed treaties to be set aside contrary to justice, solemn promises to be disregarded; because they will permit the existence of international gangsters, quite openly and with utter impunity to organize systematic and wholesale Jewish or other pogroms and concentration camps. In other words, if after this war international morality were again to sink as low as it was after 1932, there would be another world war. And this would happen at the moment when any great power composedly disregards the repeated destruction of human dignity of another, be it a small nation or large, imagining, in its selfishness and hypocrisy, that the matter does not concern it, because it affects another power and another nation, and imagining that the gangster country will go no further and leave the great power alone.

That is how the present catastrophe developed and that is how any future catastrophe may occur. It is not, therefore, the small nations and states; it is not these or those frontiers which will prove decisive as regards the future peace, but the consciousness (1) that peace, international law, and justice must always be defended by force of arms while there is still time and wherever it may be infringed upon; (2) that the nations must always keep alive their will to fight for these great human values and carry out their defense jointly, wholeheartedly, and unselfishly; and (3) that there must be a fundamental honest policy, genuinely based upon respect for the dignity of human beings and of nations, great or small, and upon real democracy. This will, in the future, primarily decide whether the peace after the second World War will be permanent or not and whether we shall or shall not have a still more terrible third World War sooner or later.

Surely our experiences in this second World War are terrible enough to convince us all definitely that it must never happen again.

THE POSSIBILITIES OF PLANNING

CHARLES E. MERRIAM

ABSTRACT

To plan or not to plan is no real issue. Planning even of economic affairs has existed at all levels of our national life, both public and private, since the beginning of our history. The only issue is who shall plan for what ends. The democratic formula seeks concrete mechanisms to guarantee the full participation of all in planning for the common good.

First, what is the basis and what are the goals of planning? Never were so many restless and discontented peoples under so many flags and so many leaders in so many scattered lands seeking for a sign and a symbol of the good life in which their cherished and legitimate aspirations might be realized. There is around the world a vast upsurging movement, reaching upward for recognition, of persons and peoples everywhere. If we identify democracy with its true spirit and aims rather than with its imperfections and aberrations, we find that fraternalism, sharing the gains of civilization, world security arising from world order, the intelligent and full development of human resources everywhere, and the guaranties of liberty and justice arising from the participation of the community in the determination of the common good provide the formula we seek.

We cannot trace precisely the blueprints of emerging forms of human association, but we can draw from human reason and experience the outlines, blurred and marred though they may be, of a fraternal association in which the basic assumptions of democracy provide the framework of justice, liberty, order, welfare, and peace.

In reality the book is never closed in a democratic association. The course of the general good moves relentlessly forward toward its own appointed ends—sometimes in peaceful channels and again in revolutionary streams and torrents of power. Life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness flow on in changing demands for human expression, for recognition in constantly novel ways—startling often to those who for the moment

are in technical authority but who have forgotten the source of their formal power, the bulk of the community.

The demand for mass participation on a fair basis in the gains of modern civilization is fundamental. It will not long be denied. It is basic in this democratic struggle. Other imperatives are subordinate to this over-all demand for an equitable part of what civilization produces, not only a material part, but participation in the highest values of life. The vast population who carry the burdens of the world are not to be denied, for they have seen the light and are moving toward it in many lands in many ways. Men rise to the challenge of vastly increased productivity of goods and services in a world of chemistry, machinery, biology, management, and organization—in a world scene that presents to us dazzling possibilities of achievement. But they also rise to demand that these new resources shall be used not to brutalize but to elevate life and fill it with finer meaning, to demand just participation in these new and ever increasing gains.

If anyone wishes to argue that democracy has imperfections, let us give him that point. Democracy is an ideal form of political association never yet fully realized. Lincoln once said of the Declaration of Independence that it was intended as an ideal, "constantly looked to, constantly labored for and, even though never perfectly attained, constantly approximated, constantly spreading its influence and augmenting the happiness and value of life to all people of all colors everywhere." So we characterize democracy.

The development of democratic ways of life has been a slow and painful process, advancing tardily over many obstacles—discrimination against persons, against races, against classes, against religions, against regions—breaking through the barriers established by changing forms of vested privilege. But the goal is plain, although the way may be rough. The goal is the recognition of the dignity of human beings and their right to determine their own destiny in forms of free association.

The competing system now offered to mankind is not new, as its leaders sometimes declare. The so-called "new order" is the old and the outworn order in which the arrogance and cruelty of the few determined the destinies of the great mass of peoples. The new order is, in fact, only the re-establishment of ancient evil that men have been learning to overthrow for long periods of time. All that is new is new departments of horror and of torture, new research in scientific cruelty, new inventions of fear and want that grind the faces of the weak and helpless, new bureaus of misinformation and confusion. These means may be new, but the harrowing results are the same old serpent.

The swastika is only a crooked cross. When the cross was twisted, there were twisted with it human ideals of right, justice, fraternity, equality, liberty—twisted into new forms of vindictive punishment, applied to helpless individuals and, indeed, to helpless nations. Peace and justice were twisted into forms of shame and sorrow. These are the work of the new masters who have made the ancient evils of slavery live and walk again.

In order that democratic goals may be attained, we must begin to consider alternative courses of action and approach decisions as to lines of action.

Are we willing to undertake orderly planning of national resources within the limits of a free-enterprise system?

Are we willing to recognize that democratic government is equal to the tasks of any necessary reorganization or develop-

ment of our national resources? Or do we fundamentally fear and mistrust our governmental activities?

Are we willing to assume the responsibility for the development of a dynamic economy?

Are we willing to underwrite the implications of the Bill of Rights in its modern form and meaning?

Are we willing to assume joint responsibility for international jural order and justice?

Are we willing to aid in the development of the resources for all peoples on a world basis?

Or, in the alternative now, what shall be our course of action if we decide that the proposals indicated above are to be rejected in whole or modified at various points in various ways?

One of the concrete methods is that of planning and programming. If there are some who shy at the word "planning," let them call it by some other name. But, historically, planning is an American product. Our forefathers deliberately planned to make America an industrial as well as an agricultural economy. They planned the use of our public lands; they planned our broad system of public education; they planned the growth of transportation even before railways came, helping the railways by huge grants of public lands.

Planning is nothing but laying out as carefully and systematically as possible the day's work or the season's work or the year's work, as the case may be—in the home, on the farm, in the factory, big or little, in the shop, big or little. We do not condemn a man or a woman who is a good planner. On the contrary, the housewife who knows how to plan her work, or the farmer or merchant or manufacturer who is a good planner, is highly regarded and more likely to succeed than the one who will not plan but merely drifts along. We have been planning our cities for a generation. The Chicago Plan movement began in 1907. There were those who poked fun at planning in the beginning, but they are forgotten now, while the name

of a great planner—Burnham—lives on. Hundreds of other cities have developed city plans. There are at the present time about a thousand city planning commissions in the United States. There are county planning authorities, some two thousand in number; there are state planning boards, forty-five of them; and there are regional planning agencies, such as T.V.A.

Planning is looking backward at what we can learn from experience, looking around at what we can learn from observation, and looking forward to see where we are going. Planners make mistakes, but one should not draw the opposite conclusion that those who never plan never make mistakes. It is also a mistake to do nothing under some conditions. The more difficult the situation and the more uncertain, the greater the need for careful consideration of the course of action or alternative courses of action. More than ever before, it is necessary to consider our way of action with all the facts, all the intelligence, all the judgment and vision at our command.

PLANNING IS POSSIBLE¹

Those who denounce planning usually prefix to planning the word "total" or "economic" or "central" and avoid reference to the kinds of planning that have actually been going on in England and in the United States for a long time. When pressed for answer, they do not deny the possibility of city planning or county planning or state planning or regional planning or national planning, provided it does not become "economic." And even at this point it is clear that agricultural planning or public works planning or tariffs or subsidies or monetary regulation are not considered planning at all. Planning, it is held, is either complete economic collectivism or—note the shift now—almost anything short of it that the particular advocate does not like. Indeed, most of

modern social legislation fell under that ban from time to time within the past generation, including regulation of the hours and working conditions of labor. How much must we plan before it becomes "planning"?

Even more confused is the position taken by those who assert that "no nation can endure half planned and half unplanned." It is plainly absurd to declare that either all or nothing must be planned. That America could not remain free if its cities, including half and more of the population, were planned, or if land or mineral uses were planned, approaches the ridiculous. An economy may be partly regulated and partly unregulated. This is indeed true of all social relations, both in society and in government. Otherwise, there is no middle ground between anarchy and government. Wise planning provides for wide areas of freedom, since we may plan for freedom if we so will.

The all-or-nothing theory of planning presented by some of its critics is contradicted by the common facts of everyday life. "Look around you" is the answer. This argument would be perfectly senseless, except that, on careful examination, it is seen to rise from a confusion of complete economic collectivism with ordinary social planning carried on in modern states which are not collectivist. Such reasoning may or may not be sincere, but it is certainly confused and confusing and requires instant clarification whenever employed. The challenge to those who denounce what they term "total planning" is whether the challenger is opposed to any planning at all, including the customary forms of planning found in free-enterprise systems.

War production has its special planning board for production. Armies and navies have planning boards for their purposes. Industries have planning sections. All through American social life there are planning agencies and planning personnel. What is there that makes all governmental planning anathema except misunderstanding, preconception, and prejudice?

Complexity of a problem is not an obstacle to planning, but, just the contrary, it

¹ See the reports of National Resources Planning Board, especially *National Resources Development*, 1943; Ferdynand Zweig, *The Planning of Free Societies*; and *Planning*, published by P.E.P. (Political and Economic Planning), especially "A Civil General Staff," November 16, 1943.

is an invitation. In any large-scale planning project there comes first a general decision in the large as to what the government should do at the given time and then the specific decision as to how that purpose shall be formulated and made effective in administration. There is no more mystery or difficulty with respect to large-scale or complex planning than there is in regard to any other of the thousand functions of the state, such as taxation, currency, and education, all of which have their complexities.

DEMOCRACY CAN PLAN

It is at times asserted that planning may be desirable or possible but that only a totalitarian or authoritarian state can successfully plan. This rests upon a mistaken idea of what a democracy is and what it can do. The truth is that a democratic political association can do whatever a government needs to do in peace or in war. If planning is socially useful, if it increases our national production in goods and services, if it raises the standard of human living, if it releases the human personality for fuller expansion and expression, then this is a responsibility which democratic states may assume with assurance of successful operation. There is no magic in the totalitarian state which gives it the monopoly of performing these functions. The only magic of totalitarianism is the black magic of violence and oppression. But we now know that co-operation and persuasion, reason and liberty, are the surest foundations of production and of the enjoyment of abundance coming from sound productive systems. The tyrant neither knows more nor can he do more than the democratic statesman. Intelligence cannot be commanded but grows out of freedom of thought and expression. The highest administrative skills are the production of free association of free men, not the outcome of slave systems in which men work under the leash.

Despotism is less capable of dealing effectively with complexity or with situations requiring action than is democracy. It was not despotism but democracy that produced the

prosperity and productivity of modern civilization with its reliance upon reason, science, technology, fraternity, and equality. It is democracy, not despotism, that can best direct and control the destinies of civilization now.

The most powerful political society is not made by those who worship the state as such and bow down before it in adoration. The prophets of such a state are out of place in the modern world, as are their rites of cruelty and violence. The strongest state is one built upon a broad base of fraternity and co-operation, of voluntary support of the commonwealth by those who give "the last full measure of devotion" for the common good, not as slaves but as free men in a free society.

It is idle to allege that only a despotic government can protect the community from fire, flood, and famine. It is foolish to contend that only a despotic government can develop the resources of a country and provide for social justice in the distribution of the resulting gains. We hear this false claim in words of clamorous propaganda, intended to terrify us or to weaken our wills. But experience and observation tell us the opposite. History shows us the rise of equality and liberty, the rise of civilization, the rise of prosperity, the rise of justice, coming with the downfall of tyrants and the overthrow of their tyrannical practices. Emancipators rather than oppressors have filled the pages of progress in modern times as men emerged from darkness into light—out of slavery, piracy, oppression, injustice.

Neither a jural order of the world guaranteeing peace to mankind, nor the full development of the resources of all peoples of the world, nor fair participation in the gains of civilization can be dependent upon the theories or the practices of despotism. They spring from free society, from free men. The progress of mankind is conditioned upon the freedom of the human spirit, upon the fraternal encouragement of the growth of human personalities, upon the determination of the common good and its administration by the consent of the community.

LIMITS OF PLANNING

But, it may fairly be asked, is there no point where governmental planning becomes dangerous to human personalities and to the general good? What are the limits of planning in theory or in practice?

There are limits to planning as to all forms of organization. Organization, management, and planning are designed to release human faculties and personality, not to restrict and limit them. Organization which operates to restrain without corresponding release of activities has no excuse for existence and should be wiped away as soon as possible.

Organization and planning are designed to release, not to restrict, human abilities and personalities. Inadequate organization restrains without corresponding release. A poor traffic plan will tie up traffic rather than expedite it; but sound planning saves both time and trouble for a mass of motorists. Poor planning of rationing causes confusion and vexation, while sound planning serves an important and useful purpose. It is easy to find many plans that have gone wrong—plans that prove to be irksome, futile, and unnecessary. But this does not mean that we should abandon planmaking or rulemaking or organization altogether. On the contrary, a progressive society such as ours is constantly making, unmaking, and remaking its charts of action. We look ahead, planning for distant goals; but our vision may not have been good, or our particular arrangement designed for reaching the goal may not have been well adapted to that purpose. In such cases, we may curse the planners, but we do not give up planning.

Planning is primarily for the purpose of doing what otherwise we could not do at all or could not do as well or as efficiently. We plan zoning regulations or conservation of oil and soil or equal access to social security or health or education to achieve ends not reached as readily in any other way. We may and do plan to increase liberty of motion, of action, of expression of thought and personality, to widen the range of human

free choices. This is in fact the purpose of planning and the only reason for its existence.

We may ask what the limits of governmental action are in general. Or, beyond that, what the limits of social intrusion are on the realm of the personality. As Mill clearly showed, this is a question not only for government but for all other forms of human association: for the family, the church, the neighborhood, the business, the labor, and the agricultural organization.² A wide range of answers will be given, depending upon a wide range of varying circumstances.

At what point planning becomes a menace to freedom cannot be precisely indicated. We do not have here a question of plus and minus—merely plus regulation and minus liberty, or minus regulation and plus liberty. We deal rather with general strategy, with significant areas or points where governmental action is socially necessary or desirable. The point at which these regulations become undesirable depends on problems concerning the government and the capacity of the government for dealing with them effectively. The problems of fire, flood, pestilence, famine, war, depression, and unemployment necessarily require governmental attention and action. "Why does not the government do something about it?" the citizens ask when an emergency arises and danger and death are in the background. Even without an emergency we call upon the government to encourage agriculture, to assist industry, to protect wages and working conditions, and to foster education, recreation, the arts and sciences. At these points governmental failure to act is as sharply criticized as governmental action in other cases where it is not wanted or needed.

We may always raise the questions: What is the range of free economic decisions? Of free political decisions? Of free intellectual decisions? Of free moral, religious, and social decisions? What are the

² Dorothy Fosdick, *On Social Planning* (New York, 1941)

priorities in freedoms and what are the priorities in ranges of human values? Obviously, government does not, cannot, and should not regulate all these value systems and their respective priorities. The poverty of power is such that government could not, if it would, go very far into the inner life of human values, or not for long, and not without destroying its own foundations. The business of legislative bodies, the business of administrative officials, the business of judicial agencies, and the business of men in charge of the armed forces are all important more or less according to the tension and attention of the moment. But most human decisions are made in the market place, in the factory, on the farm, in the school, in the church, in the family, in groups and associations that enrich our social life. Political decisions or administrative decisions or judicial decisions in the main interpret and apply social decisions to human life. These governmental decisions, it may be said, are enforceable by violence of which the state has a monopoly, but the force of a government is not a thing by itself but something tied in with the social relations of the community.

The scope of government at any given time is what the community wishes to recognize as acceptable and worthy of practical co-operation. Beyond that, the way is rough for those who are governing at the moment. Violence may stretch the lines somewhat but not forever.

In the background not only of political but of social organization lies consent. "The strong are never so strong that they do not try to turn might into right and obedience into duty," it was said long ago. "Just powers" were the cornerstone of the Declaration of Independence. Even autocrats in clumsy fashion must woo the consent of the governed by pretending to speak in their name, at least in some things.

In democratic societies formal arrangements are made—institutions and mechanisms, habits of thought, and customs provide for the orderly determination of the consent of the associated members of the

given society. Legislative bodies, courts and their procedures, and administrative officials are, in the last analysis, subject to the body of the electors. In these procedures the policy of the community is determined and the ways of enforcement and administration are set up. Procedural guaranties are established and common understandings are reached which operate to restrict any overreaching tendencies in government. Thus the limits of governmental planning are found in the extent to which the society wishes to make decisions itself through its own channels or to leave them to the formal organization known as the government. When plans and planners impinge upon this domain of individual or group or regional autonomy, they soon come to grief. That the government might become all-powerful by endeavoring to plan all is an easy form of illusion.

An army may, of course, seize the people's guns and turn them against their masters for a time; but there can also be a peoples' army. A group of planners might attempt to plan all and, by some tour de force or by some slow movement, endeavor to draw all formal power to themselves. But there can be planners in a democratic society, where there is a grass-roots public opinion and a grass-roots legislative and administrative authority holding the reins. In war or severe crisis, of course, any form of government may for the time assume wide powers, as City Manager Dykstra became "dictator" during the Cincinnati flood. But we must not mistake crisis government for the everyday life of the society, as many do, and thus fail to understand the normal relations of government to people. As soon as a high form of centralization comes into being, there begins the countermovement toward division, departmentalization, delegation, subdivision, and, finally, back again to forms of autonomy within the circle of the centralization.

The practical limits of government—and of planning—are the product of general social attitudes and understandings and of specific governmental and social mecha-

nisms and procedures. In a free society these attitudes and understandings are the continuing and changing product of free discussion, free press and radio, free association of free men; and these understandings are made effective through mechanisms for the determination of policies by elected and responsible agents, by mechanisms and personnel for the administration of these policies, and by other mechanisms for the adjudication of justiciable causes.

Business, labor, and agriculture pressure groups, all types of social aggregation, and parties and factions of parties find their limitations in this general way of democracy. Sometimes one breaks through the thinly held line of the public interest and rushes on to loot and plunder, only to be hurled back or counterattacked. In this way the public protects itself through the appropriate exercise of the consent of the governed, determining what shall be public, private, or mixed. Tariffs, taxes, land use, parities, priorities, manpower and materials, war and peace, plans and proposals—all come through the same channels of public opinion and democratic procedure. The limits of planning are found in the "general genius of the government," as Hamilton phrased it, and in the democratic wisdom of our citizens. This line is not a smooth and well-fitted curve but zigzag and crisscross.

In any case, the modern system is not a closed and sealed book; on the contrary, we have always been making changes and will continue to make changes. Stagnation in a period of swift change such as this is a form of hardening of the arteries and is not far removed from the end. Not business, labor, agriculture, or the professions can be guaranteed against changing conditions, against the competition that comes with a growing civilization, although from time to time all these groups have demanded such protection. The mere parrot-like repetition of such words as "socialism," "individualism," "collectivism," and "capitalism," intended to smear the other man, does not carry us far toward practical conclusions about what to do in troublesome cases. All is not settled

when these phrases are hurled with deadly intent at an opponent in an argument.

Much of the current speculation regarding the role of government may find itself out of date in the days that are not far ahead. The real problem involves not the answers to the question of much or little government but the types of strategic controls that will prove most useful in the given situation and those that can be implemented most practically by government or by other agencies.

On this basis most of the weapons of war constructed for theoretical warfare of the old type will be found useless, if not positively in the way. They can be melted down and turned into more useful products of peace. Class or ethnic or regional wars will not absorb the energies of the future as much as the adjustment of personalities and the contrivance of various shifting forms of social groupings with conflicting claims which must be settled. It is true that we must contemplate the possibility of another cycle of regional-racial wars, dragging out over another long stretch of time; but this is not necessary if we utilize the techniques of modern vintage instead of those of the older day.

To those battling fiercely and with right good will, these words may be unwelcome, for I am really saying that you are fighting over inconsequential side issues off the course which lies ahead. But my mission is to report what I see and give the most reasonable interpretation at my command.

The whole problem of the nature and implications of authority, power, and personality is on the agenda for searching examination, with the use of new techniques never before available to inquiring students of human nature. Psychology and sociology are lagging behind in this heavy task but not forever. They will bring with them conclusions of far-reaching importance to mankind when they make the port. Medicine has already brought forward immense contributions, and mental medicine has still more in store for the benefit of mankind. The master-slave relationship is on its way

out of human institutions, and the command-obedience psychology as a basis for governance is also on its way out, beyond any question, however slowly we may seem to move in this desired direction. When education and medicine and economics have done their full work, the nature of the human personality will adapt itself in new ways to forms of political and social co-operation and control which may make our present constructs seem childish. What these new forms may be I do not know, and I am intelligent enough, I trust, not to try to describe what I do not know about or cannot forecast on the basis of ascertained facts and principles.

The concepts of "public" and "private" likewise undergo important changes. There is no longer private property in public government as was long the case when the owner of the land was also the proprietor of the people and of the government.³ There is no longer hereditary transmission of political power, except in relatively few instances, and these of passing significance. Inheritance of public power, such as property, is thus passing away from human usage. Inheritance in the economic field is still of great importance, but it is seriously modified by the inheritance taxes which now fall upon transmission.

There are now public profits as well as private profits and public enterprise as well as private enterprise. The whole line between public and private is far less distinct than it once was, although, if we go back far enough into the feudal period, the lines are very vague indeed.⁴ This should be taken to mean not that there is no dividing-line between the public and the private but that new lines are constantly being drawn, across the old lines in various instances. Areas of privacy may be found in the densest and most complex of populations and social activities, as in a library, a hotel, a

retreat, or a soundproof seclusion which no one can easily penetrate. There may be few hermitages, but there are hermit spots which men may find in the thick of civilization.

Out of all these scattered materials will be woven the web of the politics which is to come, looking ahead as far as we can see—which is not too far. And out of all this may emerge quite different forces and phases of social planning, public and private.

PLANNING PROGRESS

The important question is what we propose to do regarding the future development of our resources with reference to specific programs of action directed toward the common good. The development of a dynamic economy will absorb our interests and our energies for some time to come, and this can be achieved without basic changes in our industrial or political economy. That there is an underlying harmony of interests common to groups and individuals throughout our nation and that there are also sharp differences in personal and group advantage goes without saying. But in a dynamic economy, with full employment and full development of national resources, the national income may be so largely increased by superior use of science, by superior forms of organization and management, by superior productivity of goods and services—all well within the bounds of possibility in a free system—that the minor differences of advantage are lost sight of in the larger gains that may accrue to all.

The fear that planning will interfere with the development of free industrial society is groundless. The very purpose of planning is to release human abilities, to broaden the field of opportunity, and to enlarge human liberty. We plan primarily for freedom; the ways and means and instruments are secondary to the main purpose. The right kind of planning—democratic planning—is a guaranty of liberty and the only real assurance in our times that men can be free to make a wide range of choices.

Among the outstanding ways in which

³ See my *Public and Private Government* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1944).

⁴ See *ibid.*, *passim*, and my *The Role of Politics in Social Change* (New York: New York University Press, 1936).

human liberty may be expanded by careful planning are:

1. Research, invention, and technological development, which are the bases of our industrial development, would profit by careful planning. From the very beginning that was an avowed purpose of the Founding Fathers, and it continues to be one of the characteristic features of our day. Business research, governmental research, academic research—all flourish under a system of freedom, in a climate where their progress is considered one of the main-springs of human progress and is fostered in every possible way, alike in social and in natural science. Physics, chemistry, biology, engineering, medicine, education, and management are the foundations upon which much of our material and social progress depends, and they flourish best where careful attention is given to their cultivation. In a democratic society these free channels of invention and ingenuity may be kept open to all, without discrimination against race or class.

2. The frontiers of industrial development are wide open. There is every reason to believe that human enterprise and organization are likely in the immediate future to utilize more fully undeveloped resources already known and to go beyond that into the exploration and advancement of entirely new fields of industrial activity. The amazing results following the release of human ingenuity in the present drive for large-scale production show the tremendous possibilities in our present system. Only those whose imagination is dead or dying can fail to recognize the vast peacetime potential of production, once the way is cleared. Obviously, all this is not the task of government alone, but government can keep the channels of enterprise open and can help to plan for continuing growth of essential resources, both material and human. We can plan for a national income of a hundred and twenty-five or a hundred and fifty billion dollars.

The 100 per cent attainment of health and education alone would transform na-

tional resources in a measure defying precise calculation, but beyond question to a point of incalculable value, even in terms of dollars and cents, to say nothing of human happiness. There is a point at which expenditure for health and education would strike the law of diminishing returns, but we have not yet even come within sight of such a situation.

Free enterprise has far more to fear from lack of planning than from its development and application to national resources. Between fascism, on the one hand, and monopoly and unregulated concentrations of economic power, on the other, the free industrial system and the open free market are hard pressed now. It is not planning that has made difficulties in the smooth working of free competition, that has fostered monopolies, cartels, racketeering, high, low, or medium, but the lack of it.

At the outset there were wide-ranging plans in the United States for land development, public debt, transportation, and industrial development prepared by such leaders as Hamilton, Jefferson,⁵ Gallatin, and Adams. It was only after the Civil War that public planning slackened for a generation, until the turn of the century. The industrial possibilities of the United States are now fabulously greater than those afforded by our public lands or the early development of our resources. There is no more reason to fear governmental planning now than there was then.

In the past few years government has brought up to date types of social legislation that were a generation late, such as social security and conservation. We still lag behind at many important points. But the dramatic possibilities of the next period are far more important than either the early planning of our public lands or the later approach to belated social and humanitarian legislation.

National planning in this important field cannot be imposed from above by a few

⁵ See Charles E. Merriam and Frank P. Bourgin, "Jefferson as a Planner of National Resources," *Ethics*, LIII (July, 1943), 284-92.

officials but must involve the co-operation of industry, labor, and agriculture and rest upon free and general discussion by the public of what is involved in decisions of this kind. Government has taken no vow to cripple or destroy industry or labor or agriculture or to substitute another system of economy or to undermine morale, nor has industry any purpose in attempting to cripple or "boycott" government, whatever a few individuals may say. The future development of the United States will be determined not by emotional disturbances of extremists but by intelligence, practical judgment, invention, and organization in the best American manner.

The possibilities of planning in the United States, at any rate, have been set forth by the National Resources Planning Board in the following terms:

I. The fullest possible development of the human personality, in relation to the common good, in a framework of freedoms and rights, of justice, liberty, equality, and the consent of the governed.

II. The fullest possible development of the productive potential of all of our resources, material and human, with full employment, continuity of income, equal access to minimum security and living standards, and a balance between economic stability and social adventure.

III. An effective jural order of the world outlawing violence and imperialism, old or new fashioned, in international relations; and permitting and energizing the fullest development of resources and rights everywhere.

These aims lie well within the range of social planning and can be realized if there is will to do so.⁶

When we make up our minds, the drifters and the doubters can be disregarded, and those with faith and courage may go forward with the job of intelligent planning of whatever needs to be planned at a given time, with the courage to plan and the courage not to plan when necessary. Proposals for social action will be condemned

then or accepted not because they are labeled "planning" but because they merit acceptance or rejection from the point of view of the general welfare. There might be many disappointments due for special pleaders of one cause or another, one plan or another, but the community as a whole would not suffer from their disaffection, provided the measures proposed and adopted were consistent with the general good.

If we agree that government is an instrument that may be used in many kinds of cases for the promotion of the general welfare, then we might decide to streamline governmental agencies in the most effective fashion. This is not the occasion to provide a bill of particulars for governmental organization adapted to a progressive development of resources, but many significant changes might well be made in order to strengthen our legislative and administrative arrangements.

This will involve not only the rooting-out of corruption and spoils in government and the encouragement of the highest levels of competence in all agencies but a general toning-up of the spirit and temper of governments. It might involve reconsideration of the relative roles of local and national and intermediate governments with a view to preserving both the values of local self-government and the advantages of national unity. It will involve a consideration of wartime controls and regulations, priorities, rationings, taxation, manpower and materials, in their relation to peacetime problems of production and prosperity.

When the misunderstandings have been cleared away, we need not be frightened by the bugaboo of the word "planning." We can undertake to plan the development of our resources. The way will then be cleared for calm consideration of the most intelligent ways of bringing this about. The various agencies of public and private enterprise can then move forward in co-operation toward the completion of their co-operative undertaking.

Then we can take the measure of the meaning of both private and public govern-

⁶ Concrete suggestions are contained in the pages of the Board's report for 1943 (*op. cit.*).

ment and can advance without being frightened either by the word "anarchism" or the word "collectivism" applied to every individual act of the government. We can recognize that government is one of the many agencies necessary to the happiness of mankind, a useful servant of the common good, for purposes willed by the community itself.

Private enterprise and public enterprise and mixed forms of enterprise will take their proper places in the national economy and may dwell together in harmony. There may and will be regional struggles and personal struggles and sectarian struggles and racial rivalries and class struggles, but they will play their proper roles in the broad setting of the common good—not as the lords of creation, but as servants and not as masters of the common good. In a truly free economy—one which is free politically and free economically and free religiously and free culturally—no one element will have a monopoly of decisions affecting the common good.

Many atrocities have been committed in the alleged name of the common man, but usually by special seekers of special privilege taking the name of democracy in vain for their own selfish purposes, with their tongues in their cheeks. But, when men once come really into their own in a fraternal society where the dignity of man and the consent of the governed are actually in force, the vested interests of special groups, political, economic, cultural, racial, or religious, will be relatively insignificant. They may be valued for what they really are.

In that day it will be possible to realize the destiny of modern life more fully than the prophets ever dared to dream. It will be possible to make full use of science and democracy in planning for the expansion of national production, for justice, for the fair distribution of national gains, for far higher standards of living, for liberty, for the recognition of the dignity of man, and for his right to participate fully in the civilization he has helped create.

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HUMAN NATURE AND WORLD DEMOCRACY

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ABSTRACT

Human nature is a manifold paradox. Man is a social animal, in the sense of "conventional," with anti-social traits equally prominent. Intelligent morality is a product of social evolution, partly uniform or convergent, partly the opposite of both. Custom, authority, and deliberate consensus are three distinguishable "stages" above instinctive animal society; the last is peculiar to recent western European civilization. Our individualistic, free, or democratic social ethic is largely limited to states by the facts of cultural and political differentiation. The place of conflicting economic interests in international war is highly ambiguous. The common idea of deliberately changing human nature is a tissue of logical confusion. The changes necessary to eliminate war without destroying freedom are largely undesirable, since war arises from conflicts between ideals and rights rather than mere interests. A peaceable and free world order calls for a combination of agreement and toleration, and both have ethical limits. The visible issues in war are relatively unimportant in comparison with the inherent clash between quantity and quality and between different qualities, in human life; and survival in a struggle for existence is, for the visible future, the final test of higher and lower. But some changes are clearly worth working for, while "we" defend our own cultural achievement.

I

To discuss this topic in the compass of a journal article we must limit our treatment closely to the practical problem. This means resisting the temptation to write a literary essay on human nature, which might bear such a title as "the low-down on human nature" or "the truth about human nature finally disclosed." The essential fact would be that human nature as we know it—the nature of man sufficiently advanced or civilized to think and talk about his own nature—is a tissue of paradox. It would be difficult to make any general statement about "man" which would not contain substantial truth; and this means that the antithesis of every statement, or, indeed, several antitheses, would also be partly true and, on the average, equally so.

The practical interest back of our discussion is a human aversion to war. This is partly because people do not like danger, suffering, and hardship; yet it is human nature to fight for interests of innumerable kinds and every degree of importance and for no interest except the fight. Man typically describes himself as the intelligent animal—*Homo sapiens*; but the main significance of this seems to be that man loves to compliment himself and considers this the highest compliment. "Intelligence" is a word of numerous meanings, and with respect to

all of them man is both a stupid animal and a romantic, preferring emotion to reason and fiction to truth. He is the laughing and the weeping animal, laughing most often at things obscene or cruel and weeping for pleasure at the sorrows of imaginary people.

Man also proverbially calls himself a social animal. He is social in a sense entirely different from other animals, a sense which involves antisocial qualities—a love of privacy, even solitude, and innumerable antipathies and conflicts of interest with his fellows in any social group. One of his social traits is exhibitionism; yet he is the only animal that has physical modesty and conceals his body in clothes; and what he does to his body is a tiny circumstance compared to his parading, concealment, and dissembling of his mind, his thoughts, and his feelings. For this function he is endowed with the marvelous faculty of speech. In his social life, again, man is a lawmaker and law-abider, one who loves ritual, formality, and rules for their own sake; yet he is also a lawbreaker, for many reasons and merely for the sake of nonconformity and defiance. He loves what is established because it is old, and he loves novelty because it is new, and change for the sake of change. Civilized man is a capricious and perverse animal. He typically has no clear idea what he wants or which of obviously incompatible things he

wants more. His acts often contradict his professed interests, which in turn are often contrary to any defensible notion of well-being. Even less, as this behavior proves, does he really believe what he says or thinks he believes. He progressively develops a repugnance for useful work and for any routine of settled, orderly life, preferring play, adventure, and excitement. He has a strong bent for fun, mischief, destruction, and cruelty, which is hardly found in any other species. (Animals are not "brutal" as the word is applied to man, i.e., cruel or lascivious; and "inhuman" behavior is as distinctive of man as "humane" acts.)

For our purpose here, the most important general truth about human nature is that man is a conventional animal—social in that sense. Of course, he is also unconventional; but this is true in the main in fields where it is conventional to be unconventional. Man is unique among animals in that he laughs at others but cannot endure being laughed at—except when he deliberately provokes laughter, which is one of his favorite sources of joy and pride. He cannot even stand it to be "looked at," except with looks of approval and admiration—though even less can he endure being avoided or ignored. Conventionality finds its extreme development in religion, a unique human interest. Yet people often welcome revolution, even in religion, and troop after the prophet of a new cult. One of the sharpest antitheses in human nature is the combination of the groveler and the power-seeker. But, on the whole, man is a conventional being, and this implies a preference for his own conventions over those of other groups. This bias, as we shall emphasize, is the primary root of war. But, even here, human nature is a paradox, since men also typically regard "foreign" people and ways and things as superior to their own; a prophet is not without honor save in his own country.

Another important fact in the study of war is that man is a discontented animal, and particularly that he is likely to grow more discontented as he becomes better off. But this is mainly because he is prone to

think someone else is getting the best of it or is putting something over on him. The conflict between different systems of conventionality or "culture," different customs, traditions, mores, on the one hand, and, on the other, increasing mass discontent as a direct consequence of an unprecedented increase in mass well-being in the last two centuries or so of our civilization are the two main causes of war which must be considered today in any thoughtful study of the problem of eliminating it.

With reference to our practical objective, it is necessary to have a clear orientation to the type of action which is contemplated. The objective is a world order which is not only peaceful but free, or democratic, and also preserves other values of our civilization. There is a vast difference in the meaning of intelligent action where the intention is to change human relations, in contrast with changing the behavior of nonhuman objects. In the latter case we can find out and apply laws of behavior which are not affected by our knowledge or intentions or attitudes, because the objects acted upon do not have reciprocal intentions or attitudes toward "us." With human beings the contrary is true. But within the human field itself there is another distinction, fully as important. If we wish merely to influence the overt behavior of other persons, it is theoretically possible to do this by coercion or persuasion—really a form of coercion and typically based upon deception. But, if we wish permanently satisfactory relations with others, this procedure is rarely effective, even in the narrow practical sense; and in the present context we assume it to be excluded by our ethical norms of satisfactory relationships. Even if it were possible to abolish war by making ourselves so strong that no one would dare to oppose our will, the result would not achieve our purpose.

Thus the problem is not one of the use of means, or power, to achieve a given concrete end. We should rather think of changing the rules of a game, so as to make it a better game. It makes all the difference in the world that the problem cannot be

treated simply as one of making others agree with us on ends and procedures by force or fraud or persuasion, but that agreement will involve mutual give and take. In a word, an essential feature of the problem is the presupposition of *democracy*; and it is necessary at the outset to recognize the historical uniqueness of this concept and its implications for human nature. Only in the past few centuries, and chiefly in the limited area of western Europe and its colonies, have men confronted this task or attempted to direct future history by intelligent mass action. Democracy is much more than a form of government. Its advent marks a transformation of man and of the meaning of a social problem. Entirely new ideals, of freedom and equality in place of status and authority, go with the revolutionary changes, dating chiefly from the seventeenth century, which established our free social order. Another unique ideal is that of progress, material and cultural. We must view human nature as active and self-changing and not merely as undergoing changes in response to outside activities or forces, and we must view social action as based on a rational consensus.

The essential fact is freedom, or creative activity. But freedom is like other traits of human nature in that it is created by a social situation or, in more technical terms, a complex of institutions. This also sets limits to freedom. The supreme paradox of man, in our civilization, is that he is an individual—unique, creative, and dynamic—yet is the creature of institutions which must be accounted for in terms of historical processes. Nothing could be more false historically than the notion that men are naturally free and equal, or even that they naturally have a right to freedom. In the light of history as a whole, the natural state of man is to live imbedded in a "crust of custom," in which most of his activities, thoughts, and feelings are determined by established patterns. These are, or were, enforced upon him and also ingrained in his being, so that he hardly thought of departure from them and hence had little feeling of unfreedom. The exist-

ence of man as a free individual is a function of free society, which is the product of biological evolution and human culture history.

The familiar saying from Aristotle, that "man is a social animal," is both true and misleading. That human beings can exist only in organized groups is true biologically and more strikingly true with respect to the traits which make us distinctively human. But the social life of man is different in principle from that of the animals, particularly those forms in which social organization is highly developed—the colonial insects. Man is social, but also naturally antisocial. His social organization always involves coercion, which he intrinsically dislikes. The capacity of coercing and being coerced is virtually peculiar to man, though we impute it in a certain degree to the "higher" animals, in domestication and in herd life. Men do not coerce the inert objects of nature and are not coerced by them, and the latter do not coerce one another. Furthermore, man's love of freedom and hatred of coercion inherently involve a craving for *power*, not merely over the objects of nature but over other men—an antisocial trait. Power is a factor or dimension in effective freedom; no clear separation can be made between "freedom from" coercion—of custom or authority—and "freedom to" act, which presupposes power. But men desire freedom and power in the abstract, as well as for the sake of any particular use which they wish to make of either. They also claim freedom and power as a moral right, against other individuals and the various social groups in which they live. And within some limits everyone admits the validity of this claim on the part of others; but their claims to freedom and power overlap, creating conflicts of interest, which are the basis of social problems. Such features seem to be entirely absent from insect society. There the biological unit is not an individual, in the human meaning. It is not motivated by interests or rights which conflict with those of others or of the group.

Human intelligence, in the primitive instrumental meaning—the use of means to

realize ends—recognizes the value and necessity of group life, first, in the aspect of co-operation. But it also involves a tendency of the individual to use the fellow-members of his group for his own purposes or to try to make the terms of co-operation favorable to himself. In addition, man is endowed with a craving for "sociability," in other forms than co-operation, which have no clear biological function; and these forms also involve both harmony and conflict of interest. A typical sociability interest is that of competitive social play—and most play is social and competitive. Here the immediate object of the individual is to win, to defeat the opponent, individual or group; but the game itself is a common interest of all the players. Very early in the history (prehistory) of civilized life, men developed a third type of social interest, the pursuit of "culture," meaning intellectual and aesthetic activity, in contrast with the economic and recreative. This "higher life" partakes of the nature of both "work," or co-operation, and play.

The "higher-culture" interests of man present a challenge to the student. They cannot be explained in terms of biological utility but are largely peculiar to man as a civilized being. From a natural point of view it is difficult to account for the development of the appreciation of beauty or a sense of humor or for speculative curiosity or the feeling of decency or that formal purity which is probably the ultimate root of the moral sense. It would seem that the civilized traits, taken en bloc, must somehow be useful, since the more civilized groups survive and increase at the expense of the less civilized—though again in the long course of history a high civilization seems to have been rather typically self-destructive.

From our point of view these interests are the heart of the problem, because among civilized peoples it is chiefly the right to civilized life, defined in terms of a particular civilization, which is at stake in war. The cultural amenities come to be regarded as "rights" by those who have them and by

those who want them, and it is for such rights that men are most likely to fight. They do not, in general, fight for any mere "interest" and are likely to be generous and self-sacrificing in the face of disaster, as when a ship is sinking or even in a food shortage, giving up the basic right to comfort, security, or life itself. To say this is not necessarily to exalt the moral nature of man; for, on the one hand, the features of a culture for which men will fight are not necessarily good, even in terms of their own recognized standards. And, on the other hand, an important trait of human nature is the disposition to regard as a right practically anything which is intensely desired, and that largely irrespective of whether the individual regards the object as really important.

Human nature is a function of the nature of society, and both are historical products. Knowledge of the course of evolution of man and of civilization would be infinitely valuable for the interpretation of human nature and for dealing with human problems, but little information about it is to be had. It is worth noting that man did not evolve from social forms, such as the insects, in which the patterns of individual and group life are instinctive, but from species of a totally different biological type. At an early stage, these lived individual lives, except for mating; then followed longer and longer association for rearing the young; later they gradually formed loose larger groupings of the "herd" type, apparently a "harem," or extreme patriarchy. The mammalian herd as we know it presents a mixture of instinct, custom (imitation and habit), and authority or dominance. Its psychological basis seems to be emotional rather than rational, as is undoubtedly true also of human society. The development of the herd was apparently connected with important physiological changes in the sex life, fairly complete in the anthropoids, while the romanticizing of sex and family relations is one of the most distinctive traits of *Homo*. From the anthropoid herd to human society the

great change is, of course, the development of speech, along with the brain capacities and mental dispositions, both rational and emotional, which are associated with articulate communication.

With reference to the course of development at the human level—though again only the most recent history is at all well known—we can discern some of the great changes through which advanced civilized man and society have become what they are and which help us to understand our situation and its problems. In “primitive” human society the most important principle of order is *custom*, as we have already noted. It is always associated with an elaborate tradition, a mythology suffused with “religious” ideas. The patterns of action and the traditions are transmitted by social inheritance through imitation and habituation, accompanied by some active “teaching” on the part of the mature generation and learning on the part of the young. The process of unconscious acculturation differs from biological inheritance of instinct, but it is equally mechanical, conservative, and opposed to individual freedom. Authority is also conspicuous in tribal society; but mostly it is not “real” authority, since those who exercise it get their position through inheritance in accord with sacred custom and tradition, of which they are the custodians, with their activities prescribed; and in this role they are viewed as the agents of supernatural powers. Their authority, or that of the traditions they enforce, is supported by the group as a whole, against recalcitrant individuals, though deliberate breach of custom is relatively rare. Thus the primary phenomenon is that of “culture” in the anthropological meaning, or of law as usage “sanctioned” by public opinion and religion.

In a summary view modern free or democratic society may be viewed as the product of an evolution from tribal life, involving two great stages of advance. First, “civilization,” in our meaning, seems always to have developed out of barbarism under an authoritarian organization, a monarchy associated with a nobility and a priesthood.

(Various forms of agricultural village and “city-state” doubtless mark the transition from tribal life to a kingdom or empire covering a wide area and including numerous “cities.”) From the standpoint of the development of individual freedom, the transition from tribal life to monarchy is rather a step backward (except for the rulers), since “government by law” is replaced in part by “government by men.” But it made possible a vast increase in power in all spheres and a great advance in “culture,” the higher life, though only for a small élite.

The second step giving rise to free society, akin to modern democracy or accepting similar ideals and combined with a high civilization, has resulted from a revolutionary overthrow of despotism, autocracy or oligarchy, and “priestocracy.” A democratic order may or may not preserve its culture, inherited from the preceding stage, or develop it further over a substantial historical period. It will be seen that this three-stage scheme is obtained by intercalating an intermediate stage of authoritarian society between “status” and “contract,” in Sir H. S. Maine’s well-known formula for the evolution of law. In juridical terms our first stage is that of customary law, including the authority and procedures for enforcement; the second stage sees the advent of a “state,” with rulers exercising a greater range of real or arbitrary power to make law, in addition to enforcing law; the third stage is that of democratic legislation, expressing a more or less rational general will, social consensus, or public opinion.

Without ranging over world history, we may think of the past thousand years or so of European civilization. Conditions in northern and western Europe at this “beginning” may be regarded as practically those of barbarism, under customary law. The religious sanction was Christianity, in the form in which it had become established in the period of decadence of classical civilization. The later evolution was, of course, profoundly influenced by survivals of the older culture and especially by the “transit

of civilization" from the East (including the Moslem world), where it survived in much greater degree, to backward regions with "frontier" conditions. The political transition occurred in northern Europe and is rather indirectly related to the cultural "Renaissance" in the Italian city-states. (Even the latter was at least as much a unique new growth as a "rebirth.") The political movement manifests the two revolutionary changes mentioned: (a) the development of autocratic states in the Renaissance period and (b) liberalization and democratization in the revolutions of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.

II

We come back to the point stressed early in the article—the historical uniqueness of the present social and political situation and its accepted ideals. What is referred to as democracy anywhere else in the panorama of history—in tribal life or in city-states or in the Middle Ages—was not democratic in anything like our equalitarian meaning of the term but was largely based on customary law, which presupposed class distinctions and status relations. It also existed only on a minute scale, in comparison with modern states; and where it was associated with a high "civilization," especially in classical Greece, it was very short lived, running into tyranny at home and then into absorption by an imperial order. (These facts inevitably call to mind analogous tendencies in our contemporary world of western European civilization.)

Our modern social ethic is individualistic. Based on the ideals of freedom, equality, and progress, it repudiates the authority of custom and of individuals as political or religious rulers. It regards "society" as a free association of juridically equal individuals, for the pursuit of ends and ideals which are individual or freely chosen. Laws are viewed as rules, made or accepted by all, governing the association of individuals and voluntary groups. Groups are formed at will in response to any common interest of their members; even the state is viewed as

ideally based on free association or "contract." Ideally, groups within the state exercise no coercive power over their members, and the state itself has a minimum of such power. The purposes or interests for which men form organized and more or less permanent groups within the state and across state boundaries (and states, in the liberal conception) may be loosely classified under the three heads of work, "culture," and play, previously mentioned.

The acute internal problems of states arise chiefly in connection with the work interest or, more broadly, the economic life. In modern thought this also is conceived in individualistic terms, as co-operation for efficiency in the pursuit of individual ends by the use of means which are either incorporated in the person of the individual or "belong to" him. In fact, of course, the individual is typically the head of a family; the natural family is the minimum possible unit in organized society as a going concern, and the system would more properly be called "familism" than "individualism." (Of necessity the family is largely traditional and authoritarian in structure.) The individualistic or familistic ideal in economic life implies that economic co-operation is worked out primarily through "free" exchange in markets, with its terms fixed by economic competition. (This has no relation to psychological competition, emulation, or rivalry, and strictly economic motivation excludes the latter.) In fact, again, neither the individual nor the family is the typical unit in modern economic life. Production and exchange (purchase and sale for money) are carried on chiefly by organizations which vary in size and internal constitution, but the business corporation is the characteristic form. Like all stable organizations, the productive unit actually has considerable power over those who participate in its activities (as legal members or on contractual terms); and this virtual "sovereignty," as well as that of other associations for economic purposes (labor unions, etc.), is an important source of internal problems in the state.

With respect to these internal problems, the general objective prescribed for the state in modern social-ethical thought is to secure the maximum of individual freedom, including free association. This ideal calls for minimizing the functions of the state itself; for even the freest state acts through law, which is coercive upon a large part of the population. Thus its main internal function is the negative one of "policing" the relations of individuals in direct association and in more permanent voluntary organizations. It is given a monopoly of coercion, chiefly for preventing individuals or groups from coercing others, through either force or fraud. However, liberal thought has always recognized a large range of positive functions for the state, to be determined by expediency, but limited to matters on which there is substantial agreement.

III

Our problem here, however, is not the "internal" problems of states but conflict between states, where, in fact, the immediately serious threat to our civilization arises. But it is of the essence of the matter that no clear separation can be made between internal and external political relations or problems; for within the state conflicts occur between institutional groups, especially families, far more than between literal individuals, and the state itself is merely one form of institution among a vast number. The state is peculiar in two respects. First, the sphere of its power or "sovereignty" is defined by territorial boundaries. (This delimitation is not at all precise, since political allegiance does not coincide with residence, while sovereignty itself is of every degree.) Second, the state has a legal monopoly of military force, including police, within its boundaries—as long as civil war, or the threat of it, is absent.

As we emphasized earlier, human society has two aspects: it is an aggregate of individuals, enjoying more or less freedom, and also a complex of institutional groups. From the standpoint of social science, the

second aspect is the essential reality. The "individual" who makes choices and figures in relations of harmony and conflict is the creation of an intricate complex of institutional groups of every imaginable character and degree of permanence, and he usually acts in the interest of some group. In modern culture the natural family and the state stand out for their relative permanence and functional unity. But we must recognize the role of innumerable other groupings of varying size, degree of stability, and formal organization. These are unified and separated by various common traits or common interests, and their boundaries have little relation to those of states or political jurisdictions. But modern social thought, on its ethical side, takes the opposite view, regarding "society" as an association of free individuals for mutual advantage. Any organization or group, including the state, is viewed as a sort of *ad hoc* affair, made voluntarily and to be remade at will, by any group of individuals to serve any end or purpose which may arise.

In our individualistic ethics, values and ideals exist in the free individual, who is taken as given. The student must recognize that this ideal view is largely contrary to unalterable facts. The ultimate possibilities of freedom are limited. Human nature is a cultural phenomenon, and the individual exists as the bearer of a culture. Viewing man in terms of civilized society, the self-perpetuating biological group plays somewhat the role of the soil which supports a particular species of plant. The nature of the plant is determined chiefly by its inheritance; and the case of man is similar, except that it is a cultural inheritance which is humanly determining rather than a physical germ plasm. The human being does not achieve individuality or freedom, or the idea of freedom, except through a culture made and continued by the various groups in which he lives. His interests and ideals, as well as his capacities, and the external means of life are derived in the main and in most cases from his cultural inheritance. But this inheritance is very different in

different culture situations. In consequence the individual's interests and social and political activities are divided in uncertain and varying proportions between striving to change the various culture complexes in which he finds himself to accord with his desires and ideals and striving to preserve and defend these against the encroachments of others which he feels to be still more alien and repugnant to his spiritual cravings, nurtured by his own group life.

These facts give rise to social conflicts, in the dual form of conflicts between individuals within groups and conflicts between groups differentiated in innumerable ways. The groups in conflict may be states or groups of states, or they may lie within states or cut across state boundaries. The conflicts tend to eventuate in war between nations or alliances or in civil war or class war or simple "crime," as the case may be. Since groups based on economic functions or other common interests, including alliances between states, are indefinitely numerous and shifting, while war practically has to occur between two "sides," the parties must be vague communities of interest which are, in fact, highly heterogeneous.

Under modern conditions, national or world war and class conflict present themselves as alternatives. Political groups tend to strive for internal unity by appealing to, and manufacturing, suspicion and ill will toward other groups. Leaders whip up patriotism by accentuating conflicts of economic interest and the feeling of difference and opposition between cultural ideals vis-à-vis other nations. As everyone knows, modern states, as they have happened to come into being in the course of history, are by no means natural economic units. Economic differences show little correspondence with political boundaries. National interests are not unitary, and between nations as they exist on the map the relations are far more complementary than conflicting. Accordingly, the causality of wars between nations or groups or blocs of nations—the issues about which peoples fight—must be

sought elsewhere than in real conflicts of economic interest. The economic policies of protectionism and autarchy, so characteristic of modern states, are patently antieconomic from the standpoint of the peoples themselves, and colonies are notoriously an economic liability.

National states on the political world map of today do correspond in a general way with major cultural differentiations in the human race as a whole. And every cultural unit which feels itself to be homogeneous and different from others has a "natural" tendency to strive both for its own preservation and for expansion or aggrandizement along numerous lines. These include population numbers, standard of living, culture, and control of territory—all sought as ends, as means to one another as ends, and as sources or symbols of power and "greatness." This endeavor leads inevitably to a competitive situation, which tends to generate antagonism and violence. This will be true even for a group which strives to be progressive without in any way injuring other groups.

This situation gives rise to conflicts of economic interest, in the broad meaning, overriding the mutual advantages of co-operation. All human life requires economic resources, both natural and artificial as usually classified, and the immaterial resources of science and technology. These are necessary for biological and cultural preservation and, additionally, for any form of growth or progress, including intellectual and spiritual culture. Moreover, the effective utilization of resources already possessed requires trade, with or without political control, as a means of access to other resources, physical and human, which are naturally complementary. But it seems to be "human nature" to seek political domination in place of free international trade. Little success has attended the efforts of modern economic teaching to get the general public, even in the most advanced and highly educated countries (specifically our own), to realize effectively and carry over into their political thinking the truism

that in free exchange the advantage is mutual.

This fact is apparent in the protectionist sentiment which is manifested, not merely on the national arena but in our states and smaller communities, against one another. The predominance of mutual advantage over conflicting interests is largely true also of functional economic groups, such as capital and labor, agriculture, industry, and finance, etc. Even individuals, but especially organized groups, tend to take it for granted that in exchange relations the other party dictates the terms in his own favor, through "monopoly" or other unfair advantage—regardless of the extent to which such factors are actually present. This is particularly true when the other party seems to be better off; and there is a real difficulty in that modern ethical thought has not reached any general understanding as to the meaning of justice or fairness in exchange where the parties are unequal in economic status. While we all believe in co-operation, we usually mean that others should co-operate with us, on our terms. This particular animus toward group antagonism and conflict would be greatly reduced if "human nature" were changed, presumably by "education," so that men would carry over into political thought and action principles which they intellectually recognize as axiomatic, such as the mutual advantage to all parties from territorial and functional specialization and exchange. But there would still remain the problem of the one-sided obligation of the economically strong to the weak, or the rights of the latter against the former, which in the nature of the case are not taken into account in market dealings. Or we may think of attempting to remove or reduce inequality in economic capacity.

The two questions—(a) as to the amount of good which economic education might do in eliminating antagonism and strife and (b) as to the possibility of the education itself—must be answered or discussed in the light of still other facts. The first is that,

entirely apart from economic relations, "human nature" is competitive and that men tend to form competitive groups, as well as to enter into individual competition. This is evident in play activities. When civilized people are freest to do what they want to do, they typically enter into some competitive game or participate vicariously as spectators. And games are usually contests between groups—and, incidentally, the contests tend strongly to generate ill will, running into strife and combat. The play interest is connected with a craving of "human nature" for power, victory, and dominance and for the admiration which "human nature" also awards to superiority and power.

The motivation of all human activities is largely the play interest and specifically that of competition, involving both individuals and groups. This is manifest in cultural activities—even religion—as well as politics and also in the reality of economic life. "Real wants" for subsistence or health and comfort for one's self and family and posterity obviously account for a small fraction of the economic activities of civilized men, even in modest circumstances, and these are readily sacrificed to less tangible considerations. The content of the wants for the goods and services for which people strive as producers and consumers is predominantly social, conventional, cultural, and aesthetic; the urge or animus is very largely emulation and rivalry—to "keep up with the Joneses" or to get ahead of them. To this end people will endure much discomfort, including the consumption of costly goods for which they have a positive distaste. It must be understood that the economic interest, as such, is completely nonspecific; it is simply the desire for any end which requires the use of scarce means and so calls for "economy" of means. In one sense or another every interest has an economic aspect, and all human interests, including those of play and culture, find expression in economic activity. We can never say how far economic rivalry is really economic in motivation.

IV

We come finally to the major practical issue—the proposal to “change human nature” so as to reduce conflicts of interest, specifically between political groups, at least to the point where they will not break out in destructive violence. What is pertinent and can be said in brief compass will merely indicate the lines of intelligent discussion and point out the naivety of most of what is said and written about the problem.

Any judgment as to either the desirability or the possibility of such a change must rest on a clear notion of the respects in which the minds or “hearts” or habits of men would have to be different in order to eliminate war. Armed conflict would not occur if either (a) every existing state or other interest group would agree to accept the present situation (the “status quo”) and would put into effect—enforce upon its citizens or subjects or members forever—all internal measures necessary to this end; or (b) all would agree in advance on all changes to be made and would enforce the requisite policies, at least enough would have to agree to enforce their will upon all. The first alternative would mean the abolition of all progress or change in any direction; the second merely calls for general agreement on the issues or on some method for their adjudication. In terms of changing human nature, what would be required is elimination of all interests which give rise to group conflict or of their expression in action. There would be no war if every group would enter into a permanently binding agreement not actively to resent anything which any other group might do and not to do anything which any other group might actively resent. And any single unit, individual, or group can always have peace through the same twofold policy. The democracies could, of course, have avoided war with the totalitarian states by joining in with the aims and projects of the latter for world reorganization. Even this would not neces-

sarily banish war from the world unless some one totalitarian system succeeded in permanently establishing itself and imposing its will from pole to pole.

To universalize the policy of nonresistance—which seems to be seriously proposed by religious pacifists and by some who do not appeal to religious principles—would call for the abandonment by all, or at least the masses, of all rights, including life itself, except love and obedience, left, perhaps, to serve as “opium”; for any active effort to live and to perpetuate itself, on the part of any species, biological group, or individual, involves conflict with others, both of the same and of different species. If humanity were not to be reduced to the level of the nonsocial animals—with the “struggle for existence” in which they actually live—the only alternative way of preventing war is the organization of the whole race into a rigidly regimented society, with reproduction and all other interests and activities “frozen” along lines of custom and caste; it means a society of the nature of the beehive or some absolute authoritarian type. Of course, this might conceivably be universally accepted, passively or even joyfully, but a moral faith in human nature requires belief that men would prefer war.

It is, indeed, possible to imagine a universal “democracy,” in which all issues arising out of conflicts of interests would be settled by a majority vote. Such a world government, representing any momentary nominal majority, would have to possess and employ force sufficient to prevent any minority, based on a regional or functional interest, from asserting its “rights” by force or to prevent such groups from coming into organized existence. Since such a system could not last a month if it existed, we need not speculate as to whether it would be better or worse than a despotism exercised by a limited self-elected and self-perpetuating “party,” with an individual head, a “leader,” chosen in some way. Such a group could not keep power and use it very far

contrary to public opinion and will and "might be" about as democratic in reality as a representative government—with the vital exception that it would repress discussion and more or less make its "will of the people" to its own taste. But the limits of this procedure also are probably rather narrow.

Ultimately, the problem of peace is that of agreement or agreement upon some method of arbitration, such as the majority vote. Agreement, direct or indirect, "may" be rational in any degree. In fact, emotion and tradition and force have always been the main factors controlling opinion. Only within fairly narrow limits is strictly rational agreement possible; for, even if men were so wise and good that each could be trusted to judge his own cause, there is no objective definition of justice. Rights as well as interests conflict and call for compromise, distant consequences are unknown, and ultimate principles do not answer concrete questions. There is not much sense in saying that men "ought" to agree, where no one knows what is right or best. It is surely the height of the immoral to contend that as a general principle men ought to yield right to wrong, or what they seriously believe to be such, either in the face of force or for love, i.e., for the sake of agreement and pleasant personal relations. How far they should yield for the sake of peace is a matter of balancing conflicting values, a matter of judgment. A minority is no more obligated to yield to a majority than the converse is true, except in so far as (a) an overwhelming majority opinion may carry a presumption of greater validity or (b) overwhelming force may make it foolish to fight. Intelligent people have never thought that democracy—and specifically federal democracy—is either a universally possible system or one that will solve all problems. Democratic federalism has never prevailed over component units of widely divergent culture except for very limited functions, chiefly war; and free government has never been able to keep the peace in the face of a serious disagreement between important

sections of the population, requiring enforcement of any law against a large minority which did not believe in that law. On this point it is enough to mention slavery and prohibition in American history.

V

Omitting superfluous comment on the desirability of eventualities which would involve having peace through indifference to all questions of desirability—in effect, the peace of death—we next turn briefly to the scientific question of the possibility of changing human nature. On this point, one constantly meets with the supposed argument that human nature *has changed* in the course of evolution and of history and that "therefore" it *can be changed*. As to the major premise, no one can say whether or not "human nature" has actually changed, in any significant or relevant respect, within a time of which we have any knowledge. The capacity to learn new facts and relationships, to acquire new skills, and to modify emotions is undoubtedly an attribute of normal men. No one can say whether this general trait of human nature has or has not changed, qualitatively or quantitatively, since man crossed the line from the brute to the human.

Whether the vast concrete changes which have certainly occurred through learning in individuals and culture groups constitute change in human nature is a question which is meaningful for us in connection with the major differences and changes in attitudes and capacities in peoples of different cultures. The differences often appear very solid and real. But the inquiring student soon learns that the facts depend on "circumstances" so various and obscure that any general assertion merely shows ignorance or prejudice. We cannot go into the matter of the degree to which culture diversity corresponds with biological, i.e., racial, differences. Students find that the differences between major human groups are chiefly a matter of acquired culture rather than of different racial inheritance; but the facts are not known, and proof is impossible.

If any proposed modification of human nature depends on biological change, the problem of action clearly falls in the field of eugenics or selective breeding; and it would be idle to comment on the possibility or the desirability of employing such measures, by political means, to any considerable extent.

Whatever the facts of change may be, the statement that human nature has changed, even if it is true, proves or implies nothing at all as to the possibility of changing it; this inference is merely absurd. However, human nature, viewed as a culture product, has in fact undoubtedly *been changed*, by deliberate action, in many cases. The scope of "teaching" is far more problematic than that of learning, but its reality will hardly be denied altogether. In this connection substantially everything depends on the personality (the specific human nature) of teacher and pupil and the social relations between them. It may be assumed, also, that some outstanding figures in history, such as authors and poets, religious prophets, and persons in a position of political authority, have at various times exerted some influence on the attitudes and interests of considerable population groups. How far the results were either permanent or intended or desirable is a question to be raised—but not one for us to attempt to answer here.

Our problem is that of the possibility that the persons interested in any particular change in political attitudes favorable to a peaceful world order "can" bring about changes that will lead to the result they wish to effect. About all that can be said about this question is that it is almost infinitely complex and difficult. At its simplest it has to do with the power of those in power—i.e., successful politicians—to mold the public opinion of the states or jurisdictions subject to their authority. Back of this is the question of the "right people" getting into power or "influencing" those who do, or affecting their selection—in competition with the efforts of multitudinous others to exercise influence in conflict-

ing directions. In the immediate background of the present world situation we have seen a demonstration of the power of *dictators* to get into power and to effect substantial changes through education and propaganda, and especially the forcible suppression of similar activities opposed to their own. It will hardly be contended that the changes have been for the better, from the standpoint of international peace and amity. It seems probable, also, that, "human nature being what it is," it is easier for a dictator to effect changes which are bad from this point of view than to effect those which are good—easier, that is, to stimulate the growth of nationalism and group megalomania than to cause change in the opposite direction—and easier to get into power on the basis of the former platform.

However, "we," the parties to the present discussion, do not want a dictatorship on a world scale or for any power or group, including ourselves. We want a world order which is free as well as peaceful. Consequently, what may be thought as to the power of dictators or even of technical majority, to "change human nature" is relevant only in a negative sense to our problem. In a democracy the possibility of progress by deliberate procedure in the direction of enlightenment rests on the hope that the more enlightened individuals finally have more influence, not merely in the pull-and-haul of concrete democratic politics, but back of that in molding public opinion, than have those who are less enlightened. Of course, we must make the prior assumption that individuals and voluntary groups have real power over the course of events in their own lives and that the choice of ends, as well as of means, can be more or less intelligent. If everything is determined by mechanical "forces" or some Cosmic Will, as pictured, respectively, by the scientific world view and by the religion or philosophy of theistic absolutism, there is no "sense" in conduct or in anything else. The possibility of freedom as an ideal depends on the reality of freedom as a metaphysical fact.

VI

The questions raised have the paradoxical character of being so "arguable" that they are rightly described as "unarguable." Further discussion would run into the ultimate issues of philosophy and ethics; and into that speculative region it cannot be carried here. It is not part of the aim of this article to give a solution of the problem of world organization, free from war but without sacrificing essential human values. The writer does not know the solution, if any exists. It is hoped that some contribution has been made to the comprehension of the problem and to its intelligent discussion, which is the first step toward solving it.

However, some constructive suggestions are implied in the argument. A more intelligent judgment of values, beginning with a more objective attitude toward culture differences, should be gradually achievable through education, if it is generally desired. This could reduce that form of patriotism and parochialism which assumes that particular institutions and ideas are ultimately valid and sacred because they are "ours"; that we should only teach other peoples, not

learn from them; and that anything which will benefit an alien group or which it may wish to do in its relations with us must be bad for us and is probably motivated by a wish to injure us. If organized groups appealed to force only on issues rationally judged to be ethically real and important, the change would be a great improvement. Even though they would still occasionally fight, perhaps just as hard or harder, they would surely fight less often. The more accidental and immaterial differences, such as language and religion, should tend to disappear, as well as no longer to arouse antagonism. Groups might also be willing to stop fighting when they were clearly whipped and so avoid much useless destruction and post-war bitterness, which tends to a resumption of the struggle by the beaten side at the first favorable opportunity. When one party is clearly in a hopeless position before a war starts, the peace treaty might be written without the war; this would be a gain even if the treaty itself were no better, but the procedure also seems likely to result in better treaties.

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THE ROLE AND THE POSITION OF THE COMMON MAN

CARL J. FRIEDRICH

ABSTRACT

The attacks of anti-rationalist élite theorists, as well as the discoveries of modern social psychology, enforce a modification of the rationalistic concept of the common man. He must be seen as a creature of custom and sentiment and only occasionally of reason. Yet it is wrong to suppose that this reason can never play a role in communal judgments on social affairs. Wartime trends in many countries point to an enhanced position of the common man throughout the world after victory.

In his rather dramatic challenge, *Which Kind of Revolution?* W. D. Herridge, Canadian conservative and one-time minister to Washington, tells us: "My enemies were many. But the common man remained my friend. I spoke in his name. For I was he. And am." To this he later adds: "The common man instinctively seeks means to get rid of the old Democracy." This kind of appeal to the common man is gaining in popularity at the present time in all English-speaking countries. It likewise provides the basis for much of the totalitarian claim to a democratic core. Hitler has dramatized himself as the common man incarnate, and the proletarian of Marxist orthodoxy is likewise the quintessence of the common man, even if led by a class-conscious élite. Joseph Stalin has maintained the gesture of the common man's attire and conduct through almost twenty-five years of continued rise to what promises now to be the world's most imposing position of individual power and pre-eminence.

Herridge's sentences are remarkable for another feature: he identifies himself with the common man completely—indeed, claims to be *it*. He does not intend this to be condescending at all. He obviously does not mean the average man. For he clearly is not an average man. Nor is his call to revolution, a conservative revolution, addressed to the average man; for he sharply abuses the majorities in Great Britain and the United States which have carried such leaders as Roosevelt and Churchill to the top. The average man, one guesses, is too ordinary to be a common man. Clearly, a

normative concept is hidden here somewhere. The common man, like the class-conscious proletarian, is quite an uncommon fellow, when you come right down to it.

It is evident that the concept of the common man is in need of clarification and definition. When Henry Wallace popularized the phrase, in the now famous speech he delivered May 8, 1942, he took the meaning for granted. The context of the phrases in which he announced the coming "Century of the Common Man" suggests that he had in mind "all the folks," the little people, as they are sometimes called, or the unprivileged. Linking the "march of freedom of the common man" to the Bible, he proclaimed: "Democracy is the only true political expression of Christianity." And he continued that with the founding of the federal union in America, "the march of the common people had just begun," but it broadened its scope as literacy grew. And he repeated: "Everywhere the common people are on the march." Turning from the past and present to the future, Wallace gathered his thoughts into the hortative key:

I say that the century on which we are entering—the century which will come out of this war—can be and must be the century of the common man. Perhaps it will be America's opportunity to suggest the freedoms and duties by which the common man must live. Everywhere the common man must learn to build his own industries with his own hands in a practical fashion. Everywhere the common man must learn to increase his productivity so that he and his children can eventually pay to the world community all that they have received. No nation will have the God-given right to exploit

other nations. Older nations will have the privilege to help younger nations get started on the path to industrialization, but there must be neither military nor economic imperialism. . . . India, China, and Latin America have a tremendous stake in the people's century. As their masses learn to read and write, and as they become productive mechanics, their standard of living will double and treble.

It was a highly inspired oration, and it has been widely acclaimed. But the conception of the common man, or the common people, retains a patronizing flavor. There breathes, throughout the speech, that ready and somewhat sentimental optimism which makes of the common man the dispenser of wisdom and the recipient of an ever higher standard of living. Derisive laughter greeted the suggestion of a quart of milk for every man. And while, on the surface, trite, the objection was not without its deeper significance. For if the Chinese do not want milk, maybe they also do not want Christianity, and with it democracy. Perhaps they would prefer to tell us what true freedom consists in; maybe they would want to reject the glorification of the higher standard of living. Or maybe they would not. It is, at present, an open question.

And behind that open question lurks the more fundamental question of the concept of the common man. Wallace is right when he argues in terms of the common man, because the belief in the common man is vital to the democratic creed. But is such a belief viable? Can it be maintained in the face of the onslaughts of modern psychology and sociology? There are many who would answer this question in the negative today. Throughout the nineteenth century, critics continually attacked the belief in man, the common man, as contrary to both reason and experience. Rationalists who held to élite theories, as well as antirationalists, made such attacks one of the mainstays of their opposition to democracy.¹

In our time, these doubts and misgivings have found expression in numerous writings

dealing with the "actual working of democracy," as it is called. Kent's *Great Game of Politics* (1930), Lippmann's *Phantom Public* (1930), De Jouvenel's *La République des camarades* (1913), and Roberto Michels' *Political Parties* are all illustrative of this trend, as is Mencken's *Notes on Democracy* (1926): "Politics under democracy consists almost wholly of the discovery, chase and scotching of bugaboos." This is a far cry from Thomas Paine's conclusion to his *Age of Reason*: "Certain I am that when opinions are free, either in matters of government or religion, truth will finally and powerfully prevail." Back of this faith in the reason of everyman are the rationalist presuppositions of the traditional belief in the common man: Give the simple mind of the common man the facts, and he will see the rational, the reasonable way to act; and having seen the way, he will follow it.

In an effort to state this concept more fully, I suggested in *The New Belief in the Common Man* (1942) that the traditional belief in the common man rests upon three interrelated assumptions. First, common men, when confronted with a problem, will work hard to learn all the facts they can. Second, they will arrive at sensible conclusions as to how to deal with the problem—to do the things that are right pragmatically and morally. They will utilize the knowledge of experts as their common sense dictates. Third, the common man possesses the character (or as some would put it, the virtue) to follow through, to act rationally as well as to think rationally. It will be seen upon reflection that the first two assumptions are primarily premises concerning the mind of the common man, while the third is a premise concerning man's emotional makeup. Furthermore, many thoughtful persons today question one or more of these premises. They consider it contrary to the common experience to assume that the commonality of mankind seek facts, draw sound conclusions, and stick to these conclusions. That really is the bearing of the elaborate writings cited above which concern themselves with the "actual working of democracy."

¹ See Carl Becker, *The Heavenly City of the Eighteenth Century Philosophers*, and B. E. Lippincott, *Victorian Critics of Democracy* (1938).

In the light of this situation, there are three alternatives open to us. We may state the concept of the common man in such a way as to negate any possible belief in him. This is the inclination of all totalitarian viewpoints. It has been brilliantly satirized by Aldous Huxley in *Brave New World*. Or we may insist upon the traditional view, elaborating or exorcising it. This John Dewey has done in *The Public and Its Problems* (1927) in obvious reply to Lippmann. This seems also the inclination of Henry Wallace. Or we may restate the concept in such a way as to take account of experience with the actual workings of democracy, yet retain those elements which are essential to democracy and the belief in the common man upon which democracy rests.

In spite of the risks involved, we propose to restate the concept so as to clarify it. The faith in the omniscience and rationality of the common man cannot be retained. Its place may be taken by a tempered and reasoned understanding of the common man's political capacity.² This understanding is compounded of four parts, all of them somewhat at variance with the rationalistic view stated above. First, the concept of the common man is built around his collective, rather than his individual, judgments. Second, the common man's judgments are fallible. Even the collective is limited in competence. Furthermore, these collective judgments are addressed to communal policies, matters of common concern which depend upon estimates of probability. Such estimates are compounded of rational and irrational elements, involving folkways and mores, traditions and standards of value, as well as technical needs and prospects. Third, the common man in the aggregate is a man of character rather than of intellect. Indeed, the very concept of character as consistency in molding conduct in conformity with established standards or values is related to the community and the common man, as

Socrates showed. Such standards are not rationalistic. It is a corollary of this proposition that, fourth, such common judgments are not designed to evaluate exceptional achievement in artistic, scientific, or other fields of creativity, workmanship, or *expertise*. Such evaluations as "This is a superb work of art" do not enter into public policy, because policies deal with average acts of average persons.

This concept of the common man salvages from the onslaught of the irrationalist revolt those elements in the older doctrine which are essential to democratic politics. It seeks a middle ground between the extreme rationalistic ideas of an earlier day and the denial of all rationality by those who were disappointed over its limitations. If we were to restate explicitly the older position as we put it, it would run somewhat as follows: Enough common men, when confronted with a problem, can be made to see the facts in a given situation to provide a working majority for a reasonable solution, and such majorities will in turn provide enough continuing support for a democratic government to enforce such common judgments concerning matters of common concern.

It remains to add that this concept of the common man is definitely at variance with all elite doctrines from Plato to Marx, Pareto, and the Fascists. You might say that it implies a disbelief in the uncommon man. Not in matters of exceptional creative achievement, but in matters of common concern. There can be no question that elites, mostly self-chosen, have ruled communities in the past much more generally than the common man. Hence, the elite can be made the central concept of an interpretation of past political societies with much show of evidence, as was done by Pareto and many others. Nor can you prove to a man who believes that what has been will be that he may be wrong. But you can show that a social order based upon a well-defined participation of the common man as conceived here has existed in the past, and may therefore continue to exist in the future. It is this

² This restatement follows the discussion in *The New Belief in the Common Man*, pp. 28 ff. and esp. p. 41. It is necessary to consult the volume for supporting data and reasoning.

train of reasoning which provides the objective underpinning for a belief in the future of the co-operative polity universalized through a world-wide union of democracies.

To repeat: By thus restricting the concept of the common man to the function of forming common judgments upon matters of common concern, we make allowance for what is irrefutable in the antirationalist challenges. We at the same time provide room for the role of reason in social action.³ But what are the actual trends? Will common people in fact emerge in ever widening segments of the world's community as key participants in the shaping of the new order? What will be their demands and expectations? What about the Soviet Union, China, India, Germany? Obviously, the problem of the role of the common man has world-wide ramifications. He would be a rash man who would pretend to expound predictions dogmatically. But it may be well to assess certain ideological signs and trends.

Tolstoy once stated the antirationalist position in its extreme form. In *War and Peace* he wrote: "If we admit that human life can be ruled by reason, the possibility of life is destroyed." This sentence gives the quintessence of the challenge to the unqualified rationalism which dominated the intellectual currents of the second half of the nineteenth century. It is much more extreme, for example, than anything Nietzsche, Freud, or Marx ever wrote. Now that the practical results of the denial of reason have become only too apparent, we might reply to Tolstoy: "If we do not admit that some part of human life can be ruled by reason, the possibility of the good life is destroyed." Or we might put it more dramatically this way: "To maintain that life is completely ruled by reason means, perhaps, death, but to maintain that life is not influenced by reason means hell." It is this hell which we are experiencing at the present time. The com-

plete denial of reason by the Fascists⁴ has been the mainstay of the internal barbarians who have plunged the world into the catastrophic cataclysm of which the end is not in sight. Will this trend continue?

There are signs that point in that direction. There are those who are fearful of the Fascist threat to America. Perhaps the most marked forms of undemocratic, pro-Fascist mentality are today to be observed in certain traditionally liberal circles when they discuss the treatment of the enemy. The Writers' War Board is permeated by such influences, as was pointed out recently by Dorothy Thompson. The chairman of this self-appointed board, writing in the *New York Times*, gave vent to very questionable sentiments on the subject of hate. From time to time other significant forces in American public life—such as the American Legion, speaking through its commander, recently—have shown signs of neglecting key tenets of the American democratic creed. It would be an error to assume from such signs, as Norman Thomas does, that fascism is likely to come to America. Comparable undemocratic and antidemocratic tendencies have persisted in America⁵ through the years.

What is more, the Fascist outlook is being completely discredited by the dismal failure of its outstanding exponents, Hitler and Mussolini. By smashing vested positions in Germany and Italy, the Fascists themselves helped to clear the road for the emergence of the common man. Furthermore, the role of the common man in defeating the Fascist

³ An important contribution to the problem is Talcott Parsons, *The Theory of Social Action*, where the views of Max Weber and Pareto, among others, are critically examined. I would, however, push the criticism of Pareto considerably further than he does.

⁴ See esp. Alfred Rosenberg, *The Myth of the Twentieth Century*, and Herrmann Rauschnig, *The Revolution of Nihilism*, esp. pp. 3-57. "Nihilism as a total rejection of any doctrine must develop of necessity by its own logic into an absolute despotism." In the German original these ideas are more fully and philosophically stated. Rauschnig's tendency to identify Stalinism as well as nazism with nihilism is, however, more than questionable. Nor can he claim the knowledge of Russia that he possesses of Germany. He does not maintain these views today (see *The Redemption of Democracy*, *passim*).

⁵ See Vernon L. Parrington, *Main Currents in American Thought*, esp. Vol. I, Book III, Part II, chap. iii; Vol. II, Book III, Part I, chaps. i and ii.

aggressor in China, Russia, and Britain, in supporting with fortitude the undaunted efforts of the underground in all countries under the Fascist and Nazi heel, has laid the foundation for his recognition beyond pre-war prospects. It is, perhaps, best to examine these developments separately, since each people and situation display peculiar features. In Britain the common man has advanced against the traditional aristocratic pattern, rapidly democratizing social life; in Russia the Soviet totalitarian pattern is being modified; in the occupied countries and in Germany the Fascist totalitarian system is dragging down older authoritarian structures in its fall (e.g., the monarchy in Italy); in China military and technological needs are giving a great impulse to mass education and industrial enterprise through the co-operatives. Even in the United States a new concern for democratic progress is stirring.

All thoughtful observers agree that Britain has made great strides in according the common man broader recognition. The undaunted heroism of the London cockney in the days of the Blitz forced it even from those who had traditionally turned up their social, if not their political, nose at him. Nothing illustrates this more convincingly than the position of the trade-unions. Sir Walter Citrine, general secretary of the British Trade-Union Congress, has said: "British Labour Unions are adequately represented on every public and private council from the war cabinet of Prime Minister Churchill to the smallest village group that has to do with the formation of policy and the administration of total defense in Great Britain. There isn't a thing that labour isn't participating in. It ranges from food rationing, to distribution and priorities." This is, perhaps, partly attributable to the fact that the Labour party and the trade-unions, the prime representatives of the common man in Britain, realized more readily than others the threat of fascism and took a stand sooner than any other large group in Britain.⁶ "In

⁶ In the days of Tory appeasement this fact was claimed to show labor's lack of realism, labor's in-

a real sense," a British labor leader has said, "this has become, for the worker, a People's War. . . . He knows that the Battle of Britain is the battle for his future. At the end of the road along which he marches, he sees a new Europe made into an equal fellowship of free men."⁷ But, of course, the Labour party has no monopoly on representing the common man in Britain. Within the Conservative party and among the people it represents, the same spread of populism has been taking place. Nothing is more revealing than the utter disregard with which men and women of all classes have been drafted for war work. Bevin was reported to have stalked right into the sacred precincts of private clubs to demand of leisurely gentlemen that they report for duty the next morning. This, for Britain, is revolutionary. While there may be a reaction to this kind of thing after the war, there is little doubt that the role and position of the common man will be greatly enhanced in the land of aristocratic traditionalism.⁸

In Russia, of course, the problem is quite different. It is not a question of the common man advancing against a deeply rooted aristocratic social tradition, but of progress in the direction of political democracy. The totalitarian dictatorship of the Soviet has been doctrinally committed to the eventual establishment of democracy. At the local level there always has been a measure of discussion and argument. In the days of the popular front, a constitution was promulgated to dramatize this continuing conviction

ability to govern an empire, and hence the conservative party's right to exclude the Labour party from power by any and all means. The absence of a large farm population in Britain gives labor a peculiar prominence in representing the common man.

⁷ See, for further testimony along this line, Harold Laski, *Where Do We Go from Here?* Herman Finer, "Post-war Reconstruction in Great Britain," *Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science*, VIII (November, 1942); and A. D. Lindsay, *Why I Believe in Democracy*.

⁸ There are many concrete signs, such as the recent reform of the foreign service, opening it to talent without regard to school tie (see *Foreign Service Journal*, July, 1943).

tion of the leaders that the dictatorship of the proletariat would lead to free popular institutions.⁹ In any case, the conversion of the illiterate masses of Russia into a nearly 100 per cent literate people, which has been accomplished by the Soviet Union in the short span of twenty years, represents a marked step in the direction of enabling the common man to participate in the government. As Harold Laski has put it: "Nothing in modern times even approximates to the scale or the rapidity of the Soviet advance in the field of education."¹⁰ There are various indications that the magnificent participation of the masses in the defense of the Russian homeland has laid the basis for greater participation of the people in political affairs, even if they do not belong to the Communist party. Writers like Maurice Hindus, biased though they may be, have stressed these prospects.¹¹ Even so critical an observer as William Henry Chamberlain, in his most recent writings, has struck a more sympathetic note when he declared: "It is at least a strong possibility that the Russian people after the war will not be so submissive to the arbitrary rule of the political police, will not allow themselves to be forced back into that mold of tight one-party dictatorship which the war itself has broken to some extent."¹² In any case, the Soviet Union is not likely to swerve from

⁹ A markedly favorable view of the democratic elements in the Soviet Union before 1939 was given, with much detailed illustration, by Sidney and Beatrice Webb, in their *Soviet Communism: A New Civilization?* The facts are most interesting, even if the political reasoning was rather unconvincing.

¹⁰ See *Reflections on the Revolution of Our Times*, p. 47. Laski feels that the educational opportunities in the Soviet Union are now greater than those in any other country save some dozen states in the United States. While this must be doubted, in the light of the facts as we know them, for Switzerland and the Scandinavian countries, the Soviet Union's progress in this field is nonetheless extraordinary. Incidentally, Laski's assessment of the Russian Revolution in this volume is the best balanced that has ever come to this writer's attention.

¹¹ *Russia*.

¹² *The Russian Enigma*, p. 289.

its settled preoccupation with the economic well-being of the common man, and increased contact with the United States in the period of reconstruction may well broaden the role and position of the common man in other significant respects, as it already has done in the matter of religious convictions.

The future of the common man in Germany and other Fascist lands is shrouded in uncertainty. The emotionalism of war has created an atmosphere charged with prejudiced distortion even of the known facts. This atmosphere is not favorable to the detached weighing of rather speculative considerations concerning the future. The unfortunate fact of the matter is, all propagandists to the contrary notwithstanding, that we do not at the present time know much about the outlook and viewpoint of the Germans, whether they are Nazis or not. Nor do we have any very clear insight into what that outlook is going to be when the utter failure of the Fascist system becomes obvious to all. But it seems highly improbable that a large number of Germans are going to remain attached to nazism after its ignominious defeat. The extent to which Himmler and his hangmen are obliged to employ violence to hold the Germans in line points in the opposite direction. It is at least conceivable that the Germans will react strongly the other way, that everything which savors of fascism will be decidedly taboo, and that democratic and communist appeals will be the only significant rivals for the allegiance of the German masses, as well as the masses in other Fascist lands. In either instance, the role and position of the common man would be considerably enhanced. We have already alluded to the destruction of established vested interests by the Nazis. The privileged position of the conservative upper classes has been largely destroyed. However much the German conservatives and junkers may have had to do with the coming of Hitler, they have had plenty of reason to regret their moves, as witness the position of Rauschning, Nie-

moeller, Count von Galen, and the many other German conservatives who have battled naziism and have perished in concentration camps. The social prestige of the German army and its officer corps is today submerged.¹³ Whether it will ever be able to recover its position it is hard to foresee at the moment. According to the most competent observers, Germany is headed toward a genuine democratic revolution, a revolution which was artificially delayed by all sorts of factors.¹⁴ Such a revolution would obviously enhance the role and position of the common man.

As we have taken Germany to illustrate the problem of the future of the common man in Fascist countries, so we may take China as perhaps symptomatic for the Far Eastern lands of ancient culture which are moving toward popular government. To be sure, the problems of India, Palestine, and other countries now under British rule are equally important. But there are clear indications that Britain will favor forward movement in the direction of free institutions, in spite of wartime hesitations. But what about China? Her five hundred million people are culturally linked with an ancient civilization which for hundreds of years has practiced certain "democratic" virtues and behaviors, while totally neglecting others. China has been traditionally the land where talent could rise on the basis of merit by competing for scholastic honors. China has since ancient times recognized the right of the people to overthrow an unworthy ruler and enthrone a new dynasty which would establish peace in the land. China has leaned toward the idea that that government is best which governs least, and has sought to

maintain human relations upon the basis of a communally accepted code of right conduct (*li*). Yet, on the other hand, China has not developed broadly representative institutions, the role of the Kuomintang suggests one-party totalitarianism, her judicial system is undeveloped, to say the least, with local magistrates meting out punishment with due regard to privileged status, and the literacy of the masses is still quite limited, albeit progressing. Indeed, institutionally speaking, Japan is considered to have progressed farther toward democratization than China. And yet there is a broad undercurrent of genuine popular participation in Chinese village life (and by far the largest number of Chinese live in villages and small towns). This deeply rooted local pattern of co-operation is now rapidly being extended into industrialization through the development of the co-operatives. Furthermore, the magnificent stand which the Chinese masses have taken in their struggle against the Japanese makes theirs a people's war in the most literal sense.¹⁵ As in Russia, so in China we may look for the increased self-consciousness of the common man which Europe experienced after the Napoleonic wars. If one weighs the several conflicting trends, he comes to conclude that the balance seems to lie in the direction of a considerably strengthened role and position of the common man. The constitution which the Chinese constituent assembly has been working on for some time is a token of greater popular participation in the life of this largest of all nations of the earth.¹⁶

Several times in these brief sketches, assessing national trends in relation to the future role and position of the common man, the role of war as a democratizing force has

¹³ See Franz L. Neumann, *Behemoth*, esp. pp. 191-93, 382-85, 473-74.

¹⁴ See Paul Hagen, *Will Germany Crack?* Jon B. Jansen and Stefan Weyl, *The Silent War*; Guenther Reemann, *The Vampire Economy*; C. J. Friedrich, "The Nazi Dictatorship in Action," in *Democracy Is Different* (ed. Wittke). See also Dorothy Thompson, *Listen, Hans*, for an imaginative approach to the problem.

¹⁵ See, e.g., Lin Yutang, *Moment in Peking*; T'ien Chün, *Village in August*; and many similar accounts portraying the Chinese common man in action.

¹⁶ For Chinese politics in recent years, the best account is found in Paul M. A. Linebarger, *The China of Chiang Kai Shek*. Linebarger goes so far as to feel that the government was obliged by popular sentiment to enter the war against Japan. The his-

been mentioned. Perhaps a few additional remarks are worth making. It is a curious fact that, while democracy has been consciously inclined to eliminate war, the democratic age has seen the rapid extension of warfare until it engages every man, woman, and child. That this kind of warfare has been called totalitarian has given rise to the presumption that it is the child of totalitarian dictatorship. History would suggest that totalitarian warfare (or better: total war) is, in fact, an outgrowth of democratic tendencies, reinforced by modern industrial technology, which itself is closely linked with democratic trends, such as universal education.¹⁷ The French and American revolutions mark the beginning of a change away from the limited wars which monarchical governments had waged up to that time. Mass risings brought out the people in arms to defend the newly won freedom of the revolutions against reactionary intervention. Washington's Continental army was a nation in arms, and the defeat of the British professionals, so surprising to military experts at the time, really pointed the way by showing what aroused common men could do. From then on wars became more and more all-engulfing. A steady progression since that time has culminated in the idea of total mobilization. A study of legislation

torical background is well sketched in L. Carrington Goodrich, *History of the Chinese People*. For the democratic currents in the revolution see Arthur Holcombe's *The Chinese Revolution*. The peculiar flavor of Chinese democratic thought is best gathered from the *Chan Min Chu I* of Sun Yat-Sen. Cf. also Linebarger's commentary, *The Political Thought of Sun Yat-Sen*.

¹⁷ The fact that reactionary generals, such as Ludendorff, have been the theoretical protagonists of total war, does not alter this situation. As a military technician, a man like Ludendorff would naturally seek to exploit the resources the age places at his disposal. His failure to realize the link between democracy and total war has been the weak spot which has vitiated the thinking of the entire Prussian military clan (see Hans Speier, "Ludendorff: The German Concept of Total War," in Edward M. Earle, *Makers of Modern Strategy* [1943]).

in this field since the last war would suggest that the methods of total war are the concomitants of democracy rather than dictatorship.¹⁸ These methods corresponded to democratic impulses and were most effective in the hands of relatively democratic countries. In terms of results, one might go so far as to suggest that total war is capable of being waged successfully only by a democracy (other things such as numbers, equipment, etc., being equal). Though looked upon by many as a grave threat to the future of democracy, total war may turn out to be the reverse: a victorious democracy may find itself reinforced by such a war, pushed forward in the direction of further democratization. This seems to be the situation in Britain, in the Dominions, and in the United States. Total war will, on the other hand, very likely, if lost, be the grave of a totalitarian dictatorship; and, even if won, it might threaten the very authoritarian basis of the dictator who won it. That seems to be the trend in both Russia and China. The very role and position the common man is placed in by modern total war reveals his collective importance for the social order as a whole and undermines the rival claims of élites who in former times could rest their privileged position upon their pre-eminence in fighting.¹⁹

In summary, the present trends point toward a vastly enhanced role and position of the common man throughout the world after the victory of the United Nations. If the common man is conceived in those more

¹⁸ Although dictatorships have avidly adopted these methods and adapted them to their own use. But, then, modern dictatorship is in more than this one respect the miscreant of democracy—the result of democracy corrupted and gone wrong. See for all this Carl J. Friedrich, *War: The Causes, Effects and Control of International Violence* (1943), esp. pp. 44 ff. and the literature cited there. This section follows that study closely.

¹⁹ The extent to which élites have been warrior classes in origin has not been conclusively determined, but it is clear that this factor has played a very great role. All élite theorists from Plato to Pareto have agreed on this.

moderate and realistic terms which were sketched at the start of this article, such a prospect is reassuring rather than disturbing. The older extreme rationalistic idea of the common man failed to provide for differences in outlook, sentiment, and tradition, and hence finds itself troubled by the prospect of the clash of religions, ideologies, and interests. The more tempered view is that of a common man who is fallible and who is collectively seeking to formulate judgments on matters of common concern

in terms of generally accepted values and beliefs. Such a view can face the future without undue optimism, yet with a feeling that the increased role and heightened position of the common man all over the earth will contribute toward social order and international stability as more and more people become adapted to the co-operative processes that constitute the essence of democratic living.

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NATURAL RESOURCES IN THE POST-WAR WORLD

GEORGE T. RENNER

ABSTRACT

Wars result largely from the struggle to possess resources. Resources are not simply a few commodity items; they involve locations, space, climates, and the whole complex gamut of geographic goods which underlie economic production. Resources are of two kinds—fixed and fluid. The fluid ones can be equalized among nations by free trade and a post-war international resources board, but such a policy would be suicidal for us until certain nations change their population policies. The fixed resources cannot be equalized without a completely new attack upon the problem. Present division of space, for instance, denies all future increases to cultured people like the Dutch, Swiss, and Czechs, but will permit both the African Bantus and the Brazilians to reach the billion mark. Such inequalities will continue to produce war. Perhaps our failure to comprehend the whole problem grows out of our habit of studying social science from the historical and institutional, rather than from the geographical, point of view.

The struggle to possess natural resources has always been one of the causes for war between nations. In the present world conflict it would seem to be the principal cause. This second World War has been variously pictured as a war of ideologies, a race war, a religious war, a war of mad leaders, and a class revolution. Superficially it is all of these, but a careful examination of the events leading up to the outbreak of hostilities shows a long series of stresses and strains involving the ownership of natural resources.

There can be no question but that this has been a world in which a vast preponderance of natural resources has been under Anglo-American control—either politically or commercially. To be sure, certain of these resources have been available for purchase and use by any nation; but only so long as that nation behaved according to or in a manner agreeable to the Anglo-American standard of conduct. That standard is an outgrowth of Anglo-American mores and is not indigenous to many of the other peoples of the world. Some nations have no intention of conforming to Anglo-American standards, but in order to be free to follow their own mores they have had to challenge our control of those resources which are necessary for power both in peace and in war. The present war would seem to be the manifestation of their challenge.

If this thesis is true, then the most important consideration at the peace table will

be the question of allocation and ownership of resources. Indeed, world peace hinges upon our answer to this question. The Axis can be defeated, the guilty political leaders punished, and the perpetrators of atrocities and obscenities executed, but this will have little effect upon the occurrence of war or peace in the future unless we also find a generally satisfactory solution to the problem of the ownership of resources.

THE MEANING OF NATURAL RESOURCES

At the outset it is important that we be entirely certain as to what natural resources really are. Often when people use this term they have in mind only a few materials in nature, such as minerals and, perhaps, timber and water power. Actually, the term is much broader than this; it includes everything present in the natural environment which can be used industrially or commercially by man.¹

MINERALS

Less than two hundred years ago England supported a population smaller than that of present-day London. The standard of living was low, 90 per cent of the people were engaged in agriculture, and British economists were becoming alarmed about overpopulation.

The use of coal was discovered; new iron deposits were opened; a vast steel industry

¹ G. T. Renner and W. H. Hartley, *Conservation and Citizenship* (Boston: Heath, 1940), p. 55.

arose. Steel ships replaced wooden vessels, and British industry was ready to build them. Soon the seven seas were traversed by British merchantmen. A merchant fleet demanded coaling stations; the British established them. Coaling stations needed naval protection; the British built a huge navy of steel battleships. Protectorates developed around and behind coaling stations, ship-repair stations, market ports, and naval bases. Protectorates grew into colonies. Colonies expanded; some of them became dominions. The empire plus the dominions now cover about one-fifth of the land of the earth and contain more than one-fourth of its population. Back home, the British people meanwhile have increased from less than 10,000,000 to nearly 50,000,000. Only 8 per cent of the population is now agricultural, there are sixty cities possessing more than 100,000 inhabitants, and Britain's standard of living is higher than ever before. No one can deny that coal and iron are vital natural resources.

In 1870 the populations of Germany and France were approximately the same (Germany about 39,000,000; France, 36,000,000). Germany possessed abundant coal but little iron ore. France possessed abundant iron ore and mediocre coal supplies. In the war of 1870-71 Germany took from France the great iron resources of Lorraine. German coal plus Lorraine iron ore enabled the Germans to build up a tremendous steel industry. By 1913 the population of Germany was 66,000,000, that of France 39,000,000. By 1939 Germany's population had become 70,000,000, while France's had reached only 42,000,000. In 1871 Germany had but eight cities whose population exceeded 100,000. By 1939 the number of such cities had reached fifty-seven—all in one man's lifetime.

In these cases the possession of coal and iron has given Britain the legacy of ruling one-fifth of the earth and has given Germany the basis for demanding more living space. Lack of them has bestowed on France the label of being a "decadent" nation and has relegated Norway, for instance, to a

fourth-rate rank among nations. About forty years ago the United States outstripped all other producers of steel, and very recently Russia has developed an enormous production. Today the task of deciding the validity of these nations' relative claims to the future iron ore and coal resources of the world would be a difficult one, to say the least. Most nations now in a position to demand a share in the world's store of coal and iron ore are those nations which either accidentally possessed them in the first place, or else seized them somewhere along the road of history. The ethics of allocating such materials to them instead of to a country like Hungary, or Ecuador, or Liberia is not altogether clear. Comparable problems attach to the scores of other kinds of minerals which are used by man.

UNDERGROUND WATERS

For centuries the Arabs have roamed Palestine with their flocks, basing their economic life upon utilization of the scanty semiarid grassland. There was ground water below him but the Arab was unaware of it. The Zionist Jews came in, bought land, and drilled hundreds of wells. Large areas have been irrigated and transformed into productive farm land. If the Jew gets Palestine, that country will support several million people and export considerable produce to the outside world. If he does not, the goats, sheep, and camels of the lean and hungry Arab will continue to pick the scanty browse and pasture. The more they pick, the more loose sand will blow, and the larger the desert will become.

FLORA

Long ago the English cut off their forests for firewood. The forests of Arden and Sherwood are today but names on a map. When their timber was gone, they went abroad and conquered other lands full of timber. The Finns, on the other hand, came relatively late to their country. They are just now cutting their forests—and making a living at it. If Finland follows England's lead and depletes her forest resources, what

will be her claim to a share in the world's reserves?

FAUNA

Japan has almost no land for the grazing of animals. The native grasses are unsatisfactory for animal feed, and the average farm acreage has become so small that there is no room for animals in the agricultural economy. The Japanese people turn to the sea in order to harvest the fauna or native animal life. They scour Japanese waters for everything from squid and sea cucumbers on up to sharks and whales. The waters of Siberia are rich in fish, but the Russians do little fishing. The Japanese, therefore, monopolize the Siberian fisheries. They also comb the North Pacific and the South Seas. For years they have waged an undeclared war on the American fishermen in Alaskan waters over faunal resources. To exclude the Japanese from foreign fishing grounds would mean nothing short of mass starvation in Japan. But does the threat of starvation constitute an ethical claim to a resource?

COAST LINES AND HARBORS

Coast zones are natural resources of great importance. We talk a good deal about dividing up the mineral resources of the world among nations, but, in many instances, coastal resources exceed mineral resources in utility. Bolivia originally consisted of a huge plateau and a tiny strip of coast. Chile, which is all coast line, took away what little coast Bolivia had. Bolivia's right to get back her tiny coastal strip is at least as valid as that of the French to get back Lorraine iron, or of the Dutch to regain their East Indies.

At the Versailles Conference the Dalmatian coast was given to Yugoslavia. This coast is practically inaccessible to Yugoslavia because of the Dinaric Alps; most Yugoslav commerce moves down the Vardar Valley through Greece, anyway. The Dalmatian coast is, however, readily accessible to Italy just across the Adriatic. In the post-war world we might conceivably find it desirable to demand a federal political

union (or at least an economic union) between Yugoslavia and Greece, and to award Dalmatia to Italy, which can use it. Some population exchanges would have to be effected, but such a measure might be the least of several possible evils. This, however, raises the question of whether ability to use a resource, plus a need for it, constitutes a valid claim to it.

In some instances the possession of a coast zone produces peculiar results, as in the case of Norway. Originally, the Norwegians and Swedes were one people. The former, however, have come to support themselves by exploiting the coast of Scandinavia; the latter, by exploiting the land with its soils, forests, and minerals. Although Norway possesses this coast, she cannot possibly defend it in this or any other war. Germany, by the simple device of occupying the Norway coast, has bottled up the people and resources of Sweden, maintained the Finns in the Axis camp, and now prevents us from having adequate contact with our Russian allies. It is at least an open question whether any small, weak nation should possess unlimited sovereignty over a resource so valuable and vital as this—at least in a world wherein competitive nationalism is allowed to exist.

SCENERY AND RECREATIONAL RESOURCES

Switzerland has achieved national prosperity and a model standard of living by exploiting her scenery and recreational resources. The Caucasus area contains equal or greater resources of this kind, but is largely undeveloped. Mount Rainier as a recreational resource exceeds in value the coal resources of the state of Washington. The shore zone of New Jersey is far more valuable than the forests or minerals of that state.

LAND FORMS

The southern Appalachian region in the United States is largely a wasted resource. Many Americans actually regard it as a liability. Japan has built a whole national existence on a topography not very differ-

ent from this southern hill country of ours. The Basques and Vlachs have only a jumble of mountains at their disposal. The Hungarians have a large fertile plain to exploit. Western Czechoslovakia was inclosed by a semicircle of mountains. These mountains had been converted into a Little Maginot Line, the guns of which all pointed toward Germany. The inhabitants of this mountain rim were Germans who had been settled there as colonists hundreds of years ago. Germany demanded these mountains, basing her claim upon the right to control their German inhabitants. France and Britain compelled the Czechs to accede to this claim, and the American public acquiesced in it. The mountain rim, however, was Czechoslovakia's most valuable single natural resource; without it she was easily overrun by Germany and disappeared from the family of nations.

SOILS

The soils over large areas in Germany are poor and sandy. Other large areas are relatively infertile clays. Even some of the comparatively productive southern valley lands are of mediocre quality. The 80,000,000 Germans have worked long and hard to develop these soils for agriculture. At the same time, 32,000,000 Ukrainians possess resources of very fertile black and red-brown soils which cover an area twice as big as Germany. Within the last twenty-five years the Germans have twice made desperate bids for these Ukrainian soils.

The red and yellow subtropical soils which cover two-thirds of China are good for producing cotton, rice, corn, tea, and many other crops. This part of China feeds about 300,000,000 people. In the American "South" there is an equal area of these same soils. On it we produce some cotton, tobacco, erosion gullies, and social problems, and it supports probably 30,000,000 people, many of them on a standard of living worse than that of the European peasant. In this area we have already destroyed more land than the Japanese nation possesses.

WATER RESOURCES

The Rhine is a German river. The Germans use it for transporting an enormous amount of freight. The mouths of the Rhine, however, are owned by Holland. It is difficult to envision an equitable control for such a resource. The matter has been still further complicated by a peculiar arrangement. The south bank of the Scheldt, one of the mouths of the Rhine, is inhabited by Flemish Belgians. Despite this the area was given to Holland, thereby cutting Belgium off from the Rhine.

Water power is a valuable natural resource—an essential in the economic life of many nations. The Belgian Congo contains water-power resources twice as large as those of the whole European continent. This area has not been, as commonly supposed, a colony of Belgium, but has been until relatively recently the personal property of one man, the king of the Belgians, who acquired it by somewhat devious means. Even as a colony of Belgium, it could hardly be expected to continue on that status in any rational post-war world. The Congo is eighty times as large as Belgium, four times as large as Germany. It contains not only water power but vast amounts of other resources. For a small nation to own it, even though its resources were made available to other nations, is scarcely a reasonable solution. For an individual to own it would, of course, be preposterous.

Sweden's climate possesses so short a growing season that it is difficult to produce one crop per year. The longer growing season in Alabama permits the growing of two crops per year from the land. The year-round growing season in Amazonia permits certain kinds of crops to yield three harvests per year from a single piece of land. A resource capable of such variation cannot be equalized among nations.

The United States ordinarily consumes three-fourths of the world's rubber output, and yet the United States possesses no rubber-producing climate. Brazil possesses an enormous area of such climate but does nothing with it. Holland uses very little

rubber, yet controls an area of rubber-producing climate sixty times as large as Holland itself. Holland was incapable of defending this resource, and hence Japan took it away from her. America is now involved in a war to the finish with Japan. Our main objective is to recover the East Indies, regardless of its cost in American lives and money. The general assumption is that after we recover the Indies, we intend to return them to Holland. It would, however, be hard to defend such an action as the most desirable ultimate solution for a resource of such immense value. The Dutch themselves apparently have some doubt that the United States will relinquish the Indies after the war: the head of the Dutch government-in-exile has recently promised post-war dominion status to the Indies in an effort to forestall American ownership.

REGIONAL FORM AND SHAPE

A glance at the 1938 map of Europe shows that the Germans occupy a large, compact, rectangular area on that continent. This map also reveals that Czechoslovakia cuts an enormous bite out of this great rectangle. The missing bite disrupted trade and transportation and made Germany difficult to defend militarily. Truly, shape or form may be an important natural resource.

At one time in American history northern Mexico formed a "bay" into United States territory. Accordingly, we acquired the Gadsden Purchase to correct this. The map of Europe shows that Poland forms a similar embayment into eastern Germany. The Treaty of Versailles made this even worse by cutting a Polish "corridor" between eastern Prussia and the main area of the Reich. Americans viewed this arrangement more or less with equanimity. As H. O. Lathrop points out:

A similar arrangement as a result of a war between the United States and Canada would give to a victorious Canada a corridor along the Mohawk-Hudson depression separating New England from the rest of the country and making New York an international port. Ger-

many was forced to sign the treaty but has always stated that it was an impossible boundary, and that sooner or later it would be changed. It was partially to secure this change that Hitler moved into Poland. . . . No attempt here is made to excuse the German invasion of Poland, but rather to point out that the basis for that invasion was laid at the Treaty of Versailles. . . .²

The fact that many past wars have been fought to "round out" national territory suggests that regional shape is a much more important natural resource than has been commonly supposed.

LOCATION

Chile has financed her national development with nitrate; Britain has grown great on her coal and iron; Hungary lives off her soil; but the basic natural resource of New York City is its geographic location. In the same way, the strategic geographic location of Constantinople is one of the most valuable natural resources in Europe. As early as A.D. 865, the Russians tried to conquer it. The thousand-year Russian search for a warm-water outlet to the sea has led the Russians to make many attempts to obtain possession of this strategic port. Each time some other nation has thwarted them. In both the Balkan War and the first World War the Turks were defeated, and they would have been expelled from Europe had the powers been able to agree upon who would control the Constantinople location. The residual area of Turkey-in-Europe was artificially maintained by power politics as a device to keep this strategic site from falling into Russian hands. After this war Russia will doubtless emerge as the dominant military power of the world. She may then demand and receive Constantinople. She may also demand and receive Port Arthur and Dairen in Manchuria. If so, the whole commercial future of the world may be changed.

For more than a century Britain has

² H. O. Lathrop, "Struggle for Land Resources as a Cause of European War," *Journal of Geography*, XXXIX (November, 1940), 300.

dominated the world navally and commercially because she possessed the positional resources of Suez, Bab el Mandeb, Malacca, Drake Strait, Cape Town, and a few other points. In the post-war world, with air commerce a promised reality, the principal trade routes may be the trans-Arctic air lines. Russia's possession of the northern Eurasian coast and our own possession of Alaska and Greenland may then be more important than the British key maritime locations. In the postwar settlement it will be desirable for us to retain possession of Greenland and to lease the airfields of Iceland. It may also be desirable for us to obtain possession of some of the northernmost Arctic islands. The values of geographic locations change drastically as world relations alter, but upon possession or lack of such resources depend the rise and fall of nations.

One of the most striking examples of the value of location as a natural resource is that bit of coast opposite to southeast England. This area is a natural base for attack upon England by a continental power. It is, or at least it was, also vulnerable to attack by British sea power. Moreover, it was the natural lowland gateway between the North German Plain and the fertile Paris Basin. So strategic was this area that the powers were unwilling to let it be controlled by any one of their number. Accordingly, a section of French people, another of Dutch Flemings, and smaller areas of Germans were put together to create the Belgian nation. This nation was too weak to be a threat to anyone, but, with its existence guaranteed collectively by its big neighbors, it served as a pad or buffer. In 1914 Germany violated Belgium's neutrality in an effort to invade France. The Belgians fought a delaying action long enough to enable France, Britain, and ultimately America to mobilize and defeat Germany. In the era of land warfare Belgium was the savior of democracy. In 1940 Germany again invaded Belgium—this time with airpower. Belgium promptly collapsed, trapping the incoming British Army and exposing completely France's

left flank. The Dunkirk evacuation was the result for Britain; national collapse, that for France; and loss of the second war front, that for the United Nations in general. Now it may cost an additional half-million American lives in helping to re-establish a second front. All because the ownership of one of the strategic locational resources of Europe was left in the hands of a weak, small nation. The world contains scores of potentially similar situations.

SPACE OR AREA

Germany has reiterated that one of her primary aims in the present war is to acquire *Lebensraum*, or "living space," for her people. There is no question but that space is one of the crucial natural resources for many nations in the world.³

The Dutch and the Germans were originally two closely related tribes. The Dutch, however, were confined to the delta of the Rhine, while the Germans had the fairly large area in which they could expand. In the same length of time the Dutch have come to number something over 8,000,000, whereas the Germans number about 80,000,000.

In 1790 the English probably numbered less than 10,000,000, while the British in the United States numbered about 3,000,000. A century and a half later the population of Britain had increased to about 45,000,000, while the descendants of the British in the much larger United States numbered more than 130,000,000. This increase in the population of the United States cannot altogether be attributed to immigration, because the birth rate of the British-Americans has declined in direct proportion to the influx of immigrants. There is some reason to think that if no immigration to America had occurred the present population of the United States might not be much less than it now is.

In similar fashion, the Portuguese in their little homeland have increased slowly

³ C. L. White and G. T. Renner, *Geography: An Introduction to Human Ecology* (New York: Appleton-Century Co., 1936), chap. xxviii.

until they now number only about 7,000,000. Meanwhile, the Portuguese colonists in Brazil have become a great nation of 45,000,000.

The fact that certain peoples possess space wherein they can increase, while others do not, raises an interesting question, viz.: Is there anything either fundamentally ethical or desirable in regarding the present distribution of space resources in the world as final? During the last thousand years a handful of Norse Varangians have become a nation of nearly 200,000,000 Russians. These Russians are now increasing at the rate of 3,000,000 per year. At this rate, the population of Russia could be 500,000,000 at the end of the next century. The much more highly cultured Czechs are confined to the Bohemian Basin and the Moravian Plateau. No such increase is open to them.

The German nation insists that it is morally entitled to an equal opportunity to increase. There is, however, very little room within their present boundaries for Germans to increase. The lands adjacent to Germany are already densely peopled. Any German expansion, therefore, means war for conquest. The same is, to a certain extent, also true for Italy and Japan, although for them there are fairly adjacent lands of relatively low population density available for settlement. The present population density per square mile is 578 for Germany, 358 for Italy, and 437 for Japan.⁴ Obviously, population increase for these nations must soon cease. Small, highly civilized nations such as Holland and Belgium are in an even worse condition, with relative densities of 627 and 702. In contrast to this, the Brazilian peoples possess nearly 3,300,000 square miles—an area which they now populate at a density of 13 per square mile. The United States, with 3,000,000 square miles of area, has a density of only 36 per square mile.

To accept this distribution of space resource as final assumes that we are ready to adopt the premise that the Germans, Ital-

ians, and Japanese are entitled to increase but little, the Dutch, Belgians, Swiss, Czechs, and Danes not at all; but that the Brazilians and African Bantus are entitled to increase to a figure of 1,000,000,000 each, the Russians and Americans to 700,000,000 each, the Malayo-Polynesians to 300,000,000, and the Chinese and Indians to about 600,000,000 each. There is nothing inevitable about such a future arrangement, but it is implied in our present division of space resources. Our present preoccupations have been with coal, oil, rubber, steel, copper, and the ferro-alloys. These latter resources determine military power control, but they do not determine the ultimate future dynamics of population. They determine present control of the earth, but not future possession of the earth.

THE EQUALIZATION OF RESOURCES

From the preceding discussion it is apparent that natural resources are far from being a simple factor in the life of nations. Rather, they constitute a highly complex group of dissimilar variables which operate in almost innumerable ways to produce social, economic, and political outcomes. Moreover, when examined on the world map, their implications become even more complex than when considered in the abstract. None of these resources is more important than any other. All should enter into any system of post-war planning. At the very outset, however, one must recognize that resources fall into two unlike categories as regards planning problems—the fixed ones and the mobile ones.

THE FIXED RESOURCES

A piece of Mediterranean climate in Finland would be worth more to the Finns than the iron ore of Lorraine. A sizable chunk of Russia's humid continental climate in India would be worth more than all the gold of Ophir. Such resources, unfortunately, are not transferable. Man himself, however, can move; that is, unless he is hindered from doing so. This suggests that travel restrictions, passport barriers, and other such im-

⁴ S. Van Valkenburg, *Elements of Political Geography* (New York: Prentice-Hall, 1939), p. 292.

pedimenta might well be abolished or at least materially reduced in the post-war world.

Space resources are likewise fixed. Our present division of space in the world gives to certain peoples the opportunity to become very numerous, while to others it denies all chance for future increase. Some correction of this must and will be made by moving whole groups of people. Moreover, the present division of space among peoples is not even anywhere near the optimum which could be effected, even without altering the existing ratio of nation to space. Europe is a case in point. Each ethnic group in that continent, instead of occupying a compact bloc of space, sprawls irregularly, thrusts out troublesome language peninsulas, possesses detached outlying islands in other countries, is marred by embayments of other peoples thrust into its flanks, or fades out into surrounding peoples in a very mixed contact zone. Frequently, national boundaries cut directly across ethnic groups.

All these evils create minority problems which result in constant frictions. Moreover, these continually threaten to break out into small wars—any one of which might easily become a world conflagration. There is not a single nation in Europe which does not possess either internal or external minority problems. Many possess both. To continue such boundaries will indicate that we attach more importance to maintaining vested political interests than to achieving an actual "people's peace" in Europe. The solution is drastic but comparatively inexpensive. The transfer of border-zone minorities and the exchange of outlying ethnic islands so as to get all ethnic groups into compact areas could be accomplished without affecting large areas. Any individuals affected could be permitted to refuse such transfer only on condition that he surrender his anomalous language and culture and adopt those of the country in which he elected to remain. The mal-solution of the Sudeten question should be a clear lesson for the post-war world.

The very important resource of geographic location is also not fluid or movable. Some of the highly strategic locations of the world are, therefore, going to change ownership. Some of these strategic loci are now occupied by small, unoffending countries; but, in the light of the new military mobility of the air age, it may no longer be safe for the rest of us to continue these arrangements. This may mean the end of the small, buffer type of nation which was so useful in past eras of surface warfare. It does not mean the end of freedom for small peoples; but it does suggest that the world, and Europe in particular, may have to seek a new formula for nation-making. Small nations may have to find their freedom within large federal frameworks, through union with other small related states.

THE FLUID OR MOBILE RESOURCES

Many resources, unlike those mentioned above, are relatively fluid. Coal, iron, oil, copper, lumber, and even electric power can be transported over long distances. The so-called United Nations have declared more or less officially that one of their post-war aims is to see that no people in the world are without opportunity to buy such commodities. This is a highly important goal, but to achieve it involves some drastic changes on our part. In the first place, it can be achieved only in one of two ways: an allied board of resource allotment (which would probably be intolerable to all nations not represented on that board),⁵ or a world system of free trade⁶ (which the American people have so far shown no tendency to adopt).

There can be no doubt that world-wide free trade is desirable in many respects, but there are at least two problems which would threaten such an arrangement. First, under free trade, nations such as the United States, operating within a closed-money system,

⁵ Eugene Staley, *Raw Materials in Peace and War* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1937), p. 173.

⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 192-93.

would find it difficult to compete against nations using a barter-exchange system. Second, we would have no guaranty that nations receiving mobile resources from us would use them to raise the standard of living of their people. They might, on the contrary, deliberately keep their standard of living depressed and use the additional resources to produce more people. This in turn would operate to keep wages low and enable them to undersell the very nations which supplied the resources.

In a very real sense, this is what Japan has been doing during the last century. Despite the huge increments of resources gained by Japan, the standard of living of the average man is probably not much better than a century ago. There are simply twice as many Japanese, and they continue to increase at about 1,000,000 per year. The Japanese religion is firm on the matter of large families. Japanese sociologists, economists, biologists, and medical men were perfectly well aware of the facts, but science is always powerless before organized religion—particularly when a church is able to invent and retreat behind the myth of divine sanction and infallibility. This policy of the Japanese church is going to cost America perhaps \$200,000,000,000 and a very long casualty list. Moreover, after the Japanese are defeated, their church will probably not change its policies. Very probably it will explain national defeat as the result of not following its teachings more closely.

Italy offers a somewhat similar example. Technological advances make resources more effective, and therefore produce the same results as additional resources. Italy has enjoyed many technological improvements during the past century. Instead of a rising standard of living, the result has been to produce more Italians on the same old levels. The larger the Italian population has become, the louder Italy's demand for the lands and other resources of its neighbors. The stark assaults upon Greece, Ethiopia, Slovenia, and Albania are, therefore, to be laid at the doorstep of those Italian institutions which have either striven to maintain

a high birth rate in Italy or which have insisted that a high birth rate is moral regardless of the resource base.

Some other European countries have followed the opposite policy. As their lands approached saturation, the birth rate has declined markedly. In some of them there is a birth-control clinic in every town. In the United States the birth rate is beginning to sag. In Russia the mechanism for population control already exists and will operate as population saturation approaches. The new China now arising is beginning to demand population control as a basis for increasing the standard of living in the interest of democratic well-being. Obviously, there is a difference between applying additional resources to countries, such as Denmark or Holland, and pouring resources into a bottomless well, such as Italy or Japan.

Machine tools and other technological equipment are the most significant of all the mobile resources which Britain and the United States possess. For a century we sent them to Japan. Now we are pouring them into Russia, India, Brazil; even to the Congo and northern Africa. Such things are the basic equipment for making war. Through our export of machine tools we Anglo-Saxons have lost our monopoly on modern military power. If the process continues the Negro, the Oriental, the Hindu, the Moslem, and the Malaysian will be able to make war as well as the European. In fact, the process has already gone so far that it is probably now beyond our control. There is nothing innate in any people which gives them the ability to create industrial and military power. It is, rather, a matter of resources plus the possession of a technology for using those resources. War-making is no longer the monopoly of the white man, and it will become less so in the future. Moreover, future world wars are likely to go badly for us, because the white man is decidedly in the minority in this world. Some sort of world government under which even the big, powerful nations would surrender their war-making powers, and certain other phases of their sovereignty, would seem to be necessary for our future survival.

THE QUESTION OF COLONIES

Closely related to the whole matter of resource control over the world is the colonial question. Spain achieved great national wealth from her colonies. More recently Britain, Holland, France, and Belgium have reaped great advantages from colonial empires.

It would appear that a colony can be profitable to the mother country in two ways: first, native labor may be exploited . . . to produce goods at a very low cost; second, a nation may control the industry and trade of a colony. The prices for certain raw materials to other people may be fixed arbitrarily at high levels and thus yield handsome returns.⁷

The exploitation of native labor has been gradually decreasing during modern times, and the Atlantic Charter promises to abolish it altogether within the near future. Colonial trade monopolies have also been declining of late, and it seems likely that they will be replaced eventually with an open-door policy such as the United States has insisted upon in the case of China. If these trends continue, colonies will apparently lose their direct economic value to the owner nations. Some students of the question doubt that colonies have ever been economic assets if all of the costs involved are tallied up.⁸

Despite their dubious economic value, colonies do have four real politico-geographic values: (a) they are sources of military manpower; (b) they bestow political prestige; (c) they may be locations from which war can be waged; and (d) some of them are suitable for settlement.

The colonial question will therefore never be disposed of by making the resources of existing colonies economically available to all nations through equal opportunity for trade. Several more fundamental solutions in the post-war world suggest themselves. First, a reapportionment of colonies among all nations of the world which may desire them. Second, mandating of colonies to

certain selected nations under supervision by an international commission. Third, pooling of all colonies for international use under a world government. Fourth, complete abolition of colonialism, with independence for present subject peoples—such independence to be gradually attained under some form of international tutelage.

PROBABLE EVENTUALITIES

Natural resources are not a simple factor in the life of nations; they constitute a highly complex realm which contains

the very essence of human existence—the natural materials and values—the geographical goods which we transform into economic goods through the means of our technology, a process which we have misnamed production. The geographer long ago learned that land is really another name for surface space and that its real virtues lie in the things which are present in that space. Geographically speaking, therefore, land is space equipped in varying amounts with various other natural resources.⁹

The ferocious and continuing struggle between nations to possess space, and its associated values and resources, has been involved in practically every war. This would suggest that it is an inevitable result of a world organized upon a basis of sovereign nationalism. This war will not end such struggle, and it is, therefore, futile to suppose that this is a war to end war.

Resources are the very basis of human existence. Human life is, like all life, highly competitive. If the struggle for resources can be kept at the individual level it will produce only business competition; at the national level it produces war. The solution of war is, then, very largely the solution of nationalism. Until we face this problem squarely, it is idle to expect any real solution of the question of resources in the post-war world. Indeed, it may be forecast with fair assurance that we are not going to resolve the matter of world resources after the present war. What we can expect is some sort of

⁷ Lathrop, *op. cit.*

⁸ G. Clark, *The Balance Sheets of Imperialism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1936).

⁹ G. T. Renner, *Conservation of National Resources: An Educational Approach to the Problem* (New York: Wiley, 1942), p. 33.

patchwork arrangement which will be tolerable for a time.

At present a considerable transfer and equalization of resources is taking place under the guise of a lease-lend program. As the war continues, this will increase, even to the point of depleting certain American resources; but this is essential to winning the war. After the war this transfer will be continued for a time, partly as a device to win certain nations over to our ideology, but in even larger measure to rehabilitate devastated or impoverished peoples in former Axis-occupied areas.

Out of the war will probably emerge four supernations: Russia, the United States, the British commonwealth, and China. These four states will presumably be the ones to make the decisions regarding the future division and allocation of resources. The obvious solution is some form of political union between these four superstates, with various federal groupings of the small states associated with them. Under their leadership colonialism should be abolished, trade restrictions reduced, investment monopolies ended, national boundaries readjusted, and ethnic minorities transferred and relocated. Before free trade should be instituted, however, certain social institutions in many nations would have to be modified. Otherwise, equal access to resources could only result in eventual disaster to those now enjoying high living standards from the present patterns of resource use.

It is, perhaps, idle to expect any such developments as a result of this war. We use the term "United Nations," but the war has as yet produced no union. We have a certain amount of unity in military action, but no political or economic unity. The war has thus far brought forth no international resources planning board, even though we are talking about post-war planning. It has not brought even any concrete statement of post-war objectives. If the urgency of this vast globe-encompassing war cannot make us set up such machinery, then it is not likely that we will do so when hostilities cease and the urgency has declined.

We may, however, expect this war to

move us a step or two in the desired direction. We will indubitably see the establishment of some form of international board of resources and trade, a modification of present-day colonialism, and a great outflow of Anglo-American money, machines, and machine tools to the relatively undeveloped parts of the world. Some minor readjustment of boundaries, and perhaps some economic and even political regrouping of peoples in Europe, also may possibly be effected. An awareness and appreciation of natural resources and their role in national and international life is arising and will continue to increase throughout the world. Judging from past experience, however, our thinking about such things and our handling of them will be mostly economic rather than geographic.

The principal reason why we have so largely failed to deal intelligently with resource use and control, with sociostatic pressures, and man-resource ratios, arises from our practice of leaving our human geography to the whims of history rather than realizing that it is something which can be planned and directed into desired channels. Human geography has been a closed book to American education and public administration, particularly in its more mature phases, such as geonomics, geopolitics, human ecology, and conservation of resources.

War is terribly destructive; the world cannot stand many more wars like the present. Human beings can recover, but our natural resources cannot. A copper mine once worked out and the copper sent to the bottom of the ocean cannot be restored. We live not on our technology but upon our resources. Many of these latter are limited in amount; others, even normally replaceable ones, can be damaged beyond repair. A solution of the problem of men and resources must be found and found without too much delay. We will not find it, however, as long as our social scientists retain their preoccupation with historical and institutional points of view and continue to ignore the geographical or ecological viewpoint.

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THE CONDITIONS AND PROSPECTS FOR A WORLD WITHOUT WAR

PITIRIM A. SOROKIN

I. NO LASTING PEACE WITHIN CONTEMPORARY CULTURE AND SOCIETY

Within the framework of contemporary (sensate) culture and with the type of society and man that express it, no enduring peace is possible. Regardless of what economic and political modifications may be made within such a framework, they cannot abolish international and civil wars, nor can they substantially decrease their magnitude or destructive ferocity. This gloomy statement is the only possible conclusion to be drawn from the relevant empirical facts, as well as from an analysis of the "heart and soul" of modern culture, society, and man. Empirical evidence shows that, with the emergence and growth of this sensate culture, society, and man, beginning with the thirteenth century and extending on to the twentieth century, the frequency and intensity of war have followed a clearly discernible trend. The data show that war steadily increased from the thirteenth to the seventeenth centuries, remained high throughout the eighteenth and the early nineteenth, decreased to the level of the sixteenth century during the period 1820-1910, and then soared up to an unprecedented height during the twentieth century—the bloodiest century in all the thirty centuries of Greco-Roman and Western cultures.¹ This movement of war, together with the unrivaled destructiveness and bestiality of the present war, convincingly demonstrates that *modern culture, society, and man are belligerent in their very sociocultural nature*, that their avowed pacifism is a mere illusion, and that interindividual (crime), civil, and inter-

national war is their inalienable characteristic.

An examination of the main properties of this culture, society, and man leads to the same conclusion and makes the above movement of war comprehensible.²

Being an articulation of its major premise that *the true reality and values are sensory*, this modern culture cannot help being pre-eminently empiricistic, positivistic, economically minded, and materialistic in its mentality; utilitarian and hedonistic in its ethics and law; sensualistic in its fine arts; and dynamic and relativistic in all its values. In accordance with its major premise, it puts the highest premium upon sensory values, beginning with wealth, material comfort, kisses, copulation, and popularity and ending with a thoroughly hedonistic, more rarely eudaemonistic, notion of happiness. In its decadent phase its scientific, religious, ethical, and sociocultural relativism develops to such an extent that there results an extreme atomization of values, which to an ever increasing degree become devoid of any universal validity, universal acceptance or rejection, and universal binding and controlling power. The clear boundary line between truth and falsity, right and wrong, the beautiful and the ugly, the just and the unjust, tends progressively to disappear, every group and individual becoming the supreme arbiter in all these matters. This leads to an enormous increase in the number of interindividual and intergroup conflicts over these issues. Such a situation results in a veritable sociocultural *anomie*, with all its mental, moral, social, and behavioral an-

¹ See the data on the movement of the magnitude of war and revolution in my *Social and Cultural Dynamics*, Vol. III (New York, 1937), and in Quincy Wright, *A Study of War* (Chicago, 1942).

² See a detailed analysis of the characteristics of modern sensate culture, society, and man and the pertinent evidence in my *Social and Cultural Dynamics* (4 vols.) and *The Crisis of Our Age* (New York, 1941). Here I mention merely those traits most relevant to the topic.

archy. This *anomie* makes inevitable the emergence of sheer brute force, assisted by fraud, as the supreme ruler of human behavior. This is uniformly accompanied by an extraordinary explosion of wars, revolutions, and crimes. Inasmuch as this relativization of values in our present-day culture has reached such a stage of *anomie*, the upsurge of war and of bloody revolution in this century is a natural and inevitable consequence.

There are other processes as well by which sensate culture, particularly in its stage of extreme relativism, leads to war and revolution. By putting a premium upon sensory values it molds in its own image the personality and conduct of its members. Each of these is impelled by it to secure a maximum share of sensory and material values, ranging all the way from wealth, kisses, freedom, popularity, and power on up to a maximum of *Lebensraum*, natural resources, markets, and world domination. An interindividual and intergroup struggle for these values develops and becomes the dominant drive in the life of individuals and groups, the main ethos and pathos of their existence. As long as universal values with their universally binding norms are active, they are able to moderate the ferocity of this struggle and inhibit the use of extremely antisocial means. But, as these values become relativized and atomized, their "brakes" cease to function, and eventually any means and any way becomes permissible as long as one is able to "get away with it." The result is an explosion of violence in various forms, with the rise to power of pressure groups and of dictatorships and with an upsurge of crime, civil war, and international war. "To suppose that men who are filled individually with every manner of restlessness, maddened by lust of power and speed, votaries of the god Whirl, will live at peace either with themselves or others, is the vainest chimera," rightly remarks one of the eminent American humanists.³

This conflagration of war and violence is

³ Irving Babbitt, *The Breakdown of Internationalism* (a reprint from the *Nation*, June, 1915) p. 25.

hastened along by the general degradation of man's value by sensate culture. Quite consistently with its major premise, it views man as a mere empirical "electron-proton complex," a "reflex mechanism," a mere "animal organism," a "psychoanalytical bag filled with libido," devoid of anything supersensory, sacred, or divine. No wonder that in such a culture man is treated in the same manner as we treat all the other sensory "complexes," "mechanisms," and "animals": any individual or group that hinders the realization of one's wishes is eliminated in the same way in which we liquidate a mosquito or a snake or "neutralize" any organic or inorganic object that impedes the fulfilment of our desires. This explains why, in spite of all the vociferous claims by our culture as to its humanistic, humane, and humanitarian mission, it is, objectively, in its decadent phase, one of the most inhuman of all cultures, killing, mutilating, and degrading human beings by the tens of millions.

Similarly, the basic institutions of contemporary society are permeated by the same militarism and are incessantly generating interindividual, civil, and international conflicts. *Private property*, with its inevitable differentiation into the excessively rich and the utterly miserable, generates persistent criminality, class antagonism, and class war. The *state* with its naked power policy of the Machiavellian *raison d'état* is an openly militaristic institution unrestrained by any of the ethical norms that are obligatory for private conduct. The same is true of our *political parties*: first and foremost they are fighting machines, using the spoils system, bribery, vituperation, murder, and civil war as instruments in their struggle for spoils and power. Our *occupational unions*, beginning with labor unions and ending with capitalists' associations, are organized primarily for militant purposes, namely, the successful defeat of antagonistic organizations by whatever means may be necessary, whether there be strikes and lockouts or revolution and civil war. Even the *family*, so far as it imbues

the children with the cult of family egotism, power, and "success," is shot through with the same militaristic spirit. Finally *almost all our institutions* glorify sensate *power* and *success* as the highest virtues. They methodically inculcate a "fighting spirit" into everyone from the day of his birth to the day of his death. Our heroes are invariably fighting persons who successfully crush their rivals, whether on the football field, in cut-throat business rivalry, on a battle field, in political machinations, or in class war; and they are typified by our "world champions" in tennis, swimming, coffee-drinking, pole-sitting, and jitterbugging. Even our "Superman" is the superman only because he "is faster than a bullet, more powerful than a locomotive," and more militant than Mars: he is forever in a fighting mess.

Thus, whether we study the objective movement of war that has accompanied the emergence and growth of modern culture or whether we study the essential characteristics exhibited by it and the society and man expressing it, we cannot fail to see their pre-eminently militant sociocultural nature. War in its various forms, and especially the war for sensory values, is their ethos, soul, and heart. Within their framework no lasting national or international peace has ever been or ever will be possible.

This means also that *most of the contemporary plans for a lasting peace are doomed to failure so far as they hope to achieve it within this framework by a mere job of repatching*. Elementary inductive considerations will show this unequivocally. As patented panaceas against war, these plans offer an enlightened self-interest; a specious "utilitarian rationality"; emancipation from religion and absolutistic ethics; a greater and more extreme relativism of all values; a still greater dose of positivism, empiricism, materialism, utilitarianism, and mechanisticism in all their varieties; a further expansion of literacy, schools, universities, newspapers, magazines, movies, the radio, and other "educational" instrumentalities; a still more rapid increase in scientific dis-

coveries and technological devices; a replacement of all monarchies by republics, of all autocracies by democracies, of capitalism by communism, socialism, and other sensate "isms"; dismemberment and disarmament of the vanquished; a bigger and better "balance of powers" and various "Unions Now" in the form of diverse double, triple, and quadruple alliances on up to the League of Nations armed with a crushing military and police force; a higher economic plane of living, at least for the victorious nations; a more just distribution of natural resources; and so on and so forth. The hopelessness of all these hopes is unquestionably shown by "an ugly fact" that with the emergence and growth of our modern culture and society from the thirteenth on to the twentieth century all these panaceas have been growing also; and yet their growth has been paralleled during these centuries by an increase of war instead of the decrease for which the plans contend. From such a "concomitant variation" only an idiot can conclude that these panaceas are suffocating war and that, when applied in a still greater dose, they could kill it forever. The only sound conclusion is that either the panaceas are perfectly impotent in the eradication of war or that, within the framework of this modern culture, society, and man, they work in favor of war rather than against it. For this reason these plans, especially those that call themselves "practical," "realistic," and "scientific," are nothing but an illusion and self-delusion. Within a different framework, as we shall see, some of these measures can be helpful; within the contemporary one, they cannot and will not build a temple of enduring peace.

II. THE CULTURE AND SOCIETY NECESSARY FOR AN ENDURING PEACE

These gloomy conclusions do not mean that an enduring peace is generally impossible. They signify only that for its realization a new culture, with an appropriate kind of society and man, different from the contemporary one, is in order. The essential

characteristics of these can be briefly summed up.⁴

1. The new culture will put less emphasis upon purely sensory reality-value and more upon the truly rational and upon the supersensory-metarational reality-value, viewing the true reality-value as an infinite manifold with three main aspects: sensory, rational, and supersensory-metarational, each within its sphere being a true reality and a true value. This conception of the true reality-value, sponsored by Plato and Aristotle, Erigena, Thomas Aquinas, and Nicolas of Cusa, to mention but a few names, will replace the major premise of our sensate culture. Accordingly, the new culture will be an articulation of this new major premise in all its main compartments: in its science, philosophy, religion, fine arts, ethics, law, and forms of social organization on up to the manners, mores, and ways of living of its individual and group members.

2. Its science will study, through sensory observation, the empirical aspects of the infinite manifold; its philosophy will investigate through mathematical and syllogistic logic the rational and logical aspects of the true reality-value; its intuitive wisdom will give us the notion of the supersensory-metalogical aspects of it through the intuition of great religious and ethical seers, great scientists like Sir Isaac Newton, great philosophers like Plato, great artists like Beethoven and Shakespeare, and great technological inventors inspired to their achievements by intuition.⁵ The history of human

knowledge is a cemetery filled with wrong empirical observations, false logical reasonings, and misleading intuitions. This means that, taken separately, each of these ways of cognition is fallible and that if it is to achieve a less fallibility it must have the co-operation and mutual verification of the other two ways of cognition. The outlined integralist system of truth gives us precisely this organic integration, co-operation, and mutual verification of all three ways of cognition. As such, it promises to give a more valid, richer, and better-tested truth than that which the dominant, one-sided sensory cognition can give. It eliminates also the contemporary antagonism between, and mutual undermining of, science, philosophy, and religion.

3. Instead of the excessively relativized and atomized utilitarian and hedonistic pseudo-norms of our culture—devoid of their universal binding-power, transgressed at every suitable occasion, and degraded to the level of mere Paretian “derivations,” Freudian “Rationalizations,” Marxian “ideological beautifications” of the economic, sexual, and other sensate “residues,” “complexes,” “drives,” and “interests”—the ethics and law of the new culture, in accordance with its major premise, will be embodied in a set of universal norms binding and effectively controlling the behavior of all, unquestioned and undisputed in their ethical prestige by any other conflicting norm. In their content these universal norms will be a variation of the main ethical norms of practically all great religions and moral codes, from the elemental Golden Rule and Ten Commandments on up to the norms of the Sermon on the Mount as their sublimest expression. Such an ethics and law will stop the atomization of moral val-

⁴ See a more detailed analysis of this new culture, society, and man in my paper, “The Task of Cultural Rebuilding,” to be published in a volume to be entitled “Intellectual and Cultural Foundations of World Order,” by the Institute for Religious Studies.

⁵ Many self-appointed pseudo-empiricists in their attack against intuition as a way of cognition of *sui generis* display a complete ignorance of how most of the great scientific, philosophical, technological, ethical, religious, and artistic discoveries and inventions have really been made. If they were real empiricists and had empirically studied this problem, they would have learned the empirically undeniable fact that most of these discoveries and inventions have been initiated and inspired by intuition (see the

facts and literature on that in my *Dynamics*, IV, 746 ff.; see also I. Sikorsky, *The Story of the Winged-S* [New York, 1942], chap. xxii; T. Langmuir, “Science, Common Sense and Decency” [presidential address of this Nobel Prize winner to the American Association for the Advancement of Science, delivered in 1942], *New York Times*, December 27, 1942).

ues, eliminate ethical and legal cynicism, and abolish the dictatorship of rude force and fraud as the supreme arbiters of human conduct.

4. Again in accordance with its major premise, the painting and sculpture, literature and music, drama and architecture, of the new culture will be quite different from contemporary fine arts. Integralist beauty will be reunited with truth and goodness, so that the new fine arts will become a value-laden art instead of being an empty art for art's sake. Instead of debunking the immortals, the new art will immortalize the mortals, ennoble the ignoble, and beautify the ugly. Instead of being negativistic, centered around the police morgue, criminal's hideouts, insane asylums, and sex organs, it will reflect mainly the eternal values, positive ideals, heroic events, and great tragedies and dramas. Like the comparable art of Greece in the fifth century B.C. and of Europe in the thirteenth century A.D., it will be an inspiring, ennobling, educating, and truly beautifying art instead of being a degrading, demoralizing, and enervating cult of social pathology, as contemporary art largely is.

5. In such a culture man will again be regarded as an end-value, as an incarnation of the divine manifold rather than as a mere biological organism, reflex-mechanism, or psychoanalytical libido, as he is usually regarded now. The value of man will again be lifted far above the utter degradation into which he is now thrown. Accordingly, the practices, institutions, and relationships that turn man into a mere means for predominantly sensate ends will largely disappear.

6. Most of the social institutions that contradict the total character of this new culture will be eliminated. The dominant form of social relationships in such a society will be neither contractual nor compulsory but familistic, similar to the relationships among the members of a good family. The economic and political regimes of such a society will be neither capitalistic nor communistic nor socialistic, but familistic. The

enormous contrast between multimillionaires and paupers, the rulers and the ruled, will disappear. Private property will be limited and will be turned into a kind of public trusteeship. A decent minimum of the necessities will be secured for all. The main motives for a socially useful economic and political life will be neither profit nor power but the motive of creative service to the society—similar to the motivation of great artists, religious leaders, scientists, and true philanthropists. Social institutions that contradict these purposes will largely disappear, those that serve them will be established and reinforced.

7. The practical consequences of the establishment of such a culture will be immense, especially in the field of human mentality, conduct, and interrelationships. The new system of values and truth will abolish the contemporary antagonism between science, philosophy, and religion: they will all be inseparable organs of a unified system of truth, all pointing toward the same verities, validities, and values. The contemporary atomization and relativization of truth, goodness, and beauty will have been terminated. With this there will be an end to the contemporary mental, moral, and social anarchy. An age of certainty will replace our present age of uncertainty. Liberated from the gnawing tortures of uncertainty, the sapping poison of contradictions, and the weariness of confusion, the human mind will once more regain an inner harmony, peace, and happiness. With these qualities its creative vigor, self-confidence, and self-control will be restored. In such conditions most of the contemporary psychoneuroses will evaporate. Universalized truth will unite into one mind all of mankind.

The general devaluation of that which is purely sensate will greatly weaken the contemporary struggle for existence and for material values and will reinforce the quest for the rational and metarational values. As a result interindividual and intergroup antagonisms will greatly decrease, their brutal forms will wither, and man's conduct will be ennobled and made truly social. The same

result will follow from the universalized ethical norms rooted into the heart and soul of men. Not so much by external sanctions as by inner power they will inhibit most of the antisocial actions and relationships, particularly the bloody mistreatment of man by man, of group by group. The most brutal forms of crime, civil strife, and international warfare cannot thrive in such a cultural climate and will greatly decrease. The same is true of brute force and fraud as the arbiters of human conduct.

The new fine arts will contribute their share to the same effect. By virtue of their positive beauty they will educate, inspire, instruct, fascinate, and control human beings fully as much as the new science and religion, philosophy, and ethics. Primarily devoted to eternal beauty, the fine arts will serve also, as a by-product, the task of true socialization of *Homo sapiens*. In this way they will contribute generously to an elimination of antisocial activities, relationships, and institutions in the human universe.

Finally, through its regained harmony, peace, and happiness of mind the new culture will make human beings less egoistic, irritable, quarrelsome, violent, and antisocial. Through a release of new creative forces in all fields of sociocultural activity it will make everyone a partner and participant in the most sublime form of happiness—the happiness of a creative genius.

In these and thousands of other ways the new culture will develop a new man—happy, generous, kind, and just to himself and to all his fellow-men. Within the framework of such a culture, society, and man neither interindividual war (crime) nor civil war nor international war can flourish. If they do not disappear entirely, they will certainly decrease to the lowest minimum known in human history.

8. Such are the essential traits of the culture, society, and man necessary for an enduring peace in interindividual, intergroup, and international relationships. Without this framework, as the main condition of peace, all the other panaceas against war are futile. With it, many of these will facilitate

its realization. For instance, with this sociocultural foundation the League of Nations and other forms of superstate government will faithfully and fruitfully serve the cause of peace. Without it, such a superstate government will be either as impotent as the defunct League of Nations or, what is still worse, may turn into a world tyranny as cruel as some of the "world empires" of the past. Without it the military and police forces of such a world government will certainly be misused and will eventually serve the cause of war instead of the cause of peace. With it, all the state and superstate governments, no matter what may be their technical forms, will be true familistic democracies. As such they will actively facilitate the maintenance of peace. Without it, no formal republican or democratic regime, even if universally diffused, can ever help—no more so than in the past, when the democratic and republican countries were at least as belligerent as the monarchical and autocratic⁶ nations and when the growth of republican and democratic regimes for the last few centuries has been followed by an increase, rather than by a decrease, of war. Without this framework the further increase of scientific discoveries and technological inventions will be of just as little avail as in the past, during which, beginning with the thirteenth century, they have steadily and rapidly increased up to the present time and have been followed by an almost parallel increase of war. The same is true of the development of schools, universities, books, magazines, papers, movies, radio, theaters, and all the other means of contemporary education. Beginning with the thirteenth century, they have been steadily increasing without any resulting decrease of war, revolutions, or crime. This is still more true in regard to such panaceas as a more equitable distribution of the natural resources or a higher material standard of

⁶ See the data on the comparative belligerency and revolutionism of republican, democratic, and monarchical-autocratic countries in my *Dynamics*, Vol. III, chaps. xii, xiii, xiv; also A. Toynbee, *A Study of History* (London, 1939), IV, 141 ff.; Wright, *op. cit.*, chap. xxii.

living or a more enlightened self-interest and utilitarian "rationality." Without the foregoing framework any truly equitable distribution of the natural resources throughout all mankind is impossible, just as it has been impossible in the past. The states and nations will remain as egotistic and rapacious as they have hitherto been. Those who believe that a diffusion of democratic forms of government would change this forget that the so-called democracies of the past and the present have been fully as imperialistic as the autocracies. They forget also the unpleasant but unquestionable fact that almost all such democracies, beginning with the Athenian and ending with the contemporary ones, have been based upon the severest exploitation of colonies and "spheres of influence" or have consisted of a vast layer of semifree and unfree population many times larger than the full-fledged citizenship of such democracies.

Likewise an "enlightened self-interest" and utilitarian "rationality" have been growing ever since the thirteenth century, without being accompanied by any decrease of war. One of the reasons for this is the fact that from a deeper standpoint this self-interest turns out to be a blind egotism, and utilitarian "rationality" a most irrational illusion. Utilitarian rationality is defined as the use of the most efficient means for the realization of an end desired. Typically, it has in view only the rationality of the means, and it neglects the rationality of the ends. The present war, which uses the most efficient and scientific means available for the defeat of the enemy is perfectly rational from this standpoint; so also is the activity of a gang of efficient murderers, armed with the best techniques of murder, which is never caught or punished. These considerations show clearly that the truly rational action is that in which the ends as well as the means are rational. An action that uses rational means to irrational ends is particularly irrational. For this reason the utilitarian rationality of our society cannot regard war as irrational, and still less is it able to achieve the abolition of war.

Likewise, without this framework, the panaceas suggested for the eradication of crime, rioting, revolution, and civil war cannot be effective. These irrational phenomena will remain and may even grow in spite of the panaceas, just as they have remained and grown during the centuries of the domination of modern culture. Notwithstanding the fact that these panaceas have been applied with especial liberality in the twentieth century, the glaring fact remains that neither crime, rioting, nor revolution has decreased; nor has the family become any better integrated; nor have suicide and mental disease declined; nor has the intensity of the interindividual and intergroup struggle for existence diminished; nor, if we can measure happiness by the movement of suicide, has man become any more happy. If anything, the objective results have been exactly opposite to what might be expected from the application of the panaceas.

The net result of the preceding analysis is that the suggested framework of the new culture, society, and man is not the manifestation of a preacher's complex, nor is it the "impractical" indulgence of an armchair philosopher in his pet preoccupation, but rather is it a most practical, scientific, and matter-of-fact indication of the *necessary conditions* for a realization of the objective—a lasting peace. Without it, all the other means to building a temple of lasting peace are bound to be impotent or will only produce even bigger and more terrible wars.

III. PROSPECTS

To this conclusion may be raised the objection that the new sociocultural framework is itself unrealizable and utopian. If such an objection were valid, it would only mean that an enduring peace is impossible. In that case all rational persons should stop fooling themselves and others with the utopia of a mankind without war, bloody revolution, and crime and should resignedly accept them as inevitable in the same manner in which we accept death. However, after a careful scrutiny, the objection turns out to be far less axiomatic and unquestionable

than it appears at first glance. In other words, the chances for a realization of the new framework, with the enduring peace that it implies, are not at all nil.

First, if mankind is going to live a creative life and is not going to sink either into the somnolence of "a benumbed and ruminating human herd" or into the tortuous agony of decay, the new framework is the only way that is left. The existing framework is so rotten and is progressively becoming so destructive and painful that mankind cannot creatively and contentedly live within it for any length of time. If it cannot be replaced by the new framework, then the end of mankind's creative history, in one of the two ways just indicated, is inescapable. But such a conclusion is far more fantastic in its pessimism than the facts of human history warrant: in spite of the gravity of many of the great crises that have beset mankind throughout history, human beings have always been able somehow to create new forms of culture and society that have eventually terminated the crisis. For the present there is no evidence whatsoever that a new sociocultural renaissance is impossible.

Second, the shift from a withered sensate culture to a form of culture somewhat akin to that just outlined has happened several times in the history of Greco-Roman, Western, and certain other great cultures. If it has been possible of occurrence in the past, there is every reason to suppose that it can recur in the future.

Third, if the birth of the new culture were dependent entirely upon contemporary "utilitarian rationality," its emergence and growth would be uncertain indeed. But fortunately such is not the manner in which one form of culture is ordinarily replaced by another. The replacement is usually a result of the historical process itself, of gigantic, impersonal, spontaneous forces immanent in a given sociocultural framework; and only at a later stage does it become facilitated by truly rational forces that plan and endeavor to build the new culture with all available scientific means. The spontaneous forces immanent in our modern culture

have already brought about its phase of decline and crisis; they have already undermined its prestige and fascination to a considerable degree; they have already alienated from it a considerable portion of the population; they have robbed it of most of its charms: its security, its safety, its prosperity, its material comfort, its happiness, its sensate freedom, and all of its main values. Not in the classroom but in the hard school of life millions of people are being incessantly taught by these forces an unforgettable and indelible lesson, comprehensible by the plainest human being, that the existing framework is going to give them "stones" and bullets instead of bread; gigantic destruction in place of creative construction; misery instead of prosperity; regimentation in lieu of freedom; death, mutilation, and suffering instead of security of life, integrity of body, or bigger and better pleasure. With these charms progressively evaporating, this modern culture of ours has no other great values by which to hold the allegiance of humanity. Like a pretty woman whose bodily charms have gone, it is destined to lose more and more the adherence of humanity until it has been entirely forsaken and dethroned from its dominant position in favor of a different sociocultural framework. This point has about been reached by our culture. Its magnificent creativeness, its prestige, and its charms are about over.

Parallel with this defection of humanity from contemporary culture, the same spontaneous forces are generating and increasing the quest for a different sociocultural framework, one which is more creative and adequate and less destructive and painful. This quest is at the present moment the main item in the order of the day: almost everyone is busy with the problems of the future society and culture. Only a few, who nothing forget and nothing learn, still cherish ideas of a restoration of the past and a revitalization of a withered framework. The overwhelming majority understand—if not by calculation and logical analysis, then by plain horse sense—that this is impossible.

They recognize the necessity of some framework different from that which we have now.

At this stage the truly rational forces enter the play and take a guiding hand in it. With all the available wisdom and knowledge and with a sense of supreme duty they endeavor to create various systematic blueprints of the new sociocultural framework—to test them, to improve them, rejecting the less adequate ones and perfecting the better ones. New plans, with their philosophies, ideologies, and ways and means of realization, multiply, become more and more coordinated, more and more diffused, continually accumulate a momentum and an ever increasing legion of adherents, until they become a tangible social force. This force grows and in thousands of ways begins significantly to influence human mentality and conduct, science and religion, philosophy

and ethics, fine arts and social institutions. The process is slow, develops erratically from day to day, and has many deviations, mistakes, and miscarriages of its own. Altogether, it takes several decades, even a few centuries, for its full realization. Sooner or later, however, it terminates in a dethronement of the previously dominant sociocultural framework and in a rise to ascendancy of the new framework.

In the case of our contemporary culture we have reached the point at which the rational forces are about ready to enter the play. Together with the spontaneous forces of the historical process itself, they will be able to create a new sociocultural framework that will be a rough approximation to the one outlined above. When this objective has been reached, the utopia of a lasting peace will become a reality.

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PROSPECT OF A WORLD WITHOUT RACE CONFLICT

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ABSTRACT

The philosophy of biological race differences which divide the world into superior and inferior people will persist after this war. This is shown in the persecution of Jews, the refusal to emancipate India, the relations between Asia and Europe, and the attitude toward South America and the Caribbean. To leave out discussions of race in post-war planning enables Europe and America to fight for democracy and the abolition of poverty while ignoring the fact that race prejudice makes this fight consistent with compulsory poverty, disease, and repression of most of the workers of the world.

It is with great regret that I do not see after this war, or within any reasonable time, the possibility of a world without race conflict; and this is true despite the fact that race conflict is playing a fatal role in the modern world. The supertragedy of this war is the treatment of the Jews in Germany. There has been nothing comparable to this in modern history. Yet its technique and its reasoning have been based upon a race philosophy similar to that which has dominated both Great Britain and the United States in relation to colored people.

This philosophy postulates a fundamental difference among the greater groups of people in the world, which makes it necessary that the superior peoples hold the inferior in check and rule them in accordance with the best interest of these superiors. Of course, many of the usual characteristics were missing in this outbreak of race hate in Germany. There was in reality little of physical difference between German and Jew. No one has been able to accuse the Jews of inferiority; rather it was the superiority of the Jews in certain respects which was the real cause of conflict. Nevertheless, the ideological basis of this attack was that of fundamental biological difference showing itself in spiritual and cultural incompatibility. Another difference distinguishes this race war. Usually the cure for race persecution and subordination has been thought to be segregation, but in this case the chance to segregate the Jews, at least partially, in Palestine, has practically been vetoed by the British government.

In other parts of the world the results of

race conflict are clear. The representative of Prime Minister Churchill presiding over the British war cabinet has been the prime minister of the Union of South Africa. Yet South Africa has without doubt the worst race problem of the modern world. The natives have been systematically deprived of their land, reduced to the status of a laboring class with the lowest of wages, disfranchised, living and working under caste conditions with only a modicum of education, and exposed to systematic public and private insult. There is a large population of mixed-bloods, and the poverty, disease, and crime throughout the Union of South Africa are appalling. Here in a land which furnishes gold and diamonds and copper, the insignia of the luxury and technique of modern civilization, this race hate has flourished and is flourishing. Smuts himself, as political leader of the Union of South Africa, has carried out much of the legislation upon which this race conflict is based; and, although from time to time he has expressed liberal ideas, he has not tried or succeeded in basically ameliorating the fundamental race war in that part of the world.

The situation in India is another case of racial conflict. The mass of people there are in the bondage of poverty, disfranchisement, and social caste. Despite eminent and widely known leadership, there has not come on the part of the British any effective attempt fundamentally to change the attitude of the governing country toward the subject peoples. The basic reason for this, openly or by inference, is the physical difference of race which makes it, according

to British thought, impossible that these peoples should within any reasonable space of time become autonomous or self-governing. There have been promises, to be sure, from time to time, and promises are pending; but no one can doubt that if these people were white and of English descent, a way out of the present impasse would have long since been found.

There is no doubt but that India is a congeries of ignorant, poverty-stricken, antagonistic groups who are destined to go through all the hell of internal strife before they emancipate themselves. But it is just as true that Europe of the sixteenth century was no more ready for freedom and autonomy than India. But Europe was not faced and coerced by a powerful overlord who did not believe Europeans were men and was determined to treat them as serfs to minister to his own comfort and luxury.

In India we have the first thoroughgoing case of modern colonial imperialism. With the capitalism built on the African slave trade and on the sugar, tobacco, and cotton crops of America, investment in India grew and spread for three hundred years, until there exists the greatest modern case of the exploitation of one people by another. This exploitation has been modified in various ways: some education has been furnished the Indians, a great system of railroads has been installed, and industrialism has been begun. But nothing has been done to loosen to any appreciable degree the strangle hold of the British Empire on the destinies of four hundred million human beings. The prestige and profit of the control of India have made it impossible for the British to conceive of India as an autonomous land.

The greatest and most dangerous race problem today is the problem of relations between Asia and Europe: the question as to how far "East is East and West is West" and of how long they are going to retain the relation of master and serf. There is in reality no difference between the reaction to this European idea on the parts of Japan and China. It is a question simply of the method of eliminating it. The idea of Japan was to

invoke war and force—to drive Europe out of Asia and substitute the domination of a weak Asia by a strong Japan. The answer of China was co-operation and gradual understanding between Great Britain, France, America, and China. Chinese leaders are under no illusions whatever as to the past attitude of Europe toward Chinese. The impudence, browbeating, robbery, rape, and insult is one long trail of blood and tears, from the Opium War to the kowtowing before the emperor in Berlin. Even in this present war and alliance there has occurred little to reassure China: certain courtesies from the British and belated and meager justice on the part of the United States, after the Soong sister had swept in on us with her retinue, jade, and jewels. There has not only been silence concerning Hong Kong, Burma, and Singapore but there is the continued assumption that the subjugation of Japan is in the interest of Europe and America and not of Asia. American military leaders have insisted that we must have in the Pacific after this war American bases for armed force. But why? If Asia is going to develop as a self-governing, autonomous part of the world, equal to other parts, why is policing by foreigners necessary? Why cannot Asia police itself? Only because of the deep-seated belief among Europeans and Americans that yellow people are the biological inferiors to the whites and not fit for self-government.

Not only does Western Europe believe that most of the rest of the world is biologically different but it believes that in this difference lies congenital inferiority; that the black and brown and yellow people are not simply untrained in certain ways of doing and methods of civilization; that they are naturally inferior and inefficient; that they are a danger to civilization as civilization is understood in Europe. This belief is so fundamental that it enters into the very reforms that we have in mind for the post-war world.

In the United States the race problem is peculiarly important just now. We see today a combination of northern investors and

southern Bourbons desiring not simply to overthrow the New Deal but to plunge the United States into fatal reaction. The power of the southerners arises from the suppression of the Negro and poor-white vote, which gives the rotten borough of Mississippi four times the political power of Massachusetts and enables the South through the rule of seniority to pack the committees of Congress and to dominate it. Nothing can be done about this situation until we face fairly the question of color discrimination in the South; until the social, political, and economic equality of civilized men is recognized, despite race, color, and poverty.

In the Caribbean area, in Central and South America, there has been for four hundred years wide intermixture of European, African, and Red Indian races. The result in one respect is widely different from that of Europe and North America; the social equality of Negroes, Indians, and mulattoes who were civilized was recognized without question. But the full results of this cultural liberalism were largely nullified by the economic control which Western Europe and North America held over these lands. The exploitation of cheap colored labor through poverty and low prices for materials was connived at as usual in the civilized world and the spoils shared with local white politicians. Economic and social prestige favored the whites and hindered the colored. A legend that the alleged backwardness of the South Americans was due to race mixture was so far stressed in the world that South America feared it and catered to it; it became the habit to send only white Brazilians, Bolivians, and Mexicans abroad to represent their countries; to encourage white immigration at all costs, even to loss of autonomy; to draw color lines in the management of industry dominated by Europe and in society where foreigners were entertained. In short, to pretend that South America hated and distrusted dark blood as much as the rest of the world, often even when the leaders of this policy were known themselves to be of Negro and Indian descent.

Thus the race problem of South and Cen-

tral America, and especially of the islands of the Caribbean, became closely allied with European and North American practice. Only in the past few decades are there signs of an insurgent native culture, striking across the color line toward economic freedom, political self-rule, and more complete social equality between races.

There still is a residual sense of racial difference among parts of Europe; a certain contemptuous attitude toward Italy has been manifest for a long time, and the Balkans have been a byword for inefficiency and muddle. The pretensions of the Greeks to represent ancient Greek culture and of the Rumanians to be Roman have been laughed at by Western Europe. The remainder of the Balkans and Russia have been looked upon as Asiatic barbarism, aping civilization. As quasi-Asiatic, they have come in for the racial contempt poured upon the yellow peoples. This attitude greeted the Russian revolution and staged almost a race war to uphold tottering capitalism, built on racial contempt. But in Eastern Europe today are a mass of awakening men. They know and see what Russia has done for her debased masses in a single generation, cutting across race lines not only between Jew and Gentile but between White Russians, Ukrainians, Tartars, Turks, Kurds, and Kalmuks. As Sidney and Beatrice Webb declared:

All sections of the community—apart from those legally deprived of citizenship on grounds unconnected with either race or nationality—enjoy, throughout the USSR, according to law, equal rights and duties, equal privileges and equal opportunities. Nor is this merely a formal equality under the law and the federal constitution. Nowhere in the world do habit and custom and public opinion approach nearer to a like equality in fact. Over the whole area between the Arctic Ocean and the Black Sea and the Central Asian mountains, containing vastly differing races and nationalities, men and women, irrespective of conformation of skull or pigmentation of skin, even including the occasional African Negro admitted from the United States, may associate freely with whom they please; travel in the same public vehicles and

frequent the same restaurants and hotels; sit next to each other in the same colleges and places of amusement; marry wherever there is mutual liking; engage on equal terms in any craft or profession for which they are qualified; join the same churches or other societies; pay the same taxes and be elected or appointed to any office or position without exception.

This, Eastern Europe knows, while Western Europe is still determined to build its culture on race discrimination and expects Russia to help her. But how far can Russia be depended upon to defend, in world war, British and American investments in Asia and Africa?

The attitude of America and Britain toward De Gaulle is puzzling until we remember that, since Gobineau, racial assumptions have entered into the relations between France and the Nordic world. During the first World War the United States was incensed at the social equality attitudes of the "frogs," while Britain as well as Germany resented the open dependence of France on her black colonial soldiers. One present great liberal statesman, Smuts, led a crusade against arming blacks in any future European war. Yet De Gaulle not only uses Senegalese soldiers but recognizes the Negro governor of a strategic French colonial province; while Burman, writing of the history of the Free French, exclaims: "I am witnessing a miracle, the rebirth of France in the jungles of Africa!" Racial caste and profitable investment after the war indicate a halt in our support of De Gaulle. France since the eighteenth century has insisted on recognizing the social equality of civilized men despite race. She has for this reason been regarded as traitor to the white colonial front, in government and in society, despite her investors who have supported British methods. Hitler is not the only modern statesman who has sneered at "mongrel" France.

These are some but by no means all of the race problems which face the world; yet they are not being discussed except indirectly. The Atlantic Charter as well as the agreements in Moscow and Teheran have

been practically silent on the subject of race. It is assumed that certain fundamental matters and more immediate issues must be met and settled before this difficult question of race can be faced. Let us now ask ourselves if this is true. What *are* the fundamental questions before the world at war?

If we measure the important matters by current discussion, we may range them somewhat as follows: (1) defense against aggression; (2) full employment after the war; (3) eventual fair distribution of both raw materials and manufactured goods; (4) abolition of poverty; and (5) health.

To anyone giving thought to these problems, it must be clear that each of them, with all of its own peculiar difficulties, tends to break asunder along the lesions of race difference and race hate. Among the primary factors entering into the discussion is the folklore and superstition which lurks in the mind of modern men and makes them thoroughly believe, in accord with inherited prejudice and unconscious cerebration, that the peoples of the world are divided into fundamentally different groups with differences that are eternal and cannot be forgotten and cannot be removed. This philosophy says that the majority of the people of the world are impossible.

Therefore, when we discuss any of the listed problems, we usually see the solution within the frame of race and race difference. When we think of defense against aggression, we are thinking particularly of Europe, and the aggregation which we have in mind is not simply another Hitler but a vaster Japan, if not all Asia and the South Sea Islands. The "Yellow peril" as envisaged by the German Emperor William II has by no means passed from the subconscious reactions of Western Europe. That is the meaning of world police and "our way of life."

When we think of the problem of unemployment, we mean especially unemployment in the developed countries of Western Europe and America. We do not have in mind any fundamental change so far as the labor of the darker world is concerned. We

do not think of full employment and a living wage for the East Indian, the Chinese coolie, and the Negro of South Africa or even the Negro of our own South. We want the white laborer in England and in America to receive a living wage and economic security without periodic unemployment. In such case we can depend on the political power of white labor to maintain the present industrial organization. But we have little or no thought of colored labor, because it is disfranchised and kept in serfdom by the power of our present governments.

This means, of course, that the industrial organization of these countries must be standardized; they must not clog their own avenues of trade by tariff restrictions and cartels. But these plans have very seldom gone far enough to envisage any change in the relations of Europe and America to the raw material of Africa and Asia or to accepting any idea of so raising the prices of this raw material and the wages of the laborers who produce it that this mass of labor will begin to approach the level of white labor. In fact, any such prospect the white laborers with votes in their hands would in vast majorities oppose.

In both the United States and the Union of South Africa it has been the organized white laborers who have systematically by vote and mob opposed the training of the black worker and the provision of decent wages for him. In this respect they have ranged themselves with exploiting investors and disseminators of race hatred like Hitler. When recently in the United States the President's Fair Employment Practices Commission sought to secure some steps of elementary justice for black railway workers, the railway unions refused even to attend the hearings. Only the Communists and some of the C.I.O. unions have ignored the color line—a significant fact.

Our attitude toward poverty represents the constant lesion of race thinking. We have with difficulty reached a place in the modern white world where we can contemplate the abolition of poverty; where we can think of an industrial organization with no

part of its essential co-operators deprived of income which will give them sufficient food and shelter, along with necessary education and some of the comforts of life. But this conception is confined almost entirely to the white race. Not only do we refuse to think of similar possibilities for the colored races but we are convinced that, even though it were possible, it would be a bad thing for the world. We must keep the Negroes, West Indians, and Indonesians poor. Otherwise they will get ambitious: they will seek strength and organization; they will demand to be treated as men, despite the fact that we know they are not men; and they will ask social equality for civilized human beings the world over.

There is a similar attitude with regard to health; we want white people to be well and strong, to "multiply and replenish the earth"; but we are interested in the health of colored people only in so far as it may threaten the health and wealth of whites. Thus in colonies where white men reside as masters, they segregate themselves in the most healthful parts of the country, provided with modern conveniences, and let the natives fester and die in the swamps and lowlands. It is for this reason that Englishmen and South Africans have seized the high land of Kenya and driven the most splendid of races of East Africa into the worst parts of the lowland, to the parts which are infested by the tsetse fly, where their cattle die and they are forced laborers on white farms.

Perhaps in no area of modern civilized endeavor is the matter of race revealed more startlingly than in the question of education. We have doubts as to the policy of so educating the colored races that they will be able to take part in modern civilization. We are willing to educate them so that they can help in our industrial development, and we want them to become good workmen so long as they are unorganized. But when it comes to a question of real acquaintanceship with what the more advanced part of the world has done and is doing, we try to keep the backward races as ignorant

as possible. We limit their schools, their travel, and their knowledge of modern tongues.

There are, of course, notable exceptions: the Negro colleges of the southern United States, the Indian universities, and some advance even in university training in South Africa and in East and West Africa. But this advance is hindered by the fact that popular education is so backward that the number of persons who can qualify for higher training is very small, especially the number who can enter the professions necessary to protect the economic status of the natives and to guide the natives in avoidance of disease. In all these matters race interferes with education.

Beyond this we have only to mention religion. There is no denying that certain missionaries have done fine work in ameliorating the lot of backward people, but at the same time there is not a ghost of a doubt that today the organized Christian church is unfavorable toward race equality. It is split into racial sections and is not disposed to disturb to any great degree the attitude of civilization toward the Chinese, the Indians, and the Negroes. The recent pronouncement of the Federation of Churches of Christ was a fine and forward-looking document, but it has aroused no attention, much less enthusiasm, among the mass of Christians and will not. The Catholic church never champions the political or economic rights of subject peoples.

This insistent clinging to the older patterns of race thought has had extraordinary influence upon modern life. In the first place, it has for years held back the progress of the social sciences. The social sciences from the beginning were deliberately used as instruments to prove the inferiority of the majority of the people of the world, who were being used as slaves for the comfort and culture of the masters. The social sciences long looked upon this as one of their major duties. History declared that the Negro had no history. Biology exaggerated the physical differences among men. Economics even today cannot talk straight on

colonial imperialism. Psychology has not yet recovered from the shame of its "intelligence" tests and its record of "conclusions" during the first World War.

Granted, therefore, that this is the basic attitude of the majority of civilized people, despite exceptions and individual differences, what must we expect after this war? In the first place, the British Empire is going to continue, if Mr. Churchill has his way, without "liquidation"; and there is slight chance that the English Labour party or any other democratic elements in England are going to be able to get past the suspensory veto of the House of Lords and the overwhelming social power of the British aristocracy. In America the control of wealth over our democracy is going to be reinforced by the action of the oligarchic South. A war-weary nation is going to ignore reform and going to work to make money. If, of course, the greedy industrial machine breaks down in 1950 as it did in 1929, there will be trouble; but the Negroes will be its chief victims and sufferers. Belgium has held its Congo empire with rare profit during the war, and the home land will recoup its losses in Europe by more systematic rape of Africa. So Holland will batten down again upon the South Seas, unless the Japanese interlude forces some slight change of heart. South America will become an even more closely integrated part of British and American industry, and the West Indies will work cheaply or starve, while tourists throw them pennies.

The only large cause for disquiet on the part of Western Europe and North America is the case of Russia. There they are reassured as to the attitude of Stalin toward the working people of the Western world. Evidently he has decided that the Western European and American workers with votes in their hands are capable of deciding their own destiny; and, if they are not, it is their own fault. But what is going to be the attitude of Russia toward colonial peoples? How far and where and when is Russia going to protect and restore British and American investments and control in Asia

and Africa? Certainly her attitude toward the Chinese has shown in the past and still shows that she has the greatest sympathy with coolie labor and no love for Chiang Kai-shek. Will she have a similar attitude toward the other peoples of Asia, of Africa, and of the South Seas? If so, smooth restoration of colonial imperialism is not going to be easy.

What now can be done by intelligent men who are aware of the continuing danger of present racial attitudes in the world? We may appeal to two groups of men: first, to those leaders of white culture who are willing to take action and, second, to the leaders of races which are victims of present conditions. White leaders and thinkers have a duty to perform in making known the conclusions of science on the subject of biological race. It takes science long to percolate to the mass unless definite effort is made. Public health is still handicapped by superstitions long disproved by science; and race fiction is still taught in schools, in newspapers, and in novels. This careless ignorance of the facts of race is precisely the refuge where antisocial economic reaction flourishes.

We must then, first, have wide dissemination of truth. But this is not all: we need deliberate and organized action on the front where race fiction is being used to prolong economic inequality and injustice in the world. Here is a chance for a modern missionary movement, not in the interest of religious dogma, but to dissipate the economic illiteracy which clouds modern thought. Organized industry has today made the teaching of the elementary principles of economic thought almost impossible in our schools and rare in our colleges; by outlawing "Communistic" propaganda, it has effectually in press and on platform almost stopped efforts at clear thinking on economic reform. Protest and revelation fall on deaf ears, because the public does not know the basic facts. We need a concerted and determined effort to make common knowledge of the facts of the distribution of property and income today among individuals; accurate details of the sources of in-

come and conditions of production and distribution of goods and use of human services, in order that we may know who profits by investment in Asia and Africa as well as in America and Europe, and why and how they profit.

Next we need organized effort to release the colored laborer from the domination of the investor. This can best be accomplished by the organization of the labor of the world as consumers, replacing the producer attitude by knowledge of consumer needs. Here the victims of race prejudice can play their great role. They need no longer be confined to two paths: appeal to a white world ruled by investors in colored degradation or war and revolt. There is a third path: the extrication of the poverty-stricken, ignorant laborer and consumer from his bondage by his own efforts as a worker and consumer, united to increase the price of his toil and reduce the cost of the necessities of life. This is being done here and there, but the news of it is suppressed, the difficulties of united action deliberately increased, and law and government united in colonial areas to prevent organization, manipulate prices, and stifle thought by force. Here colored leaders must act; but, before they act, they must know. Today, naturally, they are for the most part as economically illiterate as their masters. Thus Indian moneylenders are the willing instruments of European economic oppression in India; and many American and West Indian Negroes regard as economic progress the chance to share in the exploitation of their race by whites.

A union of economic liberals across the race line, with the object of driving exploiting investors from their hideout behind race discrimination, by freeing thought and action in colonial areas is the only realistic path to permanent peace today.

A great step toward this would be an international mandates commission with native representation, with power to investigate and report, and with jurisdiction over all areas where the natives have no effective voice in government.

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PROSPECTS FOR A WORLD WITHOUT INTOLERANCE

ELLSWORTH FARIS

ABSTRACT

Intolerance is here defined as any measure of hatred or bitterness between social groups. Five of these are discussed: national, political, religious, racial, and ideological. National friendships and enmities are arranged by officials and are highly impermanent, but peoples follow their rulers, unless disordered conditions precipitate a revolution. Political parties attack one another in bitter words, but the wounds are quickly healed because of an underlying common allegiance to the state. Religious prejudice promises to be lessened by the war, since men of many faiths unite in a supreme effort at home and at the front. The prospects for a world without racial intolerance are very good in some areas and very bad in some others. Ideological differences between radical and revolutionary groups and their opponents promise to be even more acute with increasing intolerance, because of the irreconcilable ends and because the secret planning is believed to portend internecine strife.

Even with cautious reservations the role of prophet is not lightly assumed by the competent sociologist. While prediction may be one of the ultimate ends of science, there are proximate ends to be first attained, and few of those who have ventured to forecast the future with confidence have been men whose words have carried weight. "Other things being equal" (which they never are) and "the present trend continuing" (which it rarely does) are phrases with which our contemporary soothsayers seek to protect themselves. However, a world without intolerance—a world with no intolerance at all—does not impose a difficult task with respect to a forecast of the future. Few would deny that such a utopia is as remote as a world without malaria. Our discussion must be concerned with the prospects of a diminution of intolerance in specific areas and, what is not unthinkable, a melancholy increase in other places.

Another initial obstacle concerns the difficulty of using the word "intolerance" objectively, as becomes a scientific concept. Once, in the days of fierce religious strife, men openly boasted that they were intolerant; but times have changed, or, at least, the word has suffered a semantic modification. In our day those accused of intolerance will deny the charge, for the word has taken on the character of an epithet. It is akin to the word "bigot" and is often used as synonymous with "bigotry." Now "bigot" is a boomerang word, and only bigots

cry "Bigot." He who uses the term, applying it to others, disbars himself.

Intolerance belongs in a group of words like "partiality," "bias," "prejudice," "fanaticism," and so on, all of which are good and useful words, but none of which easily admits of inclusion in the list of scientific concepts, for they all imply the disapproval of the user and an imputation of reproach or guilt, precluding objectivity.

Neither public sentiment nor the laws will tolerate the crime of murder; citizens convicted of treason may be put to death; dangerous enemy aliens are kept behind barbed wire for the safety of the state; Mosely in England was confined without trial. None of these actions is branded as "intolerance," for the word carries a certain odium, and we consider the action appropriate and just. On the other hand, the forcible ejection of a labor organizer from a southern town or the refusal of the people in a village in the Texas Panhandle to allow a Negro to reside there is labeled "intolerance" because we disapprove. If one race of men holds fast to endogamy and forbids intermarriage with outsiders, such action would be considered wise and appropriate by those who insist on it and, at the same time, would be labeled "intolerance" by critics.

We have the two words denoting opposites, namely, "tolerance" and "intolerance," but there is no verb "intolerate." If there were (though surely we have words aplenty), it would appear that, when we

tolerate actions or persons, there is tolerance but that, when we "intolerate," there is no agreement on whether or not there is intolerance. Words have a way of acquiring an opprobrious meaning even when they begin as neutral words, as witness the derivation of such words as "savage" or "knave."

Having made our peace with semantics—or at least waved a flag of truce—we may now proceed to our discussion by announcing that we are concerned with the prospects, in the world after the war, for unity, good will, co-operation, and harmony. What are the prospects for a world without hatred, discord, antagonism, resentment, and bitterness? And, since the millennium delays its coming, what are the prospects for at least an increase of harmony and concord—for a diminution of those sentiments which cause suffering and bring disaster? After the peace will the world be really and truly peaceful?

Let us limit the discussion to collective phenomena, group behavior. Our group relations are many and complex, and only a few can be chosen for examination. Let us consider five of them—five whose importance is at once apparent: nationality groupings, political party affiliations, religious memberships, racial groups, and class-conscious social groups. These groups exhibit characteristic conditions and distinct problems, and we may consider the possibilities of peace or conflict, harmony or discord, with reference to each of these in turn.

First, then, the prospect of good will between the nations of the world. The relation of one nation to another is of supreme importance to the citizens and, at the same time, largely beyond their control. A military alliance may result in disaster and in ruin, but military alliances are not made by peoples; of necessity these are arranged by a small group of officials in power at the time. There is a widespread belief that the Italian people did not want to go to war. The notion that the responsibility rests on "one man and one man alone" may be an oversimplification, but it was relatively a very small group of men who brought their

present sufferings and woe upon the forty-five millions of Italians.

The small group of officials who determine the foreign policy of nations are concerned with security and with power which insures security and prestige—moral considerations are admittedly secondary. The past conduct of a prospective ally is irrelevant. A contemporary leader recently declared that he would make a pact with the devil in order to overcome the enemy, although it must be admitted that, once such an alliance is made, the devil is usually redefined as an angel of light.

The official friendships of nations are among the most transitory and impermanent of human relations. The foe of today may be the ally of tomorrow. Finland, the object of universal sympathy, can become, a few weeks later, the object of suspicion and hostility. Russia, excoriated and denounced, can quickly be accepted as a heroic ally.

There is nothing new in all this. Not only has it always been so but it must always have been so when sovereign states sought to preserve their sovereignty and security. No responsible leader could be excused for acting on sentimental grounds to the detriment of his country's interest. No blame attaches to such conduct, for survival is the first duty of nations.

That alliances are made and broken as expediency dictates is not remarkable but that the people of the nation should so quickly and promptly change their own allegiance and sentiments does raise an interesting question. It testifies eloquently to the strength of the sentiment of patriotism and to the esprit de corps that moves a people to stand by and support their leaders as against other nations, whatever those leaders may do. Objections may be urged to accepting the slogan, "My country, right or wrong," and cogent ethical arguments have been made against it; but, when foreign relations are involved, the people seem always to act on just such a principle. Minor criticisms are uttered and small groups may strike a discordant note, but these are

negligible. The people as a whole will always "go along."

The people "go along," but the stark realism and the single-minded regard for the military security of the state which determine the actions of diplomats are not enough to secure the allegiance of the public. The announced reasons for a change in policy and the propaganda issued in defense of it must be presented in moral terms. Though the sincerity of the leaders may often be lacking, it is a tribute to the moral character of the common man that he must be assured that the actions of his leaders are right and just.

Whether it is always true, as Sumner argues, that might is right, it can hardly be denied that the title to such areas as California, Burma, Hong Kong, and Tunis rests on force and conquest. The list of such "rights" would be so long that we should have to trace our way back into the very beginnings of recorded history and into that unrecorded history which anthropology and archeology seek to restore. But time gives a valid claim if there is interval enough, although the Zionists go back nearly two thousand years in their claim for title. The right of conquest thus is transformed into a moral claim, while at the same time the right to dispossess the present occupants is also defended on moral grounds. Though leaders may be ever so cynical, the people whom they address always want to feel that they are doing right.

We may assume, therefore, that the leaders of the nations which are free to act independently will arrange their friendships and alliances according to their conceptions of the interests of power and security and that there will be friendship between those nations which have made covenants and ill-feeling against those whom the rulers leave on the outside. The sentiments of the people follow the decisions of the foreign office.

What has been said applies particularly to those nations in which the people are living a normal and stable existence. But there is a complicating fact concerning the relations between the Allied powers and those of

the Axis, an Axis which we assume will go down in defeat. Much of Europe and Asia will have been reduced to a shambles in lands where the dead number millions, not all of them soldiers. The attitude of the victors toward the conquered cannot be complacent. Wounds are long in healing, and the demand for vengeance will be insistent. Here, again, the small group of men who impose the settlement have the chief responsibility. Sometimes it is possible to satisfy a whole nation, at least in large measure, by allowing them to look at the altered lines on a redrawn map. But, in spite of all that any human agency can do, it will be a long time before Germany, Italy, and Japan are looked upon with any considerable degree of tolerance.

As to the conquered countries and their people, much will depend on the terms accorded them when their fate is meted out. At present, for better or for worse, many are insisting that the cry shall be "*Vae victis*." So the Romans cried at Carthage, but it is improbable that any attempt will be made to exterminate whole populations. A generous peace seems highly improbable, and even a negotiated peace has been precluded. Punishment of guilty leaders is in the program; but from Joan of Arc to Napoleon the guilty leaders of one day have become the martyrs of a later time. A vindictive peace will assuredly entail a transmissible bitterness, transcending all individual lives, keeping alive the fires of hatred and repressed hostility for centuries—for the memory of a people is long. Poland remembered for a hundred years, Bohemia for three centuries, and some peoples for much longer periods. Justice will, indeed, be attempted, but the injured party is not commonly trusted to administer the penalty, and a treaty, signed at the point of a gun, loses some of its sacred character.

Just what the final terms will be are as yet unannounced in detail; indeed, they are at present in detail unknown. Until these are revealed or, better, until these are actually enforced, it might be better for the prophet to hold his tongue.

When we turn to the question of partisan politics in a representative government, we are on firmer ground, since the field of operations is better known and the area is much more limited. The United States and the British Commonwealth maintain opposition parties, but Italy, Germany, Russia, and China have abolished them. In a representative government, party politics often indeed engenders much bitterness; but this is neither serious nor permanent, for, however savage may be the campaign speeches, hard words are forgotten when the election returns are compiled. Defeated candidates send congratulations to the victor. In the primary elections in America this takes on an amusing form—each of the rival candidates excoriating the others, and then all of the defeated, a few weeks later, working industriously for the very man whom they had declared to be unfit for the office. Everyone understands, for the American primary campaign is merely a rough but friendly game.

Party politics in a democratic state are in active opposition but are, at the same time basically united by an underlying common loyalty and unity of purpose, and therefore the danger of lasting intolerance and permanent bitterness is at a minimum. Neither side seeks to annihilate the other or, indeed, to reduce it to impotence, for the existence of an opposition is regarded as desirable and even essential to the functioning of the modern democratic state. In a dictatorship the opposition party is liquidated: in a democratic government it is encouraged; for both sides, and all sides when there are more than two, profess to be devoted to the welfare of the state and to the maintenance of the existing form of government and are accepted as being so devoted.

For the opposition party is held to render a distinct service to the state itself and even to the party in power. This truth is at times obscured and sometimes forgotten, but it remains a truth. Just as the church owes a debt to the heretics who compel a restatement of the doctrine and a reform in practice, so the opposition leaders and the

opposition press may greatly assist the dominant party. It is sometimes difficult to see this when attacks are made on the New Deal by a press that is violent and ill-tempered, and yet the statement can be successfully defended. The New Deal program was a vast undertaking requiring many thousands of new and untrained officials and the creation of a so-called bureaucracy, highly centralized. No such undertaking could be expected to operate without some friction and some mistakes. Had there been no criticism and no opposition to call attention to abuses and malfunctioning, serious mistakes would undoubtedly have gone uncorrected. That the criticism is sometimes unfair and the charges unfounded may be freely admitted, but it is well for officials to know that someone is watching. Similarly, this war in which we are engaged is a better war and more skilfully conducted because of the vigilant, if partisan, opposition.

The political parties of which we are speaking are divided on details but united on fundamentals. They seek the same end, the welfare of the state, although they are divided on what policies will best promote that welfare. Different parties may, and usually do, represent divergent interest groups and respond to the pressure of these groups, but they seek by compromise to reconcile what is assumed to be reconcilable. The game is rough and sometimes heads are broken (this also happens in football), but the game has rules which all acknowledge. A candidate may prophesy ruin if his opponent is chosen, but afterward he may laugh it off as mere campaign oratory. Such political differences can never produce the lasting bitterness that approaches intolerance.

In totalitarian states the opposition party is not tolerated and is accurately held to be inimicable to the existing regime. The situation is thus entirely different, and the opponents are put to death, imprisoned, driven underground, or exiled. Sometimes they escape from the country, but they are never tolerated.

The question of religious intolerance can be briefly disposed of because it is so easy. In the armed forces millions of men have been chosen by lot, and all the different faiths are mingled in one organization with a mighty purpose to win the war. It could have been freely predicted that association under such conditions would result in mutual understanding and increasing tolerance, and the testimony of soldiers and chaplains alike has confirmed the assumption. Protestants, Catholics, and Jews are comrades in a cause, and faith, reduced to a greatly simplified creed, is said to be characteristic of the soldier. Men in peril of death in battle or in shipwreck are strengthened in faith by their deliverance, while those who are lost do not return to sound a discordant note. Even the official atheism of the Russian Communist party is passed over, for, when men fight for a common end, they do not look for differences, even in religion.

The same unity of feeling on the home front produces the same effect. Concentration on the winning of the war makes men and women willing and eager to welcome others into the co-operative effort and promotes religious tolerance. Religious differences will still exist after the war, and the competition and even conflict between the groups will hardly disappear, but much will be accomplished in the direction of what the sociologists call accommodation.

Those religious groups and individuals who are consciously opposed to the war are not so fortunate. The morning newspaper which appeared the day this article was typed gives the name and address of a young man who, on yesterday, was sentenced to the federal prison for three years of hard labor for the crime of pacifism. Democracies are fighting for the rights of the individual and for the freedom of religion, but they do not tolerate anyone whose conscience opposes the war. Whether this is intolerance depends on the ethical point of view of him who judges, but there are many who have chosen to suffer the penalty rather than do what they contend is sin.

The subject of racial intolerance is of the

highest importance, and its treatment could well occupy far more space than the brief remarks that shall here be made. The outlook is spotty; there will be less of ill feeling in some areas and probably more antagonism in others. Racial prejudice is, unlike the feeling toward political states, relatively independent of formal and official action. It is a matter of the mores and not of the laws. One can have little reason to expect any decrease of antagonism toward the Japanese and every reason to anticipate an increased antagonism for a long time to come. Officially, the Chinese are now to be accepted as immigrants with their appropriate quota, but the acceptance of Chinese as assimilable citizens is a long way off. Australia forbids the entrance of any member of the colored race, and there is no indication of any change in their policy.

There is the possibility of an unprecedented rise of race feeling as a sort of countermovement in the East Indies and Southeast Asia. Just as in Haiti there is a prejudice against the white man, so it is not improbable that the natives of the Indies may manifest a similar reaction against the impassible color line that has existed there ever since the early European conquest.

The most serious racial tension in America concerns the Negro, and prophecy here is fraught with uncertainty. Officially and by law, many of the discriminations have been abolished. Leftist labor groups have, in many instances, discovered that their economic class consciousness has overcome their racial antagonisms. Much of the anti-Negro feeling has arisen from the competition of the Whites at the bottom of the economic ladder, and this situation is changing. On the other hand, a too rapid advance may be followed by a reaction after the war. The Negro has always been tolerated in America, but, while tolerated, a group can be shunned. The outlook is ambiguous, with the probabilities favoring some improvement in the relations between the races.

The fifth and last area of conflict or intolerance that it was proposed to discuss is the issue between the class-conscious group

of the extreme left and the defenders of the existing capitalistic system. It is in no sense invidious to speak of them as revolutionary, since in press and on platform their representatives seriously announce such aims. They are militant, well organized, and very active. Their numbers are probably well known to themselves, but they do not reveal them to their enemies. For they have enemies and regard themselves as enemies of the existing system and of those who support it. They are represented in every civilized country from China and India to France and the United States.

This has, of course, no reference to the larger labor unions in America—coal-miners, railway brotherhoods, automobile workers, and so on—who are continuing their struggle to secure for themselves a betterment of their conditions and a larger share of the national income. These groups sometimes fight with great energy and sometimes with no little hostility, but they operate within the existing political system and seek to use their political power to secure their ends after the manner of all pressure groups, from dairy farmers to the silver senators.

But the class-conscious revolutionary groups are very different, since they find themselves not only opposed to the system of private profit but, unlike the Socialist party in America, convinced that the changes they desire cannot be brought about by peaceful means or the normal democratic processes of campaigning and voting. This is far from being a new movement, it being nearly a hundred years since the publication of the manifesto of Marx. The events of the last twenty-five years have, however, greatly increased the importance of the agitation and augmented the numbers of those who plan to organize society on a different basis and who are of the opinion that it cannot be done peaceably.

In the nature of the case, the activities of a revolutionary group must be largely secret; it would be suicidal for a minority group to declare openly their intention to overthrow the government of the country.

And, because so much is secret, there are many inevitable consequences, one of which has to do with the methods that are employed by their opponents, defenders of the status quo, in combatting the movement. If a man is accused of being a revolutionist, actually engaged in attempts to overthrow the government, he will, if innocent, answer, "No." But if he is, in fact, an enemy of the government seeking its overthrow, he will also answer, "No." The same thing can be said of his comrades and confederates when questioned about him or brought as a witness against him. The Fascists in England and elsewhere wore a distinctive dress—a colored shirt was the usual badge—but the revolutionary of the left adopts, of necessity, secret methods. The result is that the government of every country, in combatting such movements, employs its own secret methods of counterespionage and secret-service agents. The F.B.I. has its counterparts in every country.

These "ideological" differences have been brought prominently to the fore during this second World War and have introduced new complications and very difficult tasks in dealing with the conquered areas and elsewhere. In Italy at the present moment the victors are engaged in the attempt to discover the personal philosophy of the men whom they intrust with responsibility for local or national leadership. Nor is it enough for an official to profess a creed in harmony with the requirements of the authorities—he must demonstrate it or be rejected. The same situation obtains in the attempt of the governments of America and Britain to support a French organization, at this writing in Africa. Words and professions are of no value, reliance being placed on past conduct and former associations. In France and in Italy the conflict is with those of the right; in other places it is the left who are sought and opposed.

It is easy to see why bitterness and intolerance are inseparable from such a struggle. Not only are the aims of the two parties incompatible but the very effort to discover and weed out those who are believed to be

subversive involves charges of evasion, concealment, and mendacity. Worse than this, it necessitates the use of spies whose trustworthiness is often under suspicion. Supporters of the accused will charge the agents of the government with unfairness and persecution and insist that selfish interests and not the welfare of the state are being served. They are met with the retort that the agents of the government are confronted with evasion, prevarication, and dishonesty. The United States Senate recently passed a measure naming three public servants, setting a time limit to their services, and forbidding their reappointment without formal approval after submission of their names. The action was taken in spite of the protests of loyalty on the part of the men involved and on the basis of affiliation with various organizations and certain published utterances. Controversy of the bitterest kind resulted, and no wonder. To question a man's word and to impugn his honesty is a sure way to promote discord, hostility, and intolerance.

With neither side admitting the sincerity or honesty of the other, the outlook is for an unrelenting conflict. This writer recently listened to a speaker who declared that the differences between him and his comrades as opposed to the defenders of the present system could only be settled by bloodshed—conference tables, he declared, were useless.

There is small reason to expect a lessening of this conflict after the war. The final solution may be some compromise, but, in more than one country, it has meant a bitter and bloody struggle. It may well be that in America the issue rests on the success of the efforts to secure full employment and on the progressive extension of social security legislation. Some problems we must leave to our children; perhaps this is one of them.

To summarize, our venture into the field of prophecy has yielded the following conjectures. Nations will be arrayed in friendships and alliances standing opposed to other nations and groups of nations, but these groupings, being arranged by officials, are easily altered and do not preclude

sudden changes in allegiance. The citizens of each country can be expected to follow the leaders in giving and withholding friendship.

The feelings of the inhabitants of the conquered countries will depend on their conception of the justice of their treatment by the victorious powers. A harsh or vindictive peace, or a peace that is strongly believed by those who are overcome to be harsh and vindictive, will leave seeds of bitterness that will not fail to produce, in future years or perhaps future generations, a melancholy harvest.

The Army of the United States is now training a carefully selected group of superior men to have charge of the reconstruction in the conquered lands. They are also training a large number of highly selected young soldiers to be junior officers in the army of occupation. These latter are being given intensive instruction in the language, customs, geography, and social history of the areas, including Germany, with a view to securing efficiency and intelligence in the administration. Much will depend on the orders and instructions given to these men and on the manner in which they perform their duties.

The prospect for partisan bitterness and conflict appears to be very remote. Political parties are often like opposing lawyers in a courtroom; they abuse each other during the trial, but, when the verdict is rendered, they often shake hands and go out together to get a drink.

As to religious intolerance after the war, we saw, or at least we thought we saw, reasons to believe that the common effort in waging a war would produce, at home and in the armies, an enhanced tolerance.

As to racial intolerance, we should expect more toward some (e.g., the Japanese) and less toward others (e.g., the Chinese). As to the racial groups at home we leave the question open; there are too many variables to permit a ready solution of the equation.

And, finally, concerning the "ideological" conflict, as it has come to be called, all signs seem to point to an increasingly sharp

and bitter struggle. When the intellectuals begin to write advocating the revolution, it is taken as a herald of the coming storm. An interesting feature of the revolutionaries is that the intensity of the fires of class hatred seems to melt away completely all race prejudice. Formerly the same convictions caused them to rise above nationalism also, but the stars have conspired against them in this regard.

Will it be a better world after the war? What a question! Cities in ruins; vast areas devastated; natural resources depleted; vast reserves of coal, iron, oil, lumber, copper, and the rest gone forever and into no constructive effort; millions of the finest, strongest, healthiest, and bravest young men slain and multimillions more mutilated or driven insane; women widowed while

virgins of their mates whom they have never seen; starvation and devastation over appalling areas; stunted bodies of children too hardy to perish—all these, besides the hatred, ill will, lies, and hypocrisy on a gigantic scale. These, and much worse than these, result from modern total war.

There are, indeed, those who glory in the war and prophesy good to come out of it; but they are false prophets; for they are the same men who insist that this must be the last war. Why, in heaven's name? If war brings such good, should we not plan for more and greater wars?

It were wiser to admit that war is a monstrous calamity. Our saddened children can only try to save what is left and resolve to avoid the blunders of their fathers.

LAKE FOREST, ILLINOIS

A WORLD WITHOUT PSYCHIC FRUSTRATION

FRANZ ALEXANDER, M.D.

ABSTRACT

Frustration and gratification are functions of each other. Frustration has a useful role to play as part of the developmental process of adaptation. Only those frustrations which leave no hope of solution and are therefore wholly destructive in effect can and should be eliminated.

The editor's request to write about a world without frustration is an embarrassing one for a psychiatrist, because one of the most outstanding phenomena with which he deals in his daily practice is frustration. When he turns from mental sufferers to what is supposed to be the normal man, frustration as a central phenomenon still glares into his eyes as a universal experience. To him, a world from which frustration is banished appears a fantastic utopia. He knows that the Garden of Eden, the Golden Age—whether projected into the past or, as the millennium, into the future—is a wishful fantasy. Frustration as a psychological experience is such a fundamental aspect of life that he is inclined to question the desirability of a world without it. He would even doubt whether life, as a biological phenomenon, would be possible in a universe where frustration has been fully eliminated.

The emotional experience which we call frustration is an essential part of life. It appears in the consciousness as a state of unfulfilment, discomfort, lack of satisfaction. It stimulates the organism to new attempts at gratifying the need or desire which has been thwarted, to try out new methods and make new experiments. It is theoretically conceivable to eliminate all frustrations from the life of a person by controlling the conditions upon which the gratification of all subjective needs and drives depends—a spoiled child comes nearest to this theoretical assumption; but the most common argument against spoiling a child is that later, when the child grows up, he will be unprepared to face the unavoidable frustrations

of life. Under actual conditions everyone—even a spoiled child—is exposed intermittently to frustrations which prompt the organism to undertake groping efforts at their elimination.

As soon as a correct behavior pattern is found suitable for the elimination of a certain type of frustration, it is repeated whenever the same frustrating condition arises. As a result of repetitions, the behavior pattern becomes automatic and is carried out with a minimum expenditure of energy. In this way the organism gradually learns to master a great number of frustrating situations, particularly those which occur frequently during everyday life. Since there are always new situations which the organism has not yet encountered and to which, therefore, it is not adjusted, frustration is an ever recurring experience. Situations with which the organism is unable to cope because of their suddenness or unfamiliarity are called "traumata." When exposed to a trauma, the organism makes unsuccessful attempts to get rid of the excessive excitation caused either by an impact of external violent stimuli or by an excess of frustration caused by unsatisfied needs.

The phenomenology of psychic frustration covers a great variety of experiences: Unsuccessful attempts at the satisfaction of hunger or thirst and the avoidance of exposure to cold; the more complex emotional states, such as thwarted longing for love, futile seeking of recognition or self-expression, all forms of unavailing ambition to achievement; the inability to satisfy a desire for revenge, competition or the domination of others—all belong to the same category

and may create the sensation of frustration. Thus frustration is shown to be an ever present part of the emotional life. In fact, a wish is a wish only as long as it is unfulfilled.

Biology also seems to justify the thesis that struggle against frustrating conditions is an essential part of life. A great part of the anatomical and physiological equipment of the organism serves to master obstacles which interfere with the satisfaction of basic needs. Biologists define life as "a state of dynamic equilibrium," which means that the life-process consists of expenditure of energy which the organism must replace from the environment if life is to be continued; the expenditure and replacement of energy must be in permanent equilibrium to preserve the continuity of life. The process of life itself creates permanent needs for replacement of energy and substance expended. Since this replacement of energy must be obtained from an environment which virtually always contains obstacles, temporary, recurring frustrations are unavoidable.

Theoretically, however, a life without frustration would appear possible when there have been removed from the environment all those obstacles which have to be overcome for the gratification of those needs which the life-process, in constantly using up energy, itself creates.

These obstacles can be divided into two categories—physical obstacles and human obstacles, the latter a result of the competition among men for the resources of life. As to the physical obstacles, we may grant the possibility that further technical advancement and the exploitation of all sources of energy, including the almost unlimited intra-atomic sources, could eventually lead to conditions in which all the basic needs of the human race would be satisfied smoothly, with a minimum of effort. As to the human obstacles also, we may assume that progress in the field of the social sciences and education may gradually lead to a world from which the competition of man against man for the gratification of the basic needs will be eliminated and replaced by mutual

aid and co-operation. It is certain that, in such a planned world, the size of the global population would have to be controlled, since the existing resources necessary for the maintenance of life, although vast, are not infinite on this planet.

Unquestionably, our present technical civilization has brought the fantasy of Aladdin's lamp nearer than ever to its realization. A large portion of our population visualizes the future as a world in which physical comfort is the supreme value; it is inclined to consider as progress everything which brings us nearer to its ideal of a push-button civilization, a mechanical "*Schlaffeland*," in which all our wants and needs will be satisfied, with a minimum expenditure of energy, by the help of clever mechanical devices calculated to satisfy all our needs—shelter, hygienic food, and swift, safe, comfortable locomotion. The scientific counterpart of this popular outlook is the materialistic economic theory which considers the problems of social life solved when all the basic needs of man are satisfied with as little effort as possible. True, if the strivings of the human race consisted in nothing else but the satisfaction of these basic biological needs, such a mechanical push-button civilization, ruled by equalitarian justice, would mean the end of development, and a static world order would ensue.

It belongs to one of those dialectical contradictions of history that this great emphasis upon the economic bases of social life has become so paramount in our era—an era in which the technical mastery of the resources of life has reached unparalleled perfection. Economic insecurity, in this era, has become the central theme which animates the masses, influences the internal and external politics of nations, and finds expression in materialistic political theories.

There were periods in our Western civilization, before the great technical advancement took place, in which the maintenance of life was a routine matter; the economic and social functions of everyone were well defined, and the satisfaction of these needs

better insured; economic security was taken more for granted than in our industrial era. There are also contemporary, so-called "primitive" societies of similar structure. In such a society man can emancipate himself from the relentless concern and anxiety for the morrow and turn his energies toward the less material aspects of life. Then the creative functions of the mind become activated in the forms of folk art and in those customs and rituals of everyday life which elevate human existence above mere vegetation.

It is not a mere coincidence that there has been scarcely any period of human history in which popular art—creative expression of the masses—has been at a lower ebb than in our contemporary industrial cities. A mathematically conceived standard of living has taken the place of such unscientific concepts as human happiness. Technical advancement has obviously achieved the opposite of its goal; although it raised the standard of living, it at the same time introduced a far greater amount of that sense of insecurity which drags man down to exclusive concern with the basic needs of existence and absorbs all his energies. The creative aspects of life, of necessity, must recede into the background because they are the expressions of that surplus energy which is liberated from the struggle to maintain vegetative existence. The most grotesque feature of this picture is that the possession of those technical facilities, which should make the vegetative foundations of life easier, has become an all-absorbing goal in itself; for the majority of the population, the essence of life consists in a yearly turning-in of gadgets of lower quality for those of higher quality. The possession of an automobile is no longer subordinated to the purpose of locomotion but becomes a cherished goal in itself. The tourist, rushing blindly from place to place and bringing home nothing but the memory of daily accomplishment measured in miles, bears out the validity of this contention.

All this is not intended as a jeremiad against our technical civilization. I wish only to point out that paradoxical feature

of our culture—that the machine, because of our failure to use it in a socially reasonable fashion, instead of minimizing the basic problems of vegetative existence, has increased the sense of insecurity and brought concern for the basic needs into the foreground.

The scientific counterpart of this emotional orientation is the growing emphasis upon the adaptive aspects of life—on the gratification of needs with minimum expenditure of energy, on security and stability—and a neglect of all other aspects of life, such as creativeness, wish for adventure, longing for the challenge of obstacles, all of which are manifestations of surplus energy. This all-pervading sense of insecurity explains the high premium currently set on organization and stability; it explains also the fear of initiative, of chance and frustration.

However, elimination of frustration from human experience can be neither a realistic nor a desirable goal. In fact, frustration and gratification belong together; gratification without some antecedent frustration is hardly conceivable. This principle is instinctively known to every woman who keeps her suitor in suspense; to every mother who playfully teases her baby by now showing, now hiding, the desired object; and to every author who piques his reader's curiosity by withholding the clue to the crime, by making him participate in all the harassing vicissitudes of the hero.

In folklore and fable the most common motif is a frustrating situation. In order to deserve the princess, the hero has to conquer the villain, the seven-headed hydra, the sorcerer, the tyrant; or he must first accomplish some great creative task. This shows only too clearly that, when man is following freely the course of his imagination, frustrating obstacles to be conquered belong to the steady repertoire of desires. Even Aladdin's lamp allows him the gratification of only three wishes and not a continuous indulgence of all his momentary desires. Such a super-Aladdin-lamp, indeed, would not appeal to our imagination; life

under such conditions would become utter boredom.

It seems, then, that only the poltroon would dream of an existence from which frustration is fully eliminated and in which all wishes are satisfied without expenditure of effort. In fact, one would be inclined to diagnose this type of fantasy in the case of an individual as a sign of infantilism and regression and, in the case of a nation, as a sign of decadence.

That life and struggle are inseparable is the thesis of the Hungarian dramatist Emmerich Madach in his *Tragedy of Man*. Lucifer exposes to Adam the future of the human race—the tyranny of the Egyptian pharaohs, the collapse of the Roman Empire, the Dark Ages, the French Revolution, Fourier's phalanster state leading up to a new Ice Age in which there will be too many Eskimos and too few sea lions. Discouraged, Adam challenges God: "What is the sense of life if it always leads to frustration?" The drama ends with God's voice to Adam: "Man, struggle and trust."

The intuition of the poet here anticipated scientific insight. Frustration *with* hope is a constructive factor of life; *without* hope, it is destructive. Continuous frustrating conditions which do not allow any hope for their mastery lead to defeatism and neurotic failure. Not the elimination of frustration, but the elimination of *hopeless* frustration alone, must be the aim of the social reformer.

There seems to be little doubt that in organic development—both phylogenetic and ontogenetic—frustration is one of the great driving factors. Whenever conditions which the organism has learned to master in the past change, frustration sets in and lasts until the organism learns to master the new situation. Frustration is the sign of a failure in mastery and in the motivation for achieving new mastery.

Where there is change, there is also frustration. Every living organism grows; and the process of growth is nothing but a series of modifications in the structure and size of the organism. Every new phase of the

growth process involves frustrations requiring new adjustments. Not only the structure of the organism is altered but also the external conditions. Stable conditions are not an attribute of the physical universe as we know it. Because of organic growth and changing external conditions, frustration is an integral part of life.

The opposite of frustration is adaptation. Whenever an organism is adapted to its external and internal environment, frustration is temporarily absent. However, every adaptation is only temporary, because the organism as well as the environment is constantly changing. Adaptation saves expenditure of energy because adapted behavior tends to become automatic and to require a minimum expenditure of energy.

One of the most fundamental but neglected facts of biology and psychology is that the surplus energy saved by adaptive behavior is expended in growth and play by the young organism, and in reproduction by the mature organism. Eros is the god of both play and love. In play activities the young organism exercises those faculties which later will be utilized for survival. Reproduction on the biological level, social productivity on the social level, are manifestations of surplus in the mature organism.

Both in play and in creation, expenditure of surplus energy becomes an aim in itself. In play, obstacles are sought by the organism for the sole purpose of overcoming them, thus giving opportunity for the victorious feeling of mastery. In all creative activities the organism sets a goal outside its own self—a goal which is not subordinated to anything but is an aim in itself.

The propensity of the living organism to utilize surplus energy in a creative way makes those arguments pointless which warn us that universal social security would terminate human progress. It is true that if our technical mastery of nature were utilized in a socially reasonable manner, it would increase the general security and reduce the expenditure of energy necessary for the maintenance of life. However, there is no need to fear that this would lead to

lack of initiative and thus to social stagnation. On the contrary—the energy saved by a socially just utilization of the machine would be used for creative purposes and thus for new progress.

One thing must not be forgotten, however. While biological propagation is an inherited drive, social productivity has to be learned. In a society in which the machine and its comforts are aims in themselves there is no hope for real productivity, and the surplus energies saved by the machine will, through lack of constructive

goals, be used for mutual destruction. The raising of the standard of living cannot remain an aim in itself but must be subordinated to the creative use of surplus energies.

If this industrial civilization is to survive, the sound economic understructure of society must be considered merely a means to an end. It is not further technical discoveries but education in the creative use of the energies which have been saved by technological knowledge that is the pressing need of the coming era.

WHAT IS SOCIAL ORDER?

LAWRENCE K. FRANK

ABSTRACT

Social order has long been conceived as an organization or mechanism which exists as a part of the cosmos and operates through large-scale forces acting at a distance. Social theory has taught man that he must learn to submit to these assumed forces and accept this cosmic organization as necessary to social order, while social research has attempted to measure these assumed forces. Recent studies of culture and personality indicate that social order is not given but arises from the historically developed ideas, beliefs, and patterns of conduct and of feeling which each culture has evolved as the guides to human conduct and the management of group activities. Moreover, recent studies indicate that social disorders and conflicts arise from the distorted personalities fostered by those cultural traditions. This newer conception of social order offers an escape from the defeatist beliefs so long accepted and suggests a reformulation of the tasks of social order and of the problems of social research.

Interest in the question of social order has been steadily mounting during the past few years. Today probably more individuals, both professional and lay, are aware of this question than ever before, since the issue raised by the proposal to establish the New Order in Europe has been made acute by the war and by the anxieties over a post-war world.

I

There is a widely held belief in the existence of an over-all superorganic social system or organization which operates through large-scale social forces that govern our whole social life. This belief in a social mechanism not only is held by the general public and by those who speak and write on public affairs but is also accepted by various groups of social scientists who are studying social life. In both the textbook presentations of economics, political science, and sociology (although the latter has been changing very rapidly in the last two decades) and in the monographs and research publications by members of these disciplines one finds either an explicit statement or a more or less implicit assumption that whatever happens in a society is to be viewed as the outcome of the operation of large-scale social forces, which, acting at a distance, produce all our social events. Whenever anything goes wrong in our society and the customary institutional practices of economics, politics, and social life fail to operate as expected, the

statement is made that someone or some group has been violating or interfering with the operation of social forces or economic laws. Therefore, the only remedy for our difficulties is to conform to the requirements of this assumed social system and to accept the operation of these social forces with full recognition that they alone can bring resolution of our difficulties. Consequently, it is believed that the only hope for attainment of order and intelligence in social affairs is through the slow and painful disclosure of the major features of this assumed social mechanism or system and through the quantitative determination of these assumed social forces.

This general conception and mode of thinking about social life is so familiar and so widely accepted that we must pause and reflect upon its implications before we can begin to realize just how extraordinary these ideas really are.

No one has ever been able to point out or to identify any kind of structure or organization that corresponds to this belief; indeed, the conception of a social system or organization carries with it the unspoken but well-accepted implication that it exists somewhere out in space, between the earth and the sky, and operates like gravitation. Moreover, no one has ever been able to measure or otherwise detect the operation of these assumed social forces which are always inferred from the variety of statistical data

of economic, political, and social activities, such as prices, wages, production and consumption of goods and services, votes, etc.

The persistent belief in these social forces is supported by the well-established practice among social scientists of reifying data into entities: prices, wages, rents, votes, and other formal records of human activity in these symbolic patterns are treated as actual events or entities with an independent existence and energy apart from the actors who create them. The changing aggregates of these data-entities are then treated as forces which do things to individuals and group life and to other entities.

A clue to the understanding of this curious situation may be found in the historical development of modern social theories, more especially in the elaboration of the political, the economic, and, later, the sociological theories that have arisen since the seventeenth century.¹ What apparently occurred was that first the political theorists, attempting to find some basis for order in political life and to provide a substitute for the older absolutist conceptions of sovereignty (divine right), took over the conceptual apparatus of Newtonian celestial mechanics and began to formulate theories of government and social organization in terms of natural laws and the cosmology which Newton and his successors had developed. Likewise, when the economists attempted to formulate a theory of economic activities in order to rationalize the coming industrialism and foreign-trade economy in England, they likewise used the Newtonian formulation and conceived of an *economic system* operating through large-scale economic forces, following closely the pattern of Newton's idea of the solar system and his conception of gravitation as a cosmic force acting at a distance. Thus it was that Adam Smith could develop his polemic against the older institutional and legislative framework that was obstructing the early de-

velopment of what we now call modern industry; and thus he could formulate his theory of economics, which encouraged and guided those who were eager to exploit the new machinery and opportunities for trade. In his formulation he could, with entire confidence, rely upon the operation of the "unseen hand" because he was so thoroughly convinced that all economic activities were governed by this assumed economic system and regulated by the operation of these assumed economic forces.

A critical examination of the different schools of social theory will show that with a few exceptions, which have been either ridiculed or ignored, social scientists as a group have clung to this conceptual apparatus, one which offers a framework with which they can attempt to order and explain social events and group living. It is also interesting to note that, with the development of quantitative statistical methodologies that were welcomed as the instruments that would make social science "really scientific"—i.e., quantitative—the work of the quantitative students has been largely devoted to the attempt to demonstrate statistically the operation of these supposed social and economic forces and to establish beyond the possibility of doubt the existence of this assumed system of social and economic laws governing all human activities. Even the very recent studies of business cycles have been predicated upon the assumption—more often implied than explicitly stated—that the fluctuations in economics, industry, and business were the outward, visible signs of this assumed cosmic organization that governs all economic life. As indicated earlier, some of the sociologists have repudiated this search for a social mechanism or system and have begun to study human conduct and the institutional patterns of social living that give rise to various social data.

In accordance with the basic stock of ideas with which western European culture has operated since Newton, the search for the order and meaning of social life and events has been directed by the hope of re-

¹ Cf. the writer's paper, "The Principle of Disorder and Incongruity in Economic Affairs," *Political Science Quarterly*, XLVII, No. 4 (December, 1932), 515-25.

vealing an all-powerful, controlling system or mechanism that governs and directs all social life—a search directed also by the belief that helpless man could hope for security and peace only by learning to conform to this all-powerful system and its forces and powers.

This way of thinking has been supported by the theological, philosophical, and psychological beliefs with which western European culture has, from its early days, attempted to understand human affairs and explain social group life. One is struck by the persistence of what may be called a basically defeatist attitude in western European culture in the sense that man has persistently viewed himself as at the mercy of something larger and more powerful than himself to whom or to which he must passively submit, be it an all-powerful deity or sovereign, an autocratic father, or some other authoritarian symbol or person or cosmic force.

With such a widespread belief in an underlying social and economic system operated by large-scale social forces and duly sanctioned by legal, philosophical, and even theological support, it is not difficult to understand how the discussion of social order, and especially the frequent discussion of so-called "social problems," usually falls into the familiar pattern.² First, there is the presentation of the social difficulty arising from the inadequacy of the customary institutional practices for meeting social and individual requirements, such as poverty, housing, labor difficulties, etc., followed by a long recital of the various direct and contributing "causes," with the concluding demonstration that only in so far as we are prepared to stop interfering with the operation of economic or social laws can we hope for any mitigation of our difficulties or any resolution of our problems. The further discussions of social problems are carried on almost exclusively in terms of how to persuade individuals and groups to conform to

the requirements of that system and its basic laws of operation.

II

If social order is not a part of the cosmos, arising from the operation of large-scale forces, how can we understand social life and its ongoing processes and events? Perhaps the most promising approach to that question is through more recent studies of culture and personality, which offer a dynamic conception of how group life is patterned and organized in and through the conduct and feelings of the individuals composing that group.

As we look over the world we see man existing as an organism in the geographical space of nature, from which he derives his nurture, his security, and his survival. Thanks to his mammalian ancestry, he can and does live in an extraordinary range of temperatures, altitudes, and geographical conditions to which he has adapted his very plastic organism.³

Nowhere, however, do we find man living on an elemental level of physiological functioning and organic impulse as do his fellow-mammals. Everywhere he lives in groups which historically have each developed a cultural world and a social order as their way of meeting the persistent tasks of life—coming to terms with nature for sustenance and survival, organizing their group life, and regulating conduct. Thus we find man imposing upon nature and upon himself certain assumptions and beliefs, specific patterns of conduct and of human relations with which he has attempted to create a human way of life in place of an organic existence.

In order to come to terms with nature and obtain the sustenance, shelter, and security he requires, man has had to make certain assumptions about the universe: how it was created and how it operates and where the power and control over events are located. He also has had to conceive of himself in re-

² Cf. the writer's paper, "Social Problems," *American Journal of Sociology*, XXX, No. 4 (January, 1925), 462-73.

³ See the writer's paper, "Man's Multidimensional Environment," *Scientific Monthly*, LVI (April, 1943), 344-57.

lation to nature—especially how he was created and to what end or purpose he is destined. Moreover, he has had to work out some scheme of the relation of the individual to his fellows and of their common group life in order to answer the exigent question of who shall be sacrificed for whom. Finally, he has had to develop a conception of human nature and an image of the self in order to regulate and direct his conduct.⁴

From the reports on different cultures all over the world, as observed by anthropologists, we are learning that there is an extraordinary variety of these basic assumptions and beliefs in terms of which different groups have sought to make their lives orderly and meaningful, to give living some tension and purpose beyond eating, fighting, and procreating. In accordance with these convictions each generation rears its children to see the world and themselves in terms of its traditional beliefs and assumptions and to pattern their action, speech, beliefs, and feelings according to the group-sanctioned traditions.

Thus we find different groups attempting to achieve social order in and through diverse beliefs and ways of organizing human conduct and interpreting experience. Each culture, with its selective awareness and its more or less biased or warped aspirations, may be viewed as one of the many ways in which man has sought a design for living. As Ortéga y Gasset has pointed out, culture is that which is sought in human conduct and each culture makes a virtue of its deficiencies—of what it ignores or neglects.

If, then, we think of culture as the regulation of human functioning and impulse, as the patterning of human behavior into orderly conduct in accordance with the basic assumptions and beliefs and the sensibilities of each group, we shall see that social order is not an inherent part of the cosmos but is that which is sought after or aspired to.

Culture exists or operates in human be-

ings, who, by their patterned conduct and way of life, create whatever social order there is. Here we should recognize that what we call private property and the sanctity of the person are not properties of things or persons nor are they mysterious powers surrounding objects and people; they are the learned habits or patterns of respecting the inviolability of things and persons which children develop under the tuition of parents and teachers, who inculcate the necessary inhibitions in the young.⁵ Moreover, the various patterns of conduct exhibited by men and women—as masculine and feminine roles, as responses to the immense array of conventionalized situations and relations and of rituals and symbols—all these are learned conduct, painfully acquired by children, often under severe discipline and terrorizing threats of immediate or deferred punishment. Every situation and every object and person is defined by the parent or teacher in terms of what the child must not do—or may, can, or must do—according to his age, sex, status, class, and other categories of social participation.

Along with all these lessons in conduct the child is taught the basic beliefs and assumptions as formulated in what we call religion, law, ethics and morals, folklore and the arts, so that for every lesson in conduct he learns the group-accepted reasons and sanctions therefor.

Later, as the child grows older, he is instructed in the institutional practices of contract, barter, sale, employment, voting and litigation, courtship and marriage and divorce, and all the other rituals and symbolic patterns through which one individual approaches, negotiates, and comes to terms with another over property or his services or his person. Thus the multiplicity of individual activity in a group is limited and channeled into the group-sanctioned patterns and thereby gives rise in the aggregate to that observed order, regularity, and uniformity which have been heretofore viewed

⁴ See the writer's paper, "Science and Culture," *Scientific Monthly*, L, No. 6 (June, 1940).

⁵ See the writer's paper, "The Concept of Inviolability in Culture," *American Journal of Sociology*, XXXVI, No. 4 (January, 1931), 607-15.

as the operation of an organization or social system.

Thus we can see how the appearance of large-scale social forces arises from the expression of human behavior in more or less stereotyped patterns of action, reaction, and interaction, even in the use of tools and technology, which is always governed by the customary practices of private property, contract, etc. Moreover, the so-called abnormal or antisocial behavior in crimes and delinquencies, alcoholism and drug addiction, sex offenses, mental disorders, and similar deviant activities is revealed as the conduct of those who do not conform to or abide by the prescribed norms of action, speech, belief, and feeling, because, as we are now realizing, their childhood experiences have failed to provide such patterns, or those provided have so warped, twisted, and distorted them that such socially desirable conduct is impossible for them. Social adjustment is not therefore primarily to something outside, like weather or gravitation, but rather is the way an individual has tried to come to terms with his past experience and how he has accepted his forgotten childhood, with all the corroding feelings of anxiety, guilt, and resentment so often created by childhood experience.

Out of the process of being culturized and taught to be a participating member of the group life each individual learns his peculiar idiomatic version of what his culture and society mean. In terms of these lessons and of the persistent feelings he has developed from such teachings, each individual develops his own idiosyncratic way of organizing and interpreting experience and reacting affectively—with feelings—toward other people. This dynamic process of organizing experience according to what it means for the individual is what we call "the personality."⁶

Social order, therefore, appears as the way different personalities have accepted and translated the teachings of their culture

and have learned to use the group-sanctioned practices of institutional life as their personal design for living. Social order arises, therefore, not from some mysterious cosmic mechanism but from the patterning of human behavior into the conduct approved by the group traditions.

III

In the light of the foregoing discussion the question that insistently rises is: How does this conception of social order offer any clues to the exigent social and international situation which we face today? If we cannot invoke any large-scale cosmic mechanisms or forces or laws with which to persuade or coerce groups to maintain social order and establish international peace, what, if anything, can we invoke, both as a process and as a goal, to meet the approaching threat of increasing social disorder and international anarchy?

Every great advance in human life has been initiated by a critical examination of traditions and by the formulation of new ideas and concepts and aspirations with which succeeding generations have grappled with the persistent tasks of life that face every group and have sought anew to realize the enduring human values.⁷ If we hope to develop a social order in which the amazing and rapidly increasing scientific knowledge and technology can be wisely and effectively used for human needs and values, in which some kind of decent social life can be established and maintained, and in which our basic democratic aspirations toward the recognition and conservation of human personality can be pursued, it seems obvious that we must seek a new framework of ideas and beliefs and a clarification of the persistent human values which have so long been frustrated and defeated. No one who candidly examines the history of western European culture can believe that we have ever had what could validly be called "social order." The historical record shows exploitation,

⁶ See the writer's paper, "Projective Methods for the Study of Personality," *Journal of Psychology*, VIII (1939), 389-413.

⁷ Cf. Frederick J. Teggart, *The Processes of History* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1918), esp. chap. iv.

conflict, wars, and persecution—indeed, every form of social disorder, social degradation, and defeat; and be it noted that there has never been lacking a well-formulated body of justification and rationalization for all the disasters, disorders, and defeats man has suffered or inflicted upon others. Indeed, even today we are assured by some theologians, publicists, and social theorists that what is happening is a well-merited punishment or divine retribution for man's misdeeds and mistakes, with the implication or even the explicit declaration that man is essentially and completely helpless in the face of divine and cosmic processes. Perhaps the major obstacle we face today, therefore, is this essentially defeatist tradition expressed in the various conceptions of social order described earlier, as above and beyond all human control, if not understanding, and in the reiterated belief in man's innate depravity or fall from grace, from which only divine help can rescue or restore him.

In this situation, therefore, we can and must find the courage to view social order as that which must be achieved by man himself. Then the most promising approach to social order is through the reformulation of our major assumptions and beliefs and through the modification of the process of education by which our culture and our social patterns are inculcated in the growing child. No other promising alternative seems available unless we accept some form of imposed or authoritarian order.

More specifically, this leads to the question of what kinds of character-structure personalities are being fostered by our traditional methods of child-rearing and education, under the influence of our historically developed conceptions of human nature and conduct and of the relation of the individual to his group. As long as we believe that human nature is fixed and unchangeable and continue to accept the theological conceptions of man as one who must be disciplined, coerced, and terrorized or supernaturally assisted into being a decent human being and a participating member of

society, so long will we continue to create warped, twisted, distorted personalities who continually threaten, if they do not frustrate and break down, all our efforts toward social order. It must not be forgotten that, while an occasional saint arises, the ideas and beliefs and processes of child-rearing produce the many unhappy, malevolent personalities who make life for themselves and for all others a tragic defeat. What is becoming increasingly clear from both clinical and experimental studies of human conduct is that if, during the process of early childhood education, the individual has been unnecessarily deprived and frustrated, coerced, harshly disciplined, or terrorized by parents and other adults, he may and usually does learn to conform outwardly, but he develops persistent affective reactions toward life, with strong feelings of anxiety, guilt, and especially of resentment and hostility. Carrying these often intolerable burdens of feelings within him but forbidden to release them in any overt activities, he seeks all manner of surreptitious and disguised outlets, finding in business and professional life, in politics, in educational endeavors, in marriage, in family life, and in parenthood—indeed, in every socially sanctioned occupation and activity—innumerable occasions in which to express these persistent affective trends, with consequent injury to others and to social order.

If such persons are anxious and insecure, their major endeavor in life will be to build up strong walls of defense through a thousand and one neurotic patterns that make life a burden to themselves and to others with whom they come in contact as they obstruct and oppose every endeavor that seems to offer a threat to their own precarious positions. In every organized activity of life we find such individuals engaged in quiet but effective sabotage and opposition to others, continually alert to frustrate others and especially to oppose every program in which they can interfere because it provides a release for their anxiety and an outlet for their malevolence. If they come to adult life suffering from strong feelings of guilt that

have been imposed upon them by parents and adults who have scolded and punished them for childish misdeeds, then they will engage in a wide variety of activities through which they may vicariously atone or else project their guilt on others whom they can vigorously attack, as is seen so clearly in the lives of fanatic reformers and others who spend their lives in passionate attacks on other individuals or in persistent efforts to convert others to the particular form of doctrine which they have embraced as an aid to carrying such burdens of guilt.

Still others who have grown up feeling that they are worthless and useless, that they are unwanted and unloved, will go through life with corroding and resentful feelings toward life; they will spend all their days in a persistent endeavor to "get even," to retaliate, to block and destroy others in order to release the hate they feel. Often this resentment becomes a strong hostility toward the world which drives them to every manner of destructive, antisocial activities, including war and destruction. Even though they gain nothing by what they do, nevertheless they are driven by this inner pressure of hostility to attack and destroy wherever possible.

If these strong affective threats appeared only in the well-recognized individuals suffering from mental disorders or engaged in what we call delinquency and crime, they would be serious but not fatal threats to social order. What we must face, however, is that the major activities in our social life, carried on through our group-sanctioned institutional practices of business, politics, and professional life, are, to an unbelievable extent, dominated by these destructive personality trends. The evidence is in the clinical records and the reports of what has been happening in our social activities—the breakdown of ethics and the rise of racketeering in almost every group and professional activity. It should scarcely be necessary to point out that a free society demands self-discipline and the highest standard of personal and institutional ethics; otherwise social order and freedom must be main-

tained by authoritarian commands, policing, and submissive obedience.⁸

If we genuinely seek social order, we must therefore begin to think in terms of culture and personality and to conceive of social order as that which must be achieved. Moreover, we must attempt to reconstruct the underlying ideas, conceptions, and beliefs of western European culture—a Promethean task, but one that we cannot evade since those historical conceptions and beliefs are all obsolete, if not archaic, and no longer credible or even useful for ordering experience and giving meaning and significance to our lives. Our historically developed social patterns and institutions, based upon those obsolete ideas and looking to our legal and religious sanctions for support of such archaic beliefs, no longer will serve to organize group living or to guide individual conduct; we cannot any longer believe in them or abide by their guidance. Moreover, our sensibilities are changing so that increasingly we are unable to tolerate the degradation and wastage of human life and personalities which the traditional social arrangements impose upon so many, even upon the so-called "successful" and "powerful."⁹

The crucial question involved in every attempt to achieve social order is "Who shall be sacrificed for whom?" Today, underneath the conflict and disorders of a war-torn world, there is a growing demand for human conservation and for a social order dedicated to human needs and values.¹⁰ As long as we are at the mercy of the warped, distorted personalities who seek power and prestige in our political, economic, and professional life, at whatever cost to others, we are helpless; but in recognizing that it is our obsolete, archaic culture and our traditional

⁸ See Erich Fromm, *Escape from Freedom* (New York: Farrar & Rinehart, 1941), esp. chaps. iv and v.

⁹ See the writer's paper, "The Cost of Competition," *Plan Age*, VI, Nos. 9-10 (December, 1940), 314-24.

¹⁰ Natural Resources Planning Board, *Human Conservation* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1943).

practices of child-rearing which create these malevolent personalities, we can escape the ancient defeatism of the past and face a problem that is basically within man's own power to meet.

It is evident that there are, as indicated earlier, certain persistent tasks of life that can be neither evaded nor ignored. They present social problems that cannot be solved, since each generation must face those tasks and formulate those problems anew in the light of its knowledge and understanding, its insights and aspirations, and its sensibilities. There can be no utopian solution that will permanently endure. Man himself must courageously and hopefully look forward to an unending endeavor to achieve social order and to create a human way of life.

In these terms, therefore, we can begin to examine the problems of social order and the immense task of developing a world order wherein we can hope to realize some of the hopes and aspirations now arising in the minds and hearts of man. The most effective answer to the proposed New Order of the dictators is a conception of social and of world order that will enlist the energies and sympathies of men and women of good will everywhere.¹¹ Out of the present struggle and turmoil, black as it now appears, may then come an opportunity to seek anew, in a saner, more wholesome social order, the persistent human values that have for so long been denied.

NEW YORK CITY

¹¹ Lawrence K. Frank, "World Order and Cultural Diversity," *Free World*, III, No. 1 (June, 1942).

IN MEMORIAM
ROBERT E. PARK, 1864-1944

ERNEST W. BURGESS

Robert E. Park, fifteenth president of the American Sociological Society, died in Nashville, Tennessee, February 7. Born in Luzerne County, Pennsylvania, on February 14, 1864, he grew up in a Minnesota town on the Mississippi River.

Interested from boyhood in the observation of human behavior, he became active as a student in the University of Michigan in the social, political, and philosophical discussions which were stirring others of inquiring mind, including John Dewey, George H. Mead, and Franklin Ford. Upon graduation in 1887 he worked for newspapers in Minneapolis, Detroit, and Chicago, first as reporter then as writer of special articles of human interest and of social import and later as city editor.

Finding that journalism did not provide the answers to the puzzling questions of human behavior which it often dramatically posed, he returned to his studies first at Harvard University (M.A. 1899) under William James and Josiah Royce and then in Germany (Ph.D. Heidelberg, 1904) under Windelband and Simmel.

Returning to the United States, he sought a more active participation in the observation and study of human behavior than was provided at that time in the academic environment. Selecting race relations as a pressing problem of great theoretical and practical importance, he spent the years from 1905 to 1914 in the South, serving most of this time in an informal capacity as secretary and associate of Booker T. Washington. Together they made the study of the European peasant reported in the latter's book, *The Man Farthest Down*.

Upon the initiative of W. I. Thomas and at the invitation of Albion W. Small, Park joined the staff of the department of sociology of the University of Chicago in 1914. He continued teaching as emeritus professor two years after his retirement, in 1936 becoming visiting professor of sociology at Fisk University.

At various times he was on leave of ab-

sence from his university work, serving as a staff member of the Americanization Study of the Carnegie Corporation, 1918-19; as director of the Race Relations Survey of the Pacific Coast, 1923-25; as research professor, University of Hawaii, 1931-32; as lecturer, Yenching University, China, autumn, 1932; and studying problems of race relations in India, Africa, and Brazil, 1933.

Beginning his teaching career at fifty, he developed his own methods of instruction with an emphasis upon research and frequent consultations with each student. His keen sense for the significant in human behavior, his penetrating insight, his stimulating suggestions, his provocative statement of theoretical points, his capacity for stating problems in the framework of a conceptual system, his unswerving devotion to research as central in sociological training, and not least the impact of his vigorous and vivid personality left a lasting impression upon successive groups of graduate students many of whom are now well known for contributions to research undertaken under his guidance.

Park combined in rare degree the capacity for research upon concrete problems and the drive to work out an integrated system of sociology in its functional relations to the other sciences, social, biological, and physical. He conceived of sociology as a natural science but with the necessity of devising methods of investigation appropriate to the study of human beings. The *Introduction to the Science of Sociology*, published in 1921, contained the general outlines of his system of sociology, many features of which he further developed in his projected *Sociology*, a complete collection of his published and unpublished writings upon which he was at work up to the time of his last illness. His outstanding special contributions opened up new vistas for research in the fields of race relations, the newspaper, the urban community, human ecology, and collective behavior.

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

NEWS AND NOTES

NOTES

Amalgamated Clothing Workers Union.—Miss Vera Miller, of the University of Chicago, has taken a position in the research department of the Amalgamated Clothing Workers Union, New York City.

University of Kansas.—Dr. Mapheus Smith is on leave from the University of Kansas to take a position in the Division of Research and Statistics of National Headquarters, Selective Service System, Washington, D.C.

Pacific Sociological Society.—The regular annual meeting has not been held this year. The officers, elected by mail ballot, are: *President*, William C. Smith, Linfield College, McMinnville, Oregon; *Vice-Presidents*, Northern Division: Robert H. Dann, Oregon State College; Central Division: Richard T. LaPiere, Stanford University; Southern Division: Ray E. Baber, Pomona College; *Secretary-Treasurer*, Calvin F. Schmid, University of Washington; *Members of the Advisory Council*, Dorothy S. Thomas, University of California, and Erle F. Young, University of Southern California.

Universities Committee on Post-war International Problems.—The following fundamental beliefs led to the formation of the Universities Committee:

The problems of the coming post-war settlement are perhaps more difficult and more momentous than any with which the human mind has hitherto been confronted. . . . In this task American scholars, or those among them not wholly engrossed in duties connected with the military effort, have a special responsibility and a unique opportunity. . . . While organizations already exist in a number of colleges and

universities for the study of these questions, it is desirable that their activities should be effectively correlated, and that additional groups should be created in other institutions so as to spread the movement as widely as possible.

Cooperating Groups are organized in university and college faculties throughout the country, each Group retaining the maximum freedom of action consistent with effective collaboration. Some 125 Groups have already been formed and interest in the plan has been expressed in many other institutions. The Groups vary in size from 4 to 68, with an average membership of 16. New Groups may be added at any time and existing Groups are asked to encourage the formation of others. . . .

The reports of the discussions and conclusions of the Cooperating Groups are carefully summarized and distributed to the members of the Groups, and to other interested individuals and organizations, including Government officials and agencies. . . .

The following topics have been selected for discussion by the co-operating groups. On the first eight topics, problem analyses have already (October 15) been prepared and printed in pamphlet form. Analyses of the other topics are being made ready, though there may be some changes in their order of appearance or some modification in the topics to be treated.

- I. Should the Governments of the United Nations at This Time Formulate and Announce a "Common Strategy for Peace"?
- II. By What Method and through What Stages Should the Final Peace Settlement Be Reached?
- III. Treatment of Defeated Enemy Countries—Germany
- IV. Should There Be an International Organization for General Security against Military Aggression, and Should the United States Participate?

pate in Such an Organization? (In two parts.)

- V. Relief and Rehabilitation
- VI. International Economic Collaboration
- VII. Education and World Peace
- VIII. Proposed Methods and Agencies for International Economic Collaboration. Should America Participate in Them?
- IX. Colonies and Dependent Areas
- X. Protection by International Action of the Freedom of the Individual
- XI. Bases of Peace in the Pacific Area
- XII. Control of Strategic Areas—Land, Water, and Air
- XIII. International Communications and Air and Sea Transport
- XIV. Self-determination and the Treatment of Minorities
- XV. Plans for an International Armed Force
- XVI. The Role of the Small Powers in the Postwar International System
- XVII-XIX. General Character, Powers, and Structure of the International Organization. (The specific subjects to be treated will be decided later.)
- XX. Constitutional Aspects of American Participation in an International Organization

The committee's officers are: *Chairman*, Ralph Barton Perry; *Vice-Chairmen*, Frank Aydelotte, Edwin F. Gay, Arthur O. Lovejoy; *Executive Secretary*, Leland M. Goodrich; and *Secretary*, Charles A. Baylis.

University of Michigan.—Increased recreational opportunities for both young and old were pictured as one of the best remedies for many of our social ills today at the semi-annual meeting of the Michigan Sociology Society here November 26. Guests of the University of Michigan, the sociologists from the colleges and institutions of the state met for an all-day session and discussed present reform, education, and recreation problems.

The annual meeting of the Eastern Sociological Society will be held at the Men's Faculty of Columbia University, New York City, on April 22 (3 sessions) and April 23 (1 session). Professor Maurice Davie is chairman of the Saturday-morning session concerned with reports on current sociological research, and members and advanced graduate students having projects to report should communicate with him. The meeting is being held at the Faculty Club because more ample meeting and lounge rooms and less expensive meals can be arranged there than in a downtown hotel.

BOOK REVIEWS

Sociocultural Causality, Space, Time: A Study of Referential Principles of Sociology and Social Science. By PITIRIM A. SOROKIN. Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1943. Pp. ix+246. \$3.50.

A skeleton of Professor Sorokin's theory as given in the present book may be presented as follows: Sociology and the social sciences must stop imitating the natural sciences (chap. i, "Declaration of Independence of Sociology and the Social Sciences from the Natural Sciences"). The important referential principles of the natural sciences are causality, space, and time. For use in the social sciences, these must be transformed into the homologous, but profoundly different, sociocultural causality, space, and time. Nor can they be applied without consideration of the difference between systems and congeries and of the three-plane structure of sociocultural phenomena. Sociocultural systems are characterized by "the identical dependence and interdependence of their parts upon one another and upon the whole, and of the whole upon the parts" (p. 12), while congeries lack this interdependence. "Two and two make four," a Beethoven symphony, most sentences of a familiar language, and a painting are sociocultural systems (it has been pointed out that the more common, non-Sorokinian designations of these phenomena are "culture trait" and "culture complex"), while "snow-triangle-symphony-electricity-war" (p. 13) or "an unassembled automobile, with the parts scattered on the floor" (p. 12) are congeries (of meanings and of physical objects, respectively). The three planes of sociocultural phenomena are their "meanings," their "vehicles" (more ordinarily called "culture objects"), and their "human agents."

In "Sociocultural Causality" (chap. ii) it is explained that the "integralist" (Professor Sorokin's system of sociology) analysis examines the meaningful aspect of the sociocultural phenomenon under study in order to establish whether the phenomenon represents a system or a congeries; and that, accordingly, the relations among its meanings, vehicles, and agents are "meaningful-causal" or chance, and, if the

latter, stable or unstable (pp. 79-84). "Sociocultural Space" (chap. iii), as distinguished from physicomathematical, biological, and psychological space, is "a specific manifold, consisting of three fundamental planes or aspects: (1) the plane of meanings; (2) of vehicles; and (3) of human agents" (p. 123). Hence, a sociocultural phenomenon is located in sociocultural space when its meanings are located in the universe of meanings, its vehicles in the universe of vehicles, and its human agents in the universe of human agents (*ibid.*). "Sociocultural Time" (chap. iv), again as distinguished from metaphysical, physicomathematical, biological, and psychological time, measures sociocultural phenomena in terms of other sociocultural phenomena taken for the points of reference; it does not flow evenly but has eventful and empty moments; it is "qualitative," efficient, and creative; it has a three-plane structure of *aeternitas*, or ideational time; *aevum*, or idealistic time; and *tempus*, or sensate time (pp. 171-72, 215-16).

In "Referential Principles of Integralist Sociology" (chap. v), two additional postulates are expounded. The first is "the integralist system of truth, cognition, and sociocultural reality." Since the system of truth is "the basic referential principle of any scientific discipline" (p. 226), this must be considered basic to integralist sociology; and the reader is therefore led to believe that sociocultural causality, space, and time are not basic—as was the implication throughout the preceding nine-tenths of the book. According to the integralist system of truth, sociocultural reality has three aspects: the empirical, to be studied through sense perception; the logicorational, to be apprehended through "the discursive logic of human reason"; and the supersensory, super-rational, or meta-logical, to be apprehended "through the truth of faith—that is, through a supersensory, super-rational, meta-logical act of 'intuition' or 'mystic experience'" (pp. 227-28). From this first basic principle, the second, dealing with the "properties of sociocultural reality," follows. Among the properties, material and immaterial aspects are distinguished; and three different planes

of sociocultural reality—the empirical or sensory, the rational or logical, and the supersensory or transcendental—are recognized as “given.” Integralist sociology reconciles or unifies the conflicting conceptions of the “atomists” and “integralists,” of the empiricists, rationalists, and transcendentalists, of nominalism and realism; of determinism and indeterminism, of idealism and materialism, of singularism and universalism, of temporalism and eternalism, of ideational, idealistic, and sensate conceptions of reality, and of linear, cyclical, and other theories of sociocultural processes—using the valid parts of all and giving *suum cuique* (pp. 231–36).

In the preceding exposition of Professor Sorokin's theory I have given not even a skeleton but only the “main bones”—much less any flesh, such as a presentation of moods or attitudes and of methodology. In order to understand and evaluate Professor Sorokin's work, these are as important as the theory.

In the main, the present book constitutes an elaboration of the postulates concerning causality, space, and time as previously developed in *Social and Cultural Dynamics*. Almost inadvertently, I remarked that the reader does not learn what the foundations of the integralist sociology are—whether they are the concepts of sociocultural causality, space, and time, or whether they are of the nature of sociocultural phenomena in their three-plane structure, in their division into systems and congeries, and in their relation to the three types of truth. Nor is the place of the “supersystems” (ideational, idealistic, sensate) evident. I believe it is fair to assume that all of these concepts are “meaningfully-causally” related to one another and, because inseparable, of equal importance. Also, it is not altogether clear whether the integralist system is considered a science or something else. On page 237 it is called “truly scientific”; but the insistence on the superrational intuition of metalogical reality necessarily throws this part outside scientific procedure (though by inference only). Perhaps, however, the inclusion of intuition should be ignored, and the question of the scientificity of the system be answered, rather, on the basis of the “givenness” (p. 231) of the three types of reality. For, if they are given empirically (p. 232), in the sense that we social scientists study hunger as well as mystic contemplation, nobody will quarrel with Professor Sorokin; nor will anybody feel coerced to “apprehend,” as a social scientist, hunger by eating and mystic contemplation by mystic contempla-

tion. But to resign one's self to this platitude is again made difficult, because on page 231 “empirical” is identified with “sensory,” which excludes the page-232 possibility of the givenness of things not perceptible through the senses.

This confusion results, I believe, from Professor Sorokin's polemic attitude against the “empiricists,” social “physicists,” and the like, who imitate the natural sciences and disregard meanings. To a great extent, however, Professor Sorokin is fighting strawmen, many of them set up for the purpose, as will be shown. This polemic is paralleled in intensity by his desire to buttress his system, which frequently leads to mere verbal integration and to the elaboration and mystification of the obvious—another source of confusion. A third attitude is by far the most profitable—to the reader, to the attacked “empiricist” (unless he is really as bad as Professor Sorokin makes him, and doesn't want to learn anything), and to the system. This is the eager accumulation of facts for the purpose of illustrating a concept (rather than of annihilating a foe). Thus I find the pages on types of time the most interesting in the book (pp. 158–67); and there are some more of this kind, though unfortunately not many. The uneven readability of the work, which it shares with Professor Sorokin's other writings, is striking; and, according to which (sociocultural) moment one picks, one may characterize it as “a new *Descartian Discourse upon Method*” (as does the cover blurb) or as an amazing example of the pompous elaboration of the obvious. It is neither, although comparably extreme estimates of Professor Sorokin's former works can, indeed, be found in their reviews. The understanding of Professor Sorokin as a thinker cannot, however, be achieved in this manner, but only when we reach the point whence the unevenness of his works, as well as all other riddles they represent, can be “causally-meaningfully” apprehended. This I cannot attempt in a review; I must limit myself to the discussion of the more striking characteristics of the present study.

Perhaps the most important methodological feature is the interest in building up a consistent system, at the expense of clarity and scientific validity. This interest makes for the discovery and elaboration of relations, wholes, and movements which, according to the distance between the viewpoint of the individual reader and that of the author, appear all the way from convincing to inaccessible. It is, of course, possible that

Professor Sorokin's viewpoint will one day become part of the scientific universe of discourse—in case, for instance, that his prediction of the ideational phase of culture comes true, as he seems convinced:

When the mentality of social scientists changes and the contemporary system of truth, with its probabilistic-externalistic theory of the relationships of sociocultural phenomena, becomes somewhat sounder [i.e., more Sorokinian], there will be much less need for this kind of evidence [i.e., empirical verification] and much more for evidence of the meaningful-causal type [p. 96 n.].

In his only secondary interest in scientific clarity and validity and in some aspects of his moralistic-polemic tone, Professor Sorokin reminds one of Nietzsche, Pareto, and Spengler. On the other hand, it is surprising not to find any mention of Benedict's configurationalism, which is conceptually so closely (but temperamentally so little) related to the "supersystem" and which itself is based on some concepts of Nietzsche's and Spengler's. The important difference between the "supersystems" and the "configurations," however, is that the former are much more pretentious, while the latter can be more readily investigated empirically. Their common failure is the lack of a distinction between "social" and "cultural." This is perhaps more serious in the case of Professor Sorokin in that the very key term, "sociocultural," cries for a definition of both of its components. No such definition can be found, although "sociocultural" and "cultural," respectively, are once each contrasted with "social" (pp. 117, 134-35).

In order to illustrate my contention that Professor Sorokin's interest in building up a system is frequently at the expense of clarity and validity, I mention certain aspects of his very concepts of sociocultural space and time. The platitude that meanings are spaceless as regards physical space (p. 139) is paralleled by the trivial statement that social position does not mean position in physical space (p. 117). Caste, or the income or educational group, or race determine the position of an individual or group in the society in which caste, or the income or educational group, or race are the "all-important social systems" (p. 151). To call the latter the "main coordinates" of the sociocultural space (*ibid.*) unnecessarily complicates the customary apparatus of the social scientist and "systematizes" such a concept as "social

status," without making it clearer or scientifically more valid. Similarly as concerns sociocultural time. Why physical time, with its sidereal points of reference, is called "quantitative" (chap. iv, *passim*), while sociocultural time, with its sociocultural points of reference—e.g., the birth of Christ, the hegira, "last Monday"—is called "qualitative," is clear only psychologically, for the sun and the stars become sociocultural the moment we refer to them. In fact, Professor Sorokin does admit that his conclusions about sociocultural time "considerably approach Bergson's" psychological time (p. 201 n.). It is undoubtedly very meritorious to have called attention to the existence of numerous types of time, and the study of time conceptions is of great interest in the empirical study of cultures; but the systematic insistence on space and time as referential principles of sociology, derived from their correctly or incorrectly assessed importance in the natural sciences, seems to me more of an imitation of the natural sciences than a "declaration of independence" from them.

If this "*furor systematicus*" explains some peculiarities of Professor Sorokin's methodology, two other features explain others. One is what I call "realism" (in the scholastic sense) or, more modernly expressed, "misplaced concreteness"; the other is the fight against strawmen, already mentioned. On page 36 Professor Sorokin brands a man who uses such (invented) expressions as "purposes of atoms" or "mentality of electrons" as "obviously ignorant both of logic and of the natural sciences." In other words, he takes figurative speech literally, which represents one type of misplaced concreteness. Yet I have collected twenty-four instances—and this is probably not complete—of Professor Sorokin's figurative speech which, if taken literally, would condemn him as much or more ("causal net of interdependence" [pp. 11, 82]; physical space is "like a net with too large meshes" that does "not catch the sociocultural fish" [pp. 97, 114, 121, 153]; geometrical space "bleached" of all sociocultural qualities [pp. 121, 147, 152, 153, 169, 203]; "full-blooded sociocultural time" [p. 197]; "liaisons" and "duly registered causal marriages" between sociocultural variables [p. 40]; etc.). Only a realist would take these often flowery metaphors literally.

The more one gets engaged in analysis of this work, the more challenging becomes the figure of its author and the more dif-

difficult it is to evaluate the work itself. Hence, any evaluative statement must be preliminary to, at least, the appearance of such a study as was suggested earlier in this review. With this important restriction in mind, it may be said conservatively that the imaginary average sociologist will find numerous instructive and stimulating insights and a valuable reminder of the fact that the scientific approach is but one of the approaches to reality—and that, in general, there are things outside the current sociological universe of discourse which would enrich it if they were admitted. He will, however, also be annoyed by a considerable number of pages which are characterized by berating, repetition, mystification, and looseness, to the great detriment of the uniquely positive contributions of the work.

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The Uses of Reason. By ARTHUR E. MURPHY.
New York: Macmillan, 1943. Pp. xii+346.
\$3.00.

This book, by the head of the department of philosophy at the University of Illinois and chairman of the Commission on the Function of Philosophy and Liberal Education of the American Philosophical Association, is an able, timely, and genuinely important work. It embodies a highly successful effort to present the point of view and main substance of philosophy in a form which will be intelligible and interesting to the literate adult. It deals, in an untechnical, realistic, and relevant way, with issues with which every thoughtful people must be concerned but which either are not considered or are treated dogmatically by the special disciplines, and usually without too much realism or relevance by philosophy itself. It hardly attempts any contribution to speculative thought, but rather steers away from F. H. Bradley's famous characterization of philosophy as a blind-man's search in a dark cellar for a black cat that isn't there (from which theology has been said to differ in always producing a cat). It is fair to call it an "eloquent" plea for reasonable thinking. One might wish that the words "reason" and "rational," with their boundless ambiguity and regular use to beg some question, or as mere epithets, had been replaced by "intelligence" and "reasonable" in the title of

the book and subtitles. However, the reader is clearly told, in the first few pages of the Introduction, what the author has in mind.

Following the Introduction, the work consists of four parts: "Reason and Truth"; "Practical Reason"; "Reason and Social Action"; and "The Philosophic Use of Reason." Part III is much the longest of the four and is of most interest to scientific students of society, though the whole book might well be required reading for such persons and its perusal will be found a pleasure rather than a task. The first two of the three chapters in Part III are chiefly critical, and they very effectively "show up" the limitations and absurdities of positive-scientism, dealing with the work of such writers as Lynd, Hogben, and Pareto. The antithetical but equally egregious unreasonableness of absolutistic rationalism and mysticism comes more to the fore in the third chapter and in other parts of the book. (On page 272 T. S. Eliot is disposed of as a thinker in one caustic sentence; but the operation is repeated in slightly more elaborate form at page 285, while Thomism and religious thought in general are dealt with in Parts I and IV.)

In the reviewer's opinion, the author might have dealt more sharply and clearly with the problem of ultimate criteria and their limitations, and so have been both more philosophical and more useful to the readers. He could, in particular, have pointed out that there is no more mystery about moral and social criteria than about the ultimate data and premises of any science. All thinking carries back to axioms or intuitions, to be propounded and treated as such; and in all fields the axioms are more or less provisional and hypothetical and are subject to revision through criticism in actual use in interpreting and making intelligible the growing body of human knowledge and experience. At this point, the treatment seems to be weakened by too much influence of the more naïve aspects of pragmatism, and the recurrence of loose phraseology from Dewey confirms this impression. However, the strength and weakness of pragmatism, as developed by its leading exponents (Pierce, James, and Dewey), are subjected to a fairly adequate philosophical criticism and appraisal, in chapter ii of Part I. In any case, the weakness, if it is such, is a minor one; and the author may well be a better judge than this reviewer as to what those for whom he means to write are willing to take. It is a volume that a student of one branch

of social science (economics) can heartily commend to his colleagues in all branches.

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Science, Philosophy and Religion: Third Symposium. New York: Conference on Science, Philosophy and Religion in Their Relation to the Democratic Way of Life, Inc., 1943. Pp. xix+438. \$3.00.

This volume contains a Foreword, which is a summary statement adopted by the participants in the Third Conference on Science, Philosophy and Religion held in August, 1942, and twenty-five papers arranged in five groups—namely, "The Problem of Objective Basis for Value Judgments" (six papers), "The Relation of General Objectives of the Conference to the Problems of Education and Public Administration" (seven), "The Meaning of Human Dignity and Human Civilization in Terms of Various Disciplines" (five), "The Historical Process in Its Effect on Art, Music and Letters" (five), and "The Significance of History for the Current Intellectual, Economic and Political Crisis" (two).

The participants in the conference agreed that out of any study of our present-day situation there must emerge the concept and the fact of a pluralistic civilization (p. xv).

The recognition of this concept, and the realization that it is probably the cornerstone on which human civilization must be erected in our day, is a prerequisite for adequate dealing with the problem before us [p. xv].

... truths, identical in character, but differently expressed by the theologian and the psychiatrist, may be recognized as essentially interchangeable [p. xvi].

This can be done through an appropriate technique.

... the discovery of this technique, must rank with the recognition of the concept of a pluralistic universe of thought, as a primary need of our civilization. Such a technique is far more than an aspiration of scholarship. It is a vital necessity of survival [p. xvi].

... the intellectual and spiritual impediments preventing mankind from creating a durable civilization and a peaceful world *must be removed*, and ... this removal is the task of scholarship co-operating with experience [p. xix].

This conception is certainly noble; but to me it seems rather doubtful whether scholarship can achieve as much and whether, even merely in the outline of a program, "experience" ought not to have been given more weight than it has received here.

The twenty-five papers are very uneven. So many of them are philosophical and theological in character that the title of the symposium appears misleading; even the articles contributed by natural scientists are concerned with philosophical problems. Philipp Frank's "The Relativity of Truth and the Objectivity of Values" is of interest to the social scientist in that it lends itself to stimulating analogies between the concepts of relativism in physics and that typical of the social anthropologist in his dealings with a number of different cultures.

The present volume is characterized by the presence, among the participants in the conference, of different and clashing attitudes which may be labeled in terms of basic outlooks (theological, philosophical, scientific) or of psychological moods and types ("dogmatic," "passionate," "warm-hearted," "reformist," "objective"—though the latter are decidedly in a minority). However labeled, these attitudes do not fuse, in spite of the avowed purpose of the symposium. This is shown in the discussions even more clearly than in the papers proper. In reading the volume, I found rather frequently that the only common attitude the participants could arrive at led to statements so deprived of specificity as to be trite. Or, when the common denominator of the subject matter, democracy, was considered, the attempts at bringing together viewpoints which were anchored in more or less implicit special philosophies resulted in embarrassed vagueness. Karl Llewellyn's short and concise "The Law, Human Dignity, and Human Civilization" stands out from this general picture as more personal but rather monologic.

To me, this enterprise of so many persons of good faith and great learning leaves but a stale taste. In this short review it is not possible to examine the reasons for this failure—if it is a failure. One explanation might be that it is unmanageable, in our age of specialization, to come to grips with a meaningful synthesis merely by means of a conference called together for this purpose. This, however, is only a speculation. For a more definite analysis of this conference, its development and the roles, backgrounds, standings in their respective dis-

ciplines, and reasons for participating of its members must be studied.

Only one paper was given by a sociologist (Robert M. MacIver, "After the Price of War, the Price of Peace"), but this might easily have been written by a nonsociologist; and there is only one article supplied by an anthropologist (Gregory Bateson, "Human Dignity and the Varieties of Civilization"), but it is sketchy and not entirely in line with its title.

The most important contribution in the whole volume is, in my opinion, John U. Nef's "The 'Industrial Revolution' Reconsidered." This study gives the general reader, as well as the sociologist, significant insights into the character, the period, and the geography of the Industrial Revolution, into the nature of various pre-industrial European societies, and into the problems of evaluating them by comparison with our own civilization. I should like to recommend that Professor Nef's paper be published separately, so that the reader would not be compelled to buy it, tied as it is under the present arrangement, to the 400 preceding pages.

KURT H. WOLFF

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Is Germany Incurable? By RICHARD M. BRICKNER. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Co., 1943. Pp. 318. \$3.00.

This book has been the topic of considerable heated debate, but it is not the intention of this reviewer to enter into this public argument. The professional readers of this *Journal* are not so much interested in Brickner's thesis as a topic of public discussion—though this has a point for the student of public opinion—as in his standpoint, method, and data with respect to the important problem of relating personality to culture.

Since most analyses of the present war have been stated in political or economic terms, the author—a practicing psychiatrist—justifies his entrance into this vast field on the grounds that institutional analyses tend to neglect the personality factors in behavior centering around international conflict. Since—by his own admission—the psychiatrist is the specialist per se in human conduct, it is justifiable for him to try his hand at both a diagnosis and an outline of treatment of German mentality.

To do so, he applies the diagnostic tech-

niques of the clinic and the consultation room to Germany. He says: "The national group we call Germany behaves and has long behaved startlingly like an individual involved in a dangerous mental trend" (p. 30). And this "trend," he says, is paranoia. Moreover, he clearly states that paranoia is used not as an "epithet" but as "responsible medical diagnosis" (p. 31). In short, his discussion is a matter not of analogy but of causal parallelism between Germany as a national society and the "classical individual paranoid behavior" (p. 40). He is quick to admit, however, that not all Germans as individuals are paranoiacs; but he does contend that the predominant pattern of German thought and action is "paranoid."

His data on individual cases are drawn from his own practice or from the usual psychiatric sources. The material on Germany, as a nation, is gleaned from older history and from more recent accounts by travelers, journalists, and other common-sense observers.

As the descriptive level the paranoiac is characterized by delusions of persecution, extreme jealousy and suspiciousness of others, megalomania, excessive self-pity, egocentricity, the will to dominate, and an uncompromising inability to be appeased by kind words or kind treatment. Moreover, in rationalizing his ideas and conduct, the paranoiac proceeds in a highly logical manner, once his primary premises are granted.

Having laid out the chief features of paranoid thought and behavior, the author shifts his attention, from chapter vii on, to a consideration of "paranoid trends in groups." But before discussing Germany he draws upon recent anthropological literature dealing with the interplay of personality and culture. He assumes that this work supports his major thesis that an entire group or society may be designated and diagnosed in terms traditionally applied to certain deviant individuals in our own society. With respect to Germany, he considers chiefly what might be called four master-symptoms of paranoia: megalomania; the need to dominate; persecution complex and projection; and retrospective falsification. To "prove" his thesis, he arrays an imposing mass of historical and literary data. Regarding the first symptom, he cites selected writings of Fichte, Arndt, Friedrich Ludwig Jahn, List, Bismarck, Haeckel, and Spengler. To document the symptoms of persecution complex and projection, Brickner mentions, among other things, Germany's

hostile reactions to Britain and France which led to the formation of the Triple Entente. In the same vein the "encirclement" slogan used by the Nazis is interpreted as evidence of the "paranoid-tending Germans." He makes much of his point that Germany acted as does the individual paranoiac who, suffering from delusions of persecution, plots an attack on the would-be attacker—an instance of projecting one's own aggression on another. Finally, the symptomatology of retrospective falsification is supported, he contends, by the long story of the re-writing of history in Germany to suit the Germans' sense of superiority.

The same argument is carried further in two chapters on militarism and racialism, which he interprets as clear evidence of the "paranoid culture," in which self-glorification, the cult of violence, and the dogma of biological superiority are prominent. In the chapter "Paranoid Soil," Brickner contends that "paranoid attitudes" seriously affect practically every aspect of German life. He says that "literally no department of human affairs from the relation of a husband and wife to the official organization of the police department is free of paranoid influence" (p. 233). Chapters xiv and xv carry the argument down to the present. The first attempts to show that Nazi ideology and practice are but the culmination of the long historical trend to paranoid culture; the other, that the violent hatred of the Communists—as evidenced officially in the Rome-Berlin-Tokyo Axis—and other paranoia-like reactions have now taken on a world-wide importance and threaten our nonparanoid world.

As is so often the case with such books, diagnosis, not a plan for treatment, occupies the bulk of the discussion. In the concluding chapter, "Is Germany Incurable?" the author offers but a few pages of advice as to the therapy to be applied to Germany. The method would be essentially that applied to individuals. He pins his faith on the contribution of the specialist in helping to make and execute a sound plan. He argues that the psychiatrist's "knowledge of how paranoia can be combated in individuals makes the omens good enough for combating it in groups"; that a "realization of this diagnosis of paranoia is the *sine qua non* of any success whatsoever in dealing with post-war Germany"; and that a "clear area of non-paranoid Germans within the German group is the strategic key to the whole" (p. 308). Since he does not contend that all Germans are paranoiacs, he would make

use of this minority as a basis, in part, for a retraining program. But, he states, such a scheme can, of necessity, be accomplished only by "serious outside interference" on the part of the conquering powers. He offers no blueprint on how this external management would be carried out.

In attempting to offer comment or criticism of this book, the reviewer is at a loss to know which of the many facets to examine. Sympathetic as he is with the investigations in the field of personality and culture, it seems to him that this volume does not, in any degree, advance the serious study of this important area of research. Rather, it tends to give it an unfortunate direction, especially in resurrecting the whole nest of problems related to the application of concepts derived from individual psychology to group and cultural phenomena. And, certainly, the basic assumption that one may reason from individual behavior to that of society, or can equate—in a one-to-one fashion—the ideas, attitudes, and habits of the person to the culture patterns is open to grave doubt. Let us note some of the particular difficulties:

The basic problem, obviously, is the application of diagnosis and treatment of the mentally disordered individual to the problem of analysis and therapy for an entire group and its culture. One of the major difficulties in dealing with the interplay of personality and culture is bound up in this matter. With the help of a few pat symptoms it is very easy to describe the Kwakiutl or Nazi Germany—as a group—as being paranoiac, or the Zuni as being "introverted," and so on. Yet, it is doubtful whether this application of concepts of individual psychology to societal and cultural data will prove helpful in our research. First, the whole matter of concepts of groups and culture is involved; and, second—and more important—it is not at all clear that the conduct of the Kwakiutl chief-tain in the Potlach or the Hitler in the party councils is—as a behavior phenomenon—on all fours with the behavior of the patient in an American mental hospital whom we diagnose as a paranoiac. Brickner flatly states his argument in these words: "The German group—as a collective force, not necessarily as individuals—both 'feels' and displays a remarkable number of the classical paranoid symptoms" (p. 31). Just how a "collective force," not individuals, can "feel" or "display" such symptoms is not made clear. While some manifestations of the

tribal chieftain or of Hitler and the patient are alike, the social expectation and acceptance of the conduct of the former by the supporting society may actually alter the nature and meaning of what Brickner labels paranoid for both. At least this matter needs careful investigation before we move so glibly from the clinic and the mental hospital to the analysis of entire societies and their cultures.

As to the matter of the author's use of the concept of paranoia, not as an epithet but as a diagnostic tool, the truth is that, in dealing with the material on Germany, the term is employed almost entirely as a descriptive label. There is practically no detailed analysis of any individual or historical event from the angle of psychiatry. But a word count of the last seven chapters—which deal with Germany—reveals that the term "paranoid," used as noun or adjective, appears 150 times. Of this total, moreover, 122 appear in the final four chapters. Chapter xiv, "Nazis Are Germans," has—as one might imagine—the highest count (43) of any single chapter. It is almost as though the author, as he advances his argument, becomes hypnotized by the very term "paranoid." Every aspect of Germany's history or contemporary life comes, sooner or later, to be catalogued under this label. It is not in years that this reviewer has read a book which tries to prove so much with a single concept. It is particularism in its most extreme form. Certainly, present-day social science has not been entirely amiss in considering as a highly complex set of variables the data which are here forced under one rubric.

For example, though Brickner grants that there are nonparanoids in Germany, he pays no attention to factors of regional differences or of religious, class, or age variations. While it is apparent at once that his analysis of intergroup conflict has long been dealt with by sociology in terms of well-known features of the in-group versus the out-group, he dismisses these concepts as of little or no consequence to him (pp. 38, 152). Or, take his treatment of European political history since Napoleon—perfectly sound and useful concepts growing out of studies of power politics, involving the balance of power (equilibrium analysis), and the use of racialist and imperialistic dogmas are here recast into the categories of the symptomatology of paranoia. By the same token, every aspect of international conflict could be so stated; and in the end we would simply have to say that all power

politics, all imperialist or other group struggles, are the work of paranoiacs. To consider the Triple Entente as a paranoical reaction to imagined persecution by Britain, or to treat political assassinations in revolutionary Germany after World War I, or militarism, class structure, Pan-Germanism, and racialism as evidences of Germany's peculiar paranoiais nonsense, unless one wishes to label the "white man's burden," "manifest destiny," "Pan-slavism," or the "Third International" as the same type of thing.

In short, such books as this serve not only to confuse the public by giving them pat "explanations" for highly complex events but may also hinder the more serious investigations of the important problems of correlating personality and the social-cultural environment in which one lives.

There are two introductions to this volume—one by Margaret Mead, the anthropologist, and the other by Edward A. Strecker, a fellow-psychiatrist of the author. There is a good Bibliography but no index.

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An Educational Experiment in Northern Nigeria in Its Cultural Setting. By DESMOND W. BITTINGER. Elgin, Ill.: Brethren Publishing House, 1941. Pp. 343. \$2.50.

Bittinger states that the purpose of this investigation was to give a careful examination of the educational system adopted by the British in their Central Sudanese holdings, where indirect rule, otherwise known there as the "Dual Mandate," has been government policy. The larger portion of the book is not a study of that educational system but a survey of the cultural background of the Sudanese peoples and the impingement of European cultures upon that background. One wonders if the title of the investigation is not a misnomer. The work is well written and well annotated, although some data seem unnecessarily old (1921 census figures are sometimes used when 1931 figures are available and would have been applicable). It may well be that readers will find the background material more fascinating and timely than the educational experiment itself.

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Naperville, Illinois

The American Journal of Sociology

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IN THIS ISSUE

Professor Kurt Riezler had been engaged for some years in the social-psychological study of sentiments and passions. The present article on "Comment on the Social Psychology of Fear" is a penetrating consideration of fear. Dr. Riezler, who was secretary in the 1920's to President Ebert, first president of the German Republic, is now associated with the graduate faculty of the New School for Social Research.

The article on "The Stranger" is written by Alfred Schuetz, visiting professor of sociology on the graduate faculty of New York's New School for Social Research. Dr. Schutz received his degree at the University of Vienna. He has published articles on Husserl and Scheler, and his most recent paper, on "The Problem of Rationality in the Social World," appeared in *Economica* (London) last May.

Dr. H. Warren Dunham is assistant professor of sociology at Wayne University. His article on "The Social Personality of the Catatonic-Schizophrenic" represents a sociological approach to what has generally been treated as a psychiatric problem. It is an outgrowth of several years of research.

Mozell C. Hill, Langston University professor of sociology, is now studying all-Negro communities in Oklahoma on a Rosenwald fellowship. The present article, "Basic Racial Attitudes toward Whites in the Oklahoma All-Negro Communities," deals with one aspect of a larger problem that is to be covered by the author in a book.

Werner J. Cahnman received his Ph.D. at the University of Munich. He was research associate at the Inquiry Commission of the German Reichstag and executive secretary of the Central Verien, a large Jewish organization. After two years as a visiting Ph.D. at the University of Chicago, he joined the faculty of Fisk University, where he is now an instructor. "Religion and Nationality" deals with a type of social stratification based on criteria different from those with which students of Western Europe are most familiar.

Professor S. McKee Rosen, formerly of the University of Chicago and now acting chief of the Committee on War Records Section of the Bureau of the Budget, gives an interesting picture of the efforts to utilize and marshal the research facilities of the governmental agencies in Washington, D.C.

Medicine and the War

Edited by
WILLIAM H. TALIAFERRO

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
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THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF FEAR

KURT RIEZLER

ABSTRACT

"Collective insecurity," the nightmare of modern industrial society, is a psychological phenomenon of some complexity. It is not merely the economic insecurity caused by mass unemployment. In an article in *Social Research* (September, 1943) on the psychology of the modern revolution I characterized the kind of fear which in times of crisis befalls the ordinary citizen as "fear of the unknown." An analysis of this phenomenon presupposes an inquiry into the interrelation between "fear" and "knowledge," both individual and social.

I

Man's fear is fear *of* something or *for* something: *of* illness, loss of money, dishonor; *for* his health, family, social status. The relation of the first something to the second something and their respective relevances determine the particular kind and intensity of our fear.

The one and the other something have a definite nature. We know what they are like. We may not know which of several knowable possibilities will occur. The particular relation of our knowledge to our ignorance gives a particular color to our fear.

In the concrete case fear is never alone. We always hope, if only that the thing we are afraid of will not happen. Man faces great danger without fear if a strong desire, emotion, passion sways his heart. Men and animals in rage are blind to danger. Hope can conquer fear. Man, a gambler by nature, hopes against hope.

Man, as a striving being, finite, in a world that is never entirely of his own making, is

forever in between some kind of fear and some kind of hope, some kind of knowledge and some kind of ignorance. Fear and hope are at odds: hope wants fear removed; it demands action. Fear lets hope dread its end. Fear, mingling in our hope, hope mingling in our fear—each pleads for knowledge against the other's weakness for ignorance.

Both fear and knowledge have a social dimension. We cannot start from "Man" written with a capital and with a turn of our hand substitute for the universal man the isolated individual. No man is Man—everyone is this or that man among men. An "I" takes into account what things are to a "You" and a "We"—or, to use an expression of Mead, human beings "take one another's roles." Not knowing, I rely on your knowledge: you are not afraid. Or you are afraid but you do not know; I know—lean on me. The child looks at its mother; the mother reassures the child. Every society that deserves the name is a "universe of discourse." A man's fear does not depend mere-

ly on his individual knowledge and ignorance. Within the universe of discourse the knowledge of the others reassures my ignorance; the ignorance of the others shakes my confidence in my knowledge. We need not resort to "contagion," "suggestion," "imitation."

Fear of something for something seems to be partial fear. This something has a definite character which if not known is knowable. There is, however, total fear. First, the fear of death. We are afraid of death for our life; our life includes everything.

We know death—it has a definite character. We may not know how much suffering our dying will impose or the kind of life after death, if there is any. Our fear of death blends with our fear of our suffering in dying, with our fear of, or hope for, a life beyond. Our knowledge, doubt, or ignorance gives to our fear of death a particular tint. Though we know at any moment that we must die, we do not fear death all the time, except in some remote or dark corner of our mind. We cannot escape death; we can only try to postpone it. We shove back the idea. We observe death around us, but we ourselves do not die—as yet. It is the other fellow who dies. Life refuses to think of death. This is the way of the living to protect life against the power of death.

Death seems to be eminently individual. Everybody must die his own death for himself. Dying isolates the individual. Yet death has a social dimension, too. Death is final only for the individual. Though death ends our hoping, it does not end the content of our hopes. Everyone is entitled to slight the difference, yet no one can deny it. Isaac, dying, blesses Jacob. He lives in and hopes for his children. They will carry on—though Isaac has no hope of sharing Jacob's rise. Isaac's death ends Isaac for Isaac; it does not end the world in which he lived, loved, and cared. Another man dies and sees his world, task, family, country, reputation, or whatever he cared for tottering to their fall. Both fear death—their fear has a different quality. The death of the soldier in victory and defeat is not entirely the same. The one

cannot partake in the joy of a winning cause; the other need not partake in the misery of a lost cause. The content of hope and care survives in the first case, perishes in the second. Though the difference may disappear in the extreme loneliness of the very last hour, it is still real in the last but one.

Social psychology cannot deal with any phenomenon of social life on the basis of the conceptual scheme of an individual psychology that, putting Ego in the center, refers the world as behavioral environment or phenomenal field to the individual by a one-way arrow. No sane man really thinks of himself merely as the center of his world. Nobody conceives of the world in which he lives as merely his phenomenal field or behavioral environment. This field points and refers to something beyond itself: the world in which we and our fellowmen live, everybody's potential environment, interpreted not merely by ourselves but by the "universe of discourse" in which we live. The theory of knowledge may refer the world to a transcendental subject. If the psychologist refers the phenomenal field to the psychological subject, he should not forget that the concrete individual returns the reference: everybody, however egocentric, refers himself and his phenomenal field to an objective world which is the world of the others, in one way or the other, be it in love or hate, in care, work, or a task. In this world the Ego is not the center. If the environment is what it is relatively to the individual, the individual cannot help being to himself what he is relatively to the world in which he lives. There are two arrows, both pointing both ways and interacting in a give and take. Social psychology cannot follow an individual psychology that forgets the other arrow.

II

These introductory remarks hurry through difficult terrain and jump many a hurdle. They are intended to articulate our ordinary fear in a preliminary way.

There is a kind of fear that is not fear of something definite for something definite.

It can be described as fear of everything for everything or of nothing for nothing. In extreme cases this indefinite fear can be more "total" and worse than the fear of death. Men may commit suicide to escape its extreme misery.

Under the name of "anxiety" or "basic anxiety" this fear has come to be of particular interest since Kierkegaard handed to the German "existential" philosophy of the twentieth century the distinction between *Furcht* and *Angst* and psychopathologists discovered an "anxiety neurosis."

The German *Angst*, the French *angoisse*, the English *anguish*, and the Latin *angustiae* all stem from a root which connotes "pressure," "narrowness." The corresponding word in Greek, used with some emphasis by the Christian fathers, is *stenochoria*, "the narrow space." Man's chest feels constricted. Anxiety closes walls in on man.

I may assume that this anxiety is not entirely alien to anyone. It is vague—but it may be more powerful for its vagueness. As there is no definite threat or danger upon which we could act, it paralyzes action. As the shapeless daughter of the shapeless night, it calls in the dark on the child or the lonely man. It seems to be an eminently individual experience. The presence of companions keeps it away. So it seems.

The relation of this indefinite fear to our knowledge and ignorance is dubious. Traditional psychology offers but little help. Kierkegaard and his followers answer: We fear *das Nichts*—nothingness. This is, however, hardly the result of a psychological analysis. It is a philosophical device peculiar to a situation in which a man who has lost both his god and his world is thrown back on himself and faces *das Nichts*. At least this *nihil metaphysicum* must be specified. There are too many logically different *nihils*. It seems to be a *nihil privativum*. But the privation is again a specific privation.

Common sense may suggest that this anxiety is merely a presentiment of an evil that might befall us. We simply do not know which of the many known and knowable evils it will be. This may suffice in some

light cases in which our anxiety still borders on ordinary fear. It does not suffice in other cases.

What do we mean by knowledge and ignorance? We know this and that—Mr. Brown or Chicago. There are other things we do not know—Mr. Smith or Kansas City. If our knowledge were merely of this kind—a knowledge of some items out of an aggregate of unknown items—paralyzed by fear, we could not move or act. Fortunately we know more. We know what Mr. Smith can be or is likely to be. He will not suddenly turn into an elephant and trample us down. He will keep within the limits of a definite order. We know, or assume we know, this order. Though we do not know what will happen, we know what can happen—either this or that. Every possible change or event, even our own death, will keep within the scheme of a certain order. This order we trust; it is the order of the world in which we live. On this basis and by means of this scheme we identify, classify, characterize things. We give them a place in this order. If there are things we do not know, we merely mean that we do not yet know their place. But they have a place. The order is all-comprehensive. Thus a preformed scheme limits and specifies our fear and guides our action—whether we are primitive or civilized, animal or man.

We arrive at the railway station of a town we do not know. The town is not simply "an unstructured area in the cognitive structure of the psychological field." We know what it is like: a maze of streets, houses standing on firm ground, people walking and knowing their way. The cognitive structure of our environment is not merely the present phenomenal field. It includes the rules to which any change of the present phenomenal field will submit. We know that the phenomenal field is only our present aspect of the field of all the others. It is pre-structured and knowable. We merely fill out a preformed scheme. Moreover, we rely on the others: their actual knowledge is our own potential knowledge. Our fear is limited to meeting gangsters, creditors, relatives, a

former love. Our reaction to a totally unstructured area, if there were any, would be an anxiety neurosis.

Our hope likes to go beyond this order into the realm of the impossible. We know, however, that this hope is vain. We draw a line between the possible and impossible. Hope transgresses, fear never transgresses, this line. The impossible does not frighten us. If, however, under the shock of an experience that shatters our scheme of order, we doubt or no longer trust this scheme, the dividing line fades and indefinite fear invades the bewildered soul.

Now it might be possible to specify the *nihil* in Kierkegaard's concept of anxiety. Nobody can be prevented from interpreting fear of death as fear of an absolute nothing. Anxiety, however, is not simply fear of death. In anxiety we do not fear nothingness. We fear something; we do not know it and feel unable to know what it is. This nothing is still something, though it is deprived of any definite character. It fits no scheme; it is beyond our reach. It deprives us of our trust in any order. It is not absolute nothingness but absolute "otherness." It would not be frightening if it were "nothing." It is frightening because it is still "something"—though not to be known, not to be acted upon. This anxiety may blend with the fear of death; the difference is still a psychological reality and accounts at least for a particular color in our fear of death.

III

I turn to the interpretation of different cases of anxiety. Though each case has a long story to tell, rapid glances will suffice.

a) A human being is alone in a wood at night. Dead leaves rustling cause, as Luther says, deadly fright. I cannot compel anybody to go beyond saying simply that this man is afraid for his life or his wallet, of a gangster behind a tree. In most cases we might discover another note, however faint: a feeling as if something extraordinary, hardly possible, could happen—ghosts, voices of the dead. Darkness deprives us of

the definite shape of the things that in daylight testify to the order on this well-rounded earth. Moreover, we are alone; there are no others on whom we can rely. Two children in the same situation are afraid, each for himself. The younger relies on the older—he will know. The older, knowing he is relied upon, hides his fear.

b) In modern experiments animals are treated to an anxiety neurosis.¹ The behavioristic approach seems to demand, first, that the mental system of cats be disorganized by a highly artificial conditioning of their responses. Then they are frightened by a series of unexpected and inexplicable events produced by the devilish contrivances of the modern scientist: electric currents, wind blowing out of dishes of food, walls of their cages closing in upon them. The desired result occurs: the cats go mad. However short the cat memory, they do not eat for days. Friendly petting speeds recovery. The experimenter cannot get the same results with dogs. The dog, closer than the cat to human beings, relies on the observer. He may bark furiously, but he does not get a neurosis—unless the observer, too, takes the pains to lose his mind. We may assume that even the cat world which we do not know has a cognitive structure and some scheme of order that such experiments upset.

If the experimenter could do to human beings what he does to cats, confronting an isolated human being with events as inexplicable as these events are to the cat, everybody could be treated to an anxiety neurosis.

c) After the first World War psychologists and neurologists in Germany made a careful study of incurable cases of soldiers wounded in the brain.² Diverse faculties of these men, necessary for ordinary living,

¹ These remarks refer to experiments made in the Institute for Psychiatry at the University of Chicago and to earlier experiments by Pavlov.

² K. Goldstein, *Human Nature in the Light of Psychopathology* (William James Lectures [Cambridge University Press, 1940]). Based upon various studies by K. Goldstein and A. Gelb.

have been impaired. They succeed, within certain limits, in developing substitute techniques by which they are able to carry on in the minutely and rigidly ordered environment of their hospitals. Everything must always be in its usual place. They are fettered to the particular order of an environment of extreme rigidity and narrowness, unable to detach themselves from, or to move beyond, this order. Any change, disturbance, or new task threatens the whole of this order and leads to a "catastrophic reaction," in which their neurosis recurs. As this order is the basis of any action they are capable of, any change finds them helpless and throws them into a kind of fear which, in the extreme case, may well be worse and more total than the fear of death to a healthy mind. It swallows up their world. Their scheme of order remains precarious even when not challenged by any event. It is an individual scheme, lacking any social support. There is no universe of discourse to confirm it as a matter of course. As they sense its precariousness and suspect an impending change, they fear an attack of their fear, half-consciously aware of a constant threat.

d) I oppose to this case of extreme rigidity an example of a scheme of extreme flexibility: the world of the growing child. The child has not yet an established scheme of order, a system of permanences embracing the world. Yet the child does not live in a constant state of indefinite fear. Though we might say that he explores his world in between anxiety and curiosity, his curiosity usually gets the better of his anxiety.

His system of order is in the making. Though any actual knowledge is still narrow, his mind is open to a wide range of what is possible. As he explores the world, the real and the imaginery blend—he does not yet draw our dividing-line. His play is half-serious, his seriousness half-play. Slowly he enlarges his still narrow world, reorganizing its assumed order with every new experience. All his permanences are still *ad hoc*: assumptions to be made, revised, and abandoned. Thus he stumbles along the edge of

an abyss, blindly, yet carefully, a little anxious, yet more curious, shrinking back at every touch of anxiety and trying again, ignoring demands he cannot meet, shunning the unknowable. Ignorance of danger protects the play of a tentative knowledge.

We cannot isolate the child. The process in which he forms his preliminary world could not proceed if the child were not aware of living in the world of his elders. His first assumption is his mother and her knowledge. Here, again, individual psychology easily leads astray. The mother is not simply one of many items in a phenomenal field. The entire phenomenal field is referred to the mother. The assumption of her knowledge underlies and accompanies every hypothesis the child makes concerning the nature of things. As the child builds up his own world, he "learns" the world of his elders. Objectification mixes giving names and learning the names. The child himself has a name; he is Jack or simply "he" long before he discovers the Ego. The reference to his mother and her knowledge protects the play of curiosity against anxiety. Frightened, the child hides behind his mother's apron.

e) It is amazing how much danger and fright a soldier in battle can stand: (i) when in action; (ii) if there is still hope, however slight, of survival; (iii) when he knows and can identify the danger; (iv) when relying on someone who shows no fear. The more flexible his cognitive faculties, the less exposed is the soldier to neurotic shocks. The nervous intellectual is safer than many a robust and healthy peasant. The most courageous soldier, able to face any direct threat of death, may tremble in an indefinite situation of unknown and unidentifiable dangers. French-African soldiers, fearless warriors, do not understand the situation in modern warfare. They trust, however, the knowledge of their white officers. Only in the case of tanks did the white officer find himself without power over their fear, until he succeeded in demonstrating some similarity between tanks and elephants, in behavior and treatment. After this war inter-

esting studies may become possible concerning the interrelation between particular kinds of fear and the peculiarities of modern weapons which differ widely in the amount of knowledge and awareness they permit.

IV

In these examples the distinction between our ordinary fear of and for a definite thing and our indefinite anxiety corresponds to the distinction between our knowledge and ignorance of this or that item and our knowledge and ignorance of the scheme of order to which all possible items will submit.

This scheme of order of the possible is a system of rules, principles, and assumptions which are taken for granted. Its structure is complex. Such systems can be very different with respect not only to the content of the rules but also to their structural properties. They are never merely aggregates of habits, inherited or acquired, concerning certain rules for this, and other rules for that, case. They are systems; if they are inconsistent, they pretend to be consistent. They claim to cover every possible case. They order our worlds—the worlds in which we think of ourselves as living, acting, moving.

I disregard all controversies of the theory of knowledge concerning the origin and growth of this system. They have no bearing on the psychology of fear. Likewise, I disregard the thorny problems posed by the nature, complexity, and possible variations of these systems. They would lead beyond the scope of this study. The axioms of such a system may be known *a priori* or *a posteriori*; they may be "true" or erroneous, mere assumptions, hypotheses, conventions; they may be rational or magical. In the case of the primitive man it may mean the rules of magic, the norms of a society of men, animals, spirits, demons, gods. In many a concrete case of an ordinary citizen in this rational age of ours it may encompass rational principles as well as all kinds of empirical rules, from the geometry of space, the categories in which we think, the law of causality, to such dubious assumptions as that there is "progress" or that the big banks will

never suddenly close their windows. His is a world in which a great many things cannot happen. In both cases it means a universal system of permanences which, rightly or wrongly, we take for granted and on the basis of which we give to any new experience an orderly place in our world.

This system is the basis of our action. If we do not know the nature of a danger, we make an assumption. Without such an assumption, we cannot act. Without such a scheme, we cannot even make such an assumption. We have moral principles, individual or social norms of decent behavior. We cannot, however, translate these principles or norms into concrete behavior except on the basis of such a scheme of order. Usually we are not even asked to do any such translating, as these principles and norms are already formulated in terms of our scheme of order. Hence, we might understand that a serious threat to the scheme of order of the possible can deprive human beings not only of their capacity for action but also of any standards of decent behavior they might have. In this case man knows neither what he could nor what he should do. Even hope, losing its guide, loses its force.

These systems, though systems of permanences, undergo change. They are in a continuous, though usually slow, process of growth and decay, integration and disintegration, organization, revision, reorganization, disorganization. At any phase, however, the people who live in and conceive of the world in terms of such a system assume that its rules are permanent. We can call such a scheme of order the "geometry" of our mental space. There is a great variety of possible geometries. We might best think of such a geometry as being a stratified system of axioms, upper strata being based on lower strata. On the ground of basic axioms, other axioms, meaning an additional order, can undergo change without upsetting the system as a whole. No individual or group can stand a sudden and radical overturn of the entire system of permanences which supports the consistency of any meanings, prin-

ciples of action, norms of behavior, expectations or memories. Such a *bouleversement* spells madness.

A new experience may fit into our pre-conceived scheme. It gets its place in our world. Another experience may not fit. We make it fit as far as possible or we reject it. We all have our own way of interpreting away whatever cannot be made to fit—even scientists have a way.

Some basic assumptions, of both the rational and the religious man, can be upheld under all circumstances. A hypothesis must work if it provides a possible explanation for every instance in which it does not seem to work. Then the hypothesis becomes an "axiom." We do not doubt that everything has a natural cause just because in a particular instance we do not know the cause. The religious man need not doubt the wisdom and justice of the Almighty because he does not understand His inscrutable will. We refer to our ignorance and uphold the axiom.

A new experience may force us to revise something in our system of permanences. Individuals, societies, mental ages, periods of a civilization, differ widely in their capacity for such revision. Sometimes it seems as if the particular permanence that cannot be maintained is ingrained in or intergrown with other more basic permanences that cannot be changed without upsetting the entire system. In this case the system is rigid. The rigidity or flexibility of our system determines our capacity for restructuring or reorganizing our present psychological field. The rigid mind is more, the flexible mind less, exposed to an attack of indefinite fear.

The system of things that is taken for granted is socially established, daily confirmed by the testimony of the society in which we live. It orders the universe of discourse. Whatever happens is interpreted in its terms. It has an enormous power. The ordinary individual deviates only within the range of the alternatives it offers or at least tolerates.

The universe of discourse guards the in-

dividual against indefinite fear. The individual easily succumbs either when cut off from the universe of discourse or when this universe fails to provide any support. "Man, like the generous vine, supported lives."

In every phase of the history of a society, small or large, we find a stratified system of things that are taken for granted. Different systems differ widely as to the staying-power they convey to a society, their resistance to shocks, their guiding force. The analysis of the structural qualities of such a system at a given moment is the most important, though the most difficult, part of the task of a social psychologist who in times of stress might be called upon to diagnose the danger of "collective insecurity."

V

As the analysis of even one concrete case of collective insecurity would go beyond the scope and space of this study, I restrict myself to a few tentative and fragmentary remarks about the structure and role of the universe of discourse in a religious and a rational age, in a democratic and a totalitarian society.

Collective insecurity may be interpreted as an agglomeration of many definite reasons for definite fear threatening the multiplicity of individuals in a society: the civilian population in modern war—husbands, sons, and fathers are killed in battle, air raids destroy houses at night, the Gestapo calls in the morning. These are enough reasons for fear. Yet everybody knows what it is like. I distinguish from this possible meaning of collective insecurity another meaning in which an indefinite fear invades a community and deprives even the reasons for definite fear of a distinctness on which to act. Nobody knows what to fear or what to do. In this case the behavior of a society is different.

The Christian Fathers find the heathen in constant anxiety. In the third century the universe of discourse throughout the universal empire is an impenetrable jungle of competing superstitions. The divine principle behind the countless gods of the Ro-

man pantheon is a mere word without power except for a few remnants of a dying upper class. Hundreds of gods, great and small, competing with, but forced to tolerate, one another, and innumerable hordes of priests, magicians, prophets, sorcerers, soothsayers, conjurers, and astrologers outscreech one another in selling hopes and fears. The individual, entangled in an inescapable maze, is hardly able to take a single step without elaborate rites to expel real or imaginary evils. The universe of discourse gives no lead—the practices contradict one another, and no god or demon should be offended. The individual, squeezed between opposite pressures, moves helplessly in an uncontrollable world. Shifting and precarious communities offer no support for any individual choice. Only the strong cling to Isis or Mythras, or are satisfied to wear a little golden serpent around their necks and to ignore the others and their gods. In this situation the Christian God defeats all his competitors. Only one survives: the Jewish god. He, however, no less intolerant than the Christian god but almost contented with his chosen people, hardly competed in the world at large.

The reasons for the Christian victory are diverse. Only some of them bear on the problem of fear. Gods owe their birth and power to other human needs and passions beyond mere fear. *Timor non fecit deos*, though *sacerdotes fecerunt timores*. Yet fear had a share in the Christian victory. Not the fear of the Christian God but the fear of their multiple fears drove the heathen into the worship of the only God. Threefold was the protection they found: (1) Intolerance and exclusive fervor simplified and systematized their scheme of the world: a jungle was turned into an orderly country with a simple system of roads and ways. (2) An exclusive community as a closed universe of discourse upheld and confirmed this system. (3) The Christian God, whether the God of Abraham and Jacob or Christ, is a personal God—a God of love and care and hope, the father to whose knees the trembling flock of his children flee in distress—

stronger than any fear, definite or indefinite, to those who confide, endure, and pray. Thus the one humble God of the Christians defeated the glamorous many and freed the chest of the heathen pressed in anguish, by mixing awe into their fear, hope into their awe, love into their hope—in a unique way never equaled by any other god.

To the rational man of the industrial age everything has a "natural" cause; no demons interfere. Yet, in times of crisis, he too can be gripped by indefinite fear. I outline briefly the causes of his potential weakness.

We should start by realizing that the rational man is the heir of a long period of relative security in which he accumulated a great many matters of course to be taken for granted. This dubious training may be partly responsible for his vulnerability. His scheme of order is rational only in theory. It is not enough to posit a natural cause. We must know it. The causes of an economic or social crisis in our time are of infinite complexity. From the mere law of causality nobody can derive any guidance for action. The system of things the average man takes for granted consists mainly of vague general rules, simplified experience, ingrained as habits. They supply the modern man with a set of substitute causes. They guide his judgment and action. After a period of peaceful prosperity the relative order of economic life becomes the absolute order of the world. Man may accept the fact that there are, and apparently must be, business cycles, though he fails to understand their causes. A little more of a slump, and many things happen for which no place is provided in his orderly world. He no longer knows what can or is likely to happen. A halo of indefinite fear strangely blurs his distinct reasons for definite fear. He resorts to others, to the universe of discourse. But the shattered scheme of order is not merely his individual system: it is the system of assumptions that underlie the universe of discourse itself.

Something has happened to the universe of discourse. We sense it, though we find it difficult to say what it is. We may realize it

only in the acute crisis, though it may have happened long ago and at no particular time. It seems suddenly as if nobody really believes in what he still takes for granted. Capitalists are no longer entirely and naively sure of their capitalism, socialists are strangely unsure of their socialism. An artificial note suggests a convulsive effort; voices are strained. Suddenly great old words have a hollow sound. Freedom? The average man knows in his heart what it means. His conscious concept, however, is tied up with and formulated in terms of these or those material conditions. They have been taken for granted—and now they are threatened. He cannot recognize freedom, and so all meaning goes overboard and leaves a vacuum. What does "freedom of speech," "pursuit of happiness," or "democracy" mean, unless I know how to earn a decent living by doing decent work? The scaffold of thinking that guides discourse begins to totter—confidence deserts, indefinite fear invades the bewildered mind, impairs our faculty of orientation and thus of action.

The universe of discourse splits wide apart. Different splits cross one another. Simplified substitute causes stand up against one another. Who or what is responsible? Different sides shout in different languages, each for itself, past the others' ears. There is no longer "discourse." There is no response—no reasoning, no exchange of arguments. Hostile groups, rallying around different "causes," have no basis on which to argue. Humor, wit, jokes, disappear. They presuppose detachment; anxiety does not joke. In elections these try to explain complex causes and mutter without conviction impotent reasons of expediency for caution—the others, grimly determined, cry for change at any price. If democratic leaders do not succeed in restoring the frame of reference and restructuring the mental space, even the ordinary citizen of average decency is in danger of falling victim to the great simplifier, the emotional leader, the scourge of modern society.

Whenever we analyze such a situation, our emphasis is on economic insecurity

caused by mass unemployment. When everybody has a job, there is no mental insecurity at large. Granted; yet societies in different periods, different strata and different groups within a society, differ in their psychological capacity to stand economic insecurity. Moreover, "having a job" by no means plays only an economic role. The universe of discourse in industrial society is not merely a universe of talk. It is an enormous combination of interrelated activities in a process of production, distribution, and consumption. Our job is part of the way we participate in the universe of discourse, as a little wheel here or there. Without a job we should be cut off from this process and might feel insecure, even if we got our full wages by means of unemployment insurance. Modern man without a job is strangely alone. He is badly equipped to be alone. "Entertainment" is but escape.

The universe of discourse breaks asunder; the democratic procedure is stalled. "Causes" are hopelessly entangled. The voice of wavering governments no longer reaches the average citizen. Collective insecurity shakes the precarious security of an unsupported individual. This is the psychological hour of the totalitarian leader. He masters the indefinite fear.

How does he proceed? There is a market place crowded with worried people, listening to a megaphone. The raucous voice of *der Führer* shouts in a tone of utmost determination: "German men and women, the first thing is the primary thing! The second thing is secondary!" The social psychologist should not laugh at this momentous proposition. Truisms carry weight in the rational age. Obviously, the man is right. First things come first. He knows what comes first, what second—it is a considerable time since anybody knew that. He has a way, a line—he acts.

He gives a simple frame of reference, simple causes; whoever joins him gets rid of confusion. Many join for no other reason, in a convulsive effort at voluntary blindness. First things come first—no efficient action

THE STRANGER: AN ESSAY IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY

ALFRED SCHUETZ

ABSTRACT

The cultural pattern peculiar to a social group functions for its members as an unquestioned scheme of reference. It determines the strata of relevance for their "thinking as usual" in standardized situations and the degree of knowledge required for handling the tested "recipes" involved. The approaching stranger, however, does not share certain basic assumptions which alone guarantee the functioning of these recipes. He has to place in question what seems unquestionable to the in-group and cannot even put his trust in a vague knowledge *about* the general style of the pattern but needs explicit knowledge *of* its elements. This entails a dislocation of the stranger's habitual system of relevance. A thorough modification of his schemes of orientation and interpretation and of his concepts of anonymity, typicality, and chance is the prerequisite of any possible adjustment.

The present paper intends to study in terms of a general theory of interpretation the typical situation in which a stranger finds himself in his attempt to interpret the cultural pattern of a social group which he approaches and to orient himself within it. For our present purposes the term "stranger" shall mean an adult individual of our times and civilization who tries to be permanently accepted or at least tolerated by the group which he approaches. The outstanding example for the social situation under scrutiny is that of the immigrant, and the following analyses are, as a matter of convenience, worked out with this instance in view. But by no means is their validity restricted to this special case. The applicant for membership in a closed club, the prospective bridegroom who wants to be admitted to the girl's family, the farmer's son who enters college, the city-dweller who settles in a rural environment, the "selectee" who joins the Army, the family of the war worker who moves into a boom town—all are strangers according to the definition just given, although in these cases the typical "crisis" that the immigrant undergoes may assume milder forms or even be entirely absent. Intentionally excluded, however, from the present investigation are certain cases the inclusion of which would require some qualifications in our statements: (a) the visitor or guest who intends to establish a merely transitory contact with the group; (b) children or primitives; and (c) relationships

between individuals and groups of different levels of civilization, as in the case of the Huron brought to Europe—a pattern dear to some moralists of the eighteenth century. Furthermore, it is not the purpose of this paper to deal with the processes of social assimilation and social adjustment which are treated in an abundant and, for the most part, excellent literature¹ but rather with the situation of approaching which precedes every possible social adjustment and which includes its prerequisites.

As a convenient starting-point we shall investigate how the cultural pattern of group life presents itself to the common sense of a man who lives his everyday life within the group among his fellow-men. Following the customary terminology, we use the term "cultural pattern of group life" for designating all the peculiar valuations, institutions, and systems of orientation and guidance (such as the folkways, mores, laws, habits, customs, etiquette, fashions) which, in the common opinion of sociologists of our time, characterize—if not constitute—any social group at a given moment in its his-

¹ Instead of mentioning individual outstanding contributions by American writers, such as W. G. Sumner, W. I. Thomas, Florian Znaniecki, R. E. Park, H. A. Miller, E. V. Stonequist, E. S. Bogardus, and Kimball Young, and by German authors, especially Georg Simmel and Robert Michels, we refer to the valuable monograph by Margaret Mary Wood, *The Stranger: A Study in Social Relationship* (New York, 1934), and the bibliography quoted therein.

tory. This cultural pattern, like any phenomenon of the social world, has a different aspect for the sociologist and for the man who acts and thinks within it.² The sociologist (as sociologist, not as a man among fellow-men which he remains in his private life) is the disinterested scientific onlooker of the social world. He is disinterested in that he intentionally refrains from participating in the network of plans, means-and-ends relations, motives and chances, hopes and fears, which the actor within the social world uses for interpreting his experiences of it; as a scientist he tries to observe, describe, and classify the social world as clearly as possible in well-ordered terms in accordance with the scientific ideals of coherence, consistency, and analytical consequence. The actor within the social world, however, experiences it primarily as a field of his actual and possible acts and only secondarily as an object of his thinking. In so far as he is interested in knowledge of his social world, he organizes this knowledge not in terms of a scientific system but in terms of relevance to his actions. He groups the world around himself (as the center) as a field of domination and is therefore especially interested in that segment which is within his actual or potential reach. He singles out those of its elements which may serve as means or ends for his "use and enjoyment,"³ for furthering his purposes, and for overcoming obstacles. His interest in these elements is of different degrees, and for this reason he does not aspire to become acquainted with all of them with equal thoroughness. What he wants is *graduated knowledge* of relevant elements, the degree of desired knowledge being correlated with their relevance. Put otherwise, the world seems to him at any given moment as stratified in different layers of relevance,

each of them requiring a different degree of knowledge. To illustrate these strata of relevance we may—borrowing the term from cartography—speak of "isohypses" or "hypsographical contour lines of relevance," trying to suggest by this metaphor that we could show the distribution of the interests of an individual at a given moment with respect both to their intensity and to their scope by connecting elements of equal relevance to his acts, just as the cartographer connects points of equal height by contour lines in order to reproduce adequately the shape of a mountain. The graphical representation of these "contour lines of relevance" would not show them as a single closed field but rather as numerous areas scattered over the map, each of different size and shape. Distinguishing with William James⁴ two kinds of knowledge, namely, "*knowledge of acquaintance*" and "*knowledge about*," we may say that, within the field covered by the contour lines of relevance, there are centers of explicit knowledge of what is aimed at; they are surrounded by a halo knowledge *about* what seems to be sufficient; next comes a region in which it will do merely "to put one's trust"; the adjoining foothills are the home of unwarranted hopes and assumptions; between these areas, however, lie zones of complete ignorance.

We do not want to overcharge this image. Its chief purpose has been to illustrate that the knowledge of the man who acts and thinks within the world of his daily life is not homogeneous; it is (1) incoherent, (2) only partially clear, and (3) not at all free from contradictions.

1. It is incoherent because the individual's interests which determine the relevance of the objects selected for further inquiry are themselves not integrated into a coherent system. They are only partially organized under plans of any kind, such as plans of life, plans of work and leisure, plans

² This insight seems to be the most important contribution of Max Weber's methodological writings to the problems of social science. Cf. the present writer's *Der sinnhafte Aufbau der sozialen Welt* (Vienna, 1932).

³ John Dewey, *Logic, the Theory of Inquiry* (New York, 1938), chap. iv. •

⁴ For the distinction of these two kinds of knowledge cf. William James, *Psychology* (New York, 1890), I, 221-22.

for every social role assumed. But the hierarchy of these plans changes with the situation and with the growth of the personality; interests are shifted continually and entail an uninterrupted transformation of the shape and density of the relevance lines. Not only the selection of the objects of curiosity but also the degree of knowledge aimed at changes.

2. Man in his daily life is only partially—and we dare say exceptionally—interested in the clarity of his knowledge, i.e., in full insight into the relations between the elements of his world and the general principles ruling those relations. He is satisfied that a well-functioning telephone service is available to him and, normally, does not ask how the apparatus functions in detail and what laws of physics make this functioning possible. He buys merchandise in the store, not knowing how it is produced, and pays with money, although he has only a vague idea what money really is. He takes it for granted that his fellow-man will understand his thought if expressed in plain language and will answer accordingly, without wondering how this miraculous performance may be explained. Furthermore, he does not search for the truth and does not quest for certainty. All he wants is information on likelihood and insight into the chances or risks which the situation at hand entails for the outcome of his actions. That the subway will run tomorrow as usual is for him almost of the same order of likelihood as that the sun will rise. If by reason of a special interest he needs more explicit knowledge on a topic, a benign modern civilization holds ready for him a chain of information desks and reference libraries.

3. His knowledge, finally, is not a consistent one. At the same time he may consider statements as equally valid which in fact are incompatible with one another. As a father, a citizen, an employee, and a member of his church he may have the most different and the least congruent opinions on moral, political, or economic matters. This inconsistency does not necessarily originate in a logical fallacy. Men's thought is just

spread over subject matters located within different and differently relevant levels, and they are not aware of the modifications they would have to make in passing from one level to another. This and similar problems would have to be explored by a logic of everyday thinking, postulated but not attained by all the great logicians from Leibnitz to Husserl and Dewey. Up to now the science of logic has primarily dealt with the logic of science.

The system of knowledge thus acquired—incoherent, inconsistent, and only partially clear, as it is—takes on for the members of the in-group the appearance of a *sufficient* coherence, clarity, and consistency to give anybody a reasonable chance of understanding and of being understood. Any member born or reared within the group accepts the ready-made standardized scheme of the cultural pattern handed down to him by ancestors, teachers, and authorities as an unquestioned and unquestionable guide in all the situations which normally occur within the social world. The knowledge correlated to the cultural pattern carries its evidence in itself—or, rather, it is taken for granted in the absence of evidence to the contrary. It is a knowledge of trustworthy *recipes* for interpreting the social world and for handling things and men in order to obtain the best results in every situation with a minimum of effort by avoiding undesirable consequences. The recipe works, on the one hand, as a precept for actions and thus serves as a scheme of expression: whoever wants to obtain a certain result has to proceed as indicated by the recipe provided for this purpose. On the other hand, the recipe serves as a scheme of interpretation: whoever proceeds as indicated by a specific recipe is supposed to intend the correlated result. Thus it is the function of the cultural pattern to eliminate troublesome inquiries by offering ready-made directions for use, to replace truth hard to attain by comfortable truisms, and to substitute the self-explanatory for the questionable.

This "thinking as usual," as we may call it, corresponds to Max Scheler's idea of the

"relatively natural conception of the world" (*relativ natürliche Weltanschauung*);⁵ it includes the "of-course" assumptions relevant to a particular social group which Robert S. Lynd describes in such a masterly way—together with their inherent contradictions and ambivalence—as the "Middletown-spirit."⁶ Thinking as usual may be maintained as long as some basic assumptions hold true, namely: (1) that life and especially social life will continue to be the same as it has been so far, that is to say, that the same problems requiring the same solutions will recur and that, therefore, our former experiences will suffice for mastering future situations; (2) that we may relay on the knowledge handed down to us by parents, teachers, governments, traditions, habits, etc., even if we do not understand their origin and their real meaning; (3) that in the ordinary course of affairs it is sufficient to know something *about* the general type or style of events we may encounter in our life-world in order to manage or control them; and (4) that neither the systems of recipes as schemes of interpretation and expression nor the underlying basic assumptions just mentioned are our private affair, but that they are likewise accepted and applied by our fellow-men.

If only one of these assumptions ceases to stand the test, thinking as usual becomes unworkable. Then a "crisis" arises which, according to W. I. Thomas' famous definition, "interrupts the flow of habit and gives rise to changed conditions of consciousness and practice"; or, as we may say, it overthrows precipitously the actual system of relevances. The cultural pattern no longer functions as a system of tested recipes at hand; it reveals that its applicability is restricted to a specific historical situation.

⁵ Max Scheler, "Probleme einer Soziologie des Wissens," *Die Wissensformen und die Gesellschaft* (Leipzig, 1926), pp. 58 ff.; cf. Howard Becker and Hellmuth Otto Dahlke, "Max Scheler's Sociology of Knowledge," *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, II (1942), 310-22, esp. p. 315.

⁶ Robert S. Lynd, *Middletown in Transition* (New York, 1937), chap. xii, and *Knowledge for What?* (Princeton, 1939), pp. 58-63.

Yet the stranger, by reason of his personal crisis, does not share the above-mentioned basic assumptions. He becomes essentially the man who has to place in question nearly everything that seems to be unquestionable to the members of the approached group.

To him the cultural pattern of the approached group does not have the authority of a tested system of recipes, and this, if for no other reason, because he does not partake in the vivid historical tradition by which it has been formed. To be sure, from the stranger's point of view, too, the culture of the approached group has its peculiar history, and this history is even accessible to him. But it has never become an integral part of his biography, as did the history of his home group. Only the ways in which his fathers and grandfathers lived become for everyone elements of his own way of life. Graves and reminiscences can neither be transferred nor conquered. The stranger, therefore, approaches the other group as a newcomer in the true meaning of the term. At best he may be willing and able to share the present and the future with the approached group in vivid and immediate experience; under all circumstances, however, he remains excluded from such experiences of its past. Seen from the point of view of the approached group, he is a man without a history.

To the stranger the cultural pattern of his home group continues to be the outcome of an unbroken historical development and an element of his personal biography which for this very reason has been and still is the unquestioned scheme of reference for his "relatively natural conception of the world." As a matter of course, therefore, the stranger starts to interpret his new social environment in terms of his thinking as usual. Within the scheme of reference brought from his home group, however, he finds a ready-made idea of the pattern supposedly valid within the approached group—an idea which necessarily will soon prove inadequate.⁷

⁷As one account showing how the American cultural pattern depicts itself as an "unquestionable"

First, the idea of the cultural pattern of the approached group which the stranger finds within the interpretive scheme of his home group has originated in the attitude of a disinterested observer. The approaching stranger, however, is about to transform himself from an unconcerned onlooker into a would-be member of the approached group. The cultural pattern of the approached group, then, is no longer a subject matter of his thought but a segment of the world which has to be dominated by actions. Consequently, its position within the stranger's system of relevance changes decisively, and this means, as we have seen, that another type of knowledge is required for its interpretation. Jumping from the stalls to the stage, so to speak, the former onlooker becomes a member of the cast, enters as a partner into social relations with his co-actors, and participates henceforth in the action in progress.

Second, the new cultural pattern acquires an environmental character. Its remoteness changes into proximity; its vacant frames become occupied by vivid experiences; its anonymous contents turn into definite social situations; its ready-made typologies disintegrate. In other words, the level of environmental experience of social objects is incongruous with the level of mere beliefs about unapproached objects; by passing from the latter to the former, any concept originating in the level of departure becomes necessarily inadequate if applied to the new level without having been restated in its terms.

Third, the ready-made picture of the foreign group subsisting within the stranger's home-group proves its inadequacy for the approaching stranger for the mere reason that it has not been formed with the aim of provoking a response from or a re-

action of the members of the foreign group. The knowledge which it offers serves merely as a handy scheme for interpreting the foreign group and not as a guide for interaction between the two groups. Its validity is primarily based on the consensus of those members of the home group who do not intend to establish a direct social relationship with members of the foreign group. (Those who intend to do so are in a situation analogous to that of the approaching stranger.) Consequently, the scheme of interpretation refers to the members of the foreign group merely as objects of this interpretation, but not beyond it, as addressees of possible acts emanating from the outcome of the interpretive procedure and not as subjects of anticipated reactions toward those acts. Hence, this kind of knowledge is, so to speak, insulated; it can be neither verified nor falsified by responses of the members of the foreign group. The latter, therefore, consider this knowledge—by a kind of “looking-glass” effect⁸—as both irresponsible and irresponsible and complain of its prejudices, bias, and misunderstandings. The approaching stranger, however, becomes aware of the fact that an important element of his “thinking as usual,” namely, his ideas of the foreign group, its cultural pattern, and its way of life, do not stand the test of vivid experience and social interaction.

The discovery that things in his new surroundings look quite different from what he expected them to be at home is frequently the first shock to the stranger's confidence in the validity of his habitual “thinking as usual.” Not only the picture which the stranger has brought along of the cultural pattern of the approached group but the whole hitherto unquestioned scheme of interpretation current within the home group becomes invalidated. It cannot be used as a scheme of orientation within the new social surroundings. For the members of the ap-

element within the scheme of interpretation of European intellectuals we refer to Martin Gumpert's humorous description in his book, *First Papers* (New York, 1941), pp. 8-9. Cf. also books like Jules Romains, *Visite chez les Américains* (Paris, 1930) and Jean Prevost Usonie, *Esquisse de la civilisation américaine* (Paris, 1939), pp. 245-66.

⁸ In using this term, we allude to Cooley's well-known theory of the reflected or looking-glass self (Charles H. Cooley, *Human Nature and the Social Order* [rev. ed.; New York, 1922], p. 184).

proached group *their* cultural pattern fulfils the functions of such a scheme. But the approaching stranger can neither use it simply as it is nor establish a general formula of transformation between both cultural patterns permitting him, so to speak, to convert all the co-ordinates within one scheme of orientation into those valid within the other—and this for the following reasons.

First, any scheme of orientation presupposes that everyone who uses it looks at the surrounding world as grouped around himself who stands at its center. He who wants to use a map successfully has first of all to know his standpoint in two respects: its location on the ground and its representation on the map. Applied to the social world this means that only members of the in-group, having a definite status in its hierarchy and also being aware of it, can use its cultural pattern as a natural and trustworthy scheme of orientation. The stranger, however, has to face the fact that he lacks any status as a member of the social group he is about to join and is therefore unable to get a starting-point to take his bearings. He finds himself a border case outside the territory covered by the scheme of orientation current within the group. He is, therefore, no longer permitted to consider himself as the center of his social environment, and this fact causes again a dislocation of his contour lines of relevance.

Second, the cultural pattern and its recipes represent only for the members of the in-group a unit of coinciding schemes of interpretation as well as of expression. For the outsider, however, this seeming unity falls to pieces. The approaching stranger has to "translate" its terms into terms of the cultural pattern of his home group, provided that, within the latter, interpretive equivalents exist at all. If they exist, the translated terms may be understood and remembered; they can be recognized by recurrence; they are at hand but not in hand. Yet, even then, it is obvious that the stranger cannot assume that his interpretation of the new cultural pattern coincides with that current

with the members of the in-group. On the contrary, he has to reckon with fundamental discrepancies in seeing things and handling situations.

Only after having thus collected a certain knowledge of the interpretive function of the new cultural pattern may the stranger start to adopt it as the scheme of his own expression. The difference between the two stages of knowledge is familiar to any student of a foreign language and has received the full attention of psychologists dealing with the theory of learning. It is the difference between the passive understanding of a language and its active mastering as a means for realizing one's own acts and thoughts. As a matter of convenience we want to keep to this example in order to make clear some of the limits set to the stranger's attempt at conquering the foreign pattern as a scheme of expression, bearing in mind, however, that the following remarks could easily be adapted with appropriate modifications to other categories of the cultural pattern such as mores, laws, folkways, fashions, etc.

Language as a scheme of interpretation and expression does not merely consist of the linguistic symbols catalogued in the dictionary and of the syntactical rules enumerated in an ideal grammar. The former are translatable into other languages; the latter are understandable by referring them to corresponding or deviating rules of the unquestioned mother-tongue.⁹ However, several other factors supervene.

1. Every word and every sentence is, to borrow again a term of William James, surrounded by "fringes" connecting them, on the one hand, with past and future elements of the universe of discourse to which they pertain and surrounding them, on the other hand, with a halo of emotional values and irrational implications which themselves remain ineffable. The fringes are the stuff poetry is made of; they are capable of being set to music but they are not translatable.

⁹ Therefore, the learning of a foreign language reveals to the student frequently for the first time the grammar rules of his mother-tongue which he has followed so far as "the most natural thing in the world," namely, as recipes.

2. There are in any language terms with several connotations. They, too, are noted in the dictionary. But, besides these standardized connotations, every element of the speech acquires its special secondary meaning derived from the context or the social environment within which it is used and, in addition, gets a special tinge from the actual occasion in which it is employed.

3. Idioms, technical terms, jargons, and dialects, whose use remains restricted to specific social groups, exist in every language, and their significance can be learned by an outsider too. But, in addition, every social group, be it ever so small (if not every individual), has its own private code, understandable only by those who have participated in the common past experiences in which it took rise or in the tradition connected with them.

4. As Vossler has shown, the whole history of the linguistic group is mirrored in its way of saying things.¹⁰ All the other elements of group life enter into it—above all, its literature. The erudite stranger, for example, approaching an English-speaking country is heavily handicapped if he has not read the Bible and Shakespeare in the English language, even if he grew up with translations of those books in his mother-tongue.

All the above-mentioned features are accessible only to the members of the in-group. They all pertain to the scheme of expression. They are not teachable and cannot be learned in the same way as, for example, the vocabulary. In order to command a language freely as a scheme of expression, one must have written love letters in it; one has to know how to pray and curse in it and how to say things with every shade appropriate to the addressee and to the situation. Only members of the in-group have the scheme of expression as a genuine one in hand and command it freely within their thinking as usual.

Applying the result to the total of the cultural pattern of group life, we may say

¹⁰ Karl Vossler, *Geist und Kultur in der Sprache* (Heidelberg, 1925), pp. 117 ff.

that the member of the in-group looks in one single glance through the normal social situations occurring to him and that he catches immediately the ready-made recipe appropriate to its solution. In those situations his acting shows all the marks of habituality, automatism, and half-consciousness. This is possible because the cultural pattern provides by its recipes typical solutions for typical problems available for typical actors. In other words, the chance of obtaining the desired standardized result by applying a standardized recipe is an objective one; that is open to everyone who conducts himself like the anonymous type required by the recipe. Therefore, the actor who follows a recipe does not have to check whether this objective chance coincides with a subjective chance, that is, a chance open to him, the individual, by reason of his personal circumstances and faculties which subsists independently of the question whether other people in similar situations could or could not act in the same way with the same likelihood. Even more, it can be stated that the objective chances for the efficiency of a recipe are the greater, the fewer deviations from the anonymous typified behavior occur, and this holds especially for recipes designed for social interaction. This kind of recipe, if it is to work, presupposes that any partner expects the other to act or to react typically, provided that the actor himself acts typically. He who wants to travel by railroad has to behave in that typical way which the type "railroad agent" may reasonably expect as the typical conduct of the type "passenger," and vice versa. Neither party examines the subjective chances involved. The scheme, being designed for everyone's use, need not be tested for its fitness for the peculiar individual who employs it.

For those who have grown up within the cultural pattern, not only the recipes and their efficiency chance but also the typical and anonymous attitudes required by them are an unquestioned "matter of course" which gives them both security and assurance. In other words, these attitudes by

their very anonymity and typicality are placed not within the actor's stratum of relevance which requires explicit knowledge of but in the region of mere acquaintance in which it will do to put one's trust. This interrelation between objective chance, typicality, anonymity, and relevance seems to be rather important.¹¹

For the approaching stranger, however, the pattern of the approached group does not guarantee an objective chance for success but rather a pure subjective likelihood which has to be checked step by step, that is, he has to make sure that the solutions suggested by the new scheme will also produce the desired effect for him in his special position as outsider and newcomer who has not brought within his grasp the whole system of the cultural pattern but who is rather puzzled by its inconsistency, incoherence, and lack of clarity. He has, first of all, to use the term of W. I. Thomas, to *define* the situation. Therefore, he cannot stop at an approximate acquaintance with the new pattern, trusting in his vague knowledge *about* its general style and structure but needs an explicit knowledge *of* its elements, inquiring not only into their *that* but into their *why*. Consequently, the shape of his contour lines of relevance by necessity differs radically from those of a member of the in-group as to situations, recipes, means, ends, social partners, etc. Keeping in mind the above-mentioned interrelationship between relevance, on the one hand, and typicality and anonymity, on the other, it follows that he uses another yardstick for anonymity and typicality of social acts than

¹¹ It could be referred to a general principle of the theory of relevance, but this would surpass the frame of the present paper. The only point for which there is space to contend is that all the obstacles which the stranger meets in his attempt at interpreting the approached group arise from the incongruence of the contour lines of the mutual relevance systems and, consequently, from the distortion the stranger's system undergoes within the new surrounding. But any social relationship, and especially any establishment of new social contacts, even between individuals, involves analogous phenomena, although they do not necessarily lead to a crisis.

the members of the in-group. For to the stranger the observed actors within the approached group are not—as for their co-actors—of a certain presupposed anonymity, namely, mere performers of typical functions, but individuals. On the other hand, he is inclined to take mere individual traits as typical ones. Thus he constructs a social world of pseudo-anonymity, pseudo-intimacy, and pseudo-typicality. Therefore, he cannot integrate the personal types constructed by him into a coherent picture of the approached group and cannot rely on his expectation of their response. And even less can the stranger himself adopt those typical and anonymous attitudes which a member of the in-group is entitled to expect from a partner in a typical situation. Hence the stranger's lack of feeling for distance, his oscillating between remoteness and intimacy, his hesitation and uncertainty, and his distrust in every matter which seems to be so simple and uncomplicated to those who rely on the efficiency of unquestioned recipes which have just to be followed but not understood.

In other words, the cultural pattern of the approached group is to the stranger not a shelter but a field of adventure, not a matter of course but a questionable topic of investigation, not an instrument for disentangling problematic situations but a problematic situation itself and one hard to master.

These facts explain two basic traits of the stranger's attitude toward the group to which nearly all sociological writers dealing with this topic have rendered special attention, namely, (1) the stranger's objectivity and (2) his doubtful loyalty.

1. The stranger's objectivity cannot be sufficiently explained by his critical attitude. To be sure, he is not bound to worship the "idols of the tribe" and has a vivid feeling for the incoherence and inconsistency of the approached cultural pattern. But this attitude originates far less in his propensity to judge the newly approached group by the standards brought from home than in his

need to acquire full knowledge of the elements of the approached cultural pattern and to examine for this purpose with care and precision what seems self-explanatory to the in-group. The deeper reason for his objectivity, however, lies in his own bitter experience of the limits of the "thinking as usual," which has taught him that a man may lose his status, his rules of guidance, and even his history and that the normal way of life is always far less guaranteed than it seems. Therefore, the stranger discerns, frequently with a grievous clear-sightedness, the rising of a crisis which may menace the whole foundation of the "relatively natural conception of the world," while all those symptoms pass unnoticed by the members of the in-group, who rely on the continuance of their customary way of life.

2. The doubtful loyalty of the stranger is unfortunately very frequently more than a prejudice on the part of the approached group. This is especially true in cases in which the stranger proves unwilling or unable to substitute the new cultural pattern entirely for that of the home group. Then the stranger remains what Park and Stonequist have aptly called a "marginal man," a cultural hybrid on the verge of two different patterns of group life, not knowing to which of them he belongs. But very frequently the reproach of doubtful loyalty originates in the astonishment of the members of the in-group that the stranger does not accept the total of its cultural pattern as the natural and appropriate way of life and as the best of all possible solutions of any problem. The stranger is called ungrateful, since he refuses to acknowledge that the cultural pattern offered to him grants him shelter and protection. But these people do not understand that the stranger in the state of transition does not consider this pattern as a protecting shelter at all

but as a labyrinth in which he has lost all sense of his bearings.

As stated before, we have intentionally restricted our topic to the specific attitude of the approaching stranger which precedes any social adjustment and refrained from investigating the process of social assimilation itself. One single remark concerning the latter may be permitted. Strangeness and familiarity are not limited to the social field but are general categories of our interpretation of the world. If we encounter in our experience something previously unknown and which therefore stands out of the ordinary order of our knowledge, we begin a process of inquiry. We first define the new fact; we try to catch its meaning; we then transform step by step our general scheme of interpretation of the world in such a way that the strange fact and its meaning becomes compatible and consistent with all the other facts of our experience and their meanings. If we succeed in this endeavor, then that which formerly was a strange fact and a puzzling problem to our mind is transformed into an additional element of our warranted knowledge. We have enlarged and adjusted our stock of experiences.

What is commonly called the process of social adjustment which the newcomer has to undergo is but a special case of this general principle. The adaptation of the newcomer to the in-group which at first seemed to be strange and unfamiliar to him is a continuous process of inquiry into the cultural pattern of the approached group. If this process of inquiry succeeds, then this pattern and its elements will become to the newcomer a matter of course, an unquestionable way of life, a shelter, and a protection. But then the stranger is no stranger any more, and his specific problems have been solved.

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THE SOCIAL PERSONALITY OF THE CATATONIC-SCHIZOPHRENE

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ABSTRACT

In this research we have attempted to study the catatonic-schizophrenic as a person and view his psychosis against the background of his personality development and the kind of life he has led in association with others in his community. From life-history data and observations of the catatonic's behavior in certain foreign-born communities a particular constellation of personality traits tended to emerge. Thus, it was found that the catatonic develops an acutely self-conscious personality pattern, and this pattern makes it increasingly difficult for him to fit into the life and social relationships of his own community.

In the present research our interest has been in studying the catatonic as a person and viewing his psychosis against the background of his personality development and the kind of life which he has led in association with others in his community. By utilizing this approach in the study of the catatonic reaction, we are shifting the viewpoint from an individualistic, clinical perspective to a social, community one wherein the catatonic is viewed not as an isolated individual in an official diagnostic setting but rather as a person participating in and functioning as a member of a given community milieu. This shift in perspective contrasts vividly the difference between the clinical and the social psychological procedure. In the former the individual is observed and studied in a particularized and unusual situation at the physician's office or hospital, while in the latter instance the individual is observed and studied in the general and usual sphere of his social relationships within his own community. This shift in perspective may be of some relevance, as there are indications of an intrinsic connection between the personality organization and the kind of psychosis which an individual may develop.

The study of the social personality of the catatonic has to date been of little interest to the research worker, primarily because the prevailing psychiatric notions have tended to regard this particular mental state as the result of a certain type of disease process¹ either organically or psychologically determined. Our major task in this paper

is to analyze and describe some of the catatonic's characteristic personality traits in the process of their development and to show the role which they play in the course of his experience.

The initial step in this research was to select a sample of forty-two psychiatrically diagnosed catatonics who were born and reared in certain Chicago foreign-born communities which have had high rates for juvenile delinquency and adult criminality over a long period of years. The procedure was to obtain from these catatonics life-histories as well as a series of briefer interviews. A person's life-history, as told in his own words, represents a sociological technique for revealing certain personality traits, attitudes, beliefs, and ideologies. These materials were supplemented (1) by the accounts of the catatonic's behavior as observed by family members and friends, (2) by the hospital psychiatric record containing clinical observations and diagnostic examinations, and (3) by observations of the catatonic's behavior in his social milieu. These four types of data constitute the basic framework from which a picture of the catatonic's personality and social relations have been constructed. Thus, from the life-histories and interviews which were obtained from the catatonic, a particular constellation of personality traits tended to emerge.

¹ H. Douglas Singer, "Psychosis and the Central Autonomic Nervous System," *Journal of the American Medical Association*, CX (June 18, 1938), 2048-53.

Self-consciousness.—The traits which characterize the catatonic person tend to center around a marked self-consciousness. This self-consciousness which is evident in all aspects of his behavior might be considered as the basic trait from which all the others apparently emanate. This trait appears to be composed of such qualities as timidity, cautiousness, feelings of inferiority, and an absence of spontaneity. All these qualities characterize definitely the catatonic young man and inhibit him from establishing contacts of an informal and intimate nature with the other young people in the community. These traits, although they are not labeled as such by other boys in the community, are sensed by them, and consequently they notice the difference in this young man as compared with themselves.

One of the catatonics in our research series displays this trait of self-consciousness in the following statement.

In high school I was working after school in a drug store from four to eleven. As my studies began to get harder, it was difficult for me because I had no time to study and so I got behind in my studies and got ashamed of myself. I got in with a bunch of fellows and we began to bum from school. They finally caught up with us and wanted to know if I was going to school or going to quit. I thought it was best for me to quit as I was so far behind in my studies and I did not feel that I could face my friends and not have my lessons. I am sorry that I took this step now.²

This young catatonic boy, residing in an area with a high delinquency rate, showed a definite sensitivity when he found himself behind in his studies in school. Even though he had the plausible excuse of working after school, this apparently had no weight in his own mind when he found himself failing in his subjects. This is, of course, quite different from the reaction of the other young men in this community. Most of them welcome the opportunity to get a job where they can make some money and especially

so if it relieves them of the necessity of attending school.

In the realm of sex behavior this lack of spontaneity and feeling of inferiority are universally shown and inhibit the catatonic young man in his spasmodic attempts to meet members of the opposite sex.

Of course I have not seen any girls and I have not had intercourse with one yet. I often wondered how I would go about it, how I would feel and whether I would have enough gumption to do it. I have never been in a disorderly house.

I feel that I have an inferiority complex. Somehow with girls I feel backward. I have never really been in love, I guess. I used to see quite a few girls when I worked in the department store. I hear quite a lot about "houses" from the boys in the neighborhood, and during the course of a walk we would come across them. No one ever urged us to go in, and they never went in when I was with them.³

Anxiety feelings.—Growing out of this marked self-consciousness are numerous traits which center around a feeling of anxiety; they are tied up with fearfulness, worry, and a feeling of difference. This anxiety is, of course, not always clearly defined in reference to a given situation, but it is manifested in any situation in society which is likely to be changed emotionally for the participating persons. The difference between the catatonic boy and other persons, in such a situation, is that the anxiety and tenseness is more marked on the part of the former. The boy, of course, cannot always describe what he worries about or what he fears, but these qualities are clearly observed when he tells about his own personal experiences and behavior. This anxiety, reflected by a feeling of difference, is illustrated in the following statement:

All my life I have been in a daze. I think that I am different from others, and I figure that everything is hard for me. Life is very much of a hardship for me. In fact, it is awful for me to get through a whole day.⁴

In most instances, this anxiety apparently centers around the economic insecurity of

² Case No. 6.

³ Case No. 13.

⁴ Case No. 19.

the social order. The boy is worried because he cannot find a job, or he is worried because he might lose the one he has. Often his anxiety tends to focus upon a concern for his health.

Another area of anxiety in the catatonic's life is found in the practice of masturbation. He has developed the habit of masturbating in early adolescence, and this practice is accompanied by marked feelings of guilt on his part. He soon obtains the idea from other people that this is a bad practice and is likely to injure one's health. This worries him, and he frets about it and makes various attempts to stop the habit, but generally without success. He, like most other boys, apparently outgrows the habit, but he is likely to reflect back upon such behavior and worry because he practiced it.

Seclusiveness.—This trait, which was universally found in the catatonic cases examined, is one which is emphasized whenever the schizophrenic personality is discussed. But some authorities do not consider the catatonic as seclusive, regarding this trait as characteristic of the other types of schizophrenia. Nevertheless, our case materials indicate that this trait is as clear in its outline among catatonics as it is among paranoids. The extreme self-consciousness and the anxiety traits, which have already been described, apparently are the basis for this trait of seclusiveness. Self-consciousness apparently inhibits the boy from establishing intimate contacts with other young men in the community, and consequently it appears to them that he is different. As a result, the other young people in the community tend to isolate him from certain activities, and thus they reinforce the tendency toward seclusiveness which is already existent in his personality. The vicious circle is very marked: exclusion by the community, which supplements the already present tendency on the boy's part not to seek social contacts.

This very definite isolation of the catatonic young man from certain aspects of the communal life is seen in a certain amount of ignorance about subjects which

are common knowledge to the other young men. The catatonic is extremely ignorant concerning sexual matters which are the common knowledge of other young men. He also shows an extreme lack of familiarity with the delinquent argot in the community which is generally the common knowledge of both the delinquent and the nondelinquent young men. This general lack of sophistication with these areas of life seems to flow directly from his marked social isolation. For example, a catatonic young man tells of his lack of contact with girls and indicates at the same time his rationalization of this situation.

There were a couple of fellows around our house and my sis was going out with a fellow. I didn't care much for girls myself. Up to the present day I haven't been out with a girl. I saw that sis was going out and having a nice time and I thought if I had a girl I would have as good a time as they would. These fellows work and so have money to take out a girl, and I thought that luck was with them. I kid my sis quite a lot about her boy friends.⁵

It is interesting to note that he blames the lack of money for his failure to have a girl, but, in a community where none of the young fellows have much money, this attitude is rather unusual. Lack of money apparently never inhibits any of the other young men in the community in their relations with girls.

Another catatonic describes, in extremely stilted language, his conception of sexual intercourse and also indicates his marked ignorance with certain sexual terms which are common knowledge to other young fellows in his neighborhood.

The isolation which establishes and strengthens this trait of seclusiveness often leads the potential catatonic to seek the company of persons much older than himself. Unlike most young people who prefer to be with persons of their own age, the catatonic develops a definite liking for older persons, and these contacts add a phase to his experience which the other young

⁵ Case No. 9.

people of the community, in general, lack. While the young people are most likely to be critical of the standard set by the older adults in the community, the catatonic often accepts and adopts these standards.

Traits of conformity.—In a social situation where the catatonic boy has limited personal and intimate contacts with other persons of his own age, nothing remains for him except to conform in his behavior to the folkways and mores of the larger society, for his own personality disposition makes it impossible for him to conform to many of the folkways and mores of his own community. He is a very quiet person, and one never finds him participating in the rowdy and boisterous behavior which characterizes, without exception, the normal young men and women of the community in which the majority of our catatonics resided. He is obedient to his elders and always carries out to the best of his ability any task to which he is assigned. He is honest in his personal and business relationships, and one need have no fear of trusting him in a situation where stealing might be possible. In consequence, the catatonic young man can be described as a good boy and one who has those desirable traits which all the social agencies would like to inculcate into all the young men of the community. This tendency to conform is especially marked by a freedom from so-called vices. Types of conduct which might be designated as vices in our society are apparently absent in his behavior pattern. The most common vices which do occur in his behavior include smoking and masturbation. Such vices as drinking, gambling, swearing, loafing, truancy, personal untidiness, impudence to elders, dishonesty, illicit sexual indulgence, and the telling of "dirty" stories are practically never found. The catatonic occasionally has to listen to such stories, but it is practically impossible to get him to repeat them.

Home attachment.—His early fear of leaving his mother and the sheltered home to go out into the neighborhood and from there into the larger world is apparently

intensified as the years go by. The isolation which he experiences at the hands of the other young men in the community tends to force him more and more into the security of his own home and makes it difficult for him to leave it, even though it often does occur to him to go out and mix with the other young people. This unusual attachment to the home fires causes him to take a great deal of interest in home problems and to shoulder many of the family responsibilities.

At times my uncle would work like the devil and one day he got a letter stating that he was losing his house. When I heard this, I felt very sorry for him, for I did not know how he would get help. I was going around with him at the time and he would give me money for shows and eats. I worried a great deal about this. It happened about four months before I went to the hospital.

Poor Sis. I am sorry that she is laid off. She went around the neighborhood and tried to find a job but no luck. Last night I went with my father and saw a lawyer about the house. Then we went and saw a politician around the neighborhood and talked the whole situation over with him. I got home about ten-thirty and she was there with her boy-friend. He comes on Wednesday, Saturday, and Sunday evenings. Then I had a cup of coffee and after that a cigarette came in handy.⁶

In another instance, a young catatonic youth found his home situation almost too much for him to bear, and he records playing with the idea of suicide. His home attachment was apparently so marked that the failure in his home meant a personal failure for himself.

Self-improvement interest.—This trait is evident in all our cases and is possibly connected with the fact that the catatonic is isolated from many community activities and that he feels insecure within his own personality. As a result, he turns to a certain type of reading to obtain the knowledge which is denied him in social intercourse and to strengthen his ever present feelings of inadequacy. He often shows a tendency to read books which are far be-

⁶ Case No. 9. •

yond his own educational level. The subject matter of such books often consists of academic psychology and philosophy, although, in most instances, he reads pseudo-psychology and pseudo-philosophy. For example, two of the boys had in their libraries a book by E. Shaftesbury, entitled *Instantaneous Personal Magnetism*. Another boy lists as his favorite book *The Conquering Chief*, a popularly written "success" manual. Another boy read numerous pamphlets with such titles as "How To Improve Yourself Socially" and "How To Improve Your English."

Another reading interest which occurs consistently in the boy's own story centers around sex. Most of them are avid for books which purport to discuss the facts of life and subjects about which "every young man should know." Unlike many of the other young men in the community who often regard such books as they regard the "dirty" story, the catatonic young men read them with a definite seriousness and a desire to obtain information.

This self-improvement interest is also noticeable in the boy's very serious attitude toward school. Unlike most boys in the community who are impatient to leave school, the catatonic young man looks upon school as an opportunity for improving himself for the task of getting ahead. As a rule, the catatonic young man stays in school a year or two longer than do his brothers. If he is forced to leave school for economic reasons, he often tries to supplement his education by going to night school or by taking certain special courses.

It frequently happens, however, that, while these boys make numerous plans for additional schooling and for advancing themselves, they seldom succeed in carrying them to a conclusion. Part of this lack of success is no doubt due to the general economic conditions in the community. But, instead of accepting the situation as do other young men in the community, they become very sensitive about it and take in a personal way their failure to improve themselves. This anxiety concerning their

inability to continue school or to find work often leads to an indulgence in many fantasies about getting ahead.

Recently I have thought of going to night school and take up something that would help me in the future. But I have gone about it half-heartedly; I wonder if it would be wise to go to school and take up some particular line. The reason I have thought of going to school is that my next door neighbor is in construction work and he has been talking about his work with me.

Often I would dream about getting ahead and getting a better position. I thought that someone would come along and promote me to a better position. You know at the store there was a suggestion box where the various employees could put in ideas which might bring about some economy. I gave it a thought but never did hand in any suggestions. I never had any initiative, I guess. I never had any good suggestions but if I did try hard enough to think of one I would think that it was not worth while. I thought my ideas were not any good. . . . Sometimes I would think of catching some of the shoplifters and through that get a better position.⁷

Formality traits.—Exclusion from intimate types of contact with other young men results in the catatonic boy's being extremely formal. In dress he is very conventional, and one never finds him adopting the unconventional attire as do many of the other young men in the neighborhood. He is extremely neat, as a rule, in his personal appearance, and takes some pains to look well. His hands and face are generally clean, his hair combed, and his shoes shined. He speaks slowly and gives one the impression of choosing his words carefully. He seldom gives voice to spontaneous expressions which characterize the speech of other young men in the community. To a question, he often hesitates some time before replying and gives the impression of considering the subject carefully. This tendency is to be noted in both the pre-psychotic and post-psychotic periods. This inhibition in spontaneous speech is very marked in the psychotic period. In the psychosis this

⁷ Case No. 13.

young man often speaks extremely slowly and many times, as is well known, does not speak at all.

In social intercourse one finds this same formality in behavior. He acknowledges introductions in a stereotyped fashion. His natural lack of spontaneity, a trait not characteristic of other young people in the community, causes him to be extremely formal in meeting another person. His manner and verbal response on being introduced to another person are very stilted and polite. He will shake hands very formally and say, "How do you do? I am very glad to meet you." One never finds on his lips the spontaneous and original methods of greeting characteristic of other young people in his community.

This formality is also extremely noticeable in his contacts with girls. With them his conversation is, as a rule, very polite; he never is personal in his remarks but attempts to keep the conversation on a "high" plane. He often envies the free and easy way which other young men have with girls, and he does not know how to establish this same type of relationship.

Absence of a sense of humor.—This trait emphasizes the seriousness with which the catatonic young man tends to regard the life and world about him. He sees no humor in situations humorous for other young people. One never finds him telling a joke or participating in what might be a joke on another person. When other boys describe their sex exploits with humor and gusto, the catatonic finds it impossible to laugh with the freedom and carelessness of other boys. When a "dirty" joke is told, the catatonic often fails to see the point. Life is serious and not to be treated lightly.

This seriousness toward life is also reflected in his attitude toward the movies. He finds difficulty in enjoying the "slapstick" humor of the cinema comedies. He prefers pictures of a reputedly high caliber.

Interest in the larger world.—This trait was noticeable in varying degrees in all the catatonics interviewed. Interest in the larger world means that the catatonic person

tends to pay attention to social problems and social life beyond his own immediate experience. His unguided reading interests, no doubt, play a part in the formation of this trait. One young Negro catatonic boy was greatly concerned with the solution of the race problem. Another Negro was interested in national history. Some catatonics were interested in religious questions centering around such problems as the existence of God and biological and social evolution. Sometimes this interest tends to negate his own orthodox religious values, which he sometimes questions in the light of what he reads. One of the boys was interested in the problem of a universal language.

Some time before my sickness I got to thinking that the world and man were one and I could see no reason for so much conflict between the different nationalities. I believe that if there was a universal language, it would advance science and learning and men would be better able to understand each other.

I tried to explain how this problem could be solved in writing. I got this idea a long time ago when I picked up a manual by Sackwell Stoner. The title of this was the *Manual of Natural Education—Education from the Cradle to the Grave*. This man had the idea of a universal tongue which he called "Esperanto." He had the idea that a child could learn this besides his native tongue. This was some form of Latin. I thought that it would be a good idea if all peoples had one tongue. I thought that it would be a means of eliminating wars and advancing science.

I would also think of doing something for the benefit of people. I would try to figure out why society was as it is and how it could be better. I would try to figure out why certain things should be allowed to happen and why so many lives were being wrecked. I had a belief that every child that was born had the possibilities of becoming a very fine citizen and that by mishandling the child turned out badly. . . . I just can't get clear how I happened to think of these things; at present I do not think of them.⁸

The fact that he is isolated from intimate contacts in the community and consequently thrown by himself a great deal apparent-

⁸ Case No. 6.

ly accounts for this introspective interest in his social environment. This probing always starts with his own personality and in some instance, depending on intellectual discipline and education, leads him to other more complex environmental problems which he may attempt to solve.

Thriftness.—The fact that these young men are emotionally insecure accounts, no doubt, for their unusual preoccupation with ways of making a living and increasing their income. This feeling of insecurity is reacted to by being extremely thrifty. They always tend to save some of their money, no matter how little they earn. One boy who was planning to get married had tabulated very carefully a statement of his assets and liabilities. He knew exactly how much he was going to spend on his wedding.

The catatonic as viewed by members of his family.—The catatonic's personality as described by other members of his family is a check upon the traits abstracted from the life-histories. Each mother of a catatonic who was interviewed reported without exception that her son was a "very good boy." These unsophisticated statements might be of dubious value if it were not for the fact that they were universal and that many of the mothers had other sons about whom they could not give such good reports. All mothers of the catatonic boys record their shyness and quietness in their early years. They also note their tendency to remain at home and not to go out and play with the other children as did their brothers and sisters. One mother describes her boy by this statement, "He was always a Christian boy who did not miss a single Lord's Day going to church in eleven years." Another mother records that her boy always hung onto her skirts when he was small and cried when she first took him to school. Still another mother stresses the unusual obedience of her child when he was small. Another mother speaks of her boy's qualities in the following manner.

Rocco grew just like a flower . . . all grow nice when they are small. Rocco always obeyed.

When he got a little older, he helped around the house. He would wash dishes when he was small. . . . I can't understand why he turned out that way, because when he was small he was always nice. It is puzzling why these things turn out like this.⁹

The manner in which the mothers describe the personalities of their boys in the very early years is duplicated by the accounts of the boys' brothers and sisters for their later years. They also, without exception, see their brother as one who was shy and timid. Not only do they describe him in these terms but in actual behavior situations they also report that he does not participate and that he never does things like the other boys. One boy with a long delinquent and criminal record saw clearly the personality difference between his catatonic brother and himself in the fact that the former wanted to be honest and amount to something. Another young man describes his catatonic brother in much the same way as did the criminal in describing his brother.

Jack worked hard and put in a lot of time reading and studying. He wanted to get ahead. He never went out much. I guess that it was too much for him and he had to have a breakdown.¹⁰

All the statements of the mothers, brothers, and sisters of these catatonics were relative to their early behavior tendencies. That there is a marked personality difference in these children as compared to the other children and that this difference seems to be indicated by the presence of such personality traits as sensitiveness, shyness, and fearfulness were universally recorded by the different family members. There seems to be a reasonable agreement between the manner in which the family members describe these boys and the way in which they describe themselves.

The catatonic as viewed by the psychiatrist.—An additional check on the validity of the traits which have been abstracted from the

⁹ Case No. 9.

¹⁰ Case No. 6.

catatonic's life-history can be obtained by an examination of his clinical record. Here it is to be noted that, after all possible organic diagnoses have been eliminated, the psychiatric summary of the case is made practically entirely in terms of the social characteristics found in the clinical examination. In the catatonic's clinical record the social characteristics which are mentioned by the psychiatrists most frequently correspond very closely to the traits as abstracted from the life-history of the catatonic. Such social characteristics as seclusiveness, anxiety, social inactivity, and lack of interest in the opposite sex appear with marked frequency. The psychiatrists, apparently, note particularly those social characteristics which differentiate the catatonic from others, but naturally they do not attempt a social interpretation of this fact.

It is pertinent, at this point, to examine the findings of the few psychiatric studies which have attempted an analysis of the catatonic personality. They vary from purely descriptive clinical accounts to the quantitative analysis of personality traits obtained from questionnaires or the psychiatric record.

Favor counted the traits found in 154 cases of catatonic schizophrenia by an examination of the clinical records.¹¹ Outside of the trait of seclusiveness, which he finds in almost half these cases, he obtained no clear picture of the personality traits of the catatonic, as the other traits enumerated appear in a negligible number of cases. Helmer's study,¹² which is paralleled by that of Wolff's,¹³ which adds nothing new, presents a picture of the ideas and behavior

acts of the catatonic. The bizarre and sensational sex life, ranging all the way from masturbation to bestiality, which he finds in his cases is quite at variance with the findings of all other studies. Blalock, in his study based upon information obtained from the parents and associates of twenty-five male catatonics,¹⁴ lists the following social traits found in the personalities of at least half of the cases: no tendency to talk, 22; honesty, 22; strong family attachment, 19; nondemonstrative, 19; no tendency to shirk, 18; inclined to be led, 17; tactful, 17; truthful, 16; submissive, 16; easily offended, 16; adapt poorly, 14; not affectionate, 14; overconscientious, 12; and only a few friends, 12. In addition, he reports that the intellectual and physical endowment appeared to be average.

Bigelow¹⁵ studied the personality traits of thirty-five catatonic patients by the use of a questionnaire following Hock, Amsden, Bowman, and Raymond. These data secured from relatives were checked with the clinical records. He found the following traits in at least half of his cases: oversensitivity, 31; anal-eroticism, 29; display of narcissism, 28; feelings of insufficiency, 25; Oedipus or Electra situation, 25; lack of adaptability, 23; undercommunicativeness, 21; autism, 20; oral eroticism, 18; feelings of guilt, 18; bashfulness, 18; seclusiveness, 17; and feelings of inferiority, 17.

Amsden, studying eleven catatonics out of a total of 182 schizophrenics, observes that one-half of them display no features which distinguish them from the paranoid group.¹⁶ In the other half he reports such

¹¹ H. E. Favor, "A Study of the Personality in Persons Developing Catatonic Dementia Praecox," *Psychiatric Quarterly*, VI (1932), 500-503.

¹² R. D. Helmer, "Thought Content in Catatonic Dementia Praecox," *Psychiatric Quarterly*, VI (1932), 448-99.

¹³ S. E. Wolff, "Thought Content in Catatonic Dementia Praecox," *Psychiatric Quarterly*, VI (1932), 504-12.

¹⁴ J. R. Blalock, "Personality and Catatonic Dementia Praecox," *Psychiatric Quarterly*, VI (1932), 625-41.

¹⁵ N. J. T. Bigelow, "Pre-psychotic Personality of Catatonic Schizophrenics," *Psychiatric Quarterly*, VI (1932), 642-656.

¹⁶ G. S. Amsden, "Mental and Emotional Components in Schizophrenia," in Association for Research in Nervous and Mental Diseases, *Schizophrenia—Recent Advances*, ed. Paul B. Hoerber (New York, 1928), pp. 133-38.

traits as dreaminess, bashfulness, fearfulness, and the tendency to frighten easily. Many more studies have been made of the personality traits of the schizophrenic which have disregarded the type classification than those, like the above, which have considered the subgroupings. The studies of Page, Landis, and Katz,¹⁷ Kasanin and Rosen,¹⁸ Bowman,¹⁹ and Childers²⁰ are all similar in this respect and have arrived at conceptions of the pre-schizophrenic personality which closely approximate one another from the standpoint of individual traits.

The summaries in the clinical records and the studies in the literature of the catatonic's personality traits substantiate, to a marked degree, the constellation of traits which we have found by an analysis of life-history and interview materials. Bowman's statement of the pre-schizophrenic personality is particularly significant, for it is, in the main outline, the personality picture which we have constructed for the catatonic. All the social traits which have been mentioned by the above investigators can be duplicated in our analysis with the possible exception of Bigelow's application of certain psychoanalytical terms to describe an arrested developmental condition of the catatonic person. These observations of others serve to emphasize the validity of the picture which we have constructed.

The catatonic's orientation toward his world.—The material from interviews with members of his family and his clinical record all tend to reinforce the constellation of

personality traits derived from life-history data. In addition, the life-history material shows the catatonic to possess a personal orientation which is at a marked variance with the other members of his immediate community. One might go so far as to say that the type of world to which he reacts is that which expresses the conventions and morality indicated in the folkways and mores of the larger society rather than the world of the norms and conventions of his own community. From this orientation he tends to approach the life and social relations about him in an awkward and clumsy manner and consequently is unable to touch the concrete essence of human relationships in the same fashion as do the other persons of his social milieu. This separation caused by his peculiar conception of the world places him at a disadvantage in association with his fellows. Thus, he finds himself unable to fit into those aspects of the community life which are intimate and personal. In consequence many of the avenues of social relationships are denied him, and he fails to develop those qualities of personality which make him acceptable to the members of his own age group. The catatonic has what might be described as an acutely self-conscious personality pattern.

In his attitudes toward the social and economic structure of society, there is noted an intense conformity. He does not question any of the current social arrangements. He finds nothing wrong with society but much wrong with himself. The rationalizations which other people use to maintain personality equilibrium are closed as far as the catatonic is concerned. He is likely to see in himself a marked failure surrounded by everyone who is successful. He welcomes the blame for his own situation and indulges in a large amount of self-pity.

The catatonics who were studied appeared to fall into two groups as measured by the length of the psychotic period. The two phases of excitement and stupor, which the textbooks describe as characteristic of this type of breakdown, did not seem to ap-

¹⁷ J. Page, C. Landis, and S. Katz, "Schizophrenic Traits in Functional Psychosis and in Normal Individuals," *American Journal of Psychiatry*, XIII (1934), 1213-25.

¹⁸ K. Kasanin and A. Rosen, "Clinical Variables in Schizoid Personalities," *Archives of Neurology and Psychiatry*, XXXVI (1933), 538-66.

¹⁹ K. Bowman, "A Study of the Pre-psychotic Personality in Certain Psychoses," *American Journal of Orthopsychiatry*, IV (1934), 473-98.

²⁰ A. T. Childers, "A Study of Some Schizoid Children," *Mental Hygiene*, IV (1931), 106-34.

ply to any of our cases. Rather it was noted that at the beginning of the psychosis all the persons passed through an excited period which was characterized by impulsive behavior, loud talking, stereotyped movements, random activity, and nonsensical remarks. From this point on they divided themselves into two groups. In the first group were found the cases in which the excitement decreased gradually in its intensity until the behavior and ideational content appeared to approximate the normal, and the person was ready to leave the hospital. In the second group were found the cases in which the excitement appeared to decrease more slowly, and the person gradually passed into a stuporous state, which was characterized by such symptoms as negativism, mutism, muscular rigidity, intellectual retardation, and a slowness of response. This latter group tended to remain in the hospital for a longer period.

Social psychological analysis of the catatonic.—However, the trait organization of the two groups was similar in character. The catatonic as a person presents a unique personality organization in comparison with the other persons in his community. The fact that the mores of the larger society are reflected in his personality attest to his seclusiveness and his isolation by others, with the result that the quality of his experience is of an extremely private and unique character. This private quality of experience causes him to gain a conception of himself which he has no opportunity to test, because of his social isolation, by participating and interacting with the other young people in his community. In this sense his experience also shows a quantitative defect. His opportunities, as well as the necessary mechanisms for "taking the role of the other,"²¹ are distinctly limited

and often completely lacking. As a result, in the numerous situations having emotional connotations which arise in social life, he does not know how to act, and this lack of knowledge of essential social conduct gives rise to a feeling of strangeness, which in turn produces a definite mental tension as the years go on. To himself his role and status in the group are extremely uncertain and dubious in character. He thus becomes the model youth of his time, but often in a vulgar and secular community setting where the model youth is not an object of reverence and adulation. Consequently, he finds no social niche into which he can fit in a manner to make adjustment possible.

Implications of this study.—Several notions and hypotheses have emerged from this study which indicate the need for further research. This study represents the first attempt to view the development of the trait organization of the catatonic in relation to the context of interpersonal relations in which it has been nurtured. The study has attempted to demonstrate that the personality profile is basic and is prior in time to the psychosis. Consequently, one must view the psychotic condition which arises against this background of personality. This fact sets the problem as to the relation between the personality type and psychotic condition—an area which should be subjected to careful study.

Second, in this study some attention was paid to the character of the collective social life of the community in which these catatonics resided. In this particular foreign-born community the behavior of the individuals in the catatonic's age group takes on a certain bizarre, random, individualistic, impulsive, and aggressive character. It can readily be seen that these collective ways of behaving of the other members of the community stand in sharp opposition and contrast to the social traits which characterize the catatonic's personality. Because of this opposition between the personality traits and the patterns of community life, the possibility is suggested that

²¹ See G. H. Mead, *Mind, Self, and Society* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1934). This social mechanism of "taking the role of the other" is used by Mead to show how, in the growth of the self, the person incorporates the attitudes of society in his own self-organization and hence becomes both subject and object to himself.

BASIC RACIAL ATTITUDES TOWARD WHITES IN THE OKLAHOMA ALL-NEGRO COMMUNITY

MOZELL C. HILL

ABSTRACT

This paper focuses attention upon the psychic qualities of Negroes who have voluntarily isolated themselves from the dominant culture. The all-Negro community in Oklahoma was conceived as a social experiment. It is an attempt by Negroes to escape the psychological pressures experienced in racially mixed southern communities. A "pattern of avoidance" characterizes the basic racial attitudes of the residents of these communities. There are, however, certain differences between upper and lower classes in the expression of attitudes. Nevertheless, all residents, completely assimilated into the societal structure of the all-Negro society, are quite self-conscious of the peculiarities of their culture.

This study of racial attitudes is one of a series of discussions resulting from an extended investigation (still in progress) of six all-Negro communities in the state of Oklahoma: Boley, Langston, Taft, Rentiesville, Clearview, and Tatum. All of these are incorporated villages with the exception of Clearview, which is thus under more direct county supervision than the others. Populations range from about 250 people in Clearview to 942 in Boley, all of the communities having a number of adherents and virtual residents in the adjacent, outlying districts which are not counted in the census enumerations.

Each of these Negro communities, of course, presents a unique set of problems and factors peculiar to its situation and social setting. There are, on the other hand, however, certain common denominators which apply to all of them, particularly in the psychological realm and with special reference to relations between Negroes and whites. For example, the founding of the Negro community in Oklahoma was the result of an emotional reaction of Negroes in southern mixed communities to the Reconstruction era; they were acutely conscious of the fact that emancipation had not solved the race problem. Whippings, burnings, discrimination, and disfranchisement initiated and carried on what seemed to the newly freed a reign of terror of such brutality and vindictiveness that around the turn of the century they felt the presence of a desperate

impasse. They could remain in the mixed communities and endure the psychological pressure generated by the lack of free space for movement or they could try the only solution which they felt practicable: separation from the dominant society.

In fact, isolation from the dominant society is a most vulnerable emotional spot for residents of all-Negro communities, for none of them—especially the old settlers—are entirely insensitive to the fact that their voluntary segregation has placed them at least partially outside the framework of Negro-white relations which exist in communities inhabited by both races. They are more poignantly aware of this circumstance with the passage of years, and they have formed definite attitudes in regard to it.

To abstain from contacts with whites is the general climate of opinion among the all-Negro residents in Oklahoma. Conformably, there is to be found a "pattern of avoidance," which characterizes the racial attitudes in these communities. This pattern consists of a racial etiquette which forbids social relations between its members and those of the dominant group. A recent event in one of these towns stresses the forcefulness of the organizational mores with regard to racial mixture. An attractive mulatto woman was discovered by a friend to be frequenting a near-by all-white town, where she was "passing" and "having an affair" with a married white man. The tension was so great that several persons

wanted to show their indignation by publicly reprimanding her. She was immediately "put out" of church after a very elaborate church trial. Several residents, not satisfied with this manifestation of their disapproval of her conduct, decided to "try" their transgressor in the local court, using the state law which prohibits whites and Negroes from cohabiting. Of this charge she was found guilty. The justice of the peace gave her a suspended sentence, provided that she leave town within twenty-four hours. This woman later returned to the community, but now she is virtually a social outcast among her former associates. She is completely ostracized because of her desecration of one of the most important taboos of the all-Negro community.

This is not to say, however, that there is absolute separation of the residents of the all-Negro town and members of white society. Indeed, there can be seen considerable symbiotic association between the races, especially in local political and economic activity. They do, notwithstanding, dichotomize these activities from those of a "social" nature and strongly oppose any diligence in this regard. There is a positive feeling and consensus among the residents that the welfare of their Negro society can best be served by shunning "social" relations with whites. Furthermore, most of them would hold to the very minimum the "necessary" relations with members of the near-by all-white towns.

While the fundamental racial attitude of avoidance is found to prevail among virtually all those who have become assimilated into the social structure of all-Negro towns, there is a rather sharp differentiation of racial attitudes, particularly between the upper and lower classes. Moreover, the old settlers and young people portray many shades of difference in their racial attitudes. Age and intelligence are apparently influential factors in the development and manifestation of attitudes among these groups. The writer found that the older and more experienced the informant, the more firmly fixed and resolute were his attitudes toward

whites; the attitudes of the older folk are much more stable and emotional than those of the younger generation. The intelligence of the resident apparently affects the selection of the type of racial problems around which attitudes are developed.

A case in point: An illiterate pioneer cropper, who has lived in an all-Negro town since 1903, when he migrated from the Mississippi delta because "I wanted to get some place where I could be free," is thoroughly assimilated in the all-Negro culture. He considers the white man the traditional enemy of the Negro and is extremely irrational and dogmatic in his attitudes toward whites. This old settler makes the following attestation:

The white man ain't no good. All he is trying to do is to keep us down and no Negro will ever get a break as long as he's in the lead. When a Negro does make good, it ain't because the white man help him, but he has to get what he can get in spite of him.

Thus this inarticulate old settler is hostile, albeit defensive, and would shun whites because "they don't mean you no good." His low economic and inferior immobile status in his own community accentuates the frustration, and he attributes most of his problems to the dominant group.

Another significant factor concerning the racial attitude of this old settler is that he apparently sees a connection between racial equality and sexual equality. In this regard he is extremely emotional when he talks of the race question in relation to the sexual problem:

You can always test a white man by the way a white man get excited over his women. Any white man from the biggest to the lowest simply goes crazy if he even suspect that a Negro is going with a white woman. They don't stop to think that white men have been using colored women ever since they was brought over here to this country.

It was illuminating to the writer to find the phenomenon of sex playing such an important role in the attitudinal behavior of these lower-class communicants. Old Settler would test the attitude of a white

man toward the Negro question by the way he (a white man) would react to the question of sexual equality. Since all the whites within his limited experience have responded negatively to this question, "they don't mean us no good." As a matter of fact, many of the inarticulate masses attempt to define the race problem within this limited and circumscribed area.

The son of a sharecropper in another all-Negro town reflects this same attitude and has formed definite action patterns to resolve the mental conflict. He is quite proud of the fact that he participated in a mob that was going to "beat up" a white man who "insulted one of our high school girls." Fortunately, this event did not materialize, for some of the leaders of the town took action to prevent racial conflict.

John Dollard has given considerable attention to Negro frustration and aggression by showing that sexual motives play an obvious role in the race relations of a southern mixed community.¹ In this regard the racial attitudes of Old Settler, while compensatory, are typical of many of his contemporaries who escaped the psychological pressure of the mixed town and moved to the all-Negro community where "a man can have his soul and be somebody." These frustrated people have a strong rationalization to the effect that "we don't want to have nothing to do with white folks," which is but an unconscious and subtle form of aggression, whereby they have unwittingly accepted the organizational mores of the larger society and manipulated them so as to produce community and racial solidarity.²

The controlling racial attitude of the upper-class members can be summed up from a statement made by a merchant and prominent citizen in one of these towns.

¹ *Caste and Class in a Southern Town* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1937), chap. vii.

² Hortense Powdermaker in a recent article shows that Negro aggression is not usually overt but is "channelized" in numerous ways ("The Channeling of Negro Aggression by the Cultural Process," *American Journal of Sociology*, XXVIII, No. 6 [May, 1943], 750).

The white man is all right. All I ask him to do is to stay in his place and I'll stay in mine. Of course, we have to get along with him and I know that he is always trying to use us, but at the same time we're using him. Generally we get the better end of the bargain. We now have the balance of power in voting here in the county and before an official can get elected, he's got to come by us. . . . I think the races can exist as distinctively as the five fingers on your hand, working together where necessary but entirely independent of each other. Oh yes, if we stick together and whites leave us alone, we'll get along O.K.

A cashier in the local bank in one of these towns verbalizes quite freely concerning his attitude toward whites. He is in substantial agreement, to whatever degree, with the attitudes of the merchant in another community previously mentioned. He feels that isolation is expedient up to a certain point, but he would certainly co-operate with whites in matters pertaining to economic relations, particularly if the bank were involved:

We are getting along with whites much better than the people here formerly did. We have some white depositors and the services of this bank extend even into the nearby all-white communities. I think white and colored people must carry on some business relations in order for either group to survive but it is not expedient for them to mix socially. . . . We even have a white man working in this bank, and he's accepted by the majority. A few Negroes resent his being here but they're usually the ones who don't matter anyway. When Mr. X's work is over, he drives to his home and never tries to get intimate with our people.

In a similar vein, a schoolteacher who was born and reared in one of these towns writes in an autobiographical sketch concerning her attitude on the race question:

In my early childhood, I had no definite teachings concerning what my relations with white people should be as I had very little need for such instruction. That issue just didn't come up during my impressionable years. But on my infrequent visits to all-white communities during the later years of my life, I was taught to be skeptical of whites, to shun them, and to be nice and courteous whatever

the occasion might be. I was made to feel them superior and capable of being able to set a criteria. . . . I have come to realize that as a group races cannot be compared as superior and inferior. However, I have no desire to associate with them or even converse with them for that matter any more than they do with me. But on some occasions I have been able to override my own prejudiced mind and become friendly with a few of them.

This same opinion is reflected in the unguarded statements of a minister who is pastor of one of the largest churches in the all-Negro community. He likewise feels that the best way to resolve racial problems is through some form of isolationism.

I love living in an all-Negro town because I have complete freedom to say and do as I please. I can preach the truth to my congregation and I don't have to worry about what the whites think. I pastored in "X-Town" before coming here and was condemned by my people as well as the white ministerial alliance as being radical. I was simply telling my people the truth. . . . I love white people and respect them as I would any personality for we're all one in the sight of the Master. I have come to believe, however, that the only salvation of the Negro is for him to stay to himself and try to develop his own enterprises. It's much harder to be a good Christian in the presence of whites than when we live by ourselves.

The foregoing cases suggest that there are some differences, not in the basic attitudinal "pattern of avoidance," but in the way these elite members of the all-Negro society view the race question. The attitude of the upper class is less emotional and is highly intellectualized. They feel that the separation of the races is a necessary expedient. Most of the elite, however, possess a greater degree of intelligence and have greater economic affluence; consequently, they have a tendency to intellectualize their conception of race relations.

In addition, members of the upper class apparently possess a constant fear of racial conflict and would like members of near-by all-white towns to "leave us alone" in order to avoid racial friction. The widow of a late banker (killed by white bandits), a promi-

nent citizen in one of the communities, reflects this fear of racial conflict by the attestation that

black and white just won't mix. We got along swell here until some of the Uncle Tom Negroes started running to "X-Town" telling all our business. Then a number of cheap white politicians began coming in here flattering a few gullible Negroes who would be the leaders and there has been trouble ever since.

This woman verbalized about the advantages of living in an all-Negro town and thinks 'the all-Negro society idea should grow, for "it is the only way to avoid race riots and lynchings."

The "fear of racial friction" on the part of the elite was brought forcefully to the attention of the writer when the son-in-law of an affluent Negro family in one of these communities returned recently from a defense area where he had been working as an electrical engineer at a submarine base. This man, who had lived in the all-Negro community for ten years before leaving to take a government position, says:

I have been spoiled since living here and I just can't adjust myself when I am around white people. There were just too many foreigners and poor white trash working with me out there and I stayed tense and was constantly afraid that a fight at the base might break out any time. When the "zoot"-suit riot started, then I said this is no place for me. I'd rather be in poverty and have peace in "X-Town" than to make plenty money and probably lose my life.

The younger people of the all-Negro society have become imbued and identified with the emotional attitudes of their elders, particularly those of their parents. They are, however, more undetermined and wavering in their racial attitudes, and the extreme hostility toward whites is languishing. They are not certain that the sacrifices of the "invariably better things of life" found in the larger mixed communities will compensate for the psychic security of the all-Negro town. Since they have had few, if any, of the experiences witnessed by their parents in the southern mixed town, they are less resolute in their attitude of avoidance.

An eighteen-year-old girl who frequently visits a friend in one of the larger mixed communities of the state mentioned the fact that she isn't as hostile toward whites as her parents:

Most of the people in my town are from slave states and therefore their attitude toward mixed communities is to keep whites out so they can have unlimited freedom and democracy. I don't agree with them entirely, but I do think that Negroes as a group get along better when they stay to themselves. Although no whites live in my town, they do frequent our town without any trouble. I have several white friends and I like them a great deal, but we're friends and no more; I mean we don't socialize. I think colored and white people can get along all right if they don't become too familiar with each other.

Undoubtedly this girl is not so irrational and defensive in her racial attitudes as her parents. None of the older members of the community, especially the pioneers, who are fully accommodated to the cultural patterns, would express a racial attitude similar to that of this high-school girl. In fact, many of the older residents censure the young people for their "radical" point of view. This informant apparently would welcome more interracial co-operation and, like many youth in the all-Negro towns, is looking toward more integrations of these semi-isolated racial groups.

Not all of the young people, however, are developing an attitude of symbiotic association of the races as is this high-school girl. Indeed, not a few of them, especially those of the lower classes, are more particularistic and emotional in their attitudes toward the dominant group. This group of youth reflects the attitude of its elders chiefly in regard to the relation between racial and sexual equality. A seventeen-year-old boy from a large family of low economic status states his attitudes on the race question in quite a different manner from that of the more affluent youth:

I don't like white folks because they try to keep you down below them. They've got everything anyway and won't even give a colored

person a fair break. All white folks think a colored boy wants to mess around white girls and they think all of us are rapists. A bunch of white guys in "X-Town" want to start a fight if they think you're even looking at their women. . . . It burns me up to see them flirting and whistling at colored girls every time they see one on the streets in their town. We colored folks had better stick together if we're going to get any place.

This young man expresses the dominant racial attitude of his lower-class group. He has taken over the racial attitudes of the previous generation because of a strong identification with their definition of the problem of Negroes. He is frustrated as a result of what he thinks is the sexual gain of white boys; and he believes that Negroes' sticking-together through isolationism is safer than overt aggression against whites.

The writer is aware that this cursory presentation of data and analysis does not exhaust the racial attitudes and their ramifications of all-Negro community residents. Nor does this analysis exploit the possibilities of the numerous and complex problems involved. The present discussion does, however, focus attention on the irrational, emotional, and psychic quality of the racial attitudes of Negroes who have voluntarily isolated themselves from the dominant culture. We have seen that these Negroes are racially prejudiced and defensive. Their racial ideologies are confused, contradictory, and inconsistent. In an effort to win social approval for the Negro as a group the residents of Negro towns have attempted through isolation to develop a strong racial solidarity. The inarticulate masses have, in turn, accumulated many weak rationalizations to resolve the mental conflict, engendered as a result of their inferior, immobile status. Upper-class members of the all-Negro society, while overtly manifesting less hostility toward the dominant culture than their inarticulate confreres and attempting to approach the race question with sophistication, are, nonetheless, frustrated and accordingly have "channelized" their aggression "against their foe."

RELIGION AND NATIONALITY¹

WERNER J. CAHNMAN

ABSTRACT

The Near East is the home of a type of race and culture contacts which has thus far escaped the attention of sociologists. The society of the East is stratified in terms of belief and disbelief rather than in terms of race or of class. The family rather than the territory is the nucleus of organization, and hence religion and nationality are inextricably intertwined. It is proposed that the term "millet," taken from Turkish law, be used to describe this type of intergroup relations. This would provide a conceptual tool to observe the conflict between personal and territorial nationalism and thus could contribute toward a better understanding of minority problems in many parts of the world.

I

Society in the West is based on a territorial principle which is the heritage of the Roman Empire. A child born on American soil, according to the prevailing *jus soli*, the law of the soil, is an American citizen. This, however, is not true of the East. A child born in Germany, say, of unnaturalized Polish parentage, according to the prevailing *jus sanguinis*, the law of blood (or kinship), remains a citizen of Poland if no naturalization is granted. Society in the East is based on the concept of the "folk." We may call the territorial principle the principle of the market place and designate the concept of the folk as a personal concept derived from the concept of the family. In this sense, we may speak about personal, as against territorial, nationality.

It is in the light of these concepts that we are to understand some of Sir John Hope Simpson's remarks in his survey on the refugee problem. Here is what he says:

It cannot be expected that social assimilation will be complete in the first generation but experience shows that in the second and third generation little difference persists in Western Europe and in overseas countries. This is not necessarily the case in Eastern Europe where the minority system, approximating the Turkish millet, is an obstacle to intermarriage and attendance at common schools, and isolates the group.²

In other words, social assimilation seems to be easier in a society of sellers and buyers on the market place than in a society approximating what Sir John calls the "Turkish millet." Apparently, the Turkish millet is regarded as an ideal type when it comes to a consideration of nationalities and minorities in the East. We will, therefore, concern ourselves in this paper with a definition and explanation of the millet system. We will follow up its roots in the history of the region and briefly consider its development and decline, as well as its persistence, in our time.

II

The millet system of the Ottoman Empire may be conceived of as a part of the religious law of Islam. The world of Islam, roughly speaking, falls into two sections—*dar-ul-Islam*, the world of peace and devotion, and *dar-ul-harb*, the world of warfare. The world of Moslems is considered under an obligation to engage in holy warfare until the *dar-ul-harb* progressively diminishes as more and more of it is brought into the *dar-ul-Islam*.

In the *dar-ul-Islam*, however, non-Moslems, under sufferance, may continue to exist if they are not idolators but communities of the peoples of the Book, that is to say, Christians and Jews. They may be allowed to profess their faith and to organize

¹ Paper read at the Fourteenth Annual Festival of Music and Fine Arts, Fisk University, Nashville, Tenn., April, 1943.

² *The Refugee Problem: Report of a Survey* (New York, 1939), pp. 540-41. Cf. C. D. Macartney, *National States and National Minorities* (London, 1934), p. 284.

their family affairs according to their own customs; but the theory has it that they stay on their lands only on lease, paying tribute for themselves and for their lands to the Moslem state. Their status is called the status of *Dhimmis*.³

The techniques of the sociology of knowledge will easily unveil this ideology. It is the ideology of a conquering warrior tribe from the desert which has swarmed in on the settled land and the trading townships and oases. The Beduins of Arabia, occupying Syria, Iraq, Egypt, and other countries peripheral to Arabia proper, found themselves confronted with the central problem of administration in a region where desert and steppe, on the one hand, and stretches of fertile soil, on the other, are intermingling. They would have found themselves unable to cope with the problems of urban civilization had they not availed themselves of ways and means to put to good use the traditional skills and the taxpaying capacities of subjected, yet more sophisticated, populations.

Accordingly, religious life, in the Islamic as well as the pre-Islamic period, conforms to the social pattern of the region. The Bible abounds with stories depicting the interplay between the settled land and the desert. The life of the prophet Elijah marks one phase in that ever recurring conflict. Elijah's God is the God of his fathers; we see him struggle against the Baalim of the hills, or, in other words, we see the Lord of history up against the spirits of the soil. The two deities interlocked and separated. It may be said that the community of the Exiles in Babylon returned to the Lord of history after the spirits of the soil had deserted them. Thus, they retained their own status in a strange environment. Later, the "Prince of the Exile," presumably of Davidic ancestry, was recognized under Sassanid rule

in Babylonia and Persia.⁴ It was likewise under Sassanid rule that the first agreement which can properly be called by the name of "millet" was concluded. It was the treaty of Milan between the Shah-in-Shah Jezdegerd and the catholicos of the Assyrians. The catholicos, or patriarch, became a political dignitary in addition to his ecclesiastical functions and was made responsible for the allegiance of his people to the ruler and the state. The Assyrians, or Nestorians, were granted freedom of worship and autonomous jurisdiction of civil cases among their members. In return, they would, as a community, pay taxes to the shah's treasury.⁵

The Sassanid rulers of Persia, themselves Zoroastrians, had found it advantageous to tolerate Christians and Jews who had fled to them in increasing numbers from the heresy-hunting régime which prevailed in the Byzantine Empire. They could count on the loyalty of their new subjects because they left their community life intact, and these new subjects, in turn, could swear allegiance to a ruler who was alien to them because they had no immediate territorial ambitions of their own. The Arab caliphs and, later, the Turkish sultans adopted this system, although not without gradually depressing the status of their dissenting subjects. Both Arabs and Turks were warriors with a following of primitive tribesmen, and, as a result, they were even more dependent on such a system as well as more likely to abuse it than the Persians had ever been.

The millet may be defined as the peculiar political organization which gave to non-Moslem subjects of the Ottoman Empire the right to organize into communities possessing delegated political power under their own ecclesiastical chiefs. The head of the

³ R. J. H. Gottheil, "Dhimmis and Moslems in Egypt," in *Old Testament and Semitic Studies in Memory of William Rainey Harper*, ed. Robert F. Harper (Chicago, 1908), II, 351-414; Reuben Levy, *Introduction to the Sociology of Islam* (2 vols.; London, 1931-33), esp. Vol. I, chap. i: "The Grades of Society."

⁴ Salo W. Baron, *The Jewish Community* (3 vols.; New York, 1943), I, 118 ff., 157 ff.

⁵ W. A. Wigram, *The Assyrians and Their Neighbors* (London, 1929), p. 51. See also George David Malech, *History of the Syrian Nation and the Evangelical-Apostolic Church of the East* (Minneapolis, 1910).

millet was directly responsible to the state for the administration of all its subjects. Although the millet lacked territorial cohesion and military power and had, therefore, to be protected by the ruling warrior caste, it formed in many respects an autonomous unit within the state. Yet, the members of the millet were limited in their general citizenship by virtue of the very fact that the laws of personal statute were based upon religious sanctions.⁶

This seems to us a strange notion. In our Western Christianity we have come to interpret the idea of the Kingdom of God as referring to a purely spiritual realm with no political connection, but oriental Christianity and traditional Judaism, as well as Islam, do not dissociate religion from social life, from community ties, from civic status, and from law. In our departmentalized culture, religion has a special shelf, for exclusive use, as it seems, on Sunday mornings and to be forgotten completely after the midday meal. This, however, has never been so in the East. In early antiquity, two and a half millennia before Christ, Sumerian kings were priest-kings, heads of city-states, which were at the same time religious entities. The king of Lagash was but the representative of the God of Lagash, king only in relation to the people, but priest in relation to the king of kings, the supreme ruler of the state who dominated the whole life of the people. Truly, Lagash was a "Kingdom of God," and so were Babylon, Moab, Ammon, and Israel. Moreover, public life was intimately connected with ancestral rites. The God of the fathers was venerated along with the God of the locality, as Robertson Smith and, in a larger sense, Émile Durkheim have shown.⁷ Society, conceived not merely as

an ecological or political phenomenon but envisaged primarily in terms of the enlarged family, retained its religious significance and was perpetuated through worship. Many a small kinship group preserved its social and religious identity even after centralized states had subjugated wide territories and combined many tribal units within their imperial domain. It matters little whether these established units were based on actual common descent or not; the mere fact that they were founded upon an ancestral myth or, in other words, that their members believed in a common ancestor was enough to unite them in bonds of brotherhood.

Maybe we are touching here on a general truth. But the least that can be said is that the time aspect of society rather than the space aspect seems to have been stressed in the East. The Hebrew and Arabic terms for "world" indicate infinite time rather than infinite space, and the same seems to be true of other oriental languages. It may be said that in the East, religion, understood in terms of a time sequence rather than as a spatial uplifting from this valley of tears to the high heavens, is constitutive of nation. Abraham was called by the voice of his God to leave the country into which he had been born and thus to become the father of a nation. The process was repeated when Moses led the slaves of Goshen up to Sinai, and it has been repeated ever since. Arab national consciousness has been called into being by the faith of Mohammed and has been revived by the religious zeal of the Wahabis.

Surely, Islam did not invent the pattern in which religion and nationality are inseparably intertwined, but it has drawn upon the pattern of the region and intensified it. Social stratification along economic lines cannot rise to prevalence so long as the conditions of tribal law prevail. Yet, in spite of the ethnic basis of Eastern society,

⁶ For other definitions of "millet" see James Thayer Allison, *The Christian Approach to the Moslem: A Historical Study* (New York, 1942), pp. 62, 113; Macartney, *op. cit.*, pp. 58, 64, 284; Elliot Grinnel Mears (ed.), *Modern Turkey* (New York, 1924), pp. 98, 121, 419; *The Statesman's Yearbook* (London, 1940), p. 1350. There is no definition of "millet" in the *Encyclopaedia of Islam*.

⁷ William Robertson Smith, *Lectures on the Religion of the Semites* (London, 1927), esp. Lect. II:

"The Nature of the Religious Community and the Relation of the Gods to Their Worshipers," pp. 28 ff.; cf. Émile Durkheim, *The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life: A Study in Religious Sociology*, trans. Joseph Ward Swain (New York, 1926).

we find the apparent contradiction that race or color prejudice is foreign to Islam. The explanation is to be found partly in the ancient custom of adoption or naturalization; mainly, however, in the encouragement of conversion to a religion claimed to have universal applicability. Tribal patterns do not disappear, but they are overlaid by the conception of Islam as one great brotherhood, wherein brown Javanese and black Africans are accepted under the banner of the prophet together with Arabs, Mongols, and Turks. Aided by the institution of polygamy, the Turks, especially, have drawn upon the female population of all subjected races, and on imported Negroes in addition, to fill their harems and bear their children; they have taken boys from Christian homes to rear them in Islam and to have them incorporated into the ill-famed corps of the Janizaries, which was once the fiercest unit of their army. Many of the founders of modern Turkey had foreign mothers, as Enver, Talaat, and Kemal had Greek, Jewish, and Albanian mothers, respectively. If there ever has been a melting-pot of races and peoples, it is certainly Turkey.

The dividing-line in the East runs not so much between classes and races as between conquerors and conquered, or believers and disbelievers. Disbelievers are tolerated but segregated and forced into little subsocieties of their own. Racial and economic differentiations emerge only in a secondary way. Accordingly, the millet may just as well be defined as a church organized into a nationality as a nationality organized into a church.⁸

Examples are abundant. For instance, the Bulgarians preserved their nationality under their Bulgarian exarch; the Greeks looked up to their patriarch, when he put on the robes of the Byzantine ruler, as if he had been their king. The same is true with re-

gard to the Armenians. The catholicos of the Armenians, says an Armenian author, "is recognized as their national as well as religious chief. In this dual capacity at the time of the Congress of 1878, he had sent to Berlin a representative, whose intervention had procured the insertion of Article 61 in the treaty."⁹ On the other hand, the Maronites were simply the followers of Maron, and it was only subsequently that they developed into what is now the bulk of the Lebanese people. A monk called Jacobus Baradaeus initiated the Jacobite church, which was later constituted as the Jacobite millet and perpetuated solely by endogamy, since proselytizing was forbidden to disbelievers. The followers of Nestorius, who had been declared a heretic at the Council of Chalcedon, formed the Nestorian church of the East. They expanded, at one time, far into Central Asia; but in Persia and Turkey they were recognized as the Nestorian or Assyrian millet. Their remnants split into several denominations and today are known as the Assyrian people. For instance, the Elijah line of the Assyrians submitted to the Holy See in 1845, and the Turks were quick to recognize them as a separate millet under the name of Chaldeans. Numerous similar phenomena can be found within Islam, where, for instance, the sect of the Druzes, following a religious propagandist by the name of Darazi, developed into the Druze people and, finally, under the French mandate of Syria, even acquired territorial recognition.¹⁰ In other words, all these religious or quasi-religious groups came to live in close proximity to one another, married only among themselves, and thus became in the course of time secondary ecological and kinship units. They became peoples.¹¹

As a matter of fact, a Moslem Assyrian

⁸ Wigram, *op. cit.*, pp. 51, 77, 93, 157, 161, 162, *et passim*. Wigram considers only the sequence: nationality-church, although some of his examples would seem to indicate the sequence: church-nationality, as well.

⁹ Boghos Nubar Pasha, "Armenians," in Mears (ed.), *op. cit.*, p. 70.

¹⁰ Philipp K. Hitti, *The Origins of the Druze People and Religion* ("Columbia University Oriental Studies," Vol. XXVIII [New York, 1928]).

¹¹ Leo Dominian, *The Frontiers of Language and Nationality in Europe* (New York, 1917), pp. 271 ff.

or Armenian could not exist. He became, by means of his change of faith, a Turk or an Arab; spoke, dressed, and behaved Turkish or Arabic. Even if an Armenian left his Armenian Gregorian church only to join one of the Protestant sects that were missionizing among them, he loosened, by so doing, the ties that bound him to the Armenian people. On the other hand, the Christian missions in Moslem lands were confronted with grave difficulties because for a Moslem to change his faith meant to lose his nationality. Another example is provided by the Turkish-Greek population exchange after the first World War. It proved to be well-nigh impossible to discover who was Turkish and who was Greek except by the test of religion. Every Greek Orthodox family of Asia Minor, no matter what their racial or national origin, had to leave for Greece; every Mohammedan family in Greece, most of them probably of the same stock as their "Greek" compatriots, were to be resettled in Anatolia. Even the sect of the Doenmehs, originally Jewish followers of the false messiah, Sabbatai Zebi, people who had embraced Islam but remained a strictly endogamous group, had to leave Salonika and to take up their residence in Smyrna.

What can be seen in the purity almost of an ideal type in the countries formerly under Ottoman rule becomes somewhat blurred in the outlying areas of the "East," but it still exists.¹² The majority of the Moslem subjects of France in French North Africa have not acquired French citizenship, because this would have deprived them of their political status as Moslems. If a Tatar, Jew,

Pole, or Latvian in the czarist empire took to the Greek Orthodox cross, he not only ceased to be a Mohammedan, Israelite, Roman Catholic, or Lutheran, respectively, but also lost membership among his people and became a Russian. The experiment of a unified Yugoslav nation composed of Greek Orthodox Serbs and Roman Catholic Croats and Slovenes, besides Moslems, which was initiated after the first World War, seems now to have been a failure. Roman Catholic Germans in the Prussian province of Poznań tended to become Polonized while the Mazurs in East Prussia, speaking a Polish dialect but being Lutherans, had a German national consciousness. German political life has followed religious lines until recently, and some say that it is following at least pseudo-religious lines even now.¹³

III

We can now draw a few conclusions as to the major trends in our time. The society of the East, based as it has been on the time-consecrated concepts of the folk and the family, has broken down, and the territorial society of modern nationalism, founded upon the principles of the late Roman Empire which were recovered by the French Revolution and centered around the market place, has ruled in ever increasing intensity throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The treaties that ended the first World War have carried the French nation-state far into the East. Commercialism has opened up vast colonial areas and brought peoples and races, who hitherto had lived side by side in a merely symbiotic relationship, into close, though by no means always pleasant, contact with one another. On the home front, it seemed to have become a sacred principle of progress that nation and territory had to coincide. Territorial nationalism has put dynamite to folk societies and their diversified ancestral rites everywhere; it has conquered the minds and hearts of Eastern youth from the Balkans to India. Turkey, once the seat of the caliphate, has

¹² In the Western Hemisphere, French Canada would provide as close an approximation to the millet system of minority organization as possible. The archbishop of Quebec appears as the political, in addition to being the religious, representative of the French-Canadian people. The Mormons in Utah might have developed into a separate people if it had not been for the late formation of the group in the railroad age. As to the Irish case in the United States, cf. Ruby Jo Reeves Kennedy, "Single or Triple Melting-Pot? Intermarriage Trends in New Haven, 1870-1940," *American Journal of Sociology*, XLIX, No. 4 (January, 1944), 331-39.

¹³ Peter Viereck, *Metapolitics* (New York 1941).

become a lay republic combining the best and the worst of both Germany and France. She has killed off her Armenians, expelled her Greeks, impoverished her Jews, and attempts to Turkify the rest. Christians and Moslems in Syria feel that they are Arabs first, Shias and Sunnis in Iraq try to become true Iraqians, and the British-educated leaders of the Congress party in India are bent upon an effort to bridge the innumerable gulfs between the tribes and castes of India as well as between the Hindu and Moslem communities in order to create, for the first time in history, a nationally conscious, that is to say, a territorially conceived, commonwealth of India. At the same time, the argument about the territorial principle of Pakistan, meaning a separate Moslem state, threatens to dynamite the whole country.¹⁴

We can sum up our deliberations again in the words of Sir John Hope Simpson which he applied to the numerically insignificant but highly representative people of the Assyrians:

When the Assyrians [he reports] petitioned the Council of the League [of Nations] that they might be allowed to live as a millet as they had done in the past, the Permanent Mandates Commission, taking a Western European view, concluded that the adoption of such a solution would imperil the unity of the Iraqi State.¹⁵

¹⁴ The Soviet way of minority treatment seems to be more in keeping with the traditions and realities of the East (cf. Rudolf Broda, "Revival of Nationalities in the Soviet Union," *American Journal of Sociology*, XXXVII [1931-32], 82-93).

¹⁵ Simpson, *op. cit.*, p. 541, referring to League of Nations, *Minutes of the Mandates Committee, 22nd Session*, pp. 43, 375. Macartney (*op. cit.*, p. 284) relates that the representative of the British Colonial Office contributed to this wish of the Assyrians the splendidly ingenious remark that "the real difficulty lay in the fact that the Assyrians seemed to desire to live now as they had lived in the past." The unhistorical insistence of the Mandates Commission, certainly, did not provide for them any decent life at all. The massacres in Iraq were soon to follow.

In these words we find the clash between East and West expressed in classical terms.

The West, as we know, has been victorious in this clash. The rationally conceived territorial society of the West has encroached upon traditional societies everywhere and has forced them into conformity or, where such conformity seemed out of the question, has tried to eradicate them as thoroughly as possible. But forces that have been operating throughout history are not dead; they are only pushed beneath the surface. They will reassert themselves sooner or later because they are intimately bound up with human nature. To many of us, the record of nationalism looks already like a failure. The principle of the French Revolution—one nation and one territory—has wrought havoc in the East, where nationalities interlock in such an inextricable way that dogmatic minds are driven to despair. The territorial principle as a cure-all has been followed *ad absurdum* in the most barbaric fashion by the present rulers of Germany. Populations that have lived side by side for centuries, despite frequent strife, conflict, and friction, have been uprooted from their homes, driven from one country to the other, starved and butchered by the millions, only to please the jealous God of Uniformity who tolerates no other gods beside him. To be sure, the world we live in seems to be rapidly moving along the line of expanding administrative units so that thinking in global terms has already become a slogan for the backwoods. But a grave danger is lurking in all this. What we call "globalism" might conjure up totalitarianism on a vast scale if we do not provide for cultural home rule in the face of territorial unification. Considering the diversity of our own population within the firm framework of the union, the hope is perhaps not in vain that America could become the bearer of a new message.

FISK UNIVERSITY

PLANS FOR THE HISTORY OF WORLD WAR II

S. MCKEE ROSEN

ABSTRACT

A large number of sociologists are now at work in agencies of the federal government. The experience which they are acquiring in some instances will prove invaluable when they return to academic pursuits. To these men, as well as to other social scientists, it should be of interest to know that organized plans are being made on a scale never before attempted to record the wartime experience of the United States.

At the beginning of the present conflict many government officials looked to the records of World War I for some guidance in meeting current problems. To their surprise, such records were found in most instances to be incomplete, unsatisfactory, and unworked. It was within the Bureau of the Budget that a first attempt was made "to do a capture and record job on defense organization"; in October, 1941, a project, "Administrative History of Defense Organization," was started, which later was to form the basis for expanded effort in the war-records field.

With the entry of the United States into the war, the interest in war records increased sharply in both official and private quarters. On March 4, 1942, President Roosevelt asked the director of the Bureau of the Budget, Harold Smith, to appoint a Committee on Records of War Administration, noting, among other things, that it "might be helpful to the work of the Bureau of the Budget in planning current improvements in administration in addition to its main objective of preserving for those who come after us an accurate and objective account of our present experience." The President suggested that the committee be composed of representatives of appropriate learned societies as well as administrators. The appointment of the Advisory Committee on the Records of War Administration was announced by Mr. Smith on March 22, 1942. The membership included: chairman, Waldo Leland, of the American Council of Learned Societies; executive secretary, Pendleton Herring, Harvard University; William Anderson, American Political Science Association;

Louis Brownlow, American Society for Public Administration; Donald Young, Social Science Research Council; Solon J. Buck, National Archives; Archibald MacLeish, Library of Congress; and Arthur Schlesinger and Guy Stanton Ford, American Historical Association.

The committee possesses two primary functions: (1) to stimulate the major war agencies to set up historical units so as to develop and preserve full and accurate records of their wartime experience and (2) to advise the special research staff within the Bureau of the Budget in the making of current analyses of administrative problems in major policy fields of the war effort. The small staff which has assumed the main task of carrying out the committee's objectives is known as the Committee on War Records Section and is attached to the Division of Administrative Management of the Bureau of the Budget.

Over thirty historical units have now been set up by agencies of the federal government. More than two-thirds of these are in emergency war agencies or in establishments with major war functions. While the Committee on War Records Section is in a unique position to examine interagency relationships and to analyze broad functional fields, it is realized that the basic materials for an adequate study of the history of war administration must come from the various government agencies themselves.

The status of the work under way varies considerably from agency to agency. Some historical officers have concentrated thus far on the archival task of collecting and organizing significant documents. Others have

already produced confidential first-narrative accounts and reports. The armed services have been especially active in setting a pace. Among the civilian agencies in which intensive work has already been carried on may be mentioned the War Production Board, the Department of Agriculture, and the Office of Censorship.¹

While efforts being carried on in Washington hold promise for the future, potential war records in the field—at the local and regional levels—will also be of interest, undoubtedly, to many sociologists. While centralization has been a major trend in government under stress of war, this has been accompanied in many instances by decentralization in administration. Much of the data on our society in wartime are not to be found in the nation's capital but in the communities themselves.

The Office of Price Administration, as an example, has acquired a vast amount of record material. Its local files contain much concerning the American people under stress of war—their wants, needs, business habits, attitudes, and their ways of living and of making a living. Research students in the social sciences will wish in the future to draw upon this rich store of information. Obviously, records must be treated on an anonymous or case-history basis, with no identification of facts concerning individuals or individual industries in their relationship to government agencies. At present, the problem of sifting and preserving records which have historical value is a real one and is receiving the attention of officials in the Office of Price Administration, particularly the historical records officer, Robert E. Stone. A panel of experts in different fields has been appointed to assist in this task. Among the panel members is Willard Waller, of the department of sociology, Barnard College.

The Office of Civilian Defense, the Com-

mittee on Congested Production Areas, and the War Relocation Authority are other examples of agencies which have reached deeply into the community and whose historical work may benefit the sociologist directly. In these instances, as well as in others, the development and preservation of local records are being encouraged and furthered by historical officers in the national offices. In the case of the War Relocation Authority, arrangements have been worked out for co-operation with private scholars. The moving of Japanese-Americans from their West Coast homes to relocation centers in the Middle West is a sociological experiment which has already attracted the attention of experts in the field. Dorothy Thomas, of the University of California, is the head of a research project supported jointly by the Rockefeller Foundation and Columbia University. Her group has a smooth-working relation with the War Relocation's historian, Ruth Eleanor McKee. The basis for such collaboration are the confidence which the government agency has in the integrity of the private group and the definite understanding that Miss Thomas' findings will not be published during the war. Both undertakings are benefited by the unusually close co-operative relation which exists.

While some headway is being made on the local level as illustrated by the instances cited, the major work and the primary focus of attention are found in Washington. The Committee on Records of War Administration and the staff keep in close touch with the work being done in the various departments and agencies. In its memorandum of August, 1943, "Objectives for Planning the History of World War II," the committee called attention to the broader aspects of the task ahead—a task only part of which falls directly within the committee's purview. A summary of the suggested objectives follows:

¹ The sociologist must not overlook the fact that after the war the best records of wartime opinion and attitudes will be found in studies made by such diverse agencies as the War Department, the Office of War Information, and the Department of Agriculture.

1. All of the major Federal agencies should gather data relating to their development and their most significant activities during this war period in order to create a central historical file. Upon the basis of this file, the

historical officer should prepare a first narrative comprising the life story of the agency.

2. There should be several non-official and popular accounts of World War II written from different standpoints, showing the military operation of the war, the civilian administration of the war, and the diplomatic phases of the war.
3. There should be a series of scholarly monographs analyzing the effect of the war on important phases of our social and economic life.
4. Studies should be made on a selected list of topics that are the concern of no one government or private organization.
5. State historical groups should prepare accounts of state activities in World War II.
6. Leading American industrial firms should have histories written recounting their war work.

In September, 1943, the Social Science Research Council took an important step toward implementing these objectives by appointing its Committee on War Studies, which is now composed of Roy F. Nichols and Donald Young, University of Pennsylvania; John A. Krout, Columbia University; Pendleton Herring, Harvard University; Paul Homan, Cornell University; and James Phinney Baxter III, Williams

College. The Council appointed Mr. Shepard B. Clough, of Columbia University, to its staff as a full-time member with the mandate to plan a research program in the field of wartime experience. Mr. Clough is endeavoring to stimulate historical activities in the states, in industry, in labor, in the universities, and in other private organizations. The Committee on War Studies is primarily concerned with research efforts outside the government by private individuals, whereas the Committee on Records of War Administration has been concentrating upon historical efforts within the government itself. The staff of the latter is headed by S. McKee Rosen, acting chief, Committee on War Records Section, Bureau of the Budget.

On October 28, 1943, the Committee on Records of War Administration and the Committee on War Studies agreed to create an Advisory Council on War History. While the two groups remain autonomous, it is anticipated that the Advisory Council will provide over-all guidance and facilitate the bringing-together of governmental and private scholars working on wartime records.

WASHINGTON, D.C.

NEWS AND NOTES

Central Valley Project Studies.—A committee to study the population problems in California has been set up in conjunction with the Central Valley Project Studies. These studies are investigations of the social and economic problems arising from the development of the Central Valley Project, a multi-purpose irrigation development being constructed by the Bureau of Reclamation. This committee is made up of persons and representatives of agencies who have worked on various aspects of the population field within the state. It was established to answer population questions arising from the development of the Central Valley Studies and to integrate and co-ordinate the investigations of the several members. Four statistical memorandums have been issued to date, and several are planned for the near future. The four are on "Growth of Population" (by Paul V. Lane), "General Characteristics," "Race and Nativity," and "Age and Sex" (each by Charles N. Reynolds). Additional data on population growth, density, and forecasts and on levels of living and the labor force are presently being assembled for future release. These memorandums are mimeographed and distributed by the Bureau of Agricultural Economics in Berkeley.

The committee membership includes the following: Marion Clawson (chairman), Bureau of Agricultural Economics; Walter R. Goldschmidt (secretary), Bureau of Agricultural Economics; Charles N. Reynolds, Stanford University and Bureau of Agricultural Economics; Dorothy Thomas, University of California; V. B. Stanbery, Reemployment and Reconstruction Commission; George Howson, Bureau of Reclamation; Herbert Ormsby, California State Chamber of Commerce; Victor W. Killick, Division of Motor Vehicles; Oliver P. Wheeler, Federal Reserve Bank; Paul S.

Taylor, University of California; M. I. Gershenson, California Division of Labor Statistics; Marie B. Stringer, Bureau of Vital Statistics; Hubert McHenry, California Taxpayers Association; Stillman Drake, War Production Board; George Roche, War Manpower Commission; and Eschscholtzia Lucia, University of California.

University of Chicago.—Professor Louis Wirth, department of sociology, has been appointed director of planning of the Illinois Postwar Planning Commission.

University of Connecticut.—Dr. Victor A. Rapport has been on leave of absence for the last three years as an officer in the A.E.F. and has recently been promoted to the rank of colonel; Dr. Nathan L. Whetten is completing his second year in the service of the United States State Department in Mexico City; and Dr. E. G. Burrows is completing his second year in the Military Intelligence Service in Washington, D.C.

W. H. Kelly, a graduate student of Harvard University, substituted for Dr. Burrows last year in the teaching of courses in anthropology. Last fall, Mr. Kelly resigned to join the staff of the department of anthropology at Harvard University, and Miss Isabel Sklow, a fellow in anthropology at the University of Chicago, who had been engaged in Latin-American research for the Institute of Human Relations of Yale University, was secured to complete the instructional work left by Mr. Kelly.

Henry G. Stetler, formerly instructor in sociology at Temple University, who has been substituting for Dr. Rapport for the last two years, recently received his Ph.D. degree in sociology at Columbia University. The title of his thesis is "The Socialist

Movement in Reading, Pennsylvania: A Study in Social Change."

University of Denver.—An Inter-American Education Workshop will be held this summer at the University of Denver from June 19 to July 21. The Office of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs and the University will sponsor the project jointly. Opportunity will be provided for the study of inter-American affairs and those instructional techniques and materials requisite for educational accomplishment in this field.

Specialists having practical experience in the field of inter-American relations and education will comprise the staff. Among these will be Samuel Guy Inman, noted lecturer and author; Concha Romero James and Ernesto Galarza of the Pan American Union; Erna Fergusson and Connie Garza Brockett of the Office of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs; Marjorie Johnston of the United States Office of Education; Lewis Hanke of the Library of Congress; and Mitchell Wilder of the Colorado Springs Fine Arts Center. Wilhelmina Hill and Prudence Bostwick will direct the workshop and organize its activities.

About twenty scholarships, covering tuition and a small stipend toward expenses, will be available to qualified persons who are concerned with inter-American education. Information about the workshop and the scholarships may be secured by writing to Dr. Wilhelmina Hill, University of Denver, Colorado.

Duke University.—Professor Charles A. Ellwood, professor of sociology in Duke University, after forty-five years of teaching university classes in sociology, will retire this coming June. After receiving his Doctor's degree in sociology at the University of Chicago in 1899, he began teaching sociology as an instructor that year in the University of Nebraska. The next year he was called to the newly created department of sociology at the University of Missouri, where he remained for thirty years, but finally accepted a call to organize a depart-

ment of sociology at Duke University in 1930.

Professor Ellwood is the author of *Sociology and Modern Social Problems* (1910), *Sociology in Its Psychological Aspects* (1912), *The Social Problem: A Reconstructive Analysis* (1915), *An Introduction to Social Psychology* (1917), *The Reconstruction of Religion* (1922), *Christianity and Social Science* (1923), *The Psychology of Human Society: An Introduction to Sociological Theory* (1925), *Cultural Evolution: A Study of Social Origins and Development* (1927), *Man's Social Destiny in the Light of Science* (1929), *Methods in Sociology: A Critical Study* (1933), *A History of Social Philosophy* (1938), *The World's Need of Christ* (1940), and *Sociology: Principles and Problems* (1943). Many of these volumes have been translated into Chinese, French, German, and Japanese. He is also a contributor of more than one hundred articles to the *Encyclopedia Americana*, the *American Journal of Sociology*, the *Scientific Monthly*, and of other periodicals.

Professor Howard E. Jensen, who has been associated with Professor Ellwood at Duke University since 1931, will be chairman of the department at Duke next year.

Harvard University.—Professor C. Arnold Anderson of Iowa State College is a visiting lecturer at Harvard in the sociology department for the spring term. He will give courses on the family and rural sociology. Dr. Georges Gurvitch, formerly of Strassburg University, the editor of the *Journal of Legal and Political Sociology*, a research fellow of Harvard University, will teach in the department of sociology during the summer and winter terms, offering courses in sociology of morality, sociology of knowledge, social theory, and social symbols and control. Professor Pitirim A. Sorokin was the speaker at a dinner of the Council on Foreign Relations organized in his honor on March 16, in connection with the publication of his new book, *Russia and the United States*.

University of Kansas City.—T. A. Raman, noted Indian writer, was a visiting

professor at the University of Kansas City in February and March, 1944. He lectured on "Problems of India."

The Missouri Association for Social Welfare and the Kansas Conference of Social Workers will hold a joint conference in Kansas City, April 16-19. The program will include such topics as military neuropsychiatry, social workers and the screening program for selectees, juvenile delinquency, treatment of offenders, parole and probation programs for the war emergency, community planning, contribution of research to social welfare, the individual child, today's family and its problems, and rural resources. The speakers' list includes Howard L. Russell, Luther Woodward, Lieutenant Colonel Malcolm J. Farrell, Stuart Queen, Dr. Karl Meninger, Francis X. Hiller, Joseph Anderson, Frances Levinson, Eleanor Cockerill, Grace Browning, Agnes Van Driel, and Esther Twente.

Linfield College.—William C. Smith, of the department of sociology, has been awarded a grant-in-aid by the Social Science Research Council for the completion of a study on the step-child.

University of Michigan.—Major Robert C. Angell is now stationed somewhere in England attached to the Army Air Corps.

Michigan Sociological Society.—The following papers were read before the spring meeting of the Michigan Sociological Society, March 17, at Ann Arbor: Roy H. Holmes, University of Michigan, "Inquiry into the American Way of Life"; Amos Hawley, University of Michigan, "Redistribution versus Segregation: A Suggested Solution of Minority Group Status"; Frank E. Hartung, Wayne University, "An Appraisal of Positivism in Sociology"; Elizabeth Briant Lee, Detroit, "Ecological Influence on Eminent American Women"; Elmer R. Akers and Vernon Fox, State Prison of Southern Michigan, and Maurice Floch, Detroit House of Correction, "The Detroit Race Rioters and Looters." Discussants were Ed-

ward C. Jandy and Norman D. Humphrey, Wayne University. -

Committee reports were submitted by Alfred McClung Lee, Wayne University; Lowell J. Carr, University of Michigan; and Rupert C. Koeninger, Central Michigan College of Education.

"Responsibilities and Opportunities of the Social Sciences in Adult Education" was the subject of a panel discussion at luncheon, sponsored by the district anthropology, economics, history, political science, and sociology societies. Participants were: Orion Ulrey, Michigan State College, *chairman*; Alexander G. Ruthven, University of Michigan; John F. Yeager, Michigan State Farm Bureau; Willard Martinson, Local 50, U.A.W.-C.I.O.; C. Wayne Brownell, Calumet and Hecla Consolidated Copper Company; Mrs. Helen Bryant, League of Women Voters; Henry Pointitz, Michigan Department of Public Instruction; L. A. White, University of Michigan; Willis Dunbar, Kalamazoo College; Harold Dorr, University of Michigan; and H. Warren Dunham, Wayne University.

Minnesota State Teachers College.—Dr. John Biesanz, exchange professor of sociology at the University of Costa Rica, returned recently from twenty-one months in Central America. He and Mavis Biesanz are joint authors of *The Costa Ricans and Their Culture*, to be published by Columbia University Press. A Spanish translation, for distribution in Latin America, is also being published in Costa Rica. Dr. Biesanz is now with the armed forces, on leave of absence from the State Teachers College, Winona, Minnesota.

University of Minnesota.—Professor F. Stuart Chapin was elected editor of the *American Sociological Review* to succeed Professor Joseph K. Folsom. Dr. Chapin has appointed Professor George B. Vold as co-editor. The two editors will take over with the August issue, and the review editing will be done through the editorial offices at the University of Minnesota.

Professor Lowry Nelson is a member of the Agricultural Committee of the National Planning Association.

Several studies of the impact of war on the Minnesota community with special reference to problems of postwar planning were started last summer in the city of Red Wing, Minnesota. Two of these studies are under the direction of members of the department of sociology. Dr. Chapin has concluded the first phase of a study of community social structure, public attitudes toward war and rationing based on a random sample of families from Red Wing. Dr. Monachesi has set up a detailed survey of factors related to juvenile delinquency. This study will permit comparisons with similar studies under his direction in Minneapolis and other localities in Minnesota.

Professor Clifford Kirkpatrick has written two monographs for the Historical Service Board of the American Historical Society. These monographs are to be available for educational purposes to personnel in the armed forces.

Margaret S. Harding, director of the University of Minnesota Press, announces plans for spring publication of a social-psychological study, *The People of Alor* by Dr. Cora Du Bois, professor of anthropology, Sarah Lawrence College. The Press has been awarded grants from the American Council of Learned Societies and the Coolidge Foundation toward publication.

University of North Carolina.—Dr. Guy B. Johnson has been elected by the Board of Directors as executive director of the Southern Regional Council, with headquarters in Atlanta, and Dr. Ira B. Reid of Atlanta University as associate director. "The objects and purposes of [the] Corporation are to exist and function as an eleemosynary organization, and more particularly to organize and maintain a Regional Council for the improvement of economic, civic and racial conditions in the South, in the endeavor to promote a greater unity in the South in all efforts towards regional and racial development; to attain through re-

search and action programs the ideals and practices of equal opportunity for all peoples in the region; to reduce race tension, the basis of racial tension, racial misunderstanding, and racial distrust; to develop and integrate leadership in the South on new levels of regional development and fellowship; and to cooperate with local, State, and regional agencies on all levels in the attainment of the desired objectives."

Dr. Johnson, in addition to his distinguished work as a scholar, is a member of the board of trustees of Howard University, at Washington, and carries with him the esteem of Negro and white leaders; North and South.

Howard W. Odum is president of the board, and Charles S. Johnson is chairman of the executive committee. The Council is in all respects co-racial with equal numbers of each race in the several respective units of work.

University of Pennsylvania.—Professor Ray H. Abrams will teach "Urban Sociology" at Barnard College, during the first-semester session.

Professor Thorsten Sellin has been asked by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws to prepare a draft for a new Uniform Criminal Statistics Act.

Purdue University.—Professor J. Roy Leevy is now completing a piece of research, on "The Social Effects of Good Housing upon High-School Youth," in Gary, Indiana. The Department of Sociology has completed a study on the migration of farm families from munition-plant areas in Indiana.

Southern Sociological Society.—The Southern Sociological Society held its eighth annual meeting at the Biltmore Hotel in Atlanta, Georgia, on March 31–April 1. The Society has a paid-up membership of 188 for the year 1943–44. One hundred and fifty registered for the Atlanta meetings, and a hundred of these came from outside the metropolitan area of Atlanta. This was the first meeting of the Society since the spring

of 1942. The Society plans to hold its next annual meeting in Atlanta in April, 1945.

There were section programs on "Public Welfare and Social Work," "Teaching of Sociology," "Race and Culture," "Social Research," and "Population." At the evening session on March 31, papers were given by Rupert B. Vance, University of North Carolina, president, American Sociological Society, on "Security and Adjustment: The Return to the Larger Community," and by Henry Pratt Fairchild, a former president of the American Sociological Society, on "Postwar Population Problems."

The officers for 1944-45 are: Howard W. Beers, University of Kentucky, president; H. C. Breerly, Peabody College, first vice-president; Howard E. Jensen, Duke University, second vice-president; Coyle E.

Moore, Florida State College for Women, secretary-treasurer; E. T. Krueger, Vanderbilt University, representative on the Executive Committee of the American Sociological Society; and Mildred Mell, Agnes Scott College, and Ira DeA. Reid, Atlanta University, members of the Executive Committee.

Syracuse University.—Dr. William Lehmann, who has been director of a special census of the city of Syracuse and Onondaga County, and Dr. Robert E. L. Faris are at present engaged in exploiting this census material to get fuller information on census tracts for the city than has been heretofore possible. They are also collaborating on a study of the Syracuse postwar planning project which is in full swing this year.

BOOK REVIEWS

The Displacement of Population in Europe. By EUGENE M. KULISCHER. Montreal: International Labour Office, 1943. Pp. 171. \$1.50.

Involuntary mass movements of people, owing to the direct impact of war, to persecution, and to compulsory transfer from one country to another, have probably never since the time of the *Völkerwanderung* assumed such dimensions as in this present crisis of Western society. Kulischer gives the first comprehensive and reliable account of these movements. His study deals, first, with the movements of Germans to and from the Reich; second, with the movements of non-German populations; and third, with the mobilization of foreign workers by Germany. Not covered by this study are the movements of civilians within the Reich and within various other areas occupied or controlled by Germany or the movements of soldiers. The movements studied comprise approximately thirty million people; if to these are added the movements not covered and the additional migrations which have taken place since 1943 under the impact of increased air attacks, a grand total of approximately forty million people who are living away from their homes would be reached.

The compilation and the critical analysis of the scattered and often contradictory data are in themselves a remarkable achievement. Anyone who is even slightly familiar with the intricacies of nationality and migration statistics will appreciate what Kulischer has achieved. Furthermore, the author gives interesting interpretations of the objective conditions, the ideological rationalizations, and the true motivations behind some of the population transfers. The sociologically interested reader will also obtain most shocking glimpses of the tremendous social disturbances resulting from the uprooting, scattering, and reshuffling of so many millions of human beings.

While, of course, the brunt of the suffering lies with the non-German peoples in occupied areas, one can easily see that the Germans also must have experienced enormous disruptions of social "ties" and considerable friction from redistribution of masses of population. Certainly the Nazis, instead of protecting and strength-

ening the German colonies in eastern Europe and Russia, as many of Hitler's followers wanted, have practically wrecked every one of the German communities in eastern Europe, many of which had persisted through six or seven centuries. The "repatriated" Germans have been shifted around like pawns in a chess game, herded into transfer camps, and assigned to new abodes without consideration of their own desires. The result is a chaotic condition rather than the intended new solution of the ethnic minority problems.

The evacuation of children has, since an early stage of the war, led to the breaking-up of families and, while giving temporary safety to the children, has deprived large numbers of them of the benefits of home life. Refugees and evacuated Germans from bombed cities have been settled in virtually any area that seemed to offer greater safety and sufficient housing facilities. This has resulted in the establishment of new German colonies, at least temporarily, from France to Kiev, from Norway to Athens. Civilian employees, officials, and workers are also distributed over all occupied territories. The total number of Germans transferred from abroad to the Reich approximated six hundred thousand in the spring of 1942, while the number of refugees and other migrants who moved from the Reich into occupied areas is estimated at two and a half million. Allowing for double counting, the total number of German civilians moved across the Reich's borders would thus surpass three million. This number must have increased considerably during 1943.

The movements of non-German populations are, as Kulischer points out, largely the continuation of forced migrations which began in pre-war years, when one country after the other came under totalitarian regimes. Kulischer considers as a major part of these movements the emigration and flight of Jews from Germany, Austria, and other annexed and occupied areas. One wonders whether the author, in choosing this classification, does not unintentionally lend support to the race myth. Fortunately, the text itself does not lead to such a conclusion; on page 42 a brief reference to approximately twenty thousand "Aryans who fled from Ger-

many for political reasons" has slipped into this discussion.

At the beginning of the war there must have been in Europe some three hundred thousand refugees from Greater Germany and Spain alone. The war set in motion additional millions of refugees and evacuees, including the bulk of pre-war refugees who came again under Nazi rule; in addition, some six and a half million foreign civilian laborers and prisoners of war were employed in Germany at the beginning of 1943.

The largest single movement since the war began was the evacuation of ten to fifteen million people from the western territories of Russia before the advancing German armies, including the removal of four hundred thousand Volga Germans. The two groups which have suffered probably the greatest dispersion and disruption of family and community ties and the greatest economic losses are the Poles and the Jews. More than two million Poles had been removed from their homes by the end of 1942, and some of them have sought refuge in such distant countries as Iran, British India, and various parts of Africa and Mexico. While it is impossible to separate in all cases the Jewish refugees, evacuees, and deportees from the national figures, it is estimated that four million or more Jews have been uprooted, many of whom have been compelled to change their abode repeatedly. The appalling losses of life and property and the suffering by which these movements were accompanied can hardly be imagined.

On the basis of Kulischer's data, the editors of *Population Index* have attempted to give an idea of the demographic effects of the movements (*Population Index*, October, 1943). Since many of the migrations are mutually compensating (Germans taking the place of Jews and Czechs, etc.), it is not so much the net as the total migration which counts. The ratios of all war-induced migrations into and from the various countries per thousand of the pre-war population vary from over 150 in Poland and 140 in Germany to about from 40 to 70 in the Balkan countries. Hungary, Great Britain, Sweden, and Spain have the lowest ratios. These computations seem to be rather conservative if one considers that, for example, the mobility ratio for all German cities of 50,000 or more inhabitants in the peak year of 1928 was 197 per thousand (R. Heberle and Fritz Meyer, *Die Gross-Städte im Strome der Binnenwander-*

ung [Leipzig: Hirzel, 1937], p. 92), while the ratios for the period 1900-1912 ranged between 278 and 365 per thousand. A complete coverage of all migrations within national boundaries and across national boundaries in Axis countries and Axis-controlled areas within a given year might result in much higher ratios than those given in *Population Index*. Kulischer has refrained from the computation of relative measures.

The forcible population transfers in Axis-controlled areas were largely motivated by the policy of the Nazis to "purge" Germany and the occupied territories of Jews and other "inferior" people and to consolidate the German elements in eastern Europe. This policy, it seems safe to say, has been a success only in its destructive aspects. The second motivation—the labor demands of the German war economy—has become more and more predominant.

Kulischer, in the concluding chapter, points out that the repatriation of these millions and the readjustment of population to resources and employment opportunities will be one of the primary problems of postwar policy. It cannot be solved by a mere return to unregulated migration or to immigration restrictions. Plans need to be made and an organization has to be set up to provide these people with the bare necessities of life and to direct their repatriation or resettlement. Since the labor requirements in European countries will not be the same as in pre-war years, very considerable permanent changes in population distribution may result.

These are not merely European problems; they concern every country in the world that may become the goal of postwar migration. If full employment is to be achieved, it can be attained only by a world-wide migration policy through international collaboration. Kulischer's book may be considered as a first, and very important, step toward the formulation of such policy.

RUDOLF HEBERLE

Louisiana State University

Population Problems. By WARREN S. THOMPSON. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1942. Pp. xi+471. \$4.00.

This new edition of a work on population which is perhaps the most used and quoted on this continent is assured a welcome from teachers everywhere. A few changes in the order of the chapters will cause the reader familiar with

the 1936 edition only momentary difficulty in finding his way through the volume. There has been extensive re-writing of small portions of the text, addition here and there of references to the fact of World War II, and inclusion of some figures from the 1940 census.

The attainment of superficial topicality, however, is less impressive than the way in which the addition or removal of chapters can be seen as indicating fundamental changes of outlook among students of population. These developments of scholarly thought are in turn reflections of developments in American society.

Perhaps because the rapidity of technological and social change has enforced more dynamic thinking, we find the treatment of the optimum theory reduced from a chapter and half a page to just half a page. Part of the debate on the advantages and disadvantages of the city is omitted in the new edition. Four chapters for the city was perhaps a little out of proportion even ten years ago, and criticism of metropolitan life on economic and social grounds has been partly outdated by some materialization of the movement away from the cities which it advocated. A new chapter on internal migration treats a problem to which the wanderings of the thirties first draw attention and to which wartime movements currently give prominence. Sudden internal movements attendant upon development of particular resources or in reaction to economic dislocation have occurred before; there has always been a steady flow from areas of high rates of reproduction and low economic opportunity to places where reproduction is low and opportunity high, but the interest of the citizen as well as of the demographer was until lately focused on the migrants from overseas.

Reflections of the changing currents of economic discussion characterize the new chapter on the economics of a stationary or declining population. Classical economics is replaced by Keynesian. Recognizing that investment is the mainspring of our economic processes, Thompson sees a declining population not as lessening the burden which land has to support but rather as causing unemployment in the capital goods industries and stagnation all around. Depopulation is in fact not an idle speculation; 1940 showed 2,800,000 fewer children under ten years of age than 1930.

Arising logically from the foregoing is the addition of two new chapters on policy. First,

the developments in foreign countries—France, Italy, Sweden, the Soviet Union, Germany, and Japan—are taken up, and the results obtained are measured and evaluated as far as data allow. This is followed, at the close of the book, by an outline of possible policy for the United States. Though rather self-conscious and failing to base its goals on as clear an analysis of the general value milieu as the Myrdals have worked out, the discussion indicates a stage in the emergence of population on this continent as something that somebody should do something about. Continued diffusion of family limitation patterns has made those aware of the facts feel that the direction of action is not purely a matter of individual value judgments.

The features which have gained such merited praise for the earlier editions still dominate in this edition. The contributions of the author in the analysis of census and vital statistics data dealing with the composition of the population, birth and death differentials and trends, and the projection of populations into the future on the basis of assumptions as to age-specific rates seem as outstanding as ever. The superb workmanship of the statistical treatment, however, does not always carry over into the theoretical parts. One may fail to be convinced by an argument (pp. 276-77) which concedes that the Javanese, the Indians, and the Chinese are as crowded as the Japanese, the Germans, and the Italians but would acknowledge claims to new lands only of the group which is conscious of its position and threatens force to improve it. There is throughout the implication that only absolute monopoly or complete autarchy can provide secure support for populations, where more consideration might be given to the possibility of peaceful international trade. On the other hand, Thompson's consistently negative views on positive eugenics through successive editions have been justified by the declining prestige of the doctrines of which he has been one of the severest critics.

NATHAN KEYFITZ

*Dominion Bureau
of Statistics*

Jewish Population Studies. Edited by SOPHIA M. ROBINSON. ("Jewish Social Studies," No. 3.) New York: Conference on Jewish Relations, 1943. Pp. xvi+189. \$3.50.

This is a demographic study of Jewish population in ten American communities, namely: Buffalo, Chicago, Detroit, Minneapolis, New London, Norwich, Passaic, Pittsburgh, San Francisco, and Trenton. No study of New York or of any community in the South is included. Most of the studies have been undertaken independently by various authors, three of them by the editor herself.

Accordingly, the aims of the Studies, as well as the techniques used, vary widely. Nonetheless, certain results are common to all the studies and lend themselves to cautious generalizations. We can mention here only a few. The age composition of the Jews is different from that of the general population, there being somewhat fewer in the younger age groups. However, foreign-born Jews tend to have larger families than native-born Jews; workers, larger families than professionals. The Jews become naturalized faster than most other ethnic groups with a large percentage of foreign-born. The percentage of foreign-born among the Jewish population increases with the size of the Jewish community as well as with the size of the community at large. Jews, like other ethnic groups, tend to concentrate in certain sections of cities.

The most interesting difference between the Jews and the remainder of the population is with regard to occupational status. The Jews have about 12 per cent of the gainfully employed in the professions as over against only 6.7 per cent of all the gainfully employed persons in 1930; yet the percentage of Jews in the professions is as low as 8.5 per cent in Chicago. (If, indeed, the use of death certificates as a source for demographic data—the technique employed in the Chicago study—is not responsible for the result.) The proportion of Jews in trade varies from 43 per cent in Passaic to 60 per cent in Pittsburgh; the proportion in manufacture, from 13 per cent in Trenton to 35 per cent in Chicago, as compared with 12.5 per cent of the general population engaged in trade and 30 per cent of the general population engaged in manufacture.

The conclusions of the editor are especially valuable, both with regard to a comparative evaluation of the techniques employed and with regard to suggestions for further research. Yet, two fundamentally critical remarks should be made. It is highly questionable whether the higher proportion of Jews in the professions is but "another reflection of the accommodation of a minority group in a culture in which the

professions command higher prestige than does trade or skilled labor." Nowhere is the businessman higher esteemed than in America. Furthermore, the element of self-employment which characterizes the professions as well as it does trade is by no means "attractive to minority groups" as such. It is not attractive to such large minority groups as Negroes or Poles or Italians. It is only attractive to certain minority groups, such as Japanese or Jews. To apply too readily findings which are true to a specific minority group only to minority groups in general obscures rather than clarifies the picture which we want to gain about this specific group.

WERNER J. CAHNMAN

Fisk University

War and Education. By PORTER SARGENT.
Boston: The Author, 1943. Pp. 506. \$4.00.

This is indubitably a bad book: it is honest, outspoken, boisterous, iconoclastic, discordant, and disconcertingly well documented; it is impatient of sham and hypocrisy, intolerant of stupidity, indiscreet in its exposure of rascality, undiplomatic in its mention of powerful men and entrenched interests, and unchivalric in its attitude toward the sacred cows; it quotes such characters as Brooks Adams, John Dewey, Charles Beard, William R. Harper, George Bernard Shaw, Joseph Stalin, Mark Twain, Franklin, Eleanor, and Theodore Roosevelt, and others who have at times been outspoken in regard to flagrant abuses and simian stupidities; it treats without awe or reverence the antiscientific fulminations of the humanists and other clerics of medieval persuasion, including President Hutchins and Walter Lippmann; it is almost rude in its attitude toward frustrated but verbally uninhibited literary gentlemen, "learned in unessential things," who pontificate in the learned and literary journals; it points out that men who call themselves scientists sometimes abandon the methods of science when they leave the laboratory; it wonders if the confused and conflicting pronouncements of the college administrators as to the nature and purpose of education really betray a somewhat muddled state of mind on the part of the pedagogues; it quotes both gleeful and dolorous statements of college presidents on the curiously capricious veridicality of the members of the tribe and notes that their peccadilloes are not always due to native inclination; it quotes Karl Mannheim on the contemporary mania for

facts which diverts sociologists from possibly useful activity; it sympathizes with the professors who "preach democratic theories in a matrix of practices often as oligarchic or dictatorial as the Spartan or Nazi states"; it quotes Dean Pound's statement that the punishment for the harboring or expressing of an unorthodox economic or political view is more sure and swift than punishment for murder; it holds the doctrine that the irresponsible bandying of such shibboleths as "democracy," "fascism," and "communism" blinds men to the fact that the control of power and the uses of technology are becoming increasingly centralized; it ignores the fact that men do not want to be disturbed by deeply discouraging statements about the social situation and impending trends or by demands for the suppression of abuses; it denies that the profit motive provides a complete explanation of human behavior; it agrees with Dewey that a scientific habit of mind with its concomitant distrust of authority should be the goal of education in a society where the only constant is change; it damns the English "public schools," the deadwood of our college faculties, the anachronisms of our liberal arts curriculums "inadequately changed since the Middle Ages," the absence of practiced democracy in the schools, and the denial of academic freedom in the colleges; it wastes munitions by using heavy artillery in destroying pests who merit only a squirt of flit; it notes that adjustment to the environment is essential to the existence of life and that the failure to make essential adjustments is putting an intolerable strain on the social structure; it is on the side of science but is unappreciative and treats with levity the point of view of the Harvard Professor of Cockroaches who refused to consider Professor Eigenmann's monograph on "The Antennae of Palaeozoic Cockroaches" as part requirement for the doctorate because "Harvard University was not interested in the antennae, that it was interested only in the thorax" of palaeozoic cockroaches; it insists that "the chief end of man is the head end, though frequently that is the dead end," and advocates the heretical doctrine that men, like the woodpeckers, should learn to use their heads.

Obviously, a book that raucously blurts out chunks of raw truth is a bad book; it should not be allowed on the library shelves—it should be kept in circulation.

E. B. REUTER

University of Iowa

Mill and Mansion. By JOHN COOLIDGE. New York: Columbia University Press, 1942. Pp. xi+261. \$3.75.

This hundred-page architectural essay, tenth in the "Columbia Studies in American Culture," carries the subtitle: *A Study of Architecture and Society in Lowell, Massachusetts, 1820-1865*. The essay is followed by some hundred and fifty pages of appendixes, accumulated footnotes, illustrations, and notes on illustrations. One emerges from the struggle to pull together the dispersed materials with a fairly vivid picture of the architectural, social, and ecological development of this famous early cotton-manufacturing town.

The main essay is a good, straightforward development of a novel thesis in the interpretation of nineteenth-century American architecture, which is seen not as a series of unrelated and sterile revivals (Greek, Gothic, and Italian) but as a vital and logical development and use of new "romantic" elements, fit to satisfy emerging social and architectural demands for ornament and display. The detailed analysis of this development in Lowell is full of insight and has all the vivid informativeness of a study of a limited complex in which fine illustrations are keyed to page and line of the text. It seems that, following the early prideful paternalistic building of mill and mansion and workmen's homes in the formal tradition of the eighteenth century, buildings disposed for convenience and discipline and respectability, there came first a mere impact of romanticism in architecture, after 1835, and then, with its full flowering after 1845, the striking transition from an architecture that was simple and utilitarian to one that was no longer chiefly concerned with shelter but was itself an "expressive language." The author, in tracing the development of this new language in architecture, suggests a sort of social psychology of attitudes, keyed to the fast-developing class levels of a growing industrial city. To the sociologist this is one of the most interesting features of the work. Thus, the pride of capitalistic achievement, class rivalry, and the rivalry of mill and mill, in the advanced period after 1845, are expressed in a hierarchy of architectural styles, corresponding to social and industrial position. The "temple house" of the Greek Revival is seen as sufficiently boastful and grand for the wealthy class, who first take it up and from whom—as is the case with most styles—it later moves downward in the class scale. The elabo-

rate house of the Gothic Revival is seen as too picturesque for the stolid, common-sense entrepreneur of Lowell and is abandoned to the "intellectual left wing." A later, simpler Gothic cottage, however, becomes the favorite of the lower middle class. The ease of adapting the new Italian manner to the always popular "snob-bism" of the square house is accounted one key to its wide acceptance. The more refined and reserved adaptations of revival types pointed out by the author stand out in the fine photographs he provides as refined faces in a mixed crowd; and the hybrid barbarisms in their most ill-adapted forms appear in the meanest streets. Nor is this type of interpretation by the author confined to domestic architecture. Behind the details of the High Romantic manner, added to old barnlike factories as time goes on, he sees inevitable gestures expressive of the sense of the importance, significance, and respectability of Lowell's industry.

These intimations that certain types of architecture are accepted and rejected by given classes and levels of society and are expressive of given social attitudes and values, though suggested rather than developed in this work, are more novel than the story of the rise and decline of company housing which is injected into prefatory chapters, appendix, and long footnotes. It would seem, too, that the author looks back too nostalgically to a paternalism accompanied by early strikes, black lists, and overcrowding—a paternalism which easily crumbled under the impact of immigrant labor and the onrush of the true industrial revolution after the mid-century. Again, the homily at the end of the concluding chapter follows up the claim that the early company housing was provided as a "human right," with the not too defensible claim that government housing projects today, admittedly necessary, are proceeding not in that spirit but in the *fin de siècle* spirit of charity offered the destitute. This seems as out of key with the cool, clear analysis of architectural development as is the use of emotionally loaded terms such as "boondoggling," "professorial reformers," and "political expediency" in referring to these projects. One might have wished, too, a less continual use of the terms "proletarian" and "bourgeois" with reference to class alignments in a New England town of ante-bellum days.

Other rewarding studies of a single architectural complex should follow this one; and the implicit suggestion here of a sociology of ar-

chitecture might well be the object of new sociological research.

EUGENIA LEA WHITRIDGE

University of Chicago

William James: The Man and the Thinker—Addresses Delivered at the University of Wisconsin in Celebration of the Centenary of His Birth. By MAX C. OTTO, DICKINSON S. MILLER, NORMAN CAMERON, JOHN DEWEY, BOYD H. BODE, and J. SEELYE BIKLER, with Introductions by GEORGE C. SELLERY and CLARENCE A. DYKSTRA. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1942. Pp. 147.

In Commemoration of William James, 1842-1942. Edited by H. M. KALLEN. New York: Columbia University Press, 1942. Pp. xii+234. \$2.75.

That William James was one of the half-dozen greatest thinkers whom this country has had up to now, scarcely any well-informed person will deny; nor will well-informed sociologists deny that he exercised an important seminal influence upon the development of our science as well as upon the related disciplines of psychology, social psychology, and philosophy. It is natural and fitting that his life and achievements should be commemorated by numerous papers and addresses during the centenary year of his birth; some of those papers are collected in the two volumes with which this review note is concerned. As is usual in such cases, the papers so collected are of quite unequal value. Those in the volume edited by Dr. Kallen seemed to the reviewer to be, in most cases, unduly affected by their authors' ambition to demonstrate that they were keen enough to discern shortcomings in the philosophy of the man whose work they were celebrating; the volume is, accordingly, of interest primarily to professional philosophers. The University of Wisconsin volume is somewhat better; the paper by Professor Otto is excellent. John Dewey is represented by rather brief papers in both volumes, and these, as one might expect, are particularly stimulating.

While critical and analytical papers on the work of a great thinker doubtless serve a useful purpose, the student of sociology who wishes to profit from the work of William James will be well advised to devote his time and energy chiefly to the master's own works, including

both the *Principles of Psychology* and the collected volumes of his philosophical essays, which are eminently readable. For his life and personality the two volumes of his published *Letters*, edited, with informative biographical notes, by his son Henry James, are still the best source.

FLOYD N. HOUSE

University of Virginia

Goals and Desires of Man: A Psychological Survey of Life. By PAUL SCHILDER. New York: Columbia University Press, 1942. Pp. xii+305. \$4.00.

An impatient philosopher once elicited a round of applause from his assembled colleagues by proclaiming that "a stick is a stick." Such justification as may exist for so modest a contribution to human wisdom is to be found in the complex, bewildering, and unserviceable technical definitions of a stick offered by the preceding metaphysicians on the program.

Dr. Schilder, presenting in a posthumous volume his final say on the nature of the psychology of man, returns in the manner of the above philosopher in the direction of common sense and arrives at conclusions which possess much value on their own account and which have additional merit in view of the preceding stages of the psychoanalytic movement. He has come through and beyond Freud and also beyond many of Freud's successors so far that, except for some vestiges which betray his intellectual history, he approaches substantial agreement with modern social psychology. Freud's "death instinct," for example, is thrown out in a refutation, the length of which could only be justified by the amount of acceptance this concept has achieved. Homosexuality and sadomasochism are reinterpreted as much more developments of the social personality in interaction with others than is traditional in the orthodox field. Sex comes in for some reinterpretation, also, and emerges as less basic in the organization of the person. Work and construction are seen as equally fundamental desires of man. The functioning of social relations is recognized in a way which is in much closer agreement with modern sociology than is ordinarily expected in the membership of Schilder's profession.

In spite of these encouraging indications of enlightenment, there are some points in which interpretations of cases reflect the earlier preju-

dices of the author. Among them is a conspicuous tendency to attribute to all mankind the reactions he found in what appears to be a highly selected sample of overprotected and prudish middle-class Viennese. Of such a group it may be true that they "encounter a considerable difficulty in infancy when they try to orient themselves concerning their sex parts" and that among the many problems for each boy there are "difficulties in comparing [his sex organs] with the sex parts of other boys as to size, consistency, and color." Again, it is surely not universal that "psychological problems of great importance participate in this astonishment"—the astonishment of boys over the size of the male sex organ. Schilder refers to a group of seven men of the ages between nineteen and thirty who did not know that women lactated only after childbirth. Generalizations drawn from such an exceptionally ignorant group would surely not apply to persons from, let us say, a dairy farming region.

The discussion, together with previous works, however, is offered as an integrated statement of psychology. It appears rather to be the work of a man in transition. If he could have lived and progressed a few more years, a more satisfactory unity might have been achieved.

The essentials are conveniently brought into thirty-two statements in a brief concluding chapter. There is an index and a selected bibliography which seems somewhat limited and unbalanced in view of the large scope of the discussion.

ROBERT E. L. FARIS

Syracuse University

Messiahs: Their Role in Civilization. By WILSON D. WALLIS. Washington: American Council on Public Affairs, 1943. Pp. 217. \$2.50 (paper); \$3.00 (cloth).

This book deals with one of the most far-reaching concepts in social history: the role of the messiah. But the treatment of this fascinating topic is deplorably inadequate. A wealth of material is displayed, but in a sketchy way and without integration.

Such integration could have been provided in either of two ways: according to social-psychological classification or according to social-historical sequence. But neither one of these ways has been followed. In terms of social psychology, nothing has been done to clarify the

concept of the Messiah as an example of charismatic leadership born of social distress. Messiahs, so called, who were already in a position of power when they promoted themselves to divine status have not been held apart from visionaries whose messianic fervor was expected to transform humiliation and despair into the glorious kingdom of the Lord. Certainly, al-Hākīm, who had been hereditary ruler of Egypt and caliph of the Faithful for many years prior to his self-declaration as Mahdi, cannot be confounded with Solomon Molcho, who, trying to persuade Charles V to have him raise a Jewish army for the redemption of the Holy Land, was delivered to the Inquisition. No clear distinction is made between mere impostors and ardent believers, and none between political preachers and pietistic escapists.

In terms of social history the lack of integration stands out even more startlingly. The conception and the very word "messiah" (*Mashiach*) are of biblical origin, and subsequent social movements, therefore, cannot properly be called "messianic" if they are not directly or indirectly derived from, or connected with, biblical or koranic tradition. Accordingly, the chapters on "Messiahs in Preliterate Cultures" and on the "Return of the Culture Hero," no matter of how much interest they might be to the social psychologist, are utterly out of bond with the historical development of messianic thought as envisaged by the social historian. Umhlaaza among the Bantu and Condorcanqui in Peru may be regarded as charismatic leaders and as such compared to messiahs, but they are neither messiahs nor even pseudo-messiahs themselves. On the other hand, the legends about the return of King Arthur or Barbarossa do belong to the history of messianism because of their acculturative significance, which, however, is hardly mentioned by the author. Why the prophets of the millennium are included in the story, while the medieval mystics who proclaimed the advent of the age of the Holy Spirit are excluded, is not clear. The latter seems to be simply an omission. The greatest omission is that socialism and communism, both Christian and Marxian, are not even mentioned, although they constitute the foremost messianic movement of our time. Hitler's movement, in fine, although registered, is not grasped in its character as a hybrid of gigantic dimensions and is treated in one breath with the movements of Baal Shem-Tob and Joseph Smith, the veneration of Quetzalcoatl, and the rest. In short, the

whole book, to be more than a stimulation, should be re-written from the first to the last line.

WERNER J. CAHNMAN

Fisk University

The Devil and the Jews: The Medieval Conception of the Jew and Its Relation to Modern Antisemitism. By JOSHUA TRACHTENBERG. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1943. Pp. xiv + 279. \$3.50.

Dr. Trachtenberg's book is a profound study in human prejudice and a welcome sign of the growing realism in Jewish scholarship in general and in the interpretation of anti-Semitism in particular. Religious and racial antagonisms, such as anti-Semitism, have too often been regarded as mere "backwardness" which could, and should, either be preached out of existence or else planned away by means of millennial economic improvement. Or else anti-Semitism has been treated as "just another minority problem which will disappear if. . . ." Dr. Trachtenberg realizes that the evil is much too deep-seated for a surface treatment such as this; he knows that it is based on a long and consistent tradition of emotions and an ingrained symbolization. He approaches the problem as would a cultural psychoanalyst. He exposes the medieval concept of the Jew in an attempt to show that modern anti-Semitism still stems largely from the same root.

The discovery, far from pleasant, is substantiated by the quotation of authorities from the Church Fathers to Luther and by a wealth of truly horrible illustrations. The picture which emerges is this: The Jew, in not accepting the self-evident truth of Christ the Redeemer and in stubbornly enduring discrimination because of this nonacceptance, makes himself suspected of a superhuman and antihuman perversion of mind. He is waiting for his messiah who can only be the Anti-Christ. He is plotting for his coming. He is poisoning wells, bewitching girls, murdering children, and conspiring with the worst enemies of Christendom. The ghetto pallor of his cheeks is proof that he is in desperate need of miraculous elixirs derived from innocent blood. Every crime and immorality, conceivable and inconceivable, is laid at his door. Whatever is done, by good Christians, with him and against him, is done in justifiable self-defense against the terribly threatening

hidden foe which must needs be directing him. To the medieval observer, it cannot be otherwise than that he is inspired by, and in alliance with, the devil, that he represents the true "synagogue of satan." Yes, on closer looks, he has horns and tail, a hooked nose and a goat's beard, and he is riding to hell on a sow's back! The devil himself is a Jew, and the Jew is his disciple and favorite son. He is the spirit of negation. He is "Devil Incarnate."

Look, how everything he does fits into this picture! Since Joseph of Egypt he is an interpreter of dreams and an uncanny schemer, since Moses and Aaron he is a sorcerer and a killer of the first-born. He is at home in magic and medicine. Whatever he does is smart and sinister at the same time. If the ailing finances of the state or the ailing body of a potentate are cured by a Jewish banker or a Jewish doctor—magic was in the cards; if they are not, all the more proof that the Jew's mind is eternally bent upon undermining Christian society and bodily destroying every Christian who is foolish enough to put his trust in him. It is revealing to the social psychologist who is trained in perspectivistic thinking to see how even the medical profession, supposedly the most altruistic among the professions of higher learning, can appear, on a changed plane of observation, as nothing but the most smartly selected conveyance of murderous instincts! What an object lesson could this be to those who propose to study "only the facts" without ever considering the observer!

The story is magnificently told, but, unfortunately, the author does not carry his own case to its logical conclusion. He calls anti-Semitism irrational and yet establishes its rationale more clearly than many anti-Semites have done. The fact is that we are easily inclined to decry as irrational what does not fit into our own mold of thinking. We are loath to realize that what sounds highly irrational to one observer may appear as logic pure and simple if one only changes the premises. Asks Dr. Trachtenberg:

How can one believe that all Jews are at the same time Communists and capitalists, in the face of the obvious untenability of all such generalizations, in the face of the well-known lower middle class and proletarian economy and general poverty of the Jewish masses, in the face, indeed, of the logical contradiction inherent in the dual characterization?

And he concludes:

The attempt to prove, logically and statistically, that this is not so, can quite apparently make no impression upon minds that are blind *ab initio* to the all-too-evident truth of the matter.

But what if it *can* be proved, logically and statistically, that Jews are both Communists and capitalists? That they have produced both Marx and Rothschild? That Marx himself believed that his Communist doctrine was but the Hegelian antithesis to Ricardo's capitalistic thesis? That actually both communism and capitalism are the outgrowth of an urban civilization which has been destructive of folkways and folk societies everywhere? What does it matter, then, that non-Jews, likewise, have been both Communists and capitalists under similar circumstances? The apparently self-evident "truth of the matter" is that they have been seduced by the devilish Jewish seducer, if one only accepts the premises.

At this point, the question would have posed itself: What are the premises? Why is it that the Jew has been conceived of as a demonic foe, to be feared by every good soul? Dr. Trachtenberg points to the clue of the problem when he reproduces, on page 16, Gustave Doré's stupendous cartoon on the Wandering Jew. Yet, although Dr. Trachtenberg does not say so, it is obvious what the image of the Wandering Jew conveys. The Wandering Jew is the symbol of a ghost-people without a country who, having survived against the laws of nature and history, must have been supported by the forces of evil. To remain blind to the truth of prophecy and redemption, to condemn and kill the redeemer, to fall captive to the Roman Emperor, to carry the curse which accompanies the exiled wanderer upon all the highroads of this globe without ever attaining the status that goes along with landownership, and still to remain stiff-necked, nonconformist, and convinced of being the chosen people, must have appeared as monstrous abnormality to the mind of peasant peoples and their descendants. From the premises of both Christian truth and pagan reality, there was no other solution: the Jew's curse contained at the same time his hope because he was possessed by Satan.

Dr. Trachtenberg has not anchored his thesis firmly enough, but he has also not carried it far enough ahead. And, yet, the relation between the medieval conception of the Jew and

modern anti-Semitism, which is now hardly more than a promise on the title-page, could have been very convincingly established upon the very foundation erected in his book. A host of quotations from the anti-Semitic literature of the eighteenth, nineteenth, and twentieth centuries, starting with Eisenmenger's *Entdecktes Judenthum* and ending with the *Protocols of the Elders of Zion* and the pamphlet literature of the Nazis, would have offered themselves to fortify the case. As it is, this necessary second part of the book has barely been sketched in a stunted last chapter which bears the title: "Still the Devil's Own." It is too bad that the author has closed the historical account with Martin Luther instead of following it up to Adolf Hitler. He has omitted telling us how modern anti-Semitism, now unreservedly pagan and thoroughly anti-Christian, comes to fight Christianity relentlessly with the weapons forged by Christianity itself. Too bad that he, less logical than his adversaries, stops short of the conclusive proof of his own premises.

WERNER J. CAHNMAN

Fisk University

Plantation Life in the Florida Parishes of Louisiana, 1836-1846, as Reflected in the Diary of Bennet H. Barrow. By EDWIN ADAMS DAVIS. New York: Columbia University Press, 1943. Pp. xvi+457. \$5.00.

The Arkansas Plantation, 1920-1942. By DONALD CRICHTON ALEXANDER. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1943. Pp. 118.

These two books offer comparison and contrast between the ante-bellum and the contemporary southern plantation systems. The old plantation is approached through the medium of the diary of a planter, Bennet H. Barrow, as edited by Professor Davis, a historian at Louisiana State University. The study of the contemporary plantation is an economic and social analysis of the institution in the context of federal agricultural policy since the first World War. It is the work of a senior undergraduate student of the class of 1942 at Yale University, and for the study the author was awarded the Patterson Prize in American Politics. Barrow in his diary writes naïvely and without the expectation of an audience. Alexander writes a little self-consciously and at times a little dogmatically for a northern audience.

Davis in his Introduction remarks that no study of the "psychology" of the southern planter has yet been made. Studies of personality in relationship to divisions of labor have given us books on the teacher, the waitress, the political boss, and other social types, but no one has yet utilized the rather large number of biographies, autobiographies, and diaries of particular planters to give us a general picture of the type which so strongly impressed itself upon the form of southern society and did so much to define the region. When such a study is made, diaries like that of Barrow's will furnish the most important material. This is the sort of literature in which the plantation's fundamental quality of naturalness is best revealed. Between the lines one can glimpse a culture in which there is a strong sense of house and of kinship. Motives and purposes are all the more dominating because they are taken for granted. The planter's assumption of superiority and mastership are the overtones of his type and character.

It is not very surprising that a planter who could on occasion severely flog and "stake down" a slave for as long as twelve or fifteen hours at a stretch could write "so far have never injured any human to my knowledge," since Negroes were not regarded as exactly human, but it is surprising that Davis appears to agree with the statement (p. 67).

Alexander's account of the contemporary plantation contains little that is new. The planter as a personality is still very much in the picture, but, to an extent that was not true of his ante-bellum ancestor, he seems to be subordinated to the play of vast impersonal forces national and international in scope over which he has little or no control. Arkansas planters, like Mr. Barrow earlier, have to contend with the uncertainties of weather, finance, and market, but now there are new uncertainties with which they have to contend. The age of *laissez faire* is past, and the policies of Congress and the Administration will have much to do with the plantation's future. What happens in the machine shops and laboratories of scientists and inventors may also be crucial. "The planter himself," Alexander concludes, "will have little to say about the matter."

EDGAR T. THOMPSON

Duke University

Delaware's Forgotten Folk: The Story of the Moors and Nanticokes. By C. A. WESLAGER. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1943. Pp. xiv+215. \$2.50.

The Moors and Nanticokes are mixed-blood people who live in certain rural communities in the state of Delaware. By dint of in-marriage, clannishness in their social life generally, and adherence to a folkish way of living, they have managed to keep clear of complete identification with America's lower caste, the Negroes. In at least one of the communities a sort of national revival assured the local people legal identification as Indians. This identification seems to rest on as good physical grounds as would their classification as either white or Negro.

Like other such groups in this country, they seem to be able to retain their special position just so long as they stay at home and so long as they need not fill out government documents. Birth records, school certificates, draft registration cards—all that is written, formal and official—these are their enemies. For such documents in this country break down all the special categories which grow up informally and locally and enforce the strict dichotomy of white and colored. Cities, as these people know, are "hell-bent" for documents. But cities also offer anonymity for those Nanticokes and Moors who prefer to be whites at the cost of the warm life among kin.

The author presents all that he could find on the origin of these groups, distinguishing fact from legend, but not neglecting the social significance of the legends. In addition, he tells of their present life and struggles and gives some account of the folk medicine and other customs. He probably overworks a little the thesis that the presence of many customs of Indian origin supports their contention that they should be treated as Indians. For many of the cultural items mentioned are found in most rural American communities of the eastern part of the country. The reviewer in his boyhood made and played with bull-roarers and corn-cob darts of the kind described and heard many of the beliefs, legends, and remedies—all in a community that had no people who claimed Indian origins. Perhaps it is the irony of America that some of its racially mixed groups should—by force of involuntary and sometimes voluntary isolation—retain in its purest extant form what is the nearest thing to an indigenous,

rather folkish, rural culture ever developed among English-speaking Americans. Indeed, in the sense of having become a breed, they may also be among the purest racially.

The author of this interesting addition to the literature on American racial and cultural islands claims to be an amateur. Certainly one part of the job of sociology is to fill out the gaps in our knowledge of the varieties of people and culture in this country. In many countries amateurs have done much of such description and analysis of regional and local cultures. We could do with more such work in this country. And perhaps Mr. Weslager, who has evidently spent years studying these groups, will not consider his amateur standing jeopardized by the remark that he has become a connoisseur.

EVERETT C. HUGHES

University of Chicago

Race and Rumors of Race. By HOWARD W. ODUM. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1943. Pp. viii+245. \$2.00.

Odum's work represents an attempt to portray the most recent patterns of conflict and accommodation between Negro and white by means of an informal chronicle of "rumors of race." The author points to war-induced factors as precipitating conflict through disturbance of previously established modes of adjustment. The critical nature of this conflict is mirrored in the extravagance and ubiquity of race rumors—not to say the ignorance they bespeak.

Odum recalls the flavor of Sumner in arguing that the strongly conditioned folkways of the South must be considered in any program directed toward the resolution of racial patterns of segregation with the democratic credo. This, in turn, brings him dangerously close at times to the hypostatization of "evolution" so that it becomes in itself a dynamic factor rather than a name for a perceived pattern of events.

In a summary chapter, "The Way Out and the Way On," Odum calls for a bi-racial leadership that can strike a golden mean between the heedless urging of pro-democratic reforms regardless of the folkways and stateways of the southern people and the philistine resistance to any constructive program characteristic of those who want to be left alone—in a position of dominance.

GWYNNE NETTLER

Stanford University

Three Types of Rural Economy in Yunnan. By YU-I LI, HSIAO-TUNG FEI, and TSE-I CHANG. New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1943. Pp. 35.

Magic and Science in Western Yunnan. By FRANCIS L. K. HSU. New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1943. Pp. 53.

War has driven the universities of China out of the relatively urbanized east into the "wild west." Like other pioneers, the Chinese professors and their students have had to leave behind them much of their precious academic paraphernalia and have had, in some measure, to live off the country. Whatever the losses of these forced moves may have been—and undoubtedly they have been tragically great—one of the gains has been the work of the Yenching-Yunnan Station for Sociological Research. For the professors and students of this institution in exile are deploying their forces in the towns and villages of Yunnan Province the better to observe and analyze this hitherto neglected part of China.

Two of the field studies which have resulted from their work are reported in the two small monographs commented upon in this review.

The three types of rural economy treated in the monograph by that name differ as to the kinds of agriculture, even more so in the distribution of land among various classes of families, and perhaps most in the amount, kind, and functions of auxiliary sources of income. One community has a mixed population of Lolos, an indigenous people, and of Chinese, who came as conquerors some centuries ago. The latter were once the landlords but are losing this privileged position to some extent to the Lolos. The second community is one of petty landowners who do not work at all unless their holdings are so small that they cannot hire others to do it. In the third, certain small industries supplement agriculture. In all three the analysis turns about the relationships of the various kinds of economic enterprise and of the classes of people who live by them. In short, the analysis is realistic and functional, in the strict sense of both these terms; for the parts are seen in relation to the whole and in relation to each other.

In the other monograph are recorded the things that people did in a Yunnan town when cholera broke out. But, in order to tell what people did, the author has to describe the social organization. For the various measures taken to combat the epidemic—neighborhood

prayer meetings run by voluntary committees of citizens and supported by public subscription, municipal decrees concerning water and food, a program of inoculation, etc.—articulate clearly the social structure, as mobilization for collective action must always do. As a result, one sees the native "magic" and the imported modern "science" not merely as contrasting ideologies but both as ways of behaving which may occur together and without any sense of contradiction in some social situations. Indeed, the author believes, on the basis of his evidence, that the introduction of scientific medicine will come more quickly if those who support it recognize this principle and use the social forces of the community to this end without too severe an attack on prevailing practices of healing and prevention of disease.

The significance of these two monographs is greater than that of the new light which they throw upon this region of China, great as that turned out to be for the reviewer. They indicate a new spirit among a certain group of Chinese social scientists—a spirit of adventurous curiosity coupled with the belief that this kind of work will contribute both to a program of social and economic action for China and to that kind of comparison of cultures which leads to international understanding.

Another monograph in the same series, *Labor and Labor Relations in the New Industries of Southwest China*, by Kuo-Hing Shih and Ju-K'ang T'ien, is of equal merit.

It should be mentioned that the kind of work reported in these monographs is not entirely new in China. In 1939 one of the present Yunnan group, Mr. Hsiao-Tung Fei, published *Peasant Life in China: A Field Study of Country Life in the Yangtze Valley*, with a foreword by the late Professor Bronislaw Malinowski (New York: E. P. Dutton). In it Dr. Fei relates the system of land tenure and transference dynamically to the crises which the life-cycle of individuals creates for the producing and consuming family unit, the *chia*.

We salute these young Chinese scholars who have turned hardship and exile into a social and intellectual adventure of great importance.

EVERETT C. HUGHES

University of Chicago

Exploring Tomorrow's Agriculture: Co-operative Group Farming—a Practical Program of Rural Rehabilitation. By JOSEPH W. EATON.

New York and London: Harper & Bros., 1943. Pp. xvi+255. \$2.75.

Like many another writer, Mr. Easton has found that our land of promise did not turn out to be the Promised Land for large segments of our population. Today's agriculture, he finds, falls short of providing an acceptable standard of living for many of our people who look to land for sustenance. This is particularly true of small farm operators. Increased rationalization and mechanization, he feels, is serving to widen the chasm between those who succeed in agriculture and those who do not. So he is prompted to explore tomorrow's agriculture in the form of co-operative group farming, which he considers the best available means of bringing to our less privileged rural folk the benefits associated with more efficient, mechanized production.

The book was prepared under good auspices. Although Mr. Eaton—now in the military services—was director of research with the Rural Settlement Institute, he prepared this study as a doctoral thesis under the supervision of Professor Edmund DeS. Brunner of the department of sociology of Columbia University. The manuscript also received the benefit of criticisms and suggestions from other men prominent in the fields of rural sociology, economics, and agriculture. M. L. Wilson, director of the United States Extension Service, introduces the author's subject with a cautiously worded foreword.

In the Preface the author states that he makes no claim to "objectivity." He began this study "with a hunch that co-operative group farming is a solution of many of America's rural problems, a hunch which was based on his knowledge of the successful operation of this agricultural pattern in Palestine." While he admits the dangers which inhere in this approach, he points out that facts "were not selected to prove the thesis, but they were used to test it." His material is well organized and well documented. Impending military service hastened completion of the book, and in some parts broad questions of policy and administration are covered somewhat hastily and abruptly. Incompleteness and abruptness are most marked in the third and last part of the book, which deals with nongovernment co-operative group farms in America and co-operative group farms operating in certain foreign countries.

The book is divided into three parts: (1) the theory of co-operative group farming as a

method of rural rehabilitation, (2) the co-operative corporation farms of the Farm Security Administration, and (3) other co-operative group farms.

The author submits ten criteria of rural rehabilitation or standards toward which rehabilitation must work. These include adequate and secure income, good working conditions, health, education, and leisure for living. He finds, of course, that many of our small farm units are inadequate to provide these benefits to the operators, and the prospects are, he submits, that increased mechanization will serve merely to increase the struggle for existence of the small farmer with his inefficient production. Hence he suggests that we experiment with other arrangements, such as co-operative group farm patterns.

The author seems to understand how far counter his proposal runs to deep-seated traditional desires and patterns of American farmers. However, he is not the first to question the wisdom and sanctity of "rugged isolation," "physical isolation," and "open shop" organization, so characteristic of our rural areas.

In Part II the author examines twenty-seven co-operative corporation farms which began operating in very recent years under the direction of the Farm Security Administration (the first one in March, 1937, and the last one in January, 1942). When the book was completed, these farms were still going concerns, although the federal appropriation bill for 1943 contained provisions which seriously threatened their existence. Mr. Eaton injected himself into the congressional controversy and reports with satisfaction that he did much to save these projects from extinction. He surmises that these units will continue and explore new patterns of farming. Subsequently, Mr. Eaton was inducted, and Congress in its final appropriation bill required the liquidation of these projects.

To examine the strength and weaknesses of twenty-seven federal co-operative corporation farms is no simple task, particularly when it is undertaken under time limitations. Mr. Eaton does so in 126 pages. This section of the book will meet with the most varied responses and reactions. Most of the projects were in perpetual difficulty from the day of their inception until the day of liquidation. Nevertheless, the author feels that mistakes were being rectified and that results were sufficiently encouraging to warrant the continuation of the projects. His optimism is based more on surmise than on

demonstrated facts. The short life of these units plus the absence of adequate data precludes a reliable, trustworthy evaluation.

In Part III the author presents a brief glimpse of certain nongovernment settlement projects, such as the Saline Valley Farm (Michigan), the Delta and Providence Co-operative farms (Mississippi), and the Macedonia Co-operative Community (Alabama). Here again individual predilections may incline one to declare these projects failures or to hold that they give promise of an agricultural solution. The author takes the latter position.

Utopian co-operative group farming in America receives brief attention in chapters xxv, xxvi, and xxvii. Many readers may be surprised to learn that between two hundred and three hundred of such projects have been undertaken in North America. Most of them were short-lived, but a number of them survived for considerable periods of time. Hutterite communities and the Amana Society are in existence today and are briefly described. Utopian farm settlements usually had strong religious orientation and integration, a quality which cannot be imposed on our government-financed projects.

As pointed out above, the author feels that co-operative group farming holds promise for this country because it succeeded in Palestine. The closing chapter of the book touches briefly on co-operative group farming not only in Palestine but also in Russia and Mexico. It is regrettable that this part of the book was not greatly expanded. Certainly, the material presented on this country is inconclusive and leaves much doubt as to the application of this method of farming here in the foreseeable future.

The author makes the significant observation that, when Russia, Palestine, and Mexico were

faced with serious problems of agricultural adjustment in terms of large groups and masses of people, they chose some form of co-operative farming. This pattern promised the most efficient use of available production facilities, available land, and available technologists. By this method people wholly unfamiliar with new technology in agriculture shortly became efficient producers of food and fiber and did so in competition with more advanced agricultural sections of the world. He holds that the forthcoming rehabilitation program in Europe cannot ignore these demonstrations and that we, in this traditional land of plenty, will also act wisely to explore more fully co-operative group farming with the hope of coping more effectively with our problem of low-income, small farms.

Lest the purpose of the author be misunderstood, it should be emphasized that he does not advocate a wholesale creation of co-operative group farms under government auspices. Mr. Eaton did hope that the co-operative corporation farms of the Farm Security Administration would continue in order to provide us with good laboratories in new patterns of farming. Successful patterns could then serve as blueprints for an expanded agricultural policy.

Mr. Eaton is to be commended for the contribution he has made to our agricultural literature and for giving us the benefit of nongovernment-sponsored research work in a field so largely dominated by numerous old-line state and federal agencies. We need more research and more books of this kind. Workers in the field of agriculture and those who determine policy will gain much by reading this and similar publications.

WALTER M. KOLLMORGEN

Tennessee State Planning Commission

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